2002巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司 致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东)
Our gain in net worth during 2002 was $6.1 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 10.0%. Over the last 38 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $41,727, a rate of 22.2% compounded annually.
2002年，我们的净资产增加了61亿美元，使A股和B股每股账面价值均增长了10.0%。在过去38年里（即现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值从19美元增长到了41,727美元，年复合增长率达22.2%。
In all respects 2002 was a banner year. I’ll provide details later, but here’s a summary:
各个方面来看，2002年都是丰收的一年。我稍后会提供详细内容，但以下是概要：
• Our various non-insurance operations performed exceptionally well, despite a sluggish economy. A decade ago Berkshire’s annual pre-tax earnings from our non-insurance businesses was $272 million. Now, from our ever-expanding collection of manufacturing, retailing, service and finance businesses, we earn that sum monthly.
• 尽管经济低迷，我们各类非保险业务表现依然出色。十年前，伯克希尔来自非保险业务的年税前利润为2.72亿美元；如今，我们不断扩展的制造、零售、服务和金融企业每月就能赚取这一金额。
• Our insurance group increased its float to $41.2 billion, a hefty gain of $5.7 billion. Better yet, the use of these funds in 2002 cost us only 1%. Getting back to low-cost float feels good, particularly after our poor results during the three previous years. Berkshire’s reinsurance division and GEICO shot the lights out in 2002, and underwriting discipline was restored at General Re.
• 我们的保险集团浮存金增加到了412亿美元，净增57亿美元。更令人欣喜的是，2002年使用这些资金的成本仅为1%。在经历了过去三年糟糕的表现之后，重回低成本浮存金令人振奋。2002年，伯克希尔再保险部门和政府雇员保险公司（GEICO）表现出色，通用再保险公司（General Re）也恢复了承保纪律。
• Berkshire acquired some important new businesses – with economic characteristics ranging from good to great, run by managers ranging from great to great. Those attributes are two legs of our “entrance” strategy, the third being a sensible purchase price. Unlike LBO operators and private equity firms, we have no “exit” strategy – we buy to keep. That’s one reason why Berkshire is usually the first – and sometimes the only – choice for sellers and their managers.
• 伯克希尔收购了一些重要的新企业——它们的经济特征从良好到极佳不等，管理者的能力也都非常卓越。这些是我们“进入策略”的两个支柱，第三个是合理的购买价格。与杠杆收购者和私募股权公司不同，我们没有“退出策略”——我们买入是为了长期持有。这也是为什么伯克希尔通常是卖家及其管理者的首选，有时甚至是唯一的选择。
• Our marketable securities outperformed most indices. For Lou Simpson, who manages equities at GEICO, this was old stuff. But, for me, it was a welcome change from the last few years, during which my investment record was dismal.
• 我们的可交易证券表现优于大多数指数。对负责GEICO股票投资的Lou Simpson来说，这已是寻常之事。但对我来说，这是对我过去几年糟糕投资记录的一个可喜转变。
The confluence of these favorable factors in 2002 caused our book-value gain to outstrip the performance of the S&P 500 by 32.1 percentage points. This result is aberrational: Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s vice chairman and my partner, and I hope to achieve – at most – an average annual advantage of a few points. In the future, there will be years in which the S&P soundly trounces us. That will in fact almost certainly happen during a strong bull market, because the portion of our assets committed to common stocks has significantly declined. This change, of course, helps our relative performance in down markets such as we had in 2002.
2002年这些有利因素的叠加，使得我们的账面价值增长超过了标普500指数32.1个百分点。这种结果属于异常情况：查理·芒格（Charlie Munger），伯克希尔副主席兼我的合伙人，和我希望最多每年平均能领先几个百分点即可。未来肯定会有年份标普500大幅击败我们。事实上，在强劲牛市中几乎肯定会发生这种情况，因为我们的资产中配置于普通股的比例已显著下降。当然，这种变化有助于我们在像2002年这样的熊市中取得相对较好的表现。
I have another caveat to mention about last year’s results. If you’ve been a reader of financial reports in recent years, you’ve seen a flood of “pro-forma” earnings statements – tabulations in which managers invariably show “earnings” far in excess of those allowed by their auditors. In these presentations, the CEO tells his owners “don’t count this, don’t count that – just count what makes earnings fat.” Often, a forget-all-this-bad-stuff message is delivered year after year without management so much as blushing.
我还想提醒大家注意去年业绩的另一个问题。如果你近年来阅读过财务报告，你一定见过大量“模拟”收益报表——经理们总是在其中展示远高于审计师允许的“盈利”。在这些报告中，CEO告诉股东：“这个不算，那个也不算——只看能让盈利看起来丰厚的部分。”通常，管理层年复一年地传达“忘记所有坏消息”的信息，甚至都不会脸红一下。
∗All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.
*本报告中使用的所有数据均适用于伯克希尔A股，即1996年前公司唯一的流通股。B股的经济权益相当于A股的1/30。
We’ve yet to see a pro-forma presentation disclosing that audited earnings were somewhat high. So let’s make a little history: Last year, on a pro-forma basis, Berkshire had lower earnings than those we actually reported.
我们至今尚未看到有任何模拟报表显示经审计的盈利偏高。那么我们不妨来创造一点历史吧：以模拟基础计算，去年伯克希尔的盈利低于我们实际报告的数字。
That is true because two favorable factors aided our reported figures. First, in 2002 there was no megacatastrophe, which means that Berkshire (and other insurers as well) earned more from insurance than if losses had been normal. In years when the reverse is true – because of a blockbuster hurricane, earthquake or man-made disaster – many insurers like to report that they would have earned X “except for” the unusual event. The implication is that since such megacats are infrequent, they shouldn’t be counted when “true” earnings are calculated. That is deceptive nonsense. “Except for” losses will forever be part of the insurance business, and they will forever be paid with shareholders’ money.
这是因为有两个有利因素提升了我们的报告数据。首先，2002年没有发生重大灾难，这意味着伯克希尔（及其他保险公司）的保险业务收入高于正常损失水平。当相反的情况出现时——例如因一场毁灭性的飓风、地震或人为灾害——许多保险公司喜欢声称他们“若不是”那次特殊事件本来可以赚X元。言下之意是，由于这类巨灾很少发生，“真正”的盈利计算不应计入它们。这是一种具有误导性的胡说。“除开”损失永远是保险业务的一部分，并且永远由股东的钱来支付。
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this exercise, we’ll take a page from the industry’s book. For last year, when we didn’t have any truly major disasters, a downward adjustment is appropriate if you wish to “normalize” our underwriting result.
尽管如此，为了说明问题，我们也借鉴一下业内惯用的做法。对于去年——我们未遭遇任何真正重大灾难的年份——如果你想“标准化”我们的承保结果，做出向下调整是合理的。
Secondly, the bond market in 2002 favored certain strategies we employed in our finance and financial products business. Gains from those strategies will certainly diminish within a year or two – and may well disappear.
其次，2002年的债券市场有利于我们在金融及金融产品业务中采用的某些策略。这些策略带来的收益无疑将在一两年内减少，甚至可能完全消失。
Soooo . . . “except for” a couple of favorable breaks, our pre-tax earnings last year would have been about $500 million less than we actually reported. We’re happy, nevertheless, to bank the excess. As Jack Benny once said upon receiving an award: “I don’t deserve this honor – but, then, I have arthritis, and I don’t deserve that either.”
所以……“若不是”几次好运，我们去年的税前利润将比实际报告的少约5亿美元。但我们仍然乐于接受这笔额外收益。正如杰克·本尼（Jack Benny）在获奖时曾说过的那样：“我不配得这项荣誉——不过，我有风湿痛，那也是我不该承受的。”
We continue to be blessed with an extraordinary group of managers, many of whom haven’t the slightest financial need to work. They stick around, though: In 38 years, we’ve never had a single CEO of a subsidiary elect to leave Berkshire to work elsewhere. Counting Charlie, we now have six managers over 75, and I hope that in four years that number increases by at least two (Bob Shaw and I are both 72). Our rationale: “It’s hard to teach a new dog old tricks.”
我们继续有幸拥有一群非凡的经理人，其中许多人早已不再需要靠工作谋生。但他们依然选择留下：在过去的38年里，我们从未有一位子公司CEO选择离开伯克希尔去别处工作。目前，包括查理在内，我们已有六位年龄超过75岁的经理人，我希望四年后这个数字至少再增加两人（鲍勃·肖和我都72岁了）。我们的理念是：“让新手掌握老经验很难。”
Berkshire’s operating CEOs are masters of their crafts and run their businesses as if they were their own. My job is to stay out of their way and allocate whatever excess capital their businesses generate. It’s easy work.
伯克希尔的运营CEO们都是各自领域的专家，他们经营企业就像在打理自己的生意一样。我的职责就是不去打扰他们，并把他们产生的多余资本进行合理配置。这份工作很轻松。
My managerial model is Eddie Bennett, who was a batboy. In 1919, at age 19, Eddie began his work with the Chicago White Sox, who that year went to the World Series. The next year, Eddie switched to the Brooklyn Dodgers, and they, too, won their league title. Our hero, however, smelled trouble. Changing boroughs, he joined the Yankees in 1921, and they promptly won their first pennant in history. Now Eddie settled in, shrewdly seeing what was coming. In the next seven years, the Yankees won five American League titles.
我的管理榜样是爱迪·贝内特（Eddie Bennett），他是一名球童。1919年，年仅19岁的爱迪开始为芝加哥白袜队效力，那一年他们打入了世界职业棒球大赛。次年，爱迪转投布鲁克林道奇队，他们也赢得了联盟冠军。然而我们的主角嗅到了危机的味道。于是他换了个城市，于1921年加入纽约洋基队，球队随即赢得了历史上第一个分区冠军。此后爱迪安顿下来，并明智地预见了接下来的发展。在随后的七年中，洋基队赢得了五次美国联盟冠军。
What does this have to do with management? It’s simple – to be a winner, work with winners. In 1927, for example, Eddie received $700 for the 1/8th World Series share voted him by the legendary Yankee team of Ruth and Gehrig. This sum, which Eddie earned by working only four days (because New York swept the Series) was roughly equal to the full-year pay then earned by batboys who worked with ordinary associates.
这跟管理有什么关系？很简单——要想成功，就要与成功人士共事。例如，1927年，爱迪因被传奇的鲁斯（Ruth）和盖瑞格（Gehrig）所在的洋基队授予1/8的世界大赛分红而获得了700美元。这笔钱是他仅工作四天（因为纽约横扫对手夺冠）所得，大致等于当时其他普通球队球童全年工作的工资。
Eddie understood that how he lugged bats was unimportant; what counted instead was hooking up with the cream of those on the playing field. I’ve learned from Eddie. At Berkshire, I regularly hand bats to many of the heaviest hitters in American business.
爱迪明白，自己如何搬运球棒并不重要；关键在于能否与最顶尖的球员合作。我从爱迪身上学到了很多。在伯克希尔，我经常把“球棒”交给美国商业界最有力的击球手们。
# Acquisitions (并购活动)
We added some sluggers to our lineup last year. Two acquisitions pending at yearend 2001 were completed: Albecca (which operates under the name Larson-Juhl), the U.S. leader in custom-made picture frames; and Fruit of the Loom, the producer of about 33.3% of the men’s and boy’s underwear sold in the U.S. and of other apparel as well.
去年，我们又增添了几位“强棒”加入阵容。两项在2001年底尚待完成的收购最终达成：Albecca（以Larson-Juhl品牌运营），美国定制画框市场的领军企业；以及Fruit of the Loom，生产约33.3%在美国销售的男童内衣及其他服装产品的企业。
# Both companies came with outstanding CEOs: Steve McKenzie at Albecca and John Holland at Fruit. (这两家公司都拥有杰出的CEO：Albecca的Steve McKenzie和Fruit of the Loom的John Holland)
Both companies came with outstanding CEOs: Steve McKenzie at Albecca and John Holland at Fruit. John, who had retired from Fruit in 1996, rejoined it three years ago and rescued the company from the disastrous path it had gone down after he’d left. He’s now 70, and I am trying to convince him to make his next retirement coincident with mine (presently scheduled for five years after my death – a date subject, however, to extension).
这两家公司都拥有出色的CEO：Albecca的Steve McKenzie和Fruit of the Loom的John Holland。John曾在1996年从Fruit退休，三年前又重新加入公司，并将它从他离开后误入的灾难性轨道中挽救回来。如今他已70岁，我正试图说服他在下次退休时与我同步（目前计划是在我去世后五年——不过这一日期仍可能延长）。
We initiated and completed two other acquisitions last year that were somewhat below our normal size threshold. In aggregate, however, these businesses earn more than $60 million pre-tax annually. Both operate in industries characterized by tough economics, but both also have important competitive strengths that enable them to earn decent returns on capital.
我们去年还发起并完成了另外两项收购，其规模略低于我们的常规门槛。但总体而言，这些企业每年税前利润超过6,000万美元。它们所处的行业经济环境严峻，但也都具备重要的竞争优势，使它们能够获得合理的资本回报。
The newcomers are:
新成员包括：
(a) CTB, a worldwide leader in equipment for the poultry, hog, egg production and grain industries; and
(b) Garan, a manufacturer of children’s apparel, whose largest and best-known line is Garanimals®.
(a) CTB，全球领先的家禽、生猪、蛋品生产和粮食产业设备供应商；以及
(b) Garan，儿童服装制造商，其最大且最知名的产品线是Garanimals®。
These two companies came with the managers responsible for their impressive records: Vic Mancinelli at CTB and Seymour Lichtenstein at Garan.
这两家公司也带来了为其出色业绩做出贡献的管理层：CTB的Vic Mancinelli和Garan的Seymour Lichtenstein。
The largest acquisition we initiated in 2002 was The Pampered Chef, a company with a fascinating history dating back to 1980. Doris Christopher was then a 34-year-old suburban Chicago home economics teacher with a husband, two little girls, and absolutely no business background. Wanting, however, to supplement her family’s modest income, she turned to thinking about what she knew best – food preparation. Why not, she wondered, make a business out of marketing kitchenware, focusing on the items she herself had found most useful?
2002年我们发起的最大一笔收购是The Pampered Chef（TPC），这家公司拥有一段引人入胜的历史，可追溯至1980年。当时，Doris Christopher是一位34岁的芝加哥郊区家庭经济教师，她有丈夫和两个年幼的女儿，完全没有商业背景。然而，为了补贴家庭微薄的收入，她开始思考自己最擅长的事物——烹饪准备。她心想，为什么不把厨房用具营销做成一项生意呢？尤其是那些她自己觉得最有用的产品。
To get started, Doris borrowed $3,000 against her life insurance policy – all the money ever injected into the company – and went to the Merchandise Mart on a buying expedition. There, she picked up a dozen each of this and that, and then went home to set up operations in her basement.
为了起步，Doris以自己的人寿保险为抵押借了3,000美元——这是这家公司历史上唯一一次注入资金——然后前往Merchandise Mart采购。她在那儿买了各种产品各打，之后回到家，在地下室里开始了运营。
Her plan was to conduct in-home presentations to small groups of women, gathered at the homes of their friends. While driving to her first presentation, though, Doris almost talked herself into returning home, convinced she was doomed to fail.
她的计划是在朋友家中向小型女性群体进行上门展示。但在第一次展示途中，Doris几乎劝服自己回家，因为她确信自己注定会失败。
But the women she faced that evening loved her and her products, purchased $175 of goods, and TPC was underway. Working with her husband, Jay, Doris did $50,000 of business in the first year. Today – only 22 years later – TPC does more than $700 million of business annually, working through 67,000 kitchen consultants.
但那天晚上面对她的女士们却喜欢她及其产品，购买了价值175美元的商品，TPC就此起步。在丈夫Jay的帮助下，Doris第一年的销售额达到5万美元。仅仅22年后，如今TPC年营业额超过7亿美元，依靠67,000名厨房顾问开展业务。
I’ve been to a TPC party, and it’s easy to see why the business is a success. The company’s products, in large part proprietary, are well-styled and highly useful, and the consultants are knowledgeable and enthusiastic. Everyone has a good time. Hurry to pamperedchef.com on the Internet to find where to attend a party near you.
我去过一次TPC的聚会，很容易理解为何这项业务如此成功。公司大部分产品都是自有品牌，设计时尚、实用性强，顾问们也专业而热情。每个人都玩得很开心。赶紧访问pamperedchef.com网站，找到你附近可以参加聚会的地方吧！
Two years ago, Doris brought in Sheila O’Connell Cooper, now CEO, to share the management load, and in August they met with me in Omaha. It took me about ten seconds to decide that these were two managers with whom I wished to partner, and we promptly made a deal. Berkshire shareholders couldn’t be luckier than to be associated with Doris and Sheila.
