1986巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.（伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司）
# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.（致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东）
Our gain in net worth during 1986 was $492.5 million, or 26.1%. Over the last 22 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,073.06, or 23.3% compounded annually. Both the numerator and denominator are important in the per-share book value calculation: during the 22-year period our corporate net worth has increased 10,600% while shares outstanding have increased less than 1%.
1986年，我们的净资产增长了4.925亿美元，增幅为26.1%。在过去22年里（即现任管理层接手以来），我们的每股账面价值从19.46美元增长至2073.06美元，年复合增长率为23.3%。在每股账面价值的计算中，分子和分母都至关重要：在这22年期间，公司净资产增长了10600%，而流通股数量的增幅不足1%。
In past reports I have noted that book value at most companies differs widely from intrinsic business value - the number that really counts for owners. In our own case, however, book value has served for more than a decade as a reasonable if somewhat conservative proxy for business value. That is, our business value has moderately exceeded our book value, with the ratio between the two remaining fairly steady.
在以往的报告中，我曾指出，大多数公司的账面价值与内在业务价值（对所有者而言真正重要的数值）存在巨大差异。然而就我们公司而言，过去十多年来，账面价值虽略显保守，却一直是衡量业务价值的合理替代指标。也就是说，我们的业务价值略高于账面价值，且两者之间的比率保持相对稳定。
The good news is that in 1986 our percentage gain in business value probably exceeded the book value gain. I say "probably" because business value is a soft number: in our own case, two equally well-informed observers might make judgments more than 10% apart.
好消息是，1986年我们业务价值的增幅百分比可能超过了账面价值的增幅。我用“可能”一词，是因为业务价值是一个较为主观的数值：以我们公司为例，即使是两位信息掌握程度相当的观察者，对业务价值的判断也可能存在超过10%的差异。
A large measure of our improvement in business value relative to book value reflects the outstanding performance of key managers at our major operating businesses. These managers - the Blumkins, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph Schey - have over the years improved the earnings of their businesses dramatically while, except in the case of insurance, utilizing little additional capital. This accomplishment builds economic value, or "Goodwill," that does not show up in the net worth figure on our balance sheet, nor in our per-share book value. In 1986 this unrecorded gain was substantial.
我们业务价值相对于账面价值的提升，在很大程度上得益于主要运营业务关键管理者的出色表现。这些管理者包括布卢姆金家族（Blumkins）、迈克·戈德堡（Mike Goldberg）、赫尔德曼家族（Heldmans）、查克·哈金斯（Chuck Huggins）、斯坦·利普西（Stan Lipsey）以及拉尔夫·谢伊（Ralph Schey）。多年来，他们大幅提高了各自业务的盈利，且除保险业务外，几乎没有投入额外资本。这一成就所创造的经济价值（即“商誉”），既未体现在我们资产负债表的净资产数据中，也未反映在每股账面价值里。1986年，这种未记录在案的价值增长相当可观。
So much for the good news. The bad news is that my performance did not match that of our managers. While they were doing a superb job in running our businesses, I was unable to skillfully deploy much of the capital they generated.
好消息就先说到这里。坏消息是，我的表现未能与公司管理者们相媲美。他们在运营业务方面表现卓越，但我却未能巧妙地配置他们所创造的大部分资本。
Charlie Munger, our Vice Chairman, and I really have only two jobs. One is to attract and keep outstanding managers to run our various operations. This hasn’t been all that difficult. Usually the managers came with the companies we bought, having demonstrated their talents throughout careers that spanned a wide variety of business circumstances. They were managerial stars long before they knew us, and our main contribution has been to not get in their way. This approach seems elementary: if my job were to manage a golf team - and if Jack Nicklaus or Arnold Palmer were willing to play for me - neither would get a lot of directives from me about how to swing.
我们的副董事长查理·芒格（Charlie Munger）和我，实际上只有两项工作。第一项是吸引并留住优秀的管理者来运营我们的各项业务。这项工作并不算困难。通常，这些管理者是随着我们收购的公司一同加入的，他们在职业生涯中经历过各种商业环境，早已展现出卓越才能。在认识我们之前，他们就已是管理领域的明星，而我们的主要贡献就是不干预他们的工作。这个逻辑其实很简单：假设我的工作是管理一支高尔夫球队，且杰克·尼克劳斯（Jack Nicklaus）或阿诺德·帕尔默（Arnold Palmer）愿意为我效力，我绝不会在挥杆方式上对他们指手画脚。
Some of our key managers are independently wealthy (we hope they all become so), but that poses no threat to their continued interest: they work because they love what they do and relish the thrill of outstanding performance. They unfailingly think like owners (the highest compliment we can pay a manager) and find all aspects of their business absorbing.
我们的一些关键管理者本身就已实现财务独立（我们希望他们都能如此），但这并不会影响他们对工作的持续投入：他们工作是因为热爱这份事业，并享受出色业绩带来的成就感。他们始终以所有者的思维思考问题（这是我们对管理者的最高赞誉），并对业务的各个方面都充满兴趣。
(Our prototype for occupational fervor is the Catholic tailor who used his small savings of many years to finance a pilgrimage to the Vatican. When he returned, his parish held a special meeting to get his first-hand account of the Pope. "Tell us," said the eager faithful, "just what sort of fellow is he?" Our hero wasted no words: "He’s a forty-four, medium.")
（我们心中职业热情的典范，是一位天主教裁缝。他用多年积攒的微薄积蓄，资助了一次前往梵蒂冈的朝圣之旅。归来后，他所在的教区召开了一次特别会议，希望听取他关于教皇的第一手描述。“跟我们说说，”热切的信徒们问道，“教皇是个什么样的人？”我们这位主人公言简意赅地回答：“他穿44码的衣服，中等身材。”）
Charlie and I know that the right players will make almost any team manager look good. We subscribe to the philosophy of Ogilvy & Mather’s founding genius, David Ogilvy: "If each of us hires people who are smaller than we are, we shall become a company of dwarfs. But, if each of us hires people who are bigger than we are, we shall become a company of giants."
查理和我都明白，优秀的“球员”几乎能让任何“球队经理”显得出色。我们认同奥美广告公司（Ogilvy & Mather）创始人戴维·奥格威（David Ogilvy）的理念：“如果我们每个人都聘用比自己能力弱的人，公司最终会变成一群矮子的集合。但如果我们每个人都聘用比自己能力强的人，公司终将成长为一群巨人的团队。”
A by-product of our managerial style is the ability it gives us to easily expand Berkshire’s activities. We’ve read management treatises that specify exactly how many people should report to any one executive, but they make little sense to us. When you have able managers of high character running businesses about which they are passionate, you can have a dozen or more reporting to you and still have time for an afternoon nap. Conversely, if you have even one person reporting to you who is deceitful, inept or uninterested, you will find yourself with more than you can handle. Charlie and I could work with double the number of managers we now have, so long as they had the rare qualities of the present ones.
我们管理风格的一个附带优势是，它让我们能够轻松拓展伯克希尔的业务范围。我们曾读过一些管理学著作，其中明确规定每位高管应管理多少下属，但这些规定对我们而言毫无意义。当你拥有品行端正、能力出众且对业务充满热情的管理者时，即使有十几位甚至更多人向你汇报工作，你依然会有时间午睡。相反，即便只有一位向你汇报的人不诚实、不称职或缺乏兴趣，你也会发现自己不堪重负。只要新管理者具备现有管理者那样稀缺的素质，查理和我完全能够管理两倍于当前数量的管理者。
We intend to continue our practice of working only with people whom we like and admire. This policy not only maximizes our chances for good results, it also ensures us an extraordinarily good time. On the other hand, working with people who cause your stomach to churn seems much like marrying for money - probably a bad idea under any circumstances, but absolute madness if you are already rich.
我们打算继续坚持只与自己喜欢且钦佩的人合作的原则。这一政策不仅能最大限度地提高我们取得良好业绩的可能性，还能确保我们工作得非常愉快。另一方面，与让你感到不安的人共事，就好比为了钱而结婚——无论在何种情况下，这都可能是个糟糕的主意，而如果你已经富有，这样做就更是极度愚蠢。
The second job Charlie and I must handle is the allocation of capital, which at Berkshire is a considerably more important challenge than at most companies. Three factors make that so: we earn more money than average; we retain all that we earn; and, we are fortunate to have operations that, for the most part, require little incremental capital to remain competitive and to grow. Obviously, the future results of a business earning 23% annually and retaining it all are far more affected by today’s capital allocations than are the results of a business earning 10% and distributing half of that to shareholders. If our retained earnings - and those of our major investees, GEICO and Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. - are employed in an unproductive manner, the economics of Berkshire will deteriorate very quickly. In a company adding only, say, 5% to net worth annually, capital-allocation decisions, though still important, will change the company’s economics far more slowly.
查理和我必须处理的第二项工作是资本配置。在伯克希尔，这项工作比大多数公司的同类工作更具挑战性，原因有三：其一，我们的盈利水平高于平均水平；其二，我们将所有盈利全部留存；其三，幸运的是，我们的大部分业务只需投入少量增量资本，就能保持竞争力并实现增长。显然，对于一家年收益率为23%且全额留存盈利的公司而言，当前的资本配置决策对其未来业绩的影响，远大于一家年收益率为10%且将一半盈利分配给股东的公司。如果我们的留存盈利——以及主要被投资方GEICO（政府员工保险公司）和Capital Cities/ABC公司（首都城市/美国广播公司）的留存盈利——被用于低效用途，伯克希尔的财务状况将迅速恶化。而对于一家净资产年增幅仅为5%左右的公司来说，尽管资本配置决策依然重要，但其对公司财务状况的影响速度会慢得多。
Capital allocation at Berkshire was tough work in 1986. We did make one business acquisition - The Fechheimer Bros. Company, which we will discuss in a later section. Fechheimer is a company with excellent economics, run by exactly the kind of people with whom we enjoy being associated. But it is relatively small, utilizing only about 2% of Berkshire’s net worth.
1986年，伯克希尔的资本配置工作颇具难度。我们确实完成了一项业务收购——费克海默兄弟公司（The Fechheimer Bros. Company），关于这家公司，我们将在后面的章节中详细讨论。费克海默是一家经济效益极佳的公司，其管理者正是我们乐于合作的类型。但这家公司规模相对较小，仅占用了伯克希尔约2%的净资产。
Meanwhile, we had no new ideas in the marketable equities field, an area in which once, only a few years ago, we could readily employ large sums in outstanding businesses at very reasonable prices. So our main capital allocation moves in 1986 were to pay off debt and stockpile funds. Neither is a fate worse than death, but they do not inspire us to do handsprings either. If Charlie and I were to draw blanks for a few years in our capital-allocation endeavors, Berkshire’s rate of growth would slow significantly.
与此同时，在可流通股票领域，我们没有找到新的投资机会。就在几年前，我们还能在这个领域轻松地将大笔资金投入优秀企业，且价格十分合理。因此，1986年我们主要的资本配置举措是偿还债务和囤积资金。这两件事虽不至于比死亡更可怕，但也无法让我们感到兴奋。如果查理和我在未来几年的资本配置工作中持续毫无收获，伯克希尔的增长速度将大幅放缓。
We will continue to look for operating businesses that meet our tests and, with luck, will acquire such a business every couple of years. But an acquisition will have to be large if it is to help our performance materially. Under current stock market conditions, we have little hope of finding equities to buy for our insurance companies. Markets will change significantly - you can be sure of that and some day we will again get our turn at bat. However, we haven’t the faintest idea when that might happen.
我们将继续寻找符合我们标准的运营业务，若运气好，希望能每两年收购一家这样的公司。但要想对我们的业绩产生实质性帮助，收购标的的规模必须足够大。在当前的股市环境下，我们几乎没有希望为保险公司找到可购买的股票。市场肯定会发生重大变化，总有一天我们会再次获得投资机会。然而，我们完全不知道那一天何时会到来。
It can’t be said too often (although I’m sure you feel I’ve tried) that, even under favorable conditions, our returns are certain to drop substantially because of our enlarged size. We have told you that we hope to average a return of 15% on equity and we maintain that hope, despite some negative tax law changes described in a later section of this report. If we are to achieve this rate of return, our net worth must increase $7.2 billion in the next ten years. A gain of that magnitude will be possible only if, before too long, we come up with a few very big (and good) ideas. Charlie and I can’t promise results, but we do promise you that we will keep our efforts focused on our goals.
无论怎么强调都不为过（尽管我相信你们觉得我已经说得够多了）：即便在有利环境下，由于公司规模扩大，我们的回报率也必然会大幅下降。我们此前曾告知各位，希望能实现15%的平均净资产收益率，尽管本报告后续章节会提到一些不利的税法变动，我们仍维持这一期望。要实现这一回报率，未来十年我们的净资产必须增加72亿美元。要达成如此规模的增长，前提是我们必须在不久之后，找到几个重大（且优质）的投资思路。查理和我无法承诺具体结果，但我们向各位保证，会始终全力以赴朝着目标努力。
# Sources of Reported Earnings（财报收益来源）
The table on the next page shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. This table differs in several ways from the one presented last year. We have added four new lines of business because of the Scott Fetzer and Fechheimer acquisitions. In the case of Scott Fetzer, the two major units acquired were World Book and Kirby, and each is presented separately. Fourteen other businesses of Scott Fetzer are aggregated in Scott Fetzer - Diversified Manufacturing. SF Financial Group, a credit company holding both World Book and Kirby receivables, is included in "Other." This year, because Berkshire is so much larger, we also have eliminated separate reporting for several of our smaller businesses.
下一页的表格列出了伯克希尔财报收益的主要来源。该表格与去年呈现的版本存在几处差异。由于收购了斯科特·费策尔公司（Scott Fetzer）和费克海默公司（Fechheimer），我们新增了四项业务条目。在斯科特·费策尔的收购业务中，两大核心子公司——世界图书公司（World Book）和柯比公司（Kirby）均单独列示；其余14项业务则归入“斯科特·费策尔——多元化制造”条目。持有世界图书公司和柯比公司应收账款的信贷公司SF金融集团（SF Financial Group），则被纳入“其他”类别。今年，由于伯克希尔规模显著扩大，我们还取消了对部分小型业务的单独列报。
In the table, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix to my letter in the 1983 Annual Report, is aggregated as a separate item. (A Compendium of earlier letters, including the Goodwill discussion, is available upon request.) Both the Scott Fetzer and Fechheimer acquisitions created accounting Goodwill, which is why the amortization charge for Goodwill increased in 1986.
表格中，商誉摊销并未分摊至具体业务，而是按照1983年年报中我信件附录所阐述的理由，作为单独项目汇总列示。（如需往期信件汇编，包括关于商誉的讨论内容，可随时索取。）对斯科特·费策尔和费克海默的两项收购均产生了会计层面的商誉，这也是1986年商誉摊销费用增加的原因。
Additionally, the Scott Fetzer acquisition required other major purchase-price accounting adjustments, as prescribed by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The GAAP figures, of course, are the ones used in our consolidated financial statements. But, in our view, the GAAP figures are not necessarily the most useful ones for investors or managers. Therefore, the figures shown for specific operating units are earnings before purchase-price adjustments are taken into account. In effect, these are the earnings that would have been reported by the businesses if we had not purchased them.
此外，根据公认会计原则（GAAP）的规定，收购斯科特·费策尔还需进行其他重大收购价格会计调整。当然，我们的合并财务报表采用的是符合GAAP的数字。但在我们看来，这些GAAP数字对投资者或管理者而言，未必是最有用的。因此，表格中具体运营部门列示的利润，是未考虑收购价格调整前的收益。实际上，这相当于这些业务在未被我们收购的情况下，原本应报告的收益金额。
A discussion of our reasons for preferring this form of presentation is in the Appendix to this letter. This Appendix will never substitute for a steamy novel and definitely is not required reading. However, I know that among our 6,000 shareholders there are those who are thrilled by my essays on accounting - and I hope that both of you enjoy the Appendix.
本信件附录中阐述了我们倾向于采用这种列报形式的原因。这份附录显然无法替代情节扣人心弦的小说，也绝非必读内容。但我知道，在我们6000名股东中，确实有人对我撰写的会计相关文章感兴趣——希望这两位读者能喜欢这份附录。
In the Business Segment Data on pages 41-43 and in the Management’s Discussion section on pages 45-49, you will find much additional information about our businesses. I urge you to read those sections, as well as Charlie Munger’s letter to Wesco shareholders, describing the various businesses of that subsidiary, which starts on page 50.
