1991巴菲特致股东的信
# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: (致伯克希尔哈撒韦股东)
Our gain in net worth during 1991 was $2.1 billion, or 39.6%. Over the last 27 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19 to $6,437, or at a rate of 23.7% compounded annually.
1991年我们的净资产增长了21亿美元，即39.6%。在过去27年（即现任管理层接管以来）中，我们的每股账面价值从19美元增长至6,437美元，年复合增长率达23.7%。
The size of our equity capital - which now totals $7.4 billion - makes it certain that we cannot maintain our past rate of gain or, for that matter, come close to doing so. As Berkshire grows, the universe of opportunities that can significantly influence the company's performance constantly shrinks. When we were working with capital of $20 million, an idea or business producing $1 million of profit added five percentage points to our return for the year. Now we need a $370 million idea (i.e., one contributing over $550 million of pre-tax profit) to achieve the same result. And there are many more ways to make $1 million than to make $370 million.
我们的权益资本规模现已达到74亿美元，这使得我们确定无法维持过去的增长速度，甚至无法接近该速度。随着伯克希尔的扩张，能够显著影响公司表现的投资机会不断减少。当我们管理着2,000万美元资本时，一个能产生100万美元利润的创意或业务就能为当年回报率增加五个百分点。现在我们需要一个3.7亿美元的创意（即税前利润超过5.5亿美元）才能达到同样的效果。而创造100万美元利润的方式远比创造3.7亿美元的方式多得多。
Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I have set a goal of attaining a 15% average annual increase in Berkshire's intrinsic value. If our growth in book value is to keep up with a 15% pace, we must earn $22 billion during the next decade. Wish us luck - we'll need it.
伯克希尔副董事长查理·芒格和我设定了一个目标：实现伯克希尔内在价值年均15%的增长。若账面价值要保持15%的增长速度，我们在未来十年必须赚取220亿美元。祝我们好运吧——我们需要运气。
Our outsized gain in book value in 1991 resulted from a phenomenon not apt to be repeated: a dramatic rise in the price-earnings ratios of Coca-Cola and Gillette. These two stocks accounted for nearly $1.6 billion of our $2.1 billion growth in net worth last year. When we loaded up on Coke three years ago, Berkshire's net worth was $3.4 billion; now our Coke stock alone is worth more than that.
1991年我们账面价值的异常增长源于一个难以重复的现象：可口可乐和吉列的市盈率大幅上升。这两只股票贡献了去年21亿美元净资产增长中的近16亿美元。三年前我们重仓可口可乐时，伯克希尔的净资产为34亿美元；如今仅持有的可口可乐股票市值就已超过该数字。
Coca-Cola and Gillette are two of the best companies in the world and we expect their earnings to grow at hefty rates in the years ahead. Over time, also, the value of our holdings in these stocks should grow in rough proportion. Last year, however, the valuations of these two companies rose far faster than their earnings. In effect, we got a double-dip benefit, delivered partly by the excellent earnings growth and even more so by the market's reappraisal of these stocks. We believe this reappraisal was warranted. But it can't recur annually: We'll have to settle for a single dip in the future.
可口可乐和吉列是全球最优秀的企业之一，我们预计它们的盈利将在未来几年以可观的速度增长。长期来看，我们持有的这些股票的价值也应与盈利大致成比例增长。然而去年，这两家公司的估值增速远超盈利增速。实际上，我们获得了双重收益：部分来自于优异的盈利增长，更大程度则来自于市场对这些股票的重新评估。我们认为这种重新评估是合理的，但它无法每年发生：未来我们只能满足于单一维度的收益增长。
# A Second Job (第二份工作)
In 1989 when I - a happy consumer of five cans of Cherry Coke daily - announced our purchase of $1 billion worth of Coca-Cola stock, I described the move as a rather extreme example of putting our money where my mouth was. On August 18 of last year, when I was elected Interim Chairman of Salomon Inc, it was a different story: I put my mouth where our money was.
1989年，当我（每天愉快地消费五罐樱桃味可乐）宣布购买10亿美元可口可乐股票时，我将这一举动描述为"把钱花在嘴上"的极端案例。去年8月18日，当我被选为所罗门公司临时董事长时，情况则截然不同：这次是"把嘴放在钱的位置"。
You've all read of the events that led to my appointment. My decision to take the job carried with it an implicit but important message: Berkshire's operating managers are so outstanding that I knew I could materially reduce the time I was spending at the company and yet remain confident that its economic progress would not skip a beat. The Blumkins, the Friedman family, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, Ralph Schey and Frank Rooney (CEO of H.H. Brown, our latest acquisition, which I will describe later) are all masters of their operations and need no help from me. My job is merely to treat them right and to allocate the capital they generate. Neither function is impeded by my work at Salomon.
你们都读过导致我任职的事件。我决定接受这份工作传递了一个隐含但重要的信息：伯克希尔的运营经理们如此出色，以至于我知道我可以大幅减少在公司的时间，同时仍能确信其经济进展不会出现任何停滞。布卢金家族、弗里德曼家族、迈克·戈德堡、赫尔德曼家族、查克·哈金斯、斯坦·利普西、拉尔夫·谢伊和弗兰克·鲁尼（H.H.布朗公司首席执行官，我们最新收购的企业，我稍后将详细描述）都是各自领域的运营大师，根本不需要我的帮助。我的职责仅仅是善待他们并合理配置他们创造的资本。这两项职能都不会因我在所罗门的工作而受阻。
The role that Charlie and I play in the success of our operating units can be illustrated by a story about George Mira, the one-time quarterback of the University of Miami, and his coach, Andy Gustafson. Playing Florida and near its goal line, Mira dropped back to pass. He spotted an open receiver but found his right shoulder in the unshakable grasp of a Florida linebacker. The right-handed Mira thereupon switched the ball to his other hand and threw the only left-handed pass of his life - for a touchdown. As the crowd erupted, Gustafson calmly turned to a reporter and declared: "Now that's what I call coaching."
查理和我在运营部门成功中的角色可以用一个故事来说明：迈阿密大学前四分卫乔治·米拉和他的教练安迪·古斯塔夫森的故事。对阵佛罗里达队且接近对方底线时，米拉后撤传球。他发现了一个无人防守的接球手，但右肩却被佛罗里达队的线卫死死抓住。惯用右手的米拉随即换左手持球，完成了职业生涯唯一一次左手传球达阵。当全场爆发欢呼时，古斯塔夫森冷静地转向记者宣布："这才叫教练！"
Given the managerial stars we have at our operating units, Berkshire's performance is not affected if Charlie or I slip away from time to time. You should note, however, the "interim" in my Salomon title. Berkshire is my first love and one that will never fade: At the Harvard Business School last year, a student asked me when I planned to retire and I replied, "About five to ten years after I die."
鉴于我们运营部门拥有如此多的管理明星，即使查理或我偶尔抽身，伯克希尔的表现也不会受影响。但请注意我在所罗门头衔中的"临时"二字。伯克希尔是我永远的挚爱：去年在哈佛商学院，有学生问我计划何时退休，我回答道："大约在我去世后五到十年。"
# Sources of Reported Earnings (报告收益的来源)
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表展示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在此呈现方式中，商誉摊销及其他重大购买价格会计调整并未直接分摊至相关业务，而是汇总后单独列示。这一方法能让您直观看到我们的业务若未被收购时的原始收益表现。我在过往报告中已解释过，为何我们认为这种展示方式比采用通用会计准则（GAAP）——要求按业务逐项调整购买价格——更有利于投资者和管理者。表中展示的总净收益与经审计财务报表中的GAAP数据完全一致。
A large amount of additional information about these businesses is given on pages 33-47, where you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. However, we will not in this letter discuss each of our non-insurance operations, as we have in the past. Our businesses have grown in number - and will continue to grow - so it now makes sense to rotate coverage, discussing one or two in detail each year.
关于这些业务的更多详细信息请参见第33-47页，您将在其中找到按GAAP基础报告的分部收益。不过，在本信中我们不再像过去那样逐项讨论所有非保险业务。我们的业务数量已显著增加且将持续增长，因此我们决定轮换披露重点，每年详细分析一到两项业务。
# Table: Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests)
（表：伯克希尔净收益份额（税后及少数股东权益调整后））
| Pre-Tax Earnings （税前收益） | 1991 | 1990 | Net Earnings After Taxes （税后净收益） | 1991 | 1990 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Earnings: （运营收益） | |||||
| Insurance Group: （保险集团） | |||||
| Underwriting (承保) | $(119,593) | $ (26,647) | $(77,229) | $ (14,936) | |
| Net Investment Income (净投资收益) | 331,846 | 327,047 | 285,173 | 282,613 | |
| H. H. Brown (acquired 7/1/91) （布朗公司，1991年7月1日收购） | 13,616 | --- | 8,611 | --- | |
| Buffalo News (布法罗新闻) | 37,113 | 43,954 | 21,841 | 25,981 | |
| Fechheimer (费希默) | 12,947 | 12,450 | 6,843 | 6,605 | |
| Kirby (基比) | 35,726 | 27,445 | 22,555 | 17,613 | |
| Nebraska Furniture Mart (内布拉斯加家具商城) | 14,384 | 17,248 | 6,993 | 8,485 | |
| Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group (斯科特费策制造集团) | 26,123 | 30,378 | 15,901 | 18,458 | |
| See's Candies (喜诗糖果) | 42,390 | 39,580 | 25,575 | 23,892 | |
| Wesco - other than Insurance （威斯科，除保险外） | 12,230 | 12,441 | 8,777 | 9,676 | |
| World Book (世界百科) | 22,483 | 31,896 | 15,487 | 20,420 | |
| Amortization of Goodwill (商誉摊销) | (4,113) | (3,476) | (4,098) | (3,461) | |
| Other Purchase-Price Accounting Charges (其他购买价格会计调整) | (6,021) | (5,951) | (7,019) | (6,856) | |
| Interest Expense* (利息支出) | (89,250) | (76,374) | (57,165) | (49,726) | |
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions (股东指定捐赠) | (6,772) | (5,824) | (4,388) | (3,801) | |
| Other (其他) | 77,399 | 58,310 | 47,896 | 35,782 | |
| Operating Earnings (运营收益) | 400,508 | 482,477 | 315,753 | 370,745 | |
| Sales of Securities (证券出售) | 192,478 | 33,989 | 124,155 | 23,348 | |
| Total Earnings - All Entities （所有实体总收益） | $592,986 | $516,466 | $439,908 | $394,093 |
*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and Mutual Savings & Loan.
*不含斯科特费策金融集团和互助储蓄贷款的利息支出。
# "Look-Through" Earnings (透视收益)
We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us.
我们此前讨论过透视收益，其构成如下：(1) 上一节报告的运营收益，加上；(2) 按通用会计准则未计入我们利润的重大被投资公司留存收益，减去；(3) 若这些留存收益被分配给伯克希尔时需缴纳的税款预留。
I've told you that over time look-through earnings must increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic business value is to grow at that rate. Indeed, since present management took over in 1965, our look-through earnings have grown at almost the identical 23% rate of gain recorded for book value.
