2003巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
# (伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司)
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们：
Our gain in net worth during 2003 was $13.6 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 21%. Over the last 39 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $50,498, a rate of 22.2% compounded annually.*
我们在2003年的净资产增长为136亿美元，使我们的A类和B类股票每股账面价值均增长了21%。在过去39年中（即现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值从19美元增长到50,498美元，年复合增长率达22.2%。*
It’s per-share intrinsic value that counts, however, not book value. Here, the news is good: Between 1964 and 2003, Berkshire morphed from a struggling northern textile business whose intrinsic value was less than book into a widely diversified enterprise worth far more than book. Our 39-year gain in intrinsic value has therefore somewhat exceeded our 22.2% gain in book. (For a better understanding of intrinsic value and the economic principles that guide Charlie Munger, my partner and Berkshire’s vice-chairman, and me in running Berkshire, please read our Owner’s Manual, beginning on page 69.)
然而，真正重要的是每股的内在价值，而非账面价值。好消息是：在1964年至2003年间，伯克希尔从一家挣扎中的北方纺织企业转变为了远超其账面价值的多元化企业。因此，我们在这39年间的内在价值增长略高于账面价值增长的22.2%。（关于内在价值以及指导我和我的合伙人、伯克希尔副主席查理·芒格经营伯克希尔的经济原则，请参见第69页开始的《所有者手册》。）
Despite their shortcomings, book value calculations are useful at Berkshire as a slightly understated gauge for measuring the long-term rate of increase in our intrinsic value. The calculation is less relevant, however, than it once was in rating any single year’s performance versus the S&P 500 index (a comparison we display on the facing page). Our equity holdings, including convertible preferreds, have fallen considerably as a percentage of our net worth, from an average of 114% in the 1980s, for example, to an average of 50% in 2000-03. Therefore, yearly movements in the stock market now affect a much smaller portion of our net worth than was once the case.
尽管账面价值计算有其局限性，但在伯克希尔，它仍可作为衡量长期内在价值增长的一个略微保守的指标。不过，与过去相比，账面价值现在在评估单一年度表现与标普500指数对比时的相关性已有所降低（我们在下一页展示了这一比较）。我们持有的股权（包括可转换优先股）占净价值的比例大幅下降，例如上世纪80年代平均为114%，而2000至2003年间平均仅为50%。因此，股市年度波动对我们净资产的影响比重已大幅减少。
Nonetheless, Berkshire’s long-term performance versus the S&P remains all-important. Our shareholders can buy the S&P through an index fund at very low cost. Unless we achieve gains in per-share intrinsic value in the future that outdo the S&P’s performance, Charlie and I will be adding nothing to what you can accomplish on your own.
尽管如此，伯克希尔相对于标普500指数的长期表现仍是最重要的。我们的股东可以以非常低的成本通过指数基金投资标普500指数。除非我们未来实现的每股内在价值增长超过该指数的表现，否则我和查理将无法为您带来您自己无法实现的价值。
If we fail, we will have no excuses. Charlie and I operate in an ideal environment. To begin with, we are supported by an incredible group of men and women who run our operating units. If there were a Corporate Cooperstown, its roster would surely include many of our CEOs. Any shortfall in Berkshire’s results will not be caused by our managers.
如果我们失败了，我们没有任何借口。查理和我所处的环境堪称理想。首先，我们有一群非凡的人才来管理我们的运营单位。如果有一个“企业名人堂”，其中肯定会有许多我们的CEO。伯克希尔业绩的任何不足都不会归咎于我们的经理人。
Additionally, we enjoy a rare sort of managerial freedom. Most companies are saddled with institutional constraints. A company’s history, for example, may commit it to an industry that now offers limited opportunity. A more common problem is a shareholder constituency that pressures its manager to dance to Wall Street’s tune. Many CEOs resist, but others give in and adopt operating and capital-allocation policies far different from those they would choose if left to themselves.
此外，我们享有极为罕见的管理自由。大多数公司都受到制度性限制的束缚。比如，一家公司的历史可能使其局限于某个如今机会有限的行业。更常见的问题是，股东群体迫使管理层迎合华尔街的节奏。许多CEO会抵抗这种压力，但有些人屈服了，并采取了与他们本意大相径庭的运营和资本配置政策。
At Berkshire, neither history nor the demands of owners impede intelligent decision-making. When Charlie and I make mistakes, they are – in tennis parlance – unforced errors.
在伯克希尔，无论是历史包袱还是股东要求都不会阻碍明智决策。当查理和我犯错时，那——用网球术语来说——属于“非受迫性失误”。
*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.
*本报告中使用的所有数据均适用于伯克希尔的A类股票，这是1996年前公司唯一发行的股票。B类股票的经济权益为A类股票的1/30。
# Operating Earnings
# （营运收益）
When valuations are similar, we strongly prefer owning businesses to owning stocks. During most of our years of operation, however, stocks were much the cheaper choice. We therefore sharply tilted our asset allocation in those years toward equities, as illustrated by the percentages cited earlier.
在估值相近的情况下，我们更倾向于拥有企业而非股票。但在我们多年运营期间，股票通常比企业便宜得多。因此，在那些年份里，我们将资产配置大幅偏向股票，正如前文引用的数据所示。
In recent years, however, we’ve found it hard to find significantly undervalued stocks, a difficulty greatly accentuated by the mushrooming of the funds we must deploy. Today, the number of stocks that can be purchased in large enough quantities to move the performance needle at Berkshire is a small fraction of the number that existed a decade ago. (Investment managers often profit far more from piling up assets than from handling those assets well. So when one tells you that increased funds won’t hurt his investment performance, step back: His nose is about to grow.)
然而近年来，我们发现很难找到明显被低估的股票，而这一困难因我们需要部署的资金规模迅速膨胀而加剧。如今，能够以足够大的数量买入并对伯克希尔整体业绩产生显著影响的股票，只是十年前可用数量的一小部分。（基金经理往往更多地从堆积资产中获利，而非妥善管理这些资产。所以当有人说资金增加不会损害他的投资表现时，请退后一步：他马上就要说谎了。）
The shortage of attractively-priced stocks in which we can put large sums doesn’t bother us, providing we can find companies to purchase that (1) have favorable and enduring economic characteristics; (2) are run by talented and honest managers and (3) are available at a sensible price. We have purchased a number of such businesses in recent years, though not enough to fully employ the gusher of cash that has come our way. In buying businesses, I’ve made some terrible mistakes, both of commission and omission. Overall, however, our acquisitions have led to decent gains in per-share earnings.
我们并不担心难以找到能投入大额资金的低价股票，只要能找到满足以下条件的企业：（1）具备有利且持久的经济特征；（2）由有能力且诚实的管理者经营；（3）价格合理。近年来我们收购了不少这样的企业，虽然数量还不足以完全消化我们获得的大笔现金。在并购方面，我犯过一些严重的错误，既有主动做出的决策失误，也有未及时行动的疏忽。但总体而言，我们的收购带来了每股收益的稳健增长。
Below is a table that quantifies that point. But first we need to warn you that growth-rate presentations can be significantly distorted by a calculated selection of either initial or terminal dates. For example, if earnings are tiny in a beginning year, a long-term performance that was only mediocre can be made to appear sensational. That kind of distortion can come about because the company at issue was minuscule in the base year – which means that only a handful of insiders actually benefited from the touted performance – or because a larger company was then operating at just above breakeven. Picking a terminal year that is particularly buoyant will also favorably bias a calculation of growth.
