2000巴菲特致股东的信
# To Our Shareholders (致我们的股东)
Our gain in net worth during 2000 was $3.96 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.5%. Over the last 36 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $40,442, a gain of 23.6% compounded annually.
2000年，我们的净资产增加了39.6亿美元，使得A类和B类股票每股账面价值均增长了6.5%。在过去36年里（即现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值已从19美元增长至40,442美元，年复合增长率达23.6%。
Overall, we had a decent year, our book-value gain having outpaced the performance of the S&P 500. And, though this judgment is necessarily subjective, we believe Berkshire’s gain in per-share intrinsic value moderately exceeded its gain in book value. (Intrinsic value, as well as other key investment and accounting terms and concepts, are explained in our Owner’s Manual on pages 59-66. Intrinsic value is discussed on page 64.)
总体而言，我们度过了不错的一年，账面价值的增长超过了标普500指数的表现。尽管这一判断具有一定的主观性，但我们相信伯克希尔每股内在价值的增长略高于账面价值的增长。（内在价值以及其他关键的投资与会计术语和概念在我们的《股东手册》第59至66页有解释。内在价值详见第64页。）
Furthermore, we completed two significant acquisitions that we negotiated in 1999 and initiated six more. All told, these purchases have cost us about $8 billion, with 97% of that amount paid in cash and 3% in stock. The eight businesses we’ve acquired have aggregate sales of about $13 billion and employ 58,000 people. Still, we incurred no debt in making these purchases, and our shares outstanding have increased only 1/3 of 1%. Better yet, we remain awash in liquid assets and are both eager and ready for even larger acquisitions.
此外，我们在1999年谈判完成的两笔重大收购之外又发起了六笔收购。总计这些收购花费了约80亿美元，其中97%以现金支付，3%通过股票支付。我们收购的这八家公司合计销售额约为130亿美元，员工总数为58,000人。但我们在这些交易中没有新增债务，流通股数量仅增加了三分之一个百分点。更妙的是，我们仍拥有充足的流动资产，对更大规模的收购也做好了准备。
I will detail our purchases in the next section of the report. But I will tell you now that we have embraced the 21st century by entering such cutting-edge industries as brick, carpet, insulation and paint. Try to control your excitement.
我将在报告下一节详细说明我们的收购情况。不过我可以先告诉各位，我们已经迈入了21世纪，进入了诸如砖块、地毯、隔热材料和油漆等“前沿”行业。请尽量控制你们的兴奋情绪。
On the minus side, policyholder growth at GEICO slowed to a halt as the year progressed. It has become much more expensive to obtain new business. I told you last year that we would get our money’s worth from stepped-up advertising at GEICO in 2000, but I was wrong. We’ll examine the reasons later in the report.
不利的一面是，随着年度推进，GEICO的保单持有人增长几近停滞。获取新业务的成本大幅上升。我去年曾告诉各位，我们会从GEICO在2000年增加的广告投入中获得应有价值，但我错了。我们将在报告后面分析原因。
Another negative — which has persisted for several years — is that we see our equity portfolio as only mildly attractive. We own stocks of some excellent businesses, but most of our holdings are fully priced and are unlikely to deliver more than moderate returns in the future. We’re not alone in facing this problem: The long-term prospect for equities in general is far from exciting.
另一个持续多年的问题是，我们认为自己的股票投资组合仅略微具备吸引力。我们持有若干优秀企业的股票，但大多数持仓价格已充分反映其价值，未来很难带来超过适度回报的收益。我们并非独自面对这个问题：整体来看，股票市场的长期前景远非令人振奋。
Finally, there is the negative that recurs annually: Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I are a year older than when we last reported to you. Mitigating this adverse development is the indisputable fact that the age of your top managers is increasing at a considerably lower rate — percentage-wise — than is the case at almost all other major corporations. Better yet, this differential will widen in the future.
最后还有一个每年都会出现的负面因素：查理·芒格（Charlie Munger），伯克希尔副主席兼我的合伙人，以及我自己，又比上次向各位汇报时老了一岁。缓解这一不利变化的是一个不争的事实——以百分比衡量，你们顶级管理层年龄增长的速度远远低于几乎所有其他大型公司。更妙的是，这种差距在未来还将进一步扩大。
Charlie and I continue to aim at increasing Berkshire’s per-share value at a rate that, over time, will modestly exceed the gain from owning the S&P 500. As the table on the facing page shows, a small annual advantage in our favor can, if sustained, produce an anything-but-small long-term advantage. To reach our goal we will need to add a few good businesses to Berkshire’s stable each year, have the businesses we own generally gain in value, and avoid any material increase in our outstanding shares. We are confident about meeting the last two objectives; the first will require some luck.
查理和我将继续致力于使伯克希尔每股价值的增长速度长期小幅超越持有标普500指数所带来的增长。正如对面页面上的表格所示，如果我们能持续保持每年微小的优势，最终将产生显著的长期优势。为了实现目标，我们需要每年为伯克希尔增添几家优质企业，确保我们拥有的企业普遍增值，并避免流通股数量出现实质性增长。我们对达成后两个目标充满信心；第一个目标则需要一些运气。
It’s appropriate here to thank two groups that made my job both easy and fun last year — just as they do every year. First, our operating managers continue to run their businesses in splendid fashion, which allows me to spend my time allocating capital rather than supervising them. (I wouldn’t be good at that anyway.)
在此，我要感谢两个群体，他们让我的工作既轻松又有趣——就像每年一样。首先，我们的运营经理们继续出色地管理着各自的业务，使我得以将时间用于资本配置而非监督他们的工作。（再说一句，我也并不擅长做那种监督工作。）
Our managers are a very special breed. At most large companies, the truly talented divisional managers seldom have the job they really want. Instead they yearn to become CEOs, either at their present employer or elsewhere. Indeed, if they stay put, they and their colleagues are likely to feel they have failed.
我们的经理们非常特别。在大多数大公司里，真正有才华的部门经理往往并没有自己真正想要的工作职位。相反，他们渴望成为CEO，无论是在目前的雇主还是其他公司。事实上，如果他们留在原职，他们和同事很可能会觉得自己失败了。
At Berkshire, our all-stars have exactly the jobs they want, ones that they hope and expect to keep throughout their business lifetimes. They therefore concentrate solely on maximizing the long-term value of the businesses that they “own” and love. If the businesses succeed, they have succeeded. And they stick with us: In our last 36 years, Berkshire has never had a manager of a significant subsidiary voluntarily leave to join another business.
但在伯克希尔，我们的明星经理们都拥有自己理想的工作职位，他们希望并预期能在整个职业生涯中一直保留这些职位。因此，他们专注于最大化自己“拥有”并热爱的企业之长期价值。只要企业成功，他们就成功了。而且他们都愿意留下来：在过去36年里，伯克希尔从未有过一位重要子公司的经理自愿离开加入其他公司。
The other group to which I owe enormous thanks is the home-office staff. After the eight acquisitions more than doubled our worldwide workforce to about 112,000, Charlie and I went soft last year and added one more person at headquarters. (Charlie, bless him, never lets me forget Ben Franklin’s advice: “A small leak can sink a great ship.”) Now we have 13.8 people.
另一群我深深感激的是总部工作人员。在完成八项收购后，我们的全球员工人数翻倍至约112,000人，而我和查理去年却心软了一下，在总部多加了一名员工。（愿上帝保佑查理，他总不忘提醒我本杰明·富兰克林的忠告：“一个小漏洞也能沉没一艘巨轮。”）现在我们总部共有13.8人。
This tiny band works miracles. In 2000 it handled all of the details connected with our eight acquisitions, processed extensive regulatory and tax filings (our tax return covers 4,896 pages), smoothly produced an annual meeting to which 25,000 tickets were issued, and accurately dispensed checks to 3,660 charities designated by our shareholders. In addition, the group dealt with all the routine tasks served up by a company with a revenue run-rate of $40 billion and more than 300,000 owners. And, to add to all of this, the other 12.8 are a delight to be around.
这支小小的团队创造了奇迹。2000年，他们处理了与我们八项收购相关的所有细节，完成了大量的监管和税务申报（我们的纳税申报表长达4,896页），顺利组织了一场发放了25,000张门票的年度股东大会，并准确地向3,660家股东指定的慈善机构发放了支票。此外，这个团队还应对了一家营收年化达到400亿美元、拥有超过30万名股东的公司所面临的全部日常事务。更值得一提的是，其余的12.8位同事也都是相处愉快的人。
I should pay to have my job.
我应该为拥有这份工作而付费。
# Acquisitions of 2000（2000年的收购）
Our acquisition technique at Berkshire is simplicity itself: We answer the phone. I’m also glad to report that it rings a bit more often now, because owners and/or managers increasingly wish to join their companies with Berkshire. Our acquisition criteria are set forth on page 23, and the number to call is 402-346-1400.
伯克希尔的收购方法非常简单：我们接听电话。我也很高兴地告诉大家，电话现在响得更频繁了一些，因为越来越多的所有者和/或经理人希望将自己的公司加入伯克希尔。我们的收购标准见第23页，联系电话是402-346-1400。
Let me tell you a bit about the businesses we have purchased during the past 14 months, starting with the two transactions that were initiated in 1999, but closed in 2000. (This list excludes some smaller purchases that were made by the managers of our subsidiaries and that, in most cases, will be integrated into their operations.)
让我简要介绍一下过去14个月我们收购的一些企业，首先是那两笔于1999年发起、2000年完成的交易。（此列表不包括由子公司管理层进行的一些较小收购，通常这些收购会整合进他们的运营之中。）
- I described the first purchase — 76% of MidAmerican Energy — in last year’s report. Because of regulatory constraints on our voting privileges, we perform only a “one-line” consolidation of MidAmerican’s earnings and equity in our financial statements. If we instead fully consolidated the company’s figures, our revenues in 2000 would have been $5 billion greater than we reported, though net income would remain the same.
我在去年的报告中描述了第一笔收购——收购中美能源公司（MidAmerican Energy）76%的股权。由于监管对我们投票权的限制，我们在财务报表中仅对中美能源的盈利和权益进行了“一行合并”。如果我们将该公司的数据完全合并，我们2000年的收入将比报告中的数字高出50亿美元，但净利润不会改变。
- On November 23, 1999, I received a one-page fax from Bruce Cort that appended a Washington Post article describing an aborted buyout of CORT Business Services. Despite his name, Bruce has no connection with CORT. Rather, he is an airplane broker who had sold Berkshire a jet in 1986 and who, before the fax, had not been in touch with me for about ten years.
1999年11月23日，我收到了布鲁斯·科特（Bruce Cort）发来的一份传真，只有一页纸，附带了一份《华盛顿邮报》的文章，讲述了CORT商业服务公司一次失败的收购尝试。尽管他的名字中有“Cort”，但他与CORT并无关系。他其实是一名飞机经纪人，曾在1986年卖给伯克希尔一架喷气式飞机，而在此次传真之前，我们已有大约十年未联系。
I knew nothing about CORT, but I immediately printed out its SEC filings and liked what I saw. That same day I told Bruce I had a possible interest and asked him to arrange a meeting with Paul Arnold, CORT’s CEO. Paul and I got together on November 29, and I knew at once that we had the right ingredients for a purchase: a fine though unglamorous business, an outstanding manager, and a price (going by that on the failed deal) that made sense.
我对CORT一无所知，但我立即打印出了它提交给美国证券交易委员会（SEC）的文件，并被内容吸引。当天我就告诉布鲁斯我对这家公司有兴趣，并请他安排我和CORT的首席执行官保罗·阿诺德（Paul Arnold）见面。11月29日我们见了面，我立刻意识到这笔交易具备三大要素：一家虽不起眼但质地优良的企业、一位出色的管理者，以及一个合理的价格（参考那次失败交易的价格）。
Operating out of 117 showrooms, CORT is the national leader in “rent-to-rent” furniture, primarily used in offices but also by temporary occupants of apartments. This business, it should be noted, has no similarity to “rent-to-own” operations, which usually involve the sale of home furnishings and electronics to people having limited income and poor credit.
CORT在全国拥有117家展厅，是“租转租”家具行业的全国领导者，其产品主要用于办公场所，也供公寓临时住户使用。请注意，这项业务与“租转买”完全不同，“租转买”通常是指向低收入、信用较差的人群出售家居用品和电子产品。
- We quickly purchased CORT for Wesco, our 80%-owned subsidiary, paying about $386 million in cash. You will find more details about CORT’s operations in Wesco’s 1999 and 2000 annual reports. Both Charlie and I enjoy working with Paul, and CORT looks like a good bet to beat our original expectations.
我们迅速为伯克希尔旗下的80%控股子公司Wesco完成了对CORT的收购，支付了约3.86亿美元现金。关于CORT运营的更多细节可在Wesco 1999和2000年度报告中找到。查理和我都非常乐意与保罗合作，而CORT的表现看起来有望超过我们最初的预期。
- Early last year, Ron Ferguson of General Re put me in contact with Bob Berry, whose family had owned U.S. Liability for 49 years. This insurer, along with two sister companies, is a medium-sized, highly-respected writer of unusual risks — “excess and surplus lines” in insurance jargon. After Bob and I got in touch, we agreed by phone on a half-stock, half-cash deal.
去年年初，通用再保险公司的Ron Ferguson将我介绍给了Bob Berry，他的家族拥有U.S. Liability公司达49年。这家保险公司连同其两家姐妹公司一起，是规模适中但在业内备受尊敬的特殊风险承保商——用保险术语来说就是“超额与非标准险种”。在与Bob取得联系后，我们在电话中达成了一项一半以股票、一半以现金进行交易的协议。
In recent years, Tom Nerney has managed the operation for the Berry family and has achieved a rare combination of excellent growth and unusual profitability. Tom is a powerhouse in other ways as well. In addition to having four adopted children (two from Russia), he has an extended family: the Philadelphia Belles, a young-teen girls basketball team that Tom coaches. The team had a 62-4 record last year and finished second in the AAU national tournament.
