2024巴菲特致股东的信
# Charlie Munger – The Architect of Berkshire Hathaway（查理·芒格——伯克希尔哈撒韦的建筑师）
Charlie Munger died on November 28, just 33 days before his 100th birthday. Though born and raised in Omaha, he spent 80% of his life domiciled elsewhere. Consequently, it was not until 1959 when he was 35 that I first met him.
查理·芒格于11月28日去世，距离他的100岁生日仅剩33天。尽管他出生于奥马哈并在那里长大，但他一生中80%的时间居住在其他地方。因此，直到1959年他35岁时，我才第一次见到他。
In 1962, he decided that he should take up money management. Three years later he told me – correctly! – that I had made a dumb decision in buying control of Berkshire. But, he assured me, since I had already made the move, he would tell me how to correct my mistake.
1962年，他决定投身资金管理行业。三年后，他直言不讳地告诉我（事实证明是对的！）——我收购伯克希尔控股权是一个愚蠢的决定。但他向我保证，既然已经迈出这一步，他会告诉我如何纠正这个错误。
In what I next relate, bear in mind that Charlie and his family did not have a dime invested in the small investing partnership that I was then managing and whose money I had used for the Berkshire purchase. Moreover, neither of us expected that Charlie would ever own a share of Berkshire stock.
接下来我要讲述的内容中，请记住：查理及其家人当时并未投入一分钱到我管理的小型投资合伙企业中，而我正是用这笔钱完成了伯克希尔的收购。此外，我们两人都未曾预料到查理日后会持有伯克希尔的股票。
Nevertheless, Charlie, in 1965, promptly advised me: “Warren, forget about ever buying another company like Berkshire. But now that you control Berkshire, add to it wonderful businesses purchased at fair prices and give up buying fair businesses at wonderful prices. In other words, abandon everything you learned from your hero, Ben Graham. It works but only when practiced at small scale.” With much back-sliding I subsequently followed his instructions.
然而，查理在1965年果断建议我：“沃伦，永远别再买像伯克希尔这样的公司了。但既然你已掌控伯克希尔，就收购那些价格合理的好企业吧，放弃那些以极低价格买入普通企业的做法。换句话说，把你从偶像本·格雷厄姆那里学到的一切抛诸脑后。这种方法在小规模时有效，但仅限于此。”尽管我一度反复动摇，但最终还是遵循了他的指导。
Many years later, Charlie became my partner in running Berkshire and, repeatedly, jerked me back to sanity when my old habits surfaced. Until his death, he continued in this role and together we, along with those who early on invested with us, ended up far better off than Charlie and I had ever dreamed possible.
多年后，查理成为我经营伯克希尔的合作伙伴，每当我的旧习惯浮现时，他总会及时将我拉回正轨。直至去世前，他始终扮演这一角色。我们与早期投资者一起，最终取得了远超查理和我当初想象的成就。
In reality, Charlie was the “architect” of the present Berkshire, and I acted as the “general contractor” to carry out the day-by-day construction of his vision.
事实上，查理是今日伯克希尔的“建筑师”，而我则是“总包工头”，负责日复一日地实现他的愿景。
Charlie never sought to take credit for his role as creator but instead let me take the bows and receive the accolades. In a way his relationship with me was part older brother, part loving father. Even when he knew he was right, he gave me the reins, and when I blundered he never – never – reminded me of my mistake.
查理从未试图为自己的创造者角色邀功，反而让我独享赞誉。某种程度上，他与我的关系既是兄长，也是慈父。即便他确信自己正确时，也会把决策权交给我；而当我犯错时，他从未——从未——提起过我的失误。
In the physical world, great buildings are linked to their architect while those who had poured the concrete or installed the windows are soon forgotten. Berkshire has become a great company. Though I have long been in charge of the construction crew; Charlie should forever be credited with being the architect.
在现实世界中，伟大的建筑总是与建筑师的名字相连，而浇筑混凝土或安装窗户的人则很快被遗忘。伯克希尔已成为一家伟大的公司。尽管我长期掌管施工团队，但查理理应永远被视为这座大厦的建筑师。
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.（伯克希尔哈撒韦致全体股东）
# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc
Berkshire has more than three million shareholder accounts. I am charged with writing a letter every year that will be useful to this diverse and ever-changing group of owners, many of whom wish to learn more about their investment.
伯克希尔拥有超过三百万个股东账户。我的职责是每年撰写一封对这群多元化且不断变化的股东（其中许多人希望更深入了解自己的投资）有价值的信件。
Charlie Munger, for decades my partner in managing Berkshire, viewed this obligation identically and would expect me to communicate with you this year in the regular manner. He and I were of one mind regarding our responsibilities to Berkshire shareholders.
查理·芒格曾与我共同管理伯克希尔数十年，他对这一义务的看法与我完全一致，并期望我以惯常方式在今年与各位沟通。在对伯克希尔股东的责任上，我们的观点始终如一。
Writers find it useful to picture the reader they seek, and often they are hoping to attract a mass audience. At Berkshire, we have a more limited target: investors who trust Berkshire with their savings without any expectation of resale (resembling in attitude people who save in order to buy a farm or rental property rather than people who prefer using their excess funds to purchase lottery tickets or “hot” stocks).
作家常会想象自己希望触达的读者，并试图吸引大众。但伯克希尔的目标更为聚焦：将积蓄托付给伯克希尔、且无转售预期的投资者（这类人的态度更像为购买农场或出租房产而储蓄的人，而非偏好用闲钱购买彩票或“热门股票”的人）。
Over the years, Berkshire has attracted an unusual number of such “lifetime” shareholders and their heirs. We cherish their presence and believe they are entitled to hear every year both the good and bad news, delivered directly from their CEO and not from an investor-relations officer or communications consultant forever serving up optimism and syrupy mush.
多年来，伯克希尔吸引了大量这样的“终身”股东及其继承人。我们珍视他们的存在，并认为他们每年都有权直接从CEO这里听到好消息和坏消息，而非通过投资者关系官或公关顾问传递的过度乐观的甜腻言辞。
In visualizing the owners that Berkshire seeks, I am lucky to have the perfect mental model, my sister, Bertie. Let me introduce her.
在想象伯克希尔所追求的股东形象时，我幸运地拥有一个完美的心理模板——我的妹妹伯蒂。让我向各位介绍她。
For openers, Bertie is smart, wise and likes to challenge my thinking. We have never, however, had a shouting match or anything close to a ruptured relationship. We never will.
首先，伯蒂聪明、睿智，且喜欢挑战我的想法。但即便如此，我们从未争吵过，更未让关系濒临破裂。未来也永远不会。
Furthermore, Bertie, and her three daughters as well, have a large portion of their savings in Berkshire shares. Their ownership spans decades, and every year Bertie will read what I have to say. My job is to anticipate her questions and give her honest answers.
此外，伯蒂及其三个女儿将大部分积蓄投入伯克希尔股票。她们的持股已跨越数十年，每年伯蒂都会阅读我的信件。我的职责是预判她的疑问，并给出诚实的回答。
# Operating Results, Fact and Fiction（运营结果：事实与虚构）
Bertie, like most of you, understands many accounting terms, but she is not ready for a CPA exam. She follows business news – reading four newspapers daily – but doesn’t consider herself an economic expert. She is sensible – very sensible – instinctively knowing that pundits should always be ignored. After all, if she could reliably predict tomorrow’s winners, would she freely share her valuable insights and thereby increase competitive buying? That would be like finding gold and then handing a map to the neighbors showing its location.