在第41-43页的“业务分部数据”以及第45-49页的“管理层讨论与分析”部分，你可以找到更多关于我们各项业务的详细信息。我强烈建议你阅读这些章节，同时也建议阅读查理·芒格致韦斯科（Wesco）股东的信件——该信件从第50页开始，介绍了韦斯科这家子公司的各项业务。
| 项目 | 税前收益（Pre-Tax Earnings） | 伯克希尔享有的净利润（Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings）（税后及扣除少数股东权益后） | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1986 | 1985 | 1986 | 1985 | |
| （单位：千美元，省略后三位） | （单位：千美元，省略后三位） | （单位：千美元，省略后三位） | （单位：千美元，省略后三位） | |
| 运营收益（Operating Earnings）： | ||||
| 保险集团（Insurance Group）： | ||||
| - 承保业务（Underwriting） | $(55,844) | $(44,230) | $(29,864) | $(23,569) |
| - 净投资收益（Net Investment Income） | 107,143 | 95,217 | 96,440 | 79,716 |
| 布法罗新闻（Buffalo News） | 34,736 | 29,921 | 16,918 | 14,580 |
| 费克海默（1986年6月3日收购）（Fechheimer (Acquired 6/3/86)） | 8,400 | --- | 3,792 | --- |
| 柯比公司（Kirby） | 20,218 | --- | 10,508 | --- |
| 内布拉斯加家具卖场（Nebraska Furniture Mart） | 17,685 | 12,686 | 7,192 | 5,181 |
| 斯科特·费策尔——多元化制造（Scott Fetzer - Diversified Mfg.） | 25,358 | --- | 13,354 | --- |
| 喜诗糖果（See’s Candies） | 30,347 | 28,989 | 15,176 | 14,558 |
| 韦斯科——非保险业务（Wesco - other than insurance） | 5,542 | 16,018 | 5,550 | 9,684 |
| 世界图书公司（World Book） | 21,978 | --- | 11,670 | --- |
| 商誉摊销（Amortization of Goodwill） | (2,555) | (1,475) | (2,555) | (1,475) |
| 其他收购价格会计费用（Other purchase-price accounting charges） | (10,033) | --- | (11,031) | --- |
| 债务利息及预付罚金（Interest on Debt and Pre-Payment penalty） | (23,891) | (14,415) | (12,213) | (7,288) |
| 股东指定捐赠（Shareholder-Designated Contributions） | (3,997) | (4,006) | (2,158) | (2,164) |
| 其他（Other） | 20,770 | 6,744 | 8,685 | 3,725 |
| 运营收益合计（Operating Earnings） | 195,857 | 125,449 | 131,464 | 92,948 |
| 通用食品特别分红（Special General Foods Distribution） | --- | 4,127 | --- | 3,779 |
| 《华盛顿邮报》特别分红（Special Washington Post Distribution） | --- | 14,877 | --- | 13,851 |
| 证券出售收益（Sales of securities） | 216,242 | 468,903 | 150,897 | 325,237 |
| 所有实体总收益（Total Earnings - all entities） | $412,099 | $613,356 | $282,361 | $435,815 |
As you can see, operating earnings substantially improved during 1986. Some of the improvement came from the insurance operation, whose results I will discuss in a later section. Fechheimer also will be discussed separately. Our other major businesses performed as follows:
如你所见，1986年公司运营收益大幅提升。部分增长来自保险业务，其业绩我将在后续章节中讨论；费克海默公司的情况也将单独阐述。我们其他主要业务的表现如下：
Operating results at The Buffalo News continue to reflect a truly superb managerial job by Stan Lipsey. For the third year in a row, man-hours worked fell significantly and other costs were closely controlled. Consequently, our operating margins improved materially in 1986, even though our advertising rate increases were well below those of most major newspapers.
布法罗新闻（The Buffalo News）的运营业绩持续彰显斯坦·利普西（Stan Lipsey）出色的管理能力。公司已连续三年实现工时大幅减少，其他成本也得到严格控制。因此，尽管我们的广告费率涨幅远低于大多数主流报纸，1986年的运营利润率仍实现了显著提升。
Our cost-control efforts have in no way reduced our commitment to news. We continue to deliver a 50% "news hole" (the portion of the total space in the paper devoted to news), a higher percentage, we believe, than exists at any dominant newspaper in this country of our size or larger.
我们的成本控制举措丝毫没有削弱对新闻内容的投入。我们始终保持50%的“新闻占比”（即报纸总版面中用于新闻内容的比例）。我们认为，在全美规模与我们相当或更大的主流报纸中，这一比例高于任何其他报纸。
The average news hole at papers comparable to the News is about 40%. The difference between 40% and 50% is more important than it might first seem: a paper with 30 pages of ads and a 40% news hole delivers 20 pages of news a day, whereas our paper matches 30 pages of ads with 30 pages of news. Therefore, given ad pages equal in number, we end up delivering our readers no less than 50% more news.
与《布法罗新闻》规模相当的报纸，平均新闻占比约为40%。40%与50%之间的差距，比表面看起来更为重要：一份含30页广告、新闻占比40%的报纸，每日仅能提供20页新闻；而我们的报纸在同样30页广告的基础上，能搭配30页新闻。因此，在广告页数相同的情况下，我们向读者提供的新闻内容至少多出50%。
We believe this heavy commitment to news is one of the reasons The Buffalo News has the highest weekday penetration rate (the percentage of households in the paper’s primary marketing area purchasing it each day) among any of the top 50 papers in the country. Our Sunday penetration, where we are also number one, is even more impressive. Ten years ago, the only Sunday paper serving Buffalo (the Courier-Express) had circulation of 271,000 and a penetration ratio of about 63%. The Courier-Express had served the area for many decades and its penetration ratio - which was similar to those existing in many metropolitan markets - was thought to be a "natural" one, accurately reflecting the local citizenry’s appetite for a Sunday product.
我们认为，对新闻内容的高度投入，是《布法罗新闻》在全美发行量前50的报纸中，工作日渗透率（报纸主要发行区域内每日购买该报的家庭比例）位居第一的原因之一。我们的周日版渗透率同样排名第一，且表现更为亮眼。十年前，布法罗地区唯一的周日版报纸《信使快报》（Courier-Express）发行量为27.1万份，渗透率约为63%。该报已在当地服务数十年，其渗透率与许多大都市市场的水平相当，曾被视为“自然”渗透率，被认为准确反映了当地民众对周日版报纸的需求。
Our Sunday paper was started in late 1977. It now has a penetration ratio of 83% and sells about 100,000 copies more each Sunday than did the Courier-Express ten years ago - even though population in our market area has declined during the decade. In recent history, no other city that has long had a local Sunday paper has experienced a penetration gain anywhere close to Buffalo’s.
我们的周日版报纸始于1977年末。如今其渗透率已达83%，每周日销量比十年前《信使快报》的销量多出约10万份——尽管过去十年间我们发行区域的人口有所下降。在近代历史中，没有任何一个长期拥有本地周日版报纸的城市，能实现与布法罗地区相近的渗透率增幅。
Despite our exceptional market acceptance, our operating margins almost certainly have peaked. A major newsprint price increase took effect at the end of 1986, and our advertising rate increases in 1987 will again be moderate compared to those of the industry. However, even if margins should materially shrink, we would not reduce our news-hole ratio.
尽管市场认可度极高，但我们的运营利润率几乎可以肯定已达峰值。1986年底，新闻纸价格大幅上涨正式生效；1987年我们的广告费率涨幅，与行业水平相比也将再次保持温和。然而，即便利润率大幅下滑，我们也不会降低新闻占比。
As I write this, it has been exactly ten years since we purchased The News. The financial rewards it has brought us have far exceeded our expectations and so, too, have the non-financial rewards. Our respect for the News - high when we bought it - has grown consistently ever since the purchase, as has our respect and admiration for Murray Light, the editor who turns out the product that receives such extraordinary community acceptance. The efforts of Murray and Stan, which were crucial to the News during its dark days of financial reversals and litigation, have not in the least been lessened by prosperity. Charlie and I are grateful to them.
撰写本段内容时，距离我们收购《布法罗新闻》已整整十年。它为我们带来的财务回报远超预期，非财务层面的回报亦是如此。我们在收购时就对该报高度认可，此后这份敬意持续加深；对于主编默里·莱特（Murray Light），我们的尊重与钦佩也同样与日俱增——正是他打造的报纸产品，获得了社区的极高认可。在《布法罗新闻》遭遇财务困境与诉讼纠纷的艰难时期，默里与斯坦（Stan）的努力起到了关键作用；而在公司走向繁荣后，他们的投入丝毫未减。查理和我对此深表感激。
o The amazing Blumkins continue to perform business miracles at Nebraska Furniture Mart. Competitors come and go (mostly go), but Mrs. B. and her progeny roll on. In 1986 net sales increased 10.2% to $132 million. Ten years ago sales were $44 million and, even then, NFM appeared to be doing just about all of the business available in the Greater Omaha Area. Given NFM’s remarkable dominance, Omaha’s slow growth in population and the modest inflation rates that have applied to the goods NFM sells, how can this operation continue to rack up such large sales gains? The only logical explanation is that the marketing territory of NFM’s one-and-only store continues to widen because of its ever-growing reputation for rock-bottom everyday prices and the broadest of selections. In preparation for further gains, NFM is expanding the capacity of its warehouse, located a few hundred yards from the store, by about one-third.
o 了不起的布卢姆金家族（Blumkins）在内布拉斯加家具卖场（Nebraska Furniture Mart，简称NFM）继续创造商业奇迹。竞争对手来了又走（大多以失败告终），但B夫人（Mrs. B.）及其后代仍稳步前行。1986年，NFM的净销售额增长10.2%，达到1.32亿美元。十年前，其销售额为4400万美元；即便在当时，NFM似乎已占据了大奥马哈地区几乎所有的家具市场份额。考虑到NFM已拥有极高的市场主导地位、奥马哈人口增长缓慢，且NFM所售商品的通胀率温和，这家卖场为何还能持续实现如此大幅的销售额增长？唯一合理的解释是，凭借“日常低价”与“品类最全”的声誉不断提升，NFM这家独家门店的辐射范围正持续扩大。为应对未来增长，NFM正将其门店数百码外的仓库容量扩建约三分之一。
Mrs. B, Chairman of Nebraska Furniture Mart, continues at age 93 to outsell and out-hustle any manager I’ve ever seen. She’s at the store seven days a week, from opening to close. Competing with her represents a triumph of courage over judgment.
93岁高龄的NFM董事长B夫人，其销售能力与工作投入度仍超过我所见过的任何一位管理者。她每周七天都在店里，从开门营业坚守到打烊。与她竞争，可谓是“勇气战胜理智”的行为。
It’s easy to overlook what I consider to be the critical lesson of the Mrs. B saga: at 93, Omaha based Board Chairmen have yet to reach their peak. Please file this fact away to consult before you mark your ballot at the 2024 annual meeting of Berkshire.
B夫人的故事中，有一个我认为至关重要却容易被忽视的启示：对于奥马哈的董事会主席而言，93岁仍未到事业巅峰。请记住这一点，以便在2024年伯克希尔年度股东大会投票前参考。
o At See’s, sales trends improved somewhat from those of recent years. Total pounds sold rose about 2%. (For you chocaholics who like to fantasize, one statistic: we sell over 12,000 tons annually.) Same-store sales, measured in pounds, were virtually unchanged. In the previous six years, same store poundage fell, and we gained or maintained poundage volume only by adding stores. But a particularly strong Christmas season in 1986 stemmed the decline. By stabilizing same-store volume and making a major effort to control costs, See’s was able to maintain its excellent profit margin in 1986 though it put through only minimal price increases. We have Chuck Huggins, our long-time manager at See’s, to thank for this significant achievement.
o 喜诗糖果（See’s）的销售趋势较近年有所改善。糖果总销量（以磅计）增长约2%。（给喜欢畅想的巧克力爱好者提供一个数据：我们每年销售超过1.2万吨糖果。）同店销量（以磅计）基本持平。在过去六年中，同店销量（以磅计）持续下滑，我们只能通过新增门店来维持或提升总销量。但1986年圣诞节旺季表现格外强劲，成功扭转了这一下滑趋势。通过稳定同店销量并大力控制成本，喜诗糖果在1986年仅小幅提价的情况下，仍维持了出色的利润率。这一显著成就应归功于喜诗长期任职的经理查克·哈金斯（Chuck Huggins）。
See’s has a one-of-a-kind product "personality" produced by a combination of its candy’s delicious taste and moderate price, the company’s total control of the distribution process, and the exceptional service provided by store employees. Chuck rightfully measures his success by the satisfaction of our customers, and his attitude permeates the organization. Few major retailing companies have been able to sustain such a customer-oriented spirit, and we owe Chuck a great deal for keeping it alive and well at See’s.
喜诗糖果拥有独特的产品“特质”，这源于其糖果的美味与适中价格、公司对分销流程的完全掌控，以及门店员工提供的优质服务。查克以客户满意度来衡量成功，这一理念完全合理，且已渗透到公司各个层面。极少有大型零售企业能长期保持这种以客户为中心的精神，我们应向查克致以极大感谢，感谢他在喜诗始终保持并传承这一精神。
See’s profits should stay at about their present level. We will continue to increase prices very modestly, merely matching prospective cost increases.
喜诗糖果的利润应会维持在当前水平左右。我们将继续保持温和提价，提价幅度仅与预期成本增长相匹配。
o World Book is the largest of 17 Scott Fetzer operations that joined Berkshire at the beginning of 1986. Last year I reported to you enthusiastically about the businesses of Scott Fetzer and about Ralph Schey, its manager. A year’s experience has added to my enthusiasm for both. Ralph is a superb businessman and a straight shooter. He also brings exceptional versatility and energy to his job: despite the wide array of businesses that he manages, he is on top of the operations, opportunities and problems of each. And, like our other managers, Ralph is a real pleasure to work with. Our good fortune continues.
o 世界图书公司（World Book）是1986年初加入伯克希尔的17家斯科特·费策尔（Scott Fetzer）旗下业务中规模最大的一家。去年，我曾热忱地向各位介绍过斯科特·费策尔的业务及其管理者拉尔夫·谢伊（Ralph Schey）。经过一年的合作，我对两者的好感进一步加深。拉尔夫是一位出色的商人，且为人坦诚直率。他在工作中展现出极强的多面性与充沛精力：尽管管理着众多不同业务，但他对每项业务的运营状况、潜在机遇与存在问题都了如指掌。与我们其他管理者一样，与拉尔夫共事非常愉快。我们的好运仍在延续。
World Book’s unit volume increased for the fourth consecutive year, with encyclopedia sales up 7% over 1985 and 45% over 1982. Childcraft’s unit sales also grew significantly.
世界图书公司的产品销量已连续四年增长，百科全书销量较1985年增长7%，较1982年增长45%。“儿童工艺”（Childcraft）系列产品的销量也实现了显著增长。
World Book continues to dominate the U.S. direct-sales encyclopedia market - and for good reasons. Extraordinarily well-edited and priced at under 5 cents per page, these books are a bargain for youngster and adult alike. You may find one editing technique interesting: World Book ranks over 44,000 words by difficulty. Longer entries in the encyclopedia include only the most easily comprehended words in the opening sections, with the difficulty of the material gradually escalating as the exposition proceeds. As a result, youngsters can easily and profitably read to the point at which subject matter gets too difficult, instead of immediately having to deal with a discussion that mixes up words requiring college-level comprehension with others of fourth-grade level.
世界图书公司持续主导美国直销百科全书市场，这背后有充分的理由。其百科全书编辑质量极高，每页价格不到5美分，对儿童和成人而言都是极具性价比的选择。其中一种编辑手法或许会让你感兴趣：世界图书公司将超过4.4万个词汇按难度分级。百科全书中较长的词条，在开头部分仅使用最易懂的词汇，随着内容展开，难度才逐渐提升。这样一来，儿童可以轻松阅读，直到遇到难以理解的内容为止，而不必一开始就面对“大学水平词汇与四年级水平词汇混杂”的论述。
Selling World Book is a calling. Over one-half of our active salespeople are teachers or former teachers, and another 5% have had experience as librarians. They correctly think of themselves as educators, and they do a terrific job. If you don’t have a World Book set in your house, I recommend one.