近年来，Tom Nerney代表Berry家族管理这家公司，并实现了极为少见的优异增长与异常盈利能力的结合。Tom在其他方面也是一位强人。除了收养了四个孩子（其中两个来自俄罗斯）之外，他还有一支“扩展家庭”——由他担任教练的费城Belles女子青少年篮球队。该队去年取得了62胜4负的战绩，并在美国业余体育联合会（AAU）全国锦标赛中获得亚军。
Few property-casualty companies are outstanding businesses. We have far more than our share, and U.S. Liability adds luster to the collection.
很少有财产与意外险公司具备出色的经营特质。但我们拥有的优质企业远超平均水平，而U.S. Liability则为我们的投资组合增添了光彩。
- Ben Bridge Jeweler was another purchase we made by phone, prior to any face-to-face meeting between me and the management. Ed Bridge, who with his cousin, Jon, manages this 65-store West Coast retailer, is a friend of Barnett Helzberg, from whom we bought Helzberg Diamonds in 1995. Upon learning that the Bridge family proposed to sell its company, Barnett gave Berkshire a strong recommendation. Ed then called and explained his business to me, also sending some figures, and we made a deal, again half for cash and half for stock.
Ben Bridge Jeweler是我们通过电话完成的又一笔收购，在管理层与我见面之前就敲定了交易。Ed Bridge与其堂兄Jon共同管理这家在西海岸拥有65家门店的珠宝零售商，他是我们曾在1995年从其手中收购Helzberg Diamonds的Barnett Helzberg的朋友。当得知Bridge家族有意出售公司时，Barnett向伯克希尔大力推荐。随后Ed打电话给我介绍了他们的业务，并发送了一些财务数据，我们再次达成了一半现金、一半股票的交易。
Ed and Jon are fourth generation owner-managers of a business started 89 years ago in Seattle. Both the business and the family— including Herb and Bob, the fathers of Jon and Ed — enjoy extraordinary reputations. Same-store sales have increased by 9%, 11%, 13%, 10%, 12%, 21% and 7% over the past seven years, a truly remarkable record.
Ed和Jon是这家企业创始以来第四代家族管理者，公司于89年前在西雅图创立。无论是公司本身还是Bridge家族——包括Jon和Ed的父亲Herb与Bob——都享有极高的声誉。过去七年中，同店销售额分别增长了9%、11%、13%、10%、12%、21%和7%，这是一项真正非凡的纪录。
It was vital to the family that the company operate in the future as in the past. No one wanted another jewelry chain to come in and decimate the organization with ideas about synergy and cost saving (which, though they would never work, were certain to be tried). I told Ed and Jon that they would be in charge, and they knew I could be believed: After all, it’s obvious that your Chairman would be a disaster at actually running a store or selling jewelry (though there are members of his family who have earned black belts as purchasers).
对Bridge家族而言，最重要的是公司未来能像以往一样运作。没有人希望另一家珠宝连锁品牌介入并试图通过所谓的协同效应与成本削减来摧毁现有组织架构（尽管这些做法注定失败，但几乎可以肯定会被尝试）。我告诉Ed和Jon他们会继续负责经营，他们也知道我是认真的：毕竟很明显，你们的董事长若真要经营一家商店或销售珠宝将会是一场灾难（虽然他的家人中有人已练成了采购黑带高手）。
In their typically classy way, the Bridges allocated a substantial portion of the proceeds from their sale to the hundreds of co-workers who had helped the company achieve its success. We’re proud to be associated with both the family and the company.
Bridge家族一如既往地展现出高风亮节，他们将部分出售所得分配给帮助公司取得成功的数百名员工。我们为自己能与这个家族及其公司建立合作关系感到自豪。
- In July we acquired Justin Industries, the leading maker of Western boots — including the Justin, Tony Lama, Nocona, and Chippewa brands — and the premier producer of brick in Texas and five neighboring states.
7月，我们收购了Justin Industries，这是一家领先的西部靴制造商，旗下品牌包括Justin、Tony Lama、Nocona和Chippewa，同时也是德克萨斯州及邻近五个州的主要砖块生产商。
Here again, our acquisition involved serendipity. On May 4th, I received a fax from Mark Jones, a stranger to me, proposing that Berkshire join a group to acquire an unnamed company. I faxed him back, explaining that with rare exceptions we don’t invest with others, but would happily pay him a commission if he sent details and we later made a purchase. He replied that the “mystery company” was Justin. I then went to Fort Worth to meet John Roach, chairman of the company and John Justin, who had built the business and was its major shareholder. Soon after, we bought Justin for $570 million in cash.
这次收购又一次得益于机缘巧合。5月4日，我收到了Mark Jones发来的传真，他素未谋面，提议伯克希尔加入一个财团收购一家未具名公司。我回传了一份传真解释说，除极少数例外情况外，我们通常不参与联合投资，但如果他提供详细信息并在我们之后完成购买，我们很乐意支付佣金。他回复称那家“神秘公司”就是Justin。于是我前往沃思堡会见公司董事长John Roach以及创始人兼主要股东John Justin。不久之后，我们以5.7亿美元现金收购了Justin。
John Justin loved Justin Industries but had been forced to retire because of severe health problems (which sadly led to his death in late February). John was a class act — as a citizen, businessman and human being. Fortunately, he had groomed two outstanding managers, Harrold Melton at Acme and Randy Watson at Justin Boot, each of whom runs his company autonomously.
John Justin热爱Justin Industries，但由于严重的健康问题被迫退休（令人遗憾的是，他于2月下旬去世）。John无论作为公民、商人还是人类个体，都是极具风范的人物。幸运的是，他培养出了两位杰出的经理人：Acme的Harrold Melton和Justin Boot的Randy Watson，他们都各自独立自主地经营着自己的公司。
Acme, the larger of the two operations, produces more than one billion bricks per year at its 22 plants, about 11.7% of the industry’s national output. The brick business, however, is necessarily regional, and in its territory Acme enjoys unquestioned leadership. When Texans are asked to name a brand of brick, 75% respond Acme, compared to 16% for the runner-up. (Before our purchase, I couldn’t have named a brand of brick. Could you have?) This brand recognition is not only due to Acme’s product quality, but also reflects many decades of extraordinary community service by both the company and John Justin.
Acme是这两家公司中较大的一家，在其22个工厂年产砖块超过十亿块，约占全美行业总产量的11.7%。然而，砖块产业具有明显的区域性特征，在其服务地区内Acme拥有无可争议的领导地位。当德克萨斯州居民被问及他们知道哪些砖块品牌时，75%的人回答是Acme，而排名第二的品牌只有16%的支持率。（在我们收购前，我自己根本说不出任何砖块品牌名称。你能吗？）这种品牌认知不仅源于Acme的产品质量，还反映了公司及John Justin多年来对社区做出的卓越贡献。
I can’t resist pointing out that Berkshire — whose top management has long been mired in the 19th century — is now one of the very few authentic “clicks-and-bricks” businesses around. We went into 2000 with GEICO doing significant business on the Internet, and then we added Acme. You can bet this move by Berkshire is making them sweat in Silicon Valley.
我忍不住指出，伯克希尔——其最高管理层长期以来似乎仍停留在19世纪——如今已成为为数不多真正的“线上线下融合”（Clicks-and-Bricks）企业之一。我们在2000年已有GEICO在网上开展大量业务，随后又收购了Acme。你们可以打赌，伯克希尔这一举动让硅谷的人们坐立不安。
- In June, Bob Shaw, CEO of Shaw Industries, the world’s largest carpet manufacturer, came to see me with his partner, Julian Saul, and the CEO of a second company with which Shaw was mulling a merger. The potential partner, however, faced huge asbestos liabilities from past activities, and any deal depended on these being eliminated through insurance.
6月，Shaw Industries（全球最大的地毯制造商）CEO Bob Shaw携合伙人Julian Saul，以及另一家正考虑与Shaw合并的公司CEO来访。但潜在合作伙伴因过往业务面临巨额石棉相关负债，而任何交易的前提是这些负债必须通过保险予以解决。
The executives visiting me wanted Berkshire to provide a policy that would pay all future asbestos costs. I explained that though we could write an exceptionally large policy — far larger than any other insurer would ever think of offering — we would never issue a policy that lacked a cap.
来访的高管希望伯克希尔能提供一份保险单，用于支付所有未来的石棉相关成本。我解释道，虽然我们可以出具一份极其高额的保单——远远超出其他保险公司可能提供的额度——但我们永远不会签发没有赔付上限的保单。
Bob and Julian decided that if we didn’t want to bet the ranch on the extent of the acquiree’s liability, neither did they. So their deal died. But my interest in Shaw was sparked, and a few months later Charlie and I met with Bob to work out a purchase by Berkshire. A key feature of the deal was that both Bob and Julian were to continue owning at least 5% of Shaw. This leaves us associated with the best in the business as shown by Bob and Julian’s record: Each built a large, successful carpet business before joining forces in 1998.
Bob和Julian认为，如果我们不愿意押上整个牧场来承担收购对象的全部责任，他们也不愿这么做。于是他们的交易作罢。但此次会面激发了我对Shaw的兴趣。几个月后，查理和我与Bob会面，达成了伯克希尔的收购方案。这笔交易的关键特点是，Bob和Julian将继续持有至少5%的股份。这使我们与行业内最优秀的人才建立了联系，正如Bob和Julian的经历所示：他们在1998年联手之前，各自都曾成功创办过大型地毯企业。
Shaw has annual sales of about $4 billion, and we own 87.3% of the company. Leaving aside our insurance operation, Shaw is by far our largest business. Now, if people walk all over us, we won’t mind.
Shaw年销售额约为40亿美元，我们拥有其87.3%的股权。除去保险业务，Shaw是我们目前最大的实体企业。现在如果人们踩在我们头上走来走去，我们也不会介意了。
- In July, Bob Mundheim, a director of Benjamin Moore Paint, called to ask if Berkshire might be interested in acquiring it. I knew Bob from Salomon, where he was general counsel during some difficult times, and held him in very high regard. So my answer was “Tell me more.”
7月，Benjamin Moore Paint董事Bob Mundheim致电询问伯克希尔是否对其收购感兴趣。我在所罗门公司任职期间认识Bob，当时他在困难时期担任公司法律顾问，我对他的能力非常敬重。因此我的回应是：“请继续说下去。”
In late August, Charlie and I met with Richard Roob and Yvan Dupuy, past and present CEOs of Benjamin Moore. We liked them; we liked the business; and we made a $1 billion cash offer on the spot. In October, their board approved the transaction, and we completed it in December. Benjamin Moore has been making paint for 117 years and has thousands of independent dealers that are a vital asset to its business. Make sure you specify our product for your next paint job.
8月下旬，查理和我会见了Benjamin Moore前任CEO Richard Roob和现任CEO Yvan Dupuy。我们欣赏他们本人，也欣赏这家公司，当场便提出以10亿美元现金收购。10月，他们的董事会批准了交易，我们于12月完成收购。Benjamin Moore已有117年的油漆制造历史，并拥有数千家独立经销商，这是其业务的重要资产。下次刷漆时，请务必指定使用我们的产品。
- Finally, in late December, we agreed to buy Johns Manville Corp. for about $1.8 billion. This company’s incredible odyssey over the last few decades — too multifaceted to be chronicled here — was shaped by its long history as a manufacturer of asbestos products. The much-publicized health problems that affected many people exposed to asbestos led to JM’s declaring bankruptcy in 1982.
最后，在12月下旬，我们同意以约18亿美元收购Johns Manville Corp.。这家公司过去几十年间经历了一段难以想象的复杂历程——这段历程过于多面化，无法在此详述——其根源在于它长期从事石棉制品生产的历史。由于石棉暴露引发的广泛报道的健康问题，导致JM于1982年申请破产。
Subsequently, the bankruptcy court established a trust for victims, the major asset of which was a controlling interest in JM. The trust, which sensibly wanted to diversify its assets, agreed last June to sell the business to an LBO buyer. In the end, though, the LBO group was unable to obtain financing.
随后，破产法院为受害者设立了信托基金，其主要资产是对JM的控股权。该信托基金出于合理考虑希望多元化资产配置，于去年6月同意将业务出售给一家杠杆收购买家。但最终，该LBO集团未能获得融资。
Consequently, the deal was called off on Friday, December 8th. The following Monday, Charlie and I called Bob Felise, chairman of the trust, and made an all-cash offer with no financing contingencies. The next day the trustees voted tentatively to accept our offer, and a week later we signed a contract.
因此，交易于12月8日星期五宣告终止。次周一，查理和我致电信托主席Bob Felise，提出了无融资条件限制的全额现金报价。次日，受托人投票初步接受我们的报价，一周后我们正式签署合同。
JM is the nation’s leading producer of commercial and industrial insulation and also has major positions in roofing systems and a variety of engineered products. The company’s sales exceed $2 billion and the business has earned good, if cyclical, returns. Jerry Henry, JM’s CEO, had announced his retirement plans a year ago, but I’m happy to report that Charlie and I have convinced him to stick around.
JM是美国领先的商业与工业绝缘材料生产商，同时在屋面系统及多种工程产品领域占据重要地位。公司年销售额超过20亿美元，业务虽具周期性但回报良好。JM首席执行官Jerry Henry一年前已宣布退休计划，但我很高兴告诉大家，查理和我已经说服他继续留任。
# The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance（财产/意外险的经济学）
Two economic factors probably contributed to the rush of acquisition activity we experienced last year. First, many managers and owners foresaw near-term slowdowns in their businesses — and, in fact, we purchased several companies whose earnings will almost certainly decline this year from peaks they reached in 1999 or 2000. The declines make no difference to us, given that we expect all of our businesses to now and then have ups and downs. (Only in the sales presentations of investment banks do earnings move forever upward.) We don’t care about the bumps; what matters are the overall results. But the decisions of other people are sometimes affected by the near-term outlook, which can both spur sellers and temper the enthusiasm of purchasers who might otherwise compete with us.
