1987巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. (伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司)
# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们：)
Our gain in net worth during 1987 was $464 million, or 19.5%. Over the last 23 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,477.47, or at a rate of 23.1% compounded annually.
1987年，我们的净资产增长了4.64亿美元，增幅为19.5%。在过去23年里（即现任管理层接手以来），我们的每股账面价值从19.46美元增长至2477.47美元，年化复合增长率为23.1%。
What counts, of course, is the rate of gain in per-share business value, not book value. In many cases, a corporation's book value and business value are almost totally unrelated. For example, just before they went bankrupt, LTV and Baldwin-United published yearend audits showing their book values to be $652 million and $397 million, respectively. Conversely, Belridge Oil was sold to Shell in 1979 for $3.6 billion although its book value was only $177 million.
当然，重要的是每股企业价值的增长率，而非账面价值的增长率。在许多情况下，一家公司的账面价值与企业价值几乎毫无关联。例如，LTV和鲍德温-联合公司在破产前夕发布的年终审计报告显示，其账面价值分别为6.52亿美元和3.97亿美元。相反，1979年，贝尔里奇石油公司被壳牌公司以36亿美元收购，尽管其账面价值仅为1.77亿美元。
At Berkshire, however, the two valuations have tracked rather closely, with the growth rate in business value over the last decade moderately outpacing the growth rate in book value. This good news continued in 1987.
不过，在伯克希尔，这两种估值的走势相当接近，过去十年，企业价值的增长率略高于账面价值的增长率。这一良好态势在1987年得以延续。
Our premium of business value to book value has widened for two simple reasons: We own some remarkable businesses and they are run by even more remarkable managers.
我们的企业价值高于账面价值的溢价有所扩大，原因有二：一是我们拥有一些卓越的企业；二是这些企业由更为卓越的管理者经营。
You have a right to question that second assertion. After all, CEOs seldom tell their shareholders that they have assembled a bunch of turkeys to run things. Their reluctance to do so makes for some strange annual reports. Oftentimes, in his shareholders' letter, a CEO will go on for pages detailing corporate performance that is woefully inadequate. He will nonetheless end with a warm paragraph describing his managerial comrades as "our most precious asset." Such comments sometimes make you wonder what the other assets can possibly be.
你有理由对第二个理由提出质疑。毕竟，首席执行官们很少会告诉股东，他们召集了一群无能之辈来管理公司。这种不情愿造就了一些奇怪的年度报告。通常，在致股东的信中，首席执行官会花数页篇幅详细描述公司不尽如人意的业绩，但最后总会用一段热情洋溢的文字将其管理团队描述为“我们最宝贵的资产”。这样的言论有时会让人不禁想知道，其他资产究竟能是什么。
At Berkshire, however, my appraisal of our operating managers is, if anything, understated. To understand why, first take a look at page 7, where we show the earnings (on an historical-cost accounting basis) of our seven largest non-financial units: Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See's Candies, and World Book. In 1987, these seven business units had combined operating earnings before interest and taxes of $180 million.
然而，在伯克希尔，我对我们运营管理者的评价即便有失，也是低估而非高估。要理解其中缘由，首先请看第7页，其中列出了我们七大非金融业务部门（按历史成本会计基准计算）的盈利情况：《布法罗新闻报》、费奇海默、柯比、内布拉斯加家具卖场、斯科特·费策制造集团、喜诗糖果和《世界图书百科全书》。1987年，这七大业务部门的合并息税前运营利润为1.8亿美元。
By itself, this figure says nothing about economic performance. To evaluate that, we must know how much total capital - debt and equity - was needed to produce these earnings. Debt plays an insignificant role at our seven units: Their net interest expense in 1987 was only $2 million. Thus, pre-tax earnings on the equity capital employed by these businesses amounted to $178 million. And this equity - again on an historical-cost basis - was only $175 million.
单看这一数字，并不能说明经济业绩如何。要评估业绩，我们必须知道产生这些利润需要多少总资本——债务和股权。债务在我们这七大部门中作用微乎其微：1987年，它们的净利息支出仅为200万美元。因此，这些业务所用股权资本产生的税前利润为1.78亿美元。而按历史成本计算，这些股权资本仅为1.75亿美元。
If these seven business units had operated as a single company, their 1987 after-tax earnings would have been approximately $100 million - a return of about 57% on equity capital. You'll seldom see such a percentage anywhere, let alone at large, diversified companies with nominal leverage. Here's a benchmark: In its 1988 Investor's Guide issue, Fortune reported that among the 500 largest industrial companies and 500 largest service companies, only six had averaged a return on equity of over 30% during the previous decade. The best performer among the 1000 was Commerce Clearing House at 40.2%.
如果这七大业务部门作为一家公司运营，它们1987年的税后利润约为1亿美元——股权资本回报率约为57%。这样的比例在任何地方都极为罕见，更不用说在杠杆水平极低的大型多元化公司中了。有一个参考数据：《财富》杂志在1988年的《投资者指南》中报道，在全美500家最大的工业公司和500家最大的服务公司中，过去十年间，仅有6家公司的平均净资产收益率超过30%。这1000家公司中表现最好的是商业票据交换所（Commerce Clearing House），其收益率为40.2%。
Of course, the returns that Berkshire earns from these seven units are not as high as their underlying returns because, in aggregate, we bought the businesses at a substantial premium to underlying equity capital. Overall, these operations are carried on our books at about $222 million above the historical accounting values of the underlying assets. However, the managers of the units should be judged by the returns they achieve on the underlying assets; what we pay for a business does not affect the amount of capital its manager has to work with. (If, to become a shareholder and part owner of Commerce Clearing House, you pay, say, six times book value, that does not change CCH's return on equity.)
当然，伯克希尔从这七大部门获得的回报并不及它们自身的回报率高，因为总体而言，我们收购这些业务时支付的价格较其基础股权资本有大幅溢价。总体而言，这些业务在我们账面上的价值比其基础资产的历史会计价值高出约2.22亿美元。然而，评价这些部门的管理者应基于他们在基础资产上实现的回报；我们为一项业务支付的价格并不会影响其管理者可运用的资本量。（例如，如果你以账面价值的6倍价格成为商业票据交换所的股东和部分所有者，这并不会改变该公司的净资产收益率。）
Three important inferences can be drawn from the figures I have cited. First, the current business value of these seven units is far above their historical book value and also far above the value at which they are carried on Berkshire's balance sheet. Second, because so little capital is required to run these businesses, they can grow while concurrently making almost all of their earnings available for deployment in new opportunities. Third, these businesses are run by truly extraordinary managers. The Blumkins, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph Schey all meld unusual talent, energy and character to achieve exceptional financial results.
从上述数据中可以得出三个重要结论。第一，这七大部门当前的企业价值远高于其历史账面价值，也远高于它们在伯克希尔资产负债表上的账面价值。第二，由于运营这些业务所需的资本极少，它们在实现增长的同时，几乎可以将所有利润用于开拓新的机遇。第三，这些业务由真正卓越的管理者经营。布卢姆金家族、赫尔德曼家族、查克·哈金斯、斯坦·利普西和拉尔夫·谢伊都兼具非凡的才能、充沛的精力和优秀的品格，从而取得了卓越的财务业绩。
For good reasons, we had very high expectations when we joined with these managers. In every case, however, our experience has greatly exceeded those expectations. We have received far more than we deserve, but we are willing to accept such inequities. (We subscribe to the view Jack Benny expressed upon receiving an acting award: "I don't deserve this, but then, I have arthritis and I don't deserve that either.")
我们与这些管理者合作时，抱有很高的期望，这是有充分理由的。然而，在每一个案例中，实际情况都远超我们的预期。我们得到的远多于我们应得的，但我们愿意接受这种“不公”。（我们认同杰克·本尼在获得一项表演奖时所说的话：“我不配得这个奖，但话说回来，我也不配得关节炎啊。”）
Beyond the Sainted Seven, we have our other major unit, insurance, which I believe also has a business value well above the net assets employed in it. However, appraising the business value of a property-casualty insurance company is a decidedly imprecise process. The industry is volatile, reported earnings oftentimes are seriously inaccurate, and recent changes in the Tax Code will severely hurt future profitability. Despite these problems, we like the business and it will almost certainly remain our largest operation. Under Mike Goldberg's management, the insurance business should treat us well over time.
除了这“七大圣徒”，我们还有另一个主要部门——保险业务，我认为其企业价值也远高于其所运用的净资产。然而，评估一家财产意外险公司的企业价值无疑是一个不精确的过程。这个行业波动性大，报告的利润往往存在严重误差，而且最近税法的变动将严重损害其未来盈利能力。尽管存在这些问题，我们仍然看好这一业务，它几乎肯定仍将是我们最大的业务板块。在迈克·戈德堡的管理下，保险业务长期来看应该会给我们带来不错的回报。
With managers like ours, my partner, Charlie Munger, and I have little to do with operations. in fact, it is probably fair to say that if we did more, less would be accomplished. We have no corporate meetings, no corporate budgets, and no performance reviews (though our managers, of course, oftentimes find such procedures useful at their operating units). After all, what can we tell the Blumkins about home furnishings, or the Heldmans about uniforms?
有了这样的管理者，我的合伙人查理·芒格和我几乎无需参与运营。事实上，可以说，如果我们插手更多，结果可能会更糟。我们没有公司层面的会议，没有公司预算，也没有业绩评估（当然，我们的管理者通常认为这些流程在其运营部门是有用的）。毕竟，在家具销售方面，我们能给布卢姆金家族什么建议呢？在制服业务方面，我们又能给赫尔德曼家族什么建议呢？
Our major contribution to the operations of our subsidiaries is applause. But it is not the indiscriminate applause of a Pollyanna. Rather it is informed applause based upon the two long careers we have spent intensively observing business performance and managerial behavior. Charlie and I have seen so much of the ordinary in business that we can truly appreciate a virtuoso performance. Only one response to the 1987 performance of our operating managers is appropriate: sustained, deafening applause.
我们对各子公司运营的主要贡献是掌声。但这并非盲目乐观者的无差别喝彩，而是基于我们两人长期密切观察企业业绩和管理行为的经验而发出的理性赞赏。查理和我在商界见多了平庸之作，因此才能真正欣赏卓越的表现。对于我们的运营管理者1987年的业绩，唯一恰当的回应是：持久而热烈的掌声。
# Sources of Reported Earnings (报告利润的来源)
The table on the following page shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In the table, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply but, instead, are aggregated and shown separately. In effect, this procedure presents the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. In appendixes to my letters in the 1983 and 1986 annual reports, I explained why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP presentation, which makes purchase-price adjustments on a business-by business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP figures in our audited financial statements.
下一页的表格显示了伯克希尔报告利润的主要来源。在该表格中，商誉摊销和其他重大购买价格会计调整并未计入其适用的特定业务，而是汇总后单独列示。实际上，这种列报方式呈现的是假设我们未收购这些业务时，它们本应报告的利润。在1983年和1986年致股东信的附录中，我解释了为何在我们看来，这种列报方式比标准的公认会计原则（GAAP）列报方式对投资者和管理者更有用——后者按业务逐个进行购买价格调整。当然，我们在表格中列示的总净利润与经审计财务报表中按公认会计原则计算的数字一致。
In the Business Segment Data on pages 36-38 and in the Management's Discussion section on pages 40-44 you will find much additional information about our businesses. In these sections you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. I urge you to read that material, as well as Charlie Munger's letter to Wesco shareholders, describing the various businesses of that subsidiary, which starts on page 45.
在第36-38页的业务分部数据以及第40-44页的管理层讨论部分，你会找到关于我们各项业务的更多信息。在这些部分，你还会看到按公认会计原则列报的分部利润。我强烈建议你阅读这些内容，以及查理·芒格致韦斯科公司股东的信（从第45页开始），其中描述了该子公司的各项业务。
| （单位：千美元，省略） | 税前利润（Pre-Tax Earnings） | 税前利润（Pre-Tax Earnings） | 伯克希尔所占净收益份额（税后及扣除少数股东权益后）（Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests)） | 伯克希尔所占净收益份额（税后及扣除少数股东权益后）（Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests)） |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1987 | 1986 | 1987 | 1986 | |
| 运营收益（Operating Earnings）： | ||||
| 保险集团（Insurance Group）： | ||||
| 承保业务（Underwriting）............... | $(55,429) | $(55,844) | $(20,696) | $(29,864) |
| 净投资收益（Net Investment Income）...... | 152,483 | 107,143 | 136,658 | 96,440 |
| 《布法罗新闻报》（Buffalo News）................. | 39,410 | 34,736 | 21,304 | 16,918 |
| 费奇海默（1986年6月3日收购）（Fechheimer (Acquired 6/3/86)） | 13,332 | 8,400 | 6,580 | 3,792 |
| 柯比（Kirby）........................ | 22,408 | 20,218 | 12,891 | 10,508 |
| 内布拉斯加家具卖场（Nebraska Furniture Mart）...... | 16,837 | 17,685 | 7,554 | 7,192 |
| 斯科特·费策制造集团（Scott Fetzer Mfg. Group）...... | 30,591 | 25,358 | 17,555 | 13,354 |
| 喜诗糖果（See's Candies）................ | 31,693 | 30,347 | 17,363 | 15,176 |
| 韦斯科（不含保险业务）（Wesco - other than Insurance） | 6,209 | 5,542 | 4,978 | 5,550 |
| 《世界图书百科全书》（World Book）................... | 25,745 | 21,978 | 15,136 | 11,670 |
| 商誉摊销（Amortization of Goodwill）..... | (2,862) | (2,555) | (2,862) | (2,555) |
| 其他购买价格会计调整（Other Purchase-Price Accounting Adjustments ....） | (5,546) | (10,033) | (6,544) | (11,031) |
| 债务利息及预付罚金（Interest on Debt and Pre-Payment Penalty .......） | (11,474) | (23,891) | (5,905) | (12,213) |
| 股东指定捐赠（Shareholder-Designated Contributions .............） | (4,938) | (3,997) | (2,963) | (2,158) |
| 其他（Other）........................ | 22,460 | 20,770 | 13,696 | 8,685 |
| -------- | -------- | -------- | -------- | |
| 运营收益（Operating Earnings）........... | 280,919 | 195,857 | 214,745 | 131,464 |
| 证券销售（Sales of Securities）.......... | 27,319 | 216,242 | 19,807 | 150,897 |
| -------- | -------- | -------- | -------- | |
| 所有实体总收益（Total Earnings - All Entities ..） | $308,238 | $412,099 | $234,552 | $282,361 |
| ======== | ======== | ======== | ======== |
Gypsy Rose Lee announced on one of her later birthdays: "I have everything I had last year; it's just that it's all two inches lower." As the table shows, during 1987 almost all of our businesses aged in a more upbeat way.