我曾告知各位，若要使公司内在价值以年均15%的速度增长，透视收益长期来看必须达到这一增速。事实上，自现任管理层1965年接管以来，透视收益的增长率（23%）几乎与账面价值增长率完全一致。
Last year, however, our look-through earnings did not grow at all but rather declined by 14%. To an extent, the decline was precipitated by two forces that I discussed in last year's report and that I warned you would have a negative effect on look-through earnings.
然而去年，透视收益不仅未增长，反而下降了14%。这一下滑部分源于我在去年报告中提及的两个因素，当时已警告其可能对透视收益产生负面影响。
# Look-Through Earnings (透视收益)
First, I told you that our media earnings - both direct and look-through - were "sure to decline" and they in fact did. The second force came into play on April 1, when the call of our Gillette preferred stock required us to convert it into common. The after-tax earnings in 1990 from our preferred had been about $45 million, an amount somewhat higher than the combination in 1991 of three months of dividends on our preferred plus nine months of look-through earnings on the common.
首先，我曾告知各位我们的媒体收益——无论是直接收益还是透视收益——“必然下降”，而事实确实如此。第二个影响因素发生在4月1日，当吉列优先股被赎回时，我们被迫将其转换为普通股。1990年该优先股带来的税后收益约为4,500万美元，这一金额略高于1991年优先股三个月的股息加上普通股九个月透视收益的总和。
Two other outcomes that I did not foresee also hurt look-through earnings in 1991. First, we had a break-even result from our interest in Wells Fargo (dividends we received from the company were offset by negative retained earnings). Last year I said that such a result at Wells was "a low-level possibility - not a likelihood." Second, we recorded significantly lower - though still excellent - insurance profits.
还有两个我未曾预见的结果也损害了1991年的透视收益。第一，我们对富国银行的投资仅达到盈亏平衡（公司派发的股息被负留存收益抵消）。去年我曾表示，这种结果在富国银行是“低概率事件——并非大概率”。第二，我们的保险利润显著下降——尽管仍表现优异。
The following table shows you how we calculate look-through earnings, although I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 6, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
下表展示了我们的透视收益计算方式，尽管我需提醒您这些数据必然较为粗略。（这些被投资公司支付给我们的股息已计入第6页列出的运营收益中，主要归类于“保险集团：净投资收益”。）
# Table: Calculation of Look-Through Earnings (透视收益计算表)
| Berkshire's Major Investees （伯克希尔主要被投资公司） | Ownership at Yearend (%) （年末持股比例） | Berkshire's Share of Undistributed Operating Earnings (in millions) （伯克希尔未分配运营收益份额，百万美元） |
|---|---|---|
| 1991 1990 | 1991 1990 | |
| Capital Cities/ABC Inc. (资本城/美国广播公司) | 18.1% 17.9% | $61 $85 |
| The Coca-Cola Company (可口可乐公司) | 7.0% 7.0% | $69 $58 |
| Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (联邦住房抵押贷款公司) | 3.4%(1) 3.2%(1) | $15 $10 |
| The Gillette Company (吉列公司) | 11.0% --- | $23(2) --- |
| GEICO Corp. (盖可保险) | 48.2% 46.1% | $69 $76 |
| The Washington Post Company (华盛顿邮报公司) | 14.6% 14.6% | $10 $18 |
| Wells Fargo & Company (富国银行) | 9.6% 9.7% | $(17) $19(3) |
| Total Undistributed Earnings （未分配收益总额） | $230 $266 | |
| Hypothetical tax on these undistributed earnings (假设税款) | $(30) $(35) | |
| Reported operating earnings of Berkshire (伯克希尔报告运营收益) | $316 $371 | |
| Total Look-Through Earnings （透视收益总额） | $516 $602 |
Notes:
(1) Net of minority interest at Wesco（扣除威斯科少数股东权益）
(2) For the nine months after Berkshire converted its preferred on April 1（伯克希尔4月1日转换优先股后的九个月数据）
(3) Calculated on average ownership for the year（按年度平均持股比例计算）
We also believe that investors can benefit by focusing on their own look-through earnings. To calculate these, they should determine the underlying earnings attributable to the shares they hold in their portfolio and total these. The goal of each investor should be to create a portfolio (in effect, a "company") that will deliver him or her the highest possible look-through earnings a decade or so from now.
我们也认为，投资者可通过关注自身的透视收益获益。计算方法是：确定其投资组合中每只股票对应的底层收益并累加。每位投资者的目标应是构建一个投资组合（实质上是一家“公司”），使其在未来十年左右实现最高的透视收益。
An approach of this kind will force the investor to think about long-term business prospects rather than short-term stock market prospects, a perspective likely to improve results. It's true, of course, that, in the long run, the scoreboard for investment decisions is market price. But prices will be determined by future earnings. In investing, just as in baseball, to put runs on the scoreboard one must watch the playing field, not the scoreboard.
这种策略将迫使投资者关注长期商业前景而非短期股市波动，这种视角更可能提升投资效果。当然，从长期看，投资决策的“记分牌”是市场价格。但价格由未来收益决定。在投资中，就像棒球一样，要让记分牌得分，必须紧盯赛场而非记分牌本身。
# A Change in Media Economics and Some Valuation Math (媒体经济变迁与估值逻辑)
In last year's report, I stated my opinion that the decline in the profitability of media companies reflected secular as well as cyclical factors. The events of 1991 have fortified that case: The economic strength of once-mighty media enterprises continues to erode as retailing patterns change and advertising and entertainment choices proliferate.
在去年报告中，我曾指出媒体公司盈利能力的下滑反映了结构性与周期性因素的共同作用。1991年的事件印证了这一观点：随着零售模式变迁和广告娱乐选择激增，曾经强大的媒体企业的经济优势持续削弱。
The fact is that newspaper, television, and magazine properties have begun to resemble businesses more than franchises in their economic behavior. Let's take a quick look at the characteristics separating these two classes of enterprise...
事实上，报纸、电视和杂志业务的经济行为已逐渐更接近企业而非特许经营权。让我们快速对比这两类企业的特征...
# Economic Franchise vs. Business (经济特许权与普通企业)
| Characteristics （特征） | Economic Franchise （经济特许权） | Business （普通企业） |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Product/Service Need （产品/服务需求） | 必须满足客户需求且无替代品 | 依赖低成本或供需紧张 |
| 2. Pricing Power （定价能力） | 可主动提价获取高回报 | 需应对竞争威胁 |
| 3. Management Resilience （管理容错性） | 管理失误仅影响利润，不致命 | 糟糕管理可导致灭绝 |
Until recently, media properties possessed the three characteristics of a franchise... Now, however, consumers enjoy greatly broadened choices... The result is that competition has intensified, markets have fragmented...
直至近年，媒体公司仍具备特许经营权的三大特征...但如今消费者选择大幅增加...结果导致竞争加剧、市场碎片化...
# "Look-Through" Earnings (透视收益)
We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us.
我们此前讨论过透视收益，其构成如下：(1) 上一节报告的运营收益，加上；(2) 按通用会计准则未计入我们利润的重大被投资公司留存收益，减去；(3) 若这些留存收益被分配给伯克希尔时需缴纳的税款预留。
I've told you that over time look-through earnings must increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic business value is to grow at that rate. Indeed, since present management took over in 1965, our look-through earnings have grown at almost the identical 23% rate of gain recorded for book value.
我曾告知各位，若要使公司内在价值以年均15%的速度增长，透视收益长期来看必须达到这一增速。事实上，自现任管理层1965年接管以来，透视收益的增长率（23%）几乎与账面价值增长率完全一致。
Last year, however, our look-through earnings did not grow at all but rather declined by 14%. To an extent, the decline was precipitated by two forces that I discussed in last year's report and that I warned you would have a negative effect on look-through earnings.
然而去年，透视收益不仅未增长，反而下降了14%。这一下滑部分源于我在去年报告中提及的两个因素，当时已警告其可能对透视收益产生负面影响。
First, I told you that our media earnings - both direct and look-through - were "sure to decline" and they in fact did. The second force came into play on April 1, when the call of our Gillette preferred stock required us to convert it into common. The after-tax earnings in 1990 from our preferred had been about $45 million, an amount somewhat higher than the combination in 1991 of three months of dividends on our preferred plus nine months of look-through earnings on the common.
首先，我曾告知各位我们的媒体收益（直接收益和透视收益）"必然下降"，而事实确实如此。第二个因素发生在4月1日，我们的吉列优先股被赎回，迫使我们将其转换为普通股。1990年优先股带来的税后收益约为4,500万美元，这一金额略高于1991年优先股三个月分红与普通股九个月透视收益的总和。
Two other outcomes that I did not foresee also hurt look-through earnings in 1991. First, we had a break-even result from our interest in Wells Fargo (dividends we received from the company were offset by negative retained earnings). Last year I said that such a result at Wells was "a low-level possibility - not a likelihood." Second, we recorded significantly lower - though still excellent - insurance profits.
另外两个未预料到的结果也损害了1991年的透视收益。第一，我们对富国银行的投资仅实现盈亏平衡（收到的股息被负留存收益抵消）。去年我曾表示，这种情况在富国银行"可能性极低"。第二，保险利润显著下降（尽管仍表现优异）。
The following table shows you how we calculate look-through earnings, although I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 6, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
下表展示了我们如何计算透视收益，但需提醒您这些数据必然相当粗略。（被投资公司支付给我们的股息已包含在第6页运营收益明细中，主要归类于"保险集团：净投资收益"。）
# Table: Berkshire's Share of Undistributed Operating Earnings (伯克希尔未分配运营收益份额，百万美元)
| Berkshire's Major Investees (伯克希尔主要被投资公司) | Ownership at Yearend (年末持股比例) | Berkshire's Share of Undistributed Operating Earnings (伯克希尔未分配运营收益份额，百万美元) |
|---|---|---|
| 1991 | 1990 | 1991 |
| ------ | ------ | -------- |
| Capital Cities/ABC Inc. (资本城/美国广播公司) ........ | 18.1% | 17.9% |
| The Coca-Cola Company (可口可乐公司) .......... | 7.0% | 7.0% |
| Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (联邦住房贷款抵押公司) | 3.4%(1) | 3.2%(1) |
| The Gillette Company (吉列公司) ........... | 11.0% | --- |
| GEICO Corp. (政府雇员保险公司) .................... | 48.2% | 46.1% |
| The Washington Post Company (华盛顿邮报公司) .... | 14.6% | 14.6% |
| Wells Fargo & Company (富国银行) .......... | 9.6% | 9.7% |
| Berkshire's share of undistributed earnings of major investees (伯克希尔主要被投资公司未分配收益份额) | $230 | $266 |
| Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings (假设对未分配被投资收益征税) | (30) | (35) |
| Reported operating earnings of Berkshire (伯克希尔报告运营收益) | 316 | 371 |
| Total look-through earnings of Berkshire (伯克希尔总透视收益) | $516 | $602 |
(1) Net of minority interest at Wesco (威斯科少数股东权益调整后)
(2) For the nine months after Berkshire converted its preferred on April 1 (伯克希尔4月1日转换优先股后的九个月收益)
(3) Calculated on average ownership for the year (按年度平均持股比例计算)
# A Change in Media Economics and Some Valuation Math (媒体经济变革与估值数学模型)
In last year's report, I stated my opinion that the decline in the profitability of media companies reflected secular as well as cyclical factors. The events of 1991 have fortified that case: The economic strength of once-mighty media enterprises continues to erode as retailing patterns change and advertising and entertainment choices proliferate.