伯蒂和你们大多数人一样，懂许多会计术语，但还没准备好参加注册会计师考试。她关注商业新闻——每天阅读四份报纸——但她不认为自己是经济专家。她非常理性，本能地知道应该始终忽视所谓的专家意见。毕竟，如果她真能准确预测明日赢家，她会免费分享这些宝贵见解，从而加剧竞争性买入吗？这就像找到金矿后，却把标注位置的地图送给邻居。
Bertie understands the power – for good or bad – of incentives, the weaknesses of humans, the “tells” that can be recognized when observing human behavior. She knows who is “selling” and who can be trusted. In short, she is nobody’s fool.
伯蒂深知激励机制（无论好坏）的力量、人性的弱点，以及观察人类行为时可识别的“破绽”。她知道谁在“推销”，谁值得信赖。简而言之，她绝不会轻易上当受骗。
So, what would interest Bertie this year?
Operating Results, Fact and Fiction
Let’s begin with the numbers. The official annual report begins on K-1 and extends for 124 pages. It is filled with a vast amount of information – some important, some trivial.
那么，今年什么会吸引伯蒂的兴趣？
运营结果：事实与虚构
让我们从数字开始。正式年报从K-1页开始，共124页，包含大量信息——有些重要，有些琐碎。
Among its disclosures many owners, along with financial reporters, will focus on page K-72. There, they will find the proverbial “bottom line” labeled “Net earnings (loss).” The numbers read $90 billion for 2021, ($23 billion) for 2022 and $96 billion for 2023. What in the world is going on?
在披露信息中，许多股东和金融记者会聚焦K-72页。那里列出了俗称为“底线”的“净利润（亏损）”。数据显示：2021年为900亿美元，2022年亏损230亿美元，2023年恢复至960亿美元。这一切究竟意味着什么？
You seek guidance and are told that the procedures for calculating these “earnings” are promulgated by a sober and credentialed Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), mandated by a dedicated and hard-working Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and audited by the world-class professionals at Deloitte & Touche (“D&T”). On page K-67, D&T pulls no punches: “In our opinion, the financial statements . . . present fairly, in all material respects (斜体为我所加), the financial position of the Company . . . and the results of its operations . . . for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2023 . . .”
若您寻求指导，会被告知这些“收益”的计算程序由严谨且权威的美国财务会计准则委员会（“FASB”）制定，受美国证券交易委员会（“SEC”）严格监管，并由德勤会计师事务所（“D&T”）的世界级专业人士审计。在K-67页中，德勤毫不含糊地声明：“我们认为，财务报表...在所有重大方面公允地反映了公司的财务状况...及其运营结果...涵盖截至2023年12月31日的三年期间。”
So sanctified, this worse-than-useless “net income” figure quickly gets transmitted throughout the world via the internet and media. All parties believe they have done their job – and, legally, they have.
这一被权威背书的“净利润”数字随即通过互联网和媒体迅速传播全球。各方均认为自己已尽职责——从法律角度而言确实如此。
We, however, are left uncomfortable. At Berkshire, our view is that “earnings” should be a sensible concept that Bertie will find somewhat useful – but only as a starting point – in evaluating a business. Accordingly, Berkshire also reports to Bertie and you what we call “operating earnings.” Here is the story they tell: $27.6 billion for 2021; $30.9 billion for 2022 and $37.4 billion for 2023.
然而，我们却感到不安。在伯克希尔，我们认为“收益”应是一个理性概念，对伯蒂评估企业具有参考价值——但仅作为起点。因此，伯克希尔还会向伯蒂和各位报告我们定义的“运营利润”。这一数据讲述的故事是：2021年276亿美元，2022年309亿美元，2023年374亿美元。
# 强制性数据与伯克希尔偏好的数据之间的主要差异（The primary difference between the mandated figures and the ones Berkshire prefers）
The primary difference between the mandated figures and the ones Berkshire prefers is that we exclude unrealized capital gains or losses that at times can exceed $5 billion a day. Ironically, our preference was pretty much the rule until 2018, when the “improvement” was mandated. Galileo’s experience, several centuries ago, should have taught us not to mess with mandates from on high. But, at Berkshire, we can be stubborn.
强制性规定数据与伯克希尔偏好的数据之间的主要区别在于，我们排除了未实现的资本损益，这些损益有时单日可能超过50亿美元。讽刺的是，我们的做法直到2018年之前几乎是行业惯例，直到所谓的“改进”被强制推行。数百年前伽利略的经历本应提醒我们不要轻易挑战权威指令，但伯克希尔向来以坚持己见著称。
Make no mistake about the significance of capital gains: I expect them to be a very important component of Berkshire’s value accretion during the decades ahead. Why else would we commit huge dollar amounts of your money (and Bertie’s) to marketable equities just as I have been doing with my own funds throughout my investing lifetime?
切勿低估资本利得的重要性：我认为它们将是伯克希尔未来数十年价值增长的关键。否则，我们为何要将您的资金（和伯蒂的资金）大量投入可交易股票，正如我一生投资所为？
I can’t remember a period since March 11, 1942 – the date of my first stock purchase – that I have not had a majority of my net worth in equities, U.S.-based equities. And so far, so good. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell below 100 on that fateful day in 1942 when I “pulled the trigger.” I was down about $5 by the time school was out. Soon, things turned around and now that index hovers around 38,000. America has been a terrific country for investors. All they have needed to do is sit quietly, listening to no one.
自1942年3月11日（我的首次股票买入日）以来，我不记得有任何时期将净资产的大部分配置在美股之外。到目前为止，结果令人满意。1942年那个命运之日，道琼斯指数跌破100点，我“果断出手”后，放学时账户亏损约5美元。但很快形势逆转，如今该指数已接近38,000点。美国一直是投资者的乐土，他们唯一需要做的就是安静持有，无视噪音。
It is more than silly, however, to make judgments about Berkshire’s investment value based on “earnings” that incorporate the capricious day-by-day and, yes, even year-by-year movements of the stock market. As Ben Graham taught me, “In the short run the market acts as a voting machine; in the long run it becomes a weighing machine.”
然而，若依据包含股市每日甚至每年波动的“收益”来判断伯克希尔的投资价值，则不仅是愚蠢。正如本·格雷厄姆所教导：“短期内市场是投票机，长期则是称重机。”
What We Do
Our goal at Berkshire is simple: We want to own either all or a portion of businesses that enjoy good economics that are fundamental and enduring. Within capitalism, some businesses will flourish for a very long time while others will prove to be sinkholes. It’s harder than you would think to predict which will be the winners and losers. And those who tell you they know the answer are usually either self-delusional or snake-oil salesmen.
我们的目标
伯克希尔的目标很简单：我们希望全资或部分拥有一批具备根本性和持久性良好经济特质的企业。在资本主义体系中，有些企业将长期繁荣，而另一些则会成为无底洞。预测赢家和输家远比想象困难，那些声称能准确预判的人，要么自我欺骗，要么是兜售虚假承诺的骗子。
At Berkshire, we particularly favor the rare enterprise that can deploy additional capital at high returns in the future. Owning only one of these companies – and simply sitting tight – can deliver wealth almost beyond measure. Even heirs to such a holding can – ugh! – sometimes live a lifetime of leisure.
我们尤其青睐那些未来能以高回报配置新增资本的罕见企业。仅持有一家这样的公司并长期持有，就能创造近乎无限的财富。甚至其继承人——呃！——有时也能享受终身闲暇。
We also hope these favored businesses are run by able and trustworthy managers, though that is a more difficult judgment to make, however, and Berkshire has had its share of disappointments.