吉普赛·罗斯·李在她晚年的一个生日时说：“我拥有去年所有的一切，只是都往下垂了两英寸。” 正如表格所示，1987年，我们几乎所有的业务都“越老越俏”。
There's not a lot new to report about these businesses - and that's good, not bad. Severe change and exceptional returns usually don't mix. Most investors, of course, behave as if just the opposite were true. That is, they usually confer the highest price-earnings ratios on exotic-sounding businesses that hold out the promise of feverish change. That prospect lets investors fantasize about future profitability rather than face today's business realities. For such investor-dreamers, any blind date is preferable to one with the girl next door, no matter how desirable she may be.
关于这些业务，没有太多新鲜事可报告——这是好事，不是坏事。剧烈的变化和卓越的回报通常难以兼得。当然，大多数投资者的行为却仿佛情况恰恰相反。也就是说，他们通常会给那些名字听起来很新奇、承诺会有剧烈变革的企业赋予最高的市盈率。这种前景让投资者幻想未来的盈利能力，而不是面对当下的业务现实。对于这些爱幻想的投资者来说，任何一次盲约都比和邻家女孩约会更有吸引力，无论邻家女孩多么迷人。
Experience, however, indicates that the best business returns are usually achieved by companies that are doing something quite similar today to what they were doing five or ten years ago. That is no argument for managerial complacency. Businesses always have opportunities to improve service, product lines, manufacturing techniques, and the like, and obviously these opportunities should be seized. But a business that constantly encounters major change also encounters many chances for major error. Furthermore, economic terrain that is forever shifting violently is ground on which it is difficult to build a fortress-like business franchise. Such a franchise is usually the key to sustained high returns.
然而，经验表明，最佳的业务回报通常来自那些如今所做的事情与五到十年前基本相同的公司。这并非是为管理层的自满找借口。企业总有机会改善服务、产品线、制造技术等，显然这些机会应该被抓住。但一家不断遭遇重大变革的企业也会面临许多犯重大错误的可能。此外，在经济形势不断剧烈变化的环境中，很难建立起堡垒式的企业特许经营权。而这种特许经营权通常是持续高回报的关键。
The Fortune study I mentioned earlier supports our view. Only 25 of the 1,000 companies met two tests of economic excellence - an average return on equity of over 20% in the ten years, 1977 through 1986, and no year worse than 15%. These business superstars were also stock market superstars: During the decade, 24 of the 25 outperformed the S&P 500.
我前面提到的《财富》杂志的研究支持了我们的观点。在这1000家公司中，只有25家通过了两项经济卓越性测试——在1977年至1986年的十年间，平均净资产收益率超过20%，且每年不低于15%。这些商界巨星在股市上也是明星：在这十年间，25家公司中有24家的表现超过了标准普尔500指数。
The Fortune champs may surprise you in two respects. First, most use very little leverage compared to their interest-paying capacity. Really good businesses usually don't need to borrow. Second, except for one company that is "high-tech" and several others that manufacture ethical drugs, the companies are in businesses that, on balance, seem rather mundane. Most sell non-sexy products or services in much the same manner as they did ten years ago (though in larger quantities now, or at higher prices, or both). The record of these 25 companies confirms that making the most of an already strong business franchise, or concentrating on a single winning business theme, is what usually produces exceptional economics.
《财富》榜单上的优胜者可能会在两个方面让你感到惊讶。第一，与它们的付息能力相比，大多数公司的杠杆率都很低。真正优秀的企业通常不需要借款。第二，除了一家“高科技”公司和其他几家生产处方药的公司外，这些公司总体而言都处于看似相当平凡的行业。大多数公司销售的产品或服务并不花哨，销售方式与十年前大致相同（尽管现在销量更大、价格更高，或者两者兼而有之）。这25家公司的业绩记录证实，充分利用已有的强大业务特许经营权，或者专注于一个成功的业务主题，通常能带来卓越的经济效益。
Berkshire's experience has been similar. Our managers have produced extraordinary results by doing rather ordinary things - but doing them exceptionally well. Our managers protect their franchises, they control costs, they search for new products and markets that build on their existing strengths and they don't get diverted. They work exceptionally hard at the details of their businesses, and it shows.
伯克希尔的经验也类似。我们的管理者通过做一些相当普通的事情——但做得异常出色——取得了非凡的成果。我们的管理者保护他们的特许经营权，控制成本，在现有优势的基础上寻找新产品和新市场，并且不会分心。他们在业务细节上付出了极大的努力，这一点在业绩中得到了体现。
Here's an update:
以下是最新情况：
o Agatha Christie, whose husband was an archaeologist, said that was the perfect profession for one's spouse: "The older you become, the more interested they are in you." It is students of business management, not archaeologists, who should be interested in Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin), the 94-year-old chairman of Nebraska Furniture Mart.
阿加莎·克里斯蒂的丈夫是一位考古学家，她说这是配偶的完美职业：“你年纪越大，他们对你越感兴趣。” 应该对B夫人（罗斯·布卢姆金）感兴趣的是企业管理专业的学生，而不是考古学家。94岁的B夫人是内布拉斯加家具卖场的董事长。
Fifty years ago Mrs. B started the business with $500, and today NFM is far and away the largest home furnishings store in the country. Mrs. B continues to work seven days a week at the job from the opening of each business day until the close. She buys, she sells, she manages - and she runs rings around the competition. It's clear to me that she's gathering speed and may well reach her full potential in another five or ten years. Therefore, I've persuaded the Board to scrap our mandatory retirement-at-100 policy. (And it's about time: With every passing year, this policy has seemed sillier to me.)
50年前，B夫人用500美元创办了这家企业，如今，内布拉斯加家具卖场已是美国无可争议的最大家居用品商店。B夫人仍然每周工作七天，从营业开始一直到结束。她采购、销售、管理——并且在竞争中遥遥领先。在我看来，她的势头正盛，很可能在未来五到十年内充分发挥自己的潜力。因此，我已经说服董事会废除我们的“百岁强制退休”政策。（也该如此了：随着时间的推移，这项政策在我看来越来越愚蠢。）
Net sales of NFM were $142.6 million in 1987, up 8% from 1986. There's nothing like this store in the country, and there's nothing like the family Mrs. B has produced to carry on: Her son Louie, and his three boys, Ron, Irv and Steve, possess the business instincts, integrity and drive of Mrs. B. They work as a team and, strong as each is individually, the whole is far greater than the sum of the parts.
1987年，内布拉斯加家具卖场的净销售额为1.426亿美元，较1986年增长8%。在美国，没有哪家商店能与之相比，也没有哪个家族能像B夫人培养的家族那样传承事业：她的儿子路易，以及路易的三个儿子罗恩、欧文和史蒂夫，都拥有B夫人那样的商业直觉、诚信和干劲。他们团队合作，尽管每个人都很优秀，但团队的整体力量远大于个体力量之和。
The superb job done by the Blumkins benefits us as owners, but even more dramatically benefits NFM's customers. They saved about $30 million in 1987 by buying from NFM. In other words, the goods they bought would have cost that much more if purchased elsewhere.
布卢姆金家族的出色工作让我们这些所有者受益，但更让内布拉斯加家具卖场的客户受益匪浅。1987年，他们通过购买内布拉斯加家具卖场的商品节省了约3000万美元。换句话说，如果在其他地方购买这些商品，他们将多支付这么多钱。
You'll enjoy an anonymous letter I received last August: "Sorry to see Berkshire profits fall in the second quarter. One way you may gain back part of your lost. (sic) Check the pricing at The Furniture Mart. You will find that they are leaving 10% to 20% on the table. This additional profit on $140 million of sells (sic) is $28 million. Not small change in anyone's pocket! Check out other furniture, carpet, appliance and T.V. dealers. Your raising prices to a reasonable profit will help. Thank you. /signed/ A Competitor."
你会喜欢我去年8月收到的一封匿名信：“很遗憾看到伯克希尔第二季度利润下降。有一种方法可以帮你挽回部分损失。去看看家具卖场的定价吧。你会发现他们少赚了10%到20%的利润。在1.4亿美元的销售额上，这额外的利润就是2800万美元。这可不是一笔小数目！看看其他家具、地毯、电器和电视经销商吧。把价格提高到合理的利润水平会有帮助的。谢谢。/签名/ 一个竞争对手。”
NFM will continue to grow and prosper by following Mrs. B's maxim: "Sell cheap and tell the truth."
遵循B夫人的座右铭“低价销售，诚信经营”，内布拉斯加家具卖场将继续发展壮大。
o Among dominant papers of its size or larger, the Buffalo News continues to be the national leader in two important ways: (1) its weekday and Sunday penetration rate (the percentage of households in the paper's primary market area that purchase it); and (2) its "news-hole" percentage (the portion of the paper devoted to news).
在与其规模相当或更大的主流报纸中，《布法罗新闻报》在两个重要方面继续位居全国领先地位：（1）其平日和周日的渗透率（即在报纸主要市场区域内购买该报的家庭比例）；（2）其“新闻占比”（报纸中用于新闻的版面比例）。
It may not be coincidence that one newspaper leads in both categories: an exceptionally "newsrich" product makes for broad audience appeal, which in turn leads to high penetration. Of course, quantity must be matched by quality. This not only means good reporting and good writing; it means freshness and relevance. To be indispensable, a paper must promptly tell its readers many things they want to know but won't otherwise learn until much later, if ever.
一家报纸在这两个方面都处于领先地位，这可能并非巧合：一份内容异常丰富的“新闻大餐”具有广泛的受众吸引力，进而带来高渗透率。当然，数量必须与质量相匹配。这不仅意味着优秀的报道和出色的文笔，还意味着新闻的时效性和相关性。要成为不可或缺的报纸，必须及时告诉读者许多他们想知道但如果没有这份报纸可能要很久才能知道（甚至永远无法知道）的事情。
At the News, we put out seven fresh editions every 24 hours, each one extensively changed in content. Here's a small example that may surprise you: We redo the obituary page in every edition of the News, or seven times a day. Any obituary added runs through the next six editions until the publishing cycle has been completed.
在《布法罗新闻报》，我们每24小时推出7个全新的版本，每个版本的内容都有大量变化。举一个可能会让你惊讶的小例子：我们在每个版本中都会重新编排讣告版，也就是一天7次。新增的讣告会在接下来的6个版本中连续刊登，直到出版周期结束。
It's vital, of course, for a newspaper to cover national and international news well and in depth. But it is also vital for it to do what only a local newspaper can: promptly and extensively chronicle the personally-important, otherwise-unreported details of community life. Doing this job well requires a very broad range of news - and that means lots of space, intelligently used.
当然，报纸深入、全面地报道国内和国际新闻至关重要。但同样重要的是，要做只有地方报纸才能做的事情：及时、全面地记录社区生活中那些对个人而言很重要但在其他地方不会被报道的细节。要做好这项工作，需要涵盖非常广泛的新闻——这意味着需要大量的版面，并且要合理使用。
Our news hole was about 50% in 1987, just as it has been year after year. If we were to cut it to a more typical 40%, we would save approximately $4 million annually in newsprint costs. That interests us not at all - and it won't interest us even if, for one reason or another, our profit margins should significantly shrink.
1987年，我们的新闻占比约为50%，与往年一样。如果我们将其削减到更常见的40%，每年可以节省约400万美元的新闻纸成本。但这一点也引不起我们的兴趣——即使由于某种原因，我们的利润率大幅下降，我们也不会对此感兴趣。
Charlie and I do not believe in flexible operating budgets, as in "Non-direct expenses can be X if revenues are Y, but must be reduced if revenues are Y - 5%." Should we really cut our news hole at the Buffalo News, or the quality of product and service at See's, simply because profits are down during a given year or quarter? Or, conversely, should we add a staff economist, a corporate strategist, an institutional advertising campaign or something else that does Berkshire no good simply because the money currently is rolling in?
查理和我不相信弹性运营预算，比如“如果收入为Y，非直接费用可以是X，但如果收入为Y-5%，非直接费用就必须削减”。我们真的应该仅仅因为某一年或某一季度的利润下降，就削减《布法罗新闻报》的新闻占比，或者降低喜诗糖果的产品和服务质量吗？反之，仅仅因为目前资金充裕，我们就应该增加一名 staff economist（专职经济学家）、一名 corporate strategist（企业战略家）、开展一场 institutional advertising campaign（机构广告宣传活动）或其他对伯克希尔毫无益处的事情吗？
That makes no sense to us. We neither understand the adding of unneeded people or activities because profits are booming, nor the cutting of essential people or activities because profitability is shrinking. That kind of yo-yo approach is neither business-like nor humane. Our goal is to do what makes sense for Berkshire's customers and employees at all times, and never to add the unneeded. ("But what about the corporate jet?" you rudely ask. Well, occasionally a man must rise above principle.)
这在我们看来毫无道理。我们既无法理解为何会因为利润飙升就增加不必要的人员或业务活动，也无法理解为何会因为盈利能力下降就削减必要的人员或业务活动。这种时好时坏、反复无常的做法既不符合商业规范，也缺乏人文关怀。我们的目标是始终做对伯克希尔的客户和员工有益的事，绝不增添不必要的东西。（你可能会不客气地问：“那公司的私人飞机呢？”嗯，有时候人总得不拘泥于原则嘛。）
Although the News' revenues have grown only moderately since 1984, superb management by Stan Lipsey, its publisher, has produced excellent profit growth. For several years, I have incorrectly predicted that profit margins at the News would fall. This year I will not let you down: Margins will, without question, shrink in 1988 and profit may fall as well. Skyrocketing newsprint costs will be the major cause.
尽管《布法罗新闻报》自1984年以来收入增长平缓，但在其出版商斯坦·利普西的出色管理下，实现了卓越的利润增长。多年来，我一直错误地预测该报的利润率会下降。今年我不会让你们失望：1988年利润率无疑将会下降，利润也可能随之减少。新闻纸成本飙升将是主要原因。
o Fechheimer Bros. Company is another of our family businesses - and, like the Blumkins, what a family. Three generations of Heldmans have for decades consistently, built the sales and profits of this manufacturer and distributor of uniforms. In the year that Berkshire acquired its controlling interest in Fechheimer - 1986 - profits were a record. The Heldmans didn't slow down after that. Last year earnings increased substantially and the outlook is good for 1988.
费奇海默兄弟公司是我们的另一家家族企业——和布卢姆金家族一样，这是一个多么优秀的家族啊。几十年来，赫尔德曼家族的三代人始终如一地推动着这家制服生产和经销商的销售额与利润增长。在伯克希尔取得费奇海默控股权的1986年，其利润创下了纪录。此后，赫尔德曼家族并未放缓脚步。去年，公司收益大幅增长，1988年的前景也十分良好。
There's nothing magic about the Uniform business; the only magic is in the Heldmans. Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred know the business inside and out, and they have fun running it. We are fortunate to be in partnership with them.