在去年报告中，我曾指出媒体公司盈利能力的下降反映了长期结构性因素和周期性因素的共同作用。1991年的事件印证了这一观点：随着零售模式变化和广告娱乐选择激增，曾经强大的媒体企业的经济优势持续衰退。
In the business world, unfortunately, the rear-view mirror is always clearer than the windshield: A few years back no one linked to the media business - neither lenders, owners nor financial analysts - saw the economic deterioration that was in store for the industry. (But give me a few years and I'll probably convince myself that I did.)
不幸的是，在商业世界中，后视镜永远比挡风玻璃更清晰：几年前，无论是媒体行业的贷款方、所有者还是金融分析师，都未能预见即将到来的经济恶化。（不过给我几年时间，我可能会说服自己其实我预见到了。）
The fact is that newspaper, television, and magazine properties have begun to resemble businesses more than franchises in their economic behavior. Let's take a quick look at the characteristics separating these two classes of enterprise, keeping in mind, however, that many operations fall in some middle ground and can best be described as weak franchises or strong businesses.
事实上，报纸、电视和杂志业务在经济行为上越来越像企业而非特许经营权。让我们快速了解这两类企业的区别特征，但需注意许多业务处于中间状态，更适合描述为弱特许经营权或强企业。
An economic franchise arises from a product or service that: (1) is needed or desired; (2) is thought by its customers to have no close substitute and; (3) is not subject to price regulation. The existence of all three conditions will be demonstrated by a company's ability to regularly price its product or service aggressively and thereby to earn high rates of return on capital. Moreover, franchises can tolerate mis-management. Inept managers may diminish a franchise's profitability, but they cannot inflict mortal damage.
经济特许经营权源于一种产品或服务：(1) 被市场需要或渴望；(2) 客户认为没有近似替代品；(3) 不受价格管制。满足这三项条件的表现是企业能持续积极定价并实现高资本回报率。此外，特许经营权能容忍管理失误。无能的管理者可能降低盈利能力，但不会造成致命伤害。
In contrast, "a business" earns exceptional profits only if it is the low-cost operator or if supply of its product or service is tight. Tightness in supply usually does not last long. With superior management, a company may maintain its status as a low-cost operator for a much longer time, but even then unceasingly faces the possibility of competitive attack. And a business, unlike a franchise, can be killed by poor management.
相比之下，"企业"只有在成为低成本运营商或供需紧张时才能获得超额利润。供应紧张通常难以持久。通过卓越管理，企业可能长期维持低成本地位，但仍持续面临竞争威胁。与特许经营权不同，企业可能因管理不善而消亡。
Until recently, media properties possessed the three characteristics of a franchise and consequently could both price aggressively and be managed loosely. Now, however, consumers looking for information and entertainment (their primary interest being the latter) enjoy greatly broadened choices as to where to find them. Unfortunately, demand can't expand in response to this new supply: 500 million American eyeballs and a 24-hour day are all that's available. The result is that competition has intensified, markets have fragmented, and the media industry has lost some - though far from all - of its franchise strength.
直到最近，媒体业务还具备特许经营权的三大特征，因此既能积极定价又能宽松管理。然而现在，寻求信息和娱乐（后者为主要兴趣）的消费者拥有更多选择。不幸的是，需求无法随新供给扩张：美国仅有5亿双眼睛和24小时的一天。结果导致竞争加剧、市场碎片化，媒体行业虽未完全丧失但已部分失去特许经营权优势。
# A Change in Media Economics and Some Valuation Math (媒体经济变革与估值数学模型)
The industry's weakened franchise has an impact on its value that goes far beyond the immediate effect on earnings. For an understanding of this phenomenon, let's look at some much over-simplified, but relevant, math.
行业特许经营权的弱化对估值的影响远超对收益的直接影响。为理解这一现象，我们来看一组过度简化但相关的数学模型。
A few years ago the conventional wisdom held that a newspaper, television or magazine property would forever increase its earnings at 6% or so annually and would do so without the employment of additional capital, for the reason that depreciation charges would roughly match capital expenditures and working capital requirements would be minor. Therefore, reported earnings (before amortization of intangibles) were also freely-distributable earnings, which meant that ownership of a media property could be construed as akin to owning a perpetual annuity set to grow at 6% a year. Say, next, that a discount rate of 10% was used to determine the present value of that earnings stream. One could then calculate that it was appropriate to pay a whopping $25 million for a property with current after-tax earnings of $1 million. (This after-tax multiplier of 25 translates to a multiplier on pre-tax earnings of about 16.)
几年前，传统观念认为报纸、电视或杂志业务的收益将以每年约6%的速度永久增长，且无需追加资本投入（折旧费用大致匹配资本支出，营运资金需求微不足道）。因此，报告收益（扣除无形资产摊销前）即为可自由分配收益，意味着媒体资产的所有权可视为拥有一项以6%年增长率递增的永续年金。假设采用10%的折现率计算该收益流现值，则可推导出：对当前税后收益100万美元的资产，支付2,500万美元是合理的。（25倍的税后乘数对应约16倍的税前乘数。）
Now change the assumption and posit that the $1 million represents "normal earning power" and that earnings will bob around this figure cyclically. A "bob-around" pattern is indeed the lot of most businesses, whose income stream grows only if their owners are willing to commit more capital (usually in the form of retained earnings). Under our revised assumption, $1 million of earnings, discounted by the same 10%, translates to a $10 million valuation. Thus a seemingly modest shift in assumptions reduces the property's valuation to 10 times after-tax earnings (or about 6 1/2 times pre-tax earnings).
若调整假设，将100万美元视为"正常盈利能力"，收益将在该水平周期性波动。"波动模型"实为大多数企业的常态——其现金流仅在追加资本（通常以留存收益形式）投入时才会增长。按此新假设，100万美元收益以相同10%折现率计算，估值降至1,000万美元。看似轻微的假设调整，使资产估值从25倍税后收益（16倍税前）骤降至10倍税后收益（约6.5倍税前）。
Dollars are dollars whether they are derived from the operation of media properties or of steel mills. What in the past caused buyers to value a dollar of earnings from media far higher than a dollar from steel was that the earnings of a media property were expected to constantly grow (without the business requiring much additional capital), whereas steel earnings clearly fell in the bob-around category. Now, however, expectations for media have moved toward the bob-around model. And, as our simplified example illustrates, valuations must change dramatically when expectations are revised.
无论是媒体资产还是钢铁厂产生的美元，其价值本应相同。过去买家为何给媒体一美元收益的估值远高于钢铁业？因为媒体收益被预期将持续增长（无需大量追加资本），而钢铁收益显然属于波动模型。如今媒体行业预期已向波动模型靠拢，正如我们的简化模型所示，预期改变必然导致估值剧烈调整。
We have a significant investment in media - both through our direct ownership of Buffalo News and our shareholdings in The Washington Post Company and Capital Cities/ABC - and the intrinsic value of this investment has declined materially because of the secular transformation that the industry is experiencing. (Cyclical factors have also hurt our current look-through earnings, but these factors do not reduce intrinsic value.) However, as our Business Principles on page 2-3 note, one of the rules by which we run Berkshire is that we do not sell businesses - or investee holdings that we have classified as permanent - simply because we see ways to use the money more advantageously elsewhere. (We did sell certain other media holdings sometime back, but these were relatively small.)
我们通过直接控股布法罗新闻及持有《华盛顿邮报》和资本城/ABC股份，在媒体领域有重大投资。由于行业正在进行长期结构性转型，这项投资的内在价值已显著下降。（周期性因素也损害了当前透视收益，但不影响内在价值。）然而，正如第2-3页业务原则所述，伯克希尔的运营规则之一是：不会因发现其他更优资金用途而出售业务或被分类为永久持有的被投企业。（我们确实曾出售部分其他媒体资产，但规模相对较小。）
The intrinsic value losses that we have suffered have been moderated because the Buffalo News, under Stan Lipsey's leadership, has done far better than most newspapers and because both Cap Cities and Washington Post are exceptionally well-managed. In particular, these companies stayed on the sidelines during the late 1980's period in which purchasers of media properties regularly paid irrational prices. Also, the debt of both Cap Cities and Washington Post is small and roughly offset by cash that they hold. As a result, the shrinkage in the value of their assets has not been accentuated by the effects of leverage. Among publicly-owned media companies, our two investees are about the only ones essentially free of debt. Most of the other companies, through a combination of the aggressive acquisition policies they pursued and shrinking earnings, find themselves with debt equal to five or more times their current net income.
斯坦·利普西领导下的布法罗新闻表现远优于多数报纸，加之资本城和《华盛顿邮报》的卓越管理，使我们承受的内在价值损失得以缓解。尤其值得一提的是，这两家公司在1980年代后期媒体资产普遍非理性溢价收购潮中保持旁观者姿态。此外，两家公司的债务规模较小，且基本被持有的现金抵消。因此，其资产价值缩水并未因杠杆效应加剧。在上市媒体公司中，我们的这两家被投企业几乎是唯一实质无债企业。其他多数公司因激进并购策略叠加收益下滑，负债已达当前净利润的五倍以上。
The strong balance sheets and strong managements of Cap Cities and Washington Post leave us more comfortable with these investments than we would be with holdings in any other media companies. Moreover, most media properties continue to have far better economic characteristics than those possessed by the average American business. But gone are the days of bullet-proof franchises and cornucopian economics.
资本城和《华盛顿邮报》强劲的资产负债表与卓越的管理层，使我们对这两项投资的信心远超其他媒体公司。此外，多数媒体资产的经济特性仍远优于美国企业平均水平。但依靠坚不可摧的特许经营权和取之不尽的盈利模式的时代已经终结。
# Twenty Years in a Candy Store (二十年的糖果店经营)
We've just passed a milestone: Twenty years ago, on January 3, 1972, Blue Chip Stamps (then an affiliate of Berkshire and later merged into it) bought control of See's Candy Shops, a West Coast manufacturer and retailer of boxed-chocolates. The nominal price that the sellers were asking - calculated on the 100% ownership we ultimately attained - was $40 million. But the company had $10 million of excess cash, and therefore the true offering price was $30 million. Charlie and I, not yet fully appreciative of the value of an economic franchise, looked at the company's mere $7 million of tangible net worth and said $25 million was as high as we would go (and we meant it). Fortunately, the sellers accepted our offer.
我们刚刚迎来一个里程碑：1972年1月3日（距今二十周年），蓝筹印花公司（当时为伯克希尔关联企业，后并入伯克希尔）收购了西海岸盒装巧克力制造商兼零售商喜诗糖果的控制权。卖方索要的名义价格（按我们最终取得的100%股权计算）为4,000万美元。但公司拥有1,000万美元超额现金，因此实际报价为3,000万美元。彼时我们尚未充分认识经济特许经营权的价值，仅凭公司区区700万美元有形净资产净值，坚持最高出价2,500万美元（且态度坚决）。幸运的是，卖方接受了我们的报价。
The sales of trading stamps by Blue Chip thereafter declined from $102.5 million in 1972 to $1.2 million in 1991. But See's candy sales in the same period increased from $29 million to $196 million. Moreover, profits at See's grew even faster than sales, from $4.2 million pre-tax in 1972 to $42.4 million last year.