两年前，Doris引入Sheila O’Connell Cooper（现任CEO）分担管理工作，同年八月她们在奥马哈与我会面。大约十秒钟内，我就决定要与这两位管理者合作，于是我们迅速达成协议。伯克希尔股东们能与Doris和Sheila共事，实在非常幸运。
Berkshire also made some important acquisitions last year through MidAmerican Energy Holdings (MEHC), a company in which our equity interest is 80.2%. Because the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) limits us to 9.9% voting control, however, we are unable to fully consolidate MEHC’s financial statements.
去年，伯克希尔通过MidAmerican Energy Holdings（MEHC）完成了一些重要收购，我们在这家公司持有80.2%的股权。但由于《公用事业控股公司法》（PUHCA）限制我们只能拥有9.9%的投票权，因此我们无法完全合并MEHC的财务报表。
Despite the voting-control limitation – and the somewhat strange capital structure at MEHC it has engendered – the company is a key part of Berkshire. Already it has $18 billion of assets and delivers our largest stream of non-insurance earnings. It could well grow to be huge.
尽管存在投票权控制的限制——以及由此在MEHC形成的略显奇特的资本结构——但这家公司仍是伯克希尔的重要组成部分。目前它已拥有180亿美元资产，为我们提供了最大的非保险类收益来源。未来它很可能变得更大。
Last year MEHC acquired two important gas pipelines. The first, Kern River, extends from Southwest Wyoming to Southern California. This line moves about 900 million cubic feet of gas a day and is undergoing a $1.2 billion expansion that will double throughput by this fall. At that point, the line will carry enough gas to generate electricity for ten million homes.
去年，MEHC收购了两条重要的天然气管道。第一条是Kern River管道，从怀俄明州西南部延伸至南加州。该管道每天输送约9亿立方英尺天然气，目前正在实施耗资12亿美元的扩建工程，预计今年秋季完工后输气量将翻倍。届时，这条管道输送的天然气足以供应一千万户家庭用电。
The second acquisition, Northern Natural Gas, is a 16,600 mile line extending from the Southwest to a wide range of Midwestern locations. This purchase completes a corporate odyssey of particular interest to Omahans.
第二条是Northern Natural Gas管道，全长16,600英里，从西南地区延伸至多个中西部地区。此次收购完成了一段对奥马哈人来说特别有意义的企业历程。
From its beginnings in the 1930s, Northern Natural was one of Omaha’s premier businesses, run by CEOs who regularly distinguished themselves as community leaders. Then, in July, 1985, the company – which in 1980 had been renamed InterNorth – merged with Houston Natural Gas, a business less than half its size. The companies announced that the enlarged operation would be headquartered in Omaha, with InterNorth’s CEO continuing in that job.
自1930年代起，Northern Natural就是奥马哈最顶尖的企业之一，历任CEO都在社区中担任领导角色。1985年7月，该公司——于1980年更名为InterNorth——与规模不足其一半的Houston Natural Gas合并。两家公司宣布，合并后的总部仍将设在奥马哈，InterNorth的CEO将继续担任该职。
Within a year, those promises were broken. By then, the former CEO of Houston Natural had taken over the top job at InterNorth, the company had been renamed, and the headquarters had been moved to Houston. These switches were orchestrated by the new CEO – Ken Lay – and the name he chose was Enron.
不到一年，这些承诺便被打破。原Houston Natural的CEO接管了InterNorth，公司随后更名，总部也迁往休斯顿。这一系列变动是由新任CEO肯·莱（Ken Lay）主导的，他选择的新名字是Enron（安然）。
Fast forward 15 years to late 2001. Enron ran into the troubles we’ve heard so much about and borrowed money from Dynegy, putting up the Northern Natural pipeline operation as collateral. The two companies quickly had a falling out, and the pipeline’s ownership moved to Dynegy. That company, in turn, soon encountered severe financial problems of its own.
快进15年，来到2001年底。Enron遭遇了我们熟知的重大危机，向Dynegy借款并将Northern Natural管道作为抵押。两家公司很快发生矛盾，管道所有权转归Dynegy。但Dynegy自身也很快陷入严重的财务困境。
MEHC received a call on Friday, July 26, from Dynegy, which was looking for a quick and certain cash sale of the pipeline. Dynegy phoned the right party: On July 29, we signed a contract, and shortly thereafter Northern Natural returned home.
2002年7月26日星期五，Dynegy致电MEHC，希望快速、确定地出售该管道。他们找对了买家：7月29日，我们签署了合同，不久之后，Northern Natural终于重返故乡。
When 2001 began, Charlie and I had no idea that Berkshire would be moving into the pipeline business. But upon completion of the Kern River expansion, MEHC will transport about 8% of all gas used in the U.S. We continue to look for large energy-related assets, though in the electric utility field PUHCA constrains what we can do.
2001年初，查理和我从未想到伯克希尔会进入天然气管道行业。但随着Kern River扩建工程完成，MEHC将承担美国约8%的天然气运输任务。我们仍在继续寻找大型能源相关资产，尽管在电力公用事业领域，PUHCA对我们有所限制。
A few years ago, and somewhat by accident, MEHC found itself in the residential real estate brokerage business. It is no accident, however, that we have dramatically expanded the operation. Moreover, we are likely to keep on expanding in the future.
几年前，MEHC因某种偶然原因进入了住宅房地产经纪业务。但我们大幅扩展这项业务绝非偶然。此外，我们未来很可能还会继续扩张。
We call this business HomeServices of America. In the various communities it serves, though, it operates under the names of the businesses it has acquired, such as CBS in Omaha, Edina Realty in Minneapolis and Iowa Realty in Des Moines. In most metropolitan areas in which we operate, we are the clear market leader.
我们将这项业务命名为HomeServices of America（美国房屋服务公司）。但在它服务的各个社区，它使用的是我们收购企业的原有名称，例如奥马哈的CBS、明尼阿波利斯的Edina Realty，以及得梅因的Iowa Realty。在大多数我们运营的大都市地区，我们都是明确的市场领导者。
HomeServices is now the second largest residential brokerage business in the country. On one side or the other (or both), we participated in $37 billion of transactions last year, up 100% from 2001.
HomeServices目前是全美第二大住宅地产经纪公司。我们在买卖双方（或其中一方）参与了总计370亿美元的交易，较2001年增长100%。
Most of our growth came from three acquisitions we made during 2002, the largest of which was Prudential California Realty. Last year, this company, the leading realtor in a territory consisting of Los Angeles, Orange and San Diego Counties, participated in $16 billion of closings.
我们的大部分增长来自于2002年完成的三笔收购，其中最大的是Prudential California Realty（普瑞申地产加州公司）。去年，这家公司在洛杉矶、橙县和圣地亚哥县组成的区域内是领先房地产商，参与了160亿美元的成交额。
In a very short period, Ron Peltier, the company’s CEO, has increased HomeServices’ revenues – and profits – dramatically. Though this business will always be cyclical, it’s one we like and in which we continue to have an appetite for sensible acquisitions.
在很短时间内，公司CEO Ron Peltier显著提升了HomeServices的营收和利润。虽然这项业务始终具有周期性，但我们喜欢它，并将继续积极寻求合理价格的收购机会。
Dave Sokol, MEHC’s CEO, and Greg Abel, his key associate, are huge assets for Berkshire. They are dealmakers, and they are managers. Berkshire stands ready to inject massive amounts of money into MEHC – and it will be fun to watch how far Dave and Greg can take the business.
MEHC的CEO Dave Sokol和他的核心搭档Greg Abel是伯克希尔的巨大资产。他们是交易高手，也是优秀的管理者。伯克希尔随时准备向MEHC投入大量资金——看着Dave和Greg能把这家公司带多远，将是一件令人期待的事情。
# The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance (财产/意外险的经济学)
Our core business — though we have others of great importance — is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.
我们的核心业务——尽管我们还有其他同样重要的业务——是保险。因此，要理解伯克希尔，就必须了解如何评估一家保险公司。关键因素有三个：（1）该企业产生的浮存金规模；（2）其成本；以及（3）最重要的是，这两项因素的长期前景。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an “underwriting loss,” which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money. Moreover, the downward trend of interest rates in recent years has transformed underwriting losses that formerly were tolerable into burdens that move insurance businesses deeply into the lemon category.
首先，浮存金是我们持有但不属于我们的资金。在保险运营中，浮存金产生于保费先于理赔收入这一特点，有时这个时间差可达数年。在此期间，保险公司会将这笔钱进行投资。这种令人愉快的活动通常伴随着一个负面因素：所收取的保费通常不足以覆盖最终必须支付的损失和费用，导致出现“承保亏损”，即浮存金的成本。如果浮存金的长期成本低于公司通过其他方式融资所需的成本，那么这家保险企业就有价值。但如果浮存金的成本高于市场资金利率，那这家公司就毫无价值可言。此外，近年来利率的持续下降，使得过去尚可接受的承保亏损变成了沉重负担，让许多保险公司陷入困境。
Historically, Berkshire has obtained its float at a very low cost. Indeed, our cost has been less than zero in many years; that is, we’ve actually been paid for holding other people’s money. In 2001, however, our cost was terrible, coming in at 12.8%, about half of which was attributable to World Trade Center losses. Back in 1983-84, we had years that were even worse. There’s nothing automatic about cheap float.
历史上，伯克希尔获得浮存金的成本一直非常低。事实上，在许多年份里，我们的成本甚至是负数，也就是说，我们实际上因为持有他人的资金而获得了报酬。然而在2001年，我们的成本非常糟糕，达到了12.8%，其中约有一半源自世贸中心事件带来的损失。回到1983至1984年，我们也曾经历过更糟糕的年份。低成本浮存金并非自动获得。
The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the various segments of Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered the business 36 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company (whose traditional lines are included in the segment “Other Primary”). For the table we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)
下表列出了自36年前我们通过收购National Indemnity Company进入保险行业以来，伯克希尔各保险板块所产生的浮存金情况（按间隔年份）。为计算浮存金（相对于我们的保费规模而言，浮存金数额巨大），我们将净损失准备金、理赔调整准备金、再保险承担下的留存资金和未赚取保费准备金相加，然后减去与保险相关的应收款、预付获取成本、预缴税款和适用于再保险承担的递延支出。（明白了吗？）
# Yearend Float (in $ millions)（年末浮存金，单位：百万美元）
| Year | GEICO | General Re | Other Reinsurance | Other Primary | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1967 | 20 | — | — | — | 20 |
| 1977 | 131 | — | — | — | 171 |
| 1987 | 807 | 4,014 | — | — | 4,821 |
| 1997 | 2,917 | 14,909 | 6,285 | 4,305 | 28,416 |
| 1998 | 3,125 | 15,166 | 7,805 | 4,594 | 30,690 |
| 1999 | 3,444 | 15,525 | 11,262 | 4,603 | 34,834 |
| 2000 | 3,943 | 19,310 | 13,396 | 5,981 | 42,630 |
| 2001 | 4,251 | 22,207 | 943 | 6,853 | 34,254 |
| 2002 | 4,678 | 25,298 | 685 | 7,386 | 41,224 |
Last year our cost of float was 1%. As I mentioned earlier, you should temper your enthusiasm about this favorable result given that no megacatastrophe occurred in 2002. We’re certain to get one of these disasters periodically, and when we do our float-cost will spike.
去年我们的浮存金成本为1%。正如我之前提到的，由于2002年没有发生重大灾难，你对这一有利结果的热情应有所克制。这类灾难一定会周期性地发生，一旦发生，我们的浮存金成本将大幅上升。
Our 2002 results were hurt by 1) a painful charge at General Re for losses that should have been recorded as costs in earlier years, and 2) a “desirable” charge we incur annually for retroactive insurance (see the next section for more about these items). These costs totaled $1.75 billion, or about 4.6% of float. Fortunately, our overall underwriting experience on 2002 business was excellent, which allowed us, even after the charges noted, to approach a no-cost result.
我们的2002年业绩受到了两项因素的拖累：1）General Re因本应在前几年就计入成本的损失而计提了一笔痛苦的费用；2）我们每年都会为追溯性保险计提一笔“合理”的费用（详见下一节）。这些成本总计达17.5亿美元，约占浮存金的4.6%。幸运的是，我们在2002年度新业务上的承保表现极为出色，即便扣除上述费用后，我们也接近实现了零成本的结果。
Absent a megacatastrophe, I expect our cost of float in 2003 to again be very low – perhaps even less than zero. In the rundown of our insurance operations that follows, you will see why I’m optimistic that, over time, our underwriting results will both surpass those achieved by the industry and deliver us investable funds at minimal cost.
如果没有重大灾难发生，我预计2003年的浮存金成本仍将非常低——甚至可能为负数。接下来在对我们的保险业务进行详细说明时，你会明白为什么我对未来我们的承保成果既能超越行业水平，又能以最低成本为我们带来可投资资金充满信心。
# Insurance Operations (保险运营)
If our insurance operations are to generate low-cost float over time, they must: (a) underwrite with unwavering discipline; (b) reserve conservatively; and (c) avoid an aggregation of exposures that would allow a supposedly “impossible” incident to threaten their solvency. All of our major insurance businesses, with one exception, have regularly met those tests.
如果我们的保险业务要在长期内持续产生低成本浮存金，它们必须做到以下三点：(a) 坚定不移地进行承保纪律；(b) 谨慎计提准备金；(c) 避免风险集中，从而防止某些看似“不可能”的事件威胁到公司的偿付能力。除了一个例外，我们所有主要的保险业务都定期通过了这些测试。
The exception is General Re, and there was much to do at that company last year to get it up to snuff. I’m delighted to report that under Joe Brandon’s leadership, and with yeoman assistance by Tad Montross, enormous progress has been made on each of the fronts described.
这个例外就是General Re。去年该公司还有很多工作要做才能达到标准。我很高兴地报告，在Joe Brandon的领导下，并得益于Tad Montross的有力协助，我们在上述各个领域都取得了显著进展。
When I agreed in 1998 to merge Berkshire with Gen Re, I thought that company stuck to the three rules I’ve enumerated. I had studied the operation for decades and had observed underwriting discipline that was consistent and reserving that was conservative. At merger time, I detected no slippage in Gen Re’s standards.
1998年我同意将伯克希尔与Gen Re合并时，我以为这家公司遵循了我列出的三项原则。我研究该公司业务已有几十年，观察到它的承保纪律一贯严谨，准备金计提也一向保守。在合并之时，我也未发现其标准有任何松动。
I was dead wrong. Gen Re’s culture and practices had substantially changed and unbeknownst to management – and to me – the company was grossly mispricing its current business. In addition, Gen Re had accumulated an aggregation of risks that would have been fatal had, say, terrorists detonated several large-scale nuclear bombs in an attack on the U.S. A disaster of that scope was highly improbable, of course, but it is up to insurers to limit their risks in a manner that leaves their finances rock-solid if the “impossible” happens. Indeed, had Gen Re remained independent, the World Trade Center attack alone would have threatened the company’s existence.
但我完全错了。Gen Re的文化和做法已发生了实质性变化，管理层和我都未曾察觉，公司正在严重错误地为其当前业务定价。此外，Gen Re还积累了大量风险，如果恐怖分子在美国发动袭击并引爆多个大规模核弹，这将直接致命。当然，此类灾难发生的可能性极低，但保险公司有责任限制风险，以确保即使“不可能”的事情发生，财务状况也能坚如磐石。事实上，如果Gen Re保持独立，仅世贸中心袭击事件就足以危及其生存。
When the WTC disaster occurred, it exposed weaknesses in Gen Re’s operations that I should have detected earlier. But I was lucky: Joe and Tad were on hand, freshly endowed with increased authority and eager to rapidly correct the errors of the past. They knew what to do – and they did it.
当世贸中心灾难发生时，它暴露了Gen Re运营中的弱点，而我本应更早察觉这一点。但我很幸运：Joe和Tad就在身边，他们刚被赋予更大的权力，并热切希望迅速纠正过去的错误。他们知道该怎么做——而且他们确实做到了。
It takes time for insurance policies to run off, however, and 2002 was well along before we managed to reduce our aggregation of nuclear, chemical and biological risk (NCB) to a tolerable level. That problem is now behind us.