制服行业并无神奇之处，唯一的“魔力”在于赫尔德曼家族。鲍勃、乔治、加里、罗杰和弗雷德对这项业务了如指掌，而且在经营过程中充满乐趣。能与他们合作，我们感到十分幸运。
o Chuck Huggins continues to set new records at See's, just as he has ever since we put him in charge on the day of our purchase some 16 years ago. In 1987, volume hit a new high at slightly under 25 million pounds. For the second year in a row, moreover, same-store sales, measured in pounds, were virtually unchanged. In case you are wondering, that represents improvement: In each of the previous six years, same-store sales had fallen.
查克·哈金斯在喜诗糖果不断创下新纪录，就像大约16年前我们收购喜诗并让他负责管理以来的每一天一样。1987年，喜诗糖果的销量创下新高，略低于2500万磅。此外，以磅为单位计算的同店销售额连续第二年基本持平。或许你会疑惑，这其实意味着进步：在之前的六年里，同店销售额每年都在下降。
Although we had a particularly strong 1986 Christmas season, we racked up better store-for-store comparisons in the 1987 Christmas season than at any other time of the year. Thus, the seasonal factor at See's becomes even more extreme. In 1987, about 85% of our profit was earned during December.
尽管1986年的圣诞季业绩尤为强劲，但1987年圣诞季的同店业绩对比比当年其他任何时候都要好。因此，喜诗糖果的季节性特征愈发明显。1987年，我们约85%的利润来自12月。
Candy stores are fun to visit, but most have not been fun for their owners. From what we can learn, practically no one besides See's has made significant profits in recent years from the operation of candy shops. Clearly, Chuck's record at See's is not due to a rising industry tide. Rather, it is a one-of-a-kind performance.
糖果店很适合去逛逛，但对大多数店主来说并非如此。据我们所知，近年来，除了喜诗糖果，几乎没有人能从糖果店的经营中获得可观的利润。显然，查克在喜诗取得的业绩并非得益于行业的整体上涨趋势，而是独一无二的表现。
His achievement requires an excellent product - which we have - but it also requires genuine affection for the customer. Chuck is 100% customer-oriented, and his attitude sets the tone for the rest of the See's organization.
他的成就离不开优质的产品——我们确实拥有这样的产品——但也离不开对客户真诚的关爱。查克是100%以客户为中心的，他的态度为喜诗糖果的整个团队定下了基调。
Here's an example of Chuck in action: At See's we regularly add new pieces of candy to our mix and also cull a few to keep our product line at about 100 varieties. Last spring we selected 14 items for elimination. Two, it turned out, were badly missed by our customers, who wasted no time in letting us know what they thought of our judgment: "A pox on all in See's who participated in the abominable decision...;" "May your new truffles melt in transit, may they sour in people's mouths, may your costs go up and your profits go down...;" "We are investigating the possibility of obtaining a mandatory injunction requiring you to supply...;" You get the picture. In all, we received many hundreds of letters.
以下是查克实际工作中的一个例子：在喜诗，我们会定期添加新的糖果品种，同时淘汰一些，使产品线保持在约100种左右。去年春天，我们选定了14个品种进行淘汰。结果发现，其中两个品种深受客户喜爱，他们立刻向我们表达了对这一决定的看法：“愿所有参与这个可恶决定的喜诗人员都遭殃……”“愿你们的新松露巧克力在运输途中融化，在人们口中变酸，愿你们成本上升、利润下降……”“我们正在研究是否能获得强制禁令，要求你们继续供应……”你大概能想象到这种情景。我们总共收到了数百封这样的信件。
Chuck not only reintroduced the pieces, he turned this miscue into an opportunity. Each person who had written got a complete and honest explanation in return. Said Chuck's letter: "Fortunately, when I make poor decisions, good things often happen as a result...;" And with the letter went a special gift certificate.
查克不仅重新推出了这两个品种，还将这次失误转化为了一次机遇。每一位写信的客户都收到了一份完整且诚恳的解释。查克在信中说：“幸运的是，当我做出糟糕的决定时，往往会有好的事情随之而来……”随信还附上了一张特别的礼品券。
See's increased prices only slightly in the last two years. In 1988 we have raised prices somewhat more, though still moderately. To date, sales have been weak and it may be difficult for See's to improve its earnings this year.
过去两年，喜诗的价格仅略有上涨。1988年，我们的提价幅度有所加大，但仍较为温和。到目前为止，销量表现不佳，今年喜诗的收益可能难以增长。
o World Book, Kirby, and the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group are all under the management of Ralph Schey. And what a lucky thing for us that they are. I told you last year that Scott Fetzer performance in 1986 had far exceeded the expectations that Charlie and I had at the time of our purchase. Results in 1987 were even better. Pre-tax earnings rose 10% while average capital employed declined significantly.
《世界图书百科全书》、柯比以及斯科特·费策制造集团都由拉尔夫·谢伊管理。他们能由拉尔夫管理，对我们来说是多么幸运的事啊。去年我曾说过，斯科特·费策1986年的业绩远超查理和我在收购时的预期。1987年的业绩更是锦上添花。税前利润增长了10%，而所运用的平均资本却大幅下降。
Ralph's mastery of the 19 businesses for which he is responsible is truly amazing, and he has also attracted some outstanding managers to run them. We would love to find a few additional units that could be put under Ralph's wing.
拉尔夫对他所负责的19项业务的掌控力着实令人惊叹，他还吸引了一些优秀的管理者来运营这些业务。我们很希望能再找到一些业务部门交由拉尔夫管理。
The businesses of Scott Fetzer are too numerous to describe in detail. Let's just update you on one of our favorites: At the end of 1987, World Book introduced its most dramatically-revised edition since 1962. The number of color photos was increased from 14,000 to 24,000; over 6,000 articles were revised; 840 new contributors were added. Charlie and I recommend this product to you and your family, as we do World Book's products for younger children, Childcraft and Early World of Learning.
斯科特·费策旗下的业务众多，难以一一详细描述。我们仅向你介绍其中一个我们特别喜爱的业务的最新情况：1987年底，《世界图书百科全书》推出了自1962年以来改动最大的一个版本。彩色照片数量从14,000张增加到24,000张；超过6,000篇文章经过修订；新增了840位撰稿人。查理和我向你和你的家人推荐这款产品，就像我们推荐《世界图书百科全书》为幼儿打造的产品《儿童工艺》和《早期学习世界》一样。
In 1987, World Book unit sales in the United States increased for the fifth consecutive year. International sales and profits also grew substantially. The outlook is good for Scott Fetzer operations in aggregate, and for World Book in particular.
1987年，《世界图书百科全书》在美国的销量连续第五年增长。国际销售额和利润也大幅增长。总体而言，斯科特·费策旗下业务的前景良好，尤其是《世界图书百科全书》。
# Insurance Operations (保险业务)
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the insurance industry:
以下是我们常用的展示保险业关键数据的表格更新版本：
| Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%) (保费收入年度变化率) | Statutory Combined Ratio After Policyholder Dividends (法定综合成本率（扣除保户红利后）) | Yearly Change in Incurred Losses (%) (已发生损失年度变化率) | Inflation Rate Measured by GNP Deflator (%) (以国民生产总值平减指数衡量的通货膨胀率) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1981 ..... | 3.8 | 106.0 | 6.5 | 9.6 |
| 1982 ..... | 4.4 | 109.8 | 8.4 | 6.4 |
| 1983 ..... | 4.6 | 112.0 | 6.8 | 3.8 |
| 1984 ..... | 9.2 | 117.9 | 16.9 | 3.7 |
| 1985 ..... | 22.1 | 116.3 | 16.1 | 3.2 |
| 1986 (Rev.) | 22.2 | 108.0 | 13.5 | 2.6 |
| 1987 (Est.) | 8.7 | 104.7 | 6.8 | 3.0 |
Source: Best's Insurance Management Reports (来源：《贝斯特保险管理报告》)
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.
综合成本率是指保险总成本（已发生损失加上费用）与保费收入的比率：该比率低于100意味着承保盈利，高于100则意味着承保亏损。当考虑到保险公司从持有的保户资金（“浮存金”）中获得的投资收益时，在不包括股东资金所产生收益的情况下，综合成本率在107-111区间内通常意味着整体收支平衡。
The math of the insurance business, encapsulated by the table, is not very complicated. In years when the industry's annual gain in revenues (premiums) pokes along at 4% or 5%, underwriting losses are sure to mount. That is not because auto accidents, fires, windstorms and the like are occurring more frequently, nor has it lately been the fault of general inflation. Today, social and judicial inflation are the major culprits; the cost of entering a courtroom has simply ballooned. Part of the jump in cost arises from skyrocketing verdicts, and part from the tendency of judges and juries to expand the coverage of insurance policies beyond that contemplated by the insurer when the policies were written. Seeing no let-up in either trend, we continue to believe that the industry's revenues must grow at about 10% annually for it to just hold its own in terms of profitability, even though general inflation may be running at a considerably lower rate.
表格所概括的保险业的运算逻辑并不复杂。在行业年收入（保费）增长率仅为4%或5%的年份，承保亏损肯定会增加。这并非因为汽车事故、火灾、风暴等灾害发生得更频繁，也不是近期普遍通货膨胀造成的。如今，社会通胀和司法通胀是主要原因，诉讼成本大幅飙升。成本上涨部分源于天价判决，部分源于法官和陪审团倾向于将保险单的承保范围扩大到保险公司在拟定保单时所设想的范围之外。鉴于这两种趋势都没有减弱的迹象，我们仍然认为，即使普遍通货膨胀率可能低得多，行业收入也必须以每年约10%的速度增长，才能在盈利能力方面维持自身水平。
The strong revenue gains of 1985-87 almost guaranteed the industry an excellent underwriting performance in 1987 and, indeed, it was a banner year. But the news soured as the quarters rolled by: Best's estimates that year-over-year volume increases were 12.9%, 11.1%, 5.7%, and 5.6%. In 1988, the revenue gain is certain to be far below our 10% "equilibrium" figure. Clearly, the party is over.
1985-1987年强劲的收入增长几乎保证了保险业在1987年取得出色的承保业绩，事实上，这一年确实是丰收年。但随着季度的推进，情况变得不容乐观：贝斯特估计，同比业务量增长率分别为12.9%、11.1%、5.7%和5.6%。1988年，收入增长率肯定会远低于我们10%的“均衡”数字。显然，盛宴已经结束。
However, earnings will not immediately sink. A lag factor exists in this industry: Because most policies are written for a one-year term, higher or lower insurance prices do not have their full impact on earnings until many months after they go into effect. Thus, to resume our metaphor, when the party ends and the bar is closed, you are allowed to finish your drink. If results are not hurt by a major natural catastrophe, we predict a small climb for the industry's combined ratio in 1988, followed by several years of larger increases.
然而，收益不会立即下滑。这个行业存在滞后因素：由于大多数保单的期限为一年，保险价格的高低在生效后数月才能对收益产生全面影响。因此，沿用我们之前的比喻，当宴会结束、酒吧关门时，你还可以把杯中的酒喝完。如果业绩没有受到重大自然灾害的影响，我们预测1988年行业综合成本率会有小幅上升，随后几年的升幅会更大。
The insurance industry is cursed with a set of dismal economic characteristics that make for a poor long-term outlook: hundreds of competitors, ease of entry, and a product that cannot be differentiated in any meaningful way. In such a commodity-like business, only a very low-cost operator or someone operating in a protected, and usually small, niche can sustain high profitability levels.
保险业被一系列糟糕的经济特征所困扰，导致其长期前景不佳：竞争对手众多、进入门槛低，且产品无法在任何有意义的方面形成差异化。在这样一个类似大宗商品的行业中，只有成本极低的经营者，或者在受保护且通常规模较小的细分市场中运营的从业者，才能维持较高的盈利水平。
When shortages exist, however, even commodity businesses flourish. The insurance industry enjoyed that kind of climate for a while but it is now gone. One of the ironies of capitalism is that most managers in commodity industries abhor shortage conditions - even though those are the only circumstances permitting them good returns. Whenever shortages appear, the typical manager simply can't wait to expand capacity and thereby plug the hole through which money is showering upon him. This is precisely what insurance managers did in 1985-87, confirming again Disraeli's observation: "What we learn from history is that we do not learn from history."
然而，当出现供应短缺时，即便是大宗商品行业也会繁荣起来。保险业曾一度处于这样的环境中，但现在这种环境已经消失了。资本主义的一个讽刺之处在于，大宗商品行业的大多数管理者都厌恶短缺状况——尽管只有在这种状况下他们才能获得良好的回报。每当出现短缺时，典型的管理者都会迫不及待地扩大产能，从而堵住那个让金钱源源不断流向他的缺口。这正是保险行业管理者在1985-1987年所做的事情，这再次印证了迪斯雷利的观点：“我们从历史中学到的是，我们没有从历史中学习。”
At Berkshire, we work to escape the industry's commodity economics in two ways. First, we differentiate our product by our financial strength, which exceeds that of all others in the industry. This strength, however, is limited in its usefulness. It means nothing in the personal insurance field: The buyer of an auto or homeowners policy is going to get his claim paid even if his insurer fails (as many have). It often means nothing in the commercial insurance arena: When times are good, many major corporate purchasers of insurance and their brokers pay scant attention to the insurer's ability to perform under the more adverse conditions that may exist, say, five years later when a complicated claim is finally resolved. (Out of sight, out of mind - and, later on, maybe out-of-pocket.)
在伯克希尔，我们通过两种方式努力摆脱行业的大宗商品经济特性。首先，我们凭借自身的财务实力实现产品差异化，我们的财务实力超过了行业内所有其他公司。然而，这种实力的作用是有限的。在个人保险领域，它毫无意义：即使保险公司破产（很多公司都破产了），汽车保险或房屋保险的买家也能获得理赔。在商业保险领域，它往往也无足轻重：在景气时期，许多大型企业投保人及其经纪人很少关注保险公司在可能出现的更不利情况下（比如五年后一项复杂的索赔最终解决时）的赔付能力。（眼不见，心不烦——但后来可能就要掏腰包了。）
Periodically, however, buyers remember Ben Franklin's observation that it is hard for an empty sack to stand upright and recognize their need to buy promises only from insurers that have enduring financial strength. It is then that we have a major competitive advantage. When a buyer really focuses on whether a $10 million claim can be easily paid by his insurer five or ten years down the road, and when he takes into account the possibility that poor underwriting conditions may then coincide with depressed financial markets and defaults by reinsurer, he will find only a few companies he can trust. Among those, Berkshire will lead the pack.