当然，我们希望这些企业由能干且值得信赖的管理者经营。尽管这一判断更具挑战性，伯克希尔也曾经历过失望时刻。
# 在1863年，美国首任货币监理官Hugh McCulloch的警示（In 1863, Hugh McCulloch, the first Comptroller of the United States, sent a letter to all national banks）
In 1863, Hugh McCulloch, the first Comptroller of the United States, sent a letter to all national banks. His instructions included this warning: “Never deal with a rascal under the expectation that you can prevent him from cheating you.” Many bankers who thought they could “manage” the rascal problem have learned the wisdom of Mr. McCulloch’s advice – and I have as well. People are not that easy to read. Sincerity and empathy can easily be faked. That is as true now as it was in 1863.
1863年，美国首任货币监理官Hugh McCulloch向所有国民银行发出一封信。他的指示中包含一条警示：“永远不要抱着能阻止奸诈之人欺骗你的期望与他们交易。”许多曾认为自己能“管控”奸诈问题的银行家最终都领悟了McCulloch先生建议的智慧——我也如此。人性并不容易被看透，真诚与同理心很容易被伪装。这一点在今日与1863年同样成立。
This combination of the two necessities I’ve described for acquiring businesses has for long been our goal in purchases and, for a while, we had an abundance of candidates to evaluate. If I missed one – and I missed plenty – another always came along.
我此前描述的并购企业所需的两项必要条件的结合，长期以来一直是我们的收购目标。在一段时间内，我们拥有大量可供评估的候选标的。如果我错过了一个——我确实错过很多——总会有另一个出现。
Those days are long behind us; size did us in, though increased competition for purchases was also a factor.
那些日子已成过去。如今的体量限制了我们的选择，尽管并购市场竞争加剧也是一个因素。
Berkshire now has – by far – the largest GAAP net worth recorded by any American business. Record operating income and a strong stock market led to a yearend figure of $561 billion. The total GAAP net worth for the other 499 S&P companies – a who’s who of American business – was $8.9 trillion in 2022. (The 2023 number for the S&P has not yet been tallied but is unlikely to materially exceed $9.5 trillion.)
如今，伯克希尔的按照会计准则计算的净资产规模远超其他美国企业。创纪录的运营利润和强劲的股市推动2023年末净资产达到5610亿美元。其余499家标普500公司（代表美国商界的精英）2022年的合计会计准则净资产为8.9万亿美元（2023年数据尚未完全统计，但预计不会显著超过9.5万亿美元）。
By this measure, Berkshire now occupies nearly 6% of the universe in which it operates. Doubling our huge base is simply not possible within, say, a five-year period, particularly because we are highly averse to issuing shares (an act that immediately juices net worth).
按此衡量，伯克希尔如今占据了其所在商业领域近6%的份额。在五年内让如此庞大的基数翻倍几乎不可能实现，尤其因为我们极度厌恶发行新股（这一行为会立即膨胀净资产）。
There remain only a handful of companies in this country capable of truly moving the needle at Berkshire, and they have been endlessly picked over by us and by others. Some we can value; some we can’t. And, if we can, they have to be attractively priced. Outside the U.S., there are essentially no candidates that are meaningful options for capital deployment at Berkshire. All in all, we have no possibility of eye-popping performance.
如今，美国国内能真正对伯克希尔产生影响的公司仅剩寥寥，且已被我们与他人反复筛选。有些企业我们能评估，有些则不能；即使能评估，它们的价格也必须具备吸引力。美国之外，几乎没有值得伯克希尔配置资本的标的。总而言之，我们已无法实现令人惊叹的业绩表现。
Nevertheless, managing Berkshire is mostly fun and always interesting. On the positive side, after 59 years of assemblage, the company now owns either a portion or 100% of various businesses that, on a weighted basis, have somewhat better prospects than exist at most large American companies. By both luck and pluck, a few huge winners have emerged from a great many dozens of decisions. And we now have a small cadre of long-time managers who never muse about going elsewhere and who regard 65 as just another birthday.
尽管如此，管理伯克希尔大多是乐趣，且始终充满趣味。积极的一面是，经过59年的积累，公司如今全资或部分持有的各类业务（按加权计算）整体前景略优于大多数美国大型企业。通过运气与拼搏，我们在数百项决策中孕育出少数几家大赢家。如今，我们还有一小批长期管理者，他们从未考虑过跳槽，且将65岁视作普通生日。
Berkshire benefits from an unusual constancy and clarity of purpose. While we emphasize treating our employees, communities and suppliers well – who wouldn’t wish to do so? – our allegiance will always be to our country and our shareholders. We never forget that, though your money is comingled with ours, it does not belong to us.
伯克希尔受益于一种罕见的专注与目标清晰性。尽管我们强调善待员工、社区与供应商——谁不愿如此？——我们的忠诚始终属于国家与股东。我们永远铭记：尽管您的资金与我们的混在一起，但它们并不属于我们。
With that focus, and with our present mix of businesses, Berkshire should do a bit better
than the average American corporation and, more important, should also operate with materially
less risk of permanent loss of capital. Anything beyond “slightly better,” though, is wishful
thinking. This modest aspiration wasn’t the case when Bertie went all-in on Berkshire – but it
is now.
聚焦当前业务组合，伯克希尔应能略优于美国企业平均水平，且显著降低永久性资本损失风险。但超越“小幅优势”的预期只是空想。这一谦逊目标与伯蒂当年重仓伯克希尔时已截然不同。
# Our Not-So-Secret Weapon（我们的非秘密武器）
Occasionally, markets and/or the economy will cause stocks and bonds of some large and
fundamentally good businesses to be strikingly mispriced. Indeed, markets can – and
will – unpredictably seize up or even vanish as they did for four months in 1914 and for a few days
in 2001. If you believe that American investors are now more stable than in the past, think back to
September 2008. Speed of communication and the wonders of technology facilitate instant
worldwide paralysis, and we have come a long way since smoke signals. Such instant panics won’t
happen often – but they will happen.
市场或经济偶尔会令优质大企业的股票和债券价格严重偏离价值。事实上，市场可能——也必将——突发冻结甚至消失，正如1914年四个月和2001年数天内的场景。若你认为美国投资者如今比过去更稳定，请回顾2008年9月。通信速度与技术奇迹加剧了全球瞬间瘫痪的可能性，我们早已超越烟雾信号的时代。此类恐慌虽不会频繁发生，但终将到来。
Berkshire’s ability to immediately respond to market seizures with both huge sums and
certainty of performance may offer us an occasional large-scale opportunity. Though the stock
market is massively larger than it was in our early years, today’s active participants are neither
more emotionally stable nor better taught than when I was in school. For whatever reasons, markets
now exhibit far more casino-like behavior than they did when I was young. The casino now resides
in many homes and daily tempts the occupants.
伯克希尔以巨额资金与确定性迅速应对市场冻结的能力，可能为我们带来偶发的规模化机遇。尽管股市规模远超早期，但如今活跃参与者的情绪稳定性与投资素养并未优于我求学时代。无论出于何种原因，市场如今展现出比我年轻时更强烈的赌场属性。赌场已进驻千家万户，每日诱惑居民下注。
One fact of financial life should never be forgotten. Wall Street – to use the term in its
figurative sense – would like its customers to make money, but what truly causes its denizens’
juices to flow is feverish activity. At such times, whatever foolishness can be marketed will be
vigorously marketed – not by everyone but always by someone.
金融世界有一条铁律不可遗忘：华尔街（广义而言）虽愿客户获利，但真正令其从业者兴奋的是狂热交易。此时，任何可营销的荒谬概念必将被大力推销——虽非人人如此，但总有推手。
Occasionally, the scene turns ugly. The politicians then become enraged; the most flagrant
perpetrators of misdeeds slip away, rich and unpunished; and your friend next door becomes
bewildered, poorer and sometimes vengeful. Money, he learns, has trumped morality.