然而，保险合同需要时间逐步到期，直到2002年下半年，我们才将核生化（NCB）风险敞口降低到了可控水平。这个问题现在已经解决。
On another front, Gen Re’s underwriting attitude has been dramatically altered: The entire organization now understands that we wish to write only properly-priced business, whatever the effect on volume. Joe and Tad judge themselves only by Gen Re’s underwriting profitability. Size simply doesn’t count.
另一方面，Gen Re的承保态度也发生了根本转变：整个组织现在都清楚，我们只愿意承接定价合理的业务，无论这对业务量有何影响。Joe和Tad只以Gen Re的承保利润来衡量自身绩效。规模已不再重要。
Finally, we are making every effort to get our reserving right. If we fail at that, we can’t know our true costs. And any insurer that has no idea what its costs are is heading for big trouble.
最后，我们正尽一切努力确保准备金计提准确。如果我们在这方面失败，我们就无法了解真实的成本。任何不清楚自己成本的保险公司都将面临严重问题。
At yearend 2001, General Re attempted to reserve adequately for all losses that had occurred prior to that date and were not yet paid – but we failed badly. Therefore the company’s 2002 underwriting results were penalized by an additional $1.31 billion that we recorded to correct the estimation mistakes of earlier years. When I review the reserving errors that have been uncovered at General Re, a line from a country song seems apt: “I wish I didn’t know now what I didn’t know then.”
截至2001年底，General Re曾试图为所有在该日期前发生但尚未支付的损失计提充足的准备金——但我们严重失败了。因此，公司在2002年的承保结果因我们额外记录的一笔13.1亿美元费用而受到惩罚，这笔费用用于纠正前几年的估算错误。当我回顾General Re暴露出的准备金问题时，一句乡村歌曲歌词似乎非常贴切：“我现在真希望不知道那些我当初未曾知道的事。”
I can promise you that our top priority going forward is to avoid inadequate reserving. But I can’t guarantee success. The natural tendency of most casualty-insurance managers is to underreserve, and they must have a particular mindset – which, it may surprise you, has nothing to do with actuarial expertise – if they are to overcome this devastating bias. Additionally, a reinsurer faces far more difficulties in reserving properly than does a primary insurer. Nevertheless, at Berkshire, we have generally been successful in our reserving, and we are determined to be at General Re as well.
我可以向你承诺的是，未来我们的首要任务就是避免准备金不足。但我无法保证一定成功。大多数财产/意外险经理人的自然倾向是低估准备金，如果他们想克服这种毁灭性的偏见，必须具备一种特定的心态——这可能让你感到惊讶，它与精算专业知识无关。此外，再保险公司比直保公司在准备金计提上面临更大的困难。然而，在伯克希尔，我们在准备金管理方面总体表现良好，我们也将确保在General Re同样如此。
In summary, I believe General Re is now well positioned to deliver huge amounts of no-cost float to Berkshire and that its sink-the-ship catastrophe risk has been eliminated. The company still possesses the important competitive strengths that I’ve outlined in the past. And it gained another highly significant advantage last year when each of its three largest worldwide competitors, previously rated AAA, was demoted by at least one rating agency. Among the giants, General Re, rated AAA across-the-board, is now in a class by itself in respect to financial strength.
总之，我认为General Re现在已处于一个有利位置，能够为伯克希尔提供大量低成本浮存金，并且其“足以击沉公司”的灾难性风险已被消除。该公司仍拥有我过去所描述的重要竞争优势。去年，它的三大全球竞争对手（此前均被评定为AAA评级）纷纷被至少一家评级机构下调评级，使General Re获得了另一个极具意义的优势。目前，作为唯一一家全面获得AAA评级的巨头，General Re在财务实力方面已独树一帜。
No attribute is more important. Recently, in contrast, one of the world’s largest reinsurers – a company regularly recommended to primary insurers by leading brokers – has all but ceased paying claims, including those both valid and due. This company owes many billions of dollars to hundreds of primary insurers who now face massive write-offs. “Cheap” reinsurance is a fool’s bargain: When an insurer lays out money today in exchange for a reinsurer’s promise to pay a decade or two later, it’s dangerous – and possibly life-threatening – for the insurer to deal with any but the strongest reinsurer around.
这一点至关重要。与此形成鲜明对比的是，最近有一家世界最大的再保险公司——一直被主要经纪商推荐给直保公司——几乎停止支付所有理赔，包括合法且到期的理赔。这家公司对数百家直保公司欠下数千亿美元债务，导致这些公司面临巨额坏账计提。“便宜”的再保险是一场愚蠢的交易：当一家保险公司今天拿出资金，以换取再保险公司十年或二十年后的付款承诺时，若不是与最强的再保险公司合作，那将是非常危险的，甚至可能是致命的。
Berkshire shareholders owe Joe and Tad a huge thank you for their accomplishments in 2002. They worked harder during the year than I would wish for anyone – and it is paying off.
伯克希尔股东们要衷心感谢Joe和Tad在2002年取得的成就。他们在这一年的工作强度远超我对任何人期望的程度——而现在这一切正在带来回报。
At GEICO, everything went so well in 2002 that we should pinch ourselves. Growth was substantial, profits were outstanding, policyholder retention was up and sales productivity jumped significantly. These trends continue in early 2003.
GEICO在2002年的表现如此出色，简直让人怀疑是不是在做梦。增长显著，利润优异，客户留存率提升，销售效率也大幅提高。这一趋势在2003年初仍在延续。
Thank Tony Nicely for all of this. As anyone who knows him will attest, Tony has been in love with GEICO for 41 years – ever since he went to work for the company at 18 – and his results reflect this passion. He is proud of the money we save policyholders – about $1 billion annually versus what other insurers, on average, would have charged them. He is proud of the service we provide these policyholders: In a key industry survey, GEICO was recently ranked above all major competitors. He is proud of his 19,162 associates, who last year were awarded profit-sharing payments equal to 19% of their base salary because of the splendid results they achieved. And he is proud of the growing profits he delivers to Berkshire shareholders.
这一切都要归功于Tony Nicely。任何了解他的人都会证实，他自18岁加入GEICO以来，已经热爱这家公司长达41年——他的业绩正是这份热情的体现。他为我们为客户节省的保费感到自豪——每年约10亿美元，相较于其他保险公司平均收费水平而言；他为我们提供的服务感到自豪：在一项关键行业调查中，GEICO最近排名超过所有主要竞争对手；他为他的19,162名员工感到自豪：由于他们出色的业绩，去年每人获得了相当于基本工资19%的利润分享奖金；他更为他为伯克希尔股东带来的持续增长利润感到自豪。
GEICO took in $2.9 billion in premiums when Berkshire acquired full ownership in 1996. Last year, its volume was $6.9 billion, with plenty of growth to come. Particularly promising is the company’s Internet operation, whose new business grew by 75% last year. Check us out at GEICO.com (or call 800-847-7536). In most states, shareholders get a special 8% discount.
1996年伯克希尔完成对GEICO全资收购时，其保费收入为29亿美元。去年，这一数字达到了69亿美元，而且仍有很大增长空间。尤其值得期待的是公司的互联网业务，去年新业务量增长了75%。欢迎访问GEICO.com网站（或拨打800-847-7536）。在大多数州，股东还可享受特别的8%折扣。
Here’s one footnote to GEICO’s 2002 earnings that underscores the need for insurers to do business with only the strongest of reinsurers. In 1981-1983, the managers then running GEICO decided to try their hand at writing commercial umbrella and product liability insurance. The risks seemed modest: the company took in only $3,051,000 from this line and used almost all of it – $2,979,000 – to buy reinsurance in order to limit its losses. GEICO was left with a paltry $72,000 as compensation for the minor portion of the risk that it retained. But this small bite of the apple was more than enough to make the experience memorable. GEICO’s losses from this venture now total a breathtaking $94.1 million or about 130,000% of the net premium it received. Of the total loss, uncollectable receivables from deadbeat reinsurers account for no less than $90.3 million (including $19 million charged in 2002). So much for “cheap” reinsurance.
这里还有一个关于GEICO 2002年盈利的小注脚，突显出保险公司只能与最强的再保险公司合作的重要性。在1981至1983年间，当时管理GEICO的团队决定尝试开展商业伞形责任险和产品责任险业务。这项业务看似风险不大：公司仅从该业务线获得305.1万美元保费，并几乎全部用于购买再保险来限制自身损失。GEICO仅保留极小部分风险，获得7.2万美元补偿。但即便是这点微小的风险敞口，最终也带来了难以忘怀的教训。如今，GEICO在这项业务上的累计亏损已达惊人的9,410万美元，约为净保费收入的130,000%。其中，来自违约再保险公司的应收账款坏账就高达9,030万美元（其中包括2002年新增的1,900万美元）。所谓“便宜”的再保险，不过如此。
Ajit Jain’s reinsurance division was the major reason our float cost us so little last year. If we ever put a photo in a Berkshire annual report, it will be of Ajit. In color!
Ajit Jain领导的再保险部门是我们去年浮存金成本如此之低的主要原因。如果我们要在伯克希尔年报中放一张照片，那一定是Ajit的照片——彩色印刷！
Ajit’s operation has amassed $13.4 billion of float, more than all but a handful of insurers have ever built up. He accomplished this from a standing start in 1986, and even now has a workforce numbering only 20. And, most important, he has produced underwriting profits.
Ajit的部门积累了134亿美元的浮存金，这一规模超过了除极少数保险公司外的所有同行。他从1986年开始白手起家，即便到现在，团队人数也只有20人。更重要的是，他实现了承保利润。
His profits are particularly remarkable if you factor in some accounting arcana that I am about to lay on you. So prepare to eat your spinach (or, alternatively, if debits and credits aren’t your thing, skip the next two paragraphs).
如果你考虑到一些我即将解释的会计细节，他的利润更显得非凡。所以请准备好吃点“菠菜”吧（或者，如果你对借方和贷方不感兴趣，可以跳过接下来两个段落）。
Ajit’s 2002 underwriting profit of $534 million came after his operation recognized a charge of $428 million attributable to “retroactive” insurance he has written over the years. In this line of business, we assume from another insurer the obligation to pay up to a specified amount for losses they have already incurred – often for events that took place decades earlier – but that are yet to be paid (for example, because a worker hurt in 1980 will receive monthly payments for life). In these arrangements, an insurer pays us a large upfront premium, but one that is less than the losses we expect to pay. We willingly accept this differential because a) our payments are capped, and b) we get to use the money until loss payments are actually made, with these often stretching out over a decade or more. About 80% of the $6.6 billion in asbestos and environmental loss reserves that we carry arises from capped contracts, whose costs consequently can’t skyrocket.
Ajit 2002年的承保利润为5.34亿美元，是在其部门确认了一笔4.28亿美元的费用之后得出的，该费用源于他多年来承保的“追溯性”保险。在这类业务中，我们从另一家保险公司承接赔付义务，为其已发生但尚未支付的损失支付最高限额金额——这些事件往往发生在几十年前（例如一名1980年受伤的工人将持续领取终身月度赔偿）。在这种安排下，保险公司向我们支付一笔高额首期保费，但该金额低于我们预计需支付的损失总额。我们愿意接受这一差额是因为：a）我们的赔付上限固定，b）我们可以使用这笔资金直到实际赔付发生，而这个过程往往持续十年以上。我们持有的66亿美元石棉及环境相关损失准备金中，约有80%来自此类封顶合同，因此其成本不会失控飙升。
When we write a retroactive policy, we immediately record both the premium and a reserve for the expected losses. The difference between the two is entered as an asset entitled “deferred charges – reinsurance assumed.” This is no small item: at yearend, for all retroactive policies, it was $3.4 billion. We then amortize this asset downward by charges to income over the expected life of each policy. These charges – $440 million in 2002, including charges at Gen Re – create an underwriting loss, but one that is intentional and desirable. And even after this drag on reported results, Ajit achieved a large underwriting gain last year.
当我们签署一份追溯性保单时，我们会立即记录保费收入以及预期损失的准备金。两者之间的差额则计入一项名为“递延支出——承担的再保险”的资产科目。这不是一个小数目：截至年末，所有追溯性保单对应的该项资产为34亿美元。我们随后在每份保单的有效期内，通过损益表逐步摊销这项资产。这些摊销费用——2002年总计4.4亿美元（含Gen Re部分）——会产生承保亏损，但这是有意为之且合理的设计。即使扣除这些影响后，Ajit去年仍实现了可观的承保收益。
We want to emphasize, however, that we assume risks in Ajit’s operation that are huge – far larger than those retained by any other insurer in the world. Therefore, a single event could cause a major swing in Ajit’s results in any given quarter or year. That bothers us not at all: As long as we are paid appropriately, we love taking on short-term volatility that others wish to shed. At Berkshire, we would rather earn a lumpy 15% over time than a smooth 12%.
但我们想强调的是，Ajit的业务所承担的风险极其庞大——远远超过世界上任何其他保险公司所保留的风险。因此，单一事件可能会导致Ajit在某一季度或年度的业绩出现剧烈波动。但这对我们毫无困扰：只要我们获得合理的报酬，我们就乐于承担他人想要转嫁的短期波动。在伯克希尔，我们宁愿长期获得起伏不定的15%，也不愿获得平稳的12%。
If you see Ajit at our annual meeting, bow deeply.
如果你在我们的年度股东大会上见到Ajit，请深深鞠躬致意。
Berkshire’s smaller insurers had an outstanding year. Their aggregate float grew by 38%, and they realized an underwriting profit of $32 million, or 4.5% of premiums. Collectively, these operations would make one of the finest insurance companies in the country.
伯克希尔旗下较小的保险公司也度过了非凡的一年。它们的浮存金总额增长了38%，并实现了3,200万美元的承保利润，占保费的4.5%。综合来看，这些公司合起来可构成全美最优秀的保险公司之一。
Included in these figures, however, were terrible results in our California workers’ compensation operation. There, we have work to do. There, too, our reserving severely missed the mark. Until we figure out how to get this business right, we will keep it small.
然而，在这些数据中也包含了我们在加州工伤赔偿业务中的糟糕表现。那里还有许多工作要做。同样，我们的准备金计提严重偏离实际。在我们找到正确经营这项业务的方法之前，我们将维持其小规模运作。
For the fabulous year they had in 2002, we thank Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Tom Nerney, Don Towle and Don Wurster. They added a lot of value to your Berkshire investment.
对于他们在2002年取得的卓越成绩，我们要感谢Rod Eldred、John Kizer、Tom Nerney、Don Towle和Don Wurster。他们为你的伯克希尔投资创造了巨大价值。
# Sources of Reported Earnings (报告收益的来源)
The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. You will notice that “Purchase-Accounting Adjustments” dropped sharply in 2002, the reason being that GAAP rules changed then, no longer requiring the amortization of goodwill. This change increases our reported earnings, but has no effect on our economic earnings.
下表展示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。你会注意到，“购并会计调整”（Purchase-Accounting Adjustments）在2002年大幅下降，原因在于美国通用会计准则（GAAP）发生变更，不再要求对商誉进行摊销。这一变化提升了我们的报告收益，但对经济收益没有影响。
# (in millions) Pre-Tax Earnings
# （税前收益，单位：百万美元）
| 项目（Item） | 2002 | 2001 |
|---|---|---|
| Operating Earnings: Insurance Group: | ||
| Underwriting – General Re（承保——通用再保险） | $534 | $(647) |
| Underwriting – Berkshire Group（承保——伯克希尔集团） | $416 | $221 |
| Underwriting – GEICO（承保——GEICO） | $32 | $30 |
| Underwriting – Other Primary（承保——其他直保业务） | $3,050 | $2,824 |
| Net Investment Income（净投资收益） | $229 | $186 |
| Apparel（服装业务） | $225 | $175 |
| Building Products（建筑材料） | $516 | $461 |
| Finance and Financial Products Business（金融及金融产品业务） | $1,016 | $519 |
| Flight Services（飞行服务） | $225 | $186 |
| MidAmerican Energy (80% owned)（中美能源控股公司，持股80%） | $613 | $565 |
| Retail Operations（零售运营） | $166 | $129 |
| Scott Fetzer (excluding finance operation)（斯科特·费策公司，不含金融业务） | $129 | $105 |
| Shaw Industries（肖氏工业） | $424 | $292 |
| Other Businesses（其他业务） | $256 | $212 |
| Purchase-Accounting Adjustments（购并会计调整） | $(65) | $(699) |
| Corporate Interest Expense（公司利息支出） | $(55) | $(60) |
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions（股东指定捐赠） | $(11) | $(11) |
| Other（其他） | $(11) | $(17) |
# Berkshire’s Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and Minority interests)
# （伯克希尔净利润份额，含税后及少数股权调整）
| 项目（Item） | 2002 | 2001 |
|---|---|---|
| Operating Earnings（运营收益） | $1,393 | $3,671 |
| Capital Gains from Investments（投资资本利得） | $97 | $101 |
| Total Earnings – All Entities（所有实体总收益） | $1,490 | $3,772 |
(1) Includes Fruit of the Loom from April 30, 2002 and Garan from September 4, 2002.