然而，买家们总会时不时地想起本杰明·富兰克林的话：空袋子难以直立，进而意识到他们只需要从拥有持久财务实力的保险公司购买承诺。届时，我们就拥有了重大的竞争优势。当买家真正关注其保险公司在五到十年后是否能轻松支付1000万美元的索赔，并且考虑到承保状况不佳可能与金融市场低迷以及再保险公司违约同时发生的可能性时，他会发现只有少数几家公司是他可以信任的。在这些公司中，伯克希尔将处于领先地位。
Our second method of differentiating ourselves is the total indifference to volume that we maintain. In 1989, we will be perfectly willing to write five times as much business as we write in 1988 - or only one-fifth as much. We hope, of course, that conditions will allow us large volume. But we cannot control market prices. If they are unsatisfactory, we will simply do very little business. No other major insurer acts with equal restraint.
我们实现差异化的第二种方式是完全不关注业务量。1989年，我们完全愿意承保相当于1988年五倍的业务量，或者仅为1988年五分之一的业务量。当然，我们希望情况允许我们承接大量业务。但我们无法控制市场价格。如果价格不尽如人意，我们就干脆少做业务。没有其他主要保险公司能做到同样的克制。
Three conditions that prevail in insurance, but not in most businesses, allow us our flexibility. First, market share is not an important determinant of profitability: In this business, in contrast to the newspaper or grocery businesses, the economic rule is not survival of the fattest. Second, in many sectors of insurance, including most of those in which we operate, distribution channels are not proprietary and can be easily entered: Small volume this year does not preclude huge volume next year. Third, idle capacity - which in this industry largely means people - does not result in intolerable costs. In a way that industries such as printing or steel cannot, we can operate at quarter-speed much of the time and still enjoy long-term prosperity.
保险业存在三个大多数行业所没有的条件，这让我们具备了这种灵活性。首先，市场份额并非盈利能力的重要决定因素：在这个行业，与报纸或杂货行业不同，经济法则不是“最胖者生存”。其次，在保险业的许多领域，包括我们运营的大多数领域，分销渠道并非专有，很容易进入：今年业务量小并不妨碍明年业务量大增。第三，闲置产能——在这个行业主要指人员——不会导致难以承受的成本。我们可以在大部分时间里以四分之一的速度运营，却仍能保持长期繁荣，这是印刷或钢铁等行业无法做到的。
We follow a price-based-on-exposure, not-on-competition policy because it makes sense for our shareholders. But we're happy to report that it is also pro-social. This policy means that we are always available, given prices that we believe are adequate, to write huge volumes of almost any type of property-casualty insurance. Many other insurers follow an in-and-out approach. When they are "out" - because of mounting losses, capital inadequacy, or whatever - we are available. Of course, when others are panting to do business we are also available - but at such times we often find ourselves priced above the market. In effect, we supply insurance buyers and brokers with a large reservoir of standby capacity.
我们遵循基于风险敞口而非竞争的定价政策，因为这对我们的股东有利。但我们很高兴地报告，这也是有利于社会的。这一政策意味着，只要价格在我们看来是合理的，我们随时可以承接大量几乎任何类型的财产意外险业务。许多其他保险公司采取时进时出的策略。当他们“退出”市场时——无论是因为损失不断增加、资本不足还是其他原因——我们都在。当然，当其他公司急于开展业务时，我们也在——但在这种时候，我们的定价往往高于市场水平。实际上，我们为保险买家和经纪人提供了大量的备用承保能力。
One story from mid-1987 illustrates some consequences of our pricing policy: One of the largest family-owned insurance brokers in the country is headed by a fellow who has long been a shareholder of Berkshire. This man handles a number of large risks that are candidates for placement with our New York office. Naturally, he does the best he can for his clients. And, just as naturally, when the insurance market softened dramatically in 1987 he found prices at other insurers lower than we were willing to offer. His reaction was, first, to place all of his business elsewhere and, second, to buy more stock in Berkshire. Had we been really competitive, he said, we would have gotten his insurance business but he would not have bought our stock.
1987年中期的一个故事说明了我们定价政策的一些后果：美国最大的家族保险经纪公司之一由一位长期持有伯克希尔股份的人掌管。此人处理多项大型风险业务，这些业务有可能由我们的纽约办事处承保。自然，他会为客户竭尽全力。同样自然的是，1987年保险市场大幅疲软时，他发现其他保险公司的价格低于我们愿意提供的价格。他的反应是，首先，将所有业务都放到其他地方；其次，增持伯克希尔的股票。他说，如果我们真的有竞争力，我们会得到他的保险业务，但他就不会买我们的股票了。
Berkshire's underwriting experience was excellent in 1987, in part because of the lag factor discussed earlier. Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance) was 105. Although the ratio was somewhat less favorable than in 1986, when it was 103, our profitability improved materially in 1987 because we had the use of far more float. This trend will continue to run in our favor: Our ratio of float to premium volume will increase very significantly during the next few years. Thus, Berkshire's insurance profits are quite likely to improve during 1988 and 1989, even though we expect our combined ratio to rise.
1987年，伯克希尔的承保业绩出色，部分原因是前面讨论过的滞后因素。我们的综合成本率（按法定基准计算，不包括结构化 settlements（和解协议）和财务再保险）为105。尽管这一比率比1986年的103稍逊一筹，但1987年我们的盈利能力显著提升，因为我们拥有了多得多的浮存金可供使用。这一趋势将继续对我们有利：未来几年，我们的浮存金与保费收入之比将大幅上升。因此，尽管我们预计综合成本率会上升，但伯克希尔的保险利润在1988年和1989年很可能会有所增长。
Our insurance business has also made some important non-financial gains during the last few years. Mike Goldberg, its manager, has assembled a group of talented professionals to write larger risks and unusual coverages. His operation is now well equipped to handle the lines of business that will occasionally offer us major opportunities.
过去几年，我们的保险业务还取得了一些重要的非财务方面的成就。其经理迈克·戈德堡组建了一支由才华横溢的专业人士组成的团队，负责承保大型风险和特殊险种。他的团队现在已经做好充分准备，能够应对那些偶尔会给我们带来重大机遇的业务领域。
Our loss reserve development, detailed on pages 41-42, looks better this year than it has previously. But we write lots of "long-tail" business - that is, policies generating claims that often take many years to resolve. Examples would be product liability, or directors and officers liability coverages. With a business mix like this, one year of reserve development tells you very little.
我们的损失准备金变动情况（详见第41-42页）今年看起来比以往更好。但我们承保了大量“长尾”业务——即产生的索赔往往需要多年才能解决的保单。例如产品责任保险、董事及高级职员责任保险等。由于业务组合如此，一年的准备金变动情况说明不了什么问题。
You should be very suspicious of any earnings figures reported by insurers (including our own, as we have unfortunately proved to you in the past). The record of the last decade shows that a great many of our best-known insurers have reported earnings to shareholders that later proved to be wildly erroneous. In most cases, these errors were totally innocent: The unpredictability of our legal system makes it impossible for even the most conscientious insurer to come close to judging the eventual cost of long-tail claims.
你应该对保险公司公布的任何收益数据持高度怀疑态度（包括我们自己的，不幸的是，我们过去已经向你证明了这一点）。过去十年的记录显示，许多知名保险公司向股东报告的收益后来被证明存在严重错误。在大多数情况下，这些错误完全是无心之失：我们法律体系的不可预测性使得即使是最尽责的保险公司也几乎无法准确判断长尾索赔的最终成本。
Nevertheless, auditors annually certify the numbers given them by management and in their opinions unqualifiedly state that these figures "present fairly" the financial position of their clients. The auditors use this reassuring language even though they know from long and painful experience that the numbers so certified are likely to differ dramatically from the true earnings of the period. Despite this history of error, investors understandably rely upon auditors' opinions. After all, a declaration saying that "the statements present fairly" hardly sounds equivocal to the non-accountant.
然而，审计师每年都会对管理层提供的数据进行认证，并在其意见中无条件地声明这些数据“公允列报”了客户的财务状况。尽管审计师从长期痛苦的经验中得知，经过认证的数据可能与该时期的真实收益存在巨大差异，但他们还是使用这种令人安心的措辞。尽管有这样的错误历史，投资者依赖审计师的意见也是可以理解的。毕竟，对非会计专业人士来说，“报表公允列报”这一表述听起来几乎不像是模棱两可的。
The wording in the auditor's standard opinion letter is scheduled to change next year. The new language represents improvement, but falls far short of describing the limitations of a casualty-insurer audit. If it is to depict the true state of affairs, we believe the standard opinion letter to shareholders of a property-casualty company should read something like: "We have relied upon representations of management in respect to the liabilities shown for losses and loss adjustment expenses, the estimate of which, in turn, very materially affects the earnings and financial condition herein reported. We can express no opinion about the accuracy of these figures. Subject to that important reservation, in our opinion, etc."
审计师的标准意见函措辞定于明年更改。新的措辞有所改进，但远未说明财产意外险公司审计的局限性。我们认为，如果要描述真实情况，致财产意外险公司股东的标准意见函应该是这样的：“我们依赖管理层对所示损失及损失调整费用负债的陈述，而对这些负债的估计又极大地影响了本报告所披露的收益和财务状况。我们无法对这些数据的准确性发表意见。在这一重要保留意见的前提下，我们认为……”
If lawsuits develop in respect to wildly inaccurate financial statements (which they do), auditors will definitely say something of that sort in court anyway. Why should they not be forthright about their role and its limitations from the outset?
如果针对严重不准确的财务报表引发诉讼（这种情况确实会发生），审计师在法庭上肯定会说类似的话。那么，他们为什么不从一开始就坦诚地说明自己的角色及其局限性呢？
We want to emphasize that we are not faulting auditors for their inability to accurately assess loss reserves (and therefore earnings). We fault them only for failing to publicly acknowledge that they can't do this job.
我们想强调的是，我们并非指责审计师无法准确评估损失准备金（从而无法准确评估收益）。我们只是指责他们没有公开承认自己无法胜任这项工作。
From all appearances, the innocent mistakes that are constantly made in reserving are accompanied by others that are deliberate. Various charlatans have enriched themselves at the expense of the investing public by exploiting, first, the inability of auditors to evaluate reserve figures and, second, the auditors' willingness to confidently certify those figures as if they had the expertise to do so. We will continue to see such chicanery in the future. Where "earnings" can be created by the stroke of a pen, the dishonest will gather. For them, long-tail insurance is heaven. The audit wording we suggest would at least serve to put investors on guard against these predators.
从各方面来看，在准备金计提方面不断出现的无心之失，还伴随着一些故意为之的错误。形形色色的骗子通过两种方式牺牲投资者的利益来中饱私囊：一是利用审计师无法评估准备金数据的弱点；二是利用审计师愿意像拥有专业能力一样自信地认证这些数据的心理。未来我们还会看到这样的欺诈行为。在“收益”可以通过一笔一划创造出来的地方，不诚实的人就会聚集而来。对他们来说，长尾保险就是天堂。我们建议的审计措辞至少能让投资者对这些掠夺者保持警惕。
The taxes that insurance companies pay - which increased materially, though on a delayed basis, upon enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 - took a further turn for the worse at the end of 1987. We detailed the 1986 changes in last year's report. We also commented on the irony of a statute that substantially increased 1987 reported earnings for insurers even as it materially reduced both their long-term earnings potential and their business value. At Berkshire, the temporarily-helpful "fresh start" adjustment inflated 1987 earnings by $8.2 million.
保险公司缴纳的税款——在1986年《税收改革法案》颁布后，虽然有所延迟，但大幅增加——在1987年底进一步恶化。我们在去年的报告中详细说明了1986年的变化。我们还评论了一项具有讽刺意味的法规：该法规大幅增加了保险公司1987年的报告收益，同时却大大降低了它们的长期盈利潜力和企业价值。在伯克希尔，暂时有利的“新起点”调整使1987年的收益增加了820万美元。
In our opinion, the 1986 Act was the most important economic event affecting the insurance industry over the past decade. The 1987 Bill further reduced the intercorporate dividends-received credit from 80% to 70%, effective January 1, 1988, except for cases in which the taxpayer owns at least 20% of an investee.
我们认为，1986年的《税收改革法案》是过去十年影响保险业最重要的经济事件。1987年的法案进一步将公司间股息收入抵免从80%降至70%，自1988年1月1日起生效，但纳税人持有被投资方至少20%股份的情况除外。
Investors who have owned stocks or bonds through corporate intermediaries other than qualified investment companies have always been disadvantaged in comparison to those owning the same securities directly. The penalty applying to indirect ownership was greatly increased by the 1986 Tax Bill and, to a lesser extent, by the 1987 Bill, particularly in instances where the intermediary is an insurance company. We have no way of offsetting this increased level of taxation. It simply means that a given set of pre-tax investment returns will now translate into much poorer after-tax results for our shareholders.
通过合格投资公司以外的 corporate intermediaries（企业中介机构）持有股票或债券的投资者，与直接持有相同证券的投资者相比，始终处于不利地位。1986年的税法极大地加重了对间接持股的惩罚，1987年的法案在较小程度上也加重了这种惩罚，尤其是当中介机构是保险公司时。我们无法抵消这种加重的税负。这 simply（简单地）意味着，给定的一组税前投资回报现在将转化为对我们股东来说差得多的税后结果。
All in all, we expect to do well in the insurance business, though our record is sure to be uneven. The immediate outlook is for substantially lower volume but reasonable earnings improvement. The decline in premium volume will accelerate after our quota-share agreement with Fireman's Fund expires in 1989. At some point, likely to be at least a few years away, we may see some major opportunities, for which we are now much better prepared than we were in 1985.
总而言之，我们预计在保险业务上会取得不错的成绩，尽管我们的业绩肯定会有起伏。近期前景是业务量大幅下降，但收益会有合理增长。1989年我们与消防员基金的 quota-share（配额共享）协议到期后，保费收入的下降速度将会加快。在某个时候，可能至少几年后，我们可能会遇到一些重大机遇，而我们现在对此的准备比1985年充分得多。
# Marketable Securities - Permanent Holdings (有价证券——永久持股)
Whenever Charlie and I buy common stocks for Berkshire's insurance companies (leaving aside arbitrage purchases, discussed later) we approach the transaction as if we were buying into a private business. We look at the economic prospects of the business, the people in charge of running it, and the price we must pay. We do not have in mind any time or price for sale. Indeed, we are willing to hold a stock indefinitely so long as we expect the business to increase in intrinsic value at a satisfactory rate. When investing, we view ourselves as business analysts - not as market analysts, not as macroeconomic analysts, and not even as security analysts.