市场偶尔陷入混乱。政客随之愤怒，最恶劣的作恶者却带着财富逍遥法外；你的邻居则陷入困惑、贫穷甚至报复情绪。他终将明白：金钱已凌驾于道德之上。
One investment rule at Berkshire has not and will not change: Never risk permanent loss
of capital. Thanks to the American tailwind and the power of compound interest, the arena in which
we operate has been – and will be – rewarding if you make a couple of good decisions during a
lifetime and avoid serious mistakes.
伯克希尔有一条投资铁律从未动摇：绝不冒永久性资本损失之险。得益于美国经济东风与复利威力，只要一生做出少数明智决策并规避重大错误，我们所处领域必将回报丰厚。
I believe Berkshire can handle financial disasters of a magnitude beyond any heretofore
experienced. This ability is one we will not relinquish. When economic upsets occur, as they will,
Berkshire’s goal will be to function as an asset to the country – just as it was in a very minor way
in 2008-9 – and to help extinguish the financial fire rather than to be among the many companies
that, inadvertently or otherwise, ignited the conflagration.
我坚信伯克希尔能应对前所未有的金融灾难。这一能力我们绝不会放弃。当经济动荡（必然发生）来袭时，伯克希尔的目标是成为国家资产——正如2008-2009年微弱展现的那样——协助扑灭金融危机，而非沦为点燃火势的企业之一。
# 极端财政保守主义（Extreme fiscal conservatism）
Extreme fiscal conservatism is a corporate pledge we make to those who have joined us in ownership of Berkshire. In most years – indeed in most decades – our caution will likely prove to be unneeded behavior – akin to an insurance policy on a fortress-like building thought to be fireproof. But Berkshire does not want to inflict permanent financial damage – quotational shrinkage for extended periods can’t be avoided – on Bertie or any of the individuals who have trusted us with their savings.
极端财政保守主义是我们向伯克希尔股东作出的企业承诺。在多数年份——甚至多数十年间——我们的谨慎可能显得多余，就像为一座看似防火的堡垒购买保险。但伯克希尔不愿对伯蒂或任何将积蓄托付给我们的个人造成永久性财务损失，尽管长期市值缩水无法避免。
Berkshire is built to last.
伯克希尔的目标是基业长青。
# 非控股但令人安心的业务（Non-controlled Businesses That Leave Us Comfortable）
Last year I mentioned two of Berkshire’s long-duration partial-ownership positions – Coca-Cola and American Express. These are not huge commitments like our Apple position. Each only accounts for 4-5% of Berkshire’s GAAP net worth. But they are meaningful assets and also illustrate our thought processes.
去年我提到伯克希尔的两项长期部分持股——可口可乐与美国运通。它们的规模不像苹果投资那样巨大，各占伯克希尔会计准则净资产的4%-5%。但它们是重要资产，也体现了我们的投资逻辑。
American Express began operations in 1850, and Coca-Cola was launched in an Atlanta drug store in 1886. (Berkshire is not big on newcomers.) Both companies tried expanding into unrelated areas over the years and both found little success in these attempts. In the past – but definitely not now – both were even mismanaged.
美国运通成立于1850年，可口可乐于1886年在亚特兰大一家药店诞生。（伯克希尔对新入局者兴趣不大。）两家公司曾尝试跨领域扩张，但收效甚微。过去——但绝非现在——它们甚至一度遭遇管理不善。
But each was hugely successful in its base business, reshaped here and there as conditions called for. And, crucially, their products “traveled.” Both Coke and AMEX became recognizable names worldwide as did their core products, and the consumption of liquids and the need for unquestioned financial trust are timeless essentials of our world.
但两家公司核心业务极其成功，并随环境变化不断调整。更重要的是，它们的产品具备“全球化基因”：可口可乐与美国运通成为全球知名的品牌，其核心产品深入人心。液体消费与无条件金融信任的需求，正是我们世界永恒的必需品。
# The Lesson from Coke and AMEX（可口可乐与美国运通的启示）
During 2023, we did not buy or sell a share of either AMEX or Coke – extending our own Rip Van Winkle slumber that has now lasted well over two decades. Both companies again rewarded our inaction last year by increasing their earnings and dividends. Indeed, our share of AMEX earnings in 2023 considerably exceeded the $1.3 billion cost of our long-ago purchase.
2023年，我们未买卖美国运通或可口可乐的任何股份——这种“沉睡式持有”已持续二十多年。这两家公司去年再次以盈利和分红的增长回报了我们的按兵不动。事实上，2023年美国运通的利润贡献已远超我们当年13亿美元的投资成本。
Both AMEX and Coke will almost certainly increase their dividends in 2024 – about 16% in the case of AMEX – and we will most certainly leave our holdings untouched throughout the year. Could I create a better worldwide business than these two enjoy? As Bertie will tell you: “No way.”
美国运通和可口可乐几乎肯定会在2024年提高分红（美国运通预计增幅约16%），而我们全年将按兵不动。能否创造比这两家公司更优质的世界级业务？伯蒂会直接回答：“绝无可能。”
Though Berkshire did not purchase shares of either company in 2023, your indirect ownership of both Coke and AMEX increased a bit last year because of share repurchases we made at Berkshire. Such repurchases work to increase your participation in every asset that Berkshire owns. To this obvious but often overlooked truth, I add my usual caveat: All stock repurchases should be price-dependent. What is sensible at a discount to business-value becomes stupid if done at a premium.
尽管2023年未增持，因伯克希尔自身的股票回购，您通过持股间接持有的可口可乐和美国运通权益有所增加。回购放大了您对伯克希尔每一项资产的参与度。对此显而易见却常被忽视的事实，我仍需强调：所有回购必须基于价格。以低于内在价值的价格回购是明智之举，若溢价操作则沦为蠢行。
# 持续加码的长期投资（Expanding Long-Term Commitments）
This year, I would like to describe two other investments that we expect to maintain indefinitely. Like Coke and AMEX, these commitments are not huge relative to our resources. They are worthwhile, however, and we were able to increase both positions during 2023.
今年，我想介绍两项我们计划长期持有的投资。与可口可乐和运通类似，它们的规模相对于伯克希尔资源而言不算庞大，但同样值得重视。2023年，我们成功增持了这两项资产。
At yearend, Berkshire owned 27.8% of Occidental Petroleum’s common shares and also owned warrants that, for more than five years, give us the option to materially increase our ownership at a fixed price. Though we very much like our ownership, as well as the option, Berkshire has no interest in purchasing or managing Occidental. We particularly like its vast oil and gas holdings in the United States, as well as its leadership in carbon-capture initiatives, though the economic feasibility of this technique has yet to be proven. Both of these activities are very much in our country’s interest.
年末，伯克希尔持有西方石油公司27.8%的普通股，并拥有可按固定价格大幅增持的认股权证（已持有超五年）。尽管我们看好现有持股及潜在增持权，伯克希尔无意控股或管理西方石油。我们尤其青睐其在美国的庞大油气资产，以及在碳捕捉技术领域的领先地位——尽管该技术的经济可行性尚未验证。这两项业务均高度契合美国利益。
Not so long ago, the U.S. was woefully dependent on foreign oil, and carbon capture had no meaningful constituency. Indeed, in 1975, U.S. production was eight million barrels of oil-equivalent per day (“BOEPD”), a level far short of the country’s needs. From the favorable energy position that facilitated the U.S. mobilization in World War II, the country had retreated to become heavily dependent on foreign – potentially unstable – suppliers. Further declines in oil production were predicted along with future increases in usage.