销售世界图书百科全书更像是一种“使命”。我们现有销售人员中，超过一半是教师或前教师，另有5%拥有图书馆员经验。他们准确地将自己定位为教育者，且工作表现极为出色。如果你的家中没有一套世界图书百科全书，我强烈推荐购买。
o Kirby likewise recorded its fourth straight year of unit volume gains. Worldwide, unit sales grew 4% from 1985 and 33% from 1982. While the Kirby product is more expensive than most cleaners, it performs in a manner that leaves cheaper units far behind ("in the dust," so to speak). Many 30- and 40-year-old Kirby cleaners are still in active duty. If you want the best, you buy a Kirby.
o 柯比公司（Kirby）同样实现了产品销量的连续四年增长。全球范围内，其产品销量较1985年增长4%，较1982年增长33%。尽管柯比吸尘器的价格高于大多数同类产品，但其性能远超低价产品（可以说“让低价产品望尘莫及”）。许多使用了三四十年的柯比吸尘器仍在正常使用。如果你追求最好的产品，就会选择柯比。
Some companies that historically have had great success in direct sales have stumbled in recent years. Certainly the era of the working woman has created new challenges for direct sales organizations. So far, the record shows that both Kirby and World Book have responded most successfully.
一些历史上在直销领域取得巨大成功的公司，近年来纷纷遭遇挫折。显然，职业女性时代的到来，给直销机构带来了新的挑战。截至目前，业绩记录显示，柯比与世界图书公司应对得最为成功。
The businesses described above, along with the insurance operation and Fechheimer, constitute our major business units. The brevity of our descriptions is in no way meant to diminish the importance of these businesses to us. All have been discussed in past annual reports and, because of the tendency of Berkshire owners to stay in the fold (about 98% of the stock at the end of each year is owned by people who were owners at the start of the year), we want to avoid undue repetition of basic facts. You can be sure that we will immediately report to you in detail if the underlying economics or competitive position of any of these businesses should materially change. In general, the businesses described in this section can be characterized as having very strong market positions, very high returns on capital employed, and the best of operating managements.
上述业务，连同保险业务与费克海默公司，共同构成了我们的核心业务单元。我们对这些业务的描述较为简洁，这绝不是要淡化它们对我们的重要性。这些业务在过往年报中均有讨论，且由于伯克希尔股东的持股稳定性（每年年末约98%的股份仍由年初的股东持有），我们希望避免对基本事实的过度重复。请各位放心，若任何一项业务的基础财务状况或竞争地位发生重大变化，我们将立即向各位详细汇报。总体而言，本节所描述的业务均具备以下特征：极强的市场地位、极高的已投入资本回报率，以及最优秀的运营管理团队。
# The Fechheimer Bros. Co.（费克海默兄弟公司）
Every year in Berkshire’s annual report I include a description of the kind of business that we would like to buy. This "ad" paid off in 1986.
每年，我都会在伯克希尔的年报中描述我们希望收购的业务类型。这则“招聘启事”在1986年有了回报。
On January 15th of last year I received a letter from Bob Heldman of Cincinnati, a shareholder for many years and also Chairman of Fechheimer Bros. Until I read the letter, however, I did not know of either Bob or Fechheimer. Bob wrote that he ran a company that met our tests and suggested that we get together, which we did in Omaha after their results for 1985 were compiled.
去年1月15日，我收到了来自辛辛那提的鲍勃·赫尔德曼（Bob Heldman）的来信。他是伯克希尔的多年股东，同时也是费克海默兄弟公司的董事长。但在阅读这封信之前，我既不认识鲍勃，也从未听说过费克海默公司。鲍勃在信中表示，他经营的公司符合我们的收购标准，并提议双方会面。于是，在费克海默1985年业绩数据汇总完成后，我们在奥马哈进行了会面。
He filled me in on a little history: Fechheimer, a uniform manufacturing and distribution business, began operations in 1842. Warren Heldman, Bob’s father, became involved in the business in 1941 and his sons, Bob and George (now President), along with their sons, subsequently joined the company. Under the Heldmans’ management, the business was highly successful.
他向我简要介绍了公司历史：费克海默是一家制服生产与销售企业，成立于1842年。鲍勃的父亲沃伦·赫尔德曼（Warren Heldman）于1941年加入公司，之后鲍勃与弟弟乔治（George，现任总裁），以及他们的儿子们也相继加入。在赫尔德曼家族的管理下，公司经营得非常成功。
In 1981 Fechheimer was sold to a group of venture capitalists in a leveraged buy out (an LBO), with management retaining an equity interest. The new company, as is the case with all LBOS, started with an exceptionally high debt/equity ratio. After the buy out, however, operations continued to be very successful. So by the start of last year debt had been paid down substantially and the value of the equity had increased dramatically. For a variety of reasons, the venture capitalists wished to sell and Bob, having dutifully read Berkshire’s annual reports, thought of us.
1981年，费克海默通过杠杆收购（LBO）出售给了一群风险投资家，管理层仍保留部分股权。与所有杠杆收购案例一样，新公司成立之初的负债权益比极高。但收购之后，公司运营依然非常成功。因此，到去年年初，公司已大幅偿还债务，股权价值也显著提升。由于多种原因，风险投资家希望出售股权，而鲍勃因认真阅读过伯克希尔的年报，便想到了我们。
Fechheimer is exactly the sort of business we like to buy. Its economic record is superb; its managers are talented, high-grade, and love what they do; and the Heldman family wanted to continue its financial interest in partnership with us. Therefore, we quickly purchased about 84% of the stock for a price that was based upon a $55 million valuation for the entire business.
费克海默正是我们希望收购的业务类型。它的财务业绩极佳；管理层能力出众、素质过硬且热爱本职工作；赫尔德曼家族也希望继续持有股权，与我们建立合作关系。因此，我们很快以整个公司估值5500万美元为基础，收购了约84%的股份。
The circumstances of this acquisition were similar to those prevailing in our purchase of Nebraska Furniture Mart: most of the shares were held by people who wished to employ funds elsewhere; family members who enjoyed running their business wanted to continue both as owners and managers; several generations of the family were active in the business, providing management for as far as the eye can see; and the managing family wanted a purchaser who would not re-sell, regardless of price, and who would let the business be run in the future as it had been in the past. Both Fechheimer and NFM were right for us, and we were right for them.
此次收购的情况与我们收购内布拉斯加家具卖场（NFM）时的情况相似：大部分股份由希望将资金投入其他领域的人持有；热爱经营业务的家族成员希望继续同时担任所有者与管理者；家族多代人均活跃于公司运营，未来管理层传承有保障；管理家族希望收购方无论价格如何都不会转售公司，且允许公司未来继续按原有模式运营。费克海默与NFM都适合我们，我们也适合它们。
You may be amused to know that neither Charlie nor I have been to Cincinnati, headquarters for Fechheimer, to see their operation. (And, incidentally, it works both ways: Chuck Huggins, who has been running See’s for 15 years, has never been to Omaha.) If our success were to depend upon insights we developed through plant inspections, Berkshire would be in big trouble. Rather, in considering an acquisition, we attempt to evaluate the economic characteristics of the business - its competitive strengths and weaknesses - and the quality of the people we will be joining. Fechheimer was a standout in both respects. In addition to Bob and George Heldman, who are in their mid-60s - spring chickens by our standards - there are three members of the next generation, Gary, Roger and Fred, to insure continuity.
或许你会觉得有趣，查理和我都从未去过费克海默的总部所在地辛辛那提，也未曾考察过其业务运营。（顺便提一句，这种情况是双向的：经营喜诗糖果15年的查克·哈金斯，也从未去过奥马哈。）如果我们的成功依赖于通过工厂考察获得的洞见，那么伯克希尔就麻烦大了。相反，在考虑收购时，我们会努力评估业务的经济特征——包括竞争优势与劣势——以及我们即将合作的管理层素质。费克海默在这两方面都表现突出。除了60多岁的鲍勃与乔治·赫尔德曼（以我们的标准来看，他们还很年轻），家族下一代还有加里（Gary）、罗杰（Roger）和弗雷德（Fred）三人参与运营，确保了管理层的连续性。
As a prototype for acquisitions, Fechheimer has only one drawback: size. We hope our next acquisition is at least several times as large but a carbon copy in all other respects. Our threshold for minimum annual after-tax earnings of potential acquisitions has been moved up to $10 million from the $5 million level that prevailed when Bob wrote to me.
作为收购标的范例，费克海默唯一的不足就是规模。我们希望下一次收购的标的规模至少是它的几倍，而在其他所有方面都与它完全一致。我们对潜在收购标的最低年度税后收益要求，已从鲍勃写信时的500万美元提高到了1000万美元。
Flushed with success, we repeat our ad. If you have a business that fits, call me or, preferably, write.
凭借此次成功的喜悦，我们再次发布这则“招聘启事”。如果你拥有符合条件的业务，欢迎致电，或更推荐写信与我联系。
Here’s what we’re looking for: (1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings), (2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are "turn-around" situations), (3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt. (4) management in place (we can’t supply it), (5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it), (6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
我们寻求的标的需满足以下条件：
- 规模较大（年度税后收益至少1000万美元）；
- 具备持续稳定的盈利能力（我们对未来预测不感兴趣，对“扭亏为盈”类标的也不感兴趣）；
- 权益回报率良好，且几乎不负债或负债极少；
- 管理层稳定在位（我们无法提供管理层）；
- 业务模式简单（若涉及大量技术，我们无法理解）；
- 有明确报价（在价格未知的情况下，即使是初步洽谈交易，也会浪费我们与卖方的时间，我们不愿如此）。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. Indeed, following recent advances in the price of Berkshire stock, transactions involving stock issuance may be quite feasible. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.
我们不会进行恶意收购。我们可以保证完全保密，并且会迅速回复是否感兴趣——通常在五分钟内。我们更倾向于现金收购，但如果能以同等内在业务价值进行股票交换，也会考虑发行股票。事实上，随着近期伯克希尔股价上涨，通过发行股票完成交易可能会非常可行。我们邀请潜在卖方通过联系我们过往的合作伙伴，了解我们的信誉。对于合适的业务与合适的合作伙伴，我们能提供一个理想的归宿。
On the other hand, we frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: new ventures, turnarounds, auction-like sales, and the ever-popular (among brokers) "I’m-sure-something-will-work-out-if-you-people-get-to-know-each-other." None of these attracts us in the least.
另一方面，我们经常收到不符合上述标准的收购提议：新创企业、扭亏为盈项目、拍卖式出售，以及（在经纪人中颇受欢迎的）“只要你们双方多了解，肯定能达成合作”这类提议。这些都丝毫无法吸引我们。
Besides being interested in the purchases of entire businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock, as in our Cap Cities purchase. Such purchases appeal to us only when we are very comfortable with both the economics of the business and the ability and integrity of the people running the operation. We prefer large transactions: in the unusual case we might do something as small as $50 million (or even smaller), but our preference is for commitments many times that size.
除了有意收购上述完整业务外，我们也有意通过协商收购大额但不具控制权的股票，就像我们收购首都城市/美国广播公司（Cap Cities）股票那样。只有当我们对业务的经济前景，以及运营者的能力与诚信都充满信心时，才会对这类收购感兴趣。我们更倾向于大额交易：在特殊情况下，我们可能会考虑5000万美元（甚至更低）的交易，但更偏好规模数倍于此的项目。
# Insurance Operations（保险业务）
We present our usual table of industry figures, expanded this year to include data about incurred losses and the GNP inflation index. The contrast in 1986 between the growth in premiums and growth in incurred losses will show you why underwriting results for the year improved materially:
我们按惯例提供行业数据表格，今年新增了已发生损失与国民生产总值（GNP）通胀指数数据。1986年保费增长与已发生损失增长的差异，将向你说明为何该年度承保业绩大幅改善：
| 年份 | 承保保费年增长率（Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%)） | 扣除保单持有人股息后的综合比率（Combined Ratio After Policyholder Dividends） | 已发生损失年增长率（Yearly Change in Incurred Losses (%)） | 以GNP平减指数衡量的通胀率（Inflation Rate Measured by GNP Deflator (%)） |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1981 | 3.8 | 106.0 | 6.5 | 9.7 |
| 1982 | 4.4 | 109.8 | 8.4 | 6.4 |
| 1983 | 4.6 | 112.0 | 6.8 | 3.9 |
| 1984 | 9.2 | 117.9 | 16.9 | 3.8 |
| 1985 | 22.1 | 116.5 | 16.1 | 3.3 |
| 1986（预估） | 22.6 | 108.5 | 15.5 | 2.6 |
来源：贝斯特保险管理报告（Best’s Insurance Management Reports）
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders’ funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-112 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.
综合比率是指保险总成本（已发生损失加上费用）与保费收入的比值：比率低于100意味着承保盈利，高于100则意味着承保亏损。当考虑到保险公司持有保单持有人资金（即“浮存金”）所获得的投资收益时，综合比率在107-112区间内，通常能实现整体收支平衡（不包含股东资金所产生的收益）。
The math of the insurance business, encapsulated by the table, is not very complicated. In years when the industry’s annual gain in revenues (premiums) pokes along at 4% or 5%, underwriting losses are sure to mount. This is not because auto accidents, fires, windstorms and the like are occurring more frequently, nor has it lately been the fault of general inflation. Today, social and judicial inflation are the major culprits; the cost of entering a courtroom has simply ballooned. Part of the jump in cost arises from skyrocketing verdicts, and part from the tendency of judges and juries to expand the coverage of insurance policies beyond that contemplated by the insurer when the policies were written. Seeing no let-up in either trend, we continue to believe that the industry’s revenues must grow at close to 10% annually for it to just hold its own in terms of profitability, even though general inflation may be running only 2% - 4%.
表格所概括的保险业务逻辑并不复杂。当行业年收入（保费）增长率仅为4%或5%时，承保亏损必然会增加。这并非因为汽车事故、火灾、风暴等灾害发生频率上升，近期也并非因为总体通胀问题。如今，社会通胀与司法通胀是主要原因：诉讼成本已大幅飙升。成本上涨部分源于判决金额激增，部分源于法官与陪审团倾向于将保险保单的承保范围，扩大到保险公司承保时所预期的范围之外。鉴于这两种趋势都没有放缓迹象，我们仍然认为，即使总体通胀率仅为2%-4%，行业收入也必须以每年接近10%的速度增长，才能维持盈利水平。
In 1986, as noted, the industry’s premium volume soared even faster than loss costs. Consequently, the underwriting loss of the industry fell dramatically. In last year’s report we predicted this sharp improvement but also predicted that prosperity would be fleeting. Alas, this second prediction is already proving accurate. The rate of gain in the industry’s premium volume has slowed significantly (from an estimated 27.1% in 1986’s first quarter, to 23.5% in the second, to 21.8% in the third, to 18.7% in the fourth), and we expect further slowing in 1987. Indeed, the rate of gain may well fall below my 10% "equilibrium" figure by the third quarter.
如前所述，1986年行业保费增长速度远超损失成本增长速度。因此，行业承保亏损大幅下降。在去年的年报中，我们预测到了这种大幅改善，但也预测这种繁荣将是短暂的。遗憾的是，第二个预测已被证明是准确的。行业保费增长率已显著放缓（从1986年一季度预估的27.1%，降至二季度的23.5%、三季度的21.8%，再到四季度的18.7%），我们预计1987年还会进一步放缓。事实上，到三季度，增长率很可能会降至我所说的10%“均衡”水平以下。
Nevertheless, underwriting results in 1987, assuming they are not dragged down by a major natural catastrophe, will again improve materially because price increases are recognized in revenues on a lagged basis. In effect, the good news in earnings follows the good news in prices by six to twelve months. But the improving trend in earnings will probably end by late 1988 or early 1989. Thereafter the industry is likely to head south in a hurry.