此后蓝筹印花公司的交易印花销售额从1972年的1.025亿美元骤降至1991年的120万美元。但同期喜诗糖果销售额从2,900万美元增至1.96亿美元，利润增速更快——税前利润从1972年的420万美元跃升至去年的4,240万美元。
For an increase in profits to be evaluated properly, it must be compared with the incremental capital investment required to produce it. On this score, See's has been astounding: The company now operates comfortably with only $25 million of net worth, which means that our beginning base of $7 million has had to be supplemented by only $18 million of reinvested earnings. Meanwhile, See's remaining pre-tax profits of $410 million were distributed to Blue Chip/Berkshire during the 20 years for these companies to deploy (after payment of taxes) in whatever way made most sense.
评估利润增长需对比所需追加的资本投入。在这方面喜诗糖果表现惊人：公司目前仅需2,500万美元净资产即可稳健运营，意味着我们初始700万美元基础资本仅需补充1,800万美元再投资收益。与此同时，累计4.1亿美元的税前利润已全部分配给蓝筹/伯克希尔，经纳税后用于最合理的再部署。
In our See's purchase, Charlie and I had one important insight: We saw that the business had untapped pricing power. Otherwise, we were lucky twice over. First, the transaction was not derailed by our dumb insistence on a $25 million price. Second, we found Chuck Huggins, then See's executive vice-president, whom we instantly put in charge. Both our business and personal experiences with Chuck have been outstanding. One example: When the purchase was made, we shook hands with Chuck on a compensation arrangement - conceived in about five minutes and never reduced to a written contract - that remains unchanged to this day.
收购喜诗糖果时，查理和我有一个重要洞察：我们认识到该业务存在未被开发的定价权。除此之外，我们还收获双重幸运。第一，交易未因我们坚持2,500万美元的愚蠢报价而告吹；第二，我们发现了时任喜诗糖果执行副总裁的查克·哈金斯并立即委以重任。与查克的商业合作和个人交往均堪称典范。例如交易达成时，我们仅用五分钟口头约定薪酬方案，至今未作修改也未形成书面合同。
In 1991, See's sales volume, measured in dollars, matched that of 1990. In pounds, however, volume was down 4%. All of that slippage took place in the last two months of the year, a period that normally produces more than 80% of annual profits. Despite the weakness in sales, profits last year grew 7%, and our pre-tax profit margin was a record 21.6%.
1991年喜诗糖果销售额（按美元计）与1990年持平，但销量（按磅数计）下降4%。销量下滑集中在最后两个月——该期间通常贡献全年超80%的利润。尽管销售疲软，去年利润仍增长7%，税前利润率创纪录达21.6%。
# Taxable "Snack" Foods and Non-Taxable "Non-Snack" Foods (应税“零食”与非应税“非零食”食品)
Almost 80% of See's sales come from California and our business clearly was hurt by the recession, which hit the state with particular force late in the year. Another negative, however, was the mid-year initiation in California of a sales tax of 7%-8% (depending on the county involved) on "snack food" that was deemed applicable to our candy.
See's近80%的销售额来自加州，而加州经济衰退（尤其在年末加剧）明显冲击了我们的业务。另一个不利因素是加州年中开始对“零食”征收7%-8%的销售税（税率因县而异），我们的糖果被归入应税类别。
Shareholders who are students of epistemological shadings will enjoy California's classifications of "snack" and "non-snack" foods:
对认识论细微差别感兴趣的股东们，一定会对加州对“零食”和“非零食”的分类感到趣味盎然：
# Taxable "Snack" Foods (应税“零食”) | Non-Taxable "Non-Snack" Foods (非应税“非零食”食品)
| Taxable "Snack" Foods (应税“零食”) | Non-Taxable "Non-Snack" Foods (非应税“非零食”食品) |
|---|---|
| Ritz Crackers (瑞思脆饼) | Soda Crackers (苏打饼干) |
| Popped Popcorn (爆米花) | Unpopped Popcorn (未爆玉米粒) |
| Granola Bars (格兰诺拉能量棒) | Granola Cereal (格兰诺拉麦片) |
| Slice of Pie (Wrapped) (切片派（包装）) | Whole Pie (整派) |
| Milky Way Candy Bar (玛氏能量棒) | Milky Way Ice Cream Bar (玛氏冰淇淋棒) |
What - you are sure to ask - is the tax status of a melted Milky Way ice cream bar? In that androgynous form, does it more resemble an ice cream bar or a candy bar that has been left in the sun? It's no wonder that Brad Sherman, Chairman of California's State Board of Equalization, who opposed the snack food bill but must now administer it, has said: "I came to this job as a specialist in tax law. Now I find my constituents should have elected Julia Child."
您一定会问：融化的玛氏冰淇淋棒应如何征税？这种模糊形态更像冰淇淋还是被太阳晒化的糖果？加州公平委员会主席布拉德·谢尔曼（反对该法案却被迫执行）感叹道：“我本是税务专家，现在却发现选民们该选朱莉娅·蔡尔德（著名烹饪专家）来任职。”
Charlie and I have many reasons to be thankful for our association with Chuck and See's. The obvious ones are that we've earned exceptional returns and had a good time in the process. Equally important, ownership of See's has taught us much about the evaluation of franchises. We've made significant money in certain common stocks because of the lessons we learned at See's.
查理和我有充分理由感激与查克及喜诗糖果的合作。显然，我们获得了超常回报且过程愉快。更重要的是，喜诗糖果教会了我们如何评估特许经营权。正是这些经验，让我们在某些股票投资中赚得盆满钵满。
# H. H. Brown (H.H.布朗公司)
We made a sizable acquisition in 1991 - the H. H. Brown Company - and behind this business is an interesting history. In 1927 a 29-year-old businessman named Ray Heffernan purchased the company, then located in North Brookfield, Massachusetts, for $10,000 and began a 62-year career of running it. (He also found time for other pursuits: At age 90 he was still joining new golf clubs.)
1991年我们完成了一项重大收购——H.H.布朗公司。这家企业背后有一段有趣的历史：1927年，29岁的商人雷·海弗南以1万美元收购了当时位于马萨诸塞州北布鲁克菲尔德的公司，并开始了长达62年的经营生涯。（他还有其他爱好：90岁时仍在加入新的高尔夫俱乐部。）
By Mr. Heffernan's retirement in early 1990 H. H. Brown had three plants in the United States and one in Canada; employed close to 2,000 people; and earned about $25 million annually before taxes.
至1990年初海弗南先生退休时，H.H.布朗公司已在美国拥有三家工厂、加拿大一家工厂，员工近2,000人，年税前利润约2,500万美元。
Along the way, Frances Heffernan, one of Ray's daughters, married Frank Rooney, who was sternly advised by Mr. Heffernan before the wedding that he had better forget any ideas he might have about working for his father-in-law. That was one of Mr. Heffernan's few mistakes: Frank went on to become CEO of Melville Shoe (now Melville Corp.). During his 23 years as boss, from 1964 through 1986, Melville's earnings averaged more than 20% on equity and its stock (adjusted for splits) rose from $16 to $960. And a few years after Frank retired, Mr. Heffernan, who had fallen ill, asked him to run Brown.
雷的女儿弗朗西丝嫁给弗兰克·鲁尼时，海弗南先生曾严肃告诫他勿存为岳父工作的念头。这是海弗南先生为数不多的失误之一：弗兰克后来成为梅尔维尔鞋业（现梅尔维尔公司）CEO。在其执掌的1964-1986年间，公司股权回报率平均超20%，股价（复权后）从16美元涨至960美元。弗兰克退休数年后，患病的海弗南先生邀请他出山执掌布朗公司。
After Mr. Heffernan died late in 1990, his family decided to sell the company - and here we got lucky. I had known Frank for a few years but not well enough for him to think of Berkshire as a possible buyer. He instead gave the assignment of selling Brown to a major investment banker, which failed also to think of us. But last spring Frank was playing golf in Florida with John Loomis, a long-time friend of mine as well as a Berkshire shareholder, who is always on the alert for something that might fit us. Hearing about the impending sale of Brown, John told Frank that the company should be right up Berkshire's alley, and Frank promptly gave me a call. I thought right away that we would make a deal and before long it was done.
1990年底海弗南先生去世后，家族决定出售公司——这时我们的好运来了。我与弗兰克相识多年，但交情未深到他会想到伯克希尔。他委托投行出售，对方也未考虑我们。转机出现在去年春天：弗兰克与我的老友兼伯克希尔股东约翰·卢米斯在佛罗里达打高尔夫时，约翰得知出售计划后告知弗兰克“这正合伯克希尔胃口”。弗兰克随即致电我，交易迅速达成。
Much of my enthusiasm for this purchase came from Frank's willingness to continue as CEO. Like most of our managers, he has no financial need to work but does so because he loves the game and likes to excel. Managers of this stripe cannot be "hired" in the normal sense of the word. What we must do is provide a concert hall in which business artists of this class will wish to perform.
我对此收购充满热情，很大程度源于弗兰克愿继续担任CEO。与多数伯克希尔经理人一样，他无需为生计工作，纯粹出于热爱与追求卓越。这类管理者无法通过常规方式“雇佣”，我们能做的就是提供一个让商业艺术家愿登台演出的“音乐厅”。
Brown (which, by the way, has no connection to Brown Shoe of St. Louis) is the leading North American manufacturer of work shoes and boots, and it has a history of earning unusually fine margins on sales and assets. Shoes are a tough business - of the billion pairs purchased in the United States each year, about 85% are imported - and most manufacturers in the industry do poorly. The wide range of styles and sizes that producers offer causes inventories to be heavy; substantial capital is also tied up in receivables. In this kind of environment, only outstanding managers like Frank and the group developed by Mr. Heffernan can prosper.
布朗公司（与圣路易斯的布朗鞋业无关联）是北美领先的工装鞋靴制造商，其销售和资产回报率长期优异。制鞋业竞争激烈——美国每年购买的10亿双鞋靴中约85%为进口，多数厂商表现糟糕。产品款式尺寸多样导致库存积压，大量资金被应收账款占用。在这样的环境中，只有弗兰克和海弗南先生培养的团队这类杰出管理者才能成功。
A distinguishing characteristic of H. H. Brown is one of the most unusual compensation systems I've encountered - but one that warms my heart: A number of key managers are paid an annual salary of $7,800, to which is added a designated percentage of the profits of the company after these are reduced by a charge for capital employed. These managers therefore truly stand in the shoes of owners. In contrast, most managers talk the talk but don't walk the walk, choosing instead to employ compensation systems that are long on carrots but short on sticks (and that almost invariably treat equity capital as if it were cost-free). The arrangement at Brown, in any case, has served both the company and its managers exceptionally well, which should be no surprise: Managers eager to bet heavily on their abilities usually have plenty of ability to bet on.
