1990巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. (伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司)
# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东)
Last year we made a prediction: "A reduction [in Berkshire's net worth] is almost certain in at least one of the next three years." During much of 1990's second half, we were on the road to quickly proving that forecast accurate. But some strengthening in stock prices late in the year enabled us to close 1990 with net worth up by $362 million, or 7.3%. Over the last 26 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $4,612.06, or at a rate of 23.2% compounded annually.
去年我们曾预测：“在未来三年中的至少一年，[伯克希尔的净资产]几乎肯定会减少。”在1990年下半年的大部分时间里，我们似乎很快就要验证这一预测的准确性。但年底股票价格的回升使我们在1990年结束时净资产增加了3.62亿美元，增长率为7.3%。在过去26年（即现任管理层接管以来），我们的每股账面价值从19.46美元增长到4,612.06美元，年复合增长率为23.2%。
Our growth rate was lackluster in 1990 because our four major common stock holdings, in aggregate, showed little change in market value. Last year I told you that though these companies - Capital Cities/ABC, Coca-Cola, GEICO, and Washington Post - had fine businesses and superb managements, widespread recognition of these attributes had pushed the stock prices of the four to lofty levels. The market prices of the two media companies have since fallen significantly - for good reasons relating to evolutionary industry developments that I will discuss later - and the price of Coca-Cola stock has increased significantly for what I also believe are good reasons. Overall, yearend 1990 prices of our "permanent four," though far from enticing, were a bit more appealing than they were a year earlier.
1990年我们的增长率表现平平，因为我们持有的四大主要普通股总体上市场价值几乎没有变化。去年我曾告诉你们，尽管这些公司——首都城市/ABC、可口可乐、GEICO和华盛顿邮报——拥有出色的业务和优秀的管理层，但这些优点的广泛认可已将这四家公司的股价推高至高位。此后，两家媒体公司的市场价格大幅下跌——原因与我稍后将讨论的行业演变发展有关，这些理由是合理的；而可口可乐的股价则显著上涨，我也认为这是有充分理由的。总体而言，我们“永久四家”在1990年底的价格虽远非诱人，但比一年前略有吸引力。
Berkshire's 26-year record is meaningless in forecasting future results; so also, we hope, is the one-year record. We continue to aim for a 15% average annual gain in intrinsic value. But, as we never tire of telling you, this goal becomes ever more difficult to reach as our equity base, now $5.3 billion, increases.
伯克希尔26年的记录在预测未来结果时毫无意义；我们希望一年的记录也是如此。我们继续以实现内在价值年均15%的增长为目标。但正如我们不厌其烦地告诉你们的，随着我们的股权基础（现为53亿美元）的增加，这一目标变得越来越难以实现。
If we do attain that 15% average, our shareholders should fare well. However, Berkshire's corporate gains will produce an identical gain for a specific shareholder only if he eventually sells his shares at the same relationship to intrinsic value that existed when he bought them. For example, if you buy at a 10% premium to intrinsic value; if intrinsic value subsequently grows at 15% a year; and if you then sell at a 10% premium, your own return will correspondingly be 15% compounded. (The calculation assumes that no dividends are paid.) If, however, you buy at a premium and sell at a smaller premium, your results will be somewhat inferior to those achieved by the company.
如果我们确实实现了15%的平均增长，我们的股东应该会有不错的回报。然而，只有当股东最终以与购买时相同的内在价值关系卖出股份时，伯克希尔的公司收益才会为特定股东带来相同的回报。例如，如果你以高于内在价值10%的溢价购买；如果内在价值随后每年增长15%；并且如果你以10%的溢价卖出，你的回报将相应地为15%的复合增长。（此计算假设不支付股息。）然而，如果你以溢价买入并以较小的溢价卖出，你的回报将略低于公司实现的回报。
Ideally, the results of every Berkshire shareholder would closely mirror those of the company during his period of ownership. That is why Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I hope for Berkshire to sell consistently at about intrinsic value. We prefer such steadiness to the value-ignoring volatility of the past two years: In 1989 intrinsic value grew less than did book value, which was up 44%, while the market price rose 85%; in 1990 book value and intrinsic value increased by a small amount, while the market price fell 23%.
理想情况下，每位伯克希尔股东在其持有期间的回报应与公司的表现密切相关。这就是为什么伯克希尔的副主席兼我的搭档查理·芒格和我希望伯克希尔的股价能持续接近其内在价值。我们更喜欢这种稳定性，而不是过去两年忽视价值的波动：在1989年，内在价值增长低于账面价值（后者增长了44%），而市场价格上涨了85%；在1990年，账面价值和内在价值略有增加，而市场价格下跌了23%。
Berkshire's intrinsic value continues to exceed book value by a substantial margin. We can't tell you the exact differential because intrinsic value is necessarily an estimate; Charlie and I might, in fact, differ by 10% in our appraisals. We do know, however, that we own some exceptional businesses that are worth considerably more than the values at which they are carried on our books.
伯克希尔的内在价值继续大幅超过其账面价值。我们无法告诉你具体的差额，因为内在价值必然是一个估计值；事实上，查理和我在评估上可能会有10%的差异。然而，我们确实知道，我们拥有一些杰出的企业，它们的价值远高于我们在账面上记录的价值。
Much of the extra value that exists in our businesses has been created by the managers now running them. Charlie and I feel free to brag about this group because we had nothing to do with developing the skills they possess: These superstars just came that way. Our job is merely to identify talented managers and provide an environment in which they can do their stuff. Having done it, they send their cash to headquarters and we face our only other task: the intelligent deployment of these funds.
我们企业的许多额外价值是由现在管理它们的经理人创造的。查理和我可以自豪地夸耀这群人，因为我们与他们所拥有的技能的培养毫无关系：这些超级明星天生如此。我们的工作仅仅是识别有才华的经理人，并为他们提供一个可以施展才华的环境。完成这些后，他们将现金汇到总部，我们面临的唯一其他任务是：智能地配置这些资金。
My own role in operations may best be illustrated by a small tale concerning my granddaughter, Emily, and her fourth birthday party last fall. Attending were other children, adoring relatives, and Beemer the Clown, a local entertainer who includes magic tricks in his act.
我在运营中的角色可以通过一个关于我孙女艾米丽的小故事来最好地说明，故事发生在去年秋天她的四岁生日派对上。参加派对的有其他孩子、疼爱她的亲戚，以及当地艺人比默小丑，他的表演包括魔术。
Beginning these, Beemer asked Emily to help him by waving a "magic wand" over "the box of wonders." Green handkerchiefs went into the box, Emily waved the wand, and Beemer removed blue ones. Loose handkerchiefs went in and, upon a magisterial wave by Emily, emerged knotted. After four such transformations, each more amazing than its predecessor, Emily was unable to contain herself. Her face aglow, she exulted: "Gee, I'm really good at this."
比默开始表演时，请艾米丽帮他挥动“魔法棒”在“奇迹盒子”上。绿色手帕被放进盒子，艾米丽挥动魔法棒，比默拿出了蓝色手帕。松散的手帕被放进去，在艾米丽庄严的一挥后，变成了打结的手帕。经过四次这样的变换，每一次都比前一次更令人惊叹，艾米丽再也无法抑制自己。她满脸兴奋地欢呼：“哇，我真的很擅长这个！”
And that sums up my contribution to the performance of Berkshire's business magicians - the Blumkins, the Friedman family, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey and Ralph Schey. They deserve your applause.
这总结了我对伯克希尔商业魔术师们——布卢姆金家族、弗里德曼家族、迈克·戈德堡、赫尔德曼家族、查克·哈金斯、斯坦·利普西和拉尔夫·谢伊——表现的贡献。他们值得你们的掌声。
# Sources of Reported Earnings (报告收益来源)
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表显示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在本表中，商誉摊销和其他主要购买价格会计调整未计入适用它们的具体业务，而是汇总并单独列示。这种方法让您可以查看我们业务的收益，就像我们未购买这些业务时所报告的那样。我在过去的报告中解释了为什么我们认为这种呈现方式对投资者和管理者比遵循公认会计原则（GAAP）的要求（按业务逐一进行购买价格调整）更有用。当然，我们在表中显示的总净收益与我们经审计的财务报表中的GAAP总额一致。
# Much Additional Information (更多信息)
Much additional information about these businesses is given on pages 39-46, where you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. For information on Wesco's businesses, I urge you to read Charlie Munger's letter, which starts on page 56. His letter also contains the clearest and most insightful discussion of the banking industry that I have seen.
关于这些业务的更多信息在第39-46页中有详细描述，您还可以在那里找到我们按公认会计原则（GAAP）报告的部门收益。关于Wesco的业务信息，我强烈建议您阅读查理·芒格的信，从第56页开始。他的信中还包含了我见过的最清晰、最有洞察力的银行业讨论。
# Operating Earnings Table (运营收益表)
| Operating Earnings (运营收益) | Pre-Tax Earnings (税前收益) | Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) (伯克希尔净收益份额（税后及少数股东权益后）) |
|---|---|---|
| 1990 | 1989 | |
| ---------------------------------- | ------------ | ------------ |
| Insurance Group (保险集团): | ||
| Underwriting (承保业务) | $(26,647) | $(24,400) |
| Net Investment Income (净投资收入) | 327,048 | 243,599 |
| Buffalo News (布法罗新闻) | 43,954 | 46,047 |
| Fechheimer (费希海默) | 12,450 | 12,621 |
| Kirby (柯比) | 27,445 | 26,114 |
| Nebraska Furniture Mart (内布拉斯加家具市场) | 17,248 | 17,070 |
| Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group (斯科特·费泽制造集团) | 30,378 | 33,165 |
| See's Candies (喜诗糖果) | 39,580 | 34,235 |
| Wesco - other than Insurance (Wesco - 非保险业务) | 12,441 | 13,008 |
| World Book (世界图书) | 31,896 | 25,583 |
| Amortization of Goodwill (商誉摊销) | (3,476) | (3,387) |
| Other Purchase-Price Accounting Charges (其他购买价格会计调整) | (5,951) | (5,740) |
| Interest Expense (利息费用)* | (76,374) | (42,389) |
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions (股东指定捐款) | (5,824) | (5,867) |
| Other (其他) | 58,309 | 23,755 |
| Operating Earnings (运营收益) | 482,477 | 393,414 |
| Sales of Securities (证券销售) | 33,989 | 223,810 |
| Total Earnings - All Entities (总收益 - 所有实体) | $516,466 | $617,224 |
*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and Mutual Savings & Loan.
*不包括斯科特·费泽金融集团和互助储蓄与贷款的利息费用。
We refer you also to pages 47-53, where we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments. These correspond to the way Charlie and I think about the business and should help you more in estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value than consolidated figures would do. Shown on these pages are balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our insurance operations, with their major investment positions itemized; (2) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; (3) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial; and (4) an all-other category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the companies in segment (2), all purchase-price accounting adjustments, and various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.
我们还请您参考第47-53页，我们已将伯克希尔的财务数据重新整理为四个部门。这些部门对应于查理和我对业务的思考方式，与合并数据相比，这将更有助于您估计伯克希尔的内在价值。这些页面显示了以下内容的资产负债表和收益表：(1) 我们的保险业务，列出了其主要投资项目；(2) 我们的制造、出版和零售业务，不包括某些非运营资产和购买价格会计调整；(3) 从事金融类业务的子公司，即互助储蓄和斯科特·费泽金融；(4) 其他所有类别，包括第(2)部门公司持有的非运营资产（主要是可交易证券）、所有购买价格会计调整，以及Wesco和伯克希尔母公司的各种资产和债务。
If you combine the earnings and net worths of these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements. However, I want to emphasize that this four-category presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in no way bless it.
如果您将这四个部门的收益和净资产合并，您将得出与我们GAAP报表上显示的总额相符的结果。然而，我想强调，这种四类别呈现方式不在我们审计师的审核范围内，他们对此不予认可。
# "Look-Through" Earnings (透视收益)
The term "earnings" has a precise ring to it. And when an earnings figure is accompanied by an unqualified auditor's certificate, a naive reader might think it comparable in certitude to pi, calculated to dozens of decimal places.
“收益”这个词听起来很精确。当一个收益数字附有无保留意见的审计师证书时，天真的读者可能会认为它的确定性堪比圆周率，可以精确到几十位小数。
In reality, however, earnings can be as pliable as putty when a charlatan heads the company reporting them. Eventually truth will surface, but in the meantime a lot of money can change hands. Indeed, some important American fortunes have been created by the monetization of accounting mirages.
然而，实际上，当一个骗子领导公司报告收益时，收益可以像橡皮泥一样可塑。真相最终会浮出水面，但在此期间，大量资金可能已经易手。事实上，一些重要的美国财富是通过会计幻象的货币化创造的。
Funny business in accounting is not new. For connoisseurs of chicanery, I have attached as Appendix A on page 22 a previously unpublished satire on accounting practices written by Ben Graham in 1936. Alas, excesses similar to those he then lampooned have many times since found their way into the financial statements of major American corporations and been duly certified by big-name auditors. Clearly, investors must always keep their guard up and use accounting numbers as a beginning, not an end, in their attempts to calculate true "economic earnings" accruing to them.
会计中的诡计并不新鲜。对于欺诈行为的鉴赏家，我在第22页附上了一篇本·格雷厄姆于1936年撰写的、此前未发表的关于会计实践的讽刺文章。唉，自那以后，与他当时嘲笑的类似过度行为多次出现在美国大公司的财务报表中，并被知名审计师正式认证。显然，投资者必须始终保持警惕，将会计数字作为计算其真实“经济收益”的起点，而非终点。
Berkshire's own reported earnings are misleading in a different, but important, way: We have huge investments in companies ("investees") whose earnings far exceed their dividends and in which we record our share of earnings only to the extent of the dividends we receive. The extreme case is Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. Our 17% share of the company's earnings amounted to more than $83 million last year. Yet only about $530,000 ($600,000 of dividends it paid us less some $70,000 of tax) is counted in Berkshire's GAAP earnings. The residual $82 million-plus stayed with Cap Cities as retained earnings, which work for our benefit but go unrecorded on our books.
伯克希尔自身的报告收益在另一种重要方式上具有误导性：我们在一些公司（“被投资公司”）拥有巨额投资，这些公司的收益远超其股息，而我们仅记录我们收到的股息部分的收益。极端例子是首都城市/ABC公司。我们17%的公司收益份额去年超过8300万美元。然而，只有约53万美元（其支付给我们的60万美元股息减去约7万美元的税款）计入伯克希尔的GAAP收益。其余8200多万美元留在首都城市作为留存收益，这为我们带来了利益，但未记录在我们的账面上。
Our perspective on such "forgotten-but-not-gone" earnings is simple: The way they are accounted for is of no importance, but their ownership and subsequent utilization is all-important. We care not whether the auditors hear a tree fall in the forest; we do care who owns the tree and what's next done with it.
我们对这种“被遗忘但未消失”收益的看法很简单：它们的会计处理方式并不重要，但它们的所有权和后续利用至关重要。我们不在乎审计师是否听到森林中树倒下的声音；我们在乎的是谁拥有这棵树以及接下来如何处理它。
When Coca-Cola uses retained earnings to repurchase its shares, the company increases our percentage ownership in what I regard to be the most valuable franchise in the world. (Coke also, of course, uses retained earnings in many other value-enhancing ways.) Instead of repurchasing stock, Coca-Cola could pay those funds to us in dividends, which we could then use to purchase more Coke shares. That would be a less efficient scenario: Because of taxes we would pay on dividend income, we would not be able to increase our proportionate ownership to the degree that Coke can, acting for us. If this less efficient procedure were followed, however, Berkshire would report far greater "earnings."
当可口可乐使用留存收益回购其股份时，公司增加了我们在世界上我认为最有价值的特许经营权的持股比例。（当然，可口可乐还以许多其他增值方式使用留存收益。）可口可乐可以选择将这些资金作为股息支付给我们，然后我们可以用这些资金购买更多可口可乐的股份。这将是一个效率较低的方案：由于我们需要为股息收入纳税，我们无法像可口可乐为我们行事那样大幅增加我们的比例所有权。然而，如果采用这种效率较低的程序，伯克希尔将报告更高的“收益”。
I believe the best way to think about our earnings is in terms of "look-through" results, calculated as follows: Take $250 million, which is roughly our share of the 1990 operating earnings retained by our investees; subtract $30 million, for the incremental taxes we would have owed had that $250 million been paid to us in dividends; and add the remainder, $220 million, to our reported operating earnings of $371 million. Thus our 1990 "look-through earnings" were about $590 million.