不久之前，美国曾严重依赖进口石油，碳捕捉技术也缺乏实际支持者。1975年，美国日产量仅800万桶油当量（BOEPD），远低于需求。从二战时期能源自给的黄金时代，美国一度退化为依赖不稳定的外国供应商的能源进口国，且普遍预测未来石油产量将持续下滑、需求不断增长。
# For a long time, the pessimism appeared to be correct...（长期悲观预测曾一度准确）
For a long time, the pessimism appeared to be correct, with production falling to five million BOEPD by 2007. Meanwhile, the U.S. government created a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (“SPR”) in 1975 to alleviate – though not come close to eliminating – this erosion of American self-sufficiency.
长期来看，悲观预测曾一度准确。到2007年，美国石油日产量跌至500万桶油当量（BOEPD）。与此同时，美国政府于1975年建立战略石油储备（SPR），以缓解——尽管远未根除——能源自给能力的衰退。
And then – Hallelujah! – shale economics became feasible in 2011, and our energy dependency ended. Now, U.S. production is more than 13 million BOEPD, and OPEC no longer has the upper hand. Occidental itself has annual U.S. oil production that each year comes close to matching the entire inventory of the SPR. Our country would be very – very – nervous today if domestic production had remained at five million BOEPD, and it found itself hugely dependent on non-U.S. sources. At that level, the SPR would have been emptied within months if foreign oil became unavailable.
转折点来临——哈利路亚！2011年页岩油经济可行性突破，美国能源依赖终结。如今，美国日产量已超1300万桶油当量，欧佩克失去主导地位。西方石油公司年产量几乎可匹敌整个SPR的战略储备规模。若国内产量仍停滞在500万桶/日，且严重依赖海外供应，美国今日必将陷入巨大焦虑——一旦进口中断，SPR储备将在数月内耗尽。
Under Vicki Hollub’s leadership, Occidental is doing the right things for both its country and its owners. No one knows what oil prices will do over the next month, year, or decade. But Vicki does know how to separate oil from rock, and that’s an uncommon talent, valuable to her shareholders and to her country.
在Vicki Hollub领导下，西方石油正为国家与股东创造价值。没人能预判未来月度、年度或十年内的油价走势，但Vicki深谙页岩油开采之道——这一稀缺才能既惠及股东，也助力国家。
# 日本五大企业的长期投资（Passive and Long-Term Japanese Investments）
Additionally, Berkshire continues to hold its passive and long-term interest in five very large Japanese companies, each of which operates in a highly-diversified manner somewhat similar to the way Berkshire itself is run. We increased our holdings in all five last year after Greg Abel and I made a trip to Tokyo to talk with their managements.
此外，伯克希尔持续持有日本五家大型企业的被动长期投资。这些企业业务高度多元化，经营风格与伯克希尔颇为相似。去年，Greg Abel和我专程赴东京与管理层沟通后，进一步增持了全部五家公司的股份。
Berkshire now owns about 9% of each of the five. (A minor point: Japanese companies calculate outstanding shares in a manner different from the practice in the U.S.) Berkshire has also pledged to each company that it will not purchase shares that will take our holdings beyond 9.9%. Our cost for the five totals ¥1.6 trillion, and the yearend market value of the five was ¥2.9 trillion. However, the yen has weakened in recent years and our yearend unrealized gain in dollars was 61% or $8 billion.
目前，伯克希尔对每家公司的持股均约9%。（注：日本企业流通股计算方式与美国不同。）我们承诺不会增持至超过9.9%。五家公司总成本为1.6万亿日元，年末市值达2.9万亿日元。但近年来日元贬值，以美元计价的未实现收益达61%（80亿美元）。
Neither Greg nor I believe we can forecast market prices of major currencies. We also don’t believe we can hire anyone with this ability. Therefore, Berkshire has financed most of its Japanese position with the proceeds from ¥1.3 trillion of bonds. This debt has been very well-received in Japan, and I believe Berkshire has more yen-denominated debt outstanding than any other American company. The weakened yen has produced a yearend gain for Berkshire of $1.9 billion, a sum that, pursuant to GAAP rules, has periodically been recognized in income over the 2020-23 period.
Greg和我都认为无法预测主要货币汇率，也不相信能雇佣到具备此能力的人。因此，伯克希尔以发行1.3万亿日元债券为主要融资手段。这些日元债务在日本市场广受认可，我估计伯克希尔是美国企业中未偿日元债务最多的公司。日元贬值为伯克希尔带来19亿美元年末收益，按会计准则要求，该收益已在2020-2023年间分阶段计入收入。
In certain important ways, all five companies – Itochu, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo – follow shareholder-friendly policies that are much superior to those customarily practiced in the U.S. Since we began our Japanese purchases, each of the five has reduced the number of its outstanding shares at attractive prices.
从关键角度看，伊藤忠商事、丸红、三菱商事、三井物产和住友商事这五家企业均实施股东友好政策，远优于美国惯常做法。自我们开始投资以来，五家公司均以具有吸引力的价格回购股份，减少流通股数量。
# 五家日本企业的管理层风格与伯克希尔的协同效应
Meanwhile, the managements of all five companies have been far less aggressive about their own compensation than is typical in the United States. Note as well that each of the five is applying only about 1⁄3 of its earnings to dividends. The large sums the five retain are used both to build their many businesses and, to a lesser degree, to repurchase shares. Like Berkshire, the five companies are reluctant to issue shares.
与此同时，这五家日本企业的管理层在自身薪酬方面远比美国同行更保守。此外，它们仅将约三分之一的利润用于分红。大量留存资金被用于拓展业务，并在较小程度上回购股份。与伯克希尔一样，这五家公司对增发股份持谨慎态度。
# 投资日本企业的潜在全球合作机遇
An additional benefit for Berkshire is the possibility that our investment may lead to opportunities for us to partner around the world with five large, well-managed and well-respected companies. Their interests are far more broad than ours. And, on their side, the Japanese CEOs have the comfort of knowing that Berkshire will always possess huge liquid resources that can be instantly available for such partnerships, whatever their size may be.
对伯克希尔而言，另一项潜在收益是：我们的投资可能促成与这五家大型、管理完善且受尊敬的日本企业的全球合作。它们的业务范围远比我们更广泛。另一方面，日本企业高管也清楚，伯克希尔始终拥有充足的流动性资源，可随时为任何规模的合作提供支持。
# 日本投资的长期布局特性
Our Japanese purchases began on July 4, 2019. Given Berkshire’s present size, building positions through open-market purchases takes a lot of patience and an extended period of “friendly” prices. The process is like turning a battleship. That is an important disadvantage which we did not face in our early days at Berkshire.
我们对日本的投资始于2019年7月4日。以伯克希尔当前的体量，通过公开市场逐步建仓需要极大的耐心和持续的“友好价格”。这一过程如同调头一艘战舰般缓慢。这种劣势在我们早期投资时并不存在，但如今已是必然。
# 2023年运营成绩单
The Scorecard in 2023
Every quarter we issue a press release that reports our summarized operating earnings (or loss) in a manner similar to what is shown below. Here is the full-year compilation:
2023年成绩单
我们每季度发布财报，以如下方式汇总运营利润（或亏损）。以下是全年数据：
| （单位：百万美元） | 2023年 | 2022年 |
|---|---|---|
| 保险承保利润 | 5,428 | (30) |
| 保险投资收益 | 9,567 | 6,484 |
| 铁路业务 | 5,087 | 5,946 |
| 公用事业与能源 | 2,331 | 3,904 |
| 其他业务及杂项 | 14,937 | 14,549 |
| 运营总利润 | 37,350 | 30,853 |
伯克希尔的运营利润按业务板块分类显示，保险业务表现强劲，铁路和公用事业板块则出现波动。
# 2023年股东大会展望
At Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 6, 2023, I presented the first quarter’s results which had been released early that morning. I followed with a short summary of the outlook for the full year:
(1) most of our non-insurance businesses faced lower earnings in 2023;
(2) that decline would be cushioned by decent results at our two largest non-insurance businesses, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) which, combined, had accounted for more than 30% of operating earnings in 2022;
(3) our investment income was certain to materially grow because the huge U.S. Treasury bill position held by Berkshire had finally begun to pay us far more than the pittance we had been receiving and
(4) insurance would likely do well, both because its underwriting earnings are not correlated to earnings elsewhere in the economy and, beyond that, property-casualty insurance prices had strengthened.