H.H.布朗公司最独特之处在于其薪酬体系——这是我见过最令人动容的制度之一：多位核心管理层年薪仅7,800美元，另加公司利润（扣除资本成本后）的固定比例提成。这些管理者真正以所有者心态经营。相比之下，多数管理者只会纸上谈兵，采用“重奖励轻惩罚”的薪酬机制（且往往忽视股权资本成本）。布朗公司的这套机制成效卓著不足为奇：敢于重注自身能力的管理者，往往真有非凡实力。
# 我们对投资银行的失望经历 (Discouraging Experiences with Investment Banks)
It's discouraging to note that though we have on four occasions made major purchases of companies whose sellers were represented by prominent investment banks, we were in only one of these instances contacted by the investment bank. In the other three cases, I myself or a friend initiated the transaction at some point after the investment bank had solicited its own list of prospects. We would love to see an intermediary earn its fee by thinking of us - and therefore repeat here what we're looking for:
令人失望的是，尽管我们曾四次通过知名投行代表的卖家完成重大收购，但其中仅有一家投行主动联系过我们。在另外三起案例中，交易都是在我或朋友主动介入后才达成——此时投行已自行筛选潜在买家名单。我们期待中介能主动想到伯克希尔并凭此赚取佣金，因此重申我们的收购标准：
- Large purchases (大额收购)（至少1,000万美元税后利润）
- Demonstrated consistent earning power (经验证的持续盈利能力)（我们对盈利预测和扭亏型项目不感兴趣）
- Businesses earning good returns on equity with little/no debt (低负债高资本回报企业)
- Management in place (现有管理层)（我们无法提供管理团队）
- Simple businesses (简单业务)（若涉及复杂技术，我们难以理解）
- An offering price (明确报价)（未明确价格前，我们不愿浪费双方时间）
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. (With Brown, we didn't even need to take five.) We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.
我们不会参与敌意收购。我们承诺完全保密且能在五分钟内快速答复是否感兴趣（收购布朗公司时甚至无需五分钟）。我们偏好现金交易，但若换股能带来等值商业价值，也愿意考虑。
Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the pattern through which we acquired Nebraska Furniture Mart, Fechheimer's and Borsheim's. In cases like these, the company's owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives and we invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.
我们最偏好的收购模式参考内布拉斯加家具商城、费希默和博思海姆的案例：企业所有者希望套现部分股权（常用于家庭成员或非活跃股东），同时保留重要持股并继续经营。我们鼓励潜在卖家联系过往合作伙伴验证这种模式。
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales: "When the phone don't ring, you'll know it's me."
查理和我常收到不符合标准的收购邀约：就像宣称要买牧羊犬却不断接到卖柯基犬的电话。乡村歌曲的一句歌词完美表达我们对新业务、重组企业或拍卖型交易的态度："当电话不再响起时，你就知道是我（主动回避）了。"
Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir, Champion, and American Express. We are not interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market.
除上述收购外，我们还愿协商购买类似资本城、所罗门等规模的非控股大宗股票，但不接受普通股市交易建议。
# Insurance Operations (保险运营)
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:
以下是财产-意外险行业关键数据的最新表格：
# Property-Casualty Insurance Industry Key Figures (财产-意外险行业关键数据)
| Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%) （保费收入年变化率%） | Combined Ratio After Policyholder Dividends （承保综合比率） | Yearly Change in Incurred Losses (%) （已发生损失年变化率%） | Inflation Rate Measured by GDP Deflator (%) （GDP平减指数衡量的通胀率%） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1981 ..... 3.8 | 106.0 | 6.5 | 10.0 |
| 1982 ..... 3.7 | 109.6 | 8.4 | 6.2 |
| 1983 ..... 5.0 | 112.0 | 6.8 | 4.0 |
| 1984 ..... 8.5 | 118.0 | 16.9 | 4.5 |
| 1985 ..... 22.1 | 116.3 | 16.1 | 3.7 |
| 1986 ..... 22.2 | 108.0 | 13.5 | 2.7 |
| 1987 ..... 9.4 | 104.6 | 7.8 | 3.1 |
| 1988 ..... 4.4 | 105.4 | 5.5 | 3.9 |
| 1989 ..... 3.2 | 109.2 | 7.7 | 4.4 |
| 1990 (Revised) 4.4 | 109.6 | 4.8 | 4.1 |
| 1991 (Est.) 3.1 | 109.1 | 2.9 | 3.7 |
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income from float is considered, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically breaks even.
综合比率反映保险成本（损失+费用）与保费收入的对比：低于100%为承保盈利，高于100%为亏损。计入浮存金投资收益后，107%-111%的综合比率通常可实现盈亏平衡。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow at close to 10% annually. However, under-reserving during downturns may temporarily obscure this trend. Last year's improved combined ratio (109.1%) seems questionable, as premium growth lagged (3.1%) while loss reserves suggest underestimation. Long-term, accounting gimmicks to mask operating problems inevitably fail, akin to a patient asking a doctor to "touch up X-rays" instead of treating illness.
基于过往报告中的分析，我们预计行业已发生损失将以接近10%的年增长率增长。但在行业低迷时，准备金计提不足可能暂时掩盖趋势。去年综合比率改善（109.1%）值得怀疑，因保费增长仅3.1%，而损失准备金数据表明实际表现可能更差。长期来看，通过会计手段掩盖运营问题终将失败，这就像病人要求医生"修饰X光片"而非治疗疾病。
Berkshire's insurance performance is evaluated by the cost of float (losses + expenses minus premiums + investment income). Our 1991 cost of funds was 6.31%, significantly below U.S. government bond yields. Over 25 years, we've beaten government rates 20 times, with float growing substantially. This advantage stems from our financial strength in super-cat insurance, where we accept volatile underwriting results in exchange for favorable long-term returns.
伯克希尔保险业绩的核心指标是浮存金成本（损失+费用-保费+投资收益）。1991年浮存金成本为6.31%，远低于美国国债收益率。过去25年中，我们有20年跑赢国债，且浮存金规模持续扩大。这种优势源于我们在超级巨灾险领域的财务实力，我们接受短期承保波动以换取长期回报。
# It's discouraging to note that though we have on four occasions made major purchases of companies whose sellers were represented by prominent investment banks, we were in only one of these instances contacted by the investment bank. In the other three cases, I myself or a friend initiated the transaction at some point after the investment bank had solicited its own list of prospects. We would love to see an intermediary earn its fee by thinking of us - and therefore repeat here what we're looking for: (令人沮丧的是，尽管我们四次通过知名投行代理完成重大收购，但只有一次是投行主动联系我们。其他三次交易中，我本人或朋友在投行接触完潜在买家后才主动发起交易。我们希望中介能通过主动推荐体现其价值——因此重申我们的收购标准：)
It's discouraging to note that though we have on four occasions made major purchases of companies whose sellers were represented by prominent investment banks, we were in only one of these instances contacted by the investment bank. In the other three cases, I myself or a friend initiated the transaction at some point after the investment bank had solicited its own list of prospects. We would love to see an intermediary earn its fee by thinking of us - and therefore repeat here what we're looking for:
令人沮丧的是，尽管我们四次通过知名投行代理完成重大收购，但只有一次是投行主动联系我们。其他三次交易中，我本人或朋友在投行接触完潜在买家后才主动发起交易。我们希望中介能通过主动推荐体现其价值——因此重申我们的收购标准：
# Our Acquisition Criteria (我们的收购标准)
(1) Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
(1) 大型收购（至少1,000万美元税后利润），
(2) Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are "turnaround" situations),
(2) 持续盈利能力（我们对盈利预测和扭亏为盈案例无兴趣），
(3) Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
(3) 股权回报率优异且几乎无负债的企业，
(4) Management in place (we can't supply it),
(4) 现有管理团队（我们无法提供），
(5) Simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we won't understand it),
(5) 业务简单（技术密集型企业超出理解范畴），
(6) An offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
(6) 明确报价（未披露价格前不会浪费双方时间）。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. (With Brown, we didn't even need to take five.) We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.
我们不参与不友好收购。我们承诺完全保密且能在五分钟内快速答复（收购布朗时甚至不需要五分钟）。我们偏好现金收购，但若换股交易能实现等值内在商业价值，也可接受。
Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the pattern through which we acquired Nebraska Furniture Mart, Fechheimer's and Borsheim's. In cases like these, the company's owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives and we invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.
我们最偏好的收购模式是类似收购内布拉斯加家具商城、费希默和博思浩姆的方式：企业所有者希望通过变现为企业家族或非活跃股东筹集资金，同时保留重要所有权并继续经营。我们相信这种模式完全契合此类需求，建议潜在卖家联系与我们合作过的伙伴了解情况。
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales: "When the phone don't ring, you'll know it's me."
查理和我常收到不符合标准的收购推荐：就像宣称收购牧羊犬却接到卖梗犬的电话。一首乡村歌词精准表达我们的态度："当电话不响时，你就知道是我（在坚持原则）。"
Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir, Champion, and American Express. We are not interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market.
除上述企业收购外，我们亦有兴趣通过协商收购非控股的大宗股票（如资本城、所罗门等持仓）。但我们对普通股市交易建议无兴趣。
# Insurance Operations (保险业务)
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:
以下为财产险行业关键数据的更新表格：
# Table: Property-Casualty Insurance Industry Key Figures (财产险行业关键数据表)
| Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%) （保费增长率%） | Combined Ratio After Policyholder Dividends （保单分红后综合比率） | Yearly Change in Incurred Losses (%) （赔付损失增长率%） | Inflation Rate Measured by GDP Deflator (%) （GDP平减指数衡量的通胀率%） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1981 ..... 3.8 | 106.0 | 6.5 | 10.0 |
| 1982 ..... 3.7 | 109.6 | 8.4 | 6.2 |
| 1983 ..... 5.0 | 112.0 | 6.8 | 4.0 |
| 1984 ..... 8.5 | 118.0 | 16.9 | 4.5 |
| 1985 ..... 22.1 | 116.3 | 16.1 | 3.7 |
| 1986 ..... 22.2 | 108.0 | 13.5 | 2.7 |
| 1987 ..... 9.4 | 104.6 | 7.8 | 3.1 |
| 1988 ..... 4.4 | 105.4 | 5.5 | 3.9 |
| 1989 ..... 3.2 | 109.2 | 7.7 | 4.4 |
| 1990 (Revised) 4.4 | 109.6 | 4.8 | 4.1 |
| 1991 (Est.) 3.1 | 109.1 | 2.9 | 3.7 |
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107 - 111 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.
综合比率反映总保险成本（赔付损失+费用）与保费收入的比值：低于100%表示承保盈利，高于100%表示亏损。比率越高业绩越差。计入持有保单持有人资金（"浮存金"）产生的投资收益后，107-111区间的综合比率通常可实现整体收支平衡（不含股东资金收益）。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow at close to 10% annually, even in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower. (Over the last 25 years, incurred losses have in reality grown at a still faster rate, 11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount.