去年收购活动激增，可能有两个经济因素起了推动作用。首先，许多经理人和企业主预见到短期内业务将放缓——事实上，我们收购的几家公司今年的盈利几乎肯定会从1999或2000年达到的峰值回落。对我们而言，这种下滑并不重要，因为我们预期所有业务都会经历起伏。（只有在投行的销售推介中，盈利才会被描绘为永远向上增长。）我们不关心短期波动；真正重要的是整体结果。但其他人的决策有时会受到近期前景的影响，这可能会刺激卖家出售意愿，同时抑制原本可能与我们竞争的买家的热情。
A second factor that helped us in 2000 was that the market for junk bonds dried up as the year progressed. In the two preceding years, junk bond purchasers had relaxed their standards, buying the obligations of ever-weaker issuers at inappropriate prices. The effects of this laxity were felt last year in a ballooning of defaults. In this environment, “financial” buyers of businesses — those who wish to buy using only a sliver of equity — became unable to borrow all they thought they needed. What they could still borrow, moreover, came at a high price. Consequently, LBO operators became less aggressive in their bidding when businesses came up for sale last year. Because we analyze purchases on an all-equity basis, our evaluations did not change, which means we became considerably more competitive.
第二个帮助我们的因素是，随着年度推进，垃圾债券市场逐渐枯竭。前两年，垃圾债购买者放宽了标准，以不合理的价格购入越来越弱发行人的债务。这种宽松政策在去年显现出了后果：违约率大幅上升。在这种环境下，“金融型”买家——即希望通过极少股权进行收购的企业——发现无法借到他们原本预计需要的资金。即使还能获得融资，成本也变得很高。因此，去年企业在出售时，杠杆收购操作者的出价不再像以往那样积极。由于我们始终基于全股权角度分析收购项目，我们的评估并未改变，这意味着我们在竞标中更具竞争力。
Aside from the economic factors that benefited us, we now enjoy a major and growing advantage in making acquisitions in that we are often the buyer of choice for the seller. That fact, of course, doesn’t assure a deal — sellers have to like our price, and we have to like their business and management — but it does help.
除了上述经济因素外，我们在收购方面还享有一个日益增强的优势：我们往往是卖家首选的买方。当然，这一点并不能保证交易一定达成——卖方必须接受我们的报价，我们也必须认可其业务及管理层——但它确实起到了积极作用。
We find it meaningful when an owner cares about whom he sells to. We like to do business with someone who loves his company, not just the money that a sale will bring him (though we certainly understand why he likes that as well). When this emotional attachment exists, it signals that important qualities will likely be found within the business: honest accounting, pride of product, respect for customers, and a loyal group of associates having a strong sense of direction. The reverse is apt to be true, also. When an owner auctions off his business, exhibiting a total lack of interest in what follows, you will frequently find that it has been dressed up for sale, particularly when the seller is a “financial owner.” And if owners behave with little regard for their business and its people, their conduct will often contaminate attitudes and practices throughout the company.
我们认为，当一位企业主在意将公司卖给谁时，这件事本身就具有意义。我们更愿意与那些热爱自己公司的卖方做生意，而非仅仅看重出售带来的金钱收益（尽管我们完全理解他为何也会看重这点）。这种情感联系通常意味着该企业具备一些重要特质：诚实的会计处理、对产品的自豪感、对客户的尊重，以及一支有强烈方向感的忠诚团队。相反的情况也可能成立：如果一位企业主通过拍卖出售自己的公司，并表现出对后续事务毫无兴趣的态度，你往往会发现这家公司已经被粉饰一新用于出售，尤其是当卖方是“财务型持有者”时更是如此。如果企业主对企业及其员工漠不关心，他们的行为往往会污染整个公司的态度和实践方式。
When a business masterpiece has been created by a lifetime — or several lifetimes — of unstinting care and exceptional talent, it should be important to the owner what corporation is entrusted to carry on its history. Charlie and I believe Berkshire provides an almost unique home. We take our obligations to the people who created a business very seriously, and Berkshire’s ownership structure ensures that we can fulfill our promises. When we tell John Justin that his business will remain headquartered in Fort Worth, or assure the Bridge family that its operation will not be merged with another jeweler, these sellers can take those promises to the bank.
当一家商业杰作经过一生甚至几代人的不懈努力与非凡才智打造而成时，企业主应当慎重考虑将它托付给哪家公司来延续其历史。查理和我都坚信伯克希尔能提供一个近乎独一无二的归属。我们非常认真地对待对创业者所承担的责任，而伯克希尔的所有权结构确保我们能够兑现承诺。当我们告诉John Justin他的公司将依然总部设在沃思堡，或向Bridge家族保证其业务不会与其他珠宝商合并时，这些卖家完全可以将我们的承诺视为银行支票般可靠。
How much better it is for the “painter” of a business Rembrandt to personally select its permanent home than to have a trust officer or uninterested heirs auction it off. Throughout the years we have had great experiences with those who recognize that truth and apply it to their business creations. We’ll leave the auctions to others.
对于一位创造了商业“伦勃朗画作”的企业家来说，亲自为其选择永久归属，远比由信托官员或漠不关心的继承人将其拍卖要好得多。多年来，我们一直与那些明白这一道理并将其应用于自身事业的人合作愉快。我们将把拍卖留给他人。
# The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance（财产/意外险的经济学）
Our main business — though we have others of great importance — is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.
虽然我们还有其他重要的业务，但伯克希尔的核心业务是保险。因此，若想理解伯克希尔，你必须了解如何评估一家保险公司。关键决定因素包括：(1) 公司产生的浮存金（float）金额；(2) 浮存金的成本；以及最重要的 (3) 这两个因素的长期前景。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.
首先，浮存金是我们持有但不属于我们的资金。在保险业务中，浮存金产生于保费先于理赔支付的时间差，这个时间差有时长达数年。在此期间，保险公司可以投资这笔资金。但这项令人愉悦的活动通常伴随着不利的一面：收取的保费往往不足以覆盖最终必须支付的损失和费用，从而导致“承保亏损”（underwriting loss），这就是浮存金的成本。如果一家保险公司的浮存金成本长期低于公司获取资金的其他成本，则该业务是有价值的。但如果浮存金成本高于市场资金利率，则这家保险公司就是个糟糕的投资。
A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. Both the income statements and balance sheets of insurers can be minefields.
此处需提出警告：由于理赔成本需要估算，保险公司对其承保结果的计算具有相当大的灵活性，这让投资者难以准确判断公司的实际浮存金成本。估算错误通常出于无意，但也可能是故意为之，且错误规模可能巨大。这些误判直接影响利润表。经验丰富的观察者通常能察觉大规模准备金误差，但公众往往只能被动接受报表数据。我曾多次对知名审计机构默许的一些数字感到震惊。保险公司的损益表和资产负债表都可能布满陷阱。
At Berkshire, we strive to be both consistent and conservative in our reserving. But we will make mistakes. And we warn you that there is nothing symmetrical about surprises in the insurance business: They almost always are unpleasant.
在伯克希尔，我们力求在准备金计提上保持一致性和保守性。但我们也会犯错。我们提醒各位，在保险行业中，意料之外的事从来不是双向对称的：它们几乎总是负面的。
The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the various segments of Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered the business 34 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company (whose traditional lines are included in the segment “Other Primary”). For the table we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Don’t panic, there won’t be a quiz.)
下表按时间段列示了自34年前我们通过收购National Indemnity Company进入保险行业以来，伯克希尔各保险板块所产生的浮存金情况（其中，National Indemnity的传统业务线归类于“其他直保”板块）。为了编制该表，我们通过以下方式计算浮存金（相对于保费收入而言，我们的浮存金数额较大）：将净损失准备金、理赔调整准备金、再保险合约下持有的资金以及未赚取保费准备金相加，再减去与保险相关的应收款、预付获取成本、预付税款以及适用于再保险的递延费用。（别紧张，不会考试。）
| Year | GEICO | General Re | Other Reinsurance | Other Primary | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1967 | 20 | 20 | |||
| 1977 | 40 | 20 | 60 | ||
| 1987 | 701 | 131 | 832 | ||
| 1997 | 2,917 | 14,909 | 4,014 | 807 | 22,647 |
| 1998 | 3,125 | 15,166 | 4,305 | 1,508 | 24,104 |
| 1999 | 3,444 | 15,525 | 6,285 | 455 | 25,709 |
| 2000 | 3,943 | 14,909 | 7,805 | 598 | 27,255 |
Yearend Float (in $ millions)
We’re pleased by the growth in our float during 2000 but not happy with its cost. Over the years, our cost of float has been very close to zero, with the underwriting profits realized in most years offsetting the occasional terrible year such as 1984, when our cost was a staggering 19%. In 2000, however, we had an underwriting loss of $1.6 billion, which gave us a float cost of 6%. Absent a mega-catastrophe, we expect our float cost to fall in 2001 — perhaps substantially — in large part because of corrections in pricing at General Re that should increasingly be felt as the year progresses. On a smaller scale, GEICO may experience the same improving trend.
我们对2000年浮存金的增长感到满意，但对其成本并不满意。多年来，我们的浮存金成本接近于零，因为在大多数年份里，我们实现了承保利润，抵消了一些糟糕年份（如1984年，当时成本高达19%）带来的影响。然而在2000年，我们出现了16亿美元的承保亏损，使浮存金成本达到了6%。除非出现重大灾难事件，我们预计2001年浮存金成本将会下降，甚至可能出现显著下降，这主要得益于General Re定价策略的逐步改善。规模较小的GEICO也可能呈现类似的改善趋势。
There are two factors affecting our cost of float that are very rare at other insurers but that now loom large at Berkshire. First, a few insurers that are currently experiencing large losses have offloaded a significant portion of these on us in a manner that penalizes our current earnings but gives us float we can use for many years to come. After the loss that we incur in the first year of the policy, there are no further costs attached to this business.
有两个影响我们浮存金成本的因素，在其他保险公司极为罕见，但在伯克希尔却变得愈发重要。第一，一些目前正面临巨额亏损的保险公司，将部分损失转嫁给我们，这种方式损害了我们当前的盈利表现，但却为我们带来了可在未来多年使用的浮存金。在保单第一年发生损失后，这类业务不会再带来额外成本。
When these policies are properly priced, we welcome the pain-today, gain-tomorrow effects they have. In 1999, $400 million of our underwriting loss (about 27.8% of the total) came from business of this kind and in 2000 the figure was $482 million (34.4% of our loss). We have no way of predicting how much similar business we will write in the future, but what we do get will typically be in large chunks. Because these transactions can materially distort our figures, we will tell you about them as they occur.
只要这些保单定价合理，我们就欢迎这种“今天痛苦、明天受益”的效应。1999年，我们有4亿美元的承保亏损（约占总额的27.8%）来自此类业务；2000年则为4.82亿美元（占总亏损的34.4%）。我们无法预测未来会承接多少类似业务，但一旦承接，通常是大额交易。由于这些交易可能显著扭曲我们的财务数据，我们会在发生时主动披露相关信息。
Other reinsurers have little taste for this insurance. They simply can’t stomach what huge underwriting losses do to their reported results, even though these losses are produced by policies whose overall economics are certain to be favorable. You should be careful, therefore, in comparing our underwriting results with those of other insurers.
其他再保险公司对这类业务兴趣不大。他们根本无法承受巨额承保亏损对财报造成的冲击，尽管这些亏损来源于整体经济回报明确有利的保单。因此，在比较我们的承保结果与其他保险公司时，请务必谨慎对待。
An even more significant item in our numbers — which, again, you won’t find much of elsewhere — arises from transactions in which we assume past losses of a company that wants to put its troubles behind it. To illustrate, the XYZ insurance company might have last year bought a policy obligating us to pay the first $1 billion of losses and loss adjustment expenses from events that happened in, say, 1995 and earlier years. These contracts can be very large, though we always require a cap on our exposure. We entered into a number of such transactions in 2000 and expect to close several more in 2001.
我们财务报表中还有一个更为重要的项目——这一点在其他公司你几乎找不到——即我们承接了一些企业过去已发生损失的再保险交易，帮助企业将过往问题留在身后。举例来说，XYZ保险公司可能在去年购买了一份保单，要求我们承担从比如1995年及更早年份发生的事件所产生的前10亿美元损失及理赔调整费用。这些合约可以非常庞大，尽管我们始终要求对我们的风险敞口设定上限。我们在2000年参与了多项此类交易，并预计将在2001年完成更多类似交易。
Under GAAP accounting, this “retroactive” insurance neither benefits nor penalizes our current earnings. Instead, we set up an asset called “deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance,” in an amount reflecting the difference between the premium we receive and the (higher) losses we expect to pay (for which reserves are immediately established). We then amortize this asset by making annual charges to earnings that create equivalent underwriting losses. You will find the amount of the loss that we incur from these transactions in both our quarterly and annual management discussion. By their nature, these losses will continue for many years, often stretching into decades. As an offset, though, we have the use of float — lots of it.