以下表格量化了这一点。但我们首先需要提醒您，选择特定的起始或终止年份可能会严重扭曲增长率的表现。例如，如果基年盈利极低，那么即便是平庸的长期表现也可能显得非常耀眼。这种扭曲可能是因为公司在基准年规模很小——这意味着只有少数内部人士实际受益于所宣传的业绩——或者因为一家大公司在当时仅略高于盈亏平衡点。选取一个特别强劲的终值年份也会对增长率的计算产生有利偏差。
The Berkshire Hathaway that present management assumed control of in 1965 had long been sizable. But in 1964, it earned only $175,586 or 15 cents per share, so close to breakeven that any calculation of earnings growth from that base would be meaningless. At the time, however, even those meager earnings looked good: Over the decade following the 1955 merger of Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and Hathaway Manufacturing, the combined operation had lost $10.1 million and many thousands of employees had been let go. It was not a marriage made in heaven.
1965年现任管理层接手时，伯克希尔早已是一家颇具规模的公司。但1964年，公司仅赚取了175,586美元，即每股15美分，几乎处于盈亏平衡状态，因此从这一基础计算盈利增长毫无意义。然而在当时看来，这点微薄的利润已经算是不错了：自1955年伯克希尔精细纺纱协会与哈撒韦制造公司合并后的十年间，合并业务亏损了1,010万美元，数千名员工被裁员。这并不是一场天作之合。
Against this background, we give you a picture of Berkshire’s earnings growth that begins in 1968, but also includes subsequent base years spaced five years apart. A series of calculations is presented so that you can decide for yourself which period is most meaningful. I’ve started with 1968 because it was the first full year we operated National Indemnity, the initial acquisition we made as we began to expand Berkshire’s business.
基于上述背景，我们提供了一张从1968年开始的盈利增长图，并每隔五年列出后续的基准年。我们呈现一系列计算结果，以便您自行判断哪一时间段最具意义。我之所以从1968年开始，是因为那是我们收购国家赔偿保险公司（National Indemnity）并开始扩展伯克希尔业务之后的第一个完整财年。
I don’t believe that using 2003 as the terminal year distorts our calculations. It was a terrific year for our insurance business, but the big boost that gave to earnings was largely offset by the pathetically low interest rates we earned on our large holdings of cash equivalents (a condition that will not last). All figures shown below, it should be noted, exclude capital gains.
我认为将2003年作为终值年并不会扭曲我们的计算。这一年我们的保险业务表现出色，但带来的巨大盈利提升很大程度上被我们大量持有现金等价物所获得的极低利率所抵消（这种情况不会持续）。请注意，以下所有数据均不包括资本利得。
# Operating Earnings
# 营运收益（单位：百万美元）
| 年份 | 收益（百万美元） | 每股收益（美元） | 后续每股收益的年复合增长率 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1964 | 0.2 | 0.15 | 不具意义（1964–2003） |
| 1968 | 2.7 | 2.69 | 22.8%（1968–2003） |
| 1973 | 11.9 | 12.18 | 20.8%（1973–2003） |
| 1978 | 30.0 | 29.15 | 21.1%（1978–2003） |
| 1983 | 48.6 | 45.60 | 24.3%（1983–2003） |
| 1988 | 313.4 | 273.37 | 18.6%（1988–2003） |
| 1993 | 477.8 | 413.19 | 23.9%（1993–2003） |
| 1998 | 1,277.0 | 1,020.49 | 28.2%（1998–2003） |
| 2003 | 5,422.0 | 3,531.32 | — |
We will continue the capital allocation practices we have used in the past. If stocks become significantly cheaper than entire businesses, we will buy them aggressively. If selected bonds become attractive, as they did in 2002, we will again load up on these securities. Under any market or economic conditions, we will be happy to buy businesses that meet our standards. And, for those that do, the bigger the better. Our capital is underutilized now, but that will happen periodically. It’s a painful condition to be in – but not as painful as doing something stupid. (I speak from experience.)
我们将继续沿用以往的资本配置策略。如果股票变得明显比整家企业更具吸引力，我们会积极买入。如果某些债券变得具有吸引力，就像2002年那样，我们也将再次大量购入这些证券。无论市场或经济状况如何，我们都愿意购买符合我们标准的企业，而且越大越好。目前我们的资本利用率较低，但这会周期性发生。这是一种令人痛苦的状态——但远不如做愚蠢的事更痛苦。（我是在用亲身经历说话。）
Overall, we are certain Berkshire’s performance in the future will fall far short of what it has been in the past. Nonetheless, Charlie and I remain hopeful that we can deliver results that are modestly above average. That’s what we’re being paid for.
我们确信，伯克希尔未来的表现将远远不及过去。尽管如此，查理和我仍然希望我们能够实现略高于平均水平的回报。这正是我们被雇来做的事。
Acquisitions
并购
As regular readers know, our acquisitions have often come about in strange ways. None, however, had a more unusual genesis than our purchase last year of Clayton Homes.
常读我们年报的人都知道，我们的许多收购往往以出人意料的方式达成。然而，没有哪一笔交易的起源比我们去年收购Clayton Homes更奇特了。
The unlikely source was a group of finance students from the University of Tennessee, and their teacher, Dr. Al Auxier. For the past five years, Al has brought his class to Omaha, where the group tours Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim’s, eats at Gorat’s and then comes to Kiewit Plaza for a session with me. Usually about 40 students participate.
这次收购的起点令人意想不到：它来自田纳西大学的一群金融学学生及其导师Al Auxier博士。在过去五年里，Al都会带他的学生来到奥马哈，参观Nebraska Furniture Mart和Borsheim珠宝店，在Gorat餐厅用餐，最后到Kiewit Plaza与我会面交流。通常约有40名学生参与。
After two hours of give-and-take, the group traditionally presents me with a thank-you gift. (The doors stay locked until they do.) In past years it’s been items such as a football signed by Phil Fulmer and a basketball from Tennessee’s famous women’s team.
在两个小时的互动之后，学生们照例会送我一份感谢礼物（门会一直锁着直到他们送出礼物）。以往的礼物包括菲尔·富尔默签名的橄榄球，以及田纳西大学著名女篮队赠送的篮球等。
This past February, the group opted for a book – which, luckily for me, was the recently-published autobiography of Jim Clayton, founder of Clayton Homes. I already knew the company to be the class act of the manufactured housing industry, knowledge I acquired after earlier making the mistake of buying some distressed junk debt of Oakwood Homes, one of the industry’s largest companies.