基于过往报告中的分析，即使通胀率大幅回落，行业赔付损失仍将接近10%年增长（过去25年实际增速甚至达11%）。若保费增速显著低于10%，承保亏损将加剧。
However, the industry's tendency to under-reserve when business turns bad may obscure the picture for a time - and that could well describe the situation last year. Though premiums did not come close to growing 10%, the combined ratio failed to deteriorate as I had expected but instead slightly improved. Loss-reserve data for the industry indicate that there is reason to be skeptical of that outcome, and it may turn out that 1991's ratio should have been worse than was reported. In the long run, of course, trouble awaits managements that paper over operating problems with accounting maneuvers. Eventually, managements of this kind achieve the same result as the seriously-ill patient who tells his doctor: "I can't afford the operation, but would you accept a small payment to touch up the x-rays?"
不过，行业在景气下行时普遍低估准备金的倾向可能暂时掩盖问题——这恰是去年的真实写照。尽管保费增速远低于10%，综合比率反而小幅改善。但行业损失准备金数据表明这一结果存疑，1991年综合比率可能实际更差。长期来看，通过会计手段掩盖运营问题的管理层终将遭遇困境。这类管理层的结局，就像身患重病却对医生说："手术费用太高，请收点钱帮我'优化'一下X光片"的病人。
# Insurance Operations (保险业务)
Berkshire's insurance business has changed in ways that make combined ratios, our own or the industry's, largely irrelevant to our performance. What counts with us is the "cost of funds developed from insurance," or in the vernacular, "the cost of float."
伯克希尔的保险业务已发生转变，使综合比率（无论是我们的还是行业的）对业绩的影响变得次要。我们关注的是"保险资金的成本"，即通俗所称的"浮存金成本"。
Float - which we generate in exceptional amounts - is the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. And the cost of float is measured by our underwriting loss.
浮存金（我们生成的规模极为庞大）= 损失准备金 + 损失调整费用准备金 + 未赚保费准备金 - 代理余额 - 预付取得成本 - 适用于接受再保险的递延费用。其成本由承保亏损衡量。
The table below shows our cost of float since we entered the business in 1967.
下表显示了自1967年进入保险行业以来的浮存金成本：
# Table: Berkshire's Cost of Float (伯克希尔浮存金成本)
| Year （年份） | Underwriting Loss （承保亏损，百万美元） | Average Float （平均浮存金，百万美元） | Cost of Funds （资金成本，1/2） | Yearend Yield on Long-Term Govt. Bonds （长期国债年化收益率） |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1967 ........ | profit | $17.3 | 小于零 | 5.50% |
| 1968 ........ | profit | 19.9 | 小于零 | 5.90% |
| 1969 ........ | profit | 23.4 | 小于零 | 6.79% |
| 1970 ........ | $0.37 | 32.4 | 1.14% | 6.25% |
| 1971 ........ | profit | 52.5 | 小于零 | 5.81% |
| 1972 ........ | profit | 69.5 | 小于零 | 5.82% |
| 1973 ........ | profit | 73.3 | 小于零 | 7.27% |
| 1974 ........ | 7.36 | 79.1 | 9.30% | 8.13% |
| 1975 ........ | 11.35 | 87.6 | 12.96% | 8.03% |
| 1976 ........ | profit | 102.6 | 小于零 | 7.30% |
| 1977 ........ | profit | 139.0 | 小于零 | 7.97% |
| 1978 ........ | profit | 190.4 | 小于零 | 8.93% |
| 1979 ........ | profit | 227.3 | 小于零 | 10.08% |
| 1980 ........ | profit | 237.0 | 小于零 | 11.94% |
| 1981 ........ | profit | 228.4 | 小于零 | 13.61% |
| 1982 ........ | 21.56 | 220.6 | 9.77% | 10.64% |
| 1983 ........ | 33.87 | 231.3 | 14.64% | 11.84% |
| 1984 ........ | 48.06 | 253.2 | 18.98% | 11.58% |
| 1985 ........ | 44.23 | 390.2 | 11.34% | 9.34% |
| 1986 ........ | 55.84 | 797.5 | 7.00% | 7.60% |
| 1987 ........ | 55.43 | 1,266.7 | 4.38% | 8.95% |
| 1988 ........ | 11.08 | 1,497.7 | 0.74% | 9.00% |
| 1989 ........ | 24.40 | 1,541.3 | 1.58% | 7.97% |
| 1990 ........ | 26.65 | 1,637.3 | 1.63% | 8.24% |
| 1991 ........ | 119.6 | 1,895.0 | 6.31% | 7.40% |
As you can see, our cost of funds in 1991 was well below the U. S. Government's cost on newly-issued long-term bonds. We have in fact beat the government's rate in 20 of the 25 years we have been in the insurance business, often by a wide margin. We have over that time also substantially increased the amount of funds we hold, which counts as a favorable development but only because the cost of funds has been satisfactory. Our float should continue to grow; the challenge will be to garner these funds at a reasonable cost.
显然，1991年我们的资金成本远低于美国政府新发行长期债券的成本。过去25年保险业务中，我们有20年资金成本低于政府利率（有时大幅领先）。同期我们持有的资金规模也显著增长——这被视为积极发展，但前提是资金成本保持合理。浮存金规模将持续扩大，挑战在于以合理成本获取这些资金。
Berkshire continues to be a very large writer - perhaps the largest in the world - of "super-cat" insurance, which is coverage that other insurance companies buy to protect themselves against major catastrophic losses. Profits in this business are enormously volatile. As I mentioned last year, $100 million in super-cat premiums, which is roughly our annual expectation, could deliver us anything from a $100 million profit (in a year with no big catastrophe) to a $200 million loss (in a year in which a couple of major hurricanes and/or earthquakes come along).
伯克希尔仍是全球最大的"超级灾难险"承保商之一。这一业务利润波动性极大。正如去年所述，1亿美元保费收入（大致为我们的年度预期），可能带来1亿美元盈利（无重大灾难年份），也可能导致2亿美元亏损（遭遇多次飓风或地震时）。
We price this business expecting to pay out, over the long term, about 90% of the premiums we receive. In any given year, however, we are likely to appear either enormously profitable or enormously unprofitable. That is true in part because GAAP accounting does not allow us to set up reserves in the catastrophe-free years for losses that are certain to be experienced in other years. In effect, a one-year accounting cycle is ill-suited to the nature of this business - and that is a reality you should be aware of when you assess our annual results.
我们定价时预期长期赔付率约为90%。但在特定年度可能表现为极端盈利或亏损。部分原因在于通用会计准则不允许我们在无灾年份计提必然发生的未来损失准备金。实际上，这种业务不适合单年度会计周期评估——您评价年度业绩时需特别注意这点。
Last year there appears to have been, by our definition, one super-cat, but it will trigger payments from only about 25% of our policies. Therefore, we currently estimate the 1991 underwriting profit from our catastrophe business to have been about $11 million. (You may be surprised to learn the identity of the biggest catastrophe in 1991: It was neither the Oakland fire nor Hurricane Bob, but rather a September typhoon in Japan that caused the industry an insured loss now estimated at about $4-$5 billion. At the higher figure, the loss from the typhoon would surpass that from Hurricane Hugo, the previous record-holder.)
按我们的标准，去年仅发生一次超级灾难险，但仅触发约25%保单赔付。目前估计1991年巨灾业务承保利润为1,100万美元。（您可能惊讶于1991年最大灾难：既非奥克兰大火也非鲍勃飓风，而是9月日本台风造成行业40-50亿美元保险损失——按上限计算，该损失超过此前纪录保持者雨果飓风。）
Insurers will always need huge amounts of reinsurance protection for marine and aviation disasters as well as for natural catastrophes. In the 1980's much of this reinsurance was supplied by "innocents" - that is, by insurers that did not understand the risks of the business - but they have now been financially burned beyond recognition. (Berkshire itself was an innocent all too often when I was personally running the insurance operation.) Insurers, though, like investors, eventually repeat their mistakes. At some point - probably after a few catastrophe-scarce years - innocents will reappear and prices for super-cat policies will plunge to silly levels.
保险公司始终需要巨额再保险覆盖海运、航空及自然灾害风险。1980年代这类业务多由"天真实体"（即未理解风险的保险公司）提供，如今这些实体已遭受毁灭性打击。（我亲自经营保险业务时，伯克希尔也常扮演天真角色。）保险商如同投资者，终将重蹈覆辙：经过几年灾难稀少期后，天真实体将重现，超级灾难险价格会暴跌至荒谬水平。
As long as apparently-adequate rates prevail, however, we will be a major participant in super-cat coverages. In marketing this product, we enjoy a significant competitive advantage because of our premier financial strength. Thinking insurers know that when "the big one" comes, many reinsurers who found it easy to write policies will find it difficult to write checks. (Some reinsurers can say what Jackie Mason does: "I'm fixed for life - as long as I don't buy anything.") Berkshire's ability to fulfill all its commitments under conditions of even extreme adversity is unquestioned.
只要费率看似合理，我们将持续作为超级灾难险主要承保商。营销该产品时，我们因顶级财务实力获得显著竞争优势。理性保险商深知，当"大灾难"来临时，许多轻易承保的再保商将无力支付理赔。（某些再保商可效仿杰基·梅森："我终生无忧——只要不再购买任何资产。"）伯克希尔在极端困境下履行所有承诺的能力毋庸置疑。
Overall, insurance offers Berkshire its greatest opportunities. Mike Goldberg has accomplished wonders with this operation since he took charge and it has become a very valuable asset, albeit one that can't be appraised with any precision.
整体而言，保险业务为伯克希尔提供最大机遇。迈克·戈德堡掌管后表现卓越，虽难以精确估值，但已成为核心资产。
# Marketable Common Stocks (可交易普通股)
On the next page we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
下页列出伯克希尔持有市值超10亿美元的普通股持仓，其中部分投资来自我们持股不足100%的子公司。
# Table: Berkshire's Major Stock Holdings (伯克希尔主要持仓)
| Shares （持股数量） | Company （公司） | Cost （成本，千美元） | Market （市值，千美元） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3,000,000 | Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.（资本城/美国广播公司） | $517,500 | $1,300,500 |
| 46,700,000 | The Coca-Cola Company（可口可乐） | 1,023,920 | 3,747,675 |
| 2,495,200 | Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.（联邦住房抵押贷款公司） | 77,245 | 343,090 |
| 6,850,000 | GEICO Corp.（政府雇员保险公司） | 45,713 | 1,363,150 |
| 24,000,000 | The Gillette Company（吉列公司） | 600,000 | 1,347,000 |
| 31,247,000 | Guinness PLC（吉尼斯公司） | 264,782 | 296,755 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company（华盛顿邮报） | 9,731 | 336,050 |
| 5,000,000 | Wells Fargo & Company（富国银行） | 289,431 | 290,000 |
As usual the list reflects our Rip Van Winkle approach to investing. Guinness is a new position. But we held the other seven stocks a year ago (making allowance for the conversion of our Gillette position from preferred to common) and in six of those we hold an unchanged number of shares. The exception is Federal Home Loan Mortgage ("Freddie Mac"), in which our shareholdings increased slightly.