根据美国通用会计准则（GAAP），这种“追溯性”保险既不会增益也不会损害我们当前的盈利。相反，我们会设立一项资产，称为“适用于所承担再保险的递延费用”，其金额反映我们收到的保费与我们预期支付的（更高）损失之间的差额（为此立即设立准备金）。随后，我们将通过每年对利润进行摊销的方式产生相应的承保亏损。你可以在我们的季度和年度管理层讨论中找到这些交易产生的承保亏损金额。从本质上看，这类亏损将持续多年，往往延续数十年。作为补偿，我们则拥有大量浮存金可供使用。
Clearly, float carrying an annual cost of this kind is not as desirable as float we generate from policies that are expected to produce an underwriting profit (of which we have plenty). Nevertheless, this retroactive insurance should be decent business for us.
显然，这种带有年度成本的浮存金并不如那些能带来承保利润的保单所产生的浮存金那样理想（我们手中就有很多这类优质业务）。然而，这种追溯性再保险对我们而言仍是一项不错的业务。
The net of all this is that a) I expect our cost of float to be very attractive in the future but b) rarely to return to a “no-cost” mode because of the annual charge that retroactive reinsurance will lay on us. Also — obviously — the ultimate benefits that we derive from float will depend not only on its cost but, fully as important, how effectively we deploy it.
总结来看：a）我预计未来我们的浮存金成本仍将具有吸引力；但b）由于追溯性再保险带来的年度摊销影响，它很少会回到“零成本”状态。当然，我们最终从浮存金中获得的收益不仅取决于其成本，更重要的是我们如何有效运用这笔资金。
Our retroactive business is almost single-handedly the work of Ajit Jain, whose praises I sing annually. It is impossible to overstate how valuable Ajit is to Berkshire. Don’t worry about my health; worry about his.
这项追溯性保险业务几乎完全由Ajit Jain一人主导，我每年都对他给予高度赞扬。Ajit对伯克希尔的价值怎么强调都不为过。别担心我的健康状况，该担心的是他的健康。
Last year, Ajit brought home a $2.4 billion reinsurance premium, perhaps the largest in history, from a policy that retroactively covers a major U.K. company. Subsequently, he wrote a large policy protecting the Texas Rangers from the possibility that Alex Rodriguez will become permanently disabled. As sports fans know, “A-Rod” was signed for $252 million, a record, and we think that our policy probably also set a record for disability insurance. We cover many other sports figures as well.
去年，Ajit促成了一项追溯性覆盖英国一家大型公司的再保险业务，获得了24亿美元的保费，可能是历史上最高的之一。随后，他又为德州游骑兵队设计了一份大额保单，保障亚历克斯·罗德里格斯（Alex Rodriguez）若因伤永久残疾的风险。体育迷们知道，“A-Rod”以创纪录的2.52亿美元签约，我们认为我们的这份残疾险保单也可能创下了同类纪录。此外，我们也为许多其他运动员提供保障。
In another example of his versatility, Ajit last fall negotiated a very interesting deal with Grab.com, an Internet company whose goal was to attract millions of people to its site and there to extract information from them that would be useful to marketers. To lure these people, Grab.com held out the possibility of a $1 billion prize (having a $170 million present value) and we insured its payment. A message on the site explained that the chance of anyone winning the prize was low, and indeed no one won. But the possibility of a win was far from nil.
Ajit的灵活应对能力还有另一个例子：去年秋季，他与互联网公司Grab.com达成了一笔非常有趣的交易。该公司希望吸引数百万人访问其网站，并从中收集对市场营销者有用的信息。为了吸引访客，Grab.com提供了高达10亿美元奖金的可能性（现值约1.7亿美元），而我们为其支付义务提供保障。网站上的提示说明赢得大奖的概率极低，事实上也确实无人中奖。但获奖概率并非完全为零。
Writing such a policy, we receive a modest premium, face the possibility of a huge loss, and get good odds. Very few insurers like that equation. And they’re unable to cure their unhappiness by reinsurance. Because each policy has unusual — and sometimes unique — characteristics, insurers can’t lay off the occasional shock loss through their standard reinsurance arrangements. Therefore, any insurance CEO doing a piece of business like this must run the small, but real, risk of a horrible quarterly earnings number, one that he would not enjoy explaining to his board or shareholders. Charlie and I, however, like any proposition that makes compelling mathematical sense, regardless of its effect on reported earnings.
承保此类保单时，我们收取适度的保费，面临潜在巨额损失，但赔率对我们有利。很少有保险公司愿意接受这样的公式。而且他们也无法通过再保险来缓解这种不快。因为每份保单都具有特殊——有时甚至是独一无二——的特征，保险公司无法通过标准再保险安排转嫁偶尔出现的重大损失。因此，任何保险公司高管如果做这种业务，就必须承担虽小但真实存在的季度财报难看的风险，而这并不是他乐意向董事会或股东解释的情形。然而，查理和我都喜欢那些在数学上具备明显优势的项目，无论它们对报告利润有何影响。
At General Re, the news has turned considerably better: Ron Ferguson, along with Joe Brandon, Tad Montross, and a talented supporting cast took many actions during 2000 to bring that company’s profitability back to past standards. Though our pricing is not fully corrected, we have significantly repriced business that was severely unprofitable or dropped it altogether. If there’s no mega-catastrophe in 2001, General Re’s float cost should fall materially.
在通用再保险公司（General Re）方面，情况有了显著好转：Ron Ferguson联同Joe Brandon、Tad Montross以及一众才华横溢的团队成员，在2000年采取了一系列措施，使该公司的盈利能力逐步恢复至以往水平。虽然我们的定价尚未完全调整到位，但我们已大幅重新定价严重亏损的业务，或将这些业务彻底放弃。如果2001年没有发生重大灾难事件，通用再保险的浮存金成本应会有实质性下降。
The last couple of years haven’t been any fun for Ron and his crew. But they have stepped up to tough decisions, and Charlie and I applaud them for these. General Re has several important and enduring business advantages. Better yet, it has managers who will make the most of them.
过去几年对Ron和他的团队来说并不轻松。但他们勇敢地做出了艰难决策，查理和我都对此表示赞赏。通用再保险拥有若干重要且持久的业务优势。更重要的是，它拥有一批能够充分发挥这些优势的管理者。
In aggregate, our smaller insurance operations produced an excellent underwriting profit in 2000 while generating significant float — just as they have done for more than a decade. If these companies were a single and separate operation, people would consider it an outstanding insurer. Because the companies instead reside in an enterprise as large as Berkshire, the world may not appreciate their accomplishments — but I sure do. Last year I thanked Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Don Towle and Don Wurster, and I again do so. In addition, we now also owe thanks to Tom Nerney at U.S. Liability and Michael Stearns, the new head of Cypress.
总体而言，我们旗下规模较小的保险业务在2000年实现了出色的承保利润，同时产生了可观的浮存金——这种情况已持续十多年。如果这些公司是一家独立运作的企业，人们会认为它是一家极其优秀的保险公司。但由于它们属于伯克希尔这样庞大的企业集团，外界可能并未充分认识到它们的成就——但我本人是充分认可的。去年我感谢了Rod Eldred、John Kizer、Don Towle和Don Wurster，今年我再次向他们致谢。此外，我们现在也要感谢U.S. Liability的Tom Nerney，以及Cypress的新任负责人Michael Stearns。
You may notice that Brad Kinstler, who was CEO of Cypress and whose praises I’ve sung in the past, is no longer in the list above. That’s because we needed a new manager at Fechheimer Bros., our Cincinnati-based uniform company, and called on Brad. We seldom move Berkshire managers from one enterprise to another, but maybe we should try it more often: Brad is hitting home runs in his new job, just as he always did at Cypress.
你可能会注意到，Brad Kinstler未出现在上述名单中。他曾担任Cypress的CEO，我过去也曾多次称赞他。原因是我们需要为位于辛辛那提的制服公司Fechheimer Bros.任命一位新经理人，于是我们请来了Brad。我们很少在伯克希尔内部调换经理人，但也许我们应该多尝试这种方式：Brad在新的岗位上继续表现出色，正如他在Cypress时一样。
# GEICO (1-800-800-7536 或 GEICO.com)
We show below the usual table detailing GEICO’s growth. Last year I enthusiastically told you that we would step up our expenditures on advertising in 2000 and that the added dollars were the best investment that GEICO could make. I was wrong: The extra money we spent did not produce a commensurate increase in inquiries. Additionally, the percentage of inquiries that we converted into sales fell for the first time in many years. These negative developments combined to produce a sharp increase in our per-policy acquisition cost.
以下是我们一贯展示的GEICO增长数据表。去年我曾热情洋溢地告诉各位，我们将在2000年增加广告支出，并称这些新增投入是GEICO所能做出的最佳投资。但我错了：我们花费的额外资金并未带来相应比例的咨询量增长。此外，首次在多年以来，我们成功转化为销售的咨询比例也出现了下滑。这些负面因素共同导致了每张保单获取成本的急剧上升。
| New Auto Policies(1) | Auto Policies In-Force(1) |
|---|---|
| 1993: 346,882 | 2,011,055 |
| 1994: 384,217 | 2,147,549 |
| 1995: 443,539 | 2,310,037 |
| 1996: 592,300 | 2,543,699 |
| 1997: 868,430 | 2,949,439 |
| 1998: 1,249,875 | 3,562,644 |
| 1999: 1,648,095 | 4,328,900 |
| 2000: 1,472,853 | 4,696,842 |
(1) 仅限“自愿投保”；不含指派风险等。
Agonizing over errors is a mistake. But acknowledging and analyzing them can be useful, though that practice is rare in corporate boardrooms. There, Charlie and I have almost never witnessed a candid post-mortem of a failed decision, particularly one involving an acquisition. A notable exception to this never-look-back approach is that of The Washington Post Company, which unfailingly and objectively reviews its acquisitions three years after they are made. Elsewhere, triumphs are trumpeted, but dumb decisions either get no follow-up or are rationalized.
纠结于错误是一种错误。但承认并分析错误却可能带来价值，尽管这一做法在公司董事会中极为罕见。查理和我几乎从未见过哪家公司在董事会上坦诚检讨失败决策，尤其是涉及收购的决策。一个值得注意的例外是《华盛顿邮报》公司，他们在每次收购后三年都会毫无例外、客观公正地进行回顾评估。而在其他地方，成功的案例被大肆宣传，而愚蠢的决策要么无人跟进，要么被合理化处理。
The financial consequences of these boners are regularly dumped into massive restructuring charges or write-offs that are casually waved off as “nonrecurring.” Managements just love these. Indeed, in recent years it has seemed that no earnings statement is complete without them. The origins of these charges, though, are never explored. When it comes to corporate blunders, CEOs invoke the concept of the Virgin Birth.
这些失误带来的财务后果通常被归入大规模重组费用或资产减记，并轻描淡写地称为“非经常性项目”。管理层非常喜欢这类术语。近年来，似乎每一份盈利报告缺少这类项目就不完整。但这些费用的来源却从未被深入探讨。谈到企业失误时，CEO们仿佛援引了“圣灵感孕”的概念。
To get back to our examination of GEICO: There are at least four factors that could account for the increased costs we experienced in obtaining new business last year, and all probably contributed in some manner.
First, in our advertising we have pushed “frequency” very hard, and we probably overstepped in certain media. We’ve always known that increasing the number of messages through any medium would eventually produce diminishing returns. The third ad in an hour on a given cable channel is simply not going to be as effective as the first.
回到对GEICO的分析：至少有四个因素可以解释我们在去年获取新客户过程中成本上升的问题，所有这些因素都可能以某种方式起了作用。
首先，在广告投放中，我们过度强调了“频次”，可能在某些媒体上用力过猛。我们一直都知道，通过任何媒介增加广告播放次数最终会导致边际效益递减。在某个有线电视频道上，一小时内第三轮播出的广告效果肯定不如第一轮。
Second, we may have already picked much of the low-hanging fruit. Clearly, the willingness to do business with a direct marketer of insurance varies widely among individuals: Indeed, some percentage of Americans — particularly older ones — are reluctant to make direct purchases of any kind. Over the years, however, this reluctance will ebb. A new generation with new habits will find the savings from direct purchase of their auto insurance too compelling to ignore.
其次，我们可能已经基本挖掘完了最容易获得的客户资源。显然，人们对是否愿意通过直销渠道购买保险存在很大差异：事实上，一部分美国人——尤其是年长者——对任何类型的直销方式都持保留态度。但随着时间推移，这种抵触情绪将逐渐消退。新一代消费者拥有不同的消费习惯，他们会觉得直接购买汽车保险所节省的费用实在难以忽视。
Another factor that surely decreased the conversion of inquiries into sales was stricter underwriting by GEICO. Both the frequency and severity of losses increased during the year, and rates in certain areas became inadequate, in some cases substantially so. In these instances, we necessarily tightened our underwriting standards. This tightening, as well as the many rate increases we put in during the year, made our offerings less attractive to some prospects.
另一个明显导致咨询转销售比例下降的因素是GEICO更严格的承保政策。在这一年里，理赔发生的频率和严重程度都有所上升，某些地区的保费定价已不足以覆盖成本，有些地区甚至差距显著。在这种情况下，我们必须收紧承保标准。这一收紧措施以及我们在年度内实施的多次费率上调，使得我们的产品对部分潜在客户不再具有吸引力。
A high percentage of callers, it should be emphasized, can still save money by insuring with us. Understandably, however, some prospects will switch to save $200 per year but will not switch to save $50. Therefore, rate increases that bring our prices closer to those of our competitors will hurt our acceptance rate, even when we continue to offer the best deal.