我认为考虑我们收益的最佳方式是“透视”收益，计算方法如下：取2.5亿美元，这是我们大致拥有的1990年被投资公司留存的运营收益份额；减去3000万美元，这是如果这2.5亿美元以股息形式支付给我们时我们应缴纳的增量税款；然后将剩余的2.2亿美元加到我们报告的3.71亿美元运营收益中。因此，我们1990年的“透视收益”约为5.9亿美元。
As I mentioned last year, we hope to have look-through earnings grow about 15% annually. In 1990 we substantially exceeded that rate but in 1991 we will fall far short of it. Our Gillette preferred has been called and we will convert it into common stock on April 1. This will reduce reported earnings by about $35 million annually and look-through earnings by a much smaller, but still significant, amount. Additionally, our media earnings - both direct and look-through - appear sure to decline. Whatever the results, we will post you annually on how we are doing on a look-through basis.
正如我去年提到的，我们希望透视收益每年增长约15%。1990年我们大幅超过了这一速度，但1991年我们将远远达不到这一目标。我们的吉列优先股已被赎回，我们将于4月1日将其转换为普通股。这将使报告收益每年减少约3500万美元，透视收益减少的数额较小但仍显著。此外，我们的媒体收益——无论是直接的还是透视的——似乎肯定会下降。无论结果如何，我们将每年向您报告我们在透视基础上的表现。
# Non-Insurance Operations (非保险业务)
Take another look at the figures on page 51, which aggregate the earnings and balance sheets of our non-insurance operations. After-tax earnings on average equity in 1990 were 51%, a result that would have placed the group about 20th on the 1989 Fortune 500.
请再次查看第51页的数字，这些数字汇总了我们非保险业务的收益和资产负债表。1990年平均股本的税后收益率为51%，这一结果将使该集团在1989年《财富》500强中排名大约第20位。
Two factors make this return even more remarkable. First, leverage did not produce it: Almost all our major facilities are owned, not leased, and such small debt as these operations have is basically offset by cash they hold. In fact, if the measurement was return on assets - a calculation that eliminates the effect of debt upon returns - our group would rank in Fortune's top ten.
有两个因素使这一回报更加引人注目。首先，这一回报并非由杠杆产生：我们几乎所有的主要设施都是自有的，而不是租赁的，这些业务持有的少量债务基本上被它们持有的现金所抵消。事实上，如果以资产回报率来衡量——这种计算消除了债务对回报的影响——我们的集团将在《财富》500强中排名前十。
Equally important, our return was not earned from industries, such as cigarettes or network television stations, possessing spectacular economics for all participating in them. Instead it came from a group of businesses operating in such prosaic fields as furniture retailing, candy, vacuum cleaners, and even steel warehousing. The explanation is clear: Our extraordinary returns flow from outstanding operating managers, not fortuitous industry economics.
同样重要的是，我们的回报并非来自那些对所有参与者都具有惊人经济效益的行业，如香烟或网络电视台。相反，它来自一组在家具零售、糖果、吸尘器甚至钢材仓储等平凡领域运营的业务。解释很清楚：我们非凡的回报来源于出色的运营管理者，而不是幸运的行业经济条件。
# Borsheim's (博斯海姆)
It was a poor year for retailing - particularly for big-ticket items - but someone forgot to tell Ike Friedman at Borsheim's. Sales were up 18%. That's both a same-stores and all-stores percentage, since Borsheim's operates but one establishment.
零售业表现不佳，特别是大件商品，但似乎没人告诉博斯海姆的艾克·弗里德曼。销售额增长了18%。这是同店和全店的百分比，因为博斯海姆只经营一家店。
But, oh, what an establishment! We can't be sure about the fact (because most fine-jewelry retailers are privately owned) but we believe that this jewelry store does more volume than any other in the U.S., except for Tiffany's New York store.
但这家店真是非同凡响！我们无法确定这一事实（因为大多数高端珠宝零售商是私有的），但我们相信，这家珠宝店的交易量是美国最大的，仅次于蒂芙尼的纽约店。
Borsheim's could not do nearly that well if our customers came only from the Omaha metropolitan area, whose population is about 600,000. We have long had a huge percentage of greater Omaha's jewelry business, so growth in that market is necessarily limited. But every year business from non-Midwest customers grows dramatically. Many visit the store in person. A large number of others, however, buy through the mail in a manner you will find interesting.
如果我们的客户仅来自奥马哈大都市区（人口约60万），博斯海姆不可能有如此出色的表现。我们长期以来占据了奥马哈珠宝业务的大部分市场份额，因此在该市场的增长必然有限。但每年来自非中西部客户的业务大幅增长。许多人亲自到店购物。然而，还有大量客户通过邮购方式购买，这种方式你会觉得很有趣。
These customers request a jewelry selection of a certain type and value - say, emeralds in the $10,000 -$20,000 range - and we then send them five to ten items meeting their specifications and from which they can pick. Last year we mailed about 1,500 assortments of all kinds, carrying values ranging from under $1,000 to hundreds of thousands of dollars.
这些客户会要求某种类型和价值的珠宝选品——比如，价格在1万至2万美元的祖母绿——然后我们会寄给他们五到十件符合他们规格的商品供他们挑选。去年我们邮寄了大约1500组各种类型的选品，价值从不到1000美元到数十万美元不等。
The selections are sent all over the country, some to people no one at Borsheim's has ever met. (They must always have been well recommended, however.) While the number of mailings in 1990 was a record, Ike has been sending merchandise far and wide for decades. Misanthropes will be crushed to learn how well our "honor-system" works: We have yet to experience a loss from customer dishonesty.
这些选品被寄往全国各地，有些是寄给博斯海姆从未见过的人。（不过，他们必须是经过良好推荐的。）虽然1990年的邮寄数量创下了纪录，但艾克几十年来一直在全国范围内寄送商品。厌世者会失望地发现我们的“诚信体系”运作得如此之好：我们从未因客户不诚实而遭受损失。
We attract business nationwide because we have several advantages that competitors can't match. The most important item in the equation is our operating costs, which run about 18% of sales compared to 40% or so at the typical competitor. (Included in the 18% are occupancy and buying costs, which some public companies include in "cost of goods sold.") Just as Wal-Mart, with its 15% operating costs, sells at prices that high-cost competitors can't touch and thereby constantly increases its market share, so does Borsheim's. What works with diapers works with diamonds.
我们在全国范围内吸引业务，因为我们拥有竞争对手无法匹敌的几个优势。最重要的因素是我们的运营成本，约为销售额的18%，而典型竞争对手的运营成本约为40%。（18%中包括了占用和采购成本，一些上市公司将其计入“销货成本”。）就像沃尔玛以15%的运营成本以低价销售，高成本竞争对手无法企及，从而不断增加市场份额，博斯海姆也是如此。尿布上行之有效的策略在钻石上同样适用。
Our low prices create huge volume that in turn allows us to carry an extraordinarily broad inventory of goods, running ten or more times the size of that at the typical fine-jewelry store. Couple our breadth of selection and low prices with superb service and you can understand how Ike and his family have built a national jewelry phenomenon from an Omaha location.
我们的低价创造了巨大的销量，这反过来又使我们能够持有异常广泛的商品库存，规模是典型高端珠宝店的十倍以上。结合我们广泛的选品、低廉的价格和卓越的服务，你就能理解艾克和他的家族如何从奥马哈打造出全国性的珠宝现象。
And family it is. Ike's crew always includes son Alan and sons-in-law Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale. And when things are busy - that's often - they are joined by Ike's wife, Roz, and his daughters, Janis and Susie. In addition, Fran Blumkin, wife of Louie (Chairman of Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike's cousin), regularly pitches in. Finally, you'll find Ike's 89-year-old mother, Rebecca, in the store most afternoons, Wall Street Journal in hand. Given a family commitment like this, is it any surprise that Borsheim's runs rings around competitors whose managers are thinking about how soon 5 o'clock will arrive?
这确实是一个家族企业。艾克的团队总是包括他的儿子艾伦和女婿马文·科恩以及唐纳德·耶尔。生意忙碌时——这很常见——艾克的妻子罗兹和女儿贾尼斯、苏茜也会加入。此外，内布拉斯加家具市场的董事长、艾克的表亲路易的妻子弗兰·布卢姆金也经常帮忙。最后，你会发现89岁的艾克母亲丽贝卡大多数下午都在店里，手拿《华尔街日报》。有了这样的家族投入，博斯海姆远远超过那些经理人只想着五点钟下班的竞争对手，有什么好奇怪的？
# Nebraska Furniture Mart (内布拉斯加家具市场)
While Fran Blumkin was helping the Friedman family set records at Borsheim's, her sons, Irv and Ron, along with husband Louie, were setting records at The Nebraska Furniture Mart. Sales at our one-and-only location were $159 million, up 4% from 1989. Though again the fact can't be conclusively proved, we believe NFM does close to double the volume of any other home furnishings store in the country.
当弗兰·布卢姆金在博斯海姆帮助弗里德曼家族创下纪录时，她的儿子欧文和罗恩以及丈夫路易也在内布拉斯加家具市场创下纪录。我们唯一一家店的销售额达到1.59亿美元，比1989年增长4%。虽然这一事实无法确凿证明，但我们相信NFM的交易量几乎是国内任何其他家居用品店的两倍。
The NFM formula for success parallels that of Borsheim's. First, operating costs are rock-bottom - 15% in 1990 against about 40% for Levitz, the country's largest furniture retailer, and 25% for Circuit City Stores, the leading discount retailer of electronics and appliances. Second, NFM's low costs allow the business to price well below all competitors. Indeed, major chains, knowing what they will face, steer clear of Omaha. Third, the huge volume generated by our bargain prices allows us to carry the broadest selection of merchandise available anywhere.
NFM的成功公式与博斯海姆的类似。首先，运营成本极低——1990年为15%，而全国最大的家具零售商Levitz约为40%，领先的电子产品和家电折扣零售商Circuit City Stores为25%。其次，NFM的低成本使其能够以远低于所有竞争对手的价格定价。实际上，主要连锁店知道自己将面临的挑战，纷纷避开奥马哈。第三，我们的低价带来的巨大销量使我们能够持有任何地方都无法比拟的最广泛的商品选择。
Some idea of NFM's merchandising power can be gleaned from a recent report of consumer behavior in Des Moines, which showed that NFM was Number 3 in popularity among 20 furniture retailers serving that city. That may sound like no big deal until you consider that 19 of those retailers are located in Des Moines, whereas our store is 130 miles away. This leaves customers driving a distance equal to that between Washington and Philadelphia in order to shop with us, even though they have a multitude of alternatives next door. In effect, NFM, like Borsheim's, has dramatically expanded the territory it serves - not by the traditional method of opening new stores but rather by creating an irresistible magnet that employs price and selection to pull in the crowds.
从最近关于得梅因消费者行为的报告中可以窥见NFM的商品销售能力，该报告显示，在服务该市的20家家具零售商中，NFM的受欢迎程度排名第三。这听起来似乎没什么大不了，直到你考虑到其中19家零售商位于得梅因，而我们的店距离130英里。顾客为了在我们这里购物，不惜驱车相当于华盛顿到费城的距离，尽管他们身边有众多其他选择。实际上，NFM像博斯海姆一样，显著扩大了其服务区域——不是通过传统的开设新店方式，而是通过创造一个以价格和选品吸引人群的不可抗拒的磁场。
Last year at the Mart there occurred an historic event: I experienced a counterrevelation. Regular readers of this report know that I have long scorned the boasts of corporate executives about synergy, deriding such claims as the last refuge of scoundrels defending foolish acquisitions. But now I know better: In Berkshire's first synergistic explosion, NFM put a See's candy cart in the store late last year and sold more candy than that moved by some of the full-fledged stores See's operates in California. This success contradicts all tenets of retailing. With the Blumkins, though, the impossible is routine.
去年在家具市场发生了一件历史性事件：我经历了“反启示”。本报告的常读者知道，我长期以来嘲笑企业高管关于协同效应的夸耀，嘲讽这种说法是辩护愚蠢收购的最后避难所。但现在我明白了：在伯克希尔首次协同爆炸中，NFM去年末在店内放置了一个喜诗糖果车，卖出的糖果比喜诗在加州运营的一些完整店铺还要多。这一成功违背了零售业的所有原则。然而，对于布卢姆金家族来说，不可能的事是常态。
# See's Candies (喜诗糖果)
At See's, physical volume set a record in 1990 - but only barely and only because of good sales early in the year. After the invasion of Kuwait, mall traffic in the West fell. Our poundage volume at Christmas dropped slightly, though our dollar sales were up because of a 5% price increase.
在喜诗糖果，1990年的实物销量创下纪录——但只是勉强达到，仅仅因为年初的销售表现良好。科威特入侵后，西部的商场客流量下降。圣诞节期间我们的磅数销量略有下降，尽管由于5%的价格上涨，美元销售额有所增加。
That increase, and better control of expenses, improved profit margins. Against the backdrop of a weak retailing environment, Chuck Huggins delivered outstanding results, as he has in each of the nineteen years we have owned See's. Chuck's imprint on the business - a virtual fanaticism about quality and service - is visible at all of our 225 stores.
价格上涨和更好的费用控制改善了利润率。在零售环境疲软的背景下，查克·哈金斯取得了出色的成果，正如我们在拥有喜诗的19年中他一直做到的那样。查克对业务的烙印——对质量和服务的近乎狂热追求——在我们225家门店中都清晰可见。
One happening in 1990 illustrates the close bond between See's and its customers. After 15 years of operation, our store in Albuquerque was endangered: The landlord would not renew our lease, wanting us instead to move to an inferior location in the mall and even so to pay a much higher rent. These changes would have wiped out the store's profit. After extended negotiations got us nowhere, we set a date for closing the store.
1990年发生的一件事说明了喜诗与其客户之间的紧密联系。在阿尔伯克基运营15年后，我们的门店面临危险：房东不愿续租，而是希望我们搬到商场内一个较差的位置，并且还要支付更高的租金。这些变化将抹去门店的利润。经过长时间的谈判无果后，我们定下了关闭门店的日期。
On her own, the store's manager, Ann Filkins, then took action, urging customers to protest the closing. Some 263 responded by sending letters and making phone calls to See's headquarters in San Francisco, in some cases threatening to boycott the mall. An alert reporter at the Albuquerque paper picked up the story. Supplied with this evidence of a consumer uprising, our landlord offered us a satisfactory deal. (He, too, proved susceptible to a counterrevelation.)
门店经理安·菲尔金斯主动采取行动，敦促客户抗议关闭。263名客户通过写信和打电话到旧金山的喜诗总部做出回应，有些甚至威胁要抵制商场。一名敏锐的阿尔伯克基报社记者报道了这个故事。有了消费者起义的证据，我们的房东提出了一个满意的协议。（他也证明了自己容易受到“反启示”的影响。）
Chuck subsequently wrote personal letters of thanks to every loyalist and sent each a gift certificate. He repeated his thanks in a newspaper ad that listed the names of all 263. The sequel: Christmas sales in Albuquerque were up substantially.
查克随后给每位忠诚客户写了感谢信，并送给每人一张礼券。他在一则报纸广告中再次表达感谢，列出了全部263人的名字。结果：阿尔伯克基的圣诞节销售额大幅增长。
# Media Businesses (媒体业务)
Charlie and I were surprised at developments this past year in the media industry, including newspapers such as our Buffalo News. The business showed far more vulnerability to the early stages of a recession than has been the case in the past. The question is whether this erosion is just part of an aberrational cycle - to be fully made up in the next upturn - or whether the business has slipped in a way that permanently reduces intrinsic business values.
查理和我对过去一年媒体行业（包括我们的布法罗新闻）的变化感到惊讶。该业务在经济衰退早期表现出比过去更大的脆弱性。问题在于，这种侵蚀只是异常周期的一部分——在下一次上升期将完全弥补——还是业务以某种方式下滑，永久性地降低了内在商业价值。
Since I didn't predict what has happened, you may question the value of my prediction about what will happen. Nevertheless, I'll proffer a judgment: While many media businesses will remain economic marvels in comparison with American industry generally, they will prove considerably less marvelous than I, the industry, or lenders thought would be the case only a few years ago.
由于我没有预测到发生的事情，你可能质疑我对未来预测的价值。尽管如此，我还是要提出一个判断：虽然与美国整体工业相比，许多媒体业务仍将是经济奇迹，但它们将远不如我、行业或贷款人几年前认为的那样出色。
The reason media businesses have been so outstanding in the past was not physical growth, but rather the unusual pricing power that most participants wielded. Now, however, advertising dollars are growing slowly. In addition, retailers that do little or no media advertising (though they sometimes use the Postal Service) have gradually taken market share in certain merchandise categories. Most important of all, the number of both print and electronic advertising channels has substantially increased. As a consequence, advertising dollars are more widely dispersed and the pricing power of ad vendors has diminished. These circumstances materially reduce the intrinsic value of our major media investments and also the value of our operating unit, Buffalo News - though all remain fine businesses.