今年二月，他们选择送我一本书——幸运的是，这本书恰好是Clayton Homes创始人Jim Clayton刚出版的自传。在此之前，我已经对这家公司有所了解，并认为它是预制房屋行业中的佼佼者。这种认识源于我早年犯过的一个错误：曾购买过Oakwood Homes的一些垃圾债券，而这家公司正是该行业中最大的企业之一。
At the time of that purchase, I did not understand how atrocious consumer-financing practices had become throughout most of the manufactured housing industry. But I learned: Oakwood rather promptly went bankrupt.
那次购买时，我并不清楚整个预制房屋行业的消费者融资实践已恶化到何种地步。但很快我就明白了：Oakwood没多久就破产了。
Manufactured housing, it should be emphasized, can deliver very good value to home purchasers. Indeed, for decades, the industry has accounted for more than 15% of the homes built in the U.S. During those years, moreover, both the quality and variety of manufactured houses consistently improved.
需要强调的是，预制房屋可以为购房者带来极高的价值。事实上，几十年来，这个行业在美国新建住房中占比超过15%。在此期间，预制房屋的质量和种类也在持续提升。
Progress in design and construction was not matched, however, by progress in distribution and financing. Instead, as the years went by, the industry’s business model increasingly centered on the ability of both the retailer and manufacturer to unload terrible loans on naive lenders.
然而，设计和建造方面的进步并未在分销和融资方面得到同步体现。相反，随着时间推移，该行业的商业模式越来越依赖零售商和制造商能否把糟糕的贷款转嫁给天真的放贷机构。
When “securitization” then became popular in the 1990s, further distancing the supplier of funds from the lending transaction, the industry’s conduct went from bad to worse. Much of its volume a few years back came from buyers who shouldn’t have bought, financed by lenders who shouldn’t have lent. The consequence has been huge numbers of repossessions and pitifully low recoveries on the units repossessed.
当“证券化”在1990年代兴起后，资金提供方进一步远离实际借贷行为，使得该行业的状况从糟糕变得更为恶劣。几年前，大量销售来自于本不该买房的人，由本不该放贷的机构提供资金支持。其后果就是大规模的房产被收回，且回收资产的价值极其微薄。
Oakwood participated fully in the insanity. But Clayton, though it could not isolate itself from industry practices, behaved considerably better than its major competitors.
Oakwood完全参与了这场疯狂。但Clayton虽然无法完全摆脱行业惯例，表现却远胜于其主要竞争对手。
Upon receiving Jim Clayton’s book, I told the students how much I admired his record and they took that message back to Knoxville, home of both the University of Tennessee and Clayton Homes. Al then suggested that I call Kevin Clayton, Jim’s son and the CEO, to express my views directly.
收到Jim Clayton的书后，我告诉学生们我对他的成就非常钦佩，他们便将这个信息带回了田纳西大学所在地诺克斯维尔——同时也是Clayton Homes总部所在地。随后，Al建议我直接致电Kevin Clayton（Jim的儿子兼公司CEO）表达我的想法。
As I talked with Kevin, it became clear that he was both able and a straight-shooter.
与Kevin交谈后，我越发确信他既能力出众又为人坦诚。
Soon thereafter, I made an offer for the business based solely on Jim’s book, my evaluation of Kevin, the public financials of Clayton and what I had learned from the Oakwood experience. Clayton’s board was receptive, since it understood that the large-scale financing Clayton would need in the future might be hard to get.
不久之后，我仅凭Jim的书、我对Kevin的评估、Clayton的公开财务数据以及从Oakwood经验中学到的内容，向该公司提出了收购报价。Clayton董事会对此表示欢迎，因为他们明白，未来公司所需的大量融资可能会难以获得。
Lenders had fled the industry and securitizations, when possible at all, carried far more expensive and restrictive terms than was previously the case. This tightening was particularly serious for Clayton, whose earnings significantly depended on securitizations.
当时，放贷机构已经逃离这个行业；即使还能进行证券化操作，条件也比以前昂贵得多、限制也更严格。这对严重依赖证券化的Clayton来说尤为严峻。
Today, the manufactured housing industry remains awash in problems. Delinquencies continue high, repossessed units still abound and the number of retailers has been halved. A different business model is required, one that eliminates the ability of the retailer and salesman to pocket substantial money up front by making sales financed by loans that are destined to default.
如今，预制房屋行业依然问题重重。违约率居高不下，被收回的房产数量庞大，零售商的数量也减少了一半。行业迫切需要一种新的商业模式，杜绝零售商和销售人员通过促成注定违约的贷款销售来提前获取大笔佣金的做法。
Such transactions cause hardship to both buyer and lender and lead to a flood of repossessions that then undercut the sale of new units. Under a proper model – one requiring significant down payments and shorter-term loans – the industry will likely remain much smaller than it was in the 90s. But it will deliver to home buyers an asset in which they will have equity, rather than disappointment, upon resale.
这类交易给买家和贷款人都带来了痛苦，并引发大量房产被收回，从而削弱了新房销售。在一个更合理的模式下——要求更高的首付和更短期限的贷款——该行业规模可能仍会远小于90年代。但这样的模式能让购房者在出售房产时获得真正的资产增值，而非失望。
In the “full circle” department, Clayton has agreed to buy the assets of Oakwood. When the transaction closes, Clayton’s manufacturing capacity, geographical reach and sales outlets will be substantially increased. As a byproduct, the debt of Oakwood that we own, which we bought at a deep discount, will probably return a small profit to us.
颇具讽刺意味的是，Clayton现已同意收购Oakwood的资产。交易完成后，Clayton的生产能力、地理覆盖范围和销售网点都将大幅提升。作为附带结果，我们持有的Oakwood债务（当初是以大幅折价购入）很可能为我们带来小幅利润。
And the students? In October, we had a surprise “graduation” ceremony in Knoxville for the 40 who sparked my interest in Clayton. I donned a mortarboard and presented each student with both a PhD (for phenomenal, hard-working dealmaker) from Berkshire and a B share. Al got an A share. If you meet some of the new Tennessee shareholders at our annual meeting, give them your thanks. And ask them if they’ve read any good books lately.
那群学生们呢？10月，我们在诺克斯维尔为那40位激发我对Clayton兴趣的学生举行了一场惊喜的“毕业典礼”。我戴上学位帽，为每位学生颁发了一份来自伯克希尔的“博士学位证书”（表彰他们是勤奋出色的交易撮合者），并附赠一股B股。Al则获得了一股A股。如果你在我们的年度股东大会上遇到这些新晋田纳西股东，请向他们致谢。再问问他们最近有没有读什么好书。
In early spring, Byron Trott, a Managing Director of Goldman Sachs, told me that Wal-Mart wished to sell its McLane subsidiary. McLane distributes groceries and nonfood items to convenience stores, drug stores, wholesale clubs, mass merchandisers, quick service restaurants, theaters and others. It’s a good business, but one not in the mainstream of Wal-Mart’s future. It’s made to order, however, for us.
初春时节，高盛董事总经理Byron Trott告诉我，沃尔玛有意出售旗下子公司McLane。McLane向便利店、药店、批发俱乐部、大型零售商、快餐店、影院等客户配送食品和非食品商品。这是一项不错的业务，但不属于沃尔玛未来发展的核心方向。不过对我们而言，它简直是量身定制。
McLane has sales of about $23 billion, but operates on paper-thin margins – about 1% pre-tax – and will swell Berkshire’s sales figures far more than our income. In the past, some retailers had shunned McLane because it was owned by their major competitor. Grady Rosier, McLane’s superb CEO, has already landed some of these accounts – he was in full stride the day the deal closed – and more will come.