(2) Includes Johns Manville from February 27, 2001 and MiTek from July 31, 2001.
(3) From date of acquisition, January 8, 2001.
(1) 包括Fruit of the Loom自2002年4月30日起和Garan自2002年9月4日起的数据。
(2) 包括Johns Manville自2001年2月27日起和MiTek自2001年7月31日起的数据。
(3) 自收购之日起，即2001年1月8日。
Here’s a summary of major developments at our non-insurance businesses:
以下是伯克希尔旗下非保险类业务的主要发展情况概要：
• MidAmerican Energy’s earnings grew in 2002 and will likely do so again this year. Most of the increase, both present and expected, results from the acquisitions described earlier. To fund these, Berkshire purchased $1,273 million of MidAmerican junior debt (bringing our total holdings of these 11% obligations to $1,728 million) and also invested $402 million in a “common-equivalent” stock. We now own (on a fully-diluted basis) 80.2% of MidAmerican’s equity. MidAmerican’s financial statements are presented in detail on page 37.
• 中美能源控股公司（MidAmerican Energy）2002年的盈利增长，并有望在今年继续增长。目前及预期的增长主要来自前述并购活动。为支持这些扩张，伯克希尔购买了12.73亿美元的MidAmerican次级债务（使我们持有的此类11%利率债务总额达到17.28亿美元），并投资了4.02亿美元于“等同普通股”的证券。我们现在以完全稀释基础持有MidAmerican 80.2%的股权。MidAmerican的财务报表详见第37页。
• Last year I told you of the problems at Dexter that led to a huge loss in our shoe business. Thanks to Frank Rooney and Jim Issler of H.H. Brown, the Dexter operation has been turned around. Despite the cost of unwinding our problems there, we earned $24 million in shoes last year, an upward swing of $70 million from 2001.
• 去年我曾向你们提及Dexter的问题导致我们在鞋类业务中出现巨额亏损。多亏H.H. Brown的Frank Rooney和Jim Issler的努力，Dexter业务已成功扭转局面。尽管解决这些问题带来了成本负担，去年我们在鞋类业务上实现了2,400万美元利润，较2001年增长了7,000万美元。
Randy Watson at Justin also contributed to this improvement, increasing margins significantly while trimming invested capital. Shoes are a tough business, but we have terrific managers and believe that in the future we will earn reasonable returns on the capital we employ in this operation.
Justin公司的Randy Watson也为此改善做出了贡献，在削减投入资本的同时显著提高了利润率。鞋类行业竞争激烈，但我们拥有出色的管理层，并相信未来我们将在这项业务中获得合理的资本回报。
• In a so-so year for home-furnishing and jewelry retailers, our operations did well. Among our eight retailing operations, the best performer was Homemaker’s in Des Moines. There, the talented Merschman family achieved outstanding gains in both sales and profits.
• 在家居装饰和珠宝零售商整体表现平平的一年里，我们的运营表现出色。在我们的八家零售业务中，表现最好的是位于得梅因的Homemaker’s。才华横溢的Merschman家族在销售和利润方面都取得了卓越增长。
Nebraska Furniture Mart will open a new blockbuster store in metropolitan Kansas City in August. With 450,000 square feet of retail space, it could well produce the second largest volume of any furniture store in the country – the Omaha operation being the national champion. I hope Berkshire shareholders in the Kansas City area will come out for the opening (and keep coming).
Nebraska Furniture Mart将于8月在堪萨斯城都市区开设一家大型新店。该店拥有45万平方英尺的零售空间，极有可能成为全美第二大销量家具店（仅次于奥马哈总部）。我希望堪萨斯城地区的伯克希尔股东能前来参加开业典礼（并持续光顾）。
• Our home and construction-related businesses – Acme Brick, Benjamin Moore Paint, Johns-Manville, MiTek and Shaw – delivered $941 million of pre-tax earnings last year. Of particular significance was Shaw’s gain from $292 million in 2001 to $424 million. Bob Shaw and Julian Saul are terrific operators. Carpet prices increased only 1% last year, but Shaw’s productivity gains and excellent expense control delivered significantly improved margins.
• 我们与住宅和建筑相关的业务——Acme Brick、Benjamin Moore Paint、Johns-Manville、MiTek和Shaw——去年共实现税前利润9.41亿美元。其中特别值得注意的是Shaw从2001年的2.92亿美元增长至4.24亿美元。Bob Shaw和Julian Saul是非常出色的经营者。地毯价格仅上涨了1%，但由于Shaw在生产效率和费用控制方面的出色表现，毛利率显著提升。
We cherish cost-consciousness at Berkshire. Our model is the widow who went to the local newspaper to place an obituary notice. Told there was a 25-cents-a-word charge, she requested “Fred Brown died.” She was then informed there was a seven-word minimum. “Okay” the bereaved woman replied, “make it ‘Fred Brown died, golf clubs for sale’.”
我们珍视成本意识。我们的榜样是一位前往当地报纸刊登讣告的寡妇。她被告知每字收费25美分，于是写道：“Fred Brown去世。”然后被告知至少需要七个词。“好吧，”这位悲伤的女士回应道，“那就写‘Fred Brown去世，高尔夫球杆出售’。”
• Earnings from flight services increased last year – but only because we realized a special pre-tax gain of $60 million from the sale of our 50% interest in FlightSafety Boeing. Without this gain, earnings from our training business would have fallen slightly in concert with the slowdown in business-aviation activity. FlightSafety training continues to be the gold standard for the industry, and we expect growth in the years to come.
• 飞行服务收入去年有所增加——但这主要是因为我们通过出售FlightSafety Boeing 50%权益获得了6,000万美元的特殊税前收益。若不考虑此项收益，由于商务航空活动放缓，我们的培训业务收入略有下降。FlightSafety的培训仍然是行业的黄金标准，我们预计未来几年将实现增长。
At NetJets, our fractional-ownership operation, we are the runaway leader of the four-company field. FAA records indicate that our industry share in 2002 was 75%, meaning that clients purchased or leased planes from us that were valued at triple those recorded by our three competitors combined. Last year, our fleet flew 132.7 million nautical miles, taking clients to 130 countries.
我们的NetJets是飞机共享所有权业务的领军者，在四家公司构成的市场中遥遥领先。联邦航空管理局（FAA）记录显示，我们在2002年的市场份额高达75%，意味着客户从我们这里购买或租赁的飞机价值是我们三家竞争对手合计的三倍。去年，我们的机队共飞行了1.327亿海里，为客户飞往130个国家。
Our preeminence is directly attributable to Rich Santulli, NetJets’ CEO. He invented the business in 1986 and ever since has exhibited an unbending devotion to the highest levels of service, safety and security. Rich, Charlie and I insist on planes (and personnel) worthy of carrying our own families – because they regularly do.
我们的领先地位直接归功于NetJets首席执行官Rich Santulli。他于1986年创立了这项业务，并始终致力于提供最高水平的服务、安全与保障。Rich、查理和我都坚持使用足以胜任接送自己家人任务的飞机（和人员）——因为它们确实经常承担这样的责任。
Though NetJets revenues set a record in 2002, the company again lost money. A small profit in the U.S. was more than offset by losses in Europe. Overall, the fractional-ownership industry lost significant sums last year, and that is almost certain to be the outcome in 2003 as well. The bald fact is that airplanes are costly to operate.
尽管NetJets在2002年创下了营收纪录，公司再次出现亏损。美国市场的微薄盈利被欧洲市场的亏损所抵消。总体来看，整个共享飞机行业去年损失惨重，2003年很可能也将如此。现实情况是，飞机运营成本高昂。
Over time, this economic reality should work to our advantage, given that for a great many companies, private aircraft are an essential business tool. And for most of these companies, NetJets makes compelling sense as either a primary or supplementary supplier of the aircraft they need.
但从长远来看，这种经济现实反而可能对我们有利，因为对于许多公司而言，私人飞机是一项重要的商业工具。而对大多数公司来说，NetJets无论是作为主要还是补充飞机供应商，都是极具吸引力的选择。
Many businesses could save millions of dollars annually by flying with us. Indeed, the yearly savings at some large companies could exceed $10 million. Equally important, these companies would actually increase their operational capabilities by using us. A fractional ownership of a single NetJets plane allows a client to have several planes in the air simultaneously. Additionally, through the interchange arrangement we make available, an owner of an interest in one plane can fly any of 12 other models, using whatever plane makes most sense for a mission. (One of my sisters owns a fraction of a Falcon 2000, which she uses for trips to Hawaii, but – exhibiting the Buffett gene – she interchanges to a more economical Citation Excel for short trips in the U.S.)
许多企业每年通过使用我们的服务可节省数百万美元。事实上，一些大企业的年度节省甚至超过1,000万美元。同样重要的是，这些公司实际上可以通过我们提升自身的运营能力。一份NetJets某架飞机的部分所有权可以让客户同时拥有多个航班。此外，通过我们提供的互换安排，一名拥有某架飞机部分权益的客户可以驾驶我们12种机型中的任意一种，选择最适合某次任务的飞机。（我的一位姐妹拥有一架Falcon 2000的部分权益，用于飞往夏威夷的旅行，但她也展现出巴菲特家族的节俭特质——短途旅行时会换成更经济的Citation Excel。）
The roster of NetJets users confirms the advantages we offer major businesses. Take General Electric, for example. It has a large fleet of its own but also has an unsurpassed knowledge of how to utilize aircraft effectively and economically. And it is our largest customer.
NetJets的用户名单印证了我们为大型企业带来的优势。例如通用电气（General Electric），它自身拥有庞大的机队，同时也具备无与伦比的飞机高效与经济使用知识。而它正是我们最大的客户。
• Our finance and financial products line covers a variety of operations, among them certain activities in high-grade fixed-income securities that proved highly profitable in 2002. Earnings in this arena will probably continue for a while, but are certain to decrease – and perhaps disappear – in time.
• 我们的金融及金融产品线涵盖多种业务，其中包括在高评级固定收益证券领域的某些操作，这些业务在2002年表现非常盈利。这类收益可能会持续一段时间，但最终无疑会减少，甚至可能消失。
# This category also includes a highly satisfactory – but rapidly diminishing – income stream from our Berkadia investment in Finova (described in last year’s report). Our partner, Leucadia National Corp., has managed this operation with great skill, willingly doing far more than its share of the heavy lifting. I like this division of labor and hope to join with Leucadia in future transactions.
这一类别还包括我们通过Berkadia投资Finova所获得的收入流，虽然这部分收入极具吸引力，但正在迅速减少（详见去年年报）。我们的合作伙伴Leucadia National Corp.以极高的专业能力管理这项业务，承担了远超其应有份额的工作。我非常欣赏这种分工合作，并希望未来能与Leucadia继续联手开展交易。
On the minus side, the Finance line also includes the operations of General Re Securities, a derivatives and trading business. This entity lost $173 million pre-tax last year, a result that, in part, is a belated acknowledgment of faulty, albeit standard, accounting it used in earlier periods.
另一方面，金融板块也包含了General Re Securities（通用再保险证券公司）的运营，这是一家从事衍生品和交易业务的企业。该部门去年税前亏损1.73亿美元，部分原因是对早期使用过的、虽属常规但存在问题的会计方法的一种迟来的承认。
Derivatives
（衍生品）
Charlie and I are of one mind in how we feel about derivatives and the trading activities that go with them: We view them as time bombs, both for the parties that deal in them and the economic system.
查理和我对衍生品及其相关交易活动的看法完全一致：我们认为它们是定时炸弹，无论是对参与方还是整个经济体系而言都是如此。
Having delivered that thought, which I’ll get back to, let me retreat to explaining derivatives, though the explanation must be general because the word covers an extraordinarily wide range of financial contracts.
在表达完这个观点之后（我稍后还会回到这一点），让我先来解释一下衍生品——尽管解释只能是概括性的，因为“衍生品”一词涵盖了极其广泛的金融合约。
Essentially, these instruments call for money to change hands at some future date, with the amount to be determined by one or more reference items, such as interest rates, stock prices or currency values. If, for example, you are either long or short an S&P 500 futures contract, you are a party to a very simple derivatives transaction – with your gain or loss derived from movements in the index. Derivatives contracts are of varying duration (running sometimes to 20 or more years) and their value is often tied to several variables.
本质上，这些工具规定在未来某一日期进行资金转移，金额由一个或多个参考项目决定，例如利率、股票价格或货币价值。例如，如果你持有多头或空头的标普500期货合约，你就参与了一项非常简单的衍生品交易——你的盈亏取决于指数的变动。衍生品合约期限各异（有时可达20年以上），其价值通常与多个变量挂钩。
Unless derivatives contracts are collateralized or guaranteed, their ultimate value also depends on the creditworthiness of the counterparties to them. In the meantime, though, before a contract is settled, the counterparties record profits and losses – often huge in amount – in their current earnings statements without so much as a penny changing hands.
除非衍生品合约被抵押或担保，否则其最终价值还取决于交易对手的信用状况。但在合约结算之前，交易双方会在当前损益表中记录利润或亏损——金额往往巨大——而实际上一分钱都未实际流动。
The range of derivatives contracts is limited only by the imagination of man (or sometimes, so it seems, madmen). At Enron, for example, newsprint and broadband derivatives, due to be settled many years in the future, were put on the books. Or say you want to write a contract speculating on the number of twins to be born in Nebraska in 2020. No problem – at a price, you will easily find an obliging counterparty.
衍生品合约的种类仅受限于人类的想象力（有时甚至像是疯子的创意）。例如，在安然公司（Enron），新闻纸和宽带网络的衍生品就被记入账簿，而这些合约的结算日可能要等到很多年后。又或者，你想签订一份合约，押注2020年内布拉斯加州双胞胎出生数量？没问题——只要你出价，总能找到愿意承接的交易对手。
When we purchased Gen Re, it came with General Re Securities, a derivatives dealer that Charlie and I didn’t want, judging it to be dangerous. We failed in our attempts to sell the operation, however, and are now terminating it.
当我们收购Gen Re时，也一并接手了其中的General Re Securities，一家衍生品交易商。查理和我都认为它风险极高，并不想要。然而我们尝试出售的努力失败了，现在我们正逐步终止这项业务。
But closing down a derivatives business is easier said than done. It will be a great many years before we are totally out of this operation (though we reduce our exposure daily). In fact, the reinsurance and derivatives businesses are similar: Like Hell, both are easy to enter and almost impossible to exit. In either industry, once you write a contract – which may require a large payment decades later – you are usually stuck with it. True, there are methods by which the risk can be laid off with others. But most strategies of that kind leave you with residual liability.
但关闭一个衍生品业务说起来容易做起来难。我们要花很多年才能彻底退出这项业务（尽管我们每天都在减少敞口）。事实上，再保险和衍生品行业非常相似：就像地狱一样，进去容易出来难。在这两个行业中，一旦你签了一份合约——几十年后可能需要大笔支付——你就很难脱身。诚然，你可以将风险转嫁给他人，但大多数此类策略仍会让你保留剩余责任。
Another commonality of reinsurance and derivatives is that both generate reported earnings that are often wildly overstated. That’s true because today’s earnings are in a significant way based on estimates whose inaccuracy may not be exposed for many years.
再保险和衍生品的另一个共同点在于，它们都会产生被严重高估的报告收益。这是因为当期盈利在很大程度上依赖于估计值，而这些估计值的误差可能多年后才会显现。
Errors will usually be honest, reflecting only the human tendency to take an optimistic view of one’s commitments. But the parties to derivatives also have enormous incentives to cheat in accounting for them. Those who trade derivatives are usually paid (in whole or part) on “earnings” calculated by mark-to-market accounting. But often there is no real market (think about our contract involving twins) and “mark-to-model” is utilized. This substitution can bring on large-scale mischief. As a general rule, contracts involving multiple reference items and distant settlement dates increase the opportunities for counterparties to use fanciful assumptions. In the twins scenario, for example, the two parties to the contract might well use differing models allowing both to show substantial profits for many years. In extreme cases, mark-to-model degenerates into what I would call mark-to-myth.