过去媒体业务如此出色的原因不是实体增长，而是大多数参与者拥有的非同寻常的定价能力。然而，现在广告收入增长缓慢。此外，几乎不做或不做媒体广告的零售商（尽管他们有时使用邮政服务）在某些商品类别中逐渐抢占了市场份额。最重要的是，印刷和电子广告渠道的数量大幅增加。因此，广告收入更加分散，广告供应商的定价能力下降。这些情况显著降低了我们主要媒体投资的内在价值以及我们运营单位布法罗新闻的价值——尽管它们仍然是优秀的企业。
Notwithstanding the problems, Stan Lipsey's management of the News continues to be superb. During 1990, our earnings held up much better than those of most metropolitan papers, falling only 5%. In the last few months of the year, however, the rate of decrease was far greater.
尽管存在这些问题，斯坦·利普西对《布法罗新闻》的管理仍然非常出色。1990年，我们的收益比大多数大都市报纸表现得更好，仅下降了5%。然而，在当年的最后几个月，下降速度明显加快。
I can safely make two promises about the News in 1991: (1) Stan will again rank at the top among newspaper publishers; and (2) earnings will fall substantially. Despite a slowdown in the demand for newsprint, the price per ton will average significantly more in 1991 and the paper's labor costs will also be considerably higher. Since revenues may meanwhile be down, we face a real squeeze.
我可以安全地对1991年的《布法罗新闻》做出两个承诺：(1) 斯坦将在报纸出版商中再次名列前茅；(2) 收益将大幅下降。尽管新闻纸需求放缓，1991年每吨的平均价格将显著高于去年，报纸的劳动力成本也将大幅增加。与此同时，收入可能会下降，我们面临真正的压力。
Profits may be off but our pride in the product remains. We continue to have a larger "news hole" - the portion of the paper devoted to news - than any comparable paper. In 1990, the proportion rose to 52.3% against 50.1% in 1989. Alas, the increase resulted from a decline in advertising pages rather than from a gain in news pages. Regardless of earnings pressures, we will maintain at least a 50% news hole. Cutting product quality is not a proper response to adversity.
利润可能会下降，但我们对产品的骄傲依然如故。我们继续保持比任何类似报纸更大的“新闻版面”——报纸中用于新闻的部分。1990年，这一比例从1989年的50.1%上升到52.3%。遗憾的是，这一增加是由于广告页面减少，而不是新闻页面增加。无论收益压力如何，我们将至少保持50%的新闻版面。削减产品质量不是应对逆境的正确反应。
# Fechheimer (费希海默)
The news at Fechheimer, our manufacturer and retailer of uniforms, is all good with one exception: George Heldman, at 69, has decided to retire. I tried to talk him out of it but he had one irrefutable argument: With four other Heldmans - Bob, Fred, Gary and Roger - to carry on, he was leaving us with an abundance of managerial talent.
在我们的制服制造商和零售商费希海默，消息都是好消息，只有一个例外：69岁的乔治·赫尔德曼决定退休。我试图劝阻他，但他有一个无可辩驳的理由：有其他四位赫尔德曼——鲍勃、弗雷德、加里和罗杰——继续接手，他留给我们的是丰富的管理人才。
Fechheimer's operating performance improved considerably in 1990, as many of the problems we encountered in integrating the large acquisition we made in 1988 were moderated or solved. However, several unusual items caused the earnings reported in the "Sources" table to be flat. In the retail operation, we continue to add stores and now have 42 in 22 states. Overall, prospects appear excellent for Fechheimer.
费希海默在1990年的运营表现显著改善，因为我们在整合1988年大型收购时遇到的许多问题得到了缓解或解决。然而，一些异常项目导致“来源”表中报告的收益持平。在零售业务中，我们继续增加门店，现在在22个州拥有42家门店。总体而言，费希海默的前景非常好。
# Scott Fetzer (斯科特·费泽)
At Scott Fetzer, Ralph Schey runs 19 businesses with a mastery few bring to running one. In addition to overseeing three entities listed on page 6 - World Book, Kirby, and Scott Fetzer Manufacturing - Ralph directs a finance operation that earned a record $12.2 million pre-tax in 1990.
在斯科特·费泽，拉尔夫·谢伊以很少有人能比拟的掌控力管理着19项业务。除了监督第6页列出的三个实体——世界图书、柯比和斯科特·费泽制造——拉尔夫还领导了一项金融业务，该业务在1990年创下了1220万美元的税前收益纪录。
Were Scott Fetzer an independent company, it would rank close to the top of the Fortune 500 in terms of return on equity, although it is not in businesses that one would expect to be economic champs. The superior results are directly attributable to Ralph.
如果斯科特·费泽是一家独立公司，其股本回报率将接近《财富》500强的顶端，尽管其业务并非人们预期会成为经济冠军的行业。优异的结果直接归功于拉尔夫。
# World Book (世界图书)
At World Book, earnings improved on a small decrease in unit volume. The costs of our decentralization move were considerably less in 1990 than 1989 and the benefits of decentralization are being realized. World Book remains far and away the leader in United States encyclopedia sales and we are growing internationally, though from a small base.
在世界图书，尽管单位销量略有下降，收益有所改善。我们去中心化的成本在1990年比1989年显著降低，去中心化的好处正在显现。世界图书仍然是美国百科全书销售的绝对领先者，我们在国际市场也在增长，尽管基数较小。
# Kirby (柯比)
Kirby unit volume grew substantially in 1990 with the help of our new vacuum cleaner, The Generation 3, which was an unqualified success. Earnings did not grow as fast as sales because of both start-up expenditures and "learning-curve" problems we encountered in manufacturing the new product. International business, whose dramatic growth I described last year, had a further 20% sales gain in 1990. With the aid of a recent price increase, we expect excellent earnings at Kirby in 1991.
柯比在1990年的单位销量大幅增长，这得益于我们的新款吸尘器“第三代”，它取得了无可争议的成功。由于启动费用和新产品制造中遇到的“学习曲线”问题，收益增长不如销售快。去年我描述的国际业务显著增长，在1990年又实现了20%的销售增长。在最近提价的帮助下，我们预计柯比在1991年将实现优异的收益。
# Campbell Hausfeld (坎贝尔·豪斯菲尔德)
Within the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, Campbell Hausfeld, its largest unit, had a particularly fine year. This company, the country's leading producer of small and medium-sized air compressors, achieved record sales of $109 million, more than 30% of which came from products introduced during the last five years.
在斯科特·费泽制造集团中，其最大单位坎贝尔·豪斯菲尔德表现尤为出色。这家公司是美国小型和中型空气压缩机的领先生产商，实现了1.09亿美元的创纪录销售，其中超过30%来自过去五年推出的产品。
# Non-Insurance Operations - Financial Overview (非保险业务 - 财务概览)
In looking at the figures for our non-insurance operations, you will see that net worth increased by only $47 million in 1990 although earnings were $133 million. This does not mean that our managers are in any way skimping on investments that strengthen their business franchises or that promote growth. Indeed, they diligently pursue both goals.
查看我们非保险业务的数字，你会发现尽管1990年的收益为1.33亿美元，净资产仅增加了4700万美元。这并不意味着我们的管理者在任何方面吝啬于加强业务特许经营权或促进增长的投资。事实上，他们勤奋地追求这两个目标。
But they also never deploy capital without good reason. The result: In the past five years they have funneled well over 80% of their earnings to Charlie and me for use in new business and investment opportunities.
但他们也从不无故部署资本。结果是：在过去五年中，他们将超过80%的收益输送给查理和我，用于新业务和投资机会。
# Insurance Operations (保险业务)
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:
下表是我们通常展示的财产意外险行业关键数据的更新版本：
| Year | Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%) (保费收入年变化 (%)) | Combined Ratio After Policyholder Dividends (综合成本率（扣除投保人股息后）) | Yearly Change in Incurred Losses (%) (已发生损失年变化 (%)) | Inflation Rate Measured by GNP Deflator (%) (以GNP平减指数衡量的通货膨胀率 (%)) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1981 | 3.8 | 106.0 | 6.5 | 9.6 |
| 1982 | 3.7 | 109.6 | 8.4 | 6.5 |
| 1983 | 5.0 | 112.0 | 6.8 | 3.8 |
| 1984 | 8.5 | 118.0 | 16.9 | 3.8 |
| 1985 | 22.1 | 116.3 | 16.1 | 3.0 |
| 1986 | 22.2 | 108.0 | 13.5 | 2.6 |
| 1987 | 9.4 | 104.6 | 7.8 | 3.1 |
| 1988 | 4.4 | 105.4 | 5.5 | 3.3 |
| 1989 (Revised) | 3.2 | 109.2 | 7.7 | 4.1 |
| 1990 (Est.) | 4.5 | 109.8 | 5.0 | 4.1 |
Source: A.M. Best Co.
来源：A.M. Best公司
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107 - 111 range typically produces an overall breakeven result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.
综合成本率表示总保险成本（已发生损失加上费用）与保费收入的比较：低于100表示承保盈利，高于100表示亏损。比率越高，年度表现越差。考虑到保险公司持有投保人资金（“浮存金”）获得的投资收入，综合成本率在107-111范围内通常会产生总体盈亏平衡的结果，不包括股东提供的资金的收益。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow at an average of 10% annually, even in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower. (Over the last 25 years, incurred losses have in reality grown at a still faster rate, 11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry's tendency to under-reserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time.
基于之前报告中阐述的理由，我们预计行业已发生损失将以每年平均10%的速度增长，即使在总体通货膨胀率显著较低的时期也是如此。（在过去25年中，已发生损失实际上以更快的速度增长，达11%。）如果保费增长显著落后于10%的速度，承保损失将增加，尽管行业在业务变差时倾向于低估准备金，这可能会暂时掩盖损失的规模。
Last year premium growth fell far short of the required 10% and underwriting results therefore worsened. (In our table, however, the severity of the deterioration in 1990 is masked because the industry's 1989 losses from Hurricane Hugo caused the ratio for that year to be somewhat above trendline.) The combined ratio will again increase in 1991, probably by about two points.
去年保费增长远低于所需的10%，因此承保结果恶化。（然而，在我们的表格中，1990年恶化的严重性被掩盖，因为1989年飓风雨果的损失导致该年度的比率略高于趋势线。）综合成本率在1991年将再次上升，可能会增加约两个百分点。
Results will improve only when most insurance managements become so fearful that they run from business, even though it can be done at much higher prices than now exist. At some point these managements will indeed get the message: The most important thing to do when you find yourself in a hole is to stop digging. But so far that point hasn't gotten across: Insurance managers continue to dig - sullenly but vigorously.
只有当大多数保险管理者变得如此恐惧，以至于即使可以以远高于现有价格的价格开展业务，他们也选择退出时，结果才会改善。在某个时候，这些管理者确实会明白：当你发现自己身处困境时，最重要的事情是停止挖掘。但到目前为止，这个道理尚未被理解：保险管理者继续挖掘——虽然不情愿但非常卖力。
The picture would change quickly if a major physical or financial catastrophe were to occur. Absent such a shock, one to two years will likely pass before underwriting losses become large enough to raise management fear to a level that would spur major price increases. When that moment arrives, Berkshire will be ready - both financially and psychologically - to write huge amounts of business.
如果发生重大的物理或金融灾难，情况会迅速改变。在没有这种冲击的情况下，可能需要一到两年时间，承保损失才会大到足以让管理层感到恐惧，从而推动大幅提价。当那一刻到来时，伯克希尔将在财务和心理上都做好准备，承接大量业务。
In the meantime, our insurance volume continues to be small but satisfactory. In the next section of this report we will give you a framework for evaluating insurance results. From that discussion, you will gain an understanding of why I am so enthusiastic about the performance of our insurance manager, Mike Goldberg, and his cadre of stars, Rod Eldred, Dinos Iordanou, Ajit Jain, and Don Wurster.
与此同时，我们的保险业务量继续保持较小但令人满意。在本报告的下一部分，我们将为您提供评估保险结果的框架。通过那部分讨论，您将理解为什么我对我们的保险经理迈克·戈德堡及其明星团队——罗德·埃尔德雷德、迪诺斯·约尔达努、阿吉特·贾因和唐·沃斯特——的表现如此热情。
In assessing our insurance results over the next few years, you should be aware of one type of business we are pursuing that could cause them to be unusually volatile. If this line of business expands, as it may, our underwriting experience will deviate from the trendline you might expect: In most years we will somewhat exceed expectations and in an occasional year we will fall far below them.
在评估我们未来几年的保险结果时，您应该了解我们正在追求的一种业务类型，可能会导致结果异常波动。如果这一业务线扩展，正如可能发生的那样，我们的承保经验将偏离您可能预期的趋势线：大多数年份我们将略超预期，偶尔一年我们将远低于预期。
The volatility I predict reflects the fact that we have become a large seller of insurance against truly major catastrophes ("super-cats"), which could for example be hurricanes, windstorms or earthquakes. The buyers of these policies are reinsurance companies that themselves are in the business of writing catastrophe coverage for primary insurers and that wish to "lay off," or rid themselves, of part of their exposure to catastrophes of special severity. Because the need for these buyers to collect on such a policy will only arise at times of extreme stress - perhaps even chaos - in the insurance business, they seek financially strong sellers. And here we have a major competitive advantage: In the industry, our strength is unmatched.
我预测的波动性反映了我们已成为真正重大灾难（“超级灾难”）保险的大卖家，例如飓风、风暴或地震。这些保单的买家是再保险公司，它们本身为初级保险公司提供灾难保险，并希望“卸载”或摆脱部分特别严重的灾难风险。由于这些买家只有在保险业务极度压力——甚至可能是混乱——时才需要索赔，他们寻求财务实力强大的卖家。在这方面，我们拥有行业内无与伦比的竞争优势。
A typical super-cat contract is complicated. But in a plain-vanilla instance we might write a one-year, $10 million policy providing that the buyer, a reinsurer, would be paid that sum only if a catastrophe caused two results: (1) specific losses for the reinsurer above a threshold amount; and (2) aggregate losses for the insurance industry of, say, more than $5 billion. Under virtually all circumstances, loss levels that satisfy the second condition will also have caused the first to be met.
典型的超级灾难合同很复杂。但在一个简单的例子中，我们可能签订一份为期一年、1000万美元的保单，规定买家（再保险公司）只有在灾难导致两个结果时才能获得该金额：(1) 再保险公司的特定损失超过一定门槛；(2) 保险行业的总损失，例如，超过50亿美元。在几乎所有情况下，满足第二个条件的损失水平也会导致第一个条件得到满足。
For this $10 million policy, we might receive a premium of, say, $3 million. Say, also, that we take in annual premiums of $100 million from super-cat policies of all kinds. In that case we are very likely in any given year to report either a profit of close to $100 million or a loss of well over $200 million. Note that we are not spreading risk as insurers typically do; we are concentrating it. Therefore, our yearly combined ratio on this business will almost never fall in the industry range of 100 - 120, but will instead be close to either zero or 300%.
对于这份1000万美元的保单，我们可能收到，比如，300万美元的保费。假设我们从各种超级灾难保单中每年收取1亿美元的保费。在这种情况下，我们在任何一年都很可能报告接近1亿美元的利润或超过2亿美元的损失。请注意，我们不像典型的保险公司那样分散风险；我们是在集中风险。因此，我们在这项业务上的年度综合成本率几乎从不会落在行业100-120的范围内，而是接近于零或300%。
Most insurers are financially unable to tolerate such swings. And if they have the ability to do so, they often lack the desire. They may back away, for example, because they write gobs of primary property insurance that would deliver them dismal results at the very time they would be experiencing major losses on super-cat reinsurance. In addition, most corporate managements believe that their shareholders dislike volatility in results.
大多数保险公司财务上无法承受这样的波动。即使他们有能力承受，他们往往也缺乏意愿。例如，他们可能因为承保了大量初级财产保险而在超级灾难再保险遭受重大损失时表现不佳而退缩。此外，大多数企业管理层认为他们的股东不喜欢结果的波动性。
We can take a different tack: Our business in primary property insurance is small and we believe that Berkshire shareholders, if properly informed, can handle unusual volatility in profits so long as the swings carry with them the prospect of superior long-term results. (Charlie and I always have preferred a lumpy 15% return to a smooth 12%.)
我们可以采取不同的策略：我们在初级财产保险中的业务较小，我们相信，如果伯克希尔股东得到适当的信息，他们可以接受利润的异常波动，只要这些波动带来优越的长期回报前景。（查理和我一直更喜欢波动但15%的回报，而不是平稳的12%。）
We want to emphasize three points: (1) While we expect our super-cat business to produce satisfactory results over, say, a decade, we're sure it will produce absolutely terrible results in at least an occasional year; (2) Our expectations can be based on little more than subjective judgments - for this kind of insurance, historical loss data are of very limited value to us as we decide what rates to charge today; and (3) Though we expect to write significant quantities of super-cat business, we will do so only at prices we believe to be commensurate with risk. If competitors become optimistic, our volume will fall. This insurance has, in fact, tended in recent years to be woefully underpriced; most sellers have left the field on stretchers.