持仓清单延续"沉睡投资法"：吉尼斯为新增持仓，其余七只股票（含吉列从优先股转为普通股）中，六只持股数量未变。仅联邦住房抵押贷款公司（弗雷迪·麦克）小幅增持。
Our stay-put behavior reflects our view that the stock market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from the active to the patient. (With tongue only partly in check, I suggest that recent events indicate that the much-maligned "idle rich" have received a bad rap: They have maintained or increased their wealth while many of the "energetic rich" - aggressive real estate operators, corporate acquirers, oil drillers, etc. - have seen their fortunes disappear.)
长期持有行为反映我们对股市的认知：市场是将财富从活跃者转移至耐心者的中心。（半开玩笑地指出：近况表明被污名化的"懒惰富豪"实则受冤枉——他们保值增值的同时，许多"奋斗富豪"（激进地产商、并购者、石油钻探商等）财富却蒸发了。）
Our Guinness holding represents Berkshire's first significant investment in a company domiciled outside the United States. Guinness, however, earns its money in much the same fashion as Coca-Cola and Gillette, U.S.-based companies that garner most of their profits from international operations. Indeed, in the sense of where they earn their profits - continent-by-continent - Coca-Cola and Guinness display strong similarities. (But you'll never get their drinks confused - and your Chairman remains unmovably in the Cherry Coke camp.)
吉尼斯是伯克希尔首笔重大海外投资。该公司的盈利模式与可口可乐、吉列类似——总部在美国且主要利润来自国际运营。就利润来源地域分布而言，可口可乐与吉尼斯高度相似（但饮料绝不会混淆——董事长仍坚定站在樱桃味可乐阵营。）
# Investment Philosophy (投资理念)
We continually search for large businesses with understandable, enduring and mouth-watering economics that are run by able and shareholder-oriented managements. This focus doesn't guarantee results: We both have to buy at a sensible price and get business performance from our companies that validates our assessment. But this investment approach - searching for the superstars - offers us our only chance for real success.
我们持续寻找具备可理解、可持续且吸引力强经济特性的大型企业，且管理层需能力突出并重视股东利益。这种聚焦不保证结果：我们既要以合理价格买入，也要企业表现验证评估。但聚焦超级明星股——这是我们实现真正成功的唯一路径。
Charlie and I are simply not smart enough, considering the large sums we work with, to get great results by adroitly buying and selling portions of far-from-great businesses. Nor do we think many others can achieve long-term investment success by flitting from flower to flower. Indeed, we believe that according the name "investors" to institutions that trade actively is like calling someone who repeatedly engages in one-night stands a romantic.
考虑到管理资金规模，查理和我自认不够聪明到通过频繁交易平庸企业获利。我们也不认为多数活跃交易者能实现长期成功。事实上，将频繁交易机构称为"投资者"，无异于把多次一夜情者称为"浪漫主义者"。
If my universe of business possibilities was limited, say, to private companies in Omaha, I would, first, try to assess the long-term economic characteristics of each business; second, assess the quality of the people in charge of running it; and, third, try to buy into a few of the best operations at a sensible price. I certainly would not wish to own an equal part of every business in town. Why, then, should Berkshire take a different tack when dealing with the larger universe of public companies? And since finding great businesses and outstanding managers is so difficult, why should we discard proven products? (I was tempted to say "the real thing.") Our motto is: "If at first you do succeed, quit trying."
假设我的商业可能性仅限于奥马哈的私有企业：首先评估每家企业的长期经济特性；其次评估管理者质量；最后以合理价格投资其中最优的少数企业。我绝不会平等地持有全镇所有企业股份。那么面对更大的上市公司世界，伯克希尔为何要采取不同策略？既然发现伟大企业和杰出管理者如此困难，为何还要抛弃已被验证的产品？（我本想说"真金白银"。）我们的座右铭是："一旦成功，停止折腾。"
John Maynard Keynes, whose brilliance as a practicing investor matched his brilliance in thought, wrote a letter to a business associate, F. C. Scott, on August 15, 1934 that says it all: "As time goes on, I get more and more convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which one thinks one knows something about and in the management of which one thoroughly believes. It is a mistake to think that one limits one's risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confidence. One's knowledge and experience are definitely limited and there are seldom more than two or three enterprises at any given time in which I personally feel myself entitled to put full confidence."
约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯兼具实践与理论智慧，1934年8月15日致商业伙伴F.C.斯科特的信中精辟总结："随着时间推移，我愈发确信正确的投资方法是重仓自己充分了解且深信管理层的企业...通过分散投资不熟悉/无信心的企业来控制风险是错误的...个人知识经验必有限，任何时点通常只有二三家企业值得完全信任。"
# Mistake Du Jour (今日之过)
In the 1989 annual report I wrote about "Mistakes of the First 25 Years" and promised you an update in 2015. My experiences in the first few years of this second "semester" indicate that my backlog of matters to be discussed will become unmanageable if I stick to my original plan. Therefore, I will occasionally unburden myself in these pages in the hope that public confession may deter further bumblings. (Post-mortems prove useful for hospitals and football teams; why not for businesses and investors?)
在1989年年报中我曾撰写"前25年错误"并承诺2015年更新。本"第二学期"头几年经历表明，若坚持原计划，待讨论的错误清单将失控。因此我将偶尔在此坦白，希望公开忏悔能遏制更多愚蠢行为。（尸检对医院和橄榄球队有效，为何对企业/投资者无效？）
Typically, our most egregious mistakes fall in the omission, rather than the commission, category. That may spare Charlie and me some embarrassment, since you don't see these errors; but their invisibility does not reduce their cost. In this mea culpa, I am not talking about missing out on some company that depends upon an esoteric invention (such as Xerox), high-technology (Apple), or even brilliant merchandising (Wal-Mart). We will never develop the competence to spot such businesses early. Instead I refer to business situations that Charlie and I can understand and that seem clearly attractive - but in which we nevertheless end up sucking our thumbs rather than buying.
我们的最大错误通常属于"不作为"而非"乱作为"。这或许让我们免于难堪（您看不到这些错误），但代价不菲。此处忏悔不涉及错过依赖冷门发明（如施乐）、高技术（苹果）或卓越营销（沃尔玛）的企业。我们永远无法早期识别这类公司。我要说的是那些查理和我能理解且明显吸引人的机会——但我们却攥着钱空等。
Every writer knows it helps to use striking examples, but I wish the one I now present wasn't quite so dramatic: In early 1988, we decided to buy 30 million shares (adjusted for a subsequent split) of Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), which would have been a $350-$400 million investment. We had owned the stock some years earlier and understood the company's business. Furthermore, it was clear to us that David Maxwell, Fannie Mae's CEO, had dealt superbly with some problems that he had inherited and had established the company as a financial powerhouse - with the best yet to come. I visited David in Washington and confirmed that he would not be uncomfortable if we were to take a large position.
作家都懂需用震撼案例，但希望这个例子没那么夸张：1988年初我们决定购买房利美3,000万股份（经拆股调整），相当于3.5-4亿美元投资。我们曾在更早持有该股，深知其业务。更明确的是，CEO大卫·麦克斯韦尔已出色解决遗留问题，使公司成为金融巨头——且黄金时代尚未到来。我拜访大卫并确认其接受大额持股。
After we bought about 7 million shares, the price began to climb. In frustration, I stopped buying (a mistake that, thankfully, I did not repeat when Coca-Cola stock rose similarly during our purchase program). In an even sillier move, I surrendered to my distaste for holding small positions and sold the 7 million shares we owned.
购入约700万股后股价开始攀升。我因沮丧停止买入（幸运的是，购买可口可乐时未重复此错）。更荒唐的是，我因厌恶小额持股而出售了已买入的700万股。
I wish I could give you a halfway rational explanation for my amateurish behavior vis-a-vis Fannie Mae. But there isn't one. What I can give you is an estimate as of yearend 1991 of the approximate gain that Berkshire didn't make because of your Chairman's mistake: about $1.4 billion.
若能给房利美决策失误提供半个合理的解释就好了。但无解。我能做的只是估算：因董事长失误导致伯克希尔在1991年底错失的收益约为14亿美元。
# Fixed-Income Securities (固定收益证券)
We made several significant changes in our fixed-income portfolio during 1991. As I noted earlier, our Gillette preferred was called for redemption, which forced us to convert to common stock; we eliminated our holdings of an RJR Nabisco issue that was subject to an exchange offer and subsequent call; and we purchased fixed-income securities of American Express and First Empire State Corp., a Buffalo-based bank holding company. We also added to a small position in ACF Industries that we had established in late 1990. Our largest holdings at yearend were:
1991年我们的固定收益组合发生重大调整：吉列优先股被赎回迫使转为普通股；清仓雷诺烟草债券（面临要约收购及后续赎回）；新购美国运通、第一帝国州立公司（布法罗银行控股）债券；增持1990年底建立的ACF工业小额持仓。年末最大持仓如下：
# Table: Berkshire's Fixed-Income Holdings (伯克希尔固定收益持仓)
| Issuer （发行方） | Cost of Preferreds and Amortized Value of Bonds （优先股成本及债券摊销价值） | Market （市值） |
|---|---|---|
| ACF Industries (ACF工业公司) ................ | $93,918(2) | $118,683 |
| American Express (美国运通) .............. | 300,000 | 263,265(1)(2) |
| Champion International (冠军国际) ........ | 300,000(2) | 300,000(1) |
| First Empire State (第一帝国州立) | 40,000 | 50,000(1)(2) |
| RJR Nabisco (雷诺烟草) | 222,148(2) | 285,683 |
| Salomon (所罗门) | 700,000(2) | 714,000(1) |
| USAir (美国航空) | 358,000(2) | 232,700(1) |
| Washington Public Power Systems (华盛顿公共电力系统) | 158,553(2) | 203,071 |
(1) Fair value as determined by Charlie and me
(2) Carrying value in our financial statements
Our $40 million of First Empire State preferred carries a 9% coupon, is non-callable until 1996 and is convertible at $78.91 per share. Normally I would think a purchase of this size too small for Berkshire, but I have enormous respect for Bob Wilmers, CEO of First Empire, and like being his partner on any scale.
我们持有的4,000万美元第一帝国州立优先股票面利率9%，1996年前不可赎回，每股78.91美元可转。按常规标准这笔投资对伯克希尔而言太小，但我极其尊重第一帝国CEO鲍勃·威尔默斯，愿在任何规模与其合作。
Our American Express preferred is not a normal fixed-income security. Rather it is a "Perc," which carries a fixed dividend of 8.85% on our $300 million cost. Absent one exception mentioned later, our preferred must be converted three years after issuance, into a maximum of 12,244,898 shares. If necessary, a downward adjustment in the conversion ratio will be made in order to limit to $414 million the total value of the common we receive. Though there is thus a ceiling on the value of the common stock that we will receive upon conversion, there is no floor. The terms of the preferred, however, include a provision allowing us to extend the conversion date by one year if the common stock is below $24.50 on the third anniversary of our purchase.