在2023年5月6日的年度股东大会上，我汇报了当日清晨发布的季度业绩，并进一步总结了全年展望：
（1）2023年我们的非保险业务普遍面临盈利下滑；
（2）但旗下两大非保险业务——BNSF铁路和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）的良好表现将缓解这一压力。二者合计贡献了2022年30%以上的运营利润；
（3）投资收益必将大幅增长，因伯克希尔持有的巨额美国国债终于开始提供远超此前低利率环境的回报；
（4）保险业务表现可期，一方面承保利润与经济整体盈利无关，另一方面财险价格已显著上涨。
# Insurance came through as expected. I erred, however, in my expectations for both BNSF and BHE. Let’s take a look at each.
（保险业务如期兑现，但BNSF与BHE未达预期）
保险业务表现符合预期，但我对BNSF和BHE的预期出现了偏差。让我们逐一分析。
# Rail is essential to America’s economic future...（铁路是美国经济未来的核心）
Rail is essential to America’s economic future. It is clearly the most efficient way – measured by cost, fuel usage and carbon intensity – of moving heavy materials to distant destinations. Trucking wins for short hauls, but many goods that Americans need must travel to customers many hundreds or even several thousands of miles away. The country can’t run without rail, and the industry’s capital needs will always be huge. Indeed, compared to most American businesses, railroads eat capital.
铁路对美国经济未来至关重要。以成本、燃油消耗和碳排放强度衡量，它是运输重载货物至远距离的最高效方式。短途运输依赖卡车，但许多美国人必需品需跨越数百甚至数千英里送达客户。没有铁路，国家无法运转，而铁路行业的资本需求将始终庞大。与多数美国企业相比，铁路业对资本的消耗堪称“吞噬”。
# BNSF的资产规模与替代成本
BNSF is the largest of six major rail systems that blanket North America. Our railroad carries its 23,759 miles of main track, 99 tunnels, 13,495 bridges, 7,521 locomotives and assorted other fixed assets at $70 billion on its balance sheet. But my guess is that it would cost at least $500 billion to replicate those assets and decades to complete the job.
BNSF是覆盖北美的六大铁路系统中最大的一家。我们的铁路系统账面价值700亿美元，包含23,759英里主轨道、99条隧道、13,495座桥梁、7,521台机车及各类固定资产。但若要复制这些资产，预估成本至少5,000亿美元，且需数十年完成。
# 资本支出压力与股东回报
BNSF must annually spend more than its depreciation charge to simply maintain its present level of business. This reality is bad for owners, whatever the industry in which they have invested, but it is particularly disadvantageous in capital-intensive industries. At BNSF, the outlays in excess of GAAP depreciation charges since our purchase 14 years ago have totaled a staggering $22 billion or more than $11⁄2 billion annually. Ouch! That sort of gap means BNSF dividends paid to Berkshire, its owner, will regularly fall considerably short of BNSF’s reported earnings unless we regularly increase the railroad’s debt. And that we do not intend to do.
BNSF每年需投入超过折旧费用的资金以维持现有业务水平。这对任何行业投资者均非利好，尤其在重资本行业更为不利。自14年前收购以来，BNSF超会计准则折旧费用的支出累计达220亿美元，年均超15亿美元。哎哟！这种缺口意味着BNSF向伯克希尔支付的股息将长期低于其报告利润，除非持续增加债务——而这绝非我们的选择。
# 资产估值与投资逻辑
Consequently, Berkshire is receiving an acceptable return on its purchase price, though less than it might appear, and also a pittance on the replacement value of the property. That’s no surprise to me or Berkshire’s board of directors. It explains why we could buy BNSF in 2010 at a small fraction of its replacement value.
因此，伯克希尔对BNSF的投资回报基于收购成本尚可接受，但若以替代价值衡量则近乎微薄。这对我和伯克希尔董事会而言早有预期，也解释了为何我们在2010年能以远低于其替代成本的价格收购BNSF。
# 北美铁路的运营挑战
North America’s rail system moves huge quantities of coal, grain, autos, imported and exported goods, etc. one-way for long distances and those trips often create a revenue problem for back-hauls. Weather conditions are extreme and frequently hamper or even stymie the utilization of track, bridges and equipment. Flooding can be a nightmare. None of this is a surprise. While I sit in an always-comfortable office, railroading is an outdoor activity with many employees working under trying and sometimes dangerous conditions.
北美铁路承担大量煤炭、粮食、汽车及进出口商品的单向长途运输，返程货运常面临收入难题。极端天气频繁阻碍轨道、桥梁和设备的正常使用，洪水更是灾难。这些并非意外——我坐在恒温办公室中，而铁路员工却在严酷甚至危险的户外环境中工作。
# 劳动力短缺与社会问题
An evolving problem is that a growing percentage of Americans are not looking for the difficult, and often lonely, employment conditions inherent in some rail operations. Engineers must deal with the fact that among an American population of 335 million, some forlorn or mentally-disturbed Americans are going to elect suicide by lying in front of a 100-car, extraordinarily heavy train that can’t be stopped in less than a mile or more. Would you like to be the helpless engineer? This trauma happens about once a day in North America; it is far more common in Europe and will always be with us.
新兴问题是：越来越多美国人不愿接受铁路运营中固有的艰苦且孤独的工作环境。工程师必须面对一个残酷现实：在美国3.35亿人口中，总有失落或精神异常者选择卧轨自杀——面对无法在一英里内停下的百节重载列车，工程师束手无策。你愿意成为这样的工程师吗？此类悲剧在北美每天发生一次，欧洲更为频繁，且将长期存在。
# Wage Negotiations and Regulatory Burdens in the Rail Industry（铁路行业的薪资谈判与监管负担）
Wage negotiations in the rail industry can end up in the hands of the President and Congress. Additionally, American railroads are required to carry many dangerous products every day that the industry would much rather avoid. The words “common carrier” define railroad responsibilities.
铁路行业的薪资谈判可能最终由总统和国会介入解决。此外，美国铁路公司每天被迫运输大量危险品——这是行业希望回避的业务。“公共承运人”的法律定位界定了铁路公司的责任。
Last year BNSF’s earnings declined more than I expected, as revenues fell. Though fuel costs also fell, wage increases, promulgated in Washington, were far beyond the country’s inflation goals. This differential may recur in future negotiations.
2023年，BNSF盈利降幅超过预期，因收入下滑。尽管燃料成本下降，但华盛顿推动的薪资涨幅远超全国通胀目标，这一差距可能在未来的谈判中重现。
Though BNSF carries more freight and spends more on capital expenditures than any of the five other major North American railroads, its profit margins have slipped relative to all five since our purchase. I believe that our vast service territory is second to none and that therefore our margin comparisons can and should improve.
尽管BNSF货运量与资本支出均高于北美其他五大铁路公司，但自收购以来其利润率已落后于同行。我认为，我们的服务区域覆盖范围无与伦比，因此利润率对比仍有改善空间且理应提升。
# 致力于国家与员工的贡献（Pride in BNSF’s Contributions）
I am particularly proud of both BNSF’s contribution to the country and the people who work in sub-zero outdoor jobs in North Dakota and Montana winters to keep America’s commercial arteries open. Railroads don’t get much attention when they are working but, were they unavailable, the void would be noticed immediately throughout America.