我们想强调三点：(1) 虽然我们预期超级灾难业务在未来十年内会产生令人满意的结果，但我们确定至少在某些年份会产生极其糟糕的结果；(2) 我们的预期仅基于主观判断——对于这种保险，历史损失数据对我们决定今天收取的费率价值非常有限；(3) 虽然我们预计会承保大量超级灾难业务，但我们只会在我们认为与风险相称的价格下进行。如果竞争对手变得乐观，我们的业务量将会下降。事实上，近年这种保险往往被严重低估价格；大多数卖家已经狼狈退出。
At the moment, we believe Berkshire to be the largest U.S. writer of super-cat business. So when a major quake occurs in an urban area or a winter storm rages across Europe, light a candle for us.
目前，我们相信伯克希尔是美国最大的超级灾难业务承保商。因此，当城市地区发生大地震或欧洲肆虐冬季风暴时，请为我们点燃一支蜡烛。
# Measuring Insurance Performance (保险业务表现评估)
In the previous section I mentioned "float," the funds of others that insurers, in the conduct of their business, temporarily hold. Because these funds are available to be invested, the typical property-casualty insurer can absorb losses and expenses that exceed premiums by 7% to 11% and still be able to break even on its business. Again, this calculation excludes the earnings the insurer realizes on net worth - that is, on the funds provided by shareholders.
在上一节中我提到了“浮存金”，即保险公司在业务开展过程中暂时持有的他人资金。由于这些资金可用于投资，典型的财产意外险保险公司能够承受超过保费7%至11%的损失和费用，而仍然能够在业务上实现盈亏平衡。再次说明，这一计算不包括保险公司从净资产（即股东提供的资金）实现的收益。
However, many exceptions to this 7% to 11% range exist. For example, insurance covering losses to crops from hail damage produces virtually no float at all. Premiums on this kind of business are paid to the insurer just prior to the time hailstorms are a threat, and if a farmer sustains a loss he will be paid almost immediately. Thus, a combined ratio of 100 for crop hail insurance produces no profit for the insurer.
然而，这一7%至11%的范围存在许多例外。例如，覆盖农作物冰雹损失的保险几乎不产生浮存金。这类业务的保费在冰雹风暴威胁前支付给保险公司，如果农民遭受损失，几乎会立即获得赔偿。因此，冰雹保险的综合成本率为100时，保险公司无法实现利润。
At the other extreme, malpractice insurance covering the potential liabilities of doctors, lawyers and accountants produces a very high amount of float compared to annual premium volume. The float materializes because claims are often brought long after the alleged wrongdoing takes place and because their payment may be still further delayed by lengthy litigation. The industry calls malpractice and certain other kinds of liability insurance "long-tail" business, in recognition of the extended period during which insurers get to hold large sums that in the end will go to claimants and their lawyers (and to the insurer's lawyers as well).
在另一个极端，覆盖医生、律师和会计师潜在责任的医疗事故保险与年度保费量相比产生非常高的浮存金。浮存金的产生是因为索赔往往在所谓的不当行为发生很久后才提出，而且由于冗长的诉讼，支付可能进一步延迟。行业将医疗事故保险和其他某些类型的责任保险称为“长尾”业务，以表彰保险公司在此期间能够持有大量最终将支付给索赔人及其律师（以及保险公司的律师）的资金。
In long-tail situations a combined ratio of 115 (or even more) can prove profitable, since earnings produced by the float will exceed the 15% by which claims and expenses overrun premiums. The catch, though, is that "long-tail" means exactly that: Liability business written in a given year and presumed at first to have produced a combined ratio of 115 may eventually smack the insurer with 200, 300 or worse when the years have rolled by and all claims have finally been settled.
在长尾情况下，综合成本率达到115（甚至更高）仍可能盈利，因为浮存金产生的收益将超过索赔和费用超出保费的15%。然而，问题在于“长尾”的确意味着如此：在某一年承保的责任业务，最初假设综合成本率为115，但多年后，当所有索赔最终结清时，可能会给保险公司带来200、300甚至更糟的成本率。
The pitfalls of this business mandate an operating principle that too often is ignored: Though certain long-tail lines may prove profitable at combined ratios of 110 or 115, insurers will invariably find it unprofitable to price using those ratios as targets. Instead, prices must provide a healthy margin of safety against the societal trends that are forever springing expensive surprises on the insurance industry. Setting a target of 100 can itself result in heavy losses; aiming for 110 - 115 is business suicide.
这一业务的陷阱要求一个经常被忽视的运营原则：尽管某些长尾业务在综合成本率为110或115时可能盈利，但保险公司以这些比率作为定价目标总是无利可图。相反，价格必须提供充足的安全余量，以应对不断给保险行业带来昂贵意外的社会趋势。以100为目标本身可能导致重大损失；以110-115为目标是商业自杀。
All of that said, what should the measure of an insurer's profitability be? Analysts and managers customarily look to the combined ratio - and it's true that this yardstick usually is a good indicator of where a company ranks in profitability. We believe a better measure, however, to be a comparison of underwriting loss to float developed.
尽管如此，保险公司的盈利能力应该如何衡量？分析师和管理者通常关注综合成本率——确实，这个标准通常是衡量公司盈利能力排名的良好指标。然而，我们认为更好的衡量方法是比较承保损失与产生的浮存金。
This loss/float ratio, like any statistic used in evaluating insurance results, is meaningless over short time periods: Quarterly underwriting figures and even annual ones are too heavily based on estimates to be much good. But when the ratio takes in a period of years, it gives a rough indication of the cost of funds generated by insurance operations. A low cost of funds signifies a good business; a high cost translates into a poor business.
这种损失/浮存金比率，就像用于评估保险结果的任何统计数据一样，在短时间内没有意义：季度承保数据甚至年度数据过于依赖估计，价值不大。但当该比率涵盖多年时，它大致表明了保险业务产生的资金成本。低资金成本意味着好业务；高资金成本则意味着差业务。
# Insurance Performance Table (保险业务表现表)
| Year | Underwriting Loss (承保损失) (In $ Millions) | Average Float (平均浮存金) (In $ Millions) | Approximate Cost of Funds (大致资金成本) (Ratio of 1 to 2) | Yearend Yield on Long-Term Govt. Bonds (年末长期政府债券收益率) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1967 | profit (盈利) | 17.3 | less than zero (低于零) | 5.50% |
| 1968 | profit (盈利) | 19.9 | less than zero (低于零) | 5.90% |
| 1969 | profit (盈利) | 23.4 | less than zero (低于零) | 6.79% |
| 1970 | 0.37 | 32.4 | 1.14% | 6.25% |
| 1971 | profit (盈利) | 52.5 | less than zero (低于零) | 5.81% |
| 1972 | profit (盈利) | 69.5 | less than zero (低于零) | 5.82% |
| 1973 | profit (盈利) | 73.3 | less than zero (低于零) | 7.27% |
| 1974 | 7.36 | 79.1 | 9.30% | 8.13% |
| 1975 | 11.35 | 87.6 | 12.96% | 8.03% |
| 1976 | profit (盈利) | 102.6 | less than zero (低于零) | 7.30% |
| 1977 | profit (盈利) | 139.0 | less than zero (低于零) | 7.97% |
| 1978 | profit (盈利) | 190.4 | less than zero (低于零) | 8.93% |
| 1979 | profit (盈利) | 227.3 | less than zero (低于零) | 10.08% |
| 1980 | profit (盈利) | 237.0 | less than zero (低于零) | 11.94% |
| 1981 | profit (盈利) | 228.4 | less than zero (低于零) | 13.61% |
| 1982 | 21.56 | 220.6 | 9.77% | 10.64% |
| 1983 | 33.87 | 231.3 | 14.64% | 11.84% |
| 1984 | 48.06 | 253.2 | 18.98% | 11.58% |
| 1985 | 44.23 | 390.2 | 11.34% | 9.34% |
| 1986 | 55.84 | 797.5 | 7.00% | 7.60% |
| 1987 | 55.43 | 1,266.7 | 4.38% | 8.95% |
| 1988 | 11.08 | 1,497.7 | 0.74% | 9.00% |
| 1989 | 24.40 | 1,541.3 | 1.58% | 7.97% |
| 1990 | 26.65 | 1,637.3 | 1.63% | 8.24% |
The float figures are derived from the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. At some insurers other items should enter into the calculation, but in our case these are unimportant and have been ignored.
浮存金数据来源于损失准备金、损失调整费用准备金和未赚保费准备金的总和，减去代理人余额、预付收购成本和适用于分保的递延费用。在一些保险公司中，其他项目应纳入计算，但在我们的案例中这些项目不重要，已被忽略。
During 1990 we held about $1.6 billion of float slated eventually to find its way into the hands of others. The underwriting loss we sustained during the year was $27 million and thus our insurance operation produced funds for us at a cost of about 1.6%. As the table shows, we managed in some years to underwrite at a profit and in those instances our cost of funds was less than zero. In other years, such as 1984, we paid a very high price for float. In 19 years out of the 24 we have been in insurance, though, we have developed funds at a cost below that paid by the government.
1990年我们持有约16亿美元的浮存金，这些资金最终将流向他人。我们当年的承保损失为2700万美元，因此我们的保险业务为我们提供了约1.6%的资金成本。如表所示，我们在某些年份实现了承保盈利，在这些情况下我们的资金成本低于零。在其他年份，如1984年，我们为浮存金支付了非常高的代价。然而，在我们从事保险业务的24年中，有19年的资金成本低于政府支付的成本。
There are two important qualifications to this calculation. First, the fat lady has yet to gargle, let alone sing, and we won't know our true 1967 - 1990 cost of funds until all losses from this period have been settled many decades from now. Second, the value of the float to shareholders is somewhat undercut by the fact that they must put up their own funds to support the insurance operation and are subject to double taxation on the investment income these funds earn. Direct investments would be more tax-efficient.
这一计算有两个重要的限定条件。首先，真正的结果尚未揭晓，我们无法知道1967年至1990年的真实资金成本，直到几十年后所有损失最终结清。其次，浮存金对股东的价值因股东必须投入自己的资金支持保险业务而有所削弱，且这些资金的投资收入需纳税两次。直接投资在税收上会更有效率。
The tax penalty that indirect investments impose on shareholders is in fact substantial. Though the calculation is necessarily imprecise, I would estimate that the owners of the average insurance company would find the tax penalty adds about one percentage point to their cost of float. I also think that approximates the correct figure for Berkshire.
间接投资对股东施加的税收惩罚实际上是相当大的。尽管计算必然不精确，我估计平均保险公司股东会发现税收惩罚为其浮存金成本增加约一个百分点。我认为这对伯克希尔来说也是一个近似的正确数字。
Figuring a cost of funds for an insurance business allows anyone analyzing it to determine whether the operation has a positive or negative value for shareholders. If this cost (including the tax penalty) is higher than that applying to alternative sources of funds, the value is negative. If the cost is lower, the value is positive - and if the cost is significantly lower, the insurance business qualifies as a very valuable asset.
为保险业务计算资金成本使分析者能够确定该业务对股东是正值还是负值。如果这一成本（包括税收惩罚）高于其他资金来源的成本，则价值为负。如果成本较低，则价值为正——如果成本显著较低，保险业务则成为非常有价值的资产。
So far Berkshire has fallen into the significantly-lower camp. Even more dramatic are the numbers at GEICO, in which our ownership interest is now 48% and which customarily operates at an underwriting profit. GEICO's growth has generated an ever-larger amount of funds for investment that have an effective cost of considerably less than zero. Essentially, GEICO's policyholders, in aggregate, pay the company interest on the float rather than the other way around. (But handsome is as handsome does: GEICO's unusual profitability results from its extraordinary operating efficiency and its careful classification of risks, a package that in turn allows rock-bottom prices for policyholders.)
到目前为止，伯克希尔属于成本显著较低的一类。GEICO的数字更为引人注目，我们目前持有其48%的股权，该公司通常以承保盈利运营。GEICO的增长为投资产生了越来越大的资金量，其有效成本远低于零。基本上，GEICO的投保人整体上为浮存金支付给公司利息，而不是反过来。（但正如其表现：GEICO不同寻常的盈利能力源于其卓越的运营效率和对风险的谨慎分类，这一组合反过来又使投保人能够享受极低的价格。）
Many well-known insurance companies, on the other hand, incur an underwriting loss/float cost that, combined with the tax penalty, produces negative results for owners. In addition, these companies, like all others in the industry, are vulnerable to catastrophe losses that could exceed their reinsurance protection and take their cost of float right off the chart. Unless these companies can materially improve their underwriting performance - and history indicates that is an almost impossible task - their shareholders will experience results similar to those borne by the owners of a bank that pays a higher rate of interest on deposits than it receives on loans.
另一方面，许多知名的保险公司承受的承保损失/浮存金成本加上税收惩罚，导致股东获得负收益。此外，这些公司和其他行业公司一样，容易受到可能超过其再保险保护的灾难损失的影响，使其浮存金成本飙升。除非这些公司能显著改善其承保表现——历史表明这几乎是不可能的任务——否则其股东将经历类似于银行所有者的情况，即存款支付的利息高于贷款获得的利息。
# Insurance Business Overview (保险业务概览)
All in all, the insurance business has treated us very well. We have expanded our float at a cost that on the average is reasonable, and we have further prospered because we have earned good returns on these low-cost funds. Our shareholders, true, have incurred extra taxes, but they have been more than compensated for this cost (so far) by the benefits produced by the float.
总的来说，保险业务对我们非常好。我们以合理的平均成本扩大了浮存金，并且因为我们在这些低成本资金上获得了良好的回报而进一步繁荣。诚然，我们的股东承担了额外的税收，但迄今为止，浮存金带来的利益已远远弥补了这一成本。
A particularly encouraging point about our record is that it was achieved despite some colossal mistakes made by your Chairman prior to Mike Goldberg's arrival. Insurance offers a host of opportunities for error, and when opportunity knocked, too often I answered. Many years later, the bills keep arriving for these mistakes: In the insurance business, there is no statute of limitations on stupidity.
我们记录中一个特别令人鼓舞的点是，尽管在迈克·戈德堡到来之前，您的董事长犯了一些重大错误，我们仍然取得了这样的成绩。保险业务提供了无数出错的机会，当机会敲门时，我常常应门。多年后，这些错误的账单仍在不断到来：在保险业务中，愚蠢没有诉讼时效。
The intrinsic value of our insurance business will always be far more difficult to calculate than the value of, say, our candy or newspaper companies. By any measure, however, the business is worth far more than its carrying value. Furthermore, despite the problems this operation periodically hands us, it is the one - among all the fine businesses we own - that has the greatest potential.
我们保险业务的内在价值总是比我们的糖果或报纸公司更难计算。然而，无论以何种标准衡量，该业务的价值远超其账面价值。此外，尽管该业务不时给我们带来问题，但在我们拥有的所有优秀业务中，它是潜力最大的。
# Marketable Securities (可交易证券)
Below we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
下表列出了我们持有的价值超过1亿美元的普通股投资。其中一小部分投资属于伯克希尔持有不到100%的子公司。
| Shares | Company | Cost (000s omitted) | Market (000s omitted) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3,000,000 | Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. | $517,500 | $1,377,375 |
| 46,700,000 | The Coca-Cola Co. | $1,023,920 | $2,171,550 |
| 2,400,000 | Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. | $71,729 | $117,000 |
| 6,850,000 | GEICO Corp. | $45,713 | $1,110,556 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company | $9,731 | $342,097 |
| 5,000,000 | Wells Fargo & Company | $289,431 | $289,375 |
Lethargy bordering on sloth remains the cornerstone of our investment style: This year we neither bought nor sold a share of five of our six major holdings. The exception was Wells Fargo, a superbly-managed, high-return banking operation in which we increased our ownership to just under 10%, the most we can own without the approval of the Federal Reserve Board. About one-sixth of our position was bought in 1989, the rest in 1990.
懒散近乎怠惰是我们投资风格的基石：今年我们没有买卖我们六个主要持仓中的五个的任何一股。唯一的例外是富国银行，一家管理出色、回报率高的银行，我们将其持股比例增加到略低于10%，这是我们在未经联邦储备委员会批准的情况下可以持有的最大比例。我们大约六分之一的持仓是在1989年购买的，其余在1990年购买。
The banking business is no favorite of ours. When assets are twenty times equity - a common ratio in this industry - mistakes that involve only a small portion of assets can destroy a major portion of股权. And mistakes have been the rule rather than the exception at many major banks. Most have resulted from a managerial failing that we described last year when discussing the "institutional imperative:" the tendency of executives to mindlessly imitate the behavior of their peers, no matter how foolish it may be to do so. In their lending, many bankers played follow-the-leader with lemming-like zeal; now they are experiencing a lemming-like fate.