这些错误通常是诚实的，只是反映了人们倾向于乐观看待自身承诺的天性。但衍生品交易方也有强烈的动机去操纵会计处理。那些从事衍生品交易的人通常（全部或部分）根据按市值计价（mark-to-market）计算的“盈利”获取报酬。但很多时候并没有真实市场（想想我们那份关于双胞胎的合约），于是采用了模型定价（mark-to-model）。这种替代方式可能引发大规模误导。一般来说，涉及多个参考因素和远期结算日期的合约更容易让交易对手采用幻想般的假设。例如，在双胞胎场景中，合同双方可能使用不同的模型，从而都能显示多年的巨额利润。在极端情况下，模型定价（mark-to-model）退化为我所说的“神话定价”（mark-to-myth）。
Of course, both internal and outside auditors review the numbers, but that’s no easy job. For example, General Re Securities at yearend (after ten months of winding down its operation) had 14,384 contracts outstanding, involving 672 counterparties around the world. Each contract had a plus or minus value derived from one or more reference items, including some of mind-boggling complexity. Valuing a portfolio like that, expert auditors could easily and honestly have widely varying opinions.
当然，内部和外部审计师都会审查这些数字，但这绝非易事。例如，General Re Securities在年末（已清算十个月）仍有14,384份未到期合约，涉及全球672家交易对手。每份合约的价值变化均基于一个或多个参考因素，其中一些复杂到令人难以想象。对于这样一份投资组合，即便是经验丰富的审计师也可能得出截然不同的估值结论。
The valuation problem is far from academic: In recent years, some huge-scale frauds and near-frauds have been facilitated by derivatives trades. In the energy and electric utility sectors, for example, companies used derivatives and trading activities to report great “earnings” – until the roof fell in when they actually tried to convert the derivatives-related receivables on their balance sheets into cash. “Mark-to-market” then turned out to be truly “mark-to-myth.”
估值问题远非学术层面那么简单：近年来，一些大规模欺诈和接近欺诈的行为正是通过衍生品交易实现的。例如，在能源和电力公用事业领域，企业曾利用衍生品和交易活动报告了惊人的“盈利”——直到他们试图将资产负债表上的衍生品应收账款变现时，一切才真相大白。“按市值计价”结果证明其实是“按神话计价”。
I can assure you that the marking errors in the derivatives business have not been symmetrical. Almost invariably, they have favored either the trader who was eyeing a multi-million dollar bonus or the CEO who wanted to report impressive “earnings” (or both). The bonuses were paid, and the CEO profited from his options. Only much later did shareholders learn that the reported earnings were a sham.
我可以向你保证的是，衍生品行业的估值错误并非对称出现。几乎总是有利于那些期望获得数百万奖金的交易员，或希望报告亮眼“盈利”的CEO（有时两者兼有）。奖金照发，CEO也从期权中获利。股东们则是在很久以后才发现，所谓盈利完全是虚假的。
Another problem about derivatives is that they can exacerbate trouble that a corporation has run into for completely unrelated reasons. This pile-on effect occurs because many derivatives contracts require that a company suffering a credit downgrade immediately supply collateral to counterparties. Imagine, then, that a company is downgraded because of general adversity and that its derivatives instantly kick in with their requirement, imposing an unexpected and enormous demand for cash collateral on the company. The need to meet this demand can then throw the company into a liquidity crisis that may, in some cases, trigger still more downgrades. It all becomes a spiral that can lead to a corporate meltdown.
衍生品带来的另一个问题是，它们可能加剧公司因完全无关的原因而陷入的困境。这种叠加效应发生是因为许多衍生品合约规定，若公司遭遇信用评级下调，必须立即向交易对手提供抵押品。试想，一家公司因整体不利环境被降级，而它的衍生品合约立刻触发要求，迫使公司突然面临巨大的现金抵押需求。满足这一需求的需求可能导致流动性危机，进而可能进一步导致更多降级。这形成一个恶性循环，最终可能引发企业崩盘。
Derivatives also create a daisy-chain risk that is akin to the risk run by insurers or reinsurers that lay off much of their business with others. In both cases, huge receivables from many counterparties tend to build up over time. (At Gen Re Securities, we still have $6.5 billion of receivables, though we’ve been in a liquidation mode for nearly a year.) A participant may see himself as prudent, believing his large credit exposures to be diversified and therefore not dangerous. Under certain circumstances, though, an exogenous event that causes the receivable from Company A to go bad will also affect those from Companies B through Z. History teaches us that a crisis often causes problems to correlate in a manner undreamed of in more tranquil times.
衍生品还会造成类似保险或再保险公司将其大量业务转嫁给他人的“连锁反应”风险。在两种情形下，来自众多交易对手的巨额应收账款往往会随着时间推移不断积累。（在Gen Re Securities，尽管我们已进入清算模式近一年，仍有65亿美元的应收账款。）参与者可能自认为审慎，认为自己的大额信用敞口已经分散，因此并不危险。但在某些情况下，某个外生事件导致A公司的应收账款违约，也会波及B至Z公司。历史告诉我们，在危机中，问题常常会以和平静时期无法想象的方式相互关联。
In banking, the recognition of a “linkage” problem was one of the reasons for the formation of the Federal Reserve System. Before the Fed was established, the failure of weak banks would sometimes put sudden and unanticipated liquidity demands on previously-strong banks, causing them to fail in turn. The Fed now insulates the strong from the troubles of the weak. But there is no central bank assigned to the job of preventing the dominoes toppling in insurance or derivatives. In these industries, firms that are fundamentally solid can become troubled simply because of the travails of other firms further down the chain. When a “chain reaction” threat exists within an industry, it pays to minimize links of any kind. That’s how we conduct our reinsurance business, and it’s one reason we are exiting derivatives.
在银行业，“联动性”问题的认识是美联储系统成立的原因之一。在美联储成立之前，弱小银行的倒闭有时会对原本稳健的银行造成突如其来的流动性压力，从而引发它们也相继倒闭。如今美联储保护了稳健银行免受弱势机构的影响。但在保险和衍生品行业，并没有中央银行来防止“多米诺骨牌”倒塌。在这些行业中，基本面良好的公司也可能仅仅因为链条下游其他企业的困境而陷入麻烦。当一个行业内存在“连锁反应”威胁时，尽量减少任何类型的关联就变得至关重要。这也是我们经营再保险业务的方式，也是我们退出衍生品市场的原因之一。
Many people argue that derivatives reduce systemic problems, in that participants who can’t bear certain risks are able to transfer them to stronger hands. These people believe that derivatives act to stabilize the economy, facilitate trade, and eliminate bumps for individual participants. And, on a micro level, what they say is often true. Indeed, at Berkshire, I sometimes engage in large-scale derivatives transactions in order to facilitate certain investment strategies.
许多人认为衍生品可以缓解系统性问题，因为那些无法承受特定风险的参与者可以将风险转移到更有能力承担的手中。这些人相信衍生品有助于稳定经济、促进交易，并消除个体参与者的波动。从微观角度来看，他们的说法往往是正确的。事实上，在伯克希尔，我也曾参与大规模的衍生品交易，以推动某些投资策略。
Charlie and I believe, however, that the macro picture is dangerous and getting more so. Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers, who in addition trade extensively with one other. The troubles of one could quickly infect the others. On top of that, these dealers are owed huge amounts by non-dealer counterparties. Some of these counterparties, as I’ve mentioned, are linked in ways that could cause them to contemporaneously run into a problem because of a single event (such as the implosion of the telecom industry or the precipitous decline in the value of merchant power projects). Linkage, when it suddenly surfaces, can trigger serious systemic problems.
但我们（查理和我）认为宏观图景却越来越危险。大量的风险，特别是信用风险，已经集中在少数几家衍生品交易商手中，而他们之间又频繁交易。一家的问题可能迅速传染给其他方。此外，这些交易商还对非交易商对手拥有巨额债权。正如我所说，这些对手之间可能存在联系，一个单一事件（如电信业崩溃或独立电力项目价值骤跌）就可能导致它们同时陷入困境。一旦这种关联性突然爆发，就可能引发严重的系统性问题。
Indeed, in 1998, the leveraged and derivatives-heavy activities of a single hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, caused the Federal Reserve anxieties so severe that it hastily orchestrated a rescue effort. In later Congressional testimony, Fed officials acknowledged that, had they not intervened, the outstanding trades of LTCM – a firm unknown to the general public and employing only a few hundred people – could well have posed a serious threat to the stability of American markets.
的确，在1998年，一家名为长期资本管理公司（Long-Term Capital Management）的对冲基金，因其高度杠杆化和大量使用衍生品的操作，引发了美联储极为严重的担忧，并促使其紧急组织了一次救助行动。在后来的国会听证会上，美联储官员承认，若当时不进行干预，LTCM这家公众几乎无人知晓、员工也不过几百人的公司，其未平仓交易可能会对美国市场的稳定构成严重威胁。
In other words, the Fed acted because its leaders were fearful of what might have happened to other financial institutions had the LTCM domino toppled. And this affair, though it paralyzed many parts of the fixed-income market for weeks, was far from a worst-case scenario.
换句话说，美联储之所以采取行动，是因为其领导者担心一旦LTCM这个“多米诺骨牌”倒下，其他金融机构会随之陷入困境。尽管这场危机让固定收益市场多个部分停滞数周，但这远非最坏的情况。
One of the derivatives instruments that LTCM used was total-return swaps, contracts that facilitate 100% leverage in various markets, including stocks. For example, Party A to a contract, usually a bank, puts up all of the money for the purchase of a stock while Party B, without putting up any capital, agrees that at a future date it will receive any gain or pay any loss that the bank realizes.
LTCM使用的其中一种衍生工具是总回报互换（total-return swaps），这种合约可在包括股票在内的多个市场实现100%的杠杆效应。例如，合同的一方A（通常是银行）全额出资购买某只股票，而另一方B无需任何资金投入，但同意在未来某个日期获得该银行所获的任何收益，或承担任何亏损。
Total-return swaps of this type make a joke of margin requirements. Beyond that, other types of derivatives severely curtail the ability of regulators to curb leverage and generally get their arms around the risk profiles of banks, insurers and other financial institutions. Similarly, even experienced investors and analysts encounter major problems in analyzing the financial condition of firms that are heavily involved with derivatives contracts.
这类总回报互换实际上使保证金制度形同虚设。除此之外，其他类型的衍生品也严重削弱了监管机构控制杠杆水平的能力，并使得他们难以全面掌握银行、保险公司及其他金融机构的风险状况。同样地，即便是经验丰富的投资者和分析师，在分析那些深度参与衍生品合约企业的财务状况时也会遇到重大困难。
When Charlie and I finish reading the long footnotes detailing the derivatives activities of major banks, the only thing we understand is that we don’t understand how much risk the institution is running.
查理和我读完大型银行有关衍生品活动的长篇脚注后，唯一能确定的就是——我们根本搞不清楚这些机构到底承担了多少风险。
The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments will almost certainly multiply in variety and number until some event makes their toxicity clear. Knowledge of how dangerous they are has already permeated the electricity and gas businesses, in which the eruption of major troubles caused the use of derivatives to diminish dramatically. Elsewhere, however, the derivatives business continues to expand unchecked.
如今，衍生品这枚“ genie”已彻底出瓶，这些金融工具的种类和数量几乎肯定将持续增长，直到某一事件让人们真正看清它们的危害性。电力和天然气行业已经意识到衍生品的危险性，因为此前爆发的重大问题导致衍生品的使用大幅减少。但在其他领域，衍生品业务仍在无节制地扩张。
Central banks and governments have so far found no effective way to control, or even monitor, the risks posed by these contracts.
各国央行和政府至今尚未找到有效方法来控制甚至监控这些合约所带来的风险。
Charlie and I believe Berkshire should be a fortress of financial strength – for the sake of our owners, creditors, policyholders and employees. We try to be alert to any sort of megacatastrophe risk, and that posture may make us unduly apprehensive about the burgeoning quantities of long-term derivatives contracts and the massive amount of uncollateralized receivables that are growing alongside. In our view, however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.
查理和我都认为，伯克希尔应当成为财务实力的堡垒——为了我们的股东、债权人、保单持有人以及员工的利益。我们一直警惕任何可能引发超级灾难的风险，这种态度也许让我们对日益增多的长期衍生品合约及其伴随增长的巨额无担保应收款过于谨慎。但我们仍坚持认为，衍生品是金融领域的“大规模杀伤性武器”，其潜在危险虽尚未显现，但致命的可能性不容忽视。
# Investments (投资情况)
Below we show our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $500 million at the end of 2002 are itemized.
以下是我们持有的普通股投资明细。2002年底市值超过5亿美元的投资项目如下：
# Shares
（持股数量）
| 公司名称 | 持股数量 |
|---|---|
| American Express Company（美国运通公司） | 151,610,700 |
| The Coca-Cola Company（可口可乐公司） | 200,000,000 |
| The Gillette Company（吉列公司） | 96,000,000 |
| H&R Block, Inc.（H&R Block公司） | 15,999,200 |
| M&T Bank（M&T银行） | 6,708,760 |
| Moody’s Corporation（穆迪公司） | 24,000,000 |
| The Washington Post Company（华盛顿邮报公司） | 1,727,765 |
| Wells Fargo & Company（富国银行） | 53,265,080 |
# Cost vs Market Value (成本与市值对比)
（单位：百万美元）
| 公司名称 | 成本 | 市值 |
|---|---|---|
| American Express Company | $1,470 | $28,363 |
| The Coca-Cola Company | $1,299 | $24,970 |
| The Gillette Company | $600 | $8,768 |
| H&R Block, Inc. | $255 | $2,915 |
| M&T Bank | $103 | $643 |
| Moody’s Corporation | $499 | $991 |
| The Washington Post Company | $11 | $532 |
| Wells Fargo & Company | $306 | $1,275 |
| Others（其他） | $4,621 | $5,383 |
| 总计（Total Common Stocks） | $9,164 | $53,244 |
We continue to do little in equities. Charlie and I are increasingly comfortable with our holdings in Berkshire’s major investees because most of them have increased their earnings while their valuations have decreased. But we are not inclined to add to them. Though these enterprises have good prospects, we don’t yet believe their shares are undervalued.
我们在股票投资方面依然动作不多。查理和我对伯克希尔主要持股企业越来越放心，因为大多数公司盈利上升的同时估值却在下降。但我们并不打算进一步增持。虽然这些企业前景不错，但我们目前并不认为它们的股价被低估。
In our view, the same conclusion fits stocks generally. Despite three years of falling prices, which have significantly improved the attractiveness of common stocks, we still find very few that even mildly interest us. That dismal fact is testimony to the insanity of valuations reached during The Great Bubble. Unfortunately, the hangover may prove to be proportional to the binge.
我们认为这一结论适用于整个股市。尽管过去三年股价下跌显著提升了普通股的吸引力，但我们仍然发现很少有股票真正引起我们的兴趣。这一令人沮丧的事实说明了“大泡沫”时期估值水平的疯狂程度。不幸的是，泡沫破裂后的余震可能与其膨胀程度成正比。
The aversion to equities that Charlie and I exhibit today is far from congenital. We love owning common stocks – if they can be purchased at attractive prices. In my 61 years of investing, 50 or so years have offered that kind of opportunity. There will be years like that again. Unless, however, we see a very high probability of at least 10% pre-tax returns (which translate to 6½-7% after corporate tax), we will sit on the sidelines. With short-term money returning less than 1% after-tax, sitting it out is no fun. But occasionally successful investing requires inactivity.
查理和我今天对股票的回避绝非天生如此。我们热爱持有普通股——前提是价格足够吸引人。在我61年的投资生涯中，大约有50年都曾出现过这样的机会。未来也一定还会有类似的机会。然而，除非我们看到至少10%的税前回报率（即扣除公司所得税后约6.5%-7%），否则我们会选择观望。短期货币资产带来的税后回报不到1%，坐视不动当然不是一件愉快的事。但有时，成功的投资恰恰需要耐心等待、按兵不动。
Last year we were, however, able to make sensible investments in a few “junk” bonds and loans. Overall, our commitments in this sector sextupled, reaching $8.3 billion by yearend.
不过去年，我们在一些“垃圾”债券和贷款上找到了合理投资机会。总体而言，我们在这一领域的投资增长了六倍，到年底已达83亿美元。
Investing in junk bonds and investing in stocks are alike in certain ways: Both activities require us to make a price-value calculation and also to scan hundreds of securities to find the very few that have attractive reward/risk ratios.