McLane的年销售额约为230亿美元，但利润率极低——税前利润率大约只有1%，因此它将大大增加伯克希尔的营收数字，但对利润贡献有限。过去一些零售商因McLane为竞争对手所拥有而对其避之不及。但现在，McLane卓越的CEO Grady Rosier已在交易完成当天成功争取到了部分原客户的订单，未来还会有更多。
For several years, I have given my vote to Wal-Mart in the balloting for Fortune Magazine’s “Most Admired” list. Our McLane transaction reinforced my opinion. To make the McLane deal, I had a single meeting of about two hours with Tom Schoewe, Wal-Mart’s CFO, and we then shook hands. (He did, however, first call Bentonville). Twenty-nine days later Wal-Mart had its money. We did no “due diligence.” We knew everything would be exactly as Wal-Mart said it would be – and it was.
多年来我一直将票投给沃尔玛进入《财富》杂志“最受尊敬公司”榜单。此次McLane交易进一步强化了我的看法。为了完成这笔交易，我只与沃尔玛CFO Tom Schoewe见了一次面，谈了大约两小时，然后我们就握手成交了。（当然，他事先打了电话回总部确认。）29天后，沃尔玛收到了全款。我们甚至没有做任何“尽职调查”。我们相信沃尔玛所说的一切都会如实兑现，事实也确实如此。
I should add that Byron has now been instrumental in three Berkshire acquisitions. He understands Berkshire far better than any investment banker with whom we have talked and – it hurts me to say this – earns his fee. I’m looking forward to deal number four (as, I am sure, is he).
值得一提的是，Byron目前已协助我们完成了三笔伯克希尔收购交易。他对伯克希尔的理解远超我们接触过的其他投行家——说这句话让我有点难受——但他确实配得上他的佣金。我期待第四笔交易的到来（我相信他也一样）。
# Taxes
# 税务
On May 20, 2003, The Washington Post ran an op-ed piece by me that was critical of the Bush tax proposals. Thirteen days later, Pamela Olson, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy at the U.S. Treasury, delivered a speech about the new tax legislation saying, “That means a certain midwestern oracle, who, it must be noted, has played the tax code like a fiddle, is still safe retaining all his earnings.” I think she was talking about me.
2003年5月20日，《华盛顿邮报》刊登了我一篇批评布什政府税收提案的专栏文章。13天后，美国财政部税务政策助理部长Pamela Olson在一次关于新税法的演讲中说道：“这意味着一位中西部的预言家——必须指出的是，他像拉小提琴一样熟练运用税法——仍然可以安全地保留他的全部收入。”我想她指的就是我。
Alas, my “fiddle playing” will not get me to Carnegie Hall – or even to a high school recital. Berkshire, on your behalf and mine, will send the Treasury $3.3 billion for tax on its 2003 income, a sum equaling 21⁄2% of the total income tax paid by all U.S. corporations in fiscal 2003. (In contrast, Berkshire’s market valuation is about 1% of the value of all American corporations.) Our payment will almost certainly place us among our country’s top ten taxpayers.
可惜的是，我的“拉琴技艺”不会让我登上卡内基音乐厅——甚至连高中音乐会都去不了。伯克希尔将在你我名义下向财政部支付33亿美元的2003年所得税，相当于2003财年所有美国公司缴纳所得税总额的2.5%。（相比之下，伯克希尔的市值约占全美公司总市值的1%。）这笔支付几乎肯定使我们跻身美国十大纳税人之列。
Indeed, if only 540 taxpayers paid the amount Berkshire will pay, no other individual or corporation would have to pay anything to Uncle Sam. That’s right: 290 million Americans and all other businesses would not have to pay a dime in income, social security, excise or estate taxes to the federal government. (Here’s the math: Federal tax receipts, including social security receipts, in fiscal 2003 totaled $1.782 trillion and 540 “Berkshires,” each paying $3.3 billion, would deliver the same $1.782 trillion.)
事实上，如果仅有540个纳税人缴纳税额达到伯克希尔所缴纳的金额，那么其余个人或企业都不需要再向联邦政府缴税了。没错：2.9亿美国人和其他所有企业将无需支付任何联邦所得税、社会保障税、消费税或遗产税。（计算方式如下：2003财年联邦政府税收总收入（含社保收入）为1.782万亿美元，若540个“伯克希尔”各缴33亿美元，则合计正好为1.782万亿美元。）
Our federal tax return for 2002 (2003 is not finalized), when we paid $1.75 billion, covered a mere 8,905 pages. As is required, we dutifully filed two copies of this return, creating a pile of paper seven feet tall. At World Headquarters, our small band of 15.8, though exhausted, momentarily flushed with pride: Berkshire, we felt, was surely pulling its share of our country’s fiscal load.
我们2002年的联邦税申报表（2003年的尚未完成）共8,905页，当时我们缴纳了17.5亿美元税款。按规定，我们认真地提交了两份副本，堆起来足有七英尺高。在伯克希尔总部，我们这区区15.8名员工虽然筋疲力尽，但一时也感到自豪：我们觉得，伯克希尔确实在为国家的财政负担尽了一份力。
But Ms. Olson sees things otherwise. And if that means Charlie and I need to try harder, we are ready to do so.
但奥尔森女士显然不这么看。如果这意味着查理和我需要做得更多，我们也愿意接受挑战。
I do wish, however, that Ms. Olson would give me some credit for the progress I’ve already made. In 1944, I filed my first 1040, reporting my income as a thirteen-year-old newspaper carrier. The return covered three pages. After I claimed the appropriate business deductions, such as $35 for a bicycle, my tax bill was $7. I sent my check to the Treasury and it – without comment – promptly cashed it. We lived in peace.
不过，我希望奥尔森女士能对我已取得的进步给予一些肯定。1944年，我第一次填报了个人所得税申报表（Form 1040），那时我才13岁，是个送报少年。那张申报表只有三页。扣除了一些合理的业务支出，比如买自行车花掉的35美元后，我的应缴税款是7美元。我把支票寄给了财政部，他们二话不说就兑现了。我们相安无事。
I can understand why the Treasury is now frustrated with Corporate America and prone to outbursts. But it should look to Congress and the Administration for redress, not to Berkshire.
我能理解财政部为何对美国企业界感到沮丧并容易发火。但它应该向国会和行政部门寻求解决办法，而不是针对伯克希尔。
Corporate income taxes in fiscal 2003 accounted for 7.4% of all federal tax receipts, down from a post-war peak of 32% in 1952. With one exception (1983), last year’s percentage is the lowest recorded since data was first published in 1934.