银行业并非我们的最爱。当资产是股权的二十倍——这是该行业常见的比率——仅涉及资产一小部分的错误就可能摧毁大部分股权。错误在许多大银行中是常态而非例外。大多数错误源于我们去年讨论的“制度性冲动”管理失败：高管们盲目模仿同行的行为，无论这种行为多么愚蠢。在放贷方面，许多银行家以旅鼠般的热情跟随领导者；现在他们正经历旅鼠般的命运。
Because leverage of 20:1 magnifies the effects of managerial strengths and weaknesses, we have no interest in purchasing shares of a poorly-managed bank at a "cheap" price. Instead, our only interest is in buying into well-managed banks at fair prices.
由于20:1的杠杆放大了管理优势和劣势的影响，我们对以“便宜”价格购买管理不善的银行股份没有兴趣。相反，我们的唯一兴趣是以公平价格购买管理良好的银行。
With Wells Fargo, we think we have obtained the best managers in the business, Carl Reichardt and Paul Hazen. In many ways the combination of Carl and Paul reminds me of another - Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Capital Cities/ABC. First, each pair is stronger than the sum of its parts because each partner understands, trusts and admires the other. Second, both managerial teams pay able people well, but abhor having a bigger head count than is needed. Third, both attack costs as vigorously when profits are at record levels as when they are under pressure. Finally, both stick with what they understand and let their abilities, not their egos, determine what they attempt. (Thomas J. Watson Sr. of IBM followed the same rule: "I'm no genius," he said. "I'm smart in spots - but I stay around those spots.")
在富国银行，我们认为我们获得了业内最好的管理者，卡尔·赖卡特和保罗·哈森。在许多方面，卡尔和保罗的组合让我想起了另一个组合——首都城市/ABC的汤姆·墨菲和丹·伯克。首先，每对组合都比其部分之和更强大，因为每个伙伴都理解、信任并欣赏对方。其次，两支管理团队都给有能力的人高薪，但厌恶拥有超过需要的员工人数。第三，无论利润创纪录还是面临压力，两者都同样积极地削减成本。最后，两者都坚持做自己理解的事情，让能力而非自我决定他们尝试的内容。（IBM的托马斯·J·沃森 Sr. 遵循了同样的规则：“我不是天才，”他说，“我在某些方面很聪明——但我就待在那些方面。”）
Our purchases of Wells Fargo in 1990 were helped by a chaotic market in bank stocks. The disarray was appropriate: Month by month the foolish loan decisions of once well-regarded banks were put on public display. As one huge loss after another was unveiled - often on the heels of managerial assurances that all was well - investors understandably concluded that no bank's numbers were to be trusted. Aided by their flight from bank stocks, we purchased our 10% interest in Wells Fargo for $290 million, less than five times after-tax earnings, and less than three times pre-tax earnings.
我们在1990年对富国银行的购买得益于银行股市场的混乱。这种混乱是恰当的：曾经备受推崇的银行愚蠢的贷款决定逐月公开。一次又一次的巨大损失暴露出来——往往是在管理层保证一切安好的情况下——投资者合理地得出结论，没有哪家银行的数字是可信的。在他们逃离银行股的帮助下，我们以2.9亿美元购买了富国银行10%的股份，不到税后收益的五倍，不到税前收益的三倍。
Wells Fargo is big - it has $56 billion in assets - and has been earning more than 20% on equity and 1.25% on assets. Our purchase of one-tenth of the bank may be thought of as roughly equivalent to our buying 100% of a $5 billion bank with identical financial characteristics. But were we to make such a purchase, we would have to pay about twice the $290 million we paid for Wells Fargo. Moreover, that $5 billion bank, commanding a premium price, would present us with another problem: We would not be able to find a Carl Reichardt to run it. In recent years, Wells Fargo executives have been more avidly recruited than any others in the banking business; no one, however, has been able to hire the dean.
富国银行规模很大——其资产达560亿美元——并且股权回报率超过20%，资产回报率达1.25%。我们购买该银行十分之一的股份，大约相当于我们以相同财务特征购买一家50亿美元银行的100%股份。但如果我们进行这样的购买，我们将需要支付大约两倍于我们为富国银行支付的2.9亿美元。此外，这家50亿美元的银行需要溢价购买，还会给我们带来另一个问题：我们无法找到一位像卡尔·赖卡特这样的人来管理它。近年来，富国银行的高管比银行业中的任何其他人都更受追捧；然而，没有人能聘请到这位院长。
Of course, ownership of a bank - or about any other business - is far from riskless. California banks face the specific risk of a major earthquake, which might wreak enough havoc on borrowers to in turn destroy the banks lending to them. A second risk is systemic - the possibility of a business contraction or financial panic so severe that it would endanger almost every highly-leveraged institution, no matter how intelligently run. Finally, the market's major fear of the moment is that West Coast real estate values will tumble because of overbuilding and deliver huge losses to banks that have financed the expansion. Because it is a leading real estate lender, Wells Fargo is thought to be particularly vulnerable.
当然，拥有银行——或几乎任何其他业务——远非无风险。加州银行面临重大地震的具体风险，这可能对借款人造成足够大的破坏，进而摧毁向他们贷款的银行。第二个风险是系统性的——商业收缩或金融恐慌可能严重到危及几乎所有高杠杆机构的程度，无论其管理多么聪明。最后，市场目前的主要担忧是西海岸房地产价值因过度建设而暴跌，导致为扩张提供融资的银行蒙受巨大损失。由于富国银行是领先的房地产贷款机构，被认为特别脆弱。
None of these eventualities can be ruled out. The probability of the first two occurring, however, is low and even a meaningful drop in real estate values is unlikely to cause major problems for well-managed institutions. Consider some mathematics: Wells Fargo currently earns well over $1 billion pre-tax annually after expensing more than $300 million for loan losses. If 10% of all $48 billion of the bank's loans - not just its real estate loans - were hit by problems in 1991, and these produced losses (including foregone interest) averaging 30% of principal, the company would roughly break even.
这些可能性都无法排除。然而，前两个事件发生的概率较低，即使房地产价值显著下降，也不太可能对管理良好的机构造成重大问题。考虑一些数学计算：富国银行目前每年税前收益远超10亿美元，扣除了超过3亿美元的贷款损失费用。如果1991年银行480亿美元贷款的10%——不仅是房地产贷款——出现问题，并且这些问题导致的损失（包括放弃的利息）平均为本金的30%，公司大致能够收支平衡。
A year like that - which we consider only a low-level possibility, not a likelihood - would not distress us. In fact, at Berkshire we would love to acquire businesses or invest in capital projects that produced no return for a year, but that could then be expected to earn 20% on growing equity. Nevertheless, fears of a California real estate disaster similar to that experienced in New England caused the price of Wells Fargo stock to fall almost 50% within a few months during 1990. Even though we had bought some shares at the prices prevailing before the fall, we welcomed the decline because it allowed us to pick up many more shares at the new, panic prices.
像这样的一年——我们认为只是低概率的可能性，而非可能性——不会让我们感到困扰。事实上，在伯克希尔，我们很乐意收购那些一年内没有回报但随后预计能在不断增长的股权上获得20%回报的业务或投资于资本项目。尽管如此，对类似新英格兰经历的加州房地产灾难的担忧导致富国银行股价在1990年几个月内下跌近50%。尽管我们在下跌前以当时的价格购买了一些股份，我们欢迎这种下跌，因为它让我们以新的恐慌价格买入了更多股份。
Investors who expect to be ongoing buyers of investments throughout their lifetimes should adopt a similar attitude toward market fluctuations; instead many illogically become euphoric when stock prices rise and unhappy when they fall. They show no such confusion in their reaction to food prices: Knowing they are forever going to be buyers of food, they welcome falling prices and deplore price increases. (It's the seller of food who doesn't like declining prices.) Similarly, at the Buffalo News we would cheer lower prices for newsprint - even though it would mean marking down the value of the large inventory of newsprint we always keep on hand - because we know we are going to be perpetually buying the product.
预期在其一生中持续购买投资的投资者应对市场波动采取类似的态度；然而，许多人却不合逻辑地在股价上涨时兴奋，下跌时不快。他们对食品价格的反应没有这种困惑：知道自己将永远是食品的买家，他们欢迎价格下跌，谴责价格上涨。（卖食品的人不喜欢价格下跌。）同样，在布法罗新闻，我们会为新闻纸价格降低而欢呼——尽管这意味着我们始终持有的大量新闻纸库存价值需要减记——因为我们知道我们将永远购买该产品。
Identical reasoning guides our thinking about Berkshire's investments. We will be buying businesses - or small parts of businesses, called stocks - year in, year out as long as I live (and longer, if Berkshire's directors attend the seances I have scheduled). Given these intentions, declining prices for businesses benefit us, and rising prices hurt us.
相同的推理指导我们对伯克希尔投资的思考。只要我活着（如果伯克希尔的董事参加我安排的降神会，甚至更久），我们将年复一年地购买业务——或业务的小部分，即股票。鉴于这些意图，业务价格下跌对我们有利，价格上涨则对我们不利。
The most common cause of low prices is pessimism - some times pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such an environment, not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It's optimism that is the rational buyer's enemy.
低价格的最常见原因是悲观——有时是普遍的，有时是针对特定公司或行业。我们希望在这样的环境中做生意，不是因为我们喜欢悲观，而是因为我们喜欢它产生的价格。乐观是理性买家的敌人。
None of this means, however, that a business or stock is an intelligent purchase simply because it is unpopular; a contrarian approach is just as foolish as a follow-the-crowd strategy. What's required is thinking rather than polling. Unfortunately, Bertrand Russell's observation about life in general applies with unusual force in the financial world: "Most men would rather die than think. Many do."
然而，这并不意味着仅因不受欢迎就使一个业务或股票成为明智的购买；逆势策略与随大流策略一样愚蠢。所需的是思考而非民意调查。不幸的是，伯特兰·罗素关于生活的普遍观察在金融世界中尤其适用：“大多数人宁愿死也不愿思考。许多人确实如此。”
# RJR Nabisco Bonds (RJR Nabisco债券)
Our other major portfolio change last year was large additions to our holdings of RJR Nabisco bonds, securities that we first bought in late 1989. At yearend 1990 we had $440 million invested in these securities, an amount that approximated market value. (As I write this, however, their market value has risen by more than $150 million.)
我们去年的另一个主要投资组合变化是对RJR Nabisco债券的大量增持，这些证券我们于1989年底首次购买。到1990年底，我们在这些证券上投资了4.4亿美元，接近市场价值。（然而，在我写这篇文章时，它们的市场价值已上升了超过1.5亿美元。）
Just as buying into the banking business is unusual for us, so is the purchase of below-investment-grade bonds. But opportunities that interest us and that are also large enough to have a worthwhile impact on Berkshire's results are rare. Therefore, we will look at any category of investment, so long as we understand the business we're buying into and believe that price and value may differ significantly. (Woody Allen, in another context, pointed out the advantage of open-mindedness: "I can't understand why more people aren't bi-sexual because it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night.")
正如我们进入银行业不寻常一样，购买低于投资级别的债券也是如此。但对我们有吸引力且规模足够大以对伯克希尔的业绩产生有价值影响的机会很少。因此，只要我们理解我们购买的业务，并相信价格与价值可能显著不同，我们就会考虑任何投资类别。（伍迪·艾伦在另一个语境中指出了开放心态的优势：“我不明白为什么更多人不是双性恋，因为这会让你在周六晚上约会的机会翻倍。”）
In the past we have bought a few below-investment-grade bonds with success, though these were all old-fashioned "fallen angels" - bonds that were initially of investment grade but that were downgraded when the issuers fell on bad times. In the 1984 annual report we described our rationale for buying one fallen angel, the Washington Public Power Supply System.
过去我们成功购买了一些低于投资级别的债券，尽管这些都是老式的“落天使”——最初为投资级别的债券，但因发行人陷入困境而被降级。在1984年年报中，我们描述了购买一个落天使——华盛顿公共电力供应系统的理由。
A kind of bastardized fallen angel burst onto the investment scene in the 1980s - "junk bonds" that were far below investment-grade when issued. As the decade progressed, new offerings of manufactured junk became ever junkier and ultimately the predictable outcome occurred: Junk bonds lived up to their name. In 1990 - even before the recession dealt its blows - the financial sky became dark with the bodies of failing corporations.
1980年代出现了一种变种的落天使——发行时远低于投资级别的“垃圾债券”。随着十年进展，制造的垃圾债券新发行品变得越来越垃圾，最终发生了可预见的后果：垃圾债券名副其实。1990年——甚至在经济衰退打击之前——金融天空因失败公司的身影而变得黑暗。
The disciples of debt assured us that this collapse wouldn't happen: Huge debt, we were told, would cause operating managers to focus their efforts as never before, much as a dagger mounted on the steering wheel of a car could be expected to make its driver proceed with intensified care. We'll acknowledge that such an attention-getter would produce a very alert driver. But another certain consequence would be a deadly - and unnecessary - accident if the car hit even the tiniest pothole or sliver of ice. The roads of business are riddled with potholes; a plan that requires dodging them all is a plan for disaster.
债务的信徒向我们保证这种崩溃不会发生：我们被告知，巨额债务会使运营管理者以前所未有的专注努力，就像在汽车方向盘上安装一把匕首会使司机以加倍的小心驾驶。我们承认这样的注意力吸引器会产生一个非常警觉的司机。但另一个必然的后果是，如果汽车撞到最小的坑洼或一丝冰面，就会发生致命且不必要的事故。商业的道路上布满坑洼；一个需要躲避所有坑洼的计划是灾难的计划。
In the final chapter of The Intelligent Investor Ben Graham forcefully rejected the dagger thesis: "Confronted with a challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the motto, Margin of Safety." Forty-two years after reading that, I still think those are the right three words. The failure of investors to heed this simple message caused them staggering losses as the 1990s began.
在《聪明的投资者》的最后一章中，本·格雷厄姆强烈驳斥了匕首理论：“面对提炼稳健投资秘诀为三个词的挑战，我们大胆提出座右铭，安全边际。”在读到这句话四十二年后，我仍然认为这是正确的三个词。投资者未能遵循这一简单信息，导致他们在1990年代初蒙受了惊人的损失。
At the height of the debt mania, capital structures were concocted that guaranteed failure: In some cases, so much debt was issued that even highly favorable business results could not produce the funds to service it. One particularly egregious "kill-'em-at-birth" case a few years back involved the purchase of a mature television station in Tampa, bought with so much debt that the interest on it exceeded the station's gross revenues. Even if you assume that all labor, programs and services were donated rather than purchased, this capital structure required revenues to explode - or else the station was doomed to go broke. (Many of the bonds that financed the purchase were sold to now-failed savings and loan associations; as a taxpayer, you are picking up the tab for this folly.)
在债务狂热的高峰期，资本结构被设计成注定失败：在某些情况下，发行了如此多的债务，即使业务结果非常有利，也无法产生足够的资金来偿还债务。几年前一个特别恶劣的“出生即杀死”案例涉及在坦帕购买一家成熟的电视台，债务如此之多，利息超过了该电视台的总收入。即使假设所有劳动、节目和服务都是捐赠而非购买，这种资本结构要求收入爆炸式增长——否则该电视台注定破产。（为购买提供资金的许多债券卖给了现已倒闭的储蓄和贷款协会；作为纳税人，你正在为这种愚蠢行为买单。）
# Junk Bonds and Investment Rationale (垃圾债券与投资理念)
All of this seems impossible now. When these misdeeds were done, however, dagger-selling investment bankers pointed to the "scholarly" research of academics, which reported that over the years the higher interest rates received from low-grade bonds had more than compensated for their higher rate of default. Thus, said the friendly salesmen, a diversified portfolio of junk bonds would produce greater net returns than would a portfolio of high-grade bonds. (Beware of past-performance "proofs" in finance: If history books were the key to riches, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.)
这一切现在看来似乎不可能。然而，当这些不当行为发生时，推销“匕首”的投资银行家们引用了学者的“学术”研究，这些研究报告称多年来低等级债券的较高利率足以弥补其较高的违约率。因此，友好的推销员说，分散投资的垃圾债券组合将比高等级债券组合产生更高的净回报。（在金融领域要警惕基于过往表现的“证据”：如果历史书是致富的关键，《福布斯》400强将由图书管理员组成。）
There was a flaw in the salesmen's logic - one that a first-year student in statistics is taught to recognize. An assumption was being made that the universe of newly-minted junk bonds was identical to the universe of low-grade fallen angels and that, therefore, the default experience of the latter group was meaningful in predicting the default experience of the new issues. (That was an error similar to checking the historical death rate from Kool-Aid before drinking the version served at Jonestown.)
推销员的逻辑存在一个缺陷——这是统计学一年级学生就能识别的问题。他们假设新发行的垃圾债券与低等级落天使债券的世界是相同的，因此，后者的违约经验对预测新发行债券的违约经验有意义。（这类似于在喝琼斯镇提供的Kool-Aid之前检查其历史死亡率。）
The universes were of course dissimilar in several vital respects. For openers, the manager of a fallen angel almost invariably yearned to regain investment-grade status and worked toward that goal. The junk-bond operator was usually an entirely different breed. Behaving much as a heroin user might, he devoted his energies not to finding a cure for his debt-ridden condition, but rather to finding another fix. Additionally, the fiduciary sensitivities of the executives managing the typical fallen angel were often, though not always, more finely developed than were those of the junk-bond-issuing financiopath.