投资高收益债与投资股票在某些方面是相似的：两者都需要我们进行价格与价值的计算，并从数百个证券中筛选出少数具备良好风险/回报比的标的。
But there are important differences between the two disciplines as well. In stocks, we expect every commitment to work out well because we concentrate on conservatively financed businesses with strong competitive strengths, run by able and honest people. If we buy into these companies at sensible prices, losses should be rare. Indeed, during the 38 years we have run the company’s affairs, gains from the equities we manage at Berkshire (that is, excluding those managed at General Re and GEICO) have exceeded losses by a ratio of about 100 to one.
但两者之间也有重要区别。在股票投资中，我们期望每一笔投资都能成功，因为我们专注于由有能力且诚实的人经营、财务稳健且具有强大竞争优势的企业。如果我们以合理价格买入这些公司股票，亏损应属罕见。事实上，在我们掌管公司的38年里，伯克希尔自行管理的股票投资（不包括通用再保险和GEICO管理的部分）获利与亏损的比例约为100:1。
Purchasing junk bonds, we are dealing with enterprises that are far more marginal. These businesses are usually overloaded with debt and often operate in industries characterized by low returns on capital. Additionally, the quality of management is sometimes questionable. Management may even have interests that are directly counter to those of debtholders. Therefore, we expect that we will have occasional large losses in junk issues. So far, however, we have done reasonably well in this field.
而当我们投资垃圾债券时，面对的企业则要边缘得多。这些企业通常负债累累，往往处于资本回报率低下的行业。此外，管理层素质有时也令人怀疑，甚至可能存在与债权人利益直接冲突的行为。因此，我们预期在垃圾债券领域将不时遭遇重大损失。不过迄今为止，我们在这一领域表现尚可。
# Corporate Governance (公司治理)
Both the ability and fidelity of managers have long needed monitoring. Indeed, nearly 2,000 years ago, Jesus Christ addressed this subject, speaking (Luke 16:2) approvingly of “a certain rich man” who told his manager, “Give an account of thy stewardship; for thou mayest no longer be steward.”
经理人的能力与诚信早已需要监督。事实上，近两千年前，耶稣就曾谈到这个问题（路加福音16:2），提到一位富人对管家说：“把你所经管的交代清楚，因为你不能再作管家了。”他的话表达了对代理人责任的高度重视。
Accountability and stewardship withered in the last decade, becoming qualities deemed of little importance by those caught up in the Great Bubble. As stock prices went up, the behavioral norms of managers went down. By the late ’90s, as a result, CEOs who traveled the high road did not encounter heavy traffic.
过去十年间，问责制与受托责任精神日渐衰落，人们在“大泡沫”的狂潮中将其视为无关紧要。随着股价上涨，经理人的行为规范却不断下滑。到了90年代末，坚守正道的CEO们反倒显得形单影只。
Most CEOs, it should be noted, are men and women you would be happy to have as trustees for your children’s assets or as next-door neighbors. Too many of these people, however, have in recent years behaved badly at the office, fudging numbers and drawing obscene pay for mediocre business achievements. These otherwise decent people simply followed the career path of Mae West: “I was Snow White but I drifted.”
当然，大多数CEO都是你愿意托付孩子资产、或做邻居的正派人。但近年来，太多人在办公室做出了不当行为，篡改数据、为平庸业绩领取天价薪酬。这些原本体面的人只是走了梅·韦斯特（Mae West）所说的那条路：“我曾是白雪公主，但我迷失了。”
In theory, corporate boards should have prevented this deterioration of conduct. I last wrote about the responsibilities of directors in the 1993 annual report. (We will send you a copy of this discussion on request, or you may read it on the Internet in the Corporate Governance section of the 1993 letter.) There, I said that directors “should behave as if there was a single absentee owner, whose long-term interest they should try to further in all proper ways.” This means that directors must get rid of a manager who is mediocre or worse, no matter how likable he may be. Directors must react as did the chorus-girl bride of an 85-year-old multimillionaire when he asked whether she would love him if he lost his money. “Of course,” the young beauty replied, “I would miss you, but I would still love you.”
理论上，董事会应阻止此类行为恶化。我曾在1993年致股东信中讨论董事的责任（如需可索取该部分内容，或可在网站1993年度报告的“公司治理”一栏阅读）。我当时指出，董事“应像代表一个缺席的单一所有者行事，努力维护其长远利益”。这意味着，无论管理者多么讨人喜欢，只要他表现平庸或更差，董事就必须将其解雇。董事应有的反应，就像一位年轻貌美的歌舞女郎面对85岁百万富翁的问题：“如果我没钱了，你还会爱我吗？”她回答得非常得体：“当然，我会想你的，但我的爱不会改变。”
In the 1993 annual report, I also said directors had another job: “If able but greedy managers over-reach and try to dip too deeply into the shareholders’ pockets, directors must slap their hands.” Since I wrote that, over-reaching has become common but few hands have been slapped.
在1993年年报中我还指出，董事还有另一个职责：“当有能力但贪婪的经理人伸手太深、试图掏空股东口袋时，董事必须拍案制止。”自那以后，越界行为变得普遍，但真正被打手的却寥寥无几。
Why have intelligent and decent directors failed so miserably? The answer lies not in inadequate laws – it's always been clear that directors are obligated to represent the interests of shareholders – but rather in what I'd call "boardroom atmosphere."
为什么聪明而正直的董事们会失败得如此惨重？答案并非法律不完善——董事应代表股东利益这一点始终清晰明确——而是源于我称之为“董事会气氛”的因素。
It’s almost impossible, for example, in a boardroom populated by well-mannered people, to raise the question of whether the CEO should be replaced. It’s equally awkward to question a proposed acquisition that has been endorsed by the CEO, particularly when his inside staff and outside advisors are present and unanimously support his decision. (They wouldn’t be in the room if they didn’t.) Finally, when the compensation committee – armed, as always, with support from a high-paid consultant – reports on a megagrant of options to the CEO, it would be like belching at the dinner table for a director to suggest that the committee reconsider.
例如，在一个由彬彬有礼的人组成的董事会中，几乎不可能提出是否应更换CEO的问题。同样地，质疑一项已被CEO认可的并购提案也极为尴尬，特别是当他的内部团队和外部顾问在场且一致支持这一决定时。（如果他们不支持，根本不会出现在这个场合。）最后，当薪酬委员会——一如既往地依靠高薪顾问的支持——向董事会报告给CEO授予巨额期权的决议时，若董事建议委员会重新考虑，那简直就像在餐桌上放了个响屁一样不合时宜。
These “social” difficulties argue for outside directors regularly meeting without the CEO – a reform that is being instituted and that I enthusiastically endorse. I doubt, however, that most of the other new governance rules and recommendations will provide benefits commensurate with the monetary and other costs they impose.
这些“社交性”困难说明，独立董事应定期在没有CEO参与的情况下开会——这项改革正在推行，我对此表示热烈支持。但我怀疑，其他大多数新出台的治理规则和建议所带来的效益，能否与它们所造成的金钱和其他成本相匹配。
The current cry is for “independent” directors. It is certainly true that it is desirable to have directors who think and speak independently – but they must also be business-savvy, interested and shareholder-oriented. In my 1993 commentary, those are the three qualities I described as essential.
当前人们呼吁“独立”董事。的确，拥有能够独立思考和表达的董事是可取的——但他们还必须具备商业头脑、有兴趣并以股东利益为导向。在我1993年的评论中，我把这三点视为关键素质。
Over a span of 40 years, I have been on 19 public-company boards (excluding Berkshire’s) and have interacted with perhaps 250 directors. Most of them were “independent” as defined by today’s rules. But the great majority of these directors lacked at least one of the three qualities I value. As a result, their contribution to shareholder well-being was minimal at best and, too often, negative. These people, decent and intelligent though they were, simply did not know enough about business and/or care enough about shareholders to question foolish acquisitions or egregious compensation. My own behavior, I must ruefully add, frequently fell short as well: Too often I was silent when management made proposals that I judged to be counter to the interests of shareholders. In those cases, collegiality trumped independence.
在过去40年里，我曾担任过19家上市公司（不含伯克希尔）的董事，并与大约250位董事共事过。其中大多数人按今天的定义属于“独立”董事。但绝大多数人至少缺乏我所看重的三项品质之一。因此，他们对股东福祉的贡献至多微乎其微，很多时候甚至是负面的。这些人虽正直聪明，却要么不够懂企业，要么不够关心股东，以至于无法质疑愚蠢的收购或荒唐的薪酬安排。我也必须遗憾地承认，我自己常常表现不佳：当管理层提出的议案我认为违背了股东利益时，我往往保持沉默。在这种情况下，“同事情谊”压倒了独立判断。
So that we may further see the failings of “independence,” let’s look at a 62-year case study covering thousands of companies. Since 1940, federal law has mandated that a large proportion of the directors of investment companies (most of these mutual funds) be independent. The requirement was originally 40% and now it is 50%. In any case, the typical fund has long operated with a majority of directors who qualify as independent.
为了进一步看清所谓“独立”的缺陷，我们来看一个长达62年、覆盖数千家公司的案例研究。自1940年以来，联邦法律就规定投资公司（主要是共同基金）的大部分董事必须为“独立”董事。最初要求是40%，现在已提高到50%。无论如何，典型的基金长期以来都由多数“独立”董事组成。
These directors and the entire board have many perfunctory duties, but in actuality have only two important responsibilities: obtaining the best possible investment manager and negotiating with that manager for the lowest possible fee. When you are seeking investment help yourself, those two goals are the only ones that count, and directors acting for other investors should have exactly the same priorities. Yet when it comes to independent directors pursuing either goal, their record has been absolutely pathetic.
这些董事以及整个董事会虽然有许多形式上的职责，但实际上只承担两项重要责任：挑选最优秀的投资经理，并与其谈判争取最低管理费用。当你自己寻求投资帮助时，这两个目标就是全部意义所在；代表他人投资者行事的董事也应如此。然而，就“独立”董事在这两个目标上的实际表现而言，他们的记录可以说是惨不忍睹。
Many thousands of investment-company boards meet annually to carry out the vital job of selecting who will manage the savings of the millions of owners they represent. Year after year the directors of Fund A select manager A, Fund B directors select manager B, etc. ... in a zombie-like process that makes a mockery of stewardship. Very occasionally, a board will revolt. But for the most part, a monkey will type out a Shakespeare play before an “independent” mutual-fund director will suggest that his fund look at other managers, even if the incumbent manager has persistently delivered substandard performance. When they are handling their own money, of course, directors will look to alternative advisors – but it never enters their minds to do so when they are acting as fiduciaries for others.
成千上万的投资基金管理公司在每年召开的董事会上履行着选择投资经理这一关键职责——他们代表着数百万投资者的储蓄。年复一年，A基金的董事选A经理，B基金的董事选B经理……这是一种僵尸式的流程，是对受托责任的讽刺。偶尔会有董事会反抗一下。但在大多数情况下，一只猴子打出莎士比亚剧本的可能性，都比一位“独立”的共同基金经理提议更换经理要高得多，即使现任经理长期表现糟糕。当然，当他们处理自己的资金时，董事们会寻找不同的顾问——但作为他人的受托人时，他们从没想到要做同样的事。
The hypocrisy permeating the system is vividly exposed when a fund management company – call it “A” – is sold for a huge sum to Manager “B”. Now the “independent” directors experience a “counter-revelation” and decide that Manager B is the best that can be found – even though B was available (and ignored) in previous years. Not so incidentally, B also could formerly have been hired at a far lower rate than is possible now that it has bought Manager A. That’s because B has laid out a fortune to acquire A, and B must now recoup that cost through fees paid by the A shareholders who were “delivered” as part of the deal. (For a terrific discussion of the mutual fund business, read John Bogle’s Common Sense on Mutual Funds.)
系统中的虚伪在一种情形下暴露得尤为明显：一家基金管理公司（称为“A”）以高价被卖给管理者“B”。这时，“独立”董事突然“顿悟”，认定B是最好的选择——尽管B早几年就存在却被忽视。更值得注意的是，过去B的收费远低于现在它接手A后的水平。因为B花了大笔资金收购A，现在它必须通过A的客户收取更高费用来收回成本。（关于共同基金业务的精彩讨论，请阅读John Bogle所著《共同基金常识》。）
A few years ago, my daughter was asked to become a director of a family of funds managed by a major institution. The fees she would have received as a director were very substantial, enough to have increased her annual income by about 50% (a boost, she will tell you, she could use!). Legally, she would have been an independent director. But did the fund manager who approached her think there was any chance that she would think independently as to what advisor the fund should employ? Of course not. I am proud to say that she showed real independence by turning down the offer. The fund, however, had no trouble filling the slot (and – surprise – the fund has not changed managers).
几年前，我的女儿被邀请加入一家大型机构管理的一组基金的董事会。作为董事，她将获得相当可观的报酬，足以使她的年收入增加约50%（她说这笔钱她确实需要）。从法律上看，她会被视为“独立”董事。但这位基金发起方真的相信她会对该基金聘请哪家顾问提出独立意见吗？当然不是。我很自豪地说，她拒绝了这份邀约，展现了真正的独立精神。而这家基金很快便找到了替代人选（不出所料，基金并未更换管理人）。
Investment company directors have failed as well in negotiating management fees (just as compensation committees of many American companies have failed to hold the compensation of their CEOs to sensible levels). If you or I were empowered, I can assure you that we could easily negotiate materially lower management fees with the incumbent managers of most mutual funds. And, believe me, if directors were promised a portion of any fee savings they realized, the skies would be filled with falling fees. Under the current system, though, reductions mean nothing to “independent” directors while meaning everything to managers. So guess who wins?
投资公司董事们在协商管理费方面也失败了（正如许多美国公司的薪酬委员会未能将CEO薪酬控制在合理水平一样）。如果你我拥有实权，我可以肯定地说，我们能轻松与大多数共同基金的现任经理谈出更低的管理费。请相信我，如果董事能分得部分节省下来的费用，管理费一定会像雪崩一样下降。但在现行体制下，费用降低对“独立”董事毫无意义，对经理来说却至关重要。猜猜谁才是最终赢家？
Having the right money manager, of course, is far more important to a fund than reducing the manager’s fee. Both tasks are nonetheless the job of directors. And in stepping up to these all-important responsibilities, tens of thousands of “independent” directors, over more than six decades, have failed miserably. (They’ve succeeded, however, in taking care of themselves; their fees from serving on multiple boards of a single “family” of funds often run well into six figures.)
当然，对一只基金而言，找到正确的投资经理远比降低管理费更重要。这两项任务都是董事的责任。但在履行这些至关重要的职责方面，数十万名“独立”董事在过去六十多年里几乎全面失败。（不过他们在照顾自身利益方面倒是成绩斐然；很多董事在一个基金“家族”中担任多个董事会成员，所得酬劳常达六位数以上。）
When the manager cares deeply and the directors don’t, what’s needed is a powerful countervailing force – and that’s the missing element in today’s corporate governance. Getting rid of mediocre CEOs and eliminating overreaching by the able ones requires action by owners – big owners.
当经理人极度关注自身利益，而董事却漠不关心时，我们需要一种强大的制衡力量——而这正是今日公司治理中缺失的要素。驱逐平庸的CEO、遏制优秀经理的过度行为，都需要股东——尤其是大股东——采取行动。
The logistics aren’t that tough: The ownership of stock has grown increasingly concentrated in recent decades, and today it would be easy for institutional managers to exert their will on problem situations. Twenty, or even fewer, of the largest institutions, acting together, could effectively reform corporate governance at a given company, simply by withholding their votes for directors who were tolerating odious behavior. In my view, this kind of concerted action is the only way that corporate stewardship can be meaningfully improved.
操作起来并不困难：近年来股权日益集中，如今机构投资者只需联手即可对公司治理问题施加影响。只要联合前二十家、甚至更少的大型机构，就可以通过拒绝投票支持容忍不当行为的董事来有效改善公司治理。在我看来，唯有这种协同行动才能真正提升公司受托管理水平。
Unfortunately, certain major investing institutions have “glass house” problems in arguing for better governance elsewhere; they would shudder, for example, at the thought of their own performance and fees being closely inspected by their own boards. But Jack Bogle of Vanguard fame, Chris Davis of Davis Advisors, and Bill Miller of Legg Mason are now offering leadership in getting CEOs to treat their owners properly. Pension funds, as well as other fiduciaries, will reap better investment returns in the future if they support these men.