每当查理和我为伯克希尔的保险公司购买普通股时（不包括后文讨论的套利性购买），我们对待这笔交易的态度就如同收购一家私人企业。我们会考察该企业的经济前景、负责运营的管理层以及我们必须支付的价格。我们心中并没有任何卖出的时间或价格预期。事实上，只要我们预期该企业的内在价值能以令人满意的速度增长，我们愿意无限期持有其股票。投资时，我们将自己视为企业分析师——而非市场分析师、宏观经济分析师，甚至也不是证券分析师。
Our approach makes an active trading market useful, since it periodically presents us with mouth-watering opportunities. But by no means is it essential: a prolonged suspension of trading in the securities we hold would not bother us any more than does the lack of daily quotations on World Book or Fechheimer. Eventually, our economic fate will be determined by the economic fate of the business we own, whether our ownership is partial or total.
我们的投资方法让活跃的交易市场变得有用，因为它会时不时给我们带来极具吸引力的机会。但这绝非必不可少：我们所持证券的交易长期暂停，并不会比《世界图书百科全书》或费奇海默没有每日报价更让我们困扰。最终，无论我们是部分持股还是全资拥有，我们的经济命运都将由我们所拥有企业的经济命运所决定。
Ben Graham, my friend and teacher, long ago described the mental attitude toward market fluctuations that I believe to be most conducive to investment success. He said that you should imagine market quotations as coming from a remarkably accommodating fellow named Mr. Market who is your partner in a private business. Without fail, Mr. Market appears daily and names a price at which he will either buy your interest or sell you his.
我的朋友兼导师本·格雷厄姆很久以前就描述过一种对待市场波动的心态，我认为这种心态最有助于投资成功。他说，你应该把市场报价想象成来自一位非常乐于助人的名叫“市场先生”的人，他是你在一家私人企业的合作伙伴。市场先生每天都会出现，并报出一个价格，要么想买下你在企业中的份额，要么想把他的份额卖给你。
Even though the business that the two of you own may have economic characteristics that are stable, Mr. Market's quotations will be anything but. For, sad to say, the poor fellow has incurable emotional problems. At times he feels euphoric and can see only the favorable factors affecting the business. When in that mood, he names a very high buy-sell price because he fears that you will snap up his interest and rob him of imminent gains. At other times he is depressed and can see nothing but trouble ahead for both the business and the world. On these occasions he will name a very low price, since he is terrified that you will unload your interest on him.
尽管你们俩共同拥有的企业可能具有稳定的经济特征，但市场先生的报价却绝非如此。遗憾的是，这个可怜的家伙有无法治愈的情绪问题。有时他兴高采烈，只看到影响企业的有利因素。在这种情绪下，他会报出一个很高的买卖价格，因为他担心你会抢购他的份额，抢走他即将获得的收益。有时他又情绪低落，觉得企业和整个世界前景一片黯淡。在这些时候，他会报出一个很低的价格，因为他害怕你会把你的份额甩给他。
Mr. Market has another endearing characteristic: He doesn't mind being ignored. If his quotation is uninteresting to you today, he will be back with a new one tomorrow. Transactions are strictly at your option. Under these conditions, the more manic-depressive his behavior, the better for you.
市场先生还有一个可爱的特点：他不介意被忽视。如果他今天的报价你不感兴趣，他明天会带着新的报价再来。交易完全由你决定。在这种情况下，他的行为越反复无常，对你就越有利。
But, like Cinderella at the ball, you must heed one warning or everything will turn into pumpkins and mice: Mr. Market is there to serve you, not to guide you. It is his pocketbook, not his wisdom, that you will find useful. If he shows up some day in a particularly foolish mood, you are free to either ignore him or to take advantage of him, but it will be disastrous if you fall under his influence. Indeed, if you aren't certain that you understand and can value your business far better than Mr. Market, you don't belong in the game. As they say in poker, "If you've been in the game 30 minutes and you don't know who the patsy is, you're the patsy."
但是，就像舞会上的灰姑娘一样，你必须注意一个警告，否则一切都会变成南瓜和老鼠：市场先生是来为你服务的，而不是来指导你的。你会发现有用的是他的钱袋，而不是他的智慧。如果有一天他心情特别愚蠢，你可以选择无视他，或者利用他，但如果你受他影响，那就糟了。事实上，如果你不确定自己对企业的理解和估值远胜于市场先生，你就不应该参与这场游戏。就像玩扑克时人们常说的：“如果你玩了30分钟还不知道谁是傻瓜，那你就是那个傻瓜。”
Ben's Mr. Market allegory may seem out-of-date in today's investment world, in which most professionals and academicians talk of efficient markets, dynamic hedging and betas. Their interest in such matters is understandable, since techniques shrouded in mystery clearly have value to the purveyor of investment advice. After all, what witch doctor has ever achieved fame and fortune by simply advising "Take two aspirins"?
在当今的投资界，大多数专业人士和学者都在谈论有效市场、动态对冲和贝塔系数，本的市场先生寓言可能显得过时了。他们对这些东西感兴趣是可以理解的，因为神秘的技巧显然对提供投资建议的人很有价值。毕竟，哪个巫医仅仅靠建议“吃两片阿司匹林”就能名利双收呢？
The value of market esoterica to the consumer of investment advice is a different story. In my opinion, investment success will not be produced by arcane formulae, computer programs or signals flashed by the price behavior of stocks and markets. Rather an investor will succeed by coupling good business judgment with an ability to insulate his thoughts and behavior from the super-contagious emotions that swirl about the marketplace. In my own efforts to stay insulated, I have found it highly useful to keep Ben's Mr. Market concept firmly in mind.
市场奥秘对投资建议的接受者来说价值就另当别论了。在我看来，投资成功不会来自晦涩的公式、计算机程序或股票和市场价格行为发出的信号。相反，投资者的成功在于将良好的商业判断与不受市场上狂热情绪影响的能力相结合。在我努力保持不受影响的过程中，我发现牢牢记住本的市场先生概念非常有用。
Following Ben's teachings, Charlie and I let our marketable equities tell us by their operating results - not by their daily, or even yearly, price quotations - whether our investments are successful. The market may ignore business success for a while, but eventually will confirm it. As Ben said: "In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run it is a weighing machine." The speed at which a business's success is recognized, furthermore, is not that important as long as the company's intrinsic value is increasing at a satisfactory rate. In fact, delayed recognition can be an advantage: It may give us the chance to buy more of a good thing at a bargain price.
遵循本的教诲，查理和我通过有价证券的经营业绩——而不是它们的每日甚至每年的价格报价——来判断我们的投资是否成功。市场可能会在一段时间内忽视企业的成功，但最终会认可它。正如本所说：“短期来看，市场是一台投票机，但长期来看，它是一台称重机。”此外，只要公司的内在价值以令人满意的速度增长，其成功被认可的速度并不重要。事实上，延迟认可可能是一种优势：它可能会给我们机会以便宜的价格购买更多好东西。
Sometimes, of course, the market may judge a business to be more valuable than the underlying facts would indicate it is. In such a case, we will sell our holdings. Sometimes, also, we will sell a security that is fairly valued or even undervalued because we require funds for a still more undervalued investment or one we believe we understand better.
当然，有时市场可能会认为一家企业的价值高于其实际情况所显示的价值。在这种情况下，我们会卖出所持股份。有时，我们也会卖出估值合理甚至被低估的证券，因为我们需要资金去投资那些被低估得更厉害的证券，或者我们认为自己更了解的证券。
We need to emphasize, however, that we do not sell holdings just because they have appreciated or because we have held them for a long time. (Of Wall Street maxims the most foolish may be "You can't go broke taking a profit.") We are quite content to hold any security indefinitely, so long as the prospective return on equity capital of the underlying business is satisfactory, management is competent and honest, and the market does not overvalue the business.
然而，我们需要强调的是，我们不会仅仅因为所持股份升值了或者持有时间长了就卖出。（在华尔街的格言中，最愚蠢的可能是“见好就收不会破产”。）只要相关业务的预期股本回报率令人满意、管理层有能力且诚实、市场没有高估该业务，我们非常愿意无限期持有任何证券。
However, our insurance companies own three marketable common stocks that we would not sell even though they became far overpriced in the market. In effect, we view these investments exactly like our successful controlled businesses - a permanent part of Berkshire rather than merchandise to be disposed of once Mr. Market offers us a sufficiently high price. To that, I will add one qualifier: These stocks are held by our insurance companies and we would, if absolutely necessary, sell portions of our holdings to pay extraordinary insurance losses. We intend, however, to manage our affairs so that sales are never required.
然而，我们的保险公司持有三只流通普通股，即使它们在市场上被严重高估，我们也不会卖出。实际上，我们看待这些投资就像看待我们成功的受控企业一样——是伯克希尔永久的一部分，而不是一旦市场先生给出足够高的价格就可以处置的商品。对此，我要补充一个限定条件：这些股票由我们的保险公司持有，在万不得已的情况下，我们会卖出部分持股来支付巨额保险损失。不过，我们打算管理好我们的事务，确保永远不需要这样做。
A determination to have and to hold, which Charlie and I share, obviously involves a mixture of personal and financial considerations. To some, our stand may seem highly eccentric. (Charlie and I have long followed David Oglivy's advice: "Develop your eccentricities while you are young. That way, when you get old, people won't think you're going ga-ga.") Certainly, in the transaction-fixated Wall Street of recent years, our posture must seem odd: To many in that arena, both companies and stocks are seen only as raw material for trades.
查理和我都决心持有股份，这显然涉及个人和财务方面的综合考虑。在一些人看来，我们的立场可能非常古怪。（查理和我早就遵循了大卫·奥格威的建议：“年轻时就培养你的怪癖。这样，当你老了，人们不会认为你疯了。”）当然，在近年来热衷于交易的华尔街，我们的姿态肯定显得很奇怪：在那个领域的许多人看来，公司和股票都只是交易的原材料。
Our attitude, however, fits our personalities and the way we want to live our lives. Churchill once said, "You shape your houses and then they shape you." We know the manner in which we wish to be shaped. For that reason, we would rather achieve a return of X while associating with people whom we strongly like and admire than realize 110% of X by exchanging these relationships for uninteresting or unpleasant ones. And we will never find people we like and admire more than some of the main participants at the three companies - our permanent holdings - shown below:
然而，我们的态度符合我们的个性和我们想要的生活方式。丘吉尔曾经说过：“你建造你的房子，然后房子塑造你。”我们知道我们希望被怎样塑造。出于这个原因，我们宁愿在与我们非常喜欢和钦佩的人交往中获得X的回报，也不愿通过将这些关系换成无趣或不愉快的关系来获得110%的X回报。而且，我们再也找不到比以下三家公司（我们的永久持股）的一些主要参与者更让我们喜欢和钦佩的人了：
| 持股数量（No. of Shares） | 公司名称 | 成本（Cost） | 市值（Market） |
|---|---|---|---|
| （单位：千美元，省略） | （单位：千美元，省略） | ||
| 3,000,000 | 首都/美国广播公司（Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.）........... | $517,500 | $1,035,000 |
| 6,850,000 | 政府员工保险公司（GEICO Corporation）.................. | $45,713 | $756,925 |
| 1,727,765 | 华盛顿邮报公司（The Washington Post Company）........ | $9,731 | $323,092 |
We really don't see many fundamental differences between the purchase of a controlled business and the purchase of marketable holdings such as these. In each case we try to buy into businesses with favorable long-term economics. Our goal is to find an outstanding business at a sensible price, not a mediocre business at a bargain price. Charlie and I have found that making silk purses out of silk is the best that we can do; with sow's ears, we fail.
我们真的不认为收购一家受控企业与购买诸如此类的有价证券之间有很多根本区别。在这两种情况下，我们都试图投资于具有良好长期经济前景的企业。我们的目标是以合理的价格找到一家优秀的企业，而不是以便宜的价格找到一家平庸的企业。查理和我发现，我们能做到的最好的事情就是用丝绸做丝绸钱包；用猪耳朵，我们是做不出丝绸钱包的（即巧妇难为无米之炊）。
(It must be noted that your Chairman, always a quick study, required only 20 years to recognize how important it was to buy good businesses. In the interim, I searched for "bargains" - and had the misfortune to find some. My punishment was an education in the economics of short-line farm implement manufacturers, third-place department stores, and New England textile manufacturers.)
（必须指出的是，你们的董事长虽然学东西很快，但花了20年才认识到购买好企业的重要性。在此期间，我一直在寻找“便宜货”——不幸的是还真找到了一些。我的教训是从短线农机制造商、排名第三的百货公司和新英格兰纺织制造商的经济状况中得到的。）
Of course, Charlie and I may misread the fundamental economics of a business. When that happens, we will encounter problems whether that business is a wholly-owned subsidiary or a marketable security, although it is usually far easier to exit from the latter. (Indeed, businesses can be misread: Witness the European reporter who, after being sent to this country to profile Andrew Carnegie, cabled his editor, "My God, you'll never believe the sort of money there is in running libraries.")
当然，查理和我可能会误判一家企业的基本经济状况。当这种情况发生时，无论这家企业是全资子公司还是有价证券，我们都会遇到问题，尽管通常从后者中退出要容易得多。（事实上，企业可能会被误判：有一个例子，一位欧洲记者被派到这个国家来报道安德鲁·卡内基，他给编辑发了一封电报：“天哪，你永远不会相信经营图书馆能赚这么多钱。”）
In making both control purchases and stock purchases, we try to buy not only good businesses, but ones run by high-grade, talented and likeable managers. If we make a mistake about the managers we link up with, the controlled company offers a certain advantage because we have the power to effect change. In practice, however, this advantage is somewhat illusory: Management changes, like marital changes, are painful, time-consuming and chancy. In any event, at our three marketable-but permanent holdings, this point is moot: With Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities, Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post, we simply couldn't be in better hands.
在进行控制性收购和股票购买时，我们不仅试图购买好企业，还试图购买由高素质、有才华且讨人喜欢的管理者经营的企业。如果我们在与之合作的管理者方面犯了错误，受控公司有一个特定的优势，因为我们有权力进行变革。然而，在实践中，这种优势在某种程度上是虚幻的：管理层变动，就像婚姻变动一样，是痛苦、耗时且有风险的。无论如何，在我们的三家有价证券性质的永久持股公司中，这一点无关紧要：有首都公司的汤姆·墨菲和丹·伯克、政府员工保险公司的比尔·斯奈德和卢·辛普森，以及《华盛顿邮报》的凯·格雷厄姆和迪克·西蒙斯，我们真是太幸运了。
I would say that the controlled company offers two main advantages. First, when we control a company we get to allocate capital, whereas we are likely to have little or nothing to say about this process with marketable holdings. This point can be important because the heads of many companies are not skilled in capital allocation. Their inadequacy is not surprising. Most bosses rise to the top because they have excelled in an area such as marketing, production, engineering, administration or, sometimes, institutional politics.