这两个世界在几个关键方面当然不同。首先，落天使的管理者几乎总是渴望恢复投资级别地位并为此努力。而垃圾债券运营者通常是完全不同的一类人。他们表现得像瘾君子一样，将精力用于寻找另一个“修复”而不是治愈债务缠身的状况。此外，管理典型落天使的高管们的信托责任感通常（尽管并非总是）比发行垃圾债券的金融病态者更为发达。
Wall Street cared little for such distinctions. As usual, the Street's enthusiasm for an idea was proportional not to its merit, but rather to the revenue it would produce. Mountains of junk bonds were sold by those who didn't care to those who didn't think - and there was no shortage of either.
华尔街对这些区别漠不关心。像往常一样，华尔街对一个想法的热情与它的价值无关，而与其能产生的收入成正比。大量垃圾债券被那些不在乎的人卖给那些不思考的人——这两者都不缺乏。
Junk bonds remain a mine field, even at prices that today are often a small fraction of issue price. As we said last year, we have never bought a new issue of a junk bond. (The only time to buy these is on a day with no "y" in it.) We are, however, willing to look at the field, now that it is in disarray.
垃圾债券仍然是一个雷区，即使今天的交易价格通常只是发行价格的一小部分。正如我们去年所说，我们从未购买过新发行的垃圾债券。（购买这些债券的唯一时机是星期中没有“y”的那一天。）然而，我们现在愿意审视这个领域，因为它已经一片混乱。
In the case of RJR Nabisco, we feel the Company's credit is considerably better than was generally perceived for a while and that the yield we receive, as well as the potential for capital gain, more than compensates for the risk we incur (though that is far from nil). RJR has made asset sales at favorable prices, has added major amounts of equity, and in general is being run well.
在RJR Nabisco的案例中，我们认为公司的信用状况比一段时间以来普遍认为的要好得多，我们获得的收益率以及资本增值的潜力远超我们承担的风险（尽管风险远非零）。RJR以有利价格进行了资产出售，增加了大量股权，总体上运营良好。
However, as we survey the field, most low-grade bonds still look unattractive. The handiwork of the Wall Street of the 1980s is even worse than we had thought: Many important businesses have been mortally wounded. We will, though, keep looking for opportunities as the junk market continues to unravel.
然而，纵观整个领域，大多数低等级债券仍然看起来没有吸引力。1980年代华尔街的手笔比我们想象的还要糟糕：许多重要企业已受到致命伤害。不过，随着垃圾债券市场继续解体，我们将继续寻找机会。
# Convertible Preferred Stocks (可转换优先股)
We continue to hold the convertible preferred stocks described in earlier reports: $700 million of Salomon Inc, $600 million of The Gillette Company, $358 million of USAir Group, Inc., and $300 million of Champion International Corp. Our Gillette holdings will be converted into 12 million shares of common stock on April 1. Weighing interest rates, credit quality and prices of the related common stocks, we can assess our holdings in Salomon and Champion at yearend 1990 as worth about what we paid, Gillette as worth somewhat more, and USAir as worth substantially less.
我们继续持有之前报告中描述的可转换优先股：所罗门公司7亿美元、吉列公司6亿美元、USAir集团3.58亿美元和冠军国际公司3亿美元。我们的吉列持股将于4月1日转换为1200万股普通股。综合考虑利率、信用质量和相关普通股的价格，我们可以评估1990年底所罗门和冠军的持股价值大致与我们支付的价格相当，吉列的略高，而USAir的则明显低于我们支付的价格。
In making the USAir purchase, your Chairman displayed exquisite timing: I plunged into the business at almost the exact moment that it ran into severe problems. (No one pushed me; in tennis parlance, I committed an "unforced error.") The company's troubles were brought on both by industry conditions and by the post-merger difficulties it encountered in integrating Piedmont, an affliction I should have expected since almost all airline mergers have been followed by operational turmoil.
在购买USAir时，您的董事长展现了绝妙的时机：我几乎在公司陷入严重问题的精确时刻投入了这个行业。（没有人推我；用网球术语来说，我犯了一个“非受迫性失误”。）公司的问题既源于行业状况，也源于合并后整合皮埃蒙特时遇到的困难，我本应预料到这种困扰，因为几乎所有航空公司合并后都伴随着运营混乱。
In short order, Ed Colodny and Seth Schofield resolved the second problem: The airline now gets excellent marks for service. Industry-wide problems have proved to be far more serious. Since our purchase, the economics of the airline industry have deteriorated at an alarming pace, accelerated by the kamikaze pricing tactics of certain carriers. The trouble this pricing has produced for all carriers illustrates an important truth: In a business selling a commodity-type product, it's impossible to be a lot smarter than your dumbest competitor.
很快，埃德·科洛德尼和塞斯·肖菲尔德解决了第二个问题：该航空公司现在在服务方面获得了很高的评价。行业范围的问题证明要严重得多。自我们购买以来，航空业的经济状况以惊人的速度恶化，某些航空公司自杀式的定价策略加速了这一进程。这种定价给所有航空公司带来的麻烦说明了一个重要真理：在销售商品型产品的业务中，不可能比你最愚蠢的竞争对手聪明太多。
However, unless the industry is decimated during the next few years, our USAir investment should work out all right. Ed and Seth have decisively addressed the current turbulence by making major changes in operations. Even so, our investment is now less secure than at the time I made it.
然而，除非未来几年行业遭受毁灭性打击，否则我们的USAir投资应该会没事。埃德和塞斯通过对运营进行重大调整果断应对了当前的动荡。尽管如此，我们的投资现在比我购买时更不安全。
Our convertible preferred stocks are relatively simple securities, yet I should warn you that, if the past is any guide, you may from time to time read inaccurate or misleading statements about them. Last year, for example, several members of the press calculated the value of all our preferreds as equal to that of the common stock into which they are convertible. By their logic, that is, our Salomon preferred, convertible into common at $38, would be worth 60% of face value if Salomon common were selling at $22.80. But there is a small problem with this line of reasoning: Using it, one must conclude that all of the value of a convertible preferred resides in the conversion privilege and that the value of a non-convertible preferred of Salomon would be zero, no matter what its coupon or terms for redemption.
我们的可转换优先股是相对简单的证券，但我应警告您，如果以过去为鉴，您可能会不时读到关于它们的错误或误导性陈述。例如，去年，几家媒体将我们所有优先股的价值计算为与它们可转换的普通股价值相等。按照他们的逻辑，如果所罗门普通股以22.80美元交易，我们的可转换为38美元普通股的所罗门优先股价值将是面值的60%。但这种推理有一个小问题：按照这种逻辑，必须得出结论，可转换优先股的所有价值都在于转换特权，而所罗门的不可转换优先股的价值将为零，无论其票面利率或赎回条款如何。
The point you should keep in mind is that most of the value of our convertible preferreds is derived from their fixed-income characteristics. That means the securities cannot be worth less than the value they would possess as non-convertible preferreds and may be worth more because of their conversion options.
您应该记住的一点是，我们可转换优先股的大部分价值来源于其固定收益特性。这意味着这些证券的价值不会低于它们作为不可转换优先股的价值，并且由于其转换期权，价值可能会更高。
# Tribute to Colman Mockler, Jr. (对科尔曼·莫克勒的致敬)
I deeply regret having to end this section of the report with a note about my friend, Colman Mockler, Jr., CEO of Gillette, who died in January. No description better fitted Colman than "gentleman" - a word signifying integrity, courage and modesty. Couple these qualities with the humor and exceptional business ability that Colman possessed and you can understand why I thought it an undiluted pleasure to work with him and why I, and all others who knew him, will miss Colman so much.
我深感遗憾地以关于我朋友、吉列公司首席执行官科尔曼·莫克勒的笔记结束本报告部分，他于1月去世。没有比“绅士”更适合描述科尔曼的词——这个词代表正直、勇气和谦逊。结合科尔曼拥有的幽默和卓越的商业能力，你就能理解为什么我认为与他共事是一种纯粹的快乐，以及为什么我和其他所有认识他的人会如此怀念他。
A few days before Colman died, Gillette was richly praised in a Forbes cover story. Its theme was simple: The company's success in shaving products has come not from marketing savvy (though it exhibits that talent repeatedly) but has instead resulted from its devotion to quality. This mind-set has caused it to consistently focus its energies on coming up with something better, even though its existing products already ranked as the class of the field. In so depicting Gillette, Forbes in fact painted a portrait of Colman.
在科尔曼去世前几天，吉列在《福布斯》封面故事中受到高度赞扬。其主题很简单：公司在剃须产品上的成功不是来自营销技巧（尽管它反复展示这种才能），而是源于对质量的奉献。这种心态使其始终专注于开发更好的产品，尽管其现有产品已是行业中的佼佼者。《福布斯》如此描述吉列，实际上是为科尔曼画了一幅肖像。
# Acquisition Strategy (收购策略)
Regular readers know that I shamelessly utilize the annual letter in an attempt to acquire businesses for Berkshire. And, as we constantly preach at the Buffalo News, advertising does work: Several businesses have knocked on our door because someone has read in these pages of our interest in making acquisitions. (Any good ad salesman will tell you that trying to sell something without advertising is like winking at a girl in the dark.)
常读者知道，我毫不掩饰地利用年度信函试图为伯克希尔收购企业。正如我们在布法罗新闻中不断宣扬的，广告确实有效：有几家企业因为有人在这些页面上读到我们对收购的兴趣而敲开了我们的大门。（任何优秀的广告销售员都会告诉你，不做广告就试图卖东西就像在黑暗中对女孩眨眼。）
In Appendix B (on pages 26-27) I've reproduced the essence of a letter I wrote a few years back to the owner/manager of a desirable business. If you have no personal connection with a business that might be of interest to us but have a friend who does, perhaps you can pass this report along to him.
在附录B（第26-27页）中，我重现了几年前我写给一家理想企业所有者/经理的信的精髓。如果您与我们可能感兴趣的业务没有个人联系，但有朋友有这种联系，或许您可以将这份报告转交给他。
Here's the sort of business we are looking for:
我们寻找的业务类型如下：
- Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
大额收购（税后收益至少1000万美元）， - Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are "turnaround" situations),
证明持续的盈利能力（我们对未来预测不感兴趣，也不对“扭转局面”情况感兴趣）， - Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
在几乎不使用或不使用债务的情况下获得良好股本回报的业务， - Management in place (we can't supply it),
管理层到位（我们无法提供管理）， - Simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we won't understand it),
简单业务（如果涉及大量技术，我们不会理解）， - An offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
提供价格（我们不想在价格未知的情况下浪费我们或卖家的时间，哪怕是初步讨论）。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.
我们不会进行敌意收购。我们可以承诺完全保密，并通常在五分钟内快速回答我们是否有兴趣。我们更倾向于用现金购买，但当我们获得与我们付出的内在商业价值相当的业务时，也会考虑发行股票。
Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company's owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.
我们最喜欢的购买形式是符合布卢姆金-弗里德曼-赫尔德曼模式的交易。在这些案例中，公司所有者-管理者希望产生大量现金，有时是为自己，但往往是为他们的家族或非活跃股东。同时，这些管理者希望继续作为重要股东，像过去一样运营公司。我们认为我们为具有这种目标的所有者提供了特别合适的选择。我们邀请潜在卖家通过联系我们过去合作过的人来了解我们。
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales: "When the phone don't ring, you'll know it's me."
查理和我经常被接触关于不接近我们标准的收购：我们发现，如果你广告说有兴趣买柯利犬，很多人会打电话希望卖给你他们的可卡犬。一首乡村歌曲的歌词表达了我们对新企业、扭转局面或类似拍卖的销售的感受：“当电话不响时，你就知道是我。”
Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir, and Champion. We are not interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market.
除了对上述描述的业务收购感兴趣外，我们还对协商购买大型但非控制性的股票块感兴趣，类似于我们在首都城市、所罗门、吉列、USAir和冠军的持股。然而，我们对一般股票市场中可能购买的建议不感兴趣。
# Miscellaneous (其他事项)
Ken Chace's Retirement and Succession Plan (肯·蔡斯的退休与继任计划)
Ken Chace has decided not to stand for reelection as a director at our upcoming annual meeting. We have no mandatory retirement age for directors at Berkshire (and won't!), but Ken, at 75 and living in Maine, simply decided to cut back his activities.
肯·蔡斯决定不在即将召开的年度股东大会上竞选连任董事。伯克希尔对董事没有强制退休年龄（也不会有！），但75岁且居住在缅因州的肯只是决定减少他的活动。
Ken was my immediate choice to run the textile operation after Buffett Partnership, Ltd. assumed control of Berkshire early in 1965. Although I made an economic mistake in sticking with the textile business, I made no mistake in choosing Ken: He ran the operation well, he was always 100% straight with me about its problems, and he generated the funds that allowed us to diversify into insurance.
在1965年初巴菲特合伙公司接管伯克希尔后，肯是我立即选择的纺织业务负责人。尽管我在坚持纺织业务上犯了经济错误，但选择肯没有错：他很好地管理了业务，总是100%坦诚地告诉我问题所在，并且他产生的资金使我们能够多元化进入保险业。
My wife, Susan, will be nominated to succeed Ken. She is now the second largest shareholder of Berkshire and if she outlives me will inherit all of my stock and effectively control the company. She knows, and agrees, with my thoughts on successor management and also shares my view that neither Berkshire nor its subsidiary businesses and important investments should be sold simply because some very high bid is received for one or all.
我的妻子苏珊将被提名接替肯。她现在是伯克希尔的第二大股东，如果她比我长寿，将继承我的所有股票并有效控制公司。她了解并同意我对继任管理的看法，也赞同我的观点，即伯克希尔及其子公司业务和重要投资不应仅仅因为收到一个或多个非常高的出价而被出售。
I feel strongly that the fate of our businesses and their managers should not depend on my health - which, it should be added, is excellent - and I have planned accordingly. Neither my estate plan nor that of my wife is designed to preserve the family fortune; instead, both are aimed at preserving the character of Berkshire and returning the fortune to society.
我强烈认为，我们业务及其管理者的命运不应依赖于我的健康——顺便说一句，我的健康状况很好——我已相应地进行了规划。我和我的妻子的遗产计划都不是为了保留家族财富；相反，两者都旨在保持伯克希尔的特性并将财富回馈社会。
Were I to die tomorrow, you could be sure of three things: (1) None of my stock would have to be sold; (2) Both a controlling shareholder and a manager with philosophies similar to mine would follow me; and (3) Berkshire's earnings would increase by $1 million annually, since Charlie would immediately sell our corporate jet, The Indefensible (ignoring my wish that it be buried with me).
如果我明天去世，你可以确信三件事：(1) 我的股票无需出售；(2) 一位与我理念相似的控股股东和管理者将接替我；(3) 伯克希尔的年收入将增加100万美元，因为查理会立即出售我们的公司飞机“不可辩护号”（无视我希望它与我同葬的愿望）。
Shareholder-Designated Contributions Program (股东指定捐款计划)
About 97.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1990 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $5.8 million, and 2,600 charities were recipients.
约97.3%的合格股份参与了伯克希尔1990年的股东指定捐款计划。通过该计划捐款580万美元，2600个慈善机构受益。
We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 54-55. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1991 will be ineligible for the 1991 program.
我们建议新股东阅读第54-55页的股东指定捐款计划描述。要参与未来的计划，您必须确保您的股份以实际所有者的名义注册，而不是经纪人、银行或存管机构的代名人名义。1991年8月31日未如此注册的股份将无资格参与1991年的计划。
In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses make contributions, including merchandise, averaging about $1.5 million annually. These contributions support local charities, such as The United Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.
除了伯克希尔分发的股东指定捐款外，我们运营业务的管理者每年平均捐款约150万美元，包括商品。这些捐款支持当地慈善机构，如联合之路，并为我们的业务带来大致相当的回报。
However, neither our operating managers nor officers of the parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad national programs or charitable activities of special personal interest to them, except to the extent they do so as shareholders. If your employees, including your CEO, wish to give to their alma maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal attachment, we believe they should use their own money, not yours.
然而，我们的运营管理者或母公司的高管不会使用伯克希尔资金为广泛的全国性计划或他们个人特别感兴趣的慈善活动捐款，除非他们以股东身份这样做。如果您的员工，包括首席执行官，希望捐款给他们的母校或其他他们有个人感情的机构，我们认为他们应该使用自己的钱，而不是您的。
Annual Meeting Information (年度股东大会信息)
The annual meeting this year will be held at the Orpheum Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 29, 1991. Attendance last year grew to a record 1,300, about a 100-fold increase from ten years ago.