我尤其为BNSF对国家的贡献感到自豪，也为那些在北达科他州和蒙大拿州严冬中从事零下户外作业的员工感到骄傲。铁路正常运转时无人关注，一旦瘫痪，全美将立即感受到其重要性。
A century from now, BNSF will continue to be a major asset of the country and of Berkshire. You can count on that.
百年后，BNSF仍将是国家和伯克希尔的核心资产，这一点毋庸置疑。
# BHE的盈利困境与监管风险（BHE’s Earnings Disappointment and Regulatory Risks）
Our second and even more severe earnings disappointment last year occurred at BHE. Most of its large electric-utility businesses, as well as its extensive gas pipelines, performed about as expected. But the regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of zero profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at California’s largest utility and a current threat in Hawaii).
去年伯克希尔第二大盈利未达预期发生在BHE。其大部分电力公司和天然气管道业务表现符合预期，但少数州的监管环境引发盈利归零甚至破产风险（加州最大公用事业公司已成现实，夏威夷正面临威胁）。
In such jurisdictions, it is difficult to project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among the most stable industries in America.
在这些地区，曾被视为美国最稳定行业的电力公司，如今盈利与资产价值预测变得极其困难。
For more than a century, electric utilities raised huge sums to finance their growth through a state-by-state promise of a fixed return on equity (sometimes with a small bonus for superior performance). With this approach, massive investments were made for capacity that would likely be required a few years down the road. That forward-looking regulation reflected the reality that utilities build generating and transmission assets that often take many years to construct.
百年来，电力公司通过各州承诺的固定股本回报率（优异表现可获微幅奖励）融资扩张。这种前瞻性监管基于电力基础设施建设周期长的现实，提前数年投资未来所需产能。
BHE’s extensive multi-state transmission project in the West was initiated in 2006 and remains some years from completion. Eventually, it will serve 10 states comprising 30% of the acreage in the continental United States.
BHE西部跨州输电项目始于2006年，预计仍需数年完工。项目最终将覆盖美国本土30%的国土面积（10个州）。
# 监管模式的破裂与气候挑战（Broken Regulatory Models and Climate Pressures）
With this model employed by both private and public-power systems, the lights stayed on, even if population growth or industrial demand exceeded expectations. The “margin of safety” approach seemed sensible to regulators, investors and the public. Now, the fixed-but-satisfactory-return pact has been broken in a few states, and investors are becoming apprehensive that such ruptures may spread.
私营与公营电力系统均依赖这一模式，即使人口或工业需求激增，供电也从未中断。“安全边际”原则曾被监管者、投资者和公众普遍接受。如今少数州打破这一契约，投资者担忧风险蔓延。
Climate change adds to their worries. Underground transmission may be required but who, a few decades ago, wanted to pay the staggering costs for such construction?
气候变化加剧忧虑。地下输电可能成为刚需，但几十年前谁愿承担高昂建设成本？
# 森林火灾损失与公用事业风险（Forest Fire Losses and Utility Risks）
At Berkshire, we have made a best estimate for the amount of losses that have occurred. These costs arose from forest fires, whose frequency and intensity have increased – and will likely continue to increase – if convective storms become more frequent. It will be many years until we know the final tally from BHE’s forest-fire losses and can intelligently make decisions about the desirability of future investments in vulnerable western states. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory environment will change elsewhere.
伯克希尔对已发生的损失进行了最佳估算。这些成本源于森林火灾，其频率和强度随对流风暴的增多而上升——这一趋势可能持续。BHE的森林火灾损失最终金额及未来对西部脆弱州的投资决策仍需多年才能明确，其他地区的监管环境是否会变化仍是未知数。
Other electric utilities may face survival problems resembling those of Pacific Gas and Electric and Hawaiian Electric. A confiscatory resolution of our present problems would obviously be a negative for BHE, but both that company and Berkshire itself are structured to survive negative surprises. We regularly get these in our insurance business, where our basic product is risk assumption, and they will occur elsewhere. Berkshire can sustain financial surprises but we will not knowingly throw good money after bad.
其他电力公司可能面临类似太平洋燃气电力公司和夏威夷电力公司的生存危机。若我们的当前问题被强制性解决（如监管机构采取没收性措施），对BHE将是负面打击。但BHE和伯克希尔均具备抵御意外风险的结构设计。我们在保险业务中日常应对风险（核心产品即风险承保），未来其他领域也必然出现类似挑战。伯克希尔能承受财务冲击，但绝不会明知故犯地继续投入资金。
Whatever the case at Berkshire, the final result for the utility industry may be ominous: Certain utilities might no longer attract the savings of American citizens and will be forced to adopt the public-power model. Nebraska made this choice in the 1930s and there are many public-power operations throughout the country. Eventually, voters, taxpayers and users will decide which model they prefer.
无论伯克希尔如何应对，公用事业行业的终局可能严峻：部分电力公司或将无法吸引美国民众储蓄，被迫转向公共电力模式。内布拉斯加在1930年代已做出此类选择，如今全美存在大量公共电力运营案例。最终，选民、纳税人和用户将决定偏好的商业模式。
When the dust settles, America’s power needs and the consequent capital expenditure will be staggering. I did not anticipate or even consider the adverse developments in regulatory returns and, along with Berkshire’s two partners at BHE, I made a costly mistake in not doing so.
尘埃落定后，美国的电力需求及随之而来的资本支出将令人震惊。我未能预见监管回报的恶化趋势，与BHE的两位合作伙伴共同犯下了代价高昂的错误。
# 保险业务的强劲表现（Enough about problems: Our insurance business performed exceptionally well last year）
Enough about problems: Our insurance business performed exceptionally well last year, setting records in sales, float and underwriting profits. Property-casualty insurance (“P/C”) provides the core of Berkshire’s well-being and growth. We have been in the business for 57 years and despite our nearly 5,000-fold increase in volume – from $17 million to $83 billion – we have much room to grow.
不再赘述问题：去年我们的保险业务表现卓越，创销售、浮存金和承保利润新高。财产与意外险（“P/C”）始终是伯克希尔稳健增长的核心。57年来，业务规模从1,700万美元激增至830亿美元，仍具备巨大增长空间。
Beyond that, we have learned – too often, painfully – a good deal about what types of insurance business and what sort of people to avoid. The most important lesson is that our underwriters can be thin, fat, male, female, young, old, foreign or domestic. But they can’t be optimists at the office, however desirable that quality may generally be in life.
我们更深刻认识到——往往以高昂代价——哪些保险业务和人员必须规避。最重要教训是：承保人可以是任何体型、性别或国籍，但办公室里绝不能有盲目乐观者，尽管这种品质在生活其他领域或许可贵。
Surprises in the P/C business – which can occur decades after six-month or one-year policies have expired – are almost always negative. The industry’s accounting is designed to recognize this reality, but estimation mistakes can be huge. And when charlatans are involved, detection is often both slow and costly. Berkshire will always attempt to be accurate in its estimates of future loss payments but inflation – both monetary and the “legal” variety – is a wild card.
P/C业务的意外——可能在6个月或1年期保单到期数十年后爆发——几乎总是负面的。行业会计规则旨在应对这一现实，但预估错误可能巨大。若涉及欺诈者，识别往往既迟缓又昂贵。伯克希尔始终力求精准预估未来赔付，但通胀（包括货币通胀和“法律通胀”）始终是不可控变量。
# Insurance Operations and Leadership（保险业务与领导力）
I’ve told the story of our insurance operations so many times that I will simply direct newcomers to page 18. Here, I will only repeat that our position would not be what it is if Ajit Jain had not joined Berkshire in 1986. Before that lucky day – aside from an almost unbelievably wonderful experience with GEICO that began early in 1951 and will never end – I was largely wandering in the wilderness, as I struggled to build our insurance operation.