需要强调的是，仍有很高比例的来电者通过与我们投保可以节省开支。不过可以理解的是，有些客户只有每年能省下200美元时才会考虑更换保险公司，而如果只能省下50美元则不会换。因此，即使我们仍提供最具竞争力的价格，当费率上调后使我们与竞争对手价格更加接近时，我们的新单接受率也会受到影响。
Finally, the competitive picture changed in at least one important respect: State Farm — by far the largest personal auto insurer, with about 19% of the market — has been very slow to raise prices. Its costs, however, are clearly increasing right along with those of the rest of the industry. Consequently, State Farm had an underwriting loss last year from auto insurance (including rebates to policyholders) of 18% of premiums, compared to 4% at GEICO. Our loss produced a float cost for us of 6.1%, an unsatisfactory result. (Indeed, at GEICO we expect float, over time, to be free.) But we estimate that State Farm’s float cost in 2000 was about 23%. The willingness of the largest player in the industry to tolerate such a cost makes the economics difficult for other participants.
最后，竞争格局至少在一个重要方面发生了变化：State Farm是目前最大的个人汽车保险公司，市场份额约为19%，但其调价动作却异常缓慢。然而它的成本也在随行业整体同步上升。因此，State Farm去年的汽车保险业务（包括返还给保户的部分）产生了高达保费收入18%的承保亏损，相比之下GEICO仅为4%。该亏损为我们带来的浮存金成本为6.1%，这是一个令人不满意的结果。（实际上，在GEICO，我们预期长期来看浮存金应是免费的。）但我们估计，State Farm在2000年的浮存金成本大约为23%。作为行业中体量最大的参与者，它愿意承担如此高昂的成本，这对其他市场参与者而言构成了巨大的经济压力。
That does not take away from the fact that State Farm is one of America’s greatest business stories. I’ve urged that the company be studied at business schools because it has achieved fabulous success while following a path that in many ways defies the dogma of those institutions. Studying counter-evidence is a highly useful activity, though not one always greeted with enthusiasm at citadels of learning.
但这并不影响State Farm成为美国最伟大的商业故事之一。我曾建议商学院研究这家公司，因为它走出了一条在许多方面违背主流商学院教条的道路，并取得了非凡的成功。研究反例是一种极具价值的学习活动，尽管学术界并不总是热衷于此。
State Farm was launched in 1922, by a 45-year-old, semi-retired Illinois farmer, to compete with long-established insurers — haughty institutions in New York, Philadelphia and Hartford — that possessed overwhelming advantages in capital, reputation, and distribution. Because State Farm is a mutual company, its board members and managers could not be owners, and it had no access to capital markets during its years of fast growth. Similarly, the business never had the stock options or lavish salaries that many people think vital if an American enterprise is to attract able managers and thrive.
State Farm由一位45岁、半退休的伊利诺伊州农民于1922年创立，旨在与纽约、费城和哈特福德等地历史悠久、傲慢自大的老牌保险公司竞争，这些公司在资本、声誉和分销网络上都拥有压倒性优势。由于State Farm是一家互助公司，其董事会成员和经理人无法成为股东，且在快速成长期也无法进入资本市场融资。同样地，公司也从未使用过股票期权或高薪待遇来吸引管理人才——而这些常被视为美国企业成功的关键要素。
In the end, however, State Farm eclipsed all its competitors. In fact, by 1999 the company had amassed a tangible net worth exceeding that of all but four American businesses. If you want to read how this happened, get a copy of The Farmer from Merna.
然而最终，State Farm超越了所有竞争对手。到1999年，它的有形净值超过除四家美国公司之外的所有企业。如果你想了解这段历史是如何发生的，可以阅读《来自梅尔纳的农夫》（The Farmer from Merna）一书。
Despite State Farm’s strengths, however, GEICO has much the better business model, one that embodies significantly lower operating costs. And, when a company is selling a product with commodity-like economic characteristics, being the low-cost producer is all-important. This enduring competitive advantage of GEICO — one it possessed in 1951 when, as a 20-year-old student, I first became enamored with its stock — is the reason that over time it will inevitably increase its market share significantly while simultaneously achieving excellent profits. Our growth will be slow, however, if State Farm elects to continue bearing the underwriting losses that it is now suffering.
尽管State Farm实力强大，但GEICO的商业模式更具优势，其运营成本显著更低。当一家公司销售的是具有类似大宗商品属性的产品时，低成本生产商的地位至关重要。这也是GEICO长期以来所拥有的竞争优势——早在1951年，我作为一名20岁的学生首次爱上这家公司的股票时，它便具备这一优势。正是这一持久的竞争优势，使GEICO将在未来不可避免地大幅扩大市场份额的同时实现优异利润。然而，如果State Farm选择继续承受当前的承保亏损，我们的增长速度可能会放缓。
Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, remains an owner’s dream. Everything he does makes sense. He never engages in wishful thinking or otherwise distorts reality, as so many managers do when the unexpected happens. As 2000 unfolded, Tony cut back on advertising that was not cost-effective, and he will continue to do that in 2001 if cutbacks are called for (though we will always maintain a massive media presence). Tony has also aggressively filed for price increases where we need them. He looks at the loss reports every day and is never behind the curve. To steal a line from a competitor, we are in good hands with Tony.
GEICO首席执行官Tony Nicely仍是股东梦寐以求的管理者。他所做的每一件事都合情合理。他从不抱有侥幸心理，也不会像许多经理人在面对意外情况时那样扭曲现实。随着2000年的发展，Tony果断削减了性价比不高的广告支出，若2001年形势需要，他也将继续这样做（尽管我们会始终保持强大的媒体影响力）。此外，他在必要地区积极申请提高费率。他每天都会查看理赔报告，始终走在趋势之前。借用竞争对手的一句话：“有Tony在，我们很安心。”
I’ve told you about our profit-sharing arrangement at GEICO that targets only two variables — growth in policies and the underwriting results of seasoned business. Despite the headwinds of 2000, we still had a performance that produced an 8.8% profit-sharing payment, amounting to $40.7 million.
我曾介绍过GEICO的利润分享计划，该计划只关注两个变量：保单数量的增长和成熟业务的承保结果。尽管2000年面临诸多挑战，我们仍实现了8.8%的利润分享支付，金额达4,070万美元。
GEICO will be a huge part of Berkshire’s future. Because of its rock-bottom operating costs, it offers a great many Americans the cheapest way to purchase a high-ticket product that they must buy. The company then couples this bargain with service that consistently ranks high in independent surveys. That’s a combination inevitably producing growth and profitability.
GEICO将成为伯克希尔未来的重要组成部分。凭借极低的运营成本，它为大量美国消费者提供了购买必须品——高价汽车保险的最便宜途径。同时，公司还提供在独立调查中持续名列前茅的服务质量。这种组合注定会带来持续增长和盈利。
In just the last few years, far more drivers have learned to associate the GEICO brand with saving money on their insurance. We will pound that theme relentlessly until all Americans are aware of the value that we offer.
就在过去几年，越来越多的车主开始将GEICO品牌与节省保险开支联系在一起。我们将不断强化这一信息，直到每一位美国人都意识到我们所提供的价值。
# Investments（投资）
Below we present our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $1 billion at the end of 2000 are itemized.
以下是我们持有的普通股投资情况。截至2000年底，市值超过10亿美元的投资项目已单独列出。
| Shares | Company |
|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company（美国运通公司） |
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company（可口可乐公司） |
| 96,000,000 | The Gillette Company（吉列公司） |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company（华盛顿邮报公司） |
| 55,071,380 | Wells Fargo & Company（富国银行） |
| Others（其他） | — |
| Total Common Stocks（普通股总投资） | — |
| 截至2000年12月31日（单位：百万美元） | 成本 | 市值 |
|---|---|---|
| 美国运通公司 | $1,470 | $8,329 |
| 可口可乐公司 | $1,299 | $12,188 |
| 吉列公司 | $600 | $3,468 |
| 华盛顿邮报公司 | $11 | $1,066 |
| 富国银行 | $319 | $3,067 |
| 其他 | $6,703 | $9,501 |
| 普通股总投资 | $10,402 | $37,619 |
In 2000, we sold nearly all of our Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae shares, established 15% positions in several mid-sized companies, bought the high-yield bonds of a few issuers (very few — the category is not labeled junk without reason) and added to our holdings of high-grade, mortgage-backed securities. There are no “bargains” among our current holdings: We’re content with what we own but far from excited by it.
2000年，我们几乎出售了全部房利美（Freddie Mac）和房地美（Fannie Mae）股份，建立了几家中小型公司约15%的持股仓位，买入了几家发行人的高收益债券（数量极少——这个类别之所以被称为“垃圾债”是有原因的），并增持了优质抵押支持证券。我们目前的持仓中并没有明显的“便宜货”：我们对我们所持有的资产感到满意，但远未感到兴奋。
Many people assume that marketable securities are Berkshire’s first choice when allocating capital, but that’s not true: Ever since we first published our economic principles in 1983, we have consistently stated that we would rather purchase businesses than stocks. (See number 4 on page 60.) One reason for that preference is personal, in that I love working with our managers. They are high-grade, talented and loyal. And, frankly, I find their business behavior to be more rational and owner-oriented than that prevailing at many public companies.
许多人以为，可交易证券是伯克希尔配置资金时的首选，但事实并非如此：自从1983年我们首次发布经济原则以来，我们就一直明确表示，我们更倾向于收购企业而非买入股票（详见第60页第4条）。这种偏好的一个原因是出于个人情感，因为我热爱与我们的经理人合作。他们素质高、有能力且忠诚。坦率地说，我发现他们的经营行为比许多上市公司的做法更为理性、更以股东利益为导向。
But there’s also a powerful financial reason behind the preference, and that has to do with taxes. The tax code makes Berkshire’s owning 80% or more of a business far more profitable for us, proportionately, than our owning a smaller share. When a company we own all of earns $1 million after tax, the entire amount inures to our benefit. If the $1 million is upstreamed to Berkshire, we owe no tax on the dividend. And, if the earnings are retained and we were to sell the subsidiary — not likely at Berkshire! — for $1 million more than we paid for it, we would owe no capital gains tax. That’s because our “tax cost” upon sale would include both what we paid for the business and all earnings it subsequently retained.
但这种偏好背后还有一个强有力的财务原因，那就是税收结构。根据税法规定，当我们持有某家企业80%或以上股权时，其盈利能力对我们来说远远优于持股比例较低的情形。当我们全资拥有的一家公司实现100万美元的税后利润时，这笔钱全部归我们所有。如果这100万美元以股息形式汇回伯克希尔，我们无需缴纳任何税款；如果利润被留存下来，即便我们将来以高出原收购价100万美元的价格出售该子公司（这种情况在伯克希尔极为罕见！），我们也无需缴纳资本利得税。这是因为我们在出售时的“税务成本基础”不仅包含当初收购该企业的成本，还包括其后续留存的所有利润。
Contrast that situation to what happens when we own an investment in a marketable security. There, if we own a 10% stake in a business earning $10 million after tax, our $1 million share of the earnings is subject to additional state and federal taxes of (1) about $140,000 if it is distributed to us (our tax rate on most dividends is 14%); or (2) no less than $350,000 if the $1 million is retained and subsequently captured by us in the form of a capital gain (on which our tax rate is usually about 35%, though it sometimes approaches 40%). We may defer paying the $350,000 by not immediately realizing our gain, but eventually we must pay the tax. In effect, the government is our “partner” twice when we own part of a business through a stock investment, but only once when we own at least 80%.
对比之下，当我们持有可交易证券时情况就不同了。如果我们持有一家税后盈利为1,000万美元的公司10%的股份，我们所享有的100万美元利润会面临额外的州和联邦税：（1）如果这笔利润以股息形式分配给我们，我们要缴纳约14万美元的税款（我们对大多数股息的税率是14%）；或者（2）如果这100万美元被留存下来，并最终以资本利得的形式由我们实现收益，我们将至少缴纳35万美元的税款（我们的资本利得税率通常约为35%，有时甚至接近40%）。我们可以推迟缴税——只要不立即变现收益，但迟早要交这笔税。实际上，当我们通过股票投资持有部分企业时，政府是我们“双重合伙人”，而在我们持股至少80%的情况下，它只是“单一合伙人”。
Leaving aside tax factors, the formula we use for evaluating stocks and businesses is identical. Indeed, the formula for valuing all assets that are purchased for financial gain has been unchanged since it was first laid out by a very smart man in about 600 B.C. (though he wasn’t smart enough to know it was 600 B.C.).
抛开税收因素不谈，我们在评估股票和企业时所使用的公式是一样的。事实上，用于评估所有以获取财务回报为目的之资产的价值公式自公元前约600年一位非常聪明的人首次提出以来就从未改变过（尽管他当时并不知道自己生活在公元前600年）。
The oracle was Aesop and his enduring, though somewhat incomplete, investment insight was “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.” To flesh out this principle, you must answer only three questions. How certain are you that there are indeed birds in the bush? When will they emerge and how many will there be? What is the risk-free interest rate (which we consider to be the yield on long-term U.S. bonds)? If you can answer these three questions, you will know the maximum value of the bush — and the maximum number of the birds you now possess that should be offered for it. And, of course, don’t literally think birds. Think dollars.
这位智者就是伊索（Aesop），他那持久却略显简略的投资洞见是：“一鸟在手胜过双鸟在林。” 要将这一原则具体化，你只需回答三个问题：你有多确定林中确实有鸟？它们什么时候会出现，数量有多少？无风险利率是多少（我们认为这是长期美国国债的收益率）？如果你能回答这三个问题，你就知道这片树林的最大价值是多少——以及你手中现有“鸟”的最大数量应为多少才值得用来交换。当然，别真去想鸟，而是想成美元。
Aesop’s investment axiom, thus expanded and converted into dollars, is immutable. It applies to outlays for farms, oil royalties, bonds, stocks, lottery tickets, and manufacturing plants. And neither the advent of the steam engine, the harnessing of electricity nor the creation of the automobile changed the formula one iota — nor will the Internet. Just insert the correct numbers, and you can rank the attractiveness of all possible uses of capital throughout the universe.