2003财年，公司所得税占联邦税收总收入的比例仅为7.4%，远低于1952年战后峰值时的32%。除1983年外，去年这一比例是自1934年首次发布相关数据以来的最低水平。
Even so, tax breaks for corporations (and their investors, particularly large ones) were a major part of the Administration’s 2002 and 2003 initiatives. If class warfare is being waged in America, my class is clearly winning. Today, many large corporations – run by CEOs whose fiddle-playing talents make your Chairman look like he is all thumbs – pay nothing close to the stated federal tax rate of 35%.
即便如此，公司（尤其是大型机构投资者）享受的税收减免仍是政府2002和2003年计划的重要组成部分。如果说美国正在进行“阶级战争”，那么我们这个阶层显然正在获胜。如今许多大公司——由那些玩弄税法比主席先生熟练得多的CEO们管理——所缴纳的实际税率远远低于法定的35%。
In 1985, Berkshire paid $132 million in federal income taxes, and all corporations paid $61 billion. The comparable amounts in 1995 were $286 million and $157 billion respectively. And, as mentioned, we will pay about $3.3 billion for 2003, a year when all corporations paid $132 billion. We hope our taxes continue to rise in the future – it will mean we are prospering – but we also hope that the rest of Corporate America antes up along with us. This might be a project for Ms. Olson to work on.
1985年，伯克希尔缴纳了1.32亿美元联邦所得税，全美企业合计缴纳了61亿美元；1995年分别是2.86亿和157亿美元；如前所述，我们在2003年缴纳约33亿美元，而当年所有企业合计缴纳132亿美元。我们希望未来缴税额继续增长——这说明我们经营得更好——但我们同时也希望其他美国企业也能跟上步伐。这可能是奥尔森女士可以着手推动的一个项目。
# Corporate Governance
# 公司治理
In judging whether Corporate America is serious about reforming itself, CEO pay remains the acid test. To date, the results aren’t encouraging. A few CEOs, such as Jeff Immelt of General Electric, have led the way in initiating programs that are fair to managers and shareholders alike. Generally, however, his example has been more admired than followed.
要判断美国企业是否真心改革，高管薪酬问题仍然是试金石。迄今为止，结果并不令人鼓舞。少数CEO，例如通用电气的杰夫·伊梅尔特（Jeff Immelt），率先推出了兼顾管理层与股东利益的薪酬制度。然而，大多数情况下，他的做法只是被赞赏，而非效仿。
It’s understandable how pay got out of hand. When management hires employees, or when companies bargain with a vendor, the intensity of interest is equal on both sides of the table. One party’s gain is the other party’s loss, and the money involved has real meaning to both. The result is an honest-to-God negotiation.
薪酬失控是可以理解的。当管理层招聘员工，或公司与供应商谈判时，双方都会投入相当的关注度。一方获益意味着另一方受损，涉及的资金对双方都有实际意义，因此谈判往往是真正意义上的博弈。
But when CEOs (or their representatives) have met with compensation committees, too often one side – the CEO’s – has cared far more than the other about what bargain is struck. A CEO, for example, will always regard the difference between receiving options for 100,000 shares or for 500,000 as monumental. To a comp committee, however, the difference may seem unimportant – particularly if, as has been the case at most companies, neither grant will have any effect on reported earnings. Under these conditions, the negotiation often has a “play-money” quality.
但当CEO（或其代表）与薪酬委员会谈判时，往往只有一方——即CEO本人——真正关心最终达成的协议。例如，一位CEO会把获得10万股还是50万股权激励视为天壤之别，而薪酬委员会却可能认为差别不大——尤其是在大多数公司中，这两种方案都不会影响财报利润的情况下。在这种环境下，谈判常常带有“玩假钱”的性质。
Overreaching by CEOs greatly accelerated in the 1990s as compensation packages gained by the most avaricious– a title for which there was vigorous competition – were promptly replicated elsewhere. The couriers for this epidemic of greed were usually consultants and human relations departments, which had no trouble perceiving who buttered their bread. As one compensation consultant commented: “There are two classes of clients you don’t want to offend – actual and potential.”
1990年代，CEO们的过度索取急剧上升，那些最贪婪的人所获得的薪酬方案很快被其他公司效仿。“贪婪病毒”的传播者通常是薪酬顾问和人力资源部门，他们很清楚谁才是他们的衣食父母。正如一位薪酬顾问所说：“有两种客户你千万别得罪——现有的和潜在的。”
In proposals for reforming this malfunctioning system, the cry has been for “independent” directors. But the question of what truly motivates independence has largely been neglected.
在改革这种失灵体系的提案中，“独立董事”的呼声很高。但关于什么因素真正能够激发独立性的讨论，却被大大忽视了。
In last year’s report, I took a look at how “independent” directors – as defined by statute – had performed in the mutual fund field. The Investment Company Act of 1940 mandated such directors, and that means we’ve had an extended test of what statutory standards produce. In our examination last year, we looked at the record of fund directors in respect to the two key tasks board members should perform – whether at a mutual fund business or any other. These two all-important functions are, first, to obtain (or retain) an able and honest manager and then to compensate that manager fairly.
在去年的报告中，我曾研究过法律定义下的“独立董事”在共同基金领域中的表现。1940年的《投资公司法案》强制要求设立此类董事，这意味着我们已有足够长的时间来检验法定标准的效果。我们去年的研究重点考察了基金董事们在两项关键职责上的表现——无论是在共同基金管理还是任何其他企业中，董事会都应履行这两项核心职能：第一，选聘（或保留）有能力且诚实的经理人；第二，以公平方式对其支付报酬。
Our survey was not encouraging. Year after year, at literally thousands of funds, directors had routinely rehired the incumbent management company, however pathetic its performance had been. Just as routinely, the directors had mindlessly approved fees that in many cases far exceeded those that could have been negotiated. Then, when a management company was sold – invariably at a huge price relative to tangible assets – the directors experienced a “counter-revelation” and immediately signed on with the new manager and accepted its fee schedule. In effect, the directors decided that whoever would pay the most for the old management company was the party that should manage the shareholders’ money in the future.
我们的调查结果令人失望。成千上万只基金的董事年复一年地例行决定续聘现任管理公司，不管它的业绩多么糟糕。同样例行公事的是，他们盲目批准管理费，这些费用往往远高于合理水平。一旦管理公司被出售——通常是以远高于账面资产的价格——董事们才突然“醒悟”，立刻转投新管理公司，并接受其费用结构。实际上，他们是在说：出价最高、收购旧管理公司的那个人，就是今后最值得托付股东资金的人。
Despite the lapdog behavior of independent fund directors, we did not conclude that they are bad people. They’re not. But sadly, “boardroom atmosphere” almost invariably sedates their fiduciary genes.
尽管独立董事们表现得像温顺的小狗，我们并不认为他们是坏人。他们不是。但遗憾的是，“董事会氛围”几乎总是抑制了他们作为受托人的责任感。
On May 22, 2003, not long after Berkshire’s report appeared, the Chairman of the Investment Company Institute addressed its membership about “The State of our Industry.” Responding to those who have “weighed in about our perceived failings,” he mused, “It makes me wonder what life would be like if we’d actually done something wrong.”
2003年5月22日，在伯克希尔报告发布不久后，投资公司协会主席在其成员大会上发表了题为“行业现状”的讲话。回应那些“对我们所谓缺陷提出批评”的人士时，他若有所思地说：“这让我好奇，如果我们真的做了错事，情况又会如何？”
Be careful what you wish for.