今年的年度股东大会将于1991年4月29日（星期一）上午9:30在奥马哈市中心的奥菲姆剧院举行。去年的与会人数创纪录达到1300人，较十年前增长了约100倍。
We recommend getting your hotel reservations early at one of these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2) the much larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk from the Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about 100 yards from Borsheim's and a twenty minute drive from downtown. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting, and return after it ends.
我们建议尽早预订以下酒店之一：(1) 拉迪森-雷迪克塔，位于奥菲姆剧院对面的一家小型（88间客房）但不错的酒店；(2) 较大的红狮酒店，距离奥菲姆剧院约五分钟步行路程；或 (3) 万豪酒店，位于西奥马哈，距博尔希姆约100码，距市中心约20分钟车程。我们将在万豪酒店安排巴士，于上午8:30和8:45出发前往会议，并在会议结束后返回。
Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent, owner-related questions.
查理和我总是很享受这次会议，我们希望您能参加。我们股东的素质反映在我们收到的问题质量上：我们从未参加过任何地方的年度股东大会，能持续收到如此高水平的智能、与所有者相关的问题。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. Because weekday parking can be tight around the Orpheum, we have lined up a number of nearby lots for our shareholders to use. The attachment also contains information about them.
我们的委托书材料附件解释了如何获得参加会议所需的门票。由于工作日奥菲姆剧院周围的停车位可能紧张，我们为股东安排了多个附近的停车场。附件中也包含相关信息。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you to downtown hotels or to the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays, and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays. While there, stop at the See's Candy cart and see for yourself the dawn of synergism at Berkshire.
像往常一样，我们将安排巴士在会议后送您到内布拉斯加家具市场和博尔希姆，之后送您回市中心酒店或机场。我希望您能留出充足时间充分探索这两家商店的魅力。提前到达的股东可以在一周的任何一天访问家具市场；周六营业时间为上午10点至下午5:30，周日为中午至下午5:30。在那里，停下来看看See's糖果车，亲眼见证伯克希尔协同效应的曙光。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday, but we will open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 28. At our Sunday opening last year you made Ike very happy: After totaling the day's volume, he suggested to me that we start holding annual meetings quarterly. Join us at Borsheim's even if you just come to watch; it's a show you shouldn't miss.
博尔希姆通常在周日关闭，但我们将在4月28日周日中午至下午6点为股东及其客人开放。去年周日开放时，你们让艾克非常高兴：在统计当天交易量后，他建议我开始每季度召开年度股东大会。即使只是来观看，也请加入我们在博尔希姆的活动；这是一场你不应错过的表演。
Last year the first question at the annual meeting was asked by 11-year-old Nicholas Kenner, a third-generation shareholder from New York City. Nicholas plays rough: "How come the stock is down?" he fired at me. My answer was not memorable.
去年年度股东大会的第一个问题由来自纽约市的11岁第三代股东尼古拉斯·肯纳提出。尼古拉斯毫不客气：“为什么股价下跌？”他向我发问。我的回答并不令人难忘。
We hope that other business engagements won't keep Nicholas away from this year's meeting. If he attends, he will be offered the chance to again ask the first question; Charlie and I want to tackle him while we're fresh. This year, however, it's Charlie's turn to answer.
我们希望其他商务活动不会让尼古拉斯缺席今年的会议。如果他参加，他将再次获得提出第一个问题的机会；查理和我希望在我们精力充沛时应对他。然而，今年轮到查理回答了。
March 1, 1991
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
1991年3月1日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
# Appendix A: U.S. Steel Announces Sweeping Modernization Scheme (附录A：美国钢铁公司宣布全面现代化计划)
An unpublished satire by Ben Graham, written in 1936 and given by the author to Warren Buffett in 1954.
本·格雷厄姆于1936年撰写的未发表讽刺文章，由作者于1954年赠予沃伦·巴菲特。
Myron C. Taylor, Chairman of U.S. Steel Corporation, today announced the long-awaited plan for completely modernizing the world's largest industrial enterprise. Contrary to expectations, no changes will be made in the company's manufacturing or selling policies. Instead, the bookkeeping system is to be entirely revamped. By adopting and further improving a number of modern accounting and financial devices the corporation's earning power will be amazingly transformed. Even under the subnormal conditions of 1935, it is estimated that the new bookkeeping methods would have yielded a reported profit of close to $50 per share on the common stock. The scheme of improvement is the result of a comprehensive survey made by Messrs. Price, Bacon, Guthrie & Colpitts; it includes the following six points:
美国钢铁公司主席迈伦·C·泰勒今天宣布了期待已久的全面现代化世界最大工业企业的计划。与预期相反，公司不会更改其制造或销售政策。相反，会计系统将彻底改革。通过采用并进一步改进一些现代会计和财务手段，公司的盈利能力将惊人地转变。即使在1935年的非正常条件下，估计新的会计方法将使普通股每股报告利润接近50美元。改进计划是普莱斯、培根、格思里和科尔皮茨先生进行全面调查的结果，包括以下六点：
- Writing down of Plant Account to Minus $1,000,000,000.
将工厂账户减记至负10亿美元。 - Par value of common stock to be reduced to 1¢.
将普通股面值降至1美分。 - Payment of all wages and salaries in option warrants.
所有工资和薪金以期权认股权证支付。 - Inventories to be carried at $1.
库存按1美元计价。 - Preferred Stock to be replaced by non-interest bearing bonds redeemable at 50% discount.
优先股替换为无息债券，可按50%折扣赎回。 - A $1,000,000,000 Contingency Reserve to be established.
建立10亿美元的应急储备。
The official statement of this extraordinary Modernization Plan follows in full:
这一非凡现代化计划的官方声明全文如下：
The Board of Directors of U.S. Steel Corporation is pleased to announce that after intensive study of the problems arising from changed conditions in the industry, it has approved a comprehensive plan for remodeling the Corporation's accounting methods. A survey by a Special Committee, aided and abetted by Messrs. Price, Bacon, Guthrie & Colpitts, revealed that our company has lagged somewhat behind other American business enterprises in utilizing certain advanced bookkeeping methods, by means of which the earning power may be phenomenally enhanced without requiring any cash outlay or any changes in operating or sales conditions. It has been decided not only to adopt these newer methods, but to develop them to a still higher stage of perfection. The changes adopted by the Board may be summarized under six heads, as follows:
美国钢铁公司董事会高兴地宣布，在深入研究行业条件变化带来的问题后，批准了一项全面改造公司会计方法的计划。由普莱斯、培根、格思里和科尔皮茨先生协助的特别委员会调查显示，我们公司在利用某些先进会计方法方面略落后于其他美国企业，这些方法可在无需现金支出或更改运营或销售条件的情况下显著提升盈利能力。董事会决定不仅采用这些新方法，还要将其发展到更高的完善程度。董事会采纳的变化可归纳为以下六点：
1. Fixed Assets to be written down to Minus $1,000,000,000.
Many representative companies have relieved their income accounts of all charges for depreciation by writing down their plant account to $1. The Special Committee points out that if their plants are worth only $1, the fixed assets of U.S. Steel Corporation are worth a good deal less than that sum. It is now a well-recognized fact that many plants are in reality a liability rather than an asset, entailing not only depreciation charges, but taxes, maintenance, and other expenditures. Accordingly, the Board has decided to extend the write-down policy initiated in the 1935 report, and to mark down the Fixed Assets from $1,338,522,858.96 to a round Minus $1,000,000,000.
许多代表性公司通过将工厂账户减记至1美元，免除了收入账户的所有折旧费用。特别委员会指出，如果他们的工厂仅值1美元，美国钢铁公司的固定资产价值远低于这一金额。现在公认的事实是，许多工厂实际上是负债而非资产，不仅涉及折旧费用，还包括税收、维护和其他支出。因此，董事会决定延续1935年报告中启动的减记政策，将固定资产从1,338,522,858.96美元减记至负10亿美元。
The advantages of this move should be evident. As the plant wears out, the liability becomes correspondingly reduced. Hence, instead of the present depreciation charge of some $47,000,000 yearly there will be an annual appreciation credit of 5%, or $50,000,000. This will increase earnings by no less than $97,000,000 per annum.
这一举措的优势显而易见。随着工厂的磨损，负债相应减少。因此，取代目前每年约4700万美元的折旧费用，将有5%的年度增值信用，即5000万美元。这将使年度收益增加不少于9700万美元。
2. Reduction of Par Value of Common Stock to 1¢, and 3. Payment of Salaries and Wages in Option Warrants.
Many corporations have been able to reduce their overhead expenses substantially by paying a large part of their executive salaries in the form of options to buy stock, which carry no charge against earnings. The full possibilities of this modern device have apparently not been adequately realized. The Board of Directors has adopted the following advanced form of this idea:
许多公司通过以期权认股权证形式支付高管薪金的大部分，显著降低了间接费用，这些认股权证不计入盈利负担。这一现代工具的全部潜力显然尚未被充分认识。董事会采纳了以下这一理念的先进形式：
The entire personnel of the Corporation are to receive their compensation in the form of rights to buy common stock at $50 per share, at the rate of one purchase right for each $50 of salary and/or wages in their present amounts. The par value of the common stock is to be reduced to 1¢.
公司全体人员将以每股50美元购买普通股的权利形式获得报酬，每50美元的现有薪金和/或工资对应一份购买权。普通股的面值将降至1美分。
The almost incredible advantages of this new plan are evident from the following:
这一新计划几乎不可思议的优势如下：
A. The payroll of the Corporation will be entirely eliminated, a saving of $250,000,000 per annum, based on 1935 operations.
公司将完全消除工资单，基于1935年运营，每年节省2.5亿美元。
B. At the same time, the effective compensation of all our employees will be increased severalfold. Because of the large earnings per share to be shown on our common stock under the new methods, it is certain that the shares will command a price in the market far above the option level of $50 per share, making the readily realizable value of these option warrants greatly in excess of the present cash wages that they will replace.
与此同时，我们所有员工的有效报酬将增加数倍。由于新方法下普通股将显示的每股高收益，可以肯定股票市场价格将远高于每股50美元的期权水平，使这些期权认股权证的易实现价值远超它们将取代的当前现金工资。
C. The Corporation will realize an additional large annual profit through the exercise of these warrants. Since the par value of the common stock will be fixed at 1¢, there will be a gain of $49.99 on each share subscribed for. In the interest of conservative accounting, however, this profit will not be included in the income account, but will be shown separately as a credit to Capital Surplus.
公司将通过行使这些认股权证实现额外的年度大额利润。由于普通股面值将固定为1美分，每认购一股将有49.99美元的收益。然而，出于保守会计的考虑，这部分利润不会计入收入账户，而是单独作为资本盈余的贷项。
D. The Corporation's cash position will be enormously strengthened. In place of the present annual cash outgo of $250,000,000 for wages (1935 basis), there will be annual cash inflow of $250,000,000 through exercise of the subscription warrants for 5,000,000 shares of common stock. The Company's large earnings and strong cash position will permit the payment of a liberal dividend which, in turn, will result in the exercise of these option warrants immediately after issuance which, in turn, will further improve the cash position which, in turn, will permit a higher dividend rate -- and so on, indefinitely.
公司的现金状况将极大增强。取代目前每年2.5亿美元的工资现金支出（1935年基准），通过认购500万股普通股的认股权证将有每年2.5亿美元的现金流入。公司的高收益和强劲现金状况将允许支付慷慨的股息，这反过来将导致认股权证在发行后立即被行使，这反过来将进一步改善现金状况，这反过来将允许更高的股息率——如此循环，无限期持续。
4. Inventories to be carried at $1.
Serious losses have been taken during the depression due to the necessity of adjusting inventory value to market. Various enterprises -- notably in the metal and cotton-textile fields -- have successfully dealt with this problem by carrying all or part of their inventories at extremely low unit prices. The U.S. Steel Corporation has decided to adopt a still more progressive policy, and to carry its entire inventory at $1. This will be effected by an appropriate write-down at the end of each year, the amount of said write-down to be charged to the Contingency Reserve hereinafter referred to.
在经济萧条期间，由于必须将库存价值调整至市场价，公司遭受了严重损失。多家企业——尤其是在金属和棉纺织领域——通过以极低的单位价格持有全部或部分库存成功应对了这一问题。美国钢铁公司决定采取更为进步的政策，将其全部库存按1美元计价。这将通过每年年底适当的减记来实现，减记金额将计入下文提及的应急储备。
The benefits to be derived from this new method are very great. Not only will it obviate all possibility of inventory depreciation, but it will substantially enhance the annual earnings of the Corporation. The inventory on hand at the beginning of the year, valued at $1, will be sold during the year at an excellent profit. It is estimated that our income will be increased by means of this method to the extent of at least $150,000,000 per annum which, by a coincidence, will about equal the amount of the write-down to be made each year against Contingency Reserve.
这一新方法带来的好处非常大。它不仅消除了库存贬值的可能性，还将大幅提升公司的年度收益。年初手头的库存，价值为1美元，将在年内以优厚的利润出售。估计通过这种方法，我们的收入每年将至少增加1.5亿美元，巧合的是，这大约等于每年对应急储备的减记金额。
A minority report of the Special Committee recommends that Accounts Receivable and Cash also be written down to $1, in the interest of consistency and to gain additional advantages similar to those just discussed. This proposal has been rejected for the time being because our auditors still require that any recoveries of receivables and cash so charged off be credited to surplus instead of to the year's income. It is expected, however, that this auditing rule -- which is rather reminiscent of the horse-and-buggy days -- will soon be changed in line with modern tendencies. Should this occur, the minority report will be given further and favorable consideration.
特别委员会的少数派报告建议，为了保持一致性和获得类似上述的额外优势，应将应收账款和现金也减记至1美元。这一提议暂时被否决，因为我们的审计师仍要求将如此注销的应收账款和现金的任何回收记入盈余，而不是当年的收入。然而，预计这一审计规则——颇有些像马车时代的遗物——将很快根据现代趋势改变。如果发生这种情况，少数派报告将获得进一步且有利的考虑。
# U.S. Steel Modernization Scheme (Continued)
5. Replacement of Preferred Stock by Non-Interest-Bearing Bonds Redeemable at 50% Discount.
During the recent depression many companies have been able to offset their operating losses by including in income profits arising from repurchases of their own bonds at a substantial discount from par. Unfortunately the credit of U.S. Steel Corporation has always stood so high that this lucrative source of revenue has not hitherto been available to it. The Modernization Scheme will remedy this condition.
在最近的经济萧条期间，许多公司通过以大幅折扣回购自己的债券，将所得利润计入收入，从而抵消了运营损失。不幸的是，美国钢铁公司的信用一直很高，这一丰厚的收入来源至今未能利用。现代化计划将纠正这一状况。
It is proposed that each share of preferred stock be exchanged for $300 face value of non-interest-bearing sinking-fund notes, redeemable by lot at 50% of face value in 10 equal annual installments. This will require the issuance of $1,080,000,000 of new notes, of which $108,000,000 will be retired each year at a cost to the Corporation of only $54,000,000, thus creating an annual profit of the same amount.
提议将每股优先股替换为面值300美元的无息偿债基金债券，这些债券将以抽签方式按面值50%分10年等额赎回。这将需要发行10.8亿美元的新债券，每年赎回1.08亿美元，成本仅为5400万美元，从而每年创造等额的利润。
Like the wage-and/or-salary plan described under 3. above, this arrangement will benefit both the Corporation and its preferred stockholders. The latter are assured payment for their present shares at 150% of par value over an average period of five years. Since short-term securities yield practically no return at present, the non-interest-bearing feature is of no real importance. The Corporation will convert its present annual charge of $25,000,000 for preferred dividends into an annual bond-retirement profit of $54,000,000 -- an aggregate yearly gain of $79,000,000.
与上述第3点描述的工资和/或薪金计划类似，这一安排将使公司及其优先股股东均受益。后者可确保在平均五年内以面值150%的价格支付现有股份。由于短期证券目前几乎没有回报，无息特性并不重要。公司将把目前每年2500万美元的优先股股息费用转化为每年5400万美元的债券赎回利润——年度总收益7900万美元。
6. Establishment of a Contingency Reserve of $1,000,000,000.
The Directors are confident that the improvements hereinbefore described will assure the Corporation of a satisfactory earning power under all conditions in the future. Under modern accounting methods, however, it is unnecessary to incur the slightest risk of loss through adverse business developments of any sort, since all these may be provided for in advance by means of a Contingency Reserve.
董事会对上述改进措施充满信心，确信这些措施将确保公司在未来任何条件下都具有令人满意的盈利能力。然而，在现代会计方法下，无需因任何不利业务发展而承担丝毫损失风险，因为所有这些都可以通过设立应急储备提前准备。
The Special Committee has recommended that the Corporation create such a Contingency Reserve in the fairly substantial amount of $1,000,000,000. As previously set forth, the annual write-down of inventory to $1 will be absorbed by this reserve. To prevent eventual exhaustion of the Contingency Reserve, it has been further decided that it be replenished each year by transfer of an appropriate sum from Capital Surplus. Since the latter is expected to increase each year by not less than $250,000,000 through the exercise of the Stock Option Warrants (see 3. above), it will readily make good any drains on the Contingency Reserve.