然而，假设没有重大自然灾害拖累，1987年的承保业绩仍将大幅改善，原因是保费价格上涨对收入的影响存在滞后性。实际上，盈利层面的利好会比价格层面的利好晚6到12个月显现。但这种盈利改善趋势很可能在1988年末或1989年初终止，此后行业盈利很可能迅速下滑。
Pricing behavior in the insurance industry continues to be exactly what can be expected in a commodity-type business. Only under shortage conditions are high profits achieved, and such conditions don’t last long. When the profit sun begins to shine, long-established insurers shower investors with new shares in order to build capital. In addition, newly-formed insurers rush to sell shares at the advantageous prices available in the new-issue market (prices advantageous, that is, to the insiders promoting the company but rarely to the new shareholders). These moves guarantee future trouble: capacity soars, competitive juices flow, and prices fade.
保险业的定价行为，完全符合大宗商品类业务的典型特征。只有在供给短缺时才能实现高利润，而这种短缺状态不会持续太久。当盈利前景向好时，老牌保险公司会通过向投资者增发股票来扩充资本；与此同时，新成立的保险公司也会急于在新股发行市场以“有利价格”发售股票（这里的“有利”是针对推动公司上市的内部人员而言，对新股东则往往并非如此）。这些行为必然会引发未来的问题：承保能力激增、竞争加剧，最终导致价格下跌。
It’s interesting to observe insurance leaders beseech their colleagues to behave in a more "statesmanlike" manner when pricing policies. "Why," they ask, "can’t we learn from history, even out the peaks and valleys, and consistently price to make reasonable profits?" What they wish, of course, is pricing that resembles, say, that of The Wall Street journal, whose prices are ample to start with and rise consistently each year.
观察保险业领导者恳请同行在定价时采取更具“远见”的做法，十分有趣。他们会问：“我们为何不能从历史中吸取教训，平衡盈利的高峰与低谷，通过持续合理定价实现稳定利润？”当然，他们期望的定价模式，类似于《华尔街日报》的定价策略——初始价格充足，且每年稳步上涨。
Such calls for improved behavior have all of the efficacy of those made by a Nebraska corn grower asking his fellow growers, worldwide, to market their corn with more statesmanship. What’s needed is not more statesmen, but less corn. By raising large amounts of capital in the last two years, the insurance industry has, to continue our metaphor, vastly expanded its plantings of corn. The resulting increase in "crop" - i.e., the proliferation of insurance capacity - will have the same effect on prices and profits that surplus crops have had since time immemorial.
这种呼吁改善行业行为的诉求，效果堪比内布拉斯加州的玉米种植户请求全球同行以更具“远见”的方式销售玉米。行业真正需要的不是更多“远见者”，而是减少“玉米产量”（即承保能力）。用这个比喻继续延伸：过去两年保险业通过大规模融资扩充资本，相当于大幅扩大了“玉米种植面积”。由此带来的“收成增加”——即承保能力激增——对价格和利润的影响，将与自古以来农产品过剩对价格和利润的影响如出一辙。
Our own insurance operation did well in 1986 and is also likely to do well in 1987. We have benefited significantly from industry conditions. But much of our prosperity arises from the efforts and ability of Mike Goldberg, manager of all insurance operations.
我们自身的保险业务在1986年表现良好，1987年也有望保持佳绩。我们固然从行业环境中获得了显著益处，但业务的成功在很大程度上归功于负责所有保险业务的经理迈克·戈德堡（Mike Goldberg）的努力与能力。
Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance) fell from 111 in 1985 to 103 in 1986. In addition, our premium growth has been exceptional: although final figures aren’t available, I believe that over the past two years we were the fastest growing company among the country’s top 100 insurers. Some of our growth, it is true, came from our large quota-share contract with Fireman’s Fund, described in last year’s report and updated in Charlie’s letter on page 54. But even if the premiums from that contract are excluded from the calculation, we probably still ranked first in growth.
我们的综合比率（按法定会计准则计算，不包含结构化和解与财务再保险）从1985年的111降至1986年的103。此外，我们的保费增长表现突出：尽管最终数据尚未公布，但我认为过去两年我们是美国前100大保险公司中增长最快的公司。诚然，部分增长来自我们与消防员基金（Fireman’s Fund）签订的大额配额分保合同——这份合同在去年的年报中已有描述，查理在第54页的信件中也更新了相关情况。但即便剔除该合同带来的保费，我们的增长率很可能仍位居第一。
Interestingly, we were the slowest-growing large insurer in the years immediately preceding 1985. In fact, we shrank - and we will do so again from time to time in the future. Our large swings in volume do not mean that we come and go from the insurance marketplace. Indeed, we are its most steadfast participant, always standing ready, at prices we believe adequate, to write a wide variety of high-limit coverages. The swings in our volume arise instead from the here-today, gone-tomorrow behavior of other insurers. When most insurers are "gone," because their capital is inadequate or they have been frightened by losses, insureds rush to us and find us ready to do business. But when hordes of insurers are "here," and are slashing prices far below expectable costs, many customers naturally leave us in order to take advantage of the bargains temporarily being offered by our competition.
有趣的是，在1985年之前的几年里，我们是大型保险公司中增长最慢的，甚至出现了业务萎缩——未来我们也会时不时面临这样的情况。业务量的大幅波动，并不意味着我们在保险市场中时进时出。事实上，我们是市场中最坚定的参与者：只要价格达到我们认为合理的水平，我们始终准备好承保各类高额保险业务。业务量的波动，反而源于其他保险公司“来也匆匆，去也匆匆”的行为。当多数保险公司因资本不足或被亏损吓退而“退出”市场时，投保人会纷纷涌向我们，而我们始终准备好承接业务；但当大批保险公司“涌入”市场，并将价格降至远低于预期成本时，许多客户自然会离开我们，去抢占竞争对手暂时提供的低价优惠。
Our firmness on prices works no hardship on the consumer: he is being bombarded by attractively priced insurance offers at those times when we are doing little business. And it works no hardship on our employees: we don’t engage in layoffs when we experience a cyclical slowdown at one of our generally-profitable insurance operations. This no-layoff practice is in our self-interest. Employees who fear that large layoffs will accompany sizable reductions in premium volume will understandably produce scads of business through thick and thin (mostly thin).
我们在定价上的坚定立场，并不会给消费者带来不便：在我们业务量较少的时期，消费者会被大量低价保险产品包围。这也不会给员工带来困扰：即便我们盈利稳定的保险业务遭遇周期性下滑，我们也不会裁员。这种不裁员的做法符合我们的自身利益。如果员工担心保费大幅下降会伴随大规模裁员，他们难免会在任何情况下（即便市场环境恶劣）都拼命招揽业务，以保住工作。
The trends in National Indemnity’s traditional business - the writing of commercial auto and general liability policies through general agents - suggest how gun-shy other insurers became for a while and how brave they are now getting. In the last quarter of 1984, NICO’s monthly volume averaged $5 million, about what it had been running for several years. By the first quarter of 1986, monthly volume had climbed to about $35 million. In recent months, a sharp decline has set in. Monthly volume is currently about $20 million and will continue to fall as new competitors surface and prices are cut. Ironically, the managers of certain major new competitors are the very same managers that just a few years ago bankrupted insurers that were our old competitors. Through state-mandated guaranty funds, we must pay some of the losses these managers left unpaid, and now we find them writing the same sort of business under a new name. C’est la guerre.
国民保险公司（National Indemnity）传统业务——通过总代理承保商业汽车险与一般责任险——的趋势，反映出其他保险公司曾一度多么胆怯，如今又变得多么激进。1984年四季度，该公司月均保费约为500万美元，与过去几年的水平相当；到1986年一季度，月均保费攀升至约3500万美元；而近几个月来，保费已开始大幅下滑，目前月均约为2000万美元，且随着新竞争对手涌现、价格下降，保费还将继续下跌。颇具讽刺意味的是，部分主要新竞争对手的管理者，正是几年前导致我们老牌竞争对手破产的那些人。通过各州强制设立的保险保障基金，我们不得不承担这些管理者留下的部分未赔付损失，如今却发现他们换了个新公司名称，又在承保同类业务。这就是行业现状（C’est la guerre，法语，意为“这就是战争/这就是现实”）。
The business we call "large risks" expanded significantly during 1986, and will be important to us in the future. In this operation, we regularly write policies with annual premiums of $1 - $3 million, or even higher. This business will necessarily be highly volatile - both in volume and profitability - but our premier capital position and willingness to write large net lines make us a very strong force in the market when prices are right. On the other hand, our structured settlement business has become near-dormant because present prices make no sense to us.
我们称之为“大额风险”的业务在1986年大幅扩张，未来将对我们至关重要。在这项业务中，我们通常承保年保费100万至300万美元，甚至更高的保单。这类业务的业务量与盈利能力必然会大幅波动，但凭借我们雄厚的资本实力，以及承接大额净自留额业务的意愿，当价格合理时，我们在市场中会拥有极强的竞争力。另一方面，由于当前价格不符合我们的预期，我们的结构化和解业务已近乎停滞。
The 1986 loss reserve development of our insurance group is chronicled on page 46. The figures show the amount of error in our yearend 1985 liabilities that a year of settlements and further evaluation has revealed. As you can see, what I told you last year about our loss liabilities was far from true - and that makes three years in a row of error. If the physiological rules that applied to Pinocchio were to apply to me, my nose would now draw crowds.
我们保险集团1986年的损失准备金变动情况，详见第46页。这些数据显示，经过一年的理赔结算与进一步评估，我们1985年末的负债预估存在多大误差。正如你所见，去年我向各位描述的损失负债情况与实际相去甚远——这已是连续第三年出现误差。如果皮诺曹的鼻子变长规则适用于我，现在我的鼻子恐怕会吸引众人围观。
When insurance executives belatedly establish proper reserves, they often speak of "reserve strengthening," a term that has a rather noble ring to it. They almost make it sound as if they are adding extra layers of strength to an already-solid balance sheet. That’s not the case: instead the term is a euphemism for what should more properly be called "correction of previous untruths" (albeit non-intentional ones).
当保险公司高管迟迟才计提足额准备金时，他们常称之为“准备金补强”（reserve strengthening）——这个术语听起来颇具正面意义，几乎让人觉得他们是在为原本就稳健的资产负债表再添一层保障。但实际情况并非如此：这个术语其实是一种委婉说法，更贴切的表述应是“修正此前的不实数据”（尽管这种不实并非故意造成）。
We made a special effort at the end of 1986 to reserve accurately. However, we tried just as hard at the end of 1985. Only time will tell whether we have finally succeeded in correctly estimating our insurance liabilities.
1986年末，我们特别努力地确保准备金计提准确。然而，1985年末我们也付出了同样的努力。最终我们是否成功准确预估了保险负债，只有时间才能给出答案。
Despite the difficulties we have had in reserving and the commodity economics of the industry, we expect our insurance business to both grow and make significant amounts of money - but progress will be distinctly irregular and there will be major unpleasant surprises from time to time. It’s a treacherous business and a wary attitude is essential. We must heed Woody Allen: "While the lamb may lie down with the lion, the lamb shouldn’t count on getting a whole lot of sleep."
尽管我们在准备金计提方面面临困难，且行业具有大宗商品业务的经济特征，但我们仍预期保险业务将实现增长并赚取可观利润——不过增长过程会明显起伏不定，且时不时会出现重大意外不利情况。保险业风险重重，保持警惕至关重要。我们必须谨记伍迪·艾伦（Woody Allen）的话：“羔羊或许能与狮子同眠，但羔羊别指望能睡个安稳觉。”
In our insurance operations we have an advantage in attitude, we have an advantage in capital, and we are developing an advantage in personnel. Additionally, I like to think we have some long-term edge in investing the float developed from policyholder funds. The nature of the business suggests that we will need all of these advantages in order to prosper.
我们的保险业务在态度上具有优势，在资本上具有优势，且在人才方面也在逐步建立优势。此外，我认为我们在运用保单持有人资金产生的浮存金进行投资方面，拥有一些长期优势。保险业的特性决定了，要实现繁荣发展，我们需要充分利用所有这些优势。
GEICO Corporation, 41% owned by Berkshire, had an outstanding year in 1986. Industrywide, underwriting experience in personal lines did not improve nearly as much as it did in commercial lines. But GEICO, writing personal lines almost exclusively, improved its combined ratio to 96.9 and recorded a 16% gain in premium volume. GEICO also continued to repurchase its own shares and ended the year with 5.5% fewer shares outstanding than it had at the start of the year. Our share of GEICO’s premium volume is over $500 million, close to double that of only three years ago. GEICO’s book of business is one of the best in the world of insurance, far better indeed than Berkshire’s own book.
伯克希尔持有41%股份的GEICO公司（政府员工保险公司）在1986年表现出色。从全行业来看，个人保险业务的承保业绩改善幅度远不及商业保险业务。但几乎专营个人保险业务的GEICO，其综合比率降至96.9，保费增长16%。GEICO还继续回购自身股票，年末流通股数量较年初减少5.5%。我们在GEICO保费中的份额超过5亿美元，较三年前几乎翻倍。GEICO的业务质量在保险业中位居前列，远优于伯克希尔自身的保险业务质量。
The most important ingredient in GEICO’s success is rock-bottom operating costs, which set the company apart from literally hundreds of competitors that offer auto insurance. The total of GEICO’s underwriting expense and loss adjustment expense in 1986 was only 23.5% of premiums. Many major companies show percentages 15 points higher than that. Even such huge direct writers as Allstate and State Farm incur appreciably higher costs than does GEICO.
GEICO成功的最关键因素是极低的运营成本，这使其与数百家提供汽车保险的竞争对手区分开来。1986年，GEICO的承保费用与理赔调整费用总和仅占保费的23.5%，而许多大型保险公司的这一比例比其高出15个百分点。即便是好事达（Allstate）和州立农业保险（State Farm）这样的大型直销保险公司，其成本也远高于GEICO。
The difference between GEICO’s costs and those of its competitors is a kind of moat that protects a valuable and much-sought-after business castle. No one understands this moat-around-the-castle concept better than Bill Snyder, Chairman of GEICO. He continually widens the moat by driving down costs still more, thereby defending and strengthening the economic franchise. Between 1985 and 1986, GEICO’s total expense ratio dropped from 24.1% to the 23.5% mentioned earlier and, under Bill’s leadership, the ratio is almost certain to drop further. If it does - and if GEICO maintains its service and underwriting standards - the company’s future will be brilliant indeed.
GEICO与竞争对手之间的成本差距，犹如一道“护城河”，守护着其极具价值且备受青睐的业务“城堡”。没人比GEICO董事长比尔·斯奈德（Bill Snyder）更理解“城堡环绕护城河”这一理念。他通过进一步降低成本，不断拓宽这道护城河，从而捍卫并强化公司的经济特许权。1985年至1986年间，GEICO的总费用率从24.1%降至前文提及的23.5%；在比尔的领导下，这一比率几乎肯定会进一步下降。若能实现这一目标，且GEICO继续维持其服务与承保标准，公司的未来必将一片光明。
The second stage of the GEICO rocket is fueled by Lou Simpson, Vice Chairman, who has run the company’s investments since late 1979. Indeed, it’s a little embarrassing for me, the fellow responsible for investments at Berkshire, to chronicle Lou’s performance at GEICO. Only my ownership of a controlling block of Berkshire stock makes me secure enough to give you the following figures, comparing the overall return of the equity portfolio at GEICO to that of the Standard & Poor’s 500:
GEICO发展的“第二助推器”，来自副董事长卢·辛普森（Lou Simpson）。自1979年末以来，他一直负责公司的投资业务。事实上，作为伯克希尔的投资负责人，记录卢在GEICO的投资业绩让我略感尴尬。若非我持有伯克希尔的控股权，或许没有足够底气向各位展示以下数据——这些数据对比了GEICO股票投资组合的整体回报率与标准普尔500指数（S&P 500）的回报率：
| 年份（Year） | GEICO股票组合回报率（GEICO’s Equities） | 标准普尔500指数回报率（S&P 500） |
|---|---|---|
| 1980 | 23.7% | 32.3% |
| 1981 | 5.4% | (5.0)% |
| 1982 | 45.8% | 21.4% |
| 1983 | 36.0% | 22.4% |
| 1984 | 21.8% | 6.2% |
| 1985 | 45.8% | 31.6% |
| 1986 | 38.7% | 18.6% |
These are not only terrific figures but, fully as important, they have been achieved in the right way. Lou has consistently invested in undervalued common stocks that, individually, were unlikely to present him with a permanent loss and that, collectively, were close to risk-free.