将伊索的投资格言扩展并转化为金钱语言之后，它成为了一条不变的真理。它适用于农场投资、石油特许权使用费、债券、股票、彩票乃至工厂建设。蒸汽机的发明、电力的应用或汽车的创造都未曾改变这个公式一丝一毫——互联网也不会。只要代入正确的数字，你就能衡量宇宙间一切可能资金用途的吸引力排序。
Common yardsticks such as dividend yield, the ratio of price to earnings or to book value, and even growth rates have nothing to do with valuation except to the extent they provide clues to the amount and timing of cash flows into and from the business. Indeed, growth can destroy value if it requires cash inputs in the early years of a project or enterprise that exceed the discounted value of the cash that those assets will generate in later years. Market commentators and investment managers who glibly refer to “growth” and “value” styles as contrasting approaches to investment are displaying their ignorance, not their sophistication. Growth is simply a component — usually a plus, sometimes a minus — in the value equation.
常见的衡量标准如股息收益率、市盈率、市净率，甚至增长率本身与估值无关，除非它们提供了有关企业现金流规模和时机的线索。事实上，如果一项项目或企业在早期需要大量现金投入，而这些投入超过了其未来所能产生的折现现金流价值，那么增长反而会摧毁价值。那些轻率地将“成长型”和“价值型”投资风格视为对立策略的市场评论员和基金经理人，暴露的是他们的无知，而非专业。增长不过是价值公式中的一个变量——通常是加分项，有时也可能成为减分项。
Alas, though Aesop’s proposition and the third variable — that is, interest rates — are simple, plugging in numbers for the other two variables is a difficult task. Using precise numbers is, in fact, foolish; working with a range of possibilities is the better approach.
遗憾的是，虽然伊索的命题和第三个变量——即利率——都很简单，但对于前两个变量代入具体数值却是极其困难的任务。实际上，试图使用精确数字是愚蠢的做法；更合理的方式是对各种可能性设定一个范围进行估算。
Usually, the range must be so wide that no useful conclusion can be reached. Occasionally, though, even very conservative estimates about the future emergence of birds reveal that the price quoted is startlingly low in relation to value. (Let’s call this phenomenon the IBT — Inefficient Bush Theory.) To be sure, an investor needs some general understanding of business economics as well as the ability to think independently to reach a well-founded positive conclusion. But the investor does not need brilliance nor blinding insights.
通常情况下，这个范围必须足够宽泛，以至于难以得出任何有用的结论。但在某些时候，即使采用极为保守的预测，也能发现市场价格相对于实际价值低得惊人（我们可以称这种现象为IBT——低效灌木理论）。当然，投资者需要具备一定的商业经济常识以及独立思考能力才能做出合理的正面判断。但投资者不需要天才般的洞察力。
At the other extreme, there are many times when the most brilliant of investors can’t muster a conviction about the birds to emerge, not even when a very broad range of estimates is employed. This kind of uncertainty frequently occurs when new businesses and rapidly changing industries are under examination. In cases of this sort, any capital commitment must be labeled speculative.
在另一个极端，很多时候即使是最高明的投资者也无法对“林中会有多少鸟”形成明确判断，即便他们使用了非常宽泛的估计区间也是如此。这类不确定性经常出现在新企业和快速变化的行业中。在这种情况下，任何形式的资金投入都只能被归类为投机行为。
Now, speculation — in which the focus is not on what an asset will produce but rather on what the next fellow will pay for it — is neither illegal, immoral nor un-American. But it is not a game in which Charlie and I wish to play. We bring nothing to the party, so why should we expect to take anything home?
投机行为——关注的不是资产本身能产生什么，而是下一个人愿意为其支付多少——既不违法，也不违背道德，也非不爱国行为。但我们并不打算参与这个游戏。我们无法为这场派对带来任何东西，又怎能期望从中带走些什么呢？
The line separating investment and speculation, which is never bright and clear, becomes blurred still further when most market participants have recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing sedates rationality like large doses of effortless money. After a heady experience of that kind, normally sensible people drift into behavior akin to that of Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying the festivities — that is, continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic valuations relative to the cash they are likely to generate in the future — will eventually bring on pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless hate to miss a single minute of what is one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy participants all plan to leave just seconds before midnight. There’s a problem, though: They are dancing in a room in which the clocks have no hands.
投资与投机之间的界限从来都不清晰，在市场参与者近期普遍取得胜利之后，这条界限变得更加模糊。没有什么比轻松赚取大笔财富更能麻痹理性思维的了。经历了一次如此令人陶醉的经历后，原本理智的人也会逐渐变得像参加舞会的灰姑娘一样。他们明明知道待得太久——也就是继续投机于那些估值远高于其未来可能产生现金流的企业——终将变成南瓜和老鼠。但他们仍然不愿错过哪怕一分钟的狂欢。因此，所有兴奋的参与者都计划在午夜前几秒钟离开舞会。但问题是，他们跳舞的房间里，钟表根本就没有指针。
Last year, we commented on the exuberance — and, yes, it was irrational — that prevailed, noting that investor expectations had grown to be several multiples of probable returns. One piece of evidence came from a Paine Webber-Gallup survey of investors conducted in December 1999, in which the participants were asked their opinion about the annual returns investors could expect to realize over the decade ahead. Their answers averaged 19%. That, for sure, was an irrational expectation: For American business as a whole, there couldn’t possibly be enough birds in the 2009 bush to deliver such a return.
去年我们曾评论过当时盛行的狂热情绪——没错，那是不理性的。我们指出，投资者的预期已远远超过可能实现的回报。其中一个证据来自1999年12月Paine Webber与盖洛普联合进行的一项投资者调查，受访者被问及对未来十年投资者可能获得的年化回报的看法。他们的平均预期为19%。毫无疑问，这是一个不理性的预期：对于整个美国企业而言，2009年的“灌木丛”里不可能存在足够多的“鸟”来支撑如此高的回报。
Far more irrational still were the huge valuations that market participants were then putting on businesses almost certain to end up being of modest or no value. Yet investors, mesmerized by soaring stock prices and ignoring all else, piled into these enterprises. It was as if some virus, racing wildly among investment professionals as well as amateurs, induced hallucinations in which the values of stocks in certain sectors became decoupled from the values of the businesses that underlay them.
更为荒谬的是，市场参与者竟然给予了一些几乎注定只会拥有微小或毫无价值的企业极高的估值。然而，投资者被飞涨的股价所迷惑，忽视了一切现实因素，纷纷涌入这些企业。仿佛某种病毒正在职业投资人和业余投资者之间疯狂传播，引发幻觉，使得某些行业股票的价格与其背后企业的实际价值完全脱钩。
This surreal scene was accompanied by much loose talk about “value creation.” We readily acknowledge that there has been a huge amount of true value created in the past decade by new or young businesses, and that there is much more to come. But value is destroyed, not created, by any business that loses money over its lifetime, no matter how high its interim valuation may get.
这一超现实场景伴随着大量关于“价值创造”的空泛谈论。我们毫不否认，在过去十年中，新兴企业和初创企业创造了大量真实价值，而且未来还将继续如此。但是，任何一家在其生命周期内持续亏损的企业并不会创造价值，反而会摧毁价值，无论其阶段性估值有多高。
What actually occurs in these cases is wealth transfer, often on a massive scale. By shamelessly merchandising birdless bushes, promoters have in recent years moved billions of dollars from the pockets of the public to their own purses (and to those of their friends and associates). The fact is that a bubble market has allowed the creation of bubble companies, entities designed more with an eye to making money off investors rather than for them. Too often, an IPO, not profits, was the primary goal of a company’s promoters. At bottom, the “business model” for these companies has been the old-fashioned chain letter, for which many fee-hungry investment bankers acted as eager postmen.
实际上，这些案例中发生的只是大规模的财富转移。近年来，一些发起人厚颜无耻地兜售着“空无一鸟的灌木丛”，将数十亿美元从公众口袋转移到自己钱包（以及朋友和同伙手中）。事实是，泡沫市场催生了泡沫公司，这些公司的目的更多是为了从投资者身上赚钱，而不是为他们赚钱。太多时候，一家公司的主要目标并非盈利，而是上市融资（IPO）。从根本上说，这些公司的“商业模式”更像是传统的传销链条，而许多渴望佣金的投资银行家则成了热心的邮差。
But a pin lies in wait for every bubble. And when the two eventually meet, a new wave of investors learns some very old lessons: First, many in Wall Street — a community in which quality control is not prized — will sell investors anything they will buy. Second, speculation is most dangerous when it looks easiest.
但每个泡沫背后都藏着一根针。当泡沫与针相遇时，新一轮投资者将重新学习一些古老的教训：第一，华尔街许多人——一个并不重视质量控制的群体——会向投资者兜售任何他们愿意购买的东西。第二，投机最危险的时候，往往是它看起来最容易的时候。
At Berkshire, we make no attempt to pick the few winners that will emerge from an ocean of unproven enterprises. We’re not smart enough to do that, and we know it. Instead, we try to apply Aesop’s 2,600-year-old equation to opportunities in which we have reasonable confidence as to how many birds are in the bush and when they will emerge (a formulation that my grandsons would probably update to “A girl in a convertible is worth five in the phonebook.”). Obviously, we can never precisely predict the timing of cash flows in and out of a business or their exact amount. We try, therefore, to keep our estimates conservative and to focus on industries where business surprises are unlikely to wreak havoc on owners. Even so, we make many mistakes: I’m the fellow, remember, who thought he understood the future economics of trading stamps, textiles, shoes and second-tier department stores.
在伯克希尔，我们从不试图从茫茫未验证的企业海洋中挑选少数赢家。我们没那么聪明，我们也清楚这一点。相反，我们努力运用伊索2,600年前提出的等式，寻找我们对其“林中是否有鸟”以及“何时出现”具有合理信心的投资机会（我孙子们或许会将其更新为：“一辆敞篷车里的女孩胜过电话簿里的五个。”）显然，我们永远无法准确预测企业现金流的确切时间或金额。因此，我们尽量保持谨慎估算，并专注于那些不太可能出现令股东措手不及的意外行业的投资。即便如此，我们仍犯了许多错误：别忘了，我也曾以为自己理解了印花券、纺织业、鞋类和二线百货商店的未来经济逻辑。
Lately, the most promising “bushes” have been negotiated transactions for entire businesses, and that pleases us. You should clearly understand, however, that these acquisitions will at best provide us only reasonable returns. Really juicy results from negotiated deals can be anticipated only when capital markets are severely constrained and the whole business world is pessimistic. We are 180 degrees from that point.
最近，最有前景的“灌木丛”反而是那些通过谈判达成的整家企业收购交易，这让我们感到满意。不过你需要清楚地理解，这些收购最多也只能为我们带来合理的回报。只有在资本市场极度受限、整个商业世界弥漫悲观情绪时，谈判型交易才可能带来真正丰厚的成果。而我们目前正处于完全相反的境地。
# Sources of Reported Earnings（收益来源）
The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on page 65, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表展示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在此展示方式中，购并会计调整并未分配到具体适用的业务单元，而是被汇总后单独列示。这种方式可以让您看到我们各业务部门的盈利情况，就像我们从未收购它们一样。如第65页所述，我们认为这种呈现方式比采用通用会计准则（GAAP）更为实用，后者要求将购买溢价逐项计入各个业务。当然，我们在表中所显示的总净收益与经审计财务报表中的GAAP总额完全一致。
| 来源 | 2000年（百万美元） | 1999年（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|
| 经营性利润：保险集团 | ||
| 再保险承保损失 | $(899) | $(927) |
| GEICO承保利润 | 16 | 24 |
| 其他直保承保利润 | 14 | 14 |
| 净投资收益 | 1,929 | 1,764 |
| 金融及金融产品业务 | 360 | 86 |
| 飞行服务业务 | 126 | 132 |
| 中美能源公司（持股76%） | 109 | -- |
| 零售运营 | 104 | 77 |
| Scott Fetzer（不含金融业务） | 80 | 92 |
| 其他业务 | 134 | 131 |
| 购买会计调整 | $(843) | $(648) |
| 公司利息支出 | (61) | (70) |
| 股东指定捐赠 | (11) | (11) |
| 其他 | 15 | 671 |
| 经营性利润总计 | $1,557 | $886 |
| 资本利得（来自投资） | 936 | 1,365 |
| 所有实体总收益 | $2,493 | $2,251 |
Most of our manufacturing, retailing and service businesses did at least reasonably well last year.
去年，我们的大多数制造、零售和服务类企业至少表现尚可。
# Pre-Tax Earnings（税前利润）
| 项目 | 2000年（百万美元） | 1999年（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|
| 制造业及其他业务 | $(1,399) | $(1,440) |
| 飞行服务 | 224 | (24) |
| 中美能源公司（MidAmerican Energy） | (38) | (22) |
| 零售运营 | 2,747 | 2,482 |
| Scott Fetzer（不含金融） | 556 | 125 |
| Executive Jet（NetJets） | 213 | 225 |
| GEICO | 197 | 175 |
| 其他保险业务 | 147 | 225 |
| 其他业务 | 210 | — |
# Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests)（净利润（扣除税和少数权益后））
| 项目 | 2000年（百万美元） | 1999年（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|
| 制造业及其他业务 | $39 | $25 |
| 飞行服务 | 30 | 30 |
The exception was shoes, particularly at Dexter. In our shoe businesses generally, our attempt to keep the bulk of our production in domestic factories has cost us dearly. We face another very tough year in 2001 also, as we make significant changes in how we do business.