我想说，受控公司有两个主要优势。首先，当我们控制一家公司时，我们可以进行资本配置，而对于有价证券，我们在这个过程中可能几乎没有发言权，或者完全没有发言权。这一点可能很重要，因为许多公司的负责人并不擅长资本配置。他们的不足并不令人惊讶。大多数老板之所以能升到高位，是因为他们在营销、生产、工程、管理等领域表现出色，有时甚至是在机构政治方面。
Once they become CEOs, they face new responsibilities. They now must make capital allocation decisions, a critical job that they may have never tackled and that is not easily mastered. To stretch the point, it's as if the final step for a highly-talented musician was not to perform at Carnegie Hall but, instead, to be named Chairman of the Federal Reserve.
一旦他们成为首席执行官，他们就面临着新的责任。他们现在必须做出资本配置决策，这是一项他们可能从未处理过且不易掌握的关键工作。夸张一点说，这就好比一个极具天赋的音乐家，其最终目标不是在卡内基音乐厅演出，而是被任命为美联储主席。
The lack of skill that many CEOs have at capital allocation is no small matter: After ten years on the job, a CEO whose company annually retains earnings equal to 10% of net worth will have been responsible for the deployment of more than 60% of all the capital at work in the business.
许多首席执行官在资本配置方面缺乏技能，这可不是小事：在任职十年后，一家公司每年留存收益相当于净值10%的首席执行官，将负责配置该企业60%以上的资本。
CEOs who recognize their lack of capital-allocation skills (which not all do) will often try to compensate by turning to their staffs, management consultants, or investment bankers. Charlie and I have frequently observed the consequences of such "help." On balance, we feel it is more likely to accentuate the capital-allocation problem than to solve it.
那些认识到自己缺乏资本配置技能的首席执行官（并非所有人都能认识到）往往会试图通过求助于员工、管理顾问或投资银行家来弥补。查理和我经常观察到这种“帮助”的后果。总的来说，我们认为这更有可能加剧而不是解决资本配置问题。
In the end, plenty of unintelligent capital allocation takes place in corporate America. (That's why you hear so much about "restructuring.") Berkshire, however, has been fortunate. At the companies that are our major non-controlled holdings, capital has generally been well-deployed and, in some cases, brilliantly so.
最终，美国企业界存在大量不明智的资本配置。（这就是为什么你会听到这么多关于“重组”的说法。）然而，伯克希尔很幸运。在我们的主要非受控持股公司中，资本总体上配置得当，在某些情况下，配置得非常出色。
The second advantage of a controlled company over a marketable security has to do with taxes. Berkshire, as a corporate holder, absorbs some significant tax costs through the ownership of partial positions that we do not when our ownership is 80%, or greater. Such tax disadvantages have long been with us, but changes in the tax code caused them to increase significantly during the past year. As a consequence, a given business result can now deliver Berkshire financial results that are as much as 50% better if they come from an 80%-or-greater holding rather than from a lesser holding.
受控公司相对于有价证券的第二个优势与税收有关。伯克希尔作为企业持股者，通过持有部分股权会承担一些重大的税收成本，而当我们的持股比例达到80%或更高时，就不会有这些成本。这种税收劣势长期以来一直存在，但税法的变化导致过去一年这些劣势显著增加。因此，给定的业务业绩如果来自80%或更高持股比例的公司，与来自较低持股比例的公司相比，现在能为伯克希尔带来的财务业绩要好出多达50%。
The disadvantages of owning marketable securities are sometimes offset by a huge advantage: Occasionally the stock market offers us the chance to buy non-controlling pieces of extraordinary businesses at truly ridiculous prices - dramatically below those commanded in negotiated transactions that transfer control. For example, we purchased our Washington Post stock in 1973 at $5.63 per share, and per-share operating earnings in 1987 after taxes were $10.30. Similarly, Our GEICO stock was purchased in 1976, 1979 and 1980 at an average of $6.67 per share, and after-tax operating earnings per share last year were $9.01. In cases such as these, Mr. Market has proven to be a mighty good friend.
持有有价证券的劣势有时会被一个巨大的优势所抵消：有时股票市场会给我们机会，以真正荒谬的价格购买卓越企业的非控制性股份——价格大大低于转让控制权的协商交易中的价格。例如，我们在1973年以每股5.63美元的价格购买了《华盛顿邮报》的股票，1987年的每股税后运营收益为10.30美元。同样，我们在1976年、1979年和1980年购买的政府员工保险公司的股票，平均每股6.67美元，去年的每股税后运营收益为9.01美元。在这种情况下，市场先生被证明是一个非常好的朋友。
An interesting accounting irony overlays a comparison of the reported financial results of our controlled companies with those of the permanent minority holdings listed above. As you can see, those three stocks have a market value of over $2 billion. Yet they produced only $11 million in reported after-tax earnings for Berkshire in 1987.
在比较我们的受控公司与上述永久少数股权持股公司的报告财务业绩时，存在一个有趣的会计讽刺。如你所见，这三只股票的市值超过20亿美元。然而，1987年它们为伯克希尔带来的报告税后收益仅为1100万美元。
Accounting rules dictate that we take into income only the dividends these companies pay us - which are little more than nominal - rather than our share of their earnings, which in 1987 amounted to well over $100 million. On the other hand, accounting rules provide that the carrying value of these three holdings - owned, as they are, by insurance companies - must be recorded on our balance sheet at current market prices. The result: GAAP accounting lets us reflect in our net worth the up-to-date underlying values of the businesses we partially own, but does not let us reflect their underlying earnings in our income account.
会计准则规定，我们只能将这些公司支付给我们的股息计入收入——这些股息只不过是象征性的——而不能将我们所占的它们的收益份额计入收入，1987年这部分份额远远超过1亿美元。另一方面，会计准则规定，这三项持股（由保险公司持有）的账面价值必须按当前市场价格记录在我们的资产负债表上。结果是：公认会计原则让我们在净值中反映我们部分拥有的企业的最新潜在价值，但不让我们在收入账户中反映它们的潜在收益。
In the case of our controlled companies, just the opposite is true. Here, we show full earnings in our income account but never change asset values on our balance sheet, no matter how much the value of a business might have increased since we purchased it.
在我们的受控公司中，情况恰恰相反。在这里，我们在收入账户中显示全部收益，但无论自我们购买以来企业的价值增加了多少，我们都不会改变资产负债表上的资产价值。
Our mental approach to this accounting schizophrenia is to ignore GAAP figures and to focus solely on the future earning power of both our controlled and non-controlled businesses. Using this approach, we establish our own ideas of business value, keeping these independent from both the accounting values shown on our books for controlled companies and the values placed by a sometimes foolish market on our partially-owned companies. It is this business value that we hope to increase at a reasonable (or, preferably, unreasonable) rate in the years ahead.
我们对这种会计分裂症的心态是忽视公认会计原则的数字，只关注我们的受控和非受控企业的未来盈利能力。采用这种方法，我们建立自己对企业价值的看法，使其既独立于我们账面上显示的受控公司的会计价值，也独立于有时愚蠢的市场对我们部分拥有的公司的估值。我们希望在未来几年里，这种企业价值能以合理（或者更理想的是，不合理）的速度增长。
# Marketable Securities - Other (有价证券——其他)
In addition to our three permanent common stock holdings, we hold large quantities of marketable securities in our insurance companies. In selecting these, we can choose among five major categories: (1) long-term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed-income securities, (3) long-term fixed income securities, (4) short-term cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.
除了我们的三项永久普通股持股外，我们的保险公司还持有大量有价证券。在选择这些证券时，我们可以在五大类中进行选择：（1）长期普通股投资，（2）中期固定收益证券，（3）长期固定收益证券，（4）短期现金等价物，以及（5）短期套利承诺。
We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories. We just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax returns as measured by "mathematical expectation," limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal, rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.
在从这些类别中进行选择时，我们没有特别的偏好。我们只是不断地在其中寻找以“数学期望”衡量的最高税后回报，始终将自己限制在我们认为自己理解的投资选择范围内。我们的标准与最大化可立即报告的收益无关；相反，我们的目标是最大化最终净值。
o Let's look first at common stocks. During 1987 the stock market was an area of much excitement but little net movement: The Dow advanced 2.3% for the year. You are aware, of course, of the roller coaster ride that produced this minor change. Mr. Market was on a manic rampage until October and then experienced a sudden, massive seizure.
让我们首先看看普通股。1987年，股票市场是一个充满兴奋但净波动很小的领域：道琼斯指数全年上涨2.3%。当然，你知道这种微小变化背后的过山车式波动。市场先生在10月前一直处于狂热状态，然后突然经历了一次大规模的“抽搐”。
We have "professional" investors, those who manage many billions, to thank for most of this turmoil. Instead of focusing on what businesses will do in the years ahead, many prestigious money managers now focus on what they expect other money managers to do in the days ahead. For them, stocks are merely tokens in a game, like the thimble and flatiron in Monopoly.
这场动荡在很大程度上要归功于那些管理着数十亿美元的“专业”投资者。许多知名的基金经理不再关注企业未来几年的表现，而是关注他们预期其他基金经理未来几天会做什么。对他们来说，股票只是游戏中的代币，就像大富翁游戏中的顶针和平底锅一样。
An extreme example of what their attitude leads to is "portfolio insurance," a money-management strategy that many leading investment advisors embraced in 1986-1987. This strategy - which is simply an exotically-labeled version of the small speculator's stop-loss order dictates that ever increasing portions of a stock portfolio, or their index-future equivalents, be sold as prices decline. The strategy says nothing else matters: A downtick of a given magnitude automatically produces a huge sell order. According to the Brady Report, $60 billion to $90 billion of equities were poised on this hair trigger in mid-October of 1987.
他们的态度导致的一个极端例子是“投资组合保险”，这是许多领先的投资顾问在1986-1987年采用的一种资金管理策略。这种策略——只不过是小投机者止损指令的一个花哨标签版本——规定，随着价格下跌，股票投资组合的越来越大的部分，或其指数期货等价物，都要被卖出。该策略认为其他一切都无关紧要：给定幅度的下跌会自动产生大量卖单。根据布雷迪报告，1987年10月中旬，有600亿至900亿美元的股票处于这种一触即发的状态。
If you've thought that investment advisors were hired to invest, you may be bewildered by this technique. After buying a farm, would a rational owner next order his real estate agent to start selling off pieces of it whenever a neighboring property was sold at a lower price? Or would you sell your house to whatever bidder was available at 9:31 on some morning merely because at 9:30 a similar house sold for less than it would have brought on the previous day?
如果你认为聘请投资顾问是为了进行投资，你可能会对这种技术感到困惑。购买农场后，理性的业主会在邻近的房产以较低价格出售时，命令他的房地产经纪人开始出售农场的部分土地吗？或者，你会仅仅因为在某个早上9:30，一套类似的房子售价低于前一天的价格，就在9:31把你的房子卖给任何一个出价的人吗？
Moves like that, however, are what portfolio insurance tells a pension fund or university to make when it owns a portion of enterprises such as Ford or General Electric. The less these companies are being valued at, says this approach, the more vigorously they should be sold. As a "logical" corollary, the approach commands the institutions to repurchase these companies - I'm not making this up - once their prices have rebounded significantly. Considering that huge sums are controlled by managers following such Alice-in-Wonderland practices, is it any surprise that markets sometimes behave in aberrational fashion?
然而，当养老基金或大学持有福特或通用电气等企业的部分股权时，投资组合保险就会让它们做出这样的举动。这种方法认为，这些公司的估值越低，就越应该大力抛售它们。作为一个“合乎逻辑”的推论，这种方法要求机构在这些公司的价格大幅反弹后——我可不是编造的——重新回购它们。考虑到巨额资金由遵循这种爱丽丝梦游仙境式做法的经理们控制，市场有时会出现异常行为，这有什么奇怪的吗？
Many commentators, however, have drawn an incorrect conclusion upon observing recent events: They are fond of saying that the small investor has no chance in a market now dominated by the erratic behavior of the big boys. This conclusion is dead wrong: Such markets are ideal for any investor - small or large - so long as he sticks to his investment knitting. Volatility caused by money managers who speculate irrationally with huge sums will offer the true investor more chances to make intelligent investment moves. He can be hurt by such volatility only if he is forced, by either financial or psychological pressures, to sell at untoward times.
然而，许多评论员在观察最近的事件后得出了一个错误的结论：他们喜欢说，在一个现在由大机构的不稳定行为主导的市场中，小投资者没有机会。这个结论大错特错：这样的市场对任何投资者——无论大小——都是理想的，只要他坚持自己的投资原则。由基金经理用巨额资金进行非理性投机造成的波动性，将为真正的投资者提供更多做出明智投资举动的机会。只有当他因财务或心理压力而被迫在不适宜的时机卖出时，才会被这种波动性伤害。
At Berkshire, we have found little to do in stocks during the past few years. During the break in October, a few stocks fell to prices that interested us, but we were unable to make meaningful purchases before they rebounded. At yearend 1987 we had no major common stock investments (that is, over $50 million) other than those we consider permanent or arbitrage holdings. However, Mr. Market will offer us opportunities - you can be sure of that - and, when he does, we will be willing and able to participate.
在伯克希尔，过去几年我们在股票方面几乎没什么可做的。在10月的股市暴跌期间，有几只股票跌到了让我们感兴趣的价格，但在它们反弹之前，我们没能进行有意义的购买。1987年底，除了我们认为是永久持股或套利持股的股票外，我们没有重大的普通股投资（即超过5000万美元）。然而，市场先生会给我们机会的——这一点你可以肯定——当机会来临时，我们愿意并且能够参与其中。
o In the meantime, our major parking place for money is medium-term tax-exempt bonds, whose limited virtues I explained in last year's annual report. Though we both bought and sold some of these bonds in 1987, our position changed little overall, holding around $900 million. A large portion of our bonds are "grandfathered" under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which means they are fully tax-exempt. Bonds currently purchased by insurance companies are not.
与此同时，我们主要的资金存放处是中期免税债券，我在去年的年度报告中解释了其有限的优点。尽管1987年我们既买入又卖出了一些这类债券，但我们的持仓总体变化不大，保持在约9亿美元左右。我们的很大一部分债券在1986年《税收改革法案》下是“祖父级”的，这意味着它们是完全免税的。保险公司目前购买的债券则不是。
As an alternative to short-term cash equivalents, our medium-term tax-exempts have - so far served us well. They have produced substantial extra income for us and are currently worth a bit above our cost. Regardless of their market price, we are ready to dispose of our bonds whenever something better comes along.