这些数据不仅极为出色，更重要的是，这样的业绩是通过正确的方式实现的。卢始终坚持投资被低估的普通股：从单个股票来看，几乎不会出现永久性亏损；从组合整体来看，风险接近于零。
In sum, GEICO is an exceptional business run by exceptional managers. We are fortunate to be associated with them.
总而言之，GEICO是一家由卓越管理者运营的卓越企业。能与他们合作，我们深感幸运。
# Marketable Securities（可流通证券）
During 1986, our insurance companies purchased about $700 million of tax-exempt bonds, most having a maturity of 8 to 12 years. You might think that this commitment indicates a considerable enthusiasm for such bonds. Unfortunately, that’s not so: at best, the bonds are mediocre investments. They simply seemed the least objectionable alternative at the time we bought them, and still seem so. (Currently liking neither stocks nor bonds, I find myself the polar opposite of Mae West as she declared: "I like only two kinds of men - foreign and domestic.")
1986年，我们的保险公司购买了约7亿美元的免税债券，其中大部分债券的期限为8至12年。你或许会认为，这样的投资规模表明我们对这类债券极具热情。但遗憾的是，事实并非如此：这些债券充其量只是普通的投资标的。它们只是在我们购买时，看起来是“最不糟糕”的选择，如今看来依然如此。（目前我既不看好股票，也不看好债券，这与梅·韦斯特（Mae West）的观点截然相反——她曾说：“我只喜欢两种男人，外国的和本国的。”）
We must, of necessity, hold marketable securities in our insurance companies and, as money comes in, we have only five directions to go: (1) long-term common stock investments; (2) long-term fixed-income securities; (3) medium-term fixed-income securities; (4) short-term cash equivalents; and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.
我们的保险公司必然需要持有可流通证券，而当资金流入时，我们只有五个投资方向可选：（1）长期普通股投资；（2）长期固定收益证券；（3）中期固定收益证券；（4）短期现金等价物；（5）短期套利交易。
Common stocks, of course, are the most fun. When conditions are right that is, when companies with good economics and good management sell well below intrinsic business value - stocks sometimes provide grand-slam home runs. But we currently find no equities that come close to meeting our tests. This statement in no way translates into a stock market prediction: we have no idea - and never have had - whether the market is going to go up, down, or sideways in the near- or intermediate term future.
当然，普通股是最具吸引力的投资方向。当条件成熟时——即具备良好经济效益与优秀管理团队的公司，其股价远低于内在业务价值——股票投资有时能带来“全垒打”式的回报。但目前我们尚未发现任何符合我们投资标准的股票。需要说明的是，这一表述绝非对股市的预测：我们从未知道，也永远无法知道，短期或中期内股市会上涨、下跌还是横盘整理。
What we do know, however, is that occasional outbreaks of those two super-contagious diseases, fear and greed, will forever occur in the investment community. The timing of these epidemics will be unpredictable. And the market aberrations produced by them will be equally unpredictable, both as to duration and degree. Therefore, we never try to anticipate the arrival or departure of either disease. Our goal is more modest: we simply attempt to be fearful when others are greedy and to be greedy only when others are fearful.
但我们确实知道，投资界总会不定期爆发两种极具传染性的“疾病”——恐惧与贪婪。这些“流行病”的爆发时机无法预测，其引发的市场异常（无论持续时间还是严重程度）也同样难以预料。因此，我们从不试图预测这两种“疾病”的到来或消退。我们的目标更为朴素：别人贪婪时我们恐惧，别人恐惧时我们贪婪。
As this is written, little fear is visible in Wall Street. Instead, euphoria prevails - and why not? What could be more exhilarating than to participate in a bull market in which the rewards to owners of businesses become gloriously uncoupled from the plodding performances of the businesses themselves. Unfortunately, however, stocks can’t outperform businesses indefinitely.
在撰写本段时，华尔街几乎看不到丝毫恐惧情绪，反而弥漫着乐观狂热——这也难怪：还有什么比参与一场牛市更令人兴奋的呢？在这场牛市中，企业所有者获得的回报，与企业自身平淡的经营业绩彻底脱节，且回报丰厚。但遗憾的是，股票的表现不可能永远超越企业本身的表现。
Indeed, because of the heavy transaction and investment management costs they bear, stockholders as a whole and over the long term must inevitably underperform the companies they own. If American business, in aggregate, earns about 12% on equity annually, investors must end up earning significantly less. Bull markets can obscure mathematical laws, but they cannot repeal them.
事实上，由于股东整体需承担高昂的交易成本与投资管理费用，长期来看，他们的投资回报率必然低于其所持企业的经营回报率。若美国企业整体的净资产年回报率约为12%，那么投资者最终获得的回报率肯定会远低于这一水平。牛市或许能掩盖数学规律，但永远无法推翻它们。
The second category of investments open to our insurance companies is long-term bonds. These are unlikely to be of interest to us except in very special situations, such as the Washington Public Power Supply System #1, #2 and #3 issues, discussed in our 1984 report. (At yearend, we owned WPPSS issues having an amortized cost of $218 million and a market value of $310 million, paying us $31.7 million in annual tax-exempt income.) Our aversion to long-term bonds relates to our fear that we will see much higher rates of inflation within the next decade. Over time, the behavior of our currency will be determined by the behavior of our legislators. This relationship poses a continuing threat to currency stability - and a corresponding threat to the owners of long-term bonds.
我们保险公司的第二类投资选择是长期债券。除非在极特殊的情况下，否则我们对长期债券兴趣不大——例如1984年年报中提及的华盛顿公共电力供应系统（WPPSS）1号、2号和3号债券。（年末时，我们持有的WPPSS债券摊余成本为2.18亿美元，市值为3.1亿美元，每年能为我们带来3170万美元的免税收入。）我们对长期债券的抵触，源于对未来十年通胀率大幅上升的担忧。长期来看，货币的表现取决于立法者的决策，这种关系持续威胁着货币稳定性——也相应地对长期债券持有者构成威胁。
We continue to periodically employ money in the arbitrage field. However, unlike most arbitrageurs, who purchase dozens of securities each year, we purchase only a few. We restrict ourselves to large deals that have been announced publicly and do not bet on the come. Therefore, our potential profits are apt to be small; but, with luck, our disappointments will also be few.
我们会继续定期将部分资金投入套利领域。但与大多数套利者（每年投资数十种证券）不同，我们只参与少数几笔套利交易。我们仅关注已公开宣布的大型交易，不进行“预期式”下注。因此，我们的潜在利润可能较低，但幸运的是，遭遇亏损的情况也会很少。
Our yearend portfolio shown below includes one arbitrage commitment, Lear-Siegler. Our balance sheet also includes a receivable for $145 million, representing the money owed us (and paid a few days later) by Unilever, then in the process of purchasing Chesebrough-Ponds, another of our arbitrage holdings. Arbitrage is an alternative to Treasury Bills as a short-term parking place for money - a choice that combines potentially higher returns with higher risks. To date, our returns from the funds committed to arbitrage have been many times higher than they would have been had we left those funds in Treasury Bills. Nonetheless, one bad experience could change the scorecard markedly.
我们年末的投资组合（如下所示）包含一笔套利投资——利尔-西格勒（Lear-Siegler）。我们的资产负债表中还包含一笔1.45亿美元的应收款项，这是联合利华（Unilever）当时收购我们另一笔套利标的奇华顿-旁氏（Chesebrough-Ponds）时所欠我们的款项（几天后已支付）。套利是短期资金“停泊”的一种选择，可替代美国短期国债（Treasury Bills）——这种选择虽潜在回报率更高，但风险也更大。截至目前，我们投入套利资金的回报率，已远超将资金存入短期国债的收益。尽管如此，一次失败的套利交易就可能显著改变这一业绩记录。
We also, though it takes some straining, currently view medium-term tax-exempt bonds as an alternative to short-term Treasury holdings. Buying these bonds, we run a risk of significant loss if, as seems probable, we sell many of them well before maturity. However, we believe this risk is more than counter-balanced first, by the much higher after-tax returns currently realizable from these securities as compared to Treasury Bills and second, by the possibility that sales will produce an overall profit rather than a loss. Our expectation of a higher total return, after allowing for the possibility of loss and after taking into account all tax effects, is a relatively close call and could well be wrong. Even if we sell our bonds at a fairly large loss, however, we may end up reaping a higher after-tax return than we would have realized by repeatedly rolling over Treasury Bills.
尽管需要权衡考量，但目前我们仍将中期免税债券视为短期国债的替代选择。若我们像预期那样，在债券到期前大量出售，可能会面临重大亏损风险。但我们认为，以下两点足以抵消这一风险：首先，当前这些债券的税后回报率远高于短期国债；其次，出售债券有可能实现整体盈利而非亏损。在考虑亏损可能性与所有税务影响后，我们对更高总回报的预期只是一种“险胜”的判断，很可能出现偏差。即便我们出售债券时面临较大亏损，最终获得的税后回报，仍可能高于反复滚动投资短期国债的收益。
In any event, you should know that our expectations for both the stocks and bonds we now hold are exceptionally modest, given current market levels. Probably the best thing that could happen to us is a market in which we would choose to sell many of our bond holdings at a significant loss in order to re-allocate funds to the far-better equity values then very likely to exist. The bond losses I am talking about would occur if high interest rates came along; the same rates would probably depress common stocks considerably more than medium-term bonds.
无论如何，各位应当知晓，鉴于当前的市场水平，我们对所持股票与债券的回报预期都极为温和。对我们而言，最理想的情况或许是：市场出现高利率环境，此时我们选择以较大亏损出售大量债券，将资金重新配置到估值远更合理的股票上——而这种低估值股票在高利率环境下很可能存在。我所提及的债券亏损，会在利率上升时出现；但同样的高利率，对普通股的打压很可能远大于对中期债券的影响。
We show below our 1986 yearend net holdings in marketable equities. All positions with a market value of over $25 million are listed, and the interests attributable to minority shareholdings of Wesco Financial Corp. and Nebraska Furniture Mart are excluded.
以下是我们1986年末可流通股票的净持仓情况。表格中仅列出市值超过2500万美元的持仓，且剔除了韦斯科金融公司（Wesco Financial Corp.）与内布拉斯加家具卖场（Nebraska Furniture Mart）少数股权所对应的权益。
| 持股数量（No. of Shares） | 公司名称 | 成本（Cost）（单位：千美元，省略后三位） | 市值（Market）（单位：千美元，省略后三位） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2,990,000 | 首都城市/美国广播公司（Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.） | $515,775 | $801,694 |
| 6,850,000 | GEICO公司（GEICO Corporation） | $45,713 | $674,725 |
| 2,379,200 | 汉迪-哈曼公司（Handy & Harman） | $27,318 | $46,989 |
| 489,300 | 利尔-西格勒公司（Lear Siegler, Inc.） | $44,064 | $44,587 |
| 1,727,765 | 《华盛顿邮报》公司（The Washington Post Company） | $9,731 | $269,531 |
| $642,601 | $1,837,526 | ||
| 其他所有普通股持仓（All Other Common Stockholdings） | $12,763 | $36,507 | |
| 普通股总持仓（Total Common Stocks） | $655,364 | $1,874,033 |
We should note that we expect to keep permanently our three primary holdings, Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post. Even if these securities were to appear significantly overpriced, we would not anticipate selling them, just as we would not sell See’s or Buffalo Evening News if someone were to offer us a price far above what we believe those businesses are worth.
需要说明的是，我们计划长期持有三大核心持仓：首都城市/美国广播公司、GEICO公司与《华盛顿邮报》公司。即便这些股票出现显著高估，我们也不打算出售——就像即便有人为喜诗糖果或《布法罗新闻》开出远高于我们评估价值的价格，我们也不会出售它们一样。
This attitude may seem old-fashioned in a corporate world in which activity has become the order of the day. The modern manager refers to his "portfolio" of businesses - meaning that all of them are candidates for "restructuring" whenever such a move is dictated by Wall Street preferences, operating conditions or a new corporate "concept." (Restructuring is defined narrowly, however: it extends only to dumping offending businesses, not to dumping the officers and directors who bought the businesses in the first place. "Hate the sin but love the sinner" is a theology as popular with the Fortune 500 as it is with the Salvation Army.)
在当下以“频繁行动”为常态的企业界，这种态度或许显得过时。现代管理者会将旗下业务称为“投资组合”——这意味着，只要华尔街偏好、经营环境或新的企业“理念”要求，所有业务都可能成为“重组”对象。（但“重组”的定义很狭隘：仅包括剥离“问题业务”，而非解雇最初收购这些业务的高管与董事。“恨罪不恨人”这一理念，在《财富》500强企业中与在救世军中同样流行。）
Investment managers are even more hyperkinetic: their behavior during trading hours makes whirling dervishes appear sedated by comparison. Indeed, the term "institutional investor" is becoming one of those self-contradictions called an oxymoron, comparable to "jumbo shrimp," "lady mudwrestler" and "inexpensive lawyer."
投资经理的行动则更为狂热：交易时段内他们的操作频率，足以让旋转托钵僧（whirling dervishes）显得平静。事实上，“机构投资者”一词正成为一种自相矛盾的“矛盾修辞法”，类似“巨型小虾”（jumbo shrimp）、“女子泥浆摔跤手”（lady mudwrestler）与“廉价律师”（inexpensive lawyer）这类表述。
Despite the enthusiasm for activity that has swept business and financial America, we will stick with our ‘til-death-do-us-part policy. It’s the only one with which Charlie and I are comfortable, it produces decent results, and it lets our managers and those of our investees run their businesses free of distractions.
尽管“行动狂热”席卷了美国商界与金融界，但我们仍将坚持“至死不渝”的长期持有策略。这是唯一让查理和我感到安心的策略，它能带来不错的业绩，也能让我们旗下业务及被投资公司的管理者专注经营，不受干扰。
# NHP, Inc.（NHP公司）
Last year we paid $23.7 million for about 50% of NHP, Inc., a developer, syndicator, owner and manager of multi-family rental housing. Should all executive stock options that have been authorized be granted and exercised, our equity interest will decline to slightly over 45%.
去年，我们以2370万美元收购了NHP公司约50%的股权。NHP公司是一家多户租赁住房的开发商、联合投资者、所有者与管理者。若所有已获批的高管股票期权均被授予并行权，我们的持股比例将降至略高于45%。
NHP, Inc. has a most unusual genealogy. In 1967, President Johnson appointed a commission of business and civic leaders, led by Edgar Kaiser, to study ways to increase the supply of multifamily housing for low- and moderate-income tenants. Certain members of the commission subsequently formed and promoted two business entities to foster this goal. Both are now owned by NHP, Inc. and one operates under unusual ground rules: three of its directors must be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and it is also required by law to submit an annual report to the President.
NHP公司的起源极为特殊。1967年，约翰逊总统任命了一个由商界与公民领袖组成的委员会（由埃德加·凯泽（Edgar Kaiser）领导），研究如何增加面向中低收入群体的多户住房供应。该委员会的部分成员随后成立并推动了两家企业实体，以实现这一目标。如今这两家实体均由NHP公司持有，其中一家的运营遵循特殊规则：其三名董事必须由总统在参议院的建议与同意下任命，且法律要求该实体每年向总统提交报告。
Over 260 major corporations, motivated more by the idea of public service than profit, invested $42 million in the two original entities, which promptly began, through partnerships, to develop government-subsidized rental property. The typical partnership owned a single property and was largely financed by a non-recourse mortgage. Most of the equity money for each partnership was supplied by a group of limited partners who were primarily attracted by the large tax deductions that went with the investment. NHP acted as general partner and also purchased a small portion of each partnership’s equity.
超过260家大型企业（更多是出于公共服务目的而非盈利）向这两家原始实体投资了4200万美元。这两家实体随即通过合伙制模式，开始开发政府补贴的租赁住房。通常，每个合伙实体持有一处房产，主要通过无追索权抵押贷款融资。每个合伙实体的大部分股权资金由一群有限合伙人提供，他们主要被该投资附带的大额税收减免所吸引。NHP公司担任普通合伙人，并持有每个合伙实体的少量股权。
The Government’s housing policy has, of course, shifted and NHP has necessarily broadened its activities to include non-subsidized apartments commanding market-rate rents. In addition, a subsidiary of NHP builds single-family homes in the Washington, D.C. area, realizing revenues of about $50 million annually.