但有一个例外是制鞋行业，尤其是Dexter公司。总体而言，在我们的制鞋业务中，我们试图将大部分生产保留在国内工厂的做法让我们付出了高昂代价。2001年我们将面临另一个艰难之年，因为我们要对企业运作方式进行重大调整。
I clearly made a mistake in paying what I did for Dexter in 1993. Furthermore, I compounded that mistake in a huge way by using Berkshire shares in payment. Last year, to recognize my error, we charged off all the remaining accounting goodwill that was attributable to the Dexter transaction. We may regain some economic goodwill at Dexter in the future, but we clearly have none at present.
我清楚地意识到，我在1993年为收购Dexter支付的价格过高。更糟糕的是，我使用了伯克希尔股票来完成这笔交易，使错误进一步放大。去年，为了承认这一错误，我们冲销了与Dexter交易相关的全部剩余会计商誉。未来我们或许能在Dexter恢复一些经济意义上的商誉，但目前显然已不存在任何商誉。
The managers of our shoe businesses are first-class from both a business and human perspective. They are working very hard at a tough — and often terribly painful — job, even though their personal financial circumstances don’t require them to do so. They have my admiration and thanks.
我们鞋类企业的管理者们无论从商业角度还是人品上都堪称一流。他们正在努力应对一个艰难——而且常常极其痛苦——的工作岗位，尽管他们的个人财务状况并不需要他们这样做。我对他们充满敬佩与感谢。
On a more pleasant note, we continue to be the undisputed leader in two branches of Aircraft Services — pilot training at FlightSafety (FSI) and fractional ownership of business jets at Executive Jet (EJA). Both companies are run by their remarkable founders.
令人欣慰的是，我们在飞机服务领域的两个分支继续保持无可争议的领导者地位：FlightSafety International（FSI）的飞行员培训业务，以及Executive Jet Aviation（EJA）的公务喷气机分时拥有业务。这两家公司均由其杰出的创始人领导。
Al Ueltschi at FSI is now 83 and continues to operate at full throttle. Though I am not a fan of stock splits, I am planning to split Al’s age 2-for-1 when he hits 100. (If it works, guess who’s next.)
FSI的Al Ueltschi今年已经83岁，却仍全速运转。虽然我不是股票拆分的支持者，但我计划在Al年满100岁时，把他的年龄按2:1拆分。（如果真有这一天，请猜猜下一个会是谁。）
We spent $272 million on flight simulators in 2000, and we’ll spend a similar amount this year. Anyone who thinks that the annual charges for depreciation don’t reflect a real cost — every bit as real as payroll or raw materials — should get an internship at a simulator company. Every year we spend amounts equal to our depreciation charge simply to stay in the same economic place — and then spend additional sums to grow. And growth is in prospect for FSI as far as the eye can see.
2000年我们在飞行模拟器上投入了2.72亿美元，今年也将投入类似金额。如果你认为每年的折旧费用不反映真实成本——它和工资或原材料一样真实——那你应该去一家模拟器公司实习一下。我们每年都要花费等同于折旧金额的资金，只是为了维持相同的经济地位，然后再额外花钱实现增长。对于FSI来说，增长前景非常广阔。
Even faster growth awaits EJA (whose fractional-ownership program is called NetJets®). Rich Santulli is the dynamo behind this business.
更快的增长则出现在EJA（其分时所有权项目称为NetJets®）。Rich Santulli是推动这项业务发展的关键人物。
Last year I told you that EJA’s recurring revenue from monthly management fees and hourly usage grew by 46% in 1999. In 2000 the growth was 49%. I also told you that this was a low-margin business, in which survivors will be few. Margins were indeed slim at EJA last year, in part because of the major costs we are incurring in developing our business in Europe.
去年我曾告诉各位，EJA来自每月管理费和飞行小时收费的经常性收入在1999年增长了46%，2000年更是增长了49%。我也提到过这是一个利润率极低的行业，最终能存活下来的企业寥寥无几。事实上，去年EJA的利润率确实很低，部分原因是我们正在欧洲市场发展业务而产生大量开支。
Regardless of the cost, you can be sure that EJA’s spending on safety will be whatever is needed. Obviously, we would follow this policy under any circumstances, but there’s some self-interest here as well: I, my wife, my children, my sisters, my 94-year-old aunt, all but one of our directors, and at least nine Berkshire managers regularly fly in the NetJets program. Given that cargo, I applaud Rich’s insistence on unusually high amounts of pilot training (an average of 23 days a year). In addition, our pilots cement their skills by flying 800 or so hours a year. Finally, each flies only one model of aircraft, which means our crews do no switching around among planes with different cockpit and flight characteristics.
无论成本如何，你可以放心，EJA在安全方面的支出将是必要的全额保障。显然，无论如何我们都会坚持这一政策，但这里也存在自身利益考量：我本人、我的妻子、子女、姐妹、94岁的姑妈，除了一位董事之外的所有董事会成员，以及至少九位伯克希尔的经理人都定期乘坐NetJets航班出行。考虑到这些因素，我非常支持Rich对飞行员培训提出的高标准（平均每年23天）。此外，我们的飞行员通过每年飞行约800小时来巩固技能。最后，每位飞行员只驾驶一种型号的飞机，这意味着我们的机组人员不会在驾驶舱布局和飞行特性各异的飞机之间频繁切换。
EJA’s business continues to be constrained by the availability of new aircraft. Still, our customers will take delivery of more than 50 new jets in 2001, 7% of world output. We are confident we will remain the world leader in fractional ownership, in respect to number of planes flying, quality of service, and standards of safety.
EJA的业务仍受新飞机供应限制。不过，我们的客户将在2001年接收超过50架新飞机，占全球产量的7%。我们有信心继续在分时拥有的飞机数量、服务质量及安全标准方面保持全球领先地位。
Additional information about our various businesses is given on pages 42-58, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 67-73, we have rearranged Berkshire’s financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company.
更多有关我们各项业务的信息请参见第42至58页，其中也包括以GAAP为基础划分的收益数据。此外，第67至73页以非GAAP方式重新整理了伯克希尔的财务数据，分为四个板块呈现，这也正是查理和我们思考公司结构的方式。
# Look-Through Earnings（穿透收益）
Reported earnings are an inadequate measure of economic progress at Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table on page 15 include only the dividends we receive from investees — though these dividends typically represent only a small fraction of the earnings attributable to our ownership. To depict something closer to economic reality at Berkshire than reported earnings, though, we employ the concept of "look-through" earnings. As we calculate these, they consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported on page 15; plus; (2) our share of the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating "operating earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting adjustments as well as capital gains and other major non-recurring items.
伯克希尔的报告利润并不能充分反映其经济进展，部分原因在于第15页表格中所列数字仅包含我们从被投资公司获得的股息——而这些股息通常只是我们应得利润的一小部分。为了更贴近伯克希尔的实际经济状况，我们引入了“穿透收益”（Look-Through Earnings）的概念。按照我们的计算方式，它包括以下三个部分：(1) 第15页所述经营性利润；加上 (2) 我们在主要被投资企业中所享有的未分配经营利润（根据GAAP会计准则，这部分利润并未体现在我们的利润表中）；减去 (3) 若这些未分配利润被发放给我们时伯克希尔需缴纳的税款预估值。在计算此处的“经营性利润”时，我们已剔除购并会计调整、资本利得及其他重大非经常性项目。
The following table sets forth our 2000 look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures can be no more than approximate, since they are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 15, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
下表列示了我们2000年的穿透收益数据，但我必须提醒各位，这些数字只能是估算值，因为它们基于许多主观判断。（这些被投资公司支付给我们的股息已被计入第15页列出的经营利润中，主要归类于“保险集团：净投资收益”。）
| Berkshire's Major Investees | Ownership at Yearend (1) | Berkshire's Share of Undistributed Operating Earnings (in millions)(2) |
|---|---|---|
| American Express Company | 11.4% | $265 |
| The Coca-Cola Company | 8.1% | 160 |
| Freddie Mac | 0.3% | 106 |
| The Gillette Company | 9.1% | 51 |
| M&T Bank | 7.2% | 23 |
| The Washington Post Company | 18.3% | 18 |
| Wells Fargo & Company | 3.2% | 117 |
| Total across investees | —— | $740 |
| Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings (3) | —— | $(104) |
| Reported operating earnings of Berkshire | —— | $1,779 |
| Total look-through earnings of Berkshire | —— | $2,415 million |
注释： (1) 不包括归属于少数权益的股份
(2) 按年度平均持股比例计算
(3) 使用的税率是14%，即伯克希尔对大多数股息所适用的税率
# Full and Fair Reporting（完整与公正披露）
At Berkshire, full reporting means giving you the information that we would wish you to give to us if our positions were reversed. What Charlie and I would want under that circumstance would be all the important facts about current operations as well as the CEO’s frank view of the long-term economic characteristics of the business. We would expect both a lot of financial details and a discussion of any significant data we would need to interpret what was presented.
在伯克希尔，完整披露意味着向您提供我们希望在角色互换时您能给予我们的信息。查理和我期望看到的是关于当前运营的所有重要事实，以及CEO对公司长期经济特性的坦率看法。我们既希望看到大量财务细节，也期待管理层对有助于理解报表内容的重要数据进行说明。
When Charlie and I read reports, we have no interest in pictures of personnel, plants or products. References to EBITDA make us shudder — does management think the tooth fairy pays for capital expenditures? We’re very suspicious of accounting methodology that is vague or unclear, since too often that means management wishes to hide something. And we don’t want to read messages that a public relations department or consultant has turned out. Instead, we expect a company’s CEO to explain in his or her own words what’s happening.
查理和我在阅读报告时，对员工照片、工厂图片或产品展示毫无兴趣。“EBITDA”这个词让我们感到不安——难道管理层真以为资本支出是由牙仙子来买单的吗？我们对模糊不清的会计方法非常警惕，因为这往往意味着管理层试图隐藏某些问题。我们也无意阅读由公关部门或顾问撰写的套话内容。相反，我们希望一家公司的CEO能亲自用他们自己的语言解释发生了什么。
For us, fair reporting means getting information to our 300,000 “partners” simultaneously, or as close to that mark as possible. We therefore put our annual and quarterly financials on the Internet between the close of the market on a Friday and the following morning. By our doing that, shareholders and other interested investors have timely access to these important releases and also have a reasonable amount of time to digest the information they include before the markets open on Monday. This year our quarterly information will be available on the Saturdays of May 12, August 11, and November 10. The 2001 annual report will be posted on March 9.
对我们而言，“公平披露”意味着将信息尽可能同步地传达给我们的30万名“合伙人”。因此，我们在每个周五闭市后至次日早晨之间将年报和季报发布于互联网上。这样做可以让股东和其他投资者及时获取这些关键文件，并在周一开盘前有足够时间消化其中的信息。今年我们的季度报告将在5月12日、8月11日和11月10日的周六发布，2001年年报将于3月9日发布。
We applaud the work that Arthur Levitt, Jr., until recently Chairman of the SEC, has done in cracking down on the corporate practice of “selective disclosure” that had spread like cancer in recent years. Indeed, it had become virtually standard practice for major corporations to “guide” analysts or large holders to earnings expectations that were intended either to be on the nose or a tiny bit below what the company truly expected to earn. Through the selectively dispersed hints, winks and nods that companies engaged in, speculatively-minded institutions and advisors were given an information edge over investment-oriented individuals. This was corrupt behavior, unfortunately embraced by both Wall Street and corporate America.
我们赞扬前美国证券交易委员会主席阿瑟·莱维特（Arthur Levitt Jr.）近年来打击“选择性披露”的努力。这种行为在过去几年如癌症般蔓延开来，大型企业几乎已将其视为标准做法：通过暗示、眨眼或点头等方式，引导分析师或大机构客户形成略低于实际预期的盈利预测。投机型机构投资者和顾问借此获得了相对于价值型个人投资者的信息优势。这是一种腐败行为，不幸的是，华尔街和美国企业界都曾广泛接受它。
Thanks to Chairman Levitt, whose general efforts on behalf of investors were both tireless and effective, corporations are now required to treat all of their owners equally. The fact that this reform came about because of coercion rather than conscience should be a matter of shame for CEOs and their investor relations departments.
多亏了莱维特主席为投资者利益所做出的不懈且卓有成效的努力，现在所有上市公司都被要求平等地对待每一位股东。然而，这项改革是通过强制而非道德自觉实现的，这对公司CEO及其投资者关系部门来说本应是一件令人羞耻的事。
One further thought while I’m on my soapbox: Charlie and I think it is both deceptive and dangerous for CEOs to predict growth rates for their companies. They are, of course, frequently egged on to do so by both analysts and their own investor relations departments. They should resist, however, because too often these predictions lead to trouble.
趁我还站在讲台上再说一句：查理和我都认为，CEO对企业未来增长率作出预测，既是误导也是危险的行为。当然，分析师和公司投资者关系部门常常鼓励他们这么做。但CEO应当抵制这种诱惑，因为这类预测往往会引发麻烦。
It’s fine for a CEO to have his own internal goals and, in our view, it’s even appropriate for the CEO to publicly express some hopes about the future, if these expectations are accompanied by sensible caveats. But for a major corporation to predict that its per-share earnings will grow over the long term at, say, 15% annually is to court trouble.
CEO可以设定内部目标，我们认为，只要附带合理前提条件，CEO对外表达一些对未来的期望也是合适的。但如果一家大型企业宣称每股收益将在长期内每年增长15%，那便是在自找麻烦。
That’s true because a growth rate of that magnitude can only be maintained by a very small percentage of large businesses. Here’s a test: Examine the record of, say, the 200 highest earning companies from 1970 or 1980 and tabulate how many have increased per-share earnings by 15% annually since those dates. You will find that only a handful have. I would wager you a very significant sum that fewer than 10 of the 200 most profitable companies in 2000 will attain 15% annual growth in earnings-per-share over the next 20 years.