小心你许的愿望。
Within a few months, the world began to learn that many fund-management companies had followed policies that hurt the owners of the funds they managed, while simultaneously boosting the fees of the managers. Prior to their transgressions, it should be noted, these management companies were earning profit margins and returns on tangible equity that were the envy of Corporate America. Yet to swell profits further, they trampled on the interests of fund shareholders in an appalling manner.
几个月后，世人开始了解到，许多基金管理公司采取了损害其所管理基金持有人利益的政策，同时大幅提高了自身的管理费收入。值得注意的是，在它们犯下这些错误之前，这些管理公司的利润率和有形权益回报率曾令整个美国企业界羡慕不已。但为了进一步扩大利润，它们竟然以令人震惊的方式践踏了基金持有人的利益。
So what are the directors of these looted funds doing? As I write this, I have seen none that have terminated the contract of the offending management company (though naturally that entity has often fired some of its employees). Can you imagine directors who had been personally defrauded taking such a boys-will-be-boys attitude?
那么，这些被掠夺基金的董事们在做什么呢？写到这里时，我还没见过有任何基金董事终止涉事管理公司的合同（当然，该公司自己往往会解雇部分员工）。你能想象，如果是董事本人遭受欺诈，他们会用这样“小孩子淘气”的态度来应对吗？
To top it all off, at least one miscreant management company has put itself up for sale, undoubtedly hoping to receive a huge sum for “delivering” the mutual funds it has managed to the highest bidder among other managers. This is a travesty. Why in the world don’t the directors of those funds simply select whomever they think is best among the bidding organizations and sign up with that party directly? The winner would consequently be spared a huge “payoff” to the former manager who, having flouted the principles of stewardship, deserves not a dime. Not having to bear that acquisition cost, the winner could surely manage the funds in question for a far lower ongoing fee than would otherwise have been the case. Any truly independent director should insist on this approach to obtaining a new manager.
更令人愤怒的是，至少有一家作恶的管理公司正在挂牌出售，毫无疑问是希望从其他管理者中找出出价最高的买家，以“转让”它所管理的共同基金来获取巨额收益。这是十足的闹剧。为什么这些基金的董事不直接选出他们认为最适合的竞标机构，然后与其签约呢？这样一来，中标者就可以省去一大笔“赎买费”，免于向那个背弃信托责任的前管理者支付一分钱。由于不用承担这笔收购成本，中标者完全可以在未来以远低于当前的费用水平来管理这些基金。任何真正独立的董事都应该坚持采用这种方式来选择新的管理人。
The reality is that neither the decades-old rules regulating investment company directors nor the new rules bearing down on Corporate America foster the election of truly independent directors. In both instances, an individual who is receiving 100% of his income from director fees – and who may wish to enhance his income through election to other boards – is deemed independent. That is nonsense. The same rules say that Berkshire director and lawyer Ron Olson, who receives from us perhaps 3% of his very large income, does not qualify as independent because that 3% comes from legal fees Berkshire pays his firm rather than from fees he earns as a Berkshire director. Rest assured, 3% from any source would not torpedo Ron’s independence. But getting 20%, 30% or 50% of their income from director fees might well temper the independence of many individuals, particularly if their overall income is not large. Indeed, I think it’s clear that at mutual funds, it has.
现实情况是，无论是几十年来监管投资公司董事的旧规则，还是针对美国企业界的新规定，都无法真正推动选出真正独立的董事。在两种情况下，一个完全依赖董事薪酬谋生、甚至可能希望通过进入其他董事会来增加收入的人，却被视为“独立人士”，这完全是荒谬的。同样的规则还说，伯克希尔的董事兼律师Ron Olson，从我们这里获得的收入只占他巨额收入的大约3%，但因为这部分收入来自伯克希尔支付给他所在律所的法律费用而非他作为董事的薪酬，因此他不具备“独立”资格。请放心，无论来源如何，3%的收入根本不足以影响Ron的独立性。但如果一个人收入的20%、30%甚至50%来自于董事费，尤其是在其总收入并不高的前提下，这种状况确实可能会削弱许多人的独立性。事实上，我认为共同基金行业就是这种情况。
Let me make a small suggestion to “independent” mutual fund directors. Why not simply affirm in each annual report that “(1) We have looked at other management companies and believe the one we have retained for the upcoming year is among the better operations in the field; and (2) we have negotiated a fee with our managers comparable to what other clients with equivalent funds would negotiate.”
我给那些所谓的“独立”共同基金董事提个小小的建议：为什么不每年在年报中明确声明：“（1）我们考察过其他基金管理公司，并认为我们选定的这家管理公司在业内属于优秀之列；（2）我们与管理层协商的费用水平与其他具有类似资金规模的客户所能协商到的水平相当。”
It does not seem unreasonable for shareholders to expect fund directors – who are often receiving fees that exceed $100,000 annually – to declare themselves on these points. Certainly these directors would satisfy themselves on both matters were they handing over a large chunk of their own money to the manager. If directors are unwilling to make these two declarations, shareholders should heed the maxim “If you don’t know whose side someone is on, he’s probably not on yours.”
对于股东来说，要求基金董事——他们往往每年领取超过10万美元的报酬——对这两个问题作出公开表态，并不过分。如果这些董事自己要拿出一大笔钱交给基金经理，他们肯定会认真考虑这两点。如果董事不愿做出上述两项声明，股东们就应记住一句格言：“如果你不知道某人站在哪一边，那他很可能不是站在你这边。”
Finally, a disclaimer. A great many funds have been run well and conscientiously despite the opportunities for malfeasance that exist. The shareholders of these funds have benefited, and their managers have earned their pay. Indeed, if I were a director of certain funds, including some that charge above-average fees, I would enthusiastically make the two declarations I have suggested. Additionally, those index funds that are very low-cost (such as Vanguard’s) are investor-friendly by definition and are the best selection for most of those who wish to own equities.
最后做个免责声明。尽管存在滥用职权的机会，但仍有很多基金被很好地、负责任地运营着。这些基金的持有人从中受益，他们的经理也配得上他们的报酬。实际上，如果我是某些基金（包括一些收费高于平均水平的基金）的董事，我会非常乐意做出我刚才提出的两个声明。此外，像Vanguard这样的低成本指数基金本质上就是投资者友好型产品，是大多数希望投资股票的人的最佳选择。
I am on my soapbox now only because the blatant wrongdoing that has occurred has betrayed the trust of so many millions of shareholders. Hundreds of industry insiders had to know what was going on, yet none publicly said a word. It took Eliot Spitzer, and the whistleblowers who aided him, to initiate a housecleaning. We urge fund directors to continue the job. Like directors throughout Corporate America, these fiduciaries must now decide whether their job is to work for owners or for managers.