当然，政府住房政策已发生变化，NHP公司也相应拓宽了业务范围，将收取市场租金的非补贴公寓纳入业务。此外，NHP的一家子公司在华盛顿特区周边建造独栋住宅，年营收约5000万美元。
NHP now oversees about 500 partnership properties that are located in 40 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, and that include about 80,000 housing units. The cost of these properties was more than $2.5 billion and they have been well maintained. NHP directly manages about 55,000 of the housing units and supervises the management of the rest. The company’s revenues from management are about $16 million annually, and growing.
目前，NHP公司管理着约500处合伙制房产，分布在40个州、华盛顿特区及波多黎各，共包含约8万套住房。这些房产的总成本超过25亿美元，且维护状况良好。NHP直接管理约5.5万套住房，其余住房则由其监督管理。公司每年的管理费收入约1600万美元，且仍在增长。
In addition to the equity interests it purchased upon the formation of each partnership, NHP owns varying residual interests that come into play when properties are disposed of and distributions are made to the limited partners. The residuals on many of NHP’s "deep subsidy" properties are unlikely to be of much value. But residuals on certain other properties could prove quite valuable, particularly if inflation should heat up.
除了在各合伙实体成立时购买的股权外，NHP还持有不同比例的剩余权益——这些权益在房产处置及向有限合伙人分配收益时生效。NHP旗下许多“深度补贴”房产的剩余权益可能价值不高，但其他部分房产的剩余权益或许极具价值，尤其是在通胀加剧的情况下。
The tax-oriented syndication of properties to individuals has been halted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In the main, NHP is currently trying to develop equity positions or significant residual interests in non-subsidized rental properties of quality and size (typically 200 to 500 units). In projects of this kind, NHP usually works with one or more large institutional investors or lenders. NHP will continue to seek ways to develop low- and moderate-income apartment housing, but will not likely meet success unless government policy changes.
1986年《税收改革法案》（Tax Reform Act of 1986）叫停了面向个人的“税收导向型”房产联合投资模式。目前，NHP的主要业务方向是：在优质、成规模（通常为200-500套）的非补贴租赁住房中，获取股权或大额剩余权益。在此类项目中，NHP通常与一家或多家大型机构投资者或贷款机构合作。NHP将继续寻求开发中低收入群体公寓的途径，但除非政府政策改变，否则很难取得成效。
Besides ourselves, the large shareholders in NHP are Weyerhauser (whose interest is about 25%) and a management group led by Rod Heller, chief executive of NHP. About 60 major corporations also continue to hold small interests, none larger than 2%.
除我们之外，NHP的主要股东还包括惠好公司（Weyerhauser，持股约25%），以及由NHP首席执行官罗德·海勒（Rod Heller）领导的管理团队。约60家大型企业仍持有少量股权，且持股比例均不超过2%。
# Taxation（税收）
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 affects our various businesses in important and divergent ways. Although we find much to praise in the Act, the net financial effect for Berkshire is negative: our rate of increase in business value is likely to be at least moderately slower under the new law than under the old. The net effect for our shareholders is even more negative: every dollar of increase in per-share business value, assuming the increase is accompanied by an equivalent dollar gain in the market value of Berkshire stock, will produce 72 cents of after-tax gain for our shareholders rather than the 80 cents produced under the old law. This result, of course, reflects the rise in the maximum tax rate on personal capital gains from 20% to 28%.
1986年《税收改革法案》对我们各项业务的影响重大且各不相同。尽管我们认为该法案有诸多可取之处，但对伯克希尔而言，其净财务影响为负面：在新税法下，我们业务价值的增长速度可能至少会比旧税法下适度放缓。对股东而言，净影响则更为负面：假设每股业务价值每增长1美元，伯克希尔股价也同步增长1美元，那么股东获得的税后收益将从旧税法下的80美分降至新税法下的72美分。当然，这一结果源于个人资本利得税最高税率从20%上调至28%。
Here are the main tax changes that affect Berkshire:
以下是影响伯克希尔的主要税收变化：
o The tax rate on corporate ordinary income is scheduled to decrease from 46% in 1986 to 34% in 1988. This change obviously affects us positively - and it also has a significant positive effect on two of our three major investees, Capital Cities/ABC and The Washington Post Company.
o 企业普通收入的税率计划从1986年的46%降至1988年的34%。这一变化显然对我们产生积极影响，同时也对我们三大主要被投资公司中的两家——首都城市/美国广播公司与《华盛顿邮报》公司——产生显著积极影响。
I say this knowing that over the years there has been a lot of fuzzy and often partisan commentary about who really pays corporate taxes - businesses or their customers. The argument, of course, has usually turned around tax increases, not decreases. Those people resisting increases in corporate rates frequently argue that corporations in reality pay none of the taxes levied on them but, instead, act as a sort of economic pipeline, passing all taxes through to consumers. According to these advocates, any corporate-tax increase will simply lead to higher prices that, for the corporation, offset the increase. Having taken this position, proponents of the "pipeline" theory must also conclude that a tax decrease for corporations will not help profits but will instead flow through, leading to correspondingly lower prices for consumers.
我这样说，是因为我知道多年来关于“谁真正承担企业税——企业还是消费者”的讨论一直模糊不清，且往往带有党派色彩。当然，争论焦点通常围绕“增税”而非“减税”。反对提高企业税率的人常辩称，企业实际上并未承担任何针对它们征收的税款，而是像“经济管道”一样，将所有税负转嫁给消费者。这些支持者认为，企业税的任何上调都会直接导致产品提价，而提价带来的收入将抵消企业的税负增加。基于这一立场，“管道理论”的支持者也必须得出结论：企业减税不会提升利润，而是会通过降价传递给消费者，使消费者享受更低价格。
Conversely, others argue that corporations not only pay the taxes levied upon them, but absorb them also. Consumers, this school says, will be unaffected by changes in corporate rates.
相反，另一些人则认为，企业不仅要缴纳针对它们的税款，还要自行承担这些税负。这一观点认为，消费者不会受到企业税率变化的影响。
What really happens? When the corporate rate is cut, do Berkshire, The Washington Post, Cap Cities, etc., themselves soak up the benefits, or do these companies pass the benefits along to their customers in the form of lower prices? This is an important question for investors and managers, as well as for policymakers.
实际情况究竟如何？当企业税率下调时，伯克希尔、《华盛顿邮报》公司、首都城市/美国广播公司等企业，是会自行享受减税红利，还是会通过降价将红利传递给消费者？对投资者、管理者及政策制定者而言，这都是一个重要问题。
Our conclusion is that in some cases the benefits of lower corporate taxes fall exclusively, or almost exclusively, upon the corporation and its shareholders, and that in other cases the benefits are entirely, or almost entirely, passed through to the customer. What determines the outcome is the strength of the corporation’s business franchise and whether the profitability of that franchise is regulated.
我们的结论是：在某些情况下，企业减税的红利完全（或几乎完全）由企业及其股东享有；而在另一些情况下，红利则完全（或几乎完全）传递给消费者。决定这一结果的关键因素，是企业“业务特许权”的强弱，以及该特许权的盈利能力是否受到监管。
For example, when the franchise is strong and after-tax profits are regulated in a relatively precise manner, as is the case with electric utilities, changes in corporate tax rates are largely reflected in prices, not in profits. When taxes are cut, prices will usually be reduced in short order. When taxes are increased, prices will rise, though often not as promptly.
例如，当企业拥有强大特许权，且税后利润受到相对严格的监管（如电力公司）时，企业税率变化主要体现在价格上，而非利润上。税率下调时，产品价格通常会迅速下降；税率上调时，价格也会上涨，尽管涨幅可能不那么及时。
A similar result occurs in a second arena - in the price-competitive industry, whose companies typically operate with very weak business franchises. In such industries, the free market "regulates" after-tax profits in a delayed and irregular, but generally effective, manner. The marketplace, in effect, performs much the same function in dealing with the price-competitive industry as the Public Utilities Commission does in dealing with electric utilities. In these industries, therefore, tax changes eventually affect prices more than profits.
第二种情况也会产生类似结果——在价格竞争激烈的行业中，企业通常仅拥有微弱的业务特许权。在这类行业中，自由市场会以延迟、不规则但总体有效的方式“监管”税后利润。实际上，市场对价格竞争行业的“监管”作用，与公用事业委员会对电力公司的监管作用十分相似。因此，在这些行业中，税收变化最终对价格的影响会大于对利润的影响。
In the case of unregulated businesses blessed with strong franchises, however, it’s a different story: the corporation and its shareholders are then the major beneficiaries of tax cuts. These companies benefit from a tax cut much as the electric company would if it lacked a regulator to force down prices.
然而，对于拥有强大特许权且不受监管的企业，情况则完全不同：企业及其股东是减税的主要受益者。这类企业享受减税红利的方式，类似于电力公司在没有监管机构强制降价的情况下享受减税的方式。
Many of our businesses, both those we own in whole and in part, possess such franchises. Consequently, reductions in their taxes largely end up in our pockets rather than the pockets of our customers. While this may be impolitic to state, it is impossible to deny. If you are tempted to believe otherwise, think for a moment of the most able brain surgeon or lawyer in your area. Do you really expect the fees of this expert (the local "franchise-holder" in his or her specialty) to be reduced now that the top personal tax rate is being cut from 50% to 28%?
我们旗下许多业务（无论是全资拥有还是部分持股）都拥有这样的特许权。因此，这些业务的税负降低，大部分收益会落入我们的口袋，而非消费者手中。尽管这样说可能不太合时宜，但事实无可否认。如果你对此有疑问，不妨想想你所在地区最顶尖的脑外科医生或律师。如今个人最高税率从50%降至28%，你真的认为这些专家（其专业领域的本地“特许权持有者”）会降低收费吗？
Your joy at our conclusion that lower rates benefit a number of our operating businesses and investees should be severely tempered, however, by another of our convictions: scheduled 1988 tax rates, both individual and corporate, seem totally unrealistic to us. These rates will very likely bestow a fiscal problem on Washington that will prove incompatible with price stability. We believe, therefore, that ultimately - within, say, five years - either higher tax rates or higher inflation rates are almost certain to materialize. And it would not surprise us to see both.
然而，当你得知“低税率有利于我们多家运营业务及被投资公司”这一结论时，不应过于乐观，因为我们还有另一重判断：1988年计划实施的个人与企业税率，在我们看来完全不切实际。这样的税率很可能给美国政府带来财政问题，而这一问题终将与物价稳定相冲突。因此我们认为，最终——比如未来五年内——要么税率上调，要么通胀加剧，二者几乎必然会发生其一。若两者同时出现，我们也不会感到意外。
o Corporate capital gains tax rates have been increased from 28% to 34%, effective in 1987. This change will have an important adverse effect on Berkshire because we expect much of our gain in business value in the future, as in the past, to arise from capital gains. For example, our three major investment holdings - Cap Cities, GEICO, and Washington Post - at yearend had a market value of over $1.7 billion, close to 75% of the total net worth of Berkshire, and yet they deliver us only about $9 million in annual income. Instead, all three retain a very high percentage of their earnings, which we expect to eventually deliver us capital gains.
o 企业资本利得税税率已从28%上调至34%，1987年生效。这一变化将对伯克希尔产生重大不利影响，因为无论是过去还是未来，我们业务价值的增长很大程度上都来自资本利得。例如，年末我们三大核心投资组合——首都城市/美国广播公司、GEICO公司与《华盛顿邮报》公司——的市值超过17亿美元，接近伯克希尔总净资产的75%，但它们每年为我们带来的收入仅约900万美元。这三家公司均将大部分盈利留存，我们预计这些留存盈利最终将为我们带来资本利得。
The new law increases the rate for all gains realized in the future, including the unrealized gains that existed before the law was enacted. At yearend, we had $1.2 billion of such unrealized gains in our equity investments. The effect of the new law on our balance sheet will be delayed because a GAAP rule stipulates that the deferred tax liability applicable to unrealized gains should be stated at last year’s 28% tax rate rather than the current 34% rate. This rule is expected to change soon. The moment it does, about $73 million will disappear from our GAAP net worth and be added to the deferred tax account.
新税法提高了未来所有已实现利得的税率，包括税法颁布前已存在的未实现利得。年末时，我们股票投资中的未实现利得已达12亿美元。新税法对我们资产负债表的影响将被延迟，因为公认会计原则（GAAP）规定，与未实现利得相关的递延所得税负债，应按去年28%的税率计算，而非当前34%的税率。这一规则预计很快会修改。规则修改后，我们的GAAP净资产将减少约7300万美元，这部分金额将计入递延所得税账户。
o Dividend and interest income received by our insurance companies will be taxed far more heavily under the new law. First, all corporations will be taxed on 20% of the dividends they receive from other domestic corporations, up from 15% under the old law. Second, there is a change concerning the residual 80% that applies only to property/casualty companies: 15% of that residual will be taxed if the stocks paying the dividends were purchased after August 7, 1986. A third change, again applying only to property/casualty companies, concerns tax-exempt bonds: interest on bonds purchased by insurers after August 7, 1986 will only be 85% tax-exempt.
o 新税法下，我们保险公司获得的股息与利息收入将面临更重的税负。首先，所有企业从其他美国国内企业获得的股息中，需对20%的部分缴税（旧税法下为15%）。其次，针对剩余80%的股息，有一项仅适用于财产意外险公司的新规：若股息对应的股票是1986年8月7日后购买的，剩余80%股息中的15%需缴税。第三项变化同样仅适用于财产意外险公司，涉及免税债券：保险公司在1986年8月7日后购买的债券，其利息仅有85%可享受免税待遇。
The last two changes are very important. They mean that our income from the investments we make in future years will be significantly lower than would have been the case under the old law. My best guess is that these changes alone will eventually reduce the earning power of our insurance operation by at least 10% from what we could previously have expected.
后两项变化影响重大。这意味着未来几年我们从投资中获得的收入，将远低于旧税法下的预期水平。我初步估计，仅这两项变化就可能导致我们保险业务的盈利能力，较此前预期至少下降10%。
o The new tax law also materially changes the timing of tax payments by property/casualty insurance companies. One new rule requires us to discount our loss reserves in our tax returns, a change that will decrease deductions and increase taxable income. Another rule, to be phased in over six years, requires us to include 20% of our unearned premium reserve in taxable income.
o 新税法还大幅改变了财产意外险公司的缴税时点。其中一项新规要求我们在纳税申报时，对损失准备金进行折现，这将减少可抵扣金额，增加应纳税所得额。另一项新规将在六年内逐步实施，要求我们将未赚保费准备金的20%计入应纳税所得额。
Neither rule changes the amount of the annual tax accrual in our reports to you, but each materially accelerates the schedule of payments. That is, taxes formerly deferred will now be front-ended, a change that will significantly cut the profitability of our business. An analogy will suggest the toll: if, upon turning 21, you were required to immediately pay tax on all income you were due to receive throughout your life, both your lifetime wealth and your estate would be a small fraction of what they would be if all taxes on your income were payable only when you died.
这两项规则均未改变我们向各位报告的年度应计税费总额，但都大幅加快了缴税进度。也就是说，原本可递延缴纳的税款现在需提前缴纳，这一变化将显著降低我们业务的盈利能力。举个例子就能说明其影响：若你21岁时就需为一生中所有应得收入立即缴税，那么你的终身财富与遗产规模，将远低于“所有收入仅在你去世时才需缴税”的情况。
Attentive readers may spot an inconsistency in what we say. Earlier, discussing companies in price-competitive industries, we suggested that tax increases or reductions affect these companies relatively little, but instead are largely passed along to their customers. But now we are saying that tax increases will affect profits of Berkshire’s property/casualty companies even though they operate in an intensely price-competitive industry.