这是因为只有极少数大型企业能够长期维持如此高的增长速度。做个测试吧：回顾1970或1980年以来全球收入最高的200家公司，看看有多少家实现了每股收益年均增长15%。你会发现寥寥无几。我可以打赌，2000年最赚钱的200家企业中，未来20年内能实现每股收益年增15%的，不到10家。
The problem arising from lofty predictions is not just that they spread unwarranted optimism. Even more troubling is the fact that they corrode CEO behavior. Over the years, Charlie and I have observed many instances in which CEOs engaged in uneconomic operating maneuvers so that they could meet earnings targets they had announced. Worse still, after exhausting all that operating acrobatics would do, they sometimes played a wide variety of accounting games to “make the numbers.” These accounting shenanigans have a way of snowballing: Once a company moves earnings from one period to another, operating shortfalls that occur thereafter require it to engage in further accounting maneuvers that must be even more “heroic.” These can turn fudging into fraud. (More money, it has been noted, has been stolen with the point of a pen than at the point of a gun.)
高增长预测带来的问题，不只是传播不切实际的乐观情绪。更严重的问题是，这些预测会腐蚀CEO的行为方式。多年来，查理和我目睹了许多CEO为达成公开宣布的盈利目标而采取违背商业规律的操作。更糟的是，在耗尽所有可能的运营手段之后，他们甚至动起了会计游戏的脑筋，以“达到预期”。这类会计操纵具有滚雪球效应：一旦企业开始把当期利润转移到另一时期，后续业绩下滑就迫使他们不得不采取更为激进的会计手法来“达标”。最终，修饰可能演变为欺诈。（人们早已指出，用笔偷钱比用枪抢钱更容易。）
Charlie and I tend to be leery of companies run by CEOs who woo investors with fancy predictions. A few of these managers will prove prophetic — but others will turn out to be congenital optimists, or even charlatans. Unfortunately, it’s not easy for investors to know in advance which species they are dealing with.
查理和我通常对那些靠华丽预测吸引投资者的CEO持怀疑态度。其中有些人确实有先见之明，但更多人不过是天生的乐观派，甚至可能是江湖骗子。遗憾的是，投资者往往难以提前判断自己面对的是哪一类人。
# Shareholder-Designated Contributions（股东指定捐赠）
About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 2000 shareholder-designated contributions program, with contributions totaling $16.9 million. A full description of the program appears on pages 74-75.
约有97%的符合条件股份参与了伯克希尔2000年度股东指定捐赠计划，总捐赠金额达1,690万美元。有关该计划的完整说明请参见第74至75页。
Cumulatively, over the 20 years of the program, Berkshire has made contributions of $164 million pursuant to the instructions of our shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries, which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $18.3 million in 2000, including in-kind donations of $3 million.
自本计划实施以来的20年间，伯克希尔已根据股东指示累计向指定慈善机构捐赠了1.64亿美元。其余慈善活动由我们的子公司执行，它们延续被收购前的公益模式（唯一的例外是原企业主自行负责其私人慈善事务）。整体而言，2000年我们的子公司共捐款1,830万美元，其中包括价值300万美元的实物捐赠。
To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 2001 will be ineligible for the 2001 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten. Designations received after the due date will not be honored.
欲参加未来年度的计划，请确保您持有的A类股票是以实际持有人名义登记的，而非以经纪人、银行或托管机构的名义登记。若在2001年8月31日前未完成此类登记，则您将不具备参与2001年计划的资格。收到捐赠表后，请尽快填写并返回，以免遗漏或遗忘。逾期收到的捐赠对象指定将不予受理。
# The Annual Meeting（年度股东大会）
Last year we moved the annual meeting to the Civic Auditorium, and it worked very well for us. We will meet there again on Saturday, April 28. The doors will open at 7 a.m., the movie will begin at 8:30, and the meeting itself will commence at 9:30. There will be a short break at noon for food, with sandwiches available at the Civic’s concession stands. Except for that interlude, Charlie and I will answer questions until 3:30.
去年我们将股东大会移至市政礼堂（Civic Auditorium）举行，效果非常好。今年我们将于4月28日（星期六）再次在此召开会议。当日早上7点开门入场，上午8:30播放纪录片，会议正式开始时间为9:30。中午将安排短暂午休时间用餐，现场提供三明治等简餐。除此次短暂休息外，查理和我将持续回答问题直至下午3:30。
For the next couple of years, the Civic is our only choice. We must therefore hold the meeting on either Saturday or Sunday to avoid the traffic and parking nightmare that would occur on a weekday. Shortly, however, Omaha will have a new Convention Center with ample parking. Assuming that the Center is then available to us, I will poll shareholders to see whether you wish to return to a Monday meeting. We will decide that vote based on the wishes of a majority of shareholders, not shares.
接下来几年内，Civic Auditorium仍是我们的唯一选择。因此，我们必须将会议安排在周六或周日举行，以避免工作日可能发生的交通拥堵与停车难题。不过不久之后，奥马哈将建成新的会议中心，并配备充足的停车位。届时如该中心可供使用，我将发起投票征求各位意见是否恢复周一举办会议。该决定将以多数股东的意见为准，而非持股数量决定。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to this year’s meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. In our normal fashion, we will run buses from the larger hotels to the meeting. After the meeting, the buses will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim’s and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.
随附于本报告的委托书材料中包含一份附件，详细说明如何获取参加今年股东大会及其他活动所需的凭证。关于航班、酒店及租车预订，我们再度邀请美国运通公司（电话：800-799-6634）为您提供特别协助。一如往年，我们会安排从大型酒店直达会场的大巴接送服务。会议结束后，大巴也将送回酒店，并前往Nebraska家具商场、Borsheim珠宝店以及机场。即便如此，拥有一辆租车仍可为您的行程带来更多便利。
We have added so many new companies to Berkshire this year that I’m not going to detail all of the products that we will be selling at the meeting. But come prepared to carry home everything from bricks to candy. One new product, however, deserves special note: Bob Shaw has designed a 3 x 5 rug featuring an excellent likeness of Charlie. Obviously, it would be embarrassing for Charlie — make that humiliating — if slow sales forced us to slash the rug’s price, so step up and do your part.
今年我们新增了许多新成员公司，因此不再详列本次大会所展售的所有产品。但请您做好准备，从砖块到糖果的各种商品都可带回家。其中一款新产品值得特别介绍：Bob Shaw设计了一款3英尺×5英尺大小的地毯，上面印有Charlie的逼真画像。显然，如果销售不佳导致我们不得不大幅降价出售这款地毯，对Charlie来说将是尴尬——甚至是羞辱性的。所以请大家踊跃购买，支持一下！
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to offer you a special shareholder’s discount (usually 8%). Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you some money.
GEICO将在会场设立展位，来自全国各地的多位顶尖保险顾问将在现场为您提供汽车保险报价服务。大多数情况下，您可以享受一项专属股东折扣（通常为8%）。请携带您目前的保单信息前来比较，看看我们是否能为您节省开支。
At the Omaha airport on Saturday, we will have the usual array of aircraft from Executive Jet available for your inspection. Just ask an EJA representative at the Civic about viewing any of these planes. If you buy what we consider an appropriate number of items during the weekend, you may well need your own plane to take them home.
周六当天，在奥马哈机场，Executive Jet仍将展出多架公务飞机供参观。只需向Civic会场的EJA代表咨询即可安排参观。若您在周末期间采购了我们认为“足够多”的商品，您或许真需要一架专属于自己的飞机才能把这些东西带回去了。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 75-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” pricing, which means we will be offering our shareholders a discount that is customarily given only to employees. We initiated this special pricing at NFM four years ago and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $9.1 million in 2000.
位于Dodge与Pacific大道之间72街占地75英亩的Nebraska Furniture Mart（NFM），将继续为股东们提供“伯克希尔周末”特惠价格，这意味着我们给予股东仅限员工享有的折扣待遇。这项优惠四年前首次推出时，“伯克希尔周末”期间销售额从1997年的530万美元增长至2000年的910万美元。
To get the discount, you must make your purchases between Wednesday, April 25 and Monday, April 30 and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestige manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but that, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays.
要享受此折扣，您必须于4月25日（周三）至4月30日（周一）期间购物，并出示您的股东大会入场凭证。“伯克希尔周末”期间的特价甚至适用于一些通常严格禁止打折的高端品牌制造商，他们破例为我们提供了优惠。对此我们深表感谢。NFM营业时间为平日10:00至21:00，周六日则为10:00至18:00。
Borsheim’s — the largest jewelry store in the country except for Tiffany’s Manhattan store — will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, April 27. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Sunday, April 29. Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid the large crowds that will assemble on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a shareholder. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. Borsheim’s operates on a gross margin that is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals, so the more you buy, the more you save (or at least that’s what my family always tells me).
除了蒂芙尼纽约旗舰店之外，Borsheim珠宝店堪称全美最大珠宝商。今年它将为股东举办两场专属活动：第一场是4月27日（周五）晚18:00至22:00举行的鸡尾酒会；第二场为4月29日（周日）上午9:00至下午5:00的主会场盛会。股东专属价格将在4月26日至29日期间开放。若您希望避开周五晚间和周日的人潮，可在其他时段前来，并表明您为伯克希尔股东身份。周六营业时间延长至18:00。Borsheim珠宝的毛利率比主要竞争对手低整整二十个百分点，因此买得越多省得越多（至少我的家人总是这么对我说）。
In the mall outside of Borsheim’s, we will have local bridge experts available to play with our shareholders on Sunday. Bob Hamman, who normally is with us, will be in Africa this year. He has promised, however, to be on hand in 2002. Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will also be in the mall, taking on all comers — blindfolded! Last year, Patrick played as many as six games simultaneously — with his blindfold securely in place — and demolished his opponents.
在Borsheim珠宝店外的购物中心广场上，周日当天将安排桥牌专家与股东进行互动比赛。平时经常参与的Bob Hamman今年因出差非洲无法到场，但他承诺2002年一定出席。同时，曾两次获得美国国际象棋冠军的Patrick Wolff也将亲临现场，进行蒙眼车轮战！去年他一次同时挑战六盘蒙眼棋局，结果轻松横扫对手。
As if all this isn’t enough to test your skills, our Borsheim’s Olympiad this year will also include Bill Robertie, one of only two players to twice win the backgammon world championship. Backgammon can be a big money game, so bring along your stock certificates.
为了让各位进一步挑战自我，今年Borsheim还将邀请Bill Robertie加入我们的“奥林匹克盛会”。他是历史上仅有的两位蝉联世界双陆棋冠军的选手之一。双陆棋可是个高赌注游戏，所以请务必带上您的股票持有证明来参赛。
Gorat’s — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, April 29, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that you can’t come to Gorat’s on Sunday without a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 2 (but not before). If Sunday is sold out, try Gorat’s on one of the other evenings you will be in town. If you order a rare T-bone with a double order of hash browns, you will establish your credentials as an epicure.
Gorat’s是我最喜欢的牛排馆，今年将在4月29日（周日）专门向伯克希尔股东开放，营业时间为下午4点至晚上10点。请注意，周日前往Gorat’s必须提前预约。预约电话为402-551-3733，仅限4月2日拨打（在此之前不可拨）。若周日晚间订位爆满，也可考虑您在奥马哈逗留期间的其他夜晚前往。若您点了一份三分熟T骨牛排配双份土豆煎饼，那么恭喜您，您已经通过了美食家认证。
The usual baseball game will be held at Rosenblatt Stadium at 7 p.m. on Saturday night. This year the Omaha Golden Spikes will play the New Orleans Zephyrs. Ernie Banks is again going to be on hand to — bravely — face my fastball (once clocked at 95 mpm — miles per month).
周六晚间七点，照例将在Rosenblatt体育场举行棒球友谊赛。今年对阵双方为Omaha Golden Spikes与New Orleans Zephyrs。Ernie Banks将再次勇敢地迎战我的快速球（上次投出速度记录为每小时95英里——其实是“每月95英里”，开个玩笑）。
My performance last year was not my best: It took me five pitches to throw anything resembling a strike. And, believe me, it gets lonely on the mound when you can’t find the plate. Finally, I got one over, and Ernie lashed a line drive to left field. After I was yanked from the game, the many sports writers present asked what I had served up to Ernie. I quoted what Warren Spahn said after Willie Mays hit one of his pitches for a home run (Willie’s first in the majors): “It was a helluva pitch for the first sixty feet.”
去年表现不太理想：我用了五次投球才投出一个接近好球区的球。信不信由你，当你找不到击球区中心时，站在投手丘上的感觉真的很孤独。终于有一次勉强投过去，Ernie立刻一记直线击球打向左外野。当我被换下场后，许多在场体育记者问我到底给Ernie投了个什么样的球。我引用了Warren Spahn当年面对威利·梅斯（Willie Mays）击出首支大联盟本垒打后的名言：“这球前六十英尺（即投手区到击球区）的表现堪称完美。”
It will be a different story this year. I don’t want to tip my hand, so let’s just say Ernie will have to deal with a pitch he has never seen before.
今年情况将有所不同。我不愿过早透露战术细节，但可以肯定的是，Ernie将面对一种前所未见的新式投球方式。
Our proxy statement contains instructions about obtaining tickets to the game and also a large quantity of other information that should help you enjoy your visit in Omaha. There will be plenty of action in town. So come for Woodstock Weekend and join our Celebration of Capitalism at the Civic.
我们的委托书声明中还包含获取比赛门票的方法以及其他实用信息，相信将有助于您在奥马哈度过愉快时光。整个周末活动丰富精彩，敬请前来参加这场“资本盛宴”，体验伯克希尔版伍德斯托克周末狂欢节。
Warren E. Buffett
February 28, 2001
Chairman of the Board
沃伦·E·巴菲特
2001年2月28日
董事会主席