我现在之所以站出来大声疾呼，是因为已经发生的严重不当行为辜负了数百万基金持有人的信任。数百名业内人士不可能不知道发生了什么，却没人公开说过一句话。直到艾略特·斯皮策（Eliot Spitzer）和协助他的吹哨者介入，才开始了清理工作。我们敦促基金董事们继续完成这项任务。就像整个美国企业界的董事一样，这些受托人现在必须决定，他们的职责到底是为股东服务，还是为管理层服务。
# Berkshire Governance
# （伯克希尔治理机制）
True independence – meaning the willingness to challenge a forceful CEO when something is wrong or foolish – is an enormously valuable trait in a director. It is also rare. The place to look for it is among high-grade people whose interests are in line with those of rank-and-file shareholders – and are in line in a very big way.
真正的独立——意味着当事情出错或出现愚蠢决策时，敢于挑战强势CEO的能力——是董事身上极其宝贵的品质，也非常稀缺。我们应该去寻找那些利益与普通股东高度一致的高质量人士，而且这种一致性越强越好。
We’ve made that search at Berkshire. We now have eleven directors and each of them, combined with members of their families, owns more than $4 million of Berkshire stock. Moreover, all have held major stakes in Berkshire for many years. In the case of six of the eleven, family ownership amounts to at least hundreds of millions and dates back at least three decades. All eleven directors purchased their holdings in the market just as you did; we’ve never passed out options or restricted shares. Charlie and I love such honest-to-God ownership. After all, who ever washes a rental car?
我们在伯克希尔做了这样的筛选。目前我们有十一位董事，每一位及其家庭成员合计持有的伯克希尔股票都超过400万美元。更重要的是，他们都长期持有大量股份。其中六位的家庭持股金额高达数亿美元，且至少已持有三十年以上。这十一位董事都是通过市场买入获得持股，方式与你们完全一样；我们从未发放过期权或限制性股票。查理和我都非常欣赏这种真实拥有的精神。毕竟，谁会认真洗一辆租来的车呢？
In addition, director fees at Berkshire are nominal (as my son, Howard, periodically reminds me). Thus, the upside from Berkshire for all eleven is proportionately the same as the upside for any Berkshire shareholder. And it always will be.
此外，伯克希尔的董事薪酬微乎其微（我的儿子霍华德时不时提醒我这一点）。因此，这十一位董事从伯克希尔获得的收益，与任何一位股东按比例获得的收益是一致的，未来也将如此。
The downside for Berkshire directors is actually worse than yours because we carry no directors and officers liability insurance. Therefore, if something really catastrophic happens on our directors’ watch, they are exposed to losses that will far exceed yours.
伯克希尔董事面临的风险甚至比你还大，因为我们不购买董事及高管责任保险。因此，如果在他们任职期间发生重大灾难性事件，他们承担的损失将远超普通股东。
The bottom line for our directors: You win, they win big; you lose, they lose big. Our approach might be called owner-capitalism. We know of no better way to engender true independence. (This structure does not guarantee perfect behavior, however: I’ve sat on boards of companies in which Berkshire had huge stakes and remained silent as questionable proposals were rubber-stamped.)
总结一下我们的董事制度：你赢，他们也大赢；你输，他们也大输。我们称这种方式为“所有者资本主义”。我们认为这是激发真正独立性的最佳方法。（当然，这套结构并不能保证完美行为：我自己曾坐在伯克希尔重仓公司的董事会里，在可疑提案被快速通过时保持沉默。）
In addition to being independent, directors should have business savvy, a shareholder orientation and a genuine interest in the company. The rarest of these qualities is business savvy – and if it is lacking, the other two are of little help. Many people who are smart, articulate and admired have no real understanding of business. That’s no sin; they may shine elsewhere. But they don’t belong on corporate boards. Similarly, I would be useless on a medical or scientific board (though I would likely be welcomed by a chairman who wanted to run things his way). My name would dress up the list of directors, but I wouldn’t know enough to critically evaluate proposals. Moreover, to cloak my ignorance, I would keep my mouth shut (if you can imagine that). In effect, I could be replaced, without loss, by a potted plant.
除了独立性之外，董事还应具备商业洞察力、股东导向意识以及对公司真正的兴趣。在这三项素质中，“商业洞察力”最为稀缺，如果没有这一能力，其他两项作用也不大。许多聪明、善于表达并受人尊敬的人其实并不真正理解商业运作。这不是他们的错，他们也许在别的领域很出色，但他们不适合担任公司董事。同样地，如果让我加入一个医学或科技类董事会，我也毫无用处（虽然想掌控局面的董事长可能欢迎我加入）。我的名字可以装点董事名单，但我缺乏判断提案的专业能力。为了掩饰无知，我只能保持沉默（如果你能想象的话）。实际上，把我换成一盆盆栽也不会有什么差别。
Last year, as we moved to change our board, I asked for self-nominations from shareholders who believed they had the requisite qualities to be a Berkshire director. Despite the lack of either liability insurance or meaningful compensation, we received more than twenty applications. Most were good, coming from owner-oriented individuals having family holdings of Berkshire worth well over $1 million. After considering them, Charlie and I – with the concurrence of our incumbent directors – asked four shareholders who did not nominate themselves to join the board: David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough and Tom Murphy. These four people are all friends of mine, and I know their strengths well. They bring an extraordinary amount of business talent to Berkshire’s board.
去年我们调整董事会时，我邀请自认具备伯克希尔董事资质的股东自荐。尽管我们既不提供责任保险，也没有可观的薪酬，但我们收到了超过二十份申请。大部分都很不错，申请人都是以股东为导向的人士，其家庭持有的伯克希尔股份价值普遍超过一百万美元。在审慎评估后，我和查理——并经现任董事同意——邀请了四位未自荐的股东加入董事会：David Gottesman、Charlotte Guyman、Don Keough 和 Tom Murphy。这四位都是我的朋友，我对他们的能力非常了解。他们为伯克希尔董事会带来了非凡的商业智慧。
The primary job of our directors is to select my successor, either upon my death or disability, or when I begin to lose my marbles. (David Ogilvy had it right when he said: “Develop your eccentricities when young. That way, when you get older, people won’t think you are going gaga.” Charlie’s family and mine feel that we overreacted to David’s advice.)
我们董事的主要职责是在我去世、丧失能力，或开始神志不清时（大卫·奥格威说得对：“年轻时培养些怪癖，年老后人们就不会觉得你疯癫。”查理的家人和我都觉得我们对他的话反应过度了），挑选接替我的人选。
At our directors’ meetings we cover the usual run of housekeeping matters. But the real discussion – both with me in the room and absent – centers on the strengths and weaknesses of the four internal candidates to replace me.
在董事会上，我们会处理常规事务。但真正深入的讨论——无论是我在场还是不在场——都围绕着四位内部候选人各自的优缺点展开。
Our board knows that the ultimate scorecard on its performance will be determined by the record of my successor. He or she will need to maintain Berkshire’s culture, allocate capital and keep a group of America’s best managers happy in their jobs. This isn’t the toughest task in the world – the train is already moving at a good clip down the track – and I’m totally comfortable about it being done well by any of the four candidates we have identified. I have more than 99% of my net worth in Berkshire and will be happy to have my wife or foundation (depending on the order in which she and I die) continue this concentration.