作为短期现金等价物的替代选择，我们的中期免税债券到目前为止对我们很有帮助。它们为我们带来了可观的额外收入，目前的价值略高于我们的成本。无论它们的市场价格如何，只要有更好的投资机会出现，我们就准备抛售我们的债券。
o We continue to have an aversion to long-term bonds (and may be making a serious mistake by not disliking medium-term bonds as well). Bonds are no better than the currency in which they are denominated, and nothing we have seen in the past year - or past decade - makes us enthusiastic about the long-term future of U.S. currency.
我们仍然厌恶长期债券（而且如果不厌恶中期债券，可能也是一个严重的错误）。债券的价值不会超过其计价货币的价值，而过去一年——乃至过去十年——我们所看到的一切，都没有让我们对美元的长期前景感到乐观。
Our enormous trade deficit is causing various forms of "claim checks" - U.S. government and corporate bonds, bank deposits, etc. - to pile up in the hands of foreigners at a distressing rate. By default, our government has adopted an approach to its finances patterned on that of Blanche DuBois, of A Streetcar Named Desire, who said, "I have always depended on the kindness of strangers." In this case, of course, the "strangers" are relying on the integrity of our claim checks although the plunging dollar has already made that proposition expensive for them.
我们巨大的贸易逆差正导致各种形式的“索赔凭证”——美国政府和企业债券、银行存款等——以令人不安的速度在外国人手中堆积。默认情况下，我们的政府在财政上采取的做法，就像《欲望号街车》中的布兰奇·杜波依斯所说的：“我总是依赖陌生人的善意。”当然，在这种情况下，这些“陌生人”依赖的是我们索赔凭证的诚信，尽管美元暴跌已经让他们为此付出了高昂的代价。
The faith that foreigners are placing in us may be misfounded. When the claim checks outstanding grow sufficiently numerous and when the issuing party can unilaterally determine their purchasing power, the pressure on the issuer to dilute their value by inflating the currency becomes almost irresistible. For the debtor government, the weapon of inflation is the economic equivalent of the "H" bomb, and that is why very few countries have been allowed to swamp the world with debt denominated in their own currency. Our past, relatively good record for fiscal integrity has let us break this rule, but the generosity accorded us is likely to intensify, rather than relieve, the eventual pressure on us to inflate. If we do succumb to that pressure, it won't be just the foreign holders of our claim checks who will suffer. It will be all of us as well.
外国人对我们的信任可能是没有根据的。当流通中的索赔凭证数量足够多，且发行方可以单方面决定其购买力时，发行方通过通货膨胀稀释其价值的压力几乎是不可抗拒的。对于债务国政府来说，通货膨胀这一武器在经济上相当于氢弹，这就是为什么很少有国家被允许用本国货币计价的债务充斥世界。我们过去相对良好的财政诚信记录让我们打破了这一规则，但给予我们的这种“慷慨”可能会加剧，而不是缓解最终的通胀压力。如果我们屈服于这种压力，受苦的将不仅仅是持有我们索赔凭证的外国人，我们所有人也都会受到影响。
Of course, the U.S. may take steps to stem our trade deficit well before our position as a net debtor gets out of hand. (In that respect, the falling dollar will help, though unfortunately it will hurt in other ways.) Nevertheless, our government's behavior in this test of its mettle is apt to be consistent with its Scarlett O'Hara approach generally: "I'll think about it tomorrow." And, almost inevitably, procrastination in facing up to fiscal problems will have inflationary consequences.
当然，在美国作为净债务国的地位失控之前，美国可能会采取措施遏制贸易逆差。（在这方面，美元下跌会有所帮助，尽管不幸的是，它在其他方面会造成损害。）然而，在这场考验耐力的测试中，我们政府的行为很可能与斯嘉丽·奥哈拉的通常做法一致：“明天再考虑吧。”而且，几乎不可避免的是，拖延解决财政问题将产生通胀后果。
Both the timing and the sweep of those consequences are unpredictable. But our inability to quantify or time the risk does not mean we should ignore it. While recognizing the possibility that we may be wrong and that present interest rates may adequately compensate for the inflationary risk, we retain a general fear of long-term bonds.
这些后果的发生时间和影响范围都是不可预测的。但我们无法量化或确定风险的时间，并不意味着我们应该忽视它。尽管我们认识到自己可能是错的，当前的利率可能足以补偿通胀风险，但我们仍然对长期债券普遍感到担忧。
We are, however, willing to invest a moderate portion of our funds in this category if we think we have a significant edge in a specific security. That willingness explains our holdings of the Washington Public Power Supply Systems #1, #2 and #3 issues, discussed in our 1984 report. We added to our WPPSS position during 1987. At yearend, we had holdings with an amortized cost of $240 million and a market value of $316 million, paying us tax-exempt income of $34 million annually.
然而，如果我们认为在某一特定证券上有显著优势，我们愿意将一部分资金投入这一类别。这种意愿解释了我们持有华盛顿公共电力供应系统1号、2号和3号债券的原因，这在我们1984年的报告中有所讨论。1987年，我们增加了对WPPSS的持仓。年底时，我们持有的债券摊余成本为2.4亿美元，市值为3.16亿美元，每年为我们带来3400万美元的免税收入。
o We continued to do well in arbitrage last year, though - or perhaps because - we operated on a very limited scale. We enter into only a few arbitrage commitments each year and restrict ourselves to large transactions that have been publicly announced. We do not participate in situations in which greenmailers are attempting to put a target company "in play."
去年，我们在套利方面继续表现良好，尽管——或者可能是因为——我们的操作规模非常有限。我们每年只进行少数几笔套利交易，并仅限于已公开宣布的大型交易。我们不参与那些“绿票讹诈者”试图将目标公司置于“待交易”状态的情况。
We have practiced arbitrage on an opportunistic basis for decades and, to date, our results have been quite good. Though we've never made an exact calculation, I believe that overall we have averaged annual pre-tax returns of at least 25% from arbitrage. I'm quite sure we did better than that in 1987. But it should be emphasized that a really bad experience or two - such as many arbitrage operations suffered in late 1987 - could change the figures dramatically.
几十年来，我们一直 opportunistically（ opportunistically 此处译为“伺机”）进行套利交易，到目前为止，我们的结果相当不错。虽然我们从未进行过精确计算，但我相信我们套利交易的总体平均年化税前回报率至少为25%。我很确定1987年我们的表现更好。但需要强调的是，一两次非常糟糕的经历——比如1987年末许多套利操作遭受的损失——可能会极大地改变这一数据。
Our only $50 million-plus arbitrage position at yearend 1987 was 1,096,200 shares of Allegis, with a cost of $76 million and a market value of $78 million.
1987年底，我们唯一一笔超过5000万美元的套利持仓是1,096,200股的Allegis股票，成本为7600万美元，市值为7800万美元。
o We had two other large holdings at yearend that do not fit precisely into any of our five categories. One was various Texaco, Inc. bonds with short maturities, all purchased after Texaco went into bankruptcy. Were it not for the extraordinarily strong capital position of our insurance companies, it would be inappropriate for us to buy defaulted bonds. At prices prevailing after Texaco's bankruptcy filing, however, we regarded these issues as by far the most attractive bond investment available to us.
年底时，我们还有另外两笔大型持仓，无法准确归入我们的五大类别中。其中之一是德士古公司的各种短期债券，都是在德士古破产后购买的。如果不是我们保险公司异常强劲的资本状况，我们购买违约债券是不合适的。然而，以德士古申请破产后的普遍价格来看，我们认为这些债券是目前最具吸引力的债券投资。
On a worst-case basis with respect to the Pennzoil litigation, we felt the bonds were likely to be worth about what we paid for them. Given a sensible settlement, which seemed likely, we expected the bonds to be worth considerably more. At yearend our Texaco bonds were carried on our books at $104 million and had a market value of $119 million.
就潘佐尔诉讼案的最坏情况而言，我们认为这些债券的价值可能与我们支付的价格相当。如果能达成一个合理的和解方案（这似乎是可能的），我们预计这些债券的价值会高得多。年底时，我们的德士古债券在账面上的价值为1.04亿美元，市值为1.19亿美元。
By far our largest - and most publicized - investment in 1987 was a $700 million purchase of Salomon Inc 9% preferred stock. This preferred is convertible after three years into Salomon common stock at $38 per share and, if not converted, will be redeemed ratably over five years beginning October 31, 1995. From most standpoints, this commitment fits into the medium-term fixed-income securities category. In addition, we have an interesting conversion possibility.
1987年，我们最大的——也是最受关注的——投资是斥资7亿美元购买所罗门公司9%的优先股。这种优先股在三年后可按每股38美元的价格转换为所罗门普通股，如果未转换，将从1995年10月31日开始在五年内按比例赎回。从大多数角度来看，这笔投资属于中期固定收益证券类别。此外，我们还有一个有趣的转换可能性。
We, of course, have no special insights regarding the direction or future profitability of investment banking. By their nature, the economics of this industry are far less predictable than those of most other industries in which we have major Commitments. This unpredictability is one of the reasons why our participation is in the form of a convertible preferred.
当然，我们对投资银行业的发展方向或未来盈利能力没有特别的见解。就其本质而言，这个行业的经济状况比我们有重大投资的大多数其他行业更难以预测。这种不可预测性是我们以可转换优先股形式参与投资的原因之一。
What we do have a strong feeling about is the ability and integrity of John Gutfreund, CEO of Salomon Inc. Charlie and I like, admire and trust John. We first got to know him in 1976 when he played a key role in GEICO's escape from near-bankruptcy. Several times since, we have seen John steer clients away from transactions that would have been unwise, but that the client clearly wanted to make - even though his advice provided no fee to Salomon and acquiescence would have delivered a large fee. Such service-above-self behavior is far from automatic in Wall Street.
但我们对所罗门公司首席执行官约翰·古特弗罗因德的能力和诚信有着强烈的信心。查理和我喜欢、钦佩并信任约翰。我们第一次认识他是在1976年，当时他在政府员工保险公司摆脱近乎破产的困境中发挥了关键作用。从那以后，我们多次看到约翰劝说客户放弃那些不明智但客户显然想进行的交易——尽管他的建议不会给所罗门带来任何费用，而默许这些交易本可以带来巨额费用。这种舍己为人的行为在华尔街绝非自然而然就能发生的。
For the reasons Charlie outlines on page 50, at yearend we valued our Salomon investment at 98% of par, $14 million less than our cost. However, we believe there is a reasonable likelihood that a leading, high-quality capital-raising and market-making operation can average good returns on equity. If so, our conversion right will eventually prove to be valuable.
出于查理在第50页所概述的原因，年底时我们对所罗门投资的估值为面值的98%，比我们的成本低1400万美元。然而，我们相信一家领先的、高质量的融资和做市机构有合理的可能性实现平均良好的股本回报率。如果是这样，我们的转换权最终将被证明是有价值的。
Two further comments about our investments in marketable securities are appropriate. First, we give you our usual warning: Our holdings have changed since yearend and will continue to do so without notice.
关于我们的有价证券投资，还有两点值得一提。首先，我们给你们一个惯常的警告：年底以来，我们的持仓已经发生了变化，并将继续在不通知的情况下变化。
The second comment is related: During 1987, as in some earlier years, there was speculation in the press from time to time about our purchase or sale of various securities. These stories were sometimes true, sometimes partially true, and other times completely untrue. Interestingly, there has been no correlation between the size and prestige of the publication and the accuracy of the report. One dead-wrong rumor was given considerable prominence by a major national magazine, and another leading publication misled its readers by writing about an arbitrage position as if it were a long-term investment commitment. (In not naming names, I am observing the old warning that it's not wise to pick fights with people who buy ink by the barrel.)
第二条评论与此相关：1987年，就像前几年一样，媒体时不时会猜测我们买入或卖出各种证券。这些报道有时是真的，有时部分是真的，有时则完全是假的。有趣的是，出版物的规模和声望与报道的准确性之间没有相关性。一家全国性大杂志曾大肆宣扬一个完全错误的谣言，另一家主要出版物则将一个套利持仓描述为长期投资承诺，从而误导了读者。（我不点名，是遵循一句老话：不要和那些大量购买墨水的人打架，这是不明智的。）
You should understand that we simply don't comment in any way on rumors, whether they are true or false. If we were to deny the incorrect reports and refuse comment on the correct ones, we would in effect be commenting on all.
你们应该明白，我们根本不会以任何方式对谣言发表评论，无论它们是真的还是假的。如果我们否认不正确的报道，而对正确的报道拒绝评论，实际上就相当于对所有报道都发表了评论。
In a world in which big investment ideas are both limited and valuable, we have no interest in telling potential competitors what we are doing except to the extent required by law. We certainly don't expect others to tell us of their investment ideas. Nor would we expect a media company to disclose news of acquisitions it was privately pursuing or a journalist to tell his competitors about stories on which he is working or sources he is using.
在这个世界上，重大的投资理念既有限又宝贵，除了法律要求的范围外，我们没有兴趣告诉潜在的竞争对手我们在做什么。我们当然不指望别人告诉我们他们的投资理念。我们也不指望一家媒体公司披露它私下正在进行的收购消息，或者一名记者告诉竞争对手他正在报道的新闻或他所使用的消息来源。
I find it uncomfortable when friends or acquaintances mention that they are buying X because it has been reported - incorrectly - that Berkshire is a buyer. However, I do not set them straight. If they want to participate in whatever Berkshire actually is buying, they can always purchase Berkshire stock. But perhaps that is too simple. Usually, I suspect, they find it more exciting to buy what is being talked about. Whether that strategy is more profitable is another question.
当朋友或熟人提到他们正在购买某只股票，因为有报道——错误地——称伯克希尔在买入时，我会感到不舒服。然而，我不会纠正他们。如果他们想参与伯克希尔实际正在购买的任何东西，他们随时可以购买伯克希尔的股票。但也许这太简单了。我怀疑，通常他们觉得购买那些被热议的股票更令人兴奋。这种策略是否更有利可图则是另一个问题。
# Financing (融资)
Shortly after yearend, Berkshire sold two issues of debentures, totaling $250 million. Both issues mature in 2018 and will be retired at an even pace through sinking fund operations that begin in 1999. Our overall interest cost, after allowing for expenses of issuance, is slightly over 10%. Salomon was our investment banker, and its service was excellent.
年底后不久，伯克希尔发行了两批债券，总计2.5亿美元。两批债券均于2018年到期，从1999年开始通过偿债基金以均匀的速度赎回。扣除发行费用后，我们的整体利息成本略高于10%。所罗门是我们的投资银行，其服务非常出色。
Despite our pessimistic views about inflation, our taste for debt is quite limited. To be sure, it is likely that Berkshire could improve its return on equity by moving to a much higher, though still conventional, debt-to-business-value ratio. It's even more likely that we could handle such a ratio, without problems, under economic conditions far worse than any that have prevailed since the early 1930s.