美国运通优先股非传统固定收益证券，而是"佩克"证券，票面股息率8.85%（成本3亿美元）。除一项例外条款外，优先股须在发行三年后转为普通股，上限为12,244,898股。必要时会下调换股比例，使获得的普通股总值不超过4.14亿美元。换股虽设价值上限但无下限。条款还允许若三年后普通股价低于24.50美元，可延后一年换股。
# Fixed-Income Securities (固定收益证券)
Overall, our fixed-income investments have treated us well, both over the long term and recently. We have realized large capital gains from these holdings, including about $152 million in 1991. Additionally, our after-tax yields have considerably exceeded those earned by most fixed-income portfolios.
总体而言，我们的固定收益投资长期和近期均表现优异。这些持仓已实现巨额资本收益，其中1991年贡献约1.52亿美元。此外，我们的税后收益率远超多数固定收益组合。
Nevertheless, we have had some surprises, none greater than the need for me to involve myself personally and intensely in the Salomon situation. As I write this letter, I am also writing a letter for inclusion in Salomon's annual report and I refer you to that report for an update on the company. (Write to: Corporate Secretary, Salomon Inc, Seven World Trade Center, New York, NY 10048) Despite the company's travails, Charlie and I believe our Salomon preferred stock increased slightly in value during 1991. Lower interest rates and a higher price for Salomon's common produced this result.
然而，我们仍遭遇意外，其中最戏剧性的是我不得不深度介入所罗门危机。撰写本信时，我亦在为所罗门年报撰写附信，建议您查阅其年报获取更新（联系地址：所罗门公司秘书部，纽约世界贸易中心七号，邮编10048）。尽管公司经历动荡，查理和我认为所罗门优先股在1991年小幅增值——归因于利率下降及普通股价格上涨。
Last year I told you that our USAir investment "should work out all right unless the industry is decimated during the next few years." Unfortunately 1991 was a decimating period for the industry, as Midway, Pan Am and America West all entered bankruptcy. (Stretch the period to 14 months and you can add Continental and TWA.)
去年我曾表示对美国航空的投资"只要行业不遭重创就能成功"。不幸的是1991年该行业遭遇重创：中西航空、泛美航空、美西航空相继破产（若延长至14个月，大陆航空和环球航空也加入其中）。
The low valuation that we have given USAir in our table reflects the risk that the industry will remain unprofitable for virtually all participants in it, a risk that is far from negligible. The risk is heightened by the fact that the courts have been encouraging bankrupt carriers to continue operating. These carriers can temporarily charge fares that are below the industry's costs because the bankrupts don't incur the capital costs faced by their solvent brethren and because they can fund their losses - and thereby stave off shutdown - by selling off assets. This burn-the-furniture-to-provide-firewood approach to fare-setting by bankrupt carriers contributes to the toppling of previously-marginal carriers, creating a domino effect that is perfectly designed to bring the industry to its knees.
表中对美国航空的估值较低，反映了行业可能长期亏损的风险——这一风险远非微不足道。法院鼓励破产航司持续运营加剧了该风险。这些航司可暂时以低于行业成本定价（无需承担资本开支），通过变卖资产维持运营。破产航司这种"拆房子当柴烧"的定价策略，导致边缘航司接连倒闭，形成完美多米诺骨牌效应，最终令整个行业陷入绝境。
Seth Schofield, who became CEO of USAir in 1991, is making major adjustments in the airline's operations in order to improve its chances of being one of the few industry survivors. There is no tougher job in corporate America than running an airline: Despite the huge amounts of equity capital that have been injected into it, the industry, in aggregate, has posted a net loss since its birth after Kitty Hawk. Airline managers need brains, guts, and experience - and Seth possesses all three of these attributes.
1991年掌舵美国航空的赛斯·斯科菲尔德正在大刀阔斧改革运营，提升其成为少数幸存者之一的几率。在美国企业界，运营航空公司是最艰难的工作：自莱特兄弟首飞以来，整个行业累计净亏损触目惊心。航空公司管理者需要智慧、勇气与经验——赛斯三者兼备。
# Miscellaneous (其他事项)
About 97.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1991 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $6.8 million, and 2,630 charities were recipients.
伯克希尔1991年股东指定捐赠计划获得97.7%合格股份参与，累计捐赠680万美元，惠及2,630家慈善机构。
We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 48-49. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1992 will be ineligible for the 1992 program.
新股东请参阅年报48-49页的捐赠计划说明。参与未来计划需确保股份以实际所有人名义登记，而非券商/银行/托管机构名义。1992年8月31日前未完成登记的股份将失去1992年计划资格。
In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses make contributions, including merchandise, averaging about $1.5 million annually. These contributions support local charities, such as The United Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.
除股东指定捐赠外，运营部门每年自主捐赠（含实物）约150万美元，支持联合劝募协会等本地慈善事业，并为业务创造相应回报。
However, neither our operating managers nor officers of the parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad national programs or charitable activities of special personal interest to them, except to the extent they do so as shareholders. If your employees, including your CEO, wish to give to their alma maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal attachment, we believe they should use their own money, not yours.
但管理层不得动用伯克希尔资金支持全国性项目或个人关联机构（股东身份除外）。若员工（包括CEO）欲向母校等机构捐赠，我们建议使用个人资金而非公司资金。
# Charlie's Letter to Wesco Shareholders (查理致威斯科股东的信)
The faithful will notice that, for the first time in some years, Charlie's annual letter to Wesco shareholders is not reprinted in this report. Since his letter is relatively barebones this year, Charlie said he saw no point in including it in these pages; my own recommendation, however, is that you get a copy of the Wesco report. Simply write: Corporate Secretary, Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, CA 91101.
忠实读者会发现，查理致威斯科股东的年度信首次未被收录。查理认为今年信件内容过于简略，但建议您自行联系获取报告副本：威斯科金融公司秘书部，加州帕萨迪纳科罗拉多大道315号，邮编91101。
# Chace Family Legacy (蔡斯家族传承)
Malcolm G. Chace, Jr., now 88, has decided not to stand for election as a director this year. But the association of the Chace family with Berkshire will not end: Malcolm III (Kim), Malcolm's son, will be nominated to replace him.
现年88岁的小马尔科姆·蔡斯决定不再担任董事，但蔡斯家族与伯克希尔的渊源不会终结：其子马尔科姆三世（昵称金姆）将接替提名。
In 1931, Malcolm went to work for Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates, which merged with Hathaway Manufacturing Co. in 1955 to form our present company. Two years later, Malcolm became Berkshire Hathaway's Chairman, a position he held as well in early 1965 when he made it possible for Buffett Partnership, Ltd. to buy a key block of Berkshire stock owned by some of his relatives. This purchase gave our partnership effective control of the company. Malcolm's immediate family meanwhile kept its Berkshire stock and for the last 27 years has had the second-largest holding in the company, trailing only the Buffett family. Malcolm has been a joy to work with and we are delighted that the long-running relationship between the Chace family and Berkshire is continuing to a new generation.
1931年马尔科姆入职伯克希尔精纺公司，1955年该公司与哈撒韦制造合并成立现伯克希尔。1957年他出任董事长，并于1965年促成巴菲特合伙公司收购其亲属持有的关键股份（奠定控股基础）。蔡斯家族至今保持持股，在过去27年中稳居第二大持仓（仅次于巴菲特家族）。与马尔科姆的合作令人愉悦，我们很高兴蔡斯家族与伯克希尔的百年渊源能延续至新一代。
# Annual Meeting 1992 (1992年股东大会)
The annual meeting this year will be held at the Orpheum Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 27, 1992. Attendance last year grew to a record 1,550, but that still leaves plenty of room at the Orpheum.
1992年股东大会定于4月27日（周一）上午9:30在奥马哈俄耳甫斯剧院举行。去年参会人数达1,550人创纪录，但场地仍有充足空间。
We recommend that you get your hotel reservations early at one of these hotels:
(1) The Radisson-Redick Tower (拉迪森-雷迪克塔酒店) (88房间) - 对街酒店
(2) the much larger Red Lion Hotel (红狮大酒店) - 步行5分钟
(3) the Marriott (万豪酒店) - 西奥马哈博思浩珠宝店旁，距市中心20分钟车程
We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting and return after it ends.
建议尽早预订：
(1) 拉迪森-雷迪克塔酒店（88间客房）正对俄耳甫斯剧院；
(2) 更大的红狮大酒店步行5分钟可达；
(3) 万豪酒店靠近博思浩珠宝店，距市中心20分钟车程。
万豪酒店将安排8:30/8:45发车前往会场，结束后送回。
Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent, owner-related questions.
查理和我始终期待这场聚会，希望您能参加。股东提问质量印证了股东群体的优秀——我们从未在其他年度会议见过如此高水平的理性提问。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With the admission card, we will enclose information about parking facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have to walk a few blocks.
委托书附件说明如何获取入场券。凭券将附俄耳甫斯剧院周边停车场信息。自驾请早到，附近车位紧张可能需步行数个街区。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to downtown hotels or the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores.
会议结束后大巴将送您前往内布拉斯加家具商城和博思浩珠宝店。建议预留充足时间参观。早到者可在周间任意时间造访家具商城（周六10:00-17:30，周日12:00-17:30营业）。商城内设有喜诗糖果车，亲身体验为何美国人去年消费了2,600万磅喜诗产品。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday, but we will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 26. Borsheim's will also have a special party the previous evening at which shareholders are welcome. (You must, however, write Mrs. Gladys Kaiser at our office for an invitation.) On display that evening will be a 150-year retrospective of the most exceptional timepieces made by Patek Philippe, including watches once owned by Queen Victoria, Pope Pius IX, Rudyard Kipling, Madame Curie and Albert Einstein. The centerpiece of the exhibition will be a $5 million watch whose design and manufacture required nine years of labor by Patek Philippe craftsmen. Along with the rest of the collection, this watch will be on display at the store on Sunday - unless Charlie has by then impulsively bought it.
博思浩珠宝店周日通常歇业，但4月26日将为股东及宾客开放（12:00-18:00）。前一晚还将举办股东专属派对（需提前联系格拉迪斯·凯泽女士获取邀请函）。当晚将展出百达翡丽150周年特展，展品包括维多利亚女王、庇护九世教皇、吉卜林、居里夫人和爱因斯坦收藏的时计。焦点是一件耗时9年打造的价值500万美元的腕表——除非查理当场冲动买走。
# Nicholas Kenner's Challenge (尼古拉斯·肯纳的挑战)
Nicholas Kenner nailed me - again - at last year's meeting, pointing out that I had said in the 1990 annual report that he was 11 in May 1990, when actually he was 9. So, asked Nicholas rather caustically: "If you can't get that straight, how do I know the numbers in the back [the financials] are correct?" I'm still searching for a snappy response. Nicholas will be at this year's meeting - he spurned my offer of a trip to Disney World on that day - so join us to watch a continuation of this lop-sided battle of wits.
去年大会上，尼古拉斯·肯纳再次当面指出：我在1990年年报中误称他1990年5月时11岁（实际9岁）。他尖锐质问："连年龄都搞错，我怎敢相信财务数据？"我至今未想好机智回应。今年他拒绝了迪士尼之邀，将再度出席大会——期待这场一边倒的斗智继续上演。
# Closing (结语)
Warren E. Buffett
February 28, 1992
Chairman of the Board
沃伦·E·巴菲特
1992年2月28日
董事会主席