不幸的是，某些主要投资机构自身也存在类似“玻璃房子”的问题，他们很难理直气壮地推动别家公司改善治理；比如，若他们的董事会认真审查他们自己的业绩和收费情况，他们恐怕也会胆战心惊。但先锋集团（Vanguard）的Jack Bogle、Davis Advisors的Chris Davis以及Legg Mason的Bill Miller正在引领变革，促使CEO们善待股东。养老基金及其他受托机构若能支持他们，未来必将收获更好的投资回报。
The acid test for reform will be CEO compensation. Managers will cheerfully agree to board “diversity,” attest to SEC filings and adopt meaningless proposals relating to process. What many will fight, however, is a hard look at their own pay and perks.
改革的试金石将是CEO薪酬问题。经理人会愉快地接受董事会“多元化”，会在SEC文件中签字，也会采纳一些无关痛痒的程序性建议。但他们最不愿面对的，是对自己薪酬和福利的深入审视。
In recent years compensation committees too often have been tail-wagging puppy dogs meekly following recommendations by consultants, a breed not known for allegiance to the faceless shareholders who pay their fees. (If you can’t tell whose side someone is on, they are not on yours.) True, each committee is required by the SEC to state its reasoning about pay in the proxy. But the words are usually boilerplate written by the company’s lawyers or its human-relations department.
近年来，薪酬委员会往往成了听命于咨询机构的尾巴小狗，盲目接受建议，而这些顾问的忠诚度显然不在那些默默无闻、支付他们费用的股东身上。（如果你看不出某人站在哪一边，那他就不是站在你这边。）诚然，SEC要求薪酬委员会在代理声明中说明薪酬决策理由。但通常这些说辞不过是公司律师或人力资源部门套话拼凑出来的模板。
This costly charade should cease. Directors should not serve on compensation committees unless they are themselves capable of negotiating on behalf of owners. They should explain both how they think about pay and how they measure performance. Dealing with shareholders’ money, moreover, they should behave as they would were it their own.
这场代价高昂的闹剧应当结束。除非董事本身有能力代表股东进行谈判，否则就不应进入薪酬委员会。他们应解释自己如何设定薪酬、又如何衡量绩效。而且，既然动用的是股东的钱，他们就应该像使用自己的钱那样谨慎负责。
In the 1890s, Samuel Gompers described the goal of organized labor as “More!” In the 1990s, America’s CEOs adopted his battle cry. The upshot is that CEOs have often amassed riches while their shareholders have experienced financial disasters.
19世纪90年代，Samuel Gompers将工会的目标概括为“更多！”到了90年代，美国的CEO们也继承了这一口号。结果往往是CEO们财富暴增，而股东们却遭遇财务灾难。
Directors should stop such piracy. There’s nothing wrong with paying well for truly exceptional business performance. But, for anything short of that, it’s time for directors to shout “Less!” It would be a travesty if the bloated pay of recent years became a baseline for future compensation. Compensation committees should go back to the drawing boards.
董事们应制止这种掠夺式行为。为真正卓越的商业表现支付高额报酬无可厚非。但对于达不到这种标准的表现，董事们是时候喊出“少些！”了。如果近几年高管天价薪酬成为未来薪酬设定的基准，那将是一场悲剧。薪酬委员会应回归起点，重拟方案。
Rules that have been proposed and that are almost certain to go into effect will require changes in Berkshire’s board, obliging us to add directors who meet the codified requirements for “independence.”
即将出台并几乎肯定会生效的新规将要求我们对伯克希尔董事会进行调整，迫使我们增加符合“独立性”成文标准的董事。
Doing so, we will add a test that we believe is important, but far from determinative, in fostering independence: We will select directors who have huge and true ownership interests (that is, stock that they or their family have purchased, not been given by Berkshire or received via options), expecting those interests to influence their actions to a degree that dwarfs other considerations such as prestige and board fees.
我们将引入一个我们认为重要但并非决定性的判断标准来促进真正的独立：我们会选择那些拥有巨额真实持股利益（即他们或其家族自购股票，而非从伯克希尔获得赠与或期权所得）的人担任董事。我们希望这种经济利益能压倒其他考量因素，如名誉和董事津贴。
That gets to an often-overlooked point about directors’ compensation, which at public companies averages perhaps $50,000 annually. It baffles me how the many directors who look to these dollars for perhaps 20% or more of their annual income can be considered independent when Ron Olson, for example, who is on our board, may be deemed not independent because he receives a tiny percentage of his very large income from Berkshire legal fees.
这引出了一个常被忽视的问题：公众公司的董事薪酬平均每年约5万美元。我不明白的是，很多董事年收入中高达20%甚至更多来自这些费用，却被视为独立；而以我们的董事Ron Olson为例，他从伯克希尔获得的律师费仅占其极高收入的极小比例，却可能被视为不独立。
As the investment company saga suggests, a director whose moderate income is heavily dependent on directors’ fees – and who hopes mightily to be invited to join other boards in order to earn more fees – is highly unlikely to offend a CEO or fellow directors, who in a major way will determine his reputation in corporate circles.
正如共同基金行业的故事所揭示的那样，一位收入中等、却高度依赖董事酬劳，并渴望获得更多董事席位以获取更多报酬的董事，几乎不可能去冒犯CEO或其他董事——这些人将在很大程度上决定他在企业界的声誉。
If regulators believe that “significant” money taints independence (and it certainly can), they have overlooked a massive class of possible offenders.
如果监管者认为“重大”资金会影响独立性（当然确实如此），那他们显然忽略了一大类潜在问题人物。
At Berkshire, wanting our fees to be meaningless to our directors, we pay them only a pittance. Additionally, not wanting to insulate our directors from any corporate disaster we might have, we don’t provide them with officers’ and directors’ liability insurance (an unorthodoxy that, not so incidentally, has saved our shareholders many millions of dollars over the years).
在伯克希尔，我们希望董事薪酬对他们而言微不足道，因此只支付极低的费用。此外，为了避免让董事免受任何公司灾难的影响，我们也不提供董监事责任险（这一非主流做法多年来为股东节省了数百万美元）。
Basically, we want the behavior of our directors to be driven by the effect their decisions will have on their family’s net worth, not by their compensation. That’s the equation for Charlie and me as managers, and we think it’s the right one for Berkshire directors as well.
归根结底，我们希望董事们的行为是基于其决策对其家庭净资产的影响，而不是基于他们的薪酬。这也是查理和我作为管理者的原则，我们认为它同样适用于伯克希尔的董事。
To find new directors, we will look through our shareholders list for people who directly, or in their family, have had large Berkshire holdings – in the millions of dollars – for a long time. Individuals making that cut should automatically meet two of our tests, namely that they be interested in Berkshire and shareholder-oriented. In our third test, we will look for business savvy, a competence that is far from commonplace.
为了寻找新董事，我们将从股东名单中筛选出长期个人或家族持有伯克希尔数百万美元股份的人选。这类人选自然满足我们三项标准中的两项：热爱伯克希尔、以股东利益为导向。第三项标准则是商业洞察力，这是一种极为稀缺的能力。
Finally, we will continue to have members of the Buffett family on the board. They are not there to run the business after I die, nor will they then receive compensation of any kind. Their purpose is to ensure, for both our shareholders and managers, that Berkshire’s special culture will be nurtured when I’m succeeded by other CEOs.
最后，我们仍将继续安排巴菲特家族成员进入董事会。他们不是为了在我去世后接管公司，也不会从中领取任何形式的报酬。他们的作用是向股东和经理人保证，在我之后由其他CEO领导时，伯克希尔独特的文化仍将得以延续。
Any change we make in the composition of our board will not alter the way Charlie and I run Berkshire. We will continue to emphasize substance over form in our work and waste as little time as possible during board meetings in show-and-tell and perfunctory activities. The most important job of our board is likely to be the selection of successors to Charlie and me, and that is a matter upon which it will focus.
我们对董事会构成的任何改变都不会影响查理和我对伯克希尔的管理方式。我们仍将继续重视实质胜于形式，在董事会上尽量减少作秀式的汇报和例行公事的时间。董事会最重要的职责，很可能仍然是选择我和查理的继任者，这一点也将成为其关注重点。
The board we have had up to now has overseen a shareholder-oriented business, consistently run in accord with the economic principles set forth on pages 68-74 (which I urge all new shareholders to read). Our goal is to obtain new directors who are equally devoted to those principles.
迄今为止的董事会一直在监督一家以股东利益为核心的企业，并始终遵循第68至74页所述的经济原则（我建议所有新股东阅读）。我们的目标是继续引入同样忠于这些原则的新董事。
# The Audit Committee（审计委员会）
Audit committees can’t audit. Only a company’s outside auditor can determine whether the earnings that a management purports to have made are suspect. Reforms that ignore this reality and that instead focus on the structure and charter of the audit committee will accomplish little.
审计委员会本身无法执行审计。只有外部审计师才能判断管理层声称实现的盈利是否值得怀疑。如果改革忽略了这一现实，转而去关注审计委员会的结构和章程，那么成效将非常有限。
As we’ve discussed, far too many managers have fudged their company’s numbers in recent years, using both accounting and operational techniques that are typically legal but that nevertheless materially mislead investors. Frequently, auditors knew about these deceptions. Too often, however, they remained silent. The key job of the audit committee is simply to get the auditors to divulge what they know.
正如我们讨论过的，近年来太多经理人使用看似合法、实则严重误导投资者的会计与运营手段篡改数据。审计师往往知道这些操作，但他们却经常保持沉默。审计委员会的关键任务，就是促使审计师说出他们所知的事实。
To do this job, the committee must make sure that the auditors worry more about misleading its members than about offending management. In recent years auditors have not felt that way. They have instead generally viewed the CEO, rather than the shareholders or directors, as their client. That has been a natural result of day-to-day working relationships and also of the auditors’ understanding that, no matter what the book says, the CEO and CFO pay their fees and determine whether they are retained for both auditing and other work.
要完成这项任务，委员会必须确保审计师更担心误导委员会成员，而不是得罪管理层。然而近年来，审计师的心态并非如此。他们普遍将CEO而非股东或董事视为客户。这是日常合作的自然结果，也因为审计师清楚地知道，无论制度如何规定，真正支付费用、并决定是否继续聘用他们的，是CEO和CFO，不仅包括审计工作，还包括其他业务。
The rules that have been recently instituted won’t materially change this reality. What will break this cozy relationship is audit committees unequivocally putting auditors on the spot, making them understand they will become liable for major monetary penalties if they don’t come forth with what they know or suspect.
最近出台的规定不太可能实质性改变这一现状。真正能打破这种亲密关系的方式，是审计委员会明确施压，让审计师意识到：如果不主动披露其所知或所疑，他们将面临严重的经济处罚。
In my opinion, audit committees can accomplish this goal by asking four questions of auditors, the answers to which should be recorded and reported to shareholders. These questions are:
在我看来，审计委员会可通过向审计师提出以下四个问题来达成目标，这些问题的答案应记录在案并向股东披露：
If the auditor were solely responsible for preparation of the company’s financial statements, would they have in any way been prepared differently from the manner selected by management?
This question should cover both material and nonmaterial differences. If the auditor would have done something differently, both management’s argument and the auditor’s response should be disclosed. The audit committee should then evaluate the facts.
如果审计师单独负责编制公司财务报表，是否会与管理层所采用的方式有所不同？该问题应涵盖重大与非重大会计差异。若存在不同意见，管理层的观点与审计师的回应都应予以披露，然后由审计委员会评估事实。If the auditor were an investor, would he have received – in plain English – the information essential to his understanding the company’s financial performance during the reporting period?
如果审计师自己是一名投资者，他是否能通过通俗易懂的语言获得理解公司在报告期间财务表现所需的全部关键信息？Is the company following the same internal audit procedure that would be followed if the auditor himself were CEO? If not, what are the differences and why?
公司当前使用的内部审计程序，是否与审计师本人若担任CEO时会采取的程序一致？如不一致，区别何在？原因是什么？Is the auditor aware of any actions – either accounting or operational – that have had the purpose and effect of moving revenues or expenses from one reporting period to another?
审计师是否察觉到任何会计或运营上的行为，其目的及效果是将收入或支出从一个报告期转移到另一个报告期？
If the audit committee asks these questions, its composition – the focus of most reforms – is of minor importance. In addition, the procedure will save time and expense. When auditors are put on the spot, they will do their duty. If they are not put on the spot … well, we have seen the results of that.
如果审计委员会真能提出这些问题，那么其组成（大多数改革的关注点）就变得次要。同时，这一流程还能节省时间和成本。一旦审计师被置于压力之下，他们会履行职责。反之……我们已经看到后果。
The questions we have enumerated should be asked at least a week before an earnings report is released to the public. That timing will allow differences between the auditors and management to be aired with the committee and resolved. If the timing is tighter – if an earnings release is imminent when the auditors and committee interact – the committee will feel pressure to rubberstamp the prepared figures. Haste is the enemy of accuracy.
上述四个问题应在财报发布至少一周前提出。这样可以让审计师与管理层之间的分歧提交给委员会并加以解决。若时间紧迫——比如审计师与委员会接触时财报已迫在眉睫——委员会将承受巨大压力去批准既定数字。仓促行事只会损害准确性。
My thinking, in fact, is that the SEC’s recent shortening of reporting deadlines will hurt the quality of information that shareholders receive. Charlie and I believe that rule is a mistake and should be rescinded.
事实上，我认为美国证券交易委员会（SEC）近期缩短财报截止日的做法会降低股东收到的信息质量。查理和我都认为这项规则是个错误，应当撤销。
The primary advantage of our four questions is that they will act as a prophylactic. Once the auditors know that the audit committee will require them to affirmatively endorse, rather than merely acquiesce to, management’s actions, they will resist misdoings early in the process, well before specious figures become embedded in the company’s books. Fear of the plaintiff’s bar will see to that.
我们提出的这四个问题的最大优势在于它们具有预防性。一旦审计师知道审计委员会将要求他们必须明确支持管理层行为（而非只是默许），他们就会在虚假数字入账之前尽早抵制不当行为。对原告律师团的恐惧也会促使他们这样做。
The Chicago Tribune ran a four-part series on Arthur Andersen last September that did a great job of illuminating how accounting standards and audit quality have eroded in recent years. A few decades ago, an Arthur Andersen audit opinion was the gold standard of the profession. Within the firm, an elite Professional Standards Group (PSG) insisted on honest reporting, no matter what pressures were applied by the client. Sticking to these principles, the PSG took a stand in 1992 that the cost of stock options should be recorded as the expense it clearly was.
去年九月，《芝加哥论坛报》发表了四篇关于Arthur Andersen的文章，出色地揭示了近年来会计标准和审计质量是如何滑坡的。几十年前，安达信的审计意见曾是业内黄金标准。在其内部，有一个精英部门“专业标准组”（PSG），坚持诚实报告，不管客户施加多大压力。1992年，该小组坚持认为股票期权的成本应作为费用入账，尽管这明显是一项费用。
The PSG’s position was reversed, however, by the “rainmaking” partners of Andersen who knew what their clients wanted – higher reported earnings no matter what the reality. Many CEOs also fought expensing because they knew that the obscene megagrants of options they craved would be slashed if the true costs of these had to be recorded.
然而，安达信内那些“创收合伙人”推翻了PSG的立场。他们清楚客户的真正诉求——无论现实如何，只要报告更高的利润。许多CEO也反对将期权列为费用，因为他们知道，一旦真实成本被记录，他们梦寐以求的大额期权奖励将会大幅缩水。
Soon after the Andersen reversal, the independent accounting standards board (FASB) voted 7-0 for expensing options. Predictably, the major auditing firms and an army of CEOs stormed Washington to pressure the Senate – what better institution to decide accounting questions? – into castrating the FASB.
安达信立场转变不久后，独立会计准则制定机构FASB以7比0投票通过将期权列为费用。不出所料，各大审计公司和一众CEO迅速涌向华盛顿，试图游说参议院——还有什么比参议院更适合裁定会计问题的机构呢？——最终成功削弱FASB的权威。
The voices of the protesters were amplified by their large political contributions, usually made with corporate money belonging to the very owners about to be bamboozled. It was not a sight for a civics class.
抗议者的声音因大量政治捐款而放大，而这些钱往往正是属于那些即将被蒙蔽的股东。这不是适合公民课教学的内容。
To its shame, the Senate voted 88-9 against expensing. Several prominent Senators even called for the demise of the FASB if it didn’t abandon its position. (So much for independence.) Arthur Levitt, Jr., then Chairman of the SEC – and generally a vigilant champion of shareholders – has since described his reluctant bowing to Congressional and corporate pressures as the act of his chairmanship that he most regrets. (The details of this sordid affair are related in Levitt’s excellent book, Take on the Street.)