尽管我们对通胀持悲观态度，但我们对债务的偏好相当有限。可以肯定的是，伯克希尔可以通过将债务与企业价值比率提高到更高（尽管仍然是常规水平）来提高股本回报率。更有可能的是，在比20世纪30年代初以来任何时期都糟糕得多的经济条件下，我们也能毫无问题地应对这样的比率。
But we do not wish it to be only likely that we can meet our obligations; we wish that to be certain. Thus we adhere to policies - both in regard to debt and all other matters - that will allow us to achieve acceptable long-term results under extraordinarily adverse conditions, rather than optimal results under a normal range of conditions.
但我们不希望仅仅是“有可能”履行义务，我们希望是“肯定”能履行。因此，我们坚持这样的政策——无论是在债务还是所有其他事务上——这些政策将使我们在极端不利的条件下取得可接受的长期结果，而不是在正常条件范围内取得最佳结果。
Good business or investment decisions will eventually produce quite satisfactory economic results, with no aid from leverage. Therefore, it seems to us to be both foolish and improper to risk what is important (including, necessarily, the welfare of innocent bystanders such as policyholders and employees) for some extra returns that are relatively unimportant. This view is not the product of either our advancing age or prosperity: Our opinions about debt have remained constant.
良好的商业或投资决策最终会产生相当令人满意的经济结果，无需杠杆的帮助。因此，在我们看来，为了一些相对不重要的额外回报，而去冒险牺牲重要的东西（必然包括保单持有人和员工等无辜旁观者的福祉），既愚蠢又不当。这种观点既不是我们年事已高的产物，也不是我们财富增长的结果：我们对债务的看法一直没有改变。
However, we are not phobic about borrowing. (We're far from believing that there is no fate worse than debt.) We are willing to borrow an amount that we believe - on a worst-case basis - will pose no threat to Berkshire's well-being. Analyzing what that amount might be, we can look to some important strengths that would serve us well if major problems should engulf our economy: Berkshire's earnings come from many diverse and well-entrenched businesses; these businesses seldom require much capital investment; what debt we have is structured well; and we maintain major holdings of liquid assets. Clearly, we could be comfortable with a higher debt-to-business-value ratio than we now have.
然而，我们并非恐惧借贷。（我们远不认为没有比债务更糟糕的命运了。）我们愿意借入我们认为——在最坏情况下——不会对伯克希尔的福祉构成威胁的金额。分析这个金额可能是多少时，我们可以看到一些重要的优势，这些优势在经济出现重大问题时将对我们大有裨益：伯克希尔的收益来自许多多元化且根基稳固的业务；这些业务很少需要大量资本投资；我们的债务结构合理；我们持有大量流动性资产。显然，我们可以接受比现在更高的债务与企业价值比率。
One further aspect of our debt policy deserves comment: Unlike many in the business world, we prefer to finance in anticipation of need rather than in reaction to it. A business obtains the best financial results possible by managing both sides of its balance sheet well. This means obtaining the highest-possible return on assets and the lowest-possible cost on liabilities. It would be convenient if opportunities for intelligent action on both fronts coincided. However, reason tells us that just the opposite is likely to be the case: Tight money conditions, which translate into high costs for liabilities, will create the best opportunities for acquisitions, and cheap money will cause assets to be bid to the sky. Our conclusion: Action on the liability side should sometimes be taken independent of any action on the asset side.
我们债务政策的另一个方面值得一提：与商界许多人不同，我们倾向于提前为需求融资，而不是在需求出现后才被动融资。企业通过妥善管理资产负债表的两侧，才能获得尽可能好的财务结果。这意味着要获得尽可能高的资产回报率和尽可能低的负债成本。如果两方面的明智行动机会能够同时出现，那将很方便。然而，理性告诉我们，情况可能恰恰相反：货币紧缩（意味着负债成本高）会创造最佳的收购机会，而廉价货币会导致资产被哄抬至天价。我们的结论是：有时负债方面的行动应该独立于资产方面的任何行动。
Alas, what is "tight" and "cheap" money is far from clear at any particular time. We have no ability to forecast interest rates and - maintaining our usual open-minded spirit - believe that no one else can. Therefore, we simply borrow when conditions seem non-oppressive and hope that we will later find intelligent expansion or acquisition opportunities, which - as we have said - are most likely to pop up when conditions in the debt market are clearly oppressive. Our basic principle is that if you want to shoot rare, fast-moving elephants, you should always carry a loaded gun.
唉，在任何特定时间，什么是“紧缩”货币和“廉价”货币都远不清楚。我们没有能力预测利率——并且秉持我们一贯的开放精神——相信其他人也无法预测。因此，我们只是在条件看起来不苛刻时借款，并希望之后能找到明智的扩张或收购机会，正如我们所说，这些机会最有可能在债务市场条件明显苛刻时出现。我们的基本原则是，如果你想射杀罕见的、行动迅速的大象，你应该始终随身携带一把上膛的枪。
Our fund-first, buy-or-expand-later policy almost always penalizes near-term earnings. For example, we are now earning about 6 1/2% on the $250 million we recently raised at 10%, a disparity that is currently costing us about $160,000 per week. This negative spread is unimportant to us and will not cause us to stretch for either acquisitions or higher-yielding short-term instruments. If we find the right sort of business elephant within the next five years or so, the wait will have been worthwhile.
我们这种先融资、后购买或扩张的政策几乎总是会损害短期收益。例如，我们最近以10%的成本筹集了2.5亿美元，目前这笔资金的收益率约为6.5%，这种差距目前每周给我们造成约16万美元的损失。这种负利差对我们来说并不重要，也不会导致我们急于进行收购或投资于收益率更高的短期工具。如果在未来五年左右我们能找到合适的“企业大象”，那么等待将是值得的。
# Miscellaneous (其他事项)
We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.
我们希望购买更多与我们现有业务相似的企业，我们也需要一些帮助。如果你有符合以下标准的企业，请给我打电话，或者最好是写信。
Here's what we're looking for:
我们寻找的是：
- (1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),（大规模收购（税后收益至少1000万美元））
- (2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are "turnaround" situations),（具有持续的盈利能力（我们对未来预测不感兴趣，“扭亏为盈”的情况也不感兴趣））
- (3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,（使用很少或不使用债务就能获得良好股本回报率的企业）
- (4) management in place (we can't supply it),（现有管理层到位（我们无法提供管理层））
- (5) simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we won't understand it),（业务简单（如果涉及大量技术，我们无法理解））
- (6) an offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).（有明确的报价（在价格未知的情况下，我们不想浪费我们或卖方的时间，即使是初步讨论交易））
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.
我们不会进行不友好的收购。我们可以保证完全保密，并能非常迅速地给出是否感兴趣的答复——通常在五分钟内。我们倾向于现金收购，但如果能获得与我们付出相当的企业内在价值，也会考虑发行股票。我们邀请潜在的卖方通过联系我们过去的业务伙伴来了解我们。对于合适的企业和合适的人，我们能提供一个好的归宿。
On the other hand, we frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: new ventures, turnarounds, auction-like sales, and the ever-popular (among brokers) "I'm-sure-something-will-work-out-if-you-people-get-to-know-each-other." None of these attracts us in the least.
另一方面，我们经常会接触到一些不符合我们标准的收购机会：新企业、扭亏为盈的企业、类似拍卖的销售，以及（在经纪人中）一直流行的“如果你们相互了解，肯定会有结果的”。这些都丝毫不能吸引我们。
Besides being interested in the purchases of entire businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon. We have a special interest in purchasing convertible preferreds as a long-term investment, as we did at Salomon.
除了有兴趣按上述方式收购整个企业外，我们也有兴趣通过协商购买大量（但非控制性）股票，类似于我们在首都公司和所罗门所持有的股票。我们特别有兴趣购买可转换优先股作为长期投资，就像我们在索罗门所做的那样。
And now a bit of deja vu. Most of Berkshire's major stockholders received their shares at yearend 1969 in a liquidating distribution from Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Some of these former partners will remember that in 1962 I encountered severe managerial problems at Dempster Mill Manufacturing Co., a pump and farm implement manufacturing company that BPL controlled.
现在有点似曾相识的感觉。伯克希尔的大多数主要股东是在1969年底从巴菲特有限合伙公司的清算分配中获得股票的。这些前合伙人中的一些人会记得，1962年，我在登普斯特磨坊制造公司遇到了严重的管理问题，这是一家由BPL控制的水泵和农机制造公司。
At that time, like now, I went to Charlie with problems that were too tough for me to solve. Charlie suggested the solution might lie in a California friend of his, Harry Bottle, whose special knack was never forgetting the fundamental. I met Harry in Los Angeles on April 17, 1962, and on April 23 he was in Beatrice, Nebraska, running Dempster. Our problems disappeared almost immediately. In my 1962 annual letter to partners, I named Harry "Man of the Year."
那时，和现在一样，我去找查理解决那些我难以解决的问题。查理建议，解决方案可能在于他的一位加利福尼亚朋友哈里·博特尔，哈里的特殊本领是从不忘记根本。1962年4月17日，我在洛杉矶见到了哈里，4月23日，他就到了内布拉斯加州的比阿特丽斯，负责管理登普斯特公司。我们的问题几乎立刻就解决了。在1962年给合伙人的年度信中，我将哈里评为“年度人物”。
Fade to 24 years later: The scene is K & W Products, a small Berkshire subsidiary that produces automotive compounds. For years K & W did well, but in 1985-86 it stumbled badly, as it pursued the unattainable to the neglect of the achievable. Charlie, who oversees K & W, knew there was no need to consult me. Instead, he called Harry, now 68 years old, made him CEO, and sat back to await the inevitable. He didn't wait long. In 1987 K & W's profits set a record, up more than 300% from 1986. And, as profits went up, capital employed went down: K & W's investment in accounts receivable and inventories has decreased 20%.
时间推移到24年后：场景是K&W产品公司，这是伯克希尔的一家小型子公司，生产汽车化合物。多年来，K&W表现良好，但在1985-1986年，它遭遇了严重挫折，因为它一味追求难以实现的目标，而忽视了可以实现的目标。负责监管K&W的查理知道没有必要咨询我。相反，他打电话给现已68岁的哈里，让他担任首席执行官，然后坐等着看必然的结果。他没等多久。1987年，K&W的利润创下纪录，比1986年增长了300%以上。而且，随着利润的上升，所使用的资本却在下降：K&W在应收账款和存货上的投资减少了20%。
If we run into another managerial problem ten or twenty years down the road, you know whose phone will ring.
如果在未来十年或二十年内我们遇到另一个管理问题，你知道会给谁打电话。
About 97.2% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1987 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $4.9 million, and 2,050 charities were recipients.
约97.2%的合格股票参与了伯克希尔1987年的股东指定捐赠计划。通过该计划做出的捐赠为490万美元，2050家慈善机构成为受赠方。
A recent survey reported that about 50% of major American companies match charitable contributions made by directors (sometimes by a factor of three to one). In effect, these representatives of the owners direct funds to their favorite charities, and never consult the owners as to their charitable preferences. (I wonder how they would feel if the process were reversed and shareholders could invade the directors' pockets for charities favored by the shareholders.) When A takes money from B to give to C and A is a legislator, the process is called taxation. But when A is an officer or director of a corporation, it is called philanthropy. We continue to believe that contributions, aside from those with quite clear direct benefits to the company, should reflect the charitable preferences of owners rather than those of officers and directors.
最近的一项调查显示，约50%的美国大公司会匹配董事的慈善捐赠（有时比例高达3:1）。实际上，这些所有者的代表将资金导向他们喜爱的慈善机构，却从不咨询所有者的慈善偏好。（我想知道，如果过程反过来，股东可以从董事的口袋里拿钱给股东喜爱的慈善机构，他们会有何感受。）当A从B那里拿钱给C，而A是立法者时，这个过程叫做征税。但当A是公司的高管或董事时，这叫做慈善。我们仍然认为，除了那些对公司有明显直接利益的捐赠外，捐赠应该反映所有者的慈善偏好，而不是高管和董事的慈善偏好。
We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 54 and 55. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in "street" name or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, l988 will be ineligible for the 1988 program.
我们敦促新股东阅读第54和55页上关于我们股东指定捐赠计划的描述。如果你希望参与未来的计划，我们强烈敦促你立即确保你的股票以实际所有者的名义登记，而不是以“街名”或代理人名义登记。在1988年9月30日未按此方式登记的股票将没有资格参与1988年的计划。
Last year we again had about 450 shareholders at our annual meeting. The 60 or so questions they asked were, as always, excellent. At many companies, the annual meeting is a waste of time because exhibitionists turn it into a sideshow. Ours, however, is different. It is informative for shareholders and fun for us. (At Berkshire's meetings, the exhibitionists are on the dais.)
去年，我们的年度股东大会再次有大约450名股东出席。他们提出的大约60个问题和往常一样出色。在许多公司，年度股东大会是浪费时间，因为爱出风头的人把它变成了杂耍表演。然而，我们的股东大会不同。它对股东来说信息量很大，对我们来说也很有趣。（在伯克希尔的股东大会上，爱出风头的人在主席台上。）
This year our meeting will be on May 23, 1988 in Omaha, and we hope that you come. The meeting provides the forum for you to ask any owner-related questions you may have, and we will keep answering until all (except those dealing with portfolio activities or other proprietary information) have been dealt with.
今年我们的股东大会将于1988年5月23日在奥马哈举行，我们希望你们能来。这次会议为你们提供了一个论坛，你们可以提出任何与所有者相关的问题，我们会一直回答，直到所有问题（除了那些涉及投资组合活动或其他专有信息的问题）都得到解答。
Last year we rented two buses - for $100 - to take shareholders interested in the trip to the Furniture Mart. Your actions demonstrated your good judgment: You snapped up about $40,000 of bargains. Mrs. B regards this expense/sales ratio as on the high side and attributes it to my chronic inattention to costs and generally sloppy managerial practices. But, gracious as always, she has offered me another chance and we will again have buses available following the meeting. Mrs. B says you must beat last year's sales figures, and I have told her she won't be disappointed.
去年，我们花100美元租了两辆巴士，接送有兴趣去家具卖场的股东。你们的行为展示了你们的良好判断力：你们抢购了大约4万美元的特价商品。B夫人认为这个费用与销售额的比率偏高，并将其归因于我长期不关注成本和总体草率的管理做法。但她一如既往地宽宏大量，给了我另一个机会，会议后我们将再次提供巴士。B夫人说你们必须超过去年的销售数字，我告诉她她不会失望的。
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·E·巴菲特
Chairman of the Board
董事长
February 29, 1988
1988年2月29日