我们的董事会明白，他们最终的表现评分将取决于我继任者的成绩。这位继任者需要维持伯克希尔的文化、做好资本配置，并让这群美国最优秀的管理者继续保持工作热情。这并非世界上最难的任务——火车已经在轨道上高速行驶——我对这四位候选人中的任何一位都能胜任充满信心。我超过99%的净资产都在伯克希尔，无论我和妻子谁先离世，我都乐见她或基金会继续维持这一集中投资策略。
# Sector Results
# （业务板块表现）
As managers, Charlie and I want to give our owners the financial information and commentary we would wish to receive if our roles were reversed. To do this with both clarity and reasonable brevity becomes more difficult as Berkshire’s scope widens. Some of our businesses have vastly different economic characteristics from others, which means that our consolidated statements, with their jumble of figures, make useful analysis almost impossible.
作为管理者，查理和我都希望向股东提供我们若身处其位也希望收到的财务信息和评论。随着伯克希尔的业务范围不断扩大，要做到清晰明了又不失简洁也变得更加困难。我们的部分业务具有截然不同的经济特征，这使得合并报表中混杂的数据几乎让有意义的分析变得不可能。
On the following pages, therefore, we will present some balance sheet and earnings figures from our four major categories of businesses along with commentary about each. We particularly want you to understand the limited circumstances under which we will use debt, since typically we shun it. We will not, however, inundate you with data that has no real value in calculating Berkshire’s intrinsic value. Doing so would likely obfuscate the most important facts. One warning: When analyzing Berkshire, be sure to remember that the company should be viewed as an unfolding movie, not as a still photograph. Those who focused in the past on only the snapshot of the day sometimes reached erroneous conclusions.
因此，在接下来的页面中，我们将分别介绍我们四大类主要业务的部分资产负债表和收益数据，并附上相应的评述。我们尤其希望你们理解我们仅在特定有限情况下才会使用债务融资，尽管我们通常回避债务。但我们不会用对估算伯克希尔内在价值毫无实际意义的数据来淹没你们。这样做只会模糊真正关键的事实。另外提醒一点：在分析伯克希尔时，请务必记住，这家公司更像是一部正在上映的电影，而不是一张静态的照片。过去有些人只关注当天的快照数据，结果得出错误的结论。
# Insurance
# （保险业务）
Let’s start with insurance – since that’s where the money is.
让我们从保险业务开始谈起——因为资金的来源就在这里。
The fountain of funds we enjoy in our insurance operations comes from “float,” which is money that doesn’t belong to us but that we temporarily hold. Most of our float arises because (1) premiums are paid upfront though the service we provide – insurance protection – is delivered over a period that usually covers a year and; (2) loss events that occur today do not always result in our immediately paying claims, since it sometimes takes years for losses to be reported (think asbestos), negotiated and settled.
我们在保险运营中享受的资金来源来自于“浮存金”（float），即不属于我们、但我们暂时持有的资金。我们的浮存金主要来自两个方面：（1）保费通常是预先支付的，而我们提供的服务——保险保障——是在一段时间内履行的，通常为期一年；（2）即便今天发生了损失事件，我们也未必立即支付理赔金，因为有些损失可能需要多年之后才会被报告（例如石棉相关的索赔）、协商并结清。
Float is wonderful – if it doesn’t come at a high price. The cost of float is determined by underwriting results, meaning how losses and expenses paid compare with premiums received. The property-casualty industry as a whole regularly operates at a substantial underwriting loss, and therefore often has a cost of float that is unattractive.
浮存金非常棒——只要它的成本不高。浮存金的成本由承保结果决定，也就是我们支付的损失和费用与所收取保费之间的对比。财产险和意外险行业整体上经常处于显著的承保亏损状态，因此其浮存金成本往往并不具有吸引力。
Overall, our results have been good. True, we’ve had five terrible years in which float cost us more than 10%. But in 18 of the 37 years Berkshire has been in the insurance business, we have operated at an underwriting profit, meaning we were actually paid for holding money. And the quantity of this cheap money has grown far beyond what I dreamed it could when we entered the business in 1967.
总体而言，我们的业绩表现良好。确实，我们经历过五个糟糕的年份，浮存金成本超过10%。但在伯克希尔从事保险业务的37年中，有18年我们实现了承保利润，这意味着我们实际上是靠持有资金获得报酬。这笔低成本资金的规模已远远超出我在1967年进入这个行业时的预期。
# Yearend Float (in $ millions)
# 年末浮存金（单位：百万美元）
| Year | GEICO | General Re | Reinsurance Primary | Other | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1967 | — | — | — | 20 | 20 |
| 1977 | — | — | 171 | — | 171 |
| 1987 | — | — | 1,508 | — | 1,508 |
| 1997 | 2,917 | 14,909 | 701 | 40 | 18,567 |
| 1998 | 3,125 | 15,166 | 807 | 131 | 19,229 |
| 1999 | 3,444 | 15,525 | 4,014 | 455 | 23,438 |
| 2000 | 3,943 | 19,310 | 4,305 | 415 | 27,973 |
| 2001 | 4,251 | 22,207 | 6,285 | 403 | 33,146 |
| 2002 | 4,678 | 23,654 | 7,805 | 598 | 36,735 |
| 2003 | 5,287 | 14,909 | 11,262 | 943 | 32,401 |
注：GEICO = Government Employees Insurance Company（政府雇员保险公司）
General Re = General Reinsurance Corporation（通用再保险公司）
Reinsurance Primary = 直接保险业务中的再保险部分
Other = 其他小型保险业务
Last year was a standout. Float reached record levels and it came without cost as all major segments contributed to Berkshire’s $1.7 billion pre-tax underwriting profit.
去年是特别的一年。浮存金达到历史最高水平，而且没有任何成本，因为我们所有主要保险板块都为伯克希尔贡献了17亿美元的税前承保利润。
Our results have been exceptional for one reason: We have truly exceptional managers. Insurers sell a non-proprietary piece of paper containing a non-proprietary promise. Anyone can copy anyone else’s product. No installed base, key patents, critical real estate or natural resource position protects an insurer’s competitive position. Typically, brands do not mean much either.
我们之所以取得卓越成绩，只有一个原因：我们拥有真正出色的管理者。保险公司出售的是一张没有专有性的纸，做出的也是一项没有专有性的承诺。任何人都可以复制其他人的产品。对于保险公司来说，既没有客户基础、也没有关键技术专利、关键地产或自然资源来保护其竞争优势。通常情况下，品牌也不具备太大意义。
The critical variables, therefore, are managerial brains, discipline and integrity. Our managers have all of these attributes – in spades. Let’s take a look at these all-stars and their operations.
因此，关键变量是管理者的智慧、纪律性和诚信度。我们的管理者在这些方面都非常突出。现在让我们来看看这些明星及其业务运作。
• General Re had been Berkshire’s problem child in the years following our acquisition of it in 1998. Unfortunately, it was a 400-pound child, and its negative impact on our overall performance was large.
That’s behind us: Gen Re is fixed. Thank Joe Brandon, its CEO, and his partner, Tad Montross, for that. When I wrote you last year, I thought that discipline had been restored to