参议院以88比9的压倒性票数反对将期权费用化，令人羞耻。几位重量级参议员甚至威胁称，若FASB不放弃其立场，就将其废除。（独立性何在？）当时的美国证券交易委员会（SEC）主席小阿瑟·莱维特（Arthur Levitt, Jr.），通常被认为是股东权益的坚定捍卫者，后来曾表示自己屈服于国会和企业界的强大压力是他任期内最懊悔的一件事。（这场肮脏交易的细节详见莱维特所著《挑战华尔街》，一本精彩之作。）
With the Senate in its pocket and the SEC outgunned, corporate America knew that it was now boss when it came to accounting. With that, a new era of anything-goes earnings reports – blessed and, in some cases, encouraged by big-name auditors – was launched. The licentious behavior that followed quickly became an air pump for The Great Bubble.
有了参议院的支持，SEC也无力抗衡，美国企业界深知自己已掌控会计规则制定权。从此开启了“随心所欲”的财报时代——一些知名审计机构不仅默许，甚至鼓励此类做法。随后蔓延的放纵行为迅速成为推动“大泡沫”膨胀的重要推手。
After being threatened by the Senate, FASB backed off its original position and adopted an “honor system” approach, declaring expensing to be preferable but also allowing companies to ignore the cost if they wished. The disheartening result: Of the 500 companies in the S&P, 498 adopted the method deemed less desirable, which of course let them report higher “earnings.” Compensation-hungry CEOs loved this outcome: Let FASB have the honor; they had the system.
在参议院的压力下，FASB退让了原立场，转而采用一种“自律机制”，即声明应将期权列为费用，但也允许公司选择忽略这一成本。结果令人沮丧：标普500中，有498家公司选择了被认为更不合适的处理方式，当然这样可以报告更高的“盈利”。对薪酬如饥似渴的CEO们自然对此欣喜若狂：让FASB保全名声吧，他们掌握了实质利益。
In our 1992 annual report, discussing the unseemly and self-serving behavior of so many CEOs, I said “the business elite risks losing its credibility on issues of significance to society – about which it may have much of value to say – when it advocates the incredible on issues of significance to itself.”
在1992年的年报中，谈到许多CEO令人反感且自私的行为时，我曾写道：“当商界精英在事关自身的问题上主张荒谬观点时，他们在社会重大议题上的可信度——尽管他们在这些议题上可能有很多真知灼见——也将面临丧失的风险。”
That loss of credibility has occurred. The job of CEOs is now to regain America’s trust – and for the country’s sake it’s important that they do so. They will not succeed in this endeavor, however, by way of fatuous ads, meaningless policy statements, or structural changes of boards and committees. Instead, CEOs must embrace stewardship as a way of life and treat their owners as partners, not patsies. It’s time for CEOs to walk the walk.
这种信任危机已经发生。如今CEO们的任务是重新赢得美国公众的信任——为了国家利益，这至关重要。然而，靠浮夸广告、空洞政策声明或董事会与委员会结构改革，他们无法实现这一点。相反，CEO必须真正践行受托责任，并将股东视为合伙人而非冤大头。现在是时候用实际行动来证明诚意了。
Three suggestions for investors:
给投资者的三项建议：
First, beware of companies displaying weak accounting. If a company still does not expense options, or if its pension assumptions are fanciful, watch out. When managements take the low road in aspects that are visible, it is likely they are following a similar path behind the scenes. There is seldom just one cockroach in the kitchen.
第一，警惕那些会计手段薄弱的公司。如果一家公司仍拒绝将股票期权计入费用，或者养老金假设过于理想化，请提高警觉。管理层若在明面上走低俗路线，暗地里往往也会如此。厨房里很少只有一只蟑螂。
Trumpeting EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) is a particularly pernicious practice. Doing so implies that depreciation is not truly an expense, given that it is a “non-cash” charge. That’s nonsense. In truth, depreciation is a particularly unattractive expense because the cash outlay it represents is paid up front, before the asset acquired has delivered any benefits to the business. Imagine, if you will, that at the beginning of this year a company paid all of its employees for the next ten years of their service (in the way they would lay out cash for a fixed asset to be useful for ten years). In the following nine years, compensation would be a “non-cash” expense – a reduction of a prepaid compensation asset established this year. Would anyone care to argue that the recording of the expense in years two through ten would be simply a bookkeeping formality?
高调宣传EBITDA（息税折旧及摊销前利润）是一种特别有害的做法。这样做暗示折旧不是真实支出，因为它是“非现金”科目。这是胡说八道。事实上，折旧是一项尤其不可取的支出，因为其所代表的现金支付早在资产尚未带来任何收益之前就已经支出。试想一下，如果一家公司在年初一次性支付员工未来十年的工资（就像为一项使用年限为十年的固定资产提前付清），那么接下来九年的薪酬开支就成了“非现金”项目——即本年度预付薪酬资产的逐步摊销。还有人会认为第二年至第十年的这笔费用只是个账面形式吗？
Second, unintelligible footnotes usually indicate untrustworthy management. If you can’t understand a footnote or other managerial explanation, it’s usually because the CEO doesn’t want you to. Enron’s descriptions of certain transactions still baffle me.
第二，如果看不懂脚注或其他管理说明，通常是因为CEO不想让你看懂。难以理解的脚注往往是管理层不值得信赖的信号。安然公司对某些交易的描述至今仍让我一头雾水。
Finally, be suspicious of companies that trumpet earnings projections and growth expectations. Businesses seldom operate in a tranquil, no-surprise environment, and earnings simply don’t advance smoothly (except, of course, in the offering books of investment bankers).
最后，对那些高调宣扬盈利预测和增长预期的公司保持怀疑。企业运营环境很少风平浪静、毫无意外，盈利也不可能平稳上升（当然投资银行的发行说明书除外）。
Charlie and I not only don’t know today what our businesses will earn next year – we don’t even know what they will earn next quarter. We are suspicious of those CEOs who regularly claim they do know the future – and we become downright incredulous if they consistently reach their declared targets. Managers that always promise to “make the numbers” will at some point be tempted to make up the numbers.
查理和我不仅不知道明年我们的业务能赚多少——我们甚至连下一季度的盈利都无从知晓。我们对那些声称掌握未来走向的CEO持怀疑态度；如果他们总是能达成目标，我们更是完全不相信。那些总承诺“达标”的经理人，终有一天会忍不住篡改数字。
# Shareholder-Designated Contributions（股东指定捐赠）
About 97.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 2002 shareholder-designated contributions program, with contributions totaling $16.5 million.
伯克希尔2002年股东指定捐赠计划的参与率高达97.3%（按可投票股份计），总计捐款金额为1,650万美元。
Cumulatively, over the 22 years of the program, Berkshire has made contributions of $197 million pursuant to the instructions of our shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries, which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $24 million in 2002, including in-kind donations of $4 million.
自该计划实施以来的22年间，伯克希尔根据股东指示累计捐赠达1.97亿美元。此外，我们的子公司延续了收购前的慈善模式（只是它们之前的拥有者自行负责个人慈善）。2002年，各子公司共捐赠2,400万美元，其中实物捐赠400万美元。
To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 2003 will be ineligible for the 2003 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten. Designations received after the due date will not be honored.
要参加未来的股东捐赠计划，你必须持有登记在你自己名下的A股，而非经纪人、银行或托管机构代持的股份。2003年8月31日前未完成实名登记的股份将不具备2003年计划资格。当你收到捐赠表格后，请尽快回寄，以免遗忘或搁置。逾期提交的指定捐赠将不予受理。
# The Annual Meeting（股东大会）
This year’s annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 3, and once again we will be at the Civic Auditorium. The doors will open at 7 a.m., the movie will begin at 8:30, and the meeting itself will commence at 9:30. There will be a short break at noon for food. (Sandwiches will be available at the Civic’s concession stands.) That interlude aside, Charlie and I will answer questions until 3:30. Give us your best shot.
今年的股东大会将于5月3日（星期六）举行，地点再次设在奥马哈市政礼堂。当天早上7点开门，8点半播放影片，9点半正式开始会议。中午安排短暂休息时间用餐（现场小卖部提供三明治）。除了这段时间外，查理和我会一直回答问题至下午3点半。请向我们发问吧！
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. They do a terrific job for us each year, and I thank them for it.
附在本报告代理材料中的附件详细说明了如何获取进入大会及其他活动所需的凭证。至于机票、酒店和租车预订，我们再次与美国运通合作（电话：800-799-6634），为您提供专属协助。他们每年为我们提供了极佳服务，我在此感谢他们的支持。
In our usual fashion, we will run vans from the larger hotels to the meeting. Afterwards, the vans will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim’s and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.
我们将一如既往安排从主要酒店到会场的接送巴士。散会后，巴士还将送大家返回酒店，并前往Nebraska Furniture Mart、Borsheim珠宝店以及机场。即便如此，我还是建议您租一辆车会更方便。
Our exhibit area for Berkshire goods and services will be bigger and better than ever this year. So be prepared to spend. I think you will particularly enjoy visiting The Pampered Chef display, where you may run into Doris and Sheila.
今年伯克希尔旗下产品与服务展览区规模更大、内容更丰富。做好花钱准备吧！我想你会特别喜欢参观The Pampered Chef展位，Doris和Sheila可能会在那里出现。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 41 of the 49 jurisdictions in which we operate. Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money.
GEICO将在展台安排来自全国的多位顶级保险顾问为您服务，随时为您提供汽车保险报价。大多数情况下，您可以享受股东专属折扣（通常是8%）。这项优惠已在我们经营的49个司法管辖区中的41个获得许可。带上您现有保单的详细信息来看看是否能省钱。
On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets® available for your inspection. Just ask a representative at the Civic about viewing any of these planes. If you buy what we consider an appropriate number of items during the weekend, you may well need your own plane to take them home. Furthermore, if you buy a fraction of a plane, I’ll personally see that you get a three-pack of briefs from Fruit of the Loom.
周六在奥马哈机场，我们将照例展示NetJets®旗下的飞机供您参观。只需向会场代表询问即可预约查看。若您在周末期间购买大量商品，或许真得买架飞机才能把东西带回家。另外，如果您购买飞机的部分产权，我本人将亲自确保您获赠一套Fruit of the Loom品牌的三条内裤。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” pricing, which means we will be offering our shareholders a discount that is customarily given only to employees. We initiated this special pricing at NFM six years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $14.2 million in 2002.
位于多奇街与太平洋街之间的72号街占地77英亩的Nebraska Furniture Mart将在“伯克希尔周末”期间推出特价优惠，即股东可享受通常仅限员工享有的折扣。六年前我们首次在NFM推出此活动，当年销售额为530万美元，2002年已增至1,420万美元。
To get the discount, you must make your purchases during the Thursday, May 1 through Monday, May 5 period and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but that, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sundays. On Saturday this year, from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m., we are having a special affair for shareholders only. I’ll be there, eating hot dogs and drinking Coke.
要享受此项折扣，您须于5月1日（星期四）至5月5日（星期一）之间购物，并出示股东大会入场证。此次特价还适用于几家原本严禁打折的知名品牌，它们因支持股东周末活动破例给予优惠。我们感谢他们的配合。NFM平时营业时间为工作日上午10点至晚上9点，周日为上午10点至下午6点。今年星期六晚6点至10点，我们专门为股东举办一场特别活动。我会在现场吃热狗、喝可乐。
Borsheim’s – the largest jewelry store in the country except for Tiffany’s Manhattan store – will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 2. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Sunday, May 4. Ask Charlie to autograph your sales ticket.
美国最大珠宝零售商Borsheim’s（蒂芙尼纽约旗舰店除外）将为股东举办两场专属活动。第一场是5月2日（星期五）晚6点至10点的鸡尾酒会；第二场是5月4日（星期日）上午9点至下午5点的大型庆典。别忘了请查理在你的购物小票上签名留念。
Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid the large crowds that will assemble on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a
股东可享受特价优惠的时间为星期四至星期一，因此若您希望避开星期五晚上和星期日蜂拥而至的人群，请选择其他时间前来，并表明您的股东身份。
shareholder. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. Borsheim’s operates on a gross margin that is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals, so the more you buy, the more you save (or at least that’s what my wife and daughter tell me).
股东。周六当天，营业时间延长至下午6点。Borsheim的毛利率比主要竞争对手低整整二十个百分点，因此您买得越多，省得也越多（至少我太太和女儿是这么告诉我的）。
In the mall outside of Borsheim’s, we will have some of the world’s top bridge experts available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. We expect Bob Hamman, Sharon Osberg, Fred Gitelman and Sheri Winestock to host tables. Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will also be in the mall, taking on all comers — blindfolded! Last year, Patrick played six games simultaneously — with his blindfold securely in place — and for the first time suffered a loss. (He won the other five games, however.) He’s been training overtime ever since and is planning to start a new streak this year.
在Borsheim商场外区域，周日下午我们将邀请世界级桥牌专家与我们的股东切磋技艺。Bob Hamman、Sharon Osban、Fred Gitelman和Sheri Winestock将主持牌桌。此外，两度美国国际象棋冠军Patrick Wolff也将现场蒙眼迎战所有挑战者！去年，Patrick同时进行六盘蒙眼对局，首次遭遇失利（但其余五盘他都赢了）。自那以后他一直加练，今年计划重拾连胜纪录。
Additionally, Bill Robertie, one of only two players who have twice won the backgammon world championship, will be on hand to test your skill at that game. Finally, we will have a newcomer: Peter Morris, the winner of the World Scrabble Championship in 1991. Peter will play on five boards simultaneously (no blindfold for him, however) and will also allow his challengers to consult a Scrabble dictionary.
另外，Bill Robertie——仅有的两位曾两次赢得世界双陆棋冠军的选手之一——也将亲临现场，与大家切磋棋艺。最后，我们迎来一位新朋友：1991年世界拼字游戏（Scrabble）冠军Peter Morris。他将同时进行五盘比赛（不过他不会蒙眼），并允许挑战者查阅拼字词典。
We are also going to test your vocal chords at the mall. My friend, Al Oehrle of Philadelphia, will be at the piano to play any song in any key. Susie and I will lead the singing. She is good.
我们还将在商场举办歌咏活动，测试您的嗓音实力。来自费城的朋友Al Oehrle将弹奏钢琴伴奏，无论什么歌曲、何种调子都不在话下。Susie和我会带领大家合唱，她的歌唱得很好。
Gorat’s — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 4, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on Sunday, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1 (but not before). If Sunday is sold out, try Gorat’s on one of the other evenings you will be in town. Show your sophistication by ordering a rare T-bone with a double order of hash browns.
Gorat是我最喜欢的牛排馆——今年将于5月4日（星期日）专为伯克希尔股东开放，营业时间为下午4点至晚上10点。请注意，若要在星期日前往Gorat用餐，必须提前预约。请于4月1日拨打402-551-3733进行预订（且不可早于该日期）。如果星期日场次已满，您可以选择在其他晚间前往Gorat。点餐时，来一份带血T骨牛排配双份炸土豆饼，展现您的品味。
There won’t be a ball game this year. After my fastball was clocked at 5 mph last year, I decided to hang up my spikes. So I’ll see you on Saturday night at NFM instead.
今年不会有棒球活动。去 年我的快球被测速仪显示只有每小时5英里，于是我决定退役球鞋。因此今年我将在周六晚上的NFM与大家见面。
Next year our meeting will be held at Omaha’s new convention center. This switch in locations will allow us to hold the event on either Saturday or Monday, whichever the majority of you prefer. Using the enclosed special ballot, please vote for your preference – but only if you are likely to attend in the future.
明年股东大会将在奥马哈新建的会议中心举行。地点变更后，我们可在星期六或星期一择日召开，具体由多数股东投票决定。请使用附上的特别选票投出您偏好的日期——但仅当您未来有出席计划时才参与投票。
We will make the Saturday/Monday decision based upon a count of shareholders, not shares. That is, a Class B shareholder owning one share will have a vote equal to that of a Class A shareholder owning many shares. If the vote is close, we will go with the preference of out-of-towners.
星期六/星期一的选择将依据股东人数而非持股数量做出。也就是说，即使只持有一股B股的股东，其投票权与持有大量A股的股东完全相等。若投票结果接近，我们将采纳外地股东的意见。
Again, please vote only if there is a reasonable chance that you will be attending some meetings in the future.
再次提醒：只有当您未来有可能出席股东大会时，请才参与投票。
Warren E. Buffett
February 21, 2003
Chairman of the Board
沃伦·E·巴菲特
2003年2月21日
董事会主席