细心的读者可能会发现我们表述中的一处矛盾。此前我们讨论价格竞争行业的企业时提到，税率增减对这类企业影响较小，大部分税负会转嫁给消费者。但现在我们却表示，尽管伯克希尔的财产意外险公司处于竞争激烈的行业，税率上调仍会影响其利润。
The reason this industry is likely to be an exception to our general rule is that not all major insurers will be working with identical tax equations. Important differences will exist for several reasons: a new alternative minimum tax will materially affect some companies but not others; certain major insurers have huge loss carry-forwards that will largely shield their income from significant taxes for at least a few years; and the results of some large insurers will be folded into the consolidated returns of companies with non-insurance businesses. These disparate conditions will produce widely varying marginal tax rates in the property/casualty industry. That will not be the case, however, in most other price-competitive industries, such as aluminum, autos and department stores, in which the major players will generally contend with similar tax equations.
该行业之所以成为我们一般规则的例外，是因为并非所有主要保险公司都面临相同的税务计算方式。存在重大差异的原因有三：一是新的替代性最低税会对部分公司产生重大影响，对另一些公司则无影响；二是部分主要保险公司拥有巨额亏损结转，未来至少几年内，这些亏损将大幅抵消其应税收入；三是部分大型保险公司的业绩会并入拥有非保险业务的母公司合并纳税申报表。这些不同情况将导致财产意外险行业的边际税率差异显著。但在其他大多数价格竞争行业（如铝业、汽车业、百货零售业）中，情况并非如此——这些行业的主要参与者通常面临相似的税务计算方式。
The absence of a common tax calculus for property/casualty companies means that the increased taxes falling on the industry will probably not be passed along to customers to the degree that they would in a typical price-competitive industry. Insurers, in other words, will themselves bear much of the new tax burdens.
财产意外险公司缺乏统一的税务计算标准，意味着该行业增加的税负，可能无法像典型价格竞争行业那样，大部分转嫁给消费者。换句话说，保险公司自身将承担大部分新增税负。
o A partial offset to these burdens is a "fresh start" adjustment that occurred on January 1, 1987 when our December 31, 1986 loss reserve figures were converted for tax purposes to the newly-required discounted basis. (In our reports to you, however, reserves will remain on exactly the same basis as in the past - undiscounted except in special cases such as structured settlements.) The net effect of the "fresh start" is to give us a double deduction: we will get a tax deduction in 1987 and future years for a portion of our-incurred-but-unpaid insurance losses that have already been fully deducted as costs in 1986 and earlier years.
o 一项“全新开始”调整可部分抵消上述税负压力，该调整于1987年1月1日生效——我们将1986年12月31日的损失准备金数据，按税法要求转换为新的折现基准（但在我们向各位提交的报告中，准备金的计算基准与过去完全一致，除结构化和解等特殊情况外，均不进行折现）。“全新开始”调整的净效果是为我们提供“双重抵扣”：1986年及之前年度已全额作为成本抵扣的部分“已发生但未支付”保险损失，在1987年及未来年度仍可再次获得税收抵扣。
The increase in net worth that is produced by this change is not yet reflected in our financial statements. Rather, under present GAAP rules (which may be changed), the benefit will flow into the earnings statement and, consequently, into net worth over the next few years by way of reduced tax charges. We expect the total benefit from the fresh-start adjustment to be in the $30 - $40 million range. It should be noted, however, that this is a one-time benefit, whereas the negative impact of the other insurance-related tax changes is not only ongoing but, in important respects, will become more severe as time passes.
这一调整带来的净资产增长尚未反映在我们的财务报表中。根据当前公认会计原则（可能会修改），这部分收益将在未来几年通过减少税费支出的方式，计入利润表并进而计入净资产。我们预计“全新开始”调整带来的总收益在3000万至4000万美元之间。但需注意的是，这是一次性收益，而其他与保险相关的税收变化带来的负面影响不仅会持续存在，在关键方面还会随时间推移愈发严重。
o The General Utilities Doctrine was repealed by the new tax law. This means that in 1987 and thereafter there will be a double tax on corporate liquidations, one at the corporate level and another at the shareholder level. In the past, the tax at the corporate level could be avoided, If Berkshire, for example, were to be liquidated - which it most certainly won’t be - shareholders would, under the new law, receive far less from the sales of our properties than they would have if the properties had been sold in the past, assuming identical prices in each sale. Though this outcome is theoretical in our case, the change in the law will very materially affect many companies. Therefore, it also affects our evaluations of prospective investments. Take, for example, producing oil and gas businesses, selected media companies, real estate companies, etc. that might wish to sell out. The values that their shareholders can realize are likely to be significantly reduced simply because the General Utilities Doctrine has been repealed - though the companies’ operating economics will not have changed adversely at all. My impression is that this important change in the law has not yet been fully comprehended by either investors or managers.
o 新税法废除了“通用公用事业原则”（General Utilities Doctrine）。这意味着1987年及以后，企业清算将面临双重征税：一层在企业层面，另一层在股东层面。过去，企业层面的清算税可避免。例如，若伯克希尔进行清算（我们肯定不会这么做），在新税法下，假设资产出售价格与过去相同，股东从资产出售中获得的收益将远低于过去。尽管这对我们而言只是理论上的结果，但该法律变化将对许多公司产生重大影响，因此也会影响我们对潜在投资的评估。以可能寻求出售的石油天然气生产企业、部分媒体公司、房地产公司等为例，仅因“通用公用事业原则”被废除，其股东可实现的价值就可能大幅下降——尽管这些公司的运营经济效益并未受到任何不利影响。我的印象是，投资者与管理者均尚未完全理解这一重要法律变化的影响。
This section of our report has been longer and more complicated than I would have liked. But the changes in the law are many and important, particularly for property/casualty insurers. As I have noted, the new law will hurt Berkshire’s results, but the negative impact is impossible to quantify with any precision.
本报告的这一部分篇幅比我预期的更长、更复杂。但税法变化众多且影响重大，对财产意外险公司而言尤其如此。正如我所指出的，新税法将对伯克希尔的业绩产生不利影响，但具体负面影响程度无法精确量化。
# Miscellaneous（其他事项）
We bought a corporate jet last year. What you have heard about such planes is true: they are very expensive and a luxury in situations like ours where little travel to out-of-the-way places is required. And planes not only cost a lot to operate, they cost a lot just to look at. Pre-tax, cost of capital plus depreciation on a new $15 million plane probably runs $3 million annually. On our own plane, bought for $850,000 used, such costs run close to $200,000 annually.
去年我们购买了一架公务机。关于公务机的说法都是真的：它们价格昂贵，而对我们这种无需频繁前往偏远地区的公司而言，更是一种奢侈品。而且公务机不仅运营成本高，即便闲置也需承担高额成本。一架价值1500万美元的新公务机，其税前资本成本与折旧费用每年可能高达300万美元；我们这架85万美元购入的二手机，每年此类成本也接近20万美元。
Cognizant of such figures, your Chairman, unfortunately, has in the past made a number of rather intemperate remarks about corporate jets. Accordingly, prior to our purchase, I was forced into my Galileo mode. I promptly experienced the necessary "counter-revelation" and travel is now considerably easier - and considerably costlier - than in the past. Whether Berkshire will get its money’s worth from the plane is an open question, but I will work at achieving some business triumph that I can (no matter how dubiously) attribute to it. I’m afraid Ben Franklin had my number. Said he: "So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to do."
鉴于这些数据，遗憾的是，本人（你们的董事长）过去曾对公务机发表过不少过激言论。因此，在购买这架飞机前，我不得不进入“伽利略模式”（意指改变原有观点）。我很快有了必要的“反向顿悟”——如今出行确实比过去便捷得多，但成本也高得多。伯克希尔在这架飞机上的投入是否物有所值，尚无定论，但我会努力促成一些商业成就，并将其（无论多么牵强）归功于这架飞机。恐怕本杰明·富兰克林早就看透了我，他曾说：“人之所以理性，是多么方便的一件事啊——因为它能为自己想做的任何事找到或编造理由。”
About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1986 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $4 million, and 1,934 charities were recipients.
伯克希尔1986年股东指定捐赠计划中，约97%的合格股份参与其中。该计划的捐赠总额为400万美元，惠及1934家慈善机构。
We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 58 and 59. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in "street" name or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1987 will be ineligible for the 1987 program.
我们建议新股东阅读第58-59页关于股东指定捐赠计划的说明。若你希望参与未来的捐赠计划，强烈建议你立即确认所持股份以实际所有者名义登记，而非以“街名”（券商代持）或代理人名义登记。1987年9月30日前未完成此类登记的股份，将无资格参与1987年的捐赠计划。
Last year almost 450 people attended our shareholders’ meeting, up from about 250 the year before (and from about a dozen ten years ago). I hope you can join us on May 19th in Omaha. Charlie and I like to answer owner-related questions and I can promise you that our shareholders will pose many good ones. Finishing up the questions may take quite a while - we had about 65 last year so you should feel free to leave once your own have been answered.
去年有近450人参加了我们的股东大会，高于前一年的约250人（十年前仅约12人）。我希望你能在5月19日来奥马哈参加今年的股东大会。查理和我很乐意回答与股东相关的问题，而且我可以保证，我们的股东一定会提出许多优质问题。回答完所有问题可能需要较长时间——去年我们回答了约65个问题，因此一旦你的问题得到解答，你完全可以自行离场。
Last year, after the meeting, one shareholder from New Jersey and another from New York went to the Furniture Mart, where each purchased a $5,000 Oriental rug from Mrs. B. (To be precise, they purchased rugs that might cost $10,000 elsewhere for which they were charged about $5,000.) Mrs. B was pleased - but not satisfied - and she will be looking for you at the store after this year’s meeting. Unless our shareholders top last year’s record, I’ll be in trouble. So do me (and yourself) a favor, and go see her.
去年股东大会后，一位新泽西州的股东和一位纽约州的股东前往家具卖场，各自从B夫人手中购买了一块价值5000美元的东方地毯（更准确地说，这些地毯在其他地方可能售价1万美元，而他们仅支付了约5000美元）。B夫人对此感到高兴，但并不满足——今年股东大会后，她会在卖场等候各位。除非我们的股东打破去年的采购记录，否则我就要有麻烦了。所以，帮我（也帮你自己）一个忙，去看看她吧。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 27, 1987
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
1987年2月27日
# Purchase-Price Accounting Adjustments and the "Cash Flow" Fallacy（收购价格会计调整与“现金流”谬误）
First a short quiz: below are abbreviated 1986 statements of earnings for two companies. Which business is the more valuable?
首先是一个小测试：以下是两家公司1986年的简化利润表。哪一家企业更具价值？
| 项目 | 公司O（Company O）（单位：千美元，省略后三位） | 公司N（Company N）（单位：千美元，省略后三位） |
|---|---|---|
| 收入（Revenues） | $677,240 | $677,240 |
| 销货成本（Costs of Goods Sold）： | ||
| - 历史成本（不含折旧）（Historical costs, excluding depreciation） | $341,170 | $341,170 |
| - 特殊非现金存货成本（Special non-cash inventory costs）（1） | $4,979 | - |
| - 厂房设备折旧（Depreciation of plant and equipment）（2） | $8,301 | $13,355 |
| 销货成本合计 | $349,471 | $359,504 |
| 毛利（Gross Profit） | $327,769 | $317,736 |
| 销售及管理费用（Selling & Admin. Expense） | $260,286 | $260,286 |
| 商誉摊销（Amortization of Goodwill）（3） | - | $595 |
| 销售及管理费用合计 | $260,286 | $260,881 |
| 营业利润（Operating Profit） | $67,483 | $56,855 |
| 其他收入净额（Other Income, Net） | $4,135 | $4,135 |
| 税前利润（Pre-Tax Income） | $71,618 | $60,990 |
| 适用所得税（Applicable Income Tax）： | ||
| - 历史递延及当期所得税（Historical deferred and current tax） | $31,387 | $31,387 |
| - 非现金跨期分摊调整（Non-Cash Inter-period Allocation Adjustment）（4） | - | $998 |
| 所得税合计 | $31,387 | $32,385 |
| 净利润（Net Income） | $40,231 | $28,605 |
（注：（1）至（4）项将在本节后续内容中讨论）
As you've probably guessed, Companies O and N are the same business - Scott Fetzer. In the "O" (for "old") column we have shown what the company's 1986 GAAP earnings would have been if we had not purchased it; in the "N" (for "new") column we have shown Scott Fetzer's GAAP earnings as actually reported by Berkshire.
正如你可能猜到的，公司O与公司N实际上是同一家企业——斯科特·费策尔公司（Scott Fetzer）。“O”列（代表“旧”）展示的是若我们未收购该公司，其1986年按公认会计原则（GAAP）计算的盈利；“N”列（代表“新”）展示的是伯克希尔实际报告的斯科特·费策尔公司GAAP盈利。
It should be emphasized that the two columns depict identical economics - i.e., the same sales, wages, taxes, etc. And both "companies" generate the same amount of cash for owners. Only the accounting is different.
需要强调的是，两列数据反映的经济实质完全相同——即相同的销售额、工资支出、税费等。两家“公司”为所有者创造的现金量也完全一致，唯一的差异仅在于会计处理方式。
So, fellow philosophers, which column presents truth? Upon which set of numbers should managers and investors focus?
那么，各位“思考者”，哪一列数据反映了真相？管理者与投资者应关注哪一组数据？
Before we tackle those questions, let's look at what produces the disparity between O and N. We will simplify our discussion in some respects, but the simplification should not produce any inaccuracies in analysis or conclusions.
在解答这些问题之前，我们先看看导致O列与N列数据差异的原因。我们会在某些方面简化讨论，但这种简化不会导致分析或结论出现偏差。
The contrast between O and N comes about because we paid an amount for Scott Fetzer that was different from its stated net worth. Under GAAP, such differences - such premiums or discounts - must be accounted for by "purchase-price adjustments." In Scott Fetzer's case, we paid $315 million for net assets that were carried on its books at $172.4 million. So we paid a premium of $142.6 million.
O列与N列的差异，源于我们收购斯科特·费策尔时支付的金额，与其账面净资产存在差异。根据GAAP，此类差异（溢价或折价）必须通过“收购价格调整”进行会计处理。就斯科特·费策尔而言，我们以3.15亿美元收购了其账面净值为1.724亿美元的净资产，因此支付了1.426亿美元的溢价。
The first step in accounting for any premium paid is to adjust the carrying value of current assets to current values. In practice, this requirement usually does not affect receivables, which are routinely carried at current value, but often affects inventories. Because of a $22.9 million LIFO reserve and other accounting intricacies, Scott Fetzer's inventory account was carried at a $37.3 million discount from current value. So, making our first accounting move, we used $37.3 million of our $142.6 million premium to increase the carrying value of the inventory.
处理收购溢价的第一步，是将流动资产的账面价值调整至当前公允价值。在实际操作中，这一要求通常不影响应收账款（应收账款通常按现值列示），但往往会影响存货。由于存在2290万美元的后进先出法（LIFO）准备金及其他会计细节，斯科特·费策尔的存货账面价值较其公允价值低3730万美元。因此，我们的第一步会计处理是：从1.426亿美元的溢价中，拿出3730万美元用于提高存货的账面价值。
Assuming any premium is left after current assets are adjusted, the next step is to adjust fixed assets to current value. In our case, this adjustment also required a few accounting acrobatics relating to deferred taxes. Since this has been billed as a simplified discussion, I will skip the details and give you the bottom line: $68.0 million was added to fixed assets and $13.0 million was eliminated from deferred tax liabilities. After making this $81.0 million adjustment, we were left with $24.3 million of premium to allocate.
在流动资产调整后若仍有剩余溢价，下一步是将固定资产账面价值调整至当前公允价值。就我们的情况而言，这一调整还涉及与递延所得税相关的复杂会计处理。由于我们承诺简化讨论，在此不展开细节，仅给出最终结果：固定资产增加6800万美元，递延所得税负债减少1300万美元。经过这8100万美元的调整后，剩余待分配的溢价为2430万美元。
Had our situation called for them two steps would next have been required: the adjustment of intangible assets other than Goodwill to current fair values, and the restatement of liabilities to current fair values, a requirement that typically affects only long-term debt and unfunded pension liabilities. In Scott Fetzer's case, however, neither of these steps was necessary.