特别委员会建议公司设立一个相当大的应急储备，金额为10亿美元。如前所述，每年将库存减记至1美元的费用将由该储备吸收。为防止应急储备最终耗尽，进一步决定每年通过从资本盈余中转移适当金额进行补充。由于通过行使股票期权认股权证（见上文第3点），资本盈余预计每年增加不少于2.5亿美元，这将轻松弥补应急储备的任何消耗。
In setting up this arrangement, the Board of Directors must confess regretfully that they have been unable to improve upon the devices already employed by important corporations in transferring large sums between Capital, Capital Surplus, Contingency Reserves and other Balance Sheet Accounts. In fact, it must be admitted that our entries will be somewhat too simple, and will lack that element of extreme mystification that characterizes the most advanced procedure in this field. The Board of Directors, however, have insisted upon clarity and simplicity in framing their Modernization Plan, even at the sacrifice of possible advantage to the Corporation's earning power.
在制定这一安排时，董事会必须遗憾地承认，他们未能改进重要公司已使用的在资本、资本盈余、应急储备和其他资产负债表账户之间转移大额资金的手段。事实上，必须承认我们的账目条目有些过于简单，缺乏该领域最先进程序特有的极端神秘元素。然而，董事会在制定现代化计划时坚持清晰和简单，即使这可能牺牲公司盈利能力的潜在优势。
Pro-Forma Income Account for 1935 (1935年模拟收入账户)
| Item | A. As Reported | B. Pro-Forma (Giving Effect to Changes Proposed) |
|---|---|---|
| Gross Receipts from all Sources (Including Inter-Company) | $765,000,000 | $765,000,000 |
| Salaries and Wages | $251,000,000 | -- |
| Other Operating Expenses and Taxes | $461,000,000 | $311,000,000 |
| Depreciation | $47,000,000 | ($50,000,000) |
| Interest | $5,000,000 | $5,000,000 |
| Discount on Bonds Retired | -- | ($54,000,000) |
| Preferred Dividends | $25,000,000 | -- |
| Balance for Common | ($24,000,000) | $553,000,000 |
| Average Shares Outstanding | 8,703,252 | 11,203,252 |
| Earned Per Share | ($2.76) | $49.80 |
Pro-Forma Balance Sheet as of December 31, 1935 (1935年12月31日模拟资产负债表)
| ASSETS | Amount |
|---|---|
| Fixed Assets, net | ($1,000,000,000) |
| Cash Assets | $142,000,000 |
| Receivables | $56,000,000 |
| Inventory | $1 |
| Miscellaneous Assets | $27,000,000 |
| Total | ($774,999,999) |
| LIABILITIES | Amount |
|---|---|
| Common Stock Par 1¢ (Par Value $87,032.52) Stated Value* | ($3,500,000,000) |
| Subsidiaries' Bonds and Stocks | $113,000,000 |
| New Sinking Fund Notes | $1,080,000,000 |
| Current Liabilities | $69,000,000 |
| Contingency Reserve | $1,000,000,000 |
| Other Reserves | $74,000,000 |
| Initial Surplus | $389,000,001 |
| Total | ($774,999,999) |
*Given a Stated Value differing from Par Value, in accordance with the laws of the State of Virginia, where the company will be re-incorporated.
*根据公司将在弗吉尼亚州重新注册成立的法律，赋予与面值不同的账面价值。
It is perhaps unnecessary to point out to our stockholders that modern accounting methods give rise to balance sheets differing somewhat in appearance from those of a less advanced period. In view of the very large earning power that will result from these changes in the Corporation's Balance Sheet, it is not expected that undue attention will be paid to the details of assets and liabilities.
或许无需向股东指出，现代会计方法产生的资产负债表与较不先进的时期相比，在外观上有所不同。鉴于公司资产负债表变化将带来的巨大盈利能力，预计不会过分关注资产和负债的细节。
In conclusion, the Board desires to point out that the combined procedure, whereby plant will be carried at a minus figure, our wage bill will be eliminated, and inventory will stand on our books at virtually nothing, will give U.S. Steel Corporation an enormous competitive advantage in the industry. We shall be able to sell our products at exceedingly low prices and still show a handsome margin of profit. It is the considered view of the Board of Directors that under the Modernization Scheme we shall be able to undersell all competitors to such a point that the anti-trust laws will constitute the only barrier to 100% domination of the industry.
总之，董事会希望指出，通过将工厂按负值计入、消除工资账单、将库存几乎记为零的综合程序，将使美国钢铁公司在行业中获得巨大的竞争优势。我们将能够以极低的价格销售产品，同时仍保持可观的利润率。董事会的深思熟虑观点是，在现代化计划下，我们将能够以如此程度低于所有竞争对手的价格销售产品，以至于反垄断法将成为完全支配行业的唯一障碍。
In making this statement, the Board is not unmindful of the possibility that some of our competitors may seek to offset our new advantages by adopting similar accounting improvements. We are confident, however, that U.S. Steel will be able to retain the loyalty of its customers, old and new, through the unique prestige that will accrue to it as the originator and pioneer in these new fields of service to the user of steel. Should necessity arise, moreover, we believe we shall be able to maintain our deserved superiority by introducing still more advanced bookkeeping methods, which are even now under development in our Experimental Accounting Laboratory.
在做出这一声明时，董事会并未忽视一些竞争对手可能通过采用类似的会计改进来抵消我们新优势的可能性。然而，我们相信，美国钢铁公司将通过作为钢铁用户服务新领域的开创者和先驱所获得的独特声望，保持新老客户的忠诚。此外，如有必要，我们相信通过引入目前正在我们实验会计实验室开发的更先进的会计方法，我们将能够保持我们应得的优越性。
# Appendix B: Some Thoughts on Selling Your Business (附录B：关于出售您的企业的思考)
This is an edited version of a letter I sent some years ago to a man who had indicated that he might want to sell his family business. I present it here because it is a message I would like to convey to other prospective sellers. -- W.E.B.
这是我几年前写给一位表示可能想出售家族企业的人的信的编辑版本。我在此呈现，因为这是我想对其他潜在卖家传达的信息。——W.E.B.
Dear _____________:
Here are a few thoughts pursuant to our conversation of the other day.
以下是我们前几天谈话后的一些思考。
Most business owners spend the better part of their lifetimes building their businesses. By experience built upon endless repetition, they sharpen their skills in merchandising, purchasing, personnel selection, etc. It's a learning process, and mistakes made in one year often contribute to competence and success in succeeding years.
大多数企业主一生的大部分时间都在建立他们的企业。通过无数次重复积累的经验，他们在营销、采购、人员选择等方面磨砺了自己的技能。这是一个学习过程，一年中犯的错误往往有助于随后几年的能力和成功。
In contrast, owner-managers sell their business only once -- frequently in an emotionally-charged atmosphere with a multitude of pressures coming from different directions. Often, much of the pressure comes from brokers whose compensation is contingent upon consummation of a sale, regardless of its consequences for both buyer and seller. The fact that the decision is so important, both financially and personally, to the owner can make the process more, rather than less, prone to error. And, mistakes made in the once-in-a-lifetime sale of a business are not reversible.
相比之下，所有者-管理者只出售他们的企业一次——通常是在充满情感的氛围中，面临来自不同方向的多种压力。通常，很多压力来自经纪人，他们的报酬取决于交易的完成，不论这对买家和卖家的后果如何。这一决定对所有者在财务和个人方面如此重要，反而使过程更容易出错。而且，一生一次的业务出售中犯的错误是不可逆转的。
Price is very important, but often is not the most critical aspect of the sale. You and your family have an extraordinary business -- one of a kind in your field -- and any buyer is going to recognize that. It's also a business that is going to get more valuable as the years go by. So if you decide not to sell now, you are very likely to realize more money later on. With that knowledge you can deal from strength and take the time required to select the buyer you want.
价格非常重要，但往往不是出售的最关键方面。你和你的家族拥有一个非凡的业务——在你的领域中独一无二——任何买家都会认识到这一点。这也是一个随着时间推移将变得更有价值的业务。因此，如果你现在决定不卖，你很可能会在未来实现更多的回报。有了这种知识，你可以从优势地位进行谈判，并花时间选择你想要的买家。
If you should decide to sell, I think Berkshire Hathaway offers some advantages that most other buyers do not. Practically all of these buyers will fall into one of two categories:
如果你决定出售，我认为伯克希尔·哈撒韦提供了一些大多数其他买家无法提供的优势。几乎所有这些买家将分为两类：
A company located elsewhere but operating in your business or in a business somewhat akin to yours. Such a buyer -- no matter what promises are made -- will usually have managers who feel they know how to run your business operations and, sooner or later, will want to apply some hands-on "help." If the acquiring company is much larger, it often will have squads of managers, recruited over the years in part by promises that they will get to run future acquisitions. They will have their own way of doing things and, even though your business record undoubtedly will be far better than theirs, human nature will at some point cause them to believe that their methods of operating are superior. You and your family probably have friends who have sold their businesses to larger companies, and I suspect that their experiences will confirm the tendency of parent companies to take over the running of their subsidiaries, particularly when the parent knows the industry, or thinks it does.
在其他地方运营但在你的业务或类似业务中运营的公司。 这样的买家——无论做出什么承诺——通常会有觉得自己知道如何运营你的业务的管理者，迟早会想施加一些亲手“帮助”。如果收购公司规模大得多，它往往会有多年来通过承诺未来管理收购业务而招聘的管理团队。他们有自己的做事方式，即使你的业务记录无疑远超他们的记录，人性在某个时候会让他们相信他们的运营方法更优越。你和你的家人可能有朋友将业务卖给了更大的公司，我怀疑他们的经验将证实母公司接管子公司的倾向，特别是在母公司了解行业或认为自己了解时。
A financial maneuverer, invariably operating with large amounts of borrowed money, who plans to resell either to the public or to another corporation as soon as the time is favorable. Frequently, this buyer's major contribution will be to change accounting methods so that earnings can be presented in the most favorable light just prior to his bailing out. I'm enclosing a recent article that describes this sort of transaction, which is becoming much more frequent because of a rising stock market and the great supply of funds available for such transactions.
财务操纵者，通常使用大量借入资金操作，计划在时机有利时将业务转售给公众或其他公司。 通常，这类买家的主要贡献是更改会计方法，以便在退出前以最有利的方式呈现收益。我附上了一篇近期文章，描述了这种交易，由于股票市场上涨和此类交易可用资金充足，这种交易变得越来越频繁。
If the sole motive of the present owners is to cash their chips and put the business behind them -- and plenty of sellers fall in this category -- either type of buyer that I've just described is satisfactory. But if the sellers' business represents the creative work of a lifetime and forms an integral part of their personality and sense of being, buyers of either type have serious flaws.
如果当前所有者的唯一动机是套现并将业务抛诸脑后——许多卖家属于这一类——我刚描述的任一类型买家都是满意的。但如果卖家的业务代表了一生的创造性工作，并构成其个性和存在感的重要部分，那么这两种买家都有严重缺陷。
Berkshire is another kind of buyer -- a rather unusual one. We buy to keep, but we don't have, and don't expect to have, operating people in our parent organization. All of the businesses we own are run autonomously to an extraordinary degree. In most cases, the managers of important businesses we have owned for many years have not been to Omaha or even met each other. When we buy a business, the sellers go on running it just as they did before the sale; we adapt to their methods rather than vice versa.
伯克希尔是另一种买家——相当不寻常的一种。我们购买是为了持有，但我们在母公司组织中没有，也预计不会有运营人员。我们拥有的所有业务在很大程度上都是自主运营的。在大多数情况下，我们多年来拥有的重要业务的管理者从未去过奥马哈，甚至没有见过彼此。当我们购买一家业务时，卖家继续像出售前一样运营；我们适应他们的方法，而不是反过来。
We have no one -- family, recently recruited MBAs, etc. -- to whom we have promised a chance to run businesses we have bought from owner-managers. And we won't have.
我们没有向任何人——家族成员、最近招聘的MBA等——承诺过管理我们从所有者-管理者那里购买的业务的机会。我们也不会这样做。
You know of some of our past purchases. I'm enclosing a list of everyone from whom we have ever bought a business, and I invite you to check with them as to our performance versus our promises. You should be particularly interested in checking with the few whose businesses did not do well in order to ascertain how we behaved under difficult conditions.
你知道我们过去的一些收购。我附上了一份我们曾经购买过业务的每个人的名单，我邀请你与他们联系，以核实我们的表现与承诺是否一致。你应该特别关注那些业务表现不佳的少数人，以了解我们在困难条件下的行为。
Any buyer will tell you that he needs you personally -- and if he has any brains, he most certainly does need you. But a great many buyers, for the reasons mentioned above, don't match their subsequent actions to their earlier words. We will behave exactly as promised, both because we have so promised, and because we need to in order to achieve the best business results.
任何买家都会告诉你他个人需要你——如果他有任何头脑，他确实非常需要你。但由于上述原因，许多买家的后续行动与其早先的承诺不符。我们将完全按照承诺行事，既因为我们如此承诺，也因为我们需要这样做以实现最佳业务成果。
This need explains why we would want the operating members of your family to retain a 20% interest in the business. We need 80% to consolidate earnings for tax purposes, which is a step important to us. It is equally important to us that the family members who run the business remain as owners. Very simply, we would not want to buy unless we felt key members of present management would stay on as our partners. Contracts cannot guarantee your continued interest; we would simply rely on your word.
这种需要解释了为什么我们希望你的家族运营成员保留业务20%的权益。我们需要80%的权益以合并税务收益，这对我们很重要。对我们同样重要的是，运营业务的家族成员继续作为所有者。很简单，除非我们觉得当前管理的关键成员会作为我们的合作伙伴留下来，否则我们不会购买。合同不能保证你的持续兴趣；我们只是依靠你的承诺。
The areas I get involved in are capital allocation and selection and compensation of the top man. Other personnel decisions, operating strategies, etc. are his bailiwick. Some Berkshire managers talk over some of their decisions with me; some don't. It depends upon their personalities and, to an extent, upon their own personal relationship with me.
我参与的领域是资本分配以及最高管理者的选择和薪酬。其他人员决定、运营策略等属于他的职责范围。一些伯克希尔的管理者会与我讨论他们的一些决定；有些则不会。这取决于他们的个性，以及某种程度上他们与我的个人关系。
If you should decide to do business with Berkshire, we would pay in cash. Your business would not be used as collateral for any loan by Berkshire. There would be no brokers involved.
如果你决定与伯克希尔做生意，我们将以现金支付。你的业务不会被用作伯克希尔任何贷款的抵押品。不会有经纪人参与。
Furthermore, there would be no chance that a deal would be announced and that the buyer would then back off or start suggesting adjustments (with apologies, of course, and with an explanation that banks, lawyers, boards of directors, etc. were to be blamed). And finally, you would know exactly with whom you are dealing. You would not have one executive negotiate the deal only to have someone else in charge a few years later, or have the president regretfully tell you that his board of directors required this change or that (or possibly required sale of your business to finance some new interest of the parent's).
此外，不会出现交易宣布后买家退缩或开始建议调整的情况（当然会有道歉，并解释是银行、律师、董事会等的原因）。最后，你会清楚知道你在与谁打交道。你不会遇到一个高管谈判交易，几年后却由其他人负责，或者总裁遗憾地告诉你他的董事会要求这样或那样的变化（或者可能要求出售你的业务以资助母公司的新兴趣）。
It's only fair to tell you that you would be no richer after the sale than now. The ownership of your business already makes you wealthy and soundly invested. A sale would change the form of your wealth, but it wouldn't change its amount. If you sell, you will have exchanged a 100%-owned valuable asset that you understand for another valuable asset -- cash -- that will probably be invested in small pieces (stocks) of other businesses that you understand less well. There is often a sound reason to sell but, if the transaction is a fair one, the reason is not so that the seller can become wealthier.
公平地说，出售后你不会比现在更富有。你对业务的拥有已经让你富有且投资稳健。出售会改变你财富的形式，但不会改变其金额。如果你出售，你将把你理解的100%拥有的有价值资产换成另一个有价值资产——现金——可能会投资于你了解较少的其他业务的少量股份（股票）。出售通常有合理的理由，但如果交易是公平的，理由不是为了让卖家变得更富有。
I will not pester you; if you have any possible interest in selling, I would appreciate your call. I would be extraordinarily proud to have Berkshire, along with the key members of your family, own _______; I believe we would do very well financially; and I believe you would have just as much fun running the business over the next 20 years as you have had during the past 20.
我不会纠缠你；如果你有任何出售的可能兴趣，我会感激你的电话。我将非常骄傲能让伯克希尔与你的家族关键成员一起拥有_______；我相信我们在财务上会做得很好；我也相信你在未来20年管理业务会像过去20年一样充满乐趣。
Sincerely,
/s/ Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·E·巴菲特