我们的保险业务故事已讲述过无数次，新读者可直接查阅第18页。此处仅强调：若非Ajit Jain于1986年加入伯克希尔，我们的保险地位绝不会如此稳固。在那个幸运日子之前——除了1951年初开启、至今仍在持续的GEICO传奇经历外——我在构建保险业务的过程中几乎处于迷茫探索状态。
Ajit’s achievements since joining Berkshire have been supported by a large cast of hugely-talented insurance executives in our various P/C operations. Their names and faces are unknown to most of the press and the public. Berkshire’s lineup of managers, however, is to P/C insurance what Cooperstown’s honorees are to baseball.
Ajit加入后取得的成就，离不开我们在财产与意外险（P/C）领域众多顶尖保险高管的支持。这些人的名字和面孔对媒体与公众而言鲜为人知，但伯克希尔的管理团队之于保险业，正如棒球名人堂入选者之于棒球界的地位。
Bertie, you can feel good about the fact that you own a piece of an incredible P/C operation that now operates worldwide with unmatched financial resources, reputation and talent. It carried the day in 2023.
伯蒂，你大可为此感到欣慰：你持有全球首屈一指的P/C业务权益，其财务资源、声誉与人才无可匹敌，且在2023年成为关键支撑力量。
# Omaha’s Influence and Berkshire’s Leadership（奥马哈的烙印与伯克希尔领导层）
What is it with Omaha?
Come to Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 4, 2024. On stage you will see the three managers who now bear the prime responsibilities for steering your company. What, you may wonder, do the three have in common? They certainly don’t look alike. Let’s dig deeper.
奥马哈究竟有何特殊之处？
请参加伯克希尔2024年5月4日的年度股东大会。届时台上将出现三位核心管理者——他们肩负着掌舵公司的重任。或许你会好奇：这三人有何共同点？他们的外表显然迥异，但背后另有深意。
Greg Abel, who runs all non-insurance operations for Berkshire – and in all respects is ready to be CEO of Berkshire tomorrow – was born and raised in Canada (he still plays hockey). In the 1990s, however, Greg lived for six years in Omaha just a few blocks away from me. During that period, I never met him.
负责伯克希尔所有非保险业务的Greg Abel——无论从哪方面看，他都已具备接任CEO的条件——出生于加拿大（至今热爱冰球）。1990年代，Greg曾在我家数个街区外的奥马哈居住六年，但那时我们从未相识。
A decade or so earlier, Ajit Jain, who was born, raised and educated in India, lived with his family in Omaha only a mile or so from my home (where I’ve lived since 1958). Both Ajit and his wife, Tinku, have many Omaha friends, though it’s been more than three decades since they moved to New York (in order to be where much of the action in reinsurance takes place).
更早约十年，出生于印度、成长于印度的Ajit Jain曾携家人住在离我家仅一英里的奥马哈（我自1958年起定居于此）。尽管Ajit与妻子Tinku在奥马哈结交了许多朋友，但自他们为专注再保险业务迁居纽约已逾三十年。
Missing from the stage this year will be Charlie. He and I were both born in Omaha about two miles from where you will sit at our May get-together. In his first ten years, Charlie lived about a half-mile from where Berkshire has long maintained its office. Both Charlie and I spent our early years in Omaha public schools and were indelibly shaped by our Omaha childhood. We didn’t meet, however, until much later. (A footnote that may surprise you: Charlie lived under 15 of America’s 45 presidents. People refer to President Biden as #46, but that numbering counts Grover Cleveland as both #22 and #24 because his terms were not consecutive. America is a very young country.)
今年的舞台将缺少查理的身影。查理和我都出生于奥马哈，且会场距离我们出生地仅两英里。查理人生的头十年就住在离伯克希尔办公室半英里处。我们在奥马哈公立学校度过了童年，并深受这座城市塑造。直到多年后，我们才得以相遇。（一个可能令你惊讶的花絮：查理一生历经美国45位总统中的15位。拜登总统被称作第46任，但这一计数方式将格罗弗·克利夫兰非连续任期的第22和第24任合并计算。美国仍是一个年轻的国家。）
# Moving to the corporate level...（企业层面的迁址与“奥马哈效应”）
Moving to the corporate level, Berkshire itself relocated in 1970 from its 81 years of residence in New England to settle in Omaha, leaving its troubles behind and blossoming in its new home.
从企业层面看，伯克希尔自身于1970年结束了在新英格兰地区81年的历史，迁至奥马哈。它抛开旧日困境，在新家园蓬勃发展。
As a final punctuation point to the “Omaha Effect,” Bertie – yes that Bertie – spent her early formative years in a middle-class neighborhood in Omaha and, many decades later, emerged as one of the country’s great investors.
作为“奥马哈效应”的最终注脚，伯蒂——是的，就是这位伯蒂——早年在奥马哈的中产社区成长，数十年后成为美国最杰出的投资者之一。
You may be thinking that she put all of her money in Berkshire and then simply sat on it. But that’s not true. After starting a family in 1956, Bertie was active financially for 20 years: holding bonds, putting 1⁄3 of her funds in a publicly-held mutual fund and trading stocks with some frequency. Her potential remained unnoticed.
你或许会认为她将全部资金投入伯克希尔后便静坐不动。但事实并非如此。1956年成家后，伯蒂在财务上活跃了20年：持有债券，将三分之一资金投入公募基金，并频繁交易股票。她的潜力始终未被察觉。
Then, in 1980, when 46, and independent of any urgings from her brother, Bertie decided to make her move. Retaining only the mutual fund and Berkshire, she made no new trades during the next 43 years. During that period, she became very rich, even after making large philanthropic gifts (think nine figures).
1980年，46岁的伯蒂在未受兄长影响下自主决策：保留公募基金和伯克希尔股份，此后43年未做新交易。在此期间，她成为巨富——即便捐出大量资金（九位数金额）。
Millions of American investors could have followed her reasoning which involved only the common sense she had somehow absorbed as a child in Omaha. And, taking no chances, Bertie returns to Omaha every May to be re-energized.
数百万美国投资者本可效仿她的逻辑——这种逻辑仅包含她在奥马哈童年吸收的常识。为规避风险，伯蒂每年五月重返奥马哈汲取力量。
So what is going on? Is it Omaha’s water? Is it Omaha’s air? Is it some strange planetary phenomenon akin to that which has produced Jamaica’s sprinters, Kenya’s marathon runners, or Russia’s chess experts? Must we wait until AI someday yields the answer to this puzzle?
究竟发生了什么？是奥马哈的水土？还是某种类似催生牙买加短跑、肯尼亚马拉松、俄罗斯国际象棋的神秘天体现象？我们是否要等待AI破解这一谜题？
Keep an open mind. Come to Omaha in May, inhale the air, drink the water and say “hi” to Bertie and her good-looking daughters. Who knows? There is no downside, and, in any event, you will have a good time and meet a huge crowd of friendly people. To top things off, we will have available the new 4th edition of Poor Charlie’s Almanack. Pick up a copy. Charlie’s wisdom will improve your life as it has mine.
保持开放心态。五月来奥马哈，呼吸这里的空气，品尝这里的水，向伯蒂和她美丽的女儿们问好。谁知道呢？此行毫无损失，你定会结识友善的人群并度过愉快时光。更值得期待的是，查理·芒格的《穷查理宝典》第四版将在现场发售。请务必购入一本，查理的智慧曾改变我的人生，也会改变你的。
February 24, 2024
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
2024年2月24日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席