若情况需要，接下来还需完成两个步骤：将商誉以外的无形资产调整至当前公允价值，以及将负债重述至当前公允价值（这一要求通常仅影响长期债务与未计提的养老金负债）。但就斯科特·费策尔而言，这两个步骤均无需执行。
The final accounting adjustment we needed to make, after recording fair market values for all assets and liabilities, was the assignment of the residual premium to Goodwill (technically known as "excess of cost over the fair value of net assets acquired"). This residual amounted to $24.3 million. Thus, the balance sheet of Scott Fetzer immediately before the acquisition, which is summarized below in column O, was transformed by the purchase into the balance sheet shown in column N. In real terms, both balance sheets depict the same assets and liabilities - but, as you can see, certain figures differ significantly.
在将所有资产与负债按公允价值记录后，我们所需进行的最后一项会计调整，是将剩余溢价计入商誉（技术上称为“收购成本超过所获净资产公允价值的部分”）。这部分剩余溢价为2430万美元。因此，斯科特·费策尔在收购前的资产负债表（如下表O列所示），经收购后转变为N列所示的资产负债表。从实质来看，两张资产负债表反映的是相同的资产与负债——但如你所见，部分数据存在显著差异。
| 项目 | 公司O（Company O）（单位：千美元，省略后三位） | 公司N（Company N）（单位：千美元，省略后三位） |
|---|---|---|
| 资产（Assets） | ||
| 现金及现金等价物（Cash and Cash Equivalents） | $3,593 | $3,593 |
| 应收账款净额（Receivables, net） | $90,919 | $90,919 |
| 存货（Inventories） | $77,489 | $114,764 |
| 其他资产（Other） | $5,954 | $5,954 |
| 流动资产合计（Total Current Assets） | $177,955 | $215,230 |
| 厂房设备净额（Property, Plant, and Equipment, net） | $80,967 | $148,960 |
| 对未合并子公司及合资企业的投资与预付款（Investments in and Advances to Unconsolidated Subsidiaries and Joint Ventures） | $93,589 | $93,589 |
| 其他资产（含商誉）（Other Assets, including Goodwill） | $9,836 | $34,210 |
| 资产总计 | $362,347 | $491,989 |
| 负债（Liabilities） | ||
| 应付票据及长期债务当期部分（Notes Payable and Current Portion of Long-term Debt） | $4,650 | $4,650 |
| 应付账款（Accounts Payable） | $39,003 | $39,003 |
| 应计负债（Accrued Liabilities） | $84,939 | $84,939 |
| 流动负债合计（Total Current Liabilities） | $128,592 | $128,592 |
| 长期债务及资本化租赁（Long-term Debt and Capitalized Leases） | $34,669 | $34,669 |
| 递延所得税（Deferred Income Taxes） | $17,052 | $4,075 |
| 其他递延贷项（Other Deferred Credits） | $9,657 | $9,657 |
| 负债总计（Total Liabilities） | $189,970 | $176,993 |
| 股东权益（Shareholders' Equity） | $172,377 | $314,996 |
| 负债及股东权益总计 | $362,347 | $491,989 |
The higher balance sheet figures shown in column N produce the lower income figures shown in column N of the earnings statement presented earlier. This is the result of the asset write-ups and of the fact that some of the written-up assets must be depreciated or amortized. The higher the asset figure, the higher the annual depreciation or amortization charge to earnings must be. The charges that flowed to the earnings statement because of the balance sheet write-ups were numbered in the statement of earnings shown earlier:
N列资产负债表中的较高数据，导致了前文利润表N列中的较低盈利数据。这是资产增值以及“部分增值资产需计提折旧或摊销”的结果——资产账面价值越高，计入利润表的年度折旧或摊销费用就越高。因资产负债表增值而计入利润表的费用，已在前文利润表中用编号标注，具体如下：
- 497.9万美元的非现金存货成本：主要源于斯科特·费策尔1986年减少存货的操作；此类费用在未来年度可能金额较小或为零。
- 505.4万美元的固定资产增值额外折旧：未来12年每年可能都会计提近似金额的此类费用。
- 59.5万美元的商誉摊销：未来39年每年都会计提此类费用，且金额会略高（因我们在1月6日完成收购，1986年的摊销仅覆盖全年的98%）。
- 99.8万美元的递延所得税调整：此类调整的具体逻辑难以简要解释（甚至详细解释也颇具难度）；未来12年每年可能都会计提近似金额的此类费用。
It is important to understand that none of these newly-created accounting costs, totaling $11.6 million, are deductible for income tax purposes. The "new" Scott Fetzer pays exactly the same tax as the "old" Scott Fetzer would have, even though the GAAP earnings of the two entities differ greatly. And, in respect to operating earnings, that would be true in the future also. However, in the unlikely event that Scott Fetzer sells one of its businesses, the tax consequences to the "old" and "new" company might differ widely.
需重点理解的是：这些新增的合计1160万美元会计费用，均不可在计算所得税时抵扣。尽管“新”斯科特·费策尔与“旧”斯科特·费策尔的GAAP盈利差异巨大，但两者缴纳的所得税金额完全相同。未来在营业利润层面，这一情况也将持续。不过，若斯科特·费策尔出售旗下某项业务（可能性较低），“旧”公司与“新”公司面临的税务影响可能会存在显著差异。
By the end of 1986 the difference between the net worth of the "old" and "new" Scott Fetzer had been reduced from $142.6 million to $131.0 million by means of the extra $11.6 million that was charged to earnings of the new entity. As the years go by, similar charges to earnings will cause most of the premium to disappear, and the two balance sheets will converge. However, the higher land values and most of the higher inventory values that were established on the new balance sheet will remain unless land is disposed of or inventory levels are further reduced.
截至1986年末，通过向“新”公司利润表计提1160万美元的额外费用，“旧”斯科特·费策尔与“新”斯科特·费策尔的净资产差异已从1.426亿美元降至1.31亿美元。随着时间推移，类似的利润表费用计提将使大部分溢价逐渐消失，两张资产负债表的数据也将趋于一致。但“新”资产负债表中确认的较高土地价值及大部分较高存货价值，除非土地被处置或存货水平进一步降低，否则将持续存在。
What does all this mean for owners? Did the shareholders of Berkshire buy a business that earned $40.2 million in 1986 or did they buy one earning $28.6 million? Were those $11.6 million of new charges a real economic cost to us? Should investors pay more for the stock of Company O than of Company N? And, if a business is worth some given multiple of earnings, was Scott Fetzer worth considerably more the day before we bought it than it was worth the following day?
这一切对所有者意味着什么？伯克希尔的股东收购的，是1986年盈利4023万美元的企业，还是盈利2860万美元的企业？这1160万美元的新增费用，对我们而言是真实的经济成本吗？投资者应给予公司O股票更高的估值，而非公司N吗？若企业价值按盈利的一定倍数计算，那么斯科特·费策尔在我们收购前一天的价值，是否远高于收购后一天的价值？
If we think through these questions, we can gain some insights about what may be called "owner earnings." These represent (a) reported earnings plus (b) depreciation, depletion, amortization, and certain other non-cash charges such as Company N's items (1) and (4) less ( c) the average annual amount of capitalized expenditures for plant and equipment, etc. that the business requires to fully maintain its long-term competitive position and its unit volume. (If the business requires additional working capital to maintain its competitive position and unit volume, the increment also should be included in ( c) . However, businesses following the LIFO inventory method usually do not require additional working capital if unit volume does not change.)
若深入思考这些问题，我们就能理解所谓的“所有者盈利”（owner earnings）。所有者盈利的计算公式为：（a）报告盈利 +（b）折旧、折耗、摊销及其他非现金费用（如公司N的项目（1）与（4）） -（c）企业为维持长期竞争地位及单位产量，所需的厂房设备等资本化支出的年均金额。（若企业需额外营运资金以维持竞争地位及单位产量，该增量也应计入（c）。但采用后进先出法（LIFO）的企业，若单位产量不变，通常无需额外营运资金。）
Our owner-earnings equation does not yield the deceptively precise figures provided by GAAP, since (c) must be a guess - and one sometimes very difficult to make. Despite this problem, we consider the owner earnings figure, not the GAAP figure, to be the relevant item for valuation purposes - both for investors in buying stocks and for managers in buying entire businesses. We agree with Keynes's observation: "I would rather be vaguely right than precisely wrong."
我们的所有者盈利公式无法得出GAAP所提供的、具有误导性的精确数据，因为（c）必须通过估算得出——有时这种估算难度极大。尽管存在这一问题，但无论是投资者购买股票，还是管理者收购整个企业，我们都认为所有者盈利（而非GAAP盈利）才是估值的关键指标。我们认同凯恩斯的观点：“宁要模糊的正确，不要精确的错误。”
The approach we have outlined produces "owner earnings" for Company O and Company N that are identical, which means valuations are also identical, just as common sense would tell you should be the case. This result is reached because the sum of (a) and (b) is the same in both columns O and N, and because (c) is necessarily the same in both cases.
我们提出的方法计算得出的公司O与公司N的“所有者盈利”完全相同，这意味着两者的估值也完全一致——这与常识判断相符。之所以得出这一结果，是因为O列与N列中（a）与（b）的总和相同，且（c）在两种情况下必然相等。
And what do Charlie and I, as owners and managers, believe is the correct figure for the owner earnings of Scott Fetzer? Under current circumstances, we believe (c) is very close to the "old" company's (b) number of $8.3 million and much below the "new" company's (b) number of $19.9 million. Therefore, we believe that owner earnings are far better depicted by the reported earnings in the O column than by those in the N column. In other words, we feel owner earnings of Scott Fetzer are considerably larger than the GAAP figures that we report.
作为所有者与管理者，查理和我认为斯科特·费策尔的合理所有者盈利金额是多少？在当前情况下，我们认为（c）非常接近“旧”公司的（b）金额（830万美元），远低于“新”公司的（b）金额（1990万美元）。因此，我们认为O列的报告盈利比N列更能反映真实的所有者盈利。换句话说，我们认为斯科特·费策尔的所有者盈利，远高于我们报告的GAAP盈利。
That is obviously a happy state of affairs. But calculations of this sort usually do not provide such pleasant news. Most managers probably will acknowledge that they need to spend something more than (b) on their businesses over the longer term just to hold their ground in terms of both unit volume and competitive position. When this imperative exists - that is, when (c) exceeds (b) - GAAP earnings overstate owner earnings. Frequently this overstatement is substantial. The oil industry has in recent years provided a conspicuous example of this phenomenon. Had most major oil companies spent only (b) each year, they would have guaranteed their shrinkage in real terms.
显然，这是一种理想情况。但此类计算通常不会得出如此乐观的结果。大多数管理者可能会承认，长期来看，为维持单位产量与竞争地位，他们在业务上的支出需超过（b）。当这种必要性存在时——即（c）超过（b）——GAAP盈利会高估所有者盈利。这种高估往往幅度显著。近年来，石油行业就是这一现象的典型例子：若多数大型石油公司每年仅支出（b），其实际规模必然会萎缩。
All of this points up the absurdity of the "cash flow" numbers that are often set forth in Wall Street reports. These numbers routinely include (a) plus (b) - but do not subtract (c). Most sales brochures of investment bankers also feature deceptive presentations of this kind. These imply that the business being offered is the commercial counterpart of the Pyramids - forever state-of-the-art, never needing to be replaced, improved or refurbished. Indeed, if all U.S. corporations were to be offered simultaneously for sale through our leading investment bankers - and if the sales brochures describing them were to be believed - governmental projections of national plant and equipment spending would have to be slashed by 90%.
这一切都凸显了华尔街报告中常见的“现金流”数据的荒谬性。这些数据通常仅计算（a）+（b），却未减去（c）。投资银行家的大多数销售手册也采用此类误导性表述，暗示待售企业如同商业领域的金字塔——永远处于顶尖水平，无需更换、改进或翻新。事实上，若所有美国企业通过顶尖投资银行同时挂牌出售，且其销售手册内容可信，那么政府对全国厂房设备支出的预测将不得不下调90%。
"Cash Flow", true, may serve as a shorthand of some utility in descriptions of certain real estate businesses or other enterprises that make huge initial outlays and only tiny outlays thereafter. A company whose only holding is a bridge or an extremely long-lived gas field would be an example. But "cash flow" is meaningless in such businesses as manufacturing, retailing, extractive companies, and utilities because, for them, (c) is always significant. To be sure, businesses of this kind may in a given year be able to defer capital spending. But over a five- or ten-year period, they must make the investment - or the business decays.
诚然，“现金流”在描述某些房地产企业或“初始投入巨大、后续投入极少”的企业时，可作为一种有一定用途的简化表述。例如，仅持有一座桥梁或一个寿命极长的气田的公司。但在制造业、零售业、采掘业及公用事业等行业，“现金流”毫无意义——因为对这些行业而言，（c）始终具有重要影响。当然，这类企业可能在某一年推迟资本支出，但在5至10年的周期内，它们必须进行投资，否则业务将走向衰退。
Why, then, are "cash flow" numbers so popular today? In answer, we confess our cynicism: we believe these numbers are frequently used by marketers of businesses and securities in attempts to justify the unjustifiable (and thereby to sell what should be the unsalable). When (a) - that is, GAAP earnings - looks by itself inadequate to service debt of a junk bond or justify a foolish stock price, how convenient it becomes for salesmen to focus on (a) + (b). But you shouldn't add (b) without subtracting (c): though dentists correctly claim that if you ignore your teeth they'll go away, the same is not true for (c). The company or investor believing that the debt-servicing ability or the equity valuation of an enterprise can be measured by totaling (a) and (b) while ignoring (c) is headed for certain trouble.
那么，为何“现金流”数据如今如此流行？坦诚而言，我们的看法带有一定质疑：我们认为，企业与证券的营销者频繁使用这一数据，是为了给不合理的行为找借口（进而推销本应无人问津的资产）。当（a）（即GAAP盈利）本身不足以支撑垃圾债券的偿债需求，或无法证明过高股价的合理性时，营销者转而聚焦（a）+（b）就显得格外方便。但你不应只加（b）而不减（c）：牙医说得对，忽视牙齿会导致牙齿脱落，但忽视（c）不会让其消失。若企业或投资者认为，可通过（a）+（b）（忽略（c））来衡量企业的偿债能力或股权价值，那么他们必将面临麻烦。
To sum up: in the case of both Scott Fetzer and our other businesses, we feel that (b) on an historical-cost basis - i.e., with both amortization of intangibles and other purchase-price adjustments excluded - is quite close in amount to (c). (The two items are not identical, of course. For example, at See's we annually make capitalized expenditures that exceed depreciation by $500,000 to $1 million, simply to hold our ground competitively.) Our conviction about this point is the reason we show our amortization and other purchase-price adjustment items separately in the table on page 8 and is also our reason for viewing the earnings of the individual businesses as reported there as much more closely approximating owner earnings than the GAAP figures.
总结而言：无论是斯科特·费策尔，还是我们旗下其他业务，我们认为按历史成本计算的（b）——即剔除无形资产摊销及其他收购价格调整后的（b）——与（c）的金额非常接近。（当然，两者并非完全一致。例如，喜诗糖果每年的资本化支出比折旧高出50万至100万美元，仅为维持竞争地位。）正是基于这一判断，我们在第8页的表格中单独列示了摊销及其他收购价格调整项目，也正是因此，我们认为表格中列示的各业务盈利，比GAAP盈利更接近真实的所有者盈利。
Questioning GAAP figures may seem impious to some. After all, what are we paying the accountants for if it is not to deliver us the "truth" about our business. But the accountants' job is to record, not to evaluate. The evaluation job falls to investors and managers.
对某些人而言，质疑GAAP数据可能显得“不尊重”。毕竟，若会计师不能为我们提供企业的“真相”，我们为何要付费聘请他们？但会计师的职责是记录，而非评估——评估的工作应由投资者与管理者承担。
Accounting numbers, of course, are the language of business and as such are of enormous help to anyone evaluating the worth of a business and tracking its progress. Charlie and I would be lost without these numbers: they invariably are the starting point for us in evaluating our own businesses and those of others. Managers and owners need to remember, however, that accounting is but an aid to business thinking, never a substitute for it.
当然，会计数据是商业的语言，对评估企业价值、跟踪业务进展具有极大帮助。没有这些数据，查理和我将无从下手——它们始终是我们评估自身及他人业务的起点。但管理者与所有者需记住，会计只是商业思考的辅助工具，永远不能替代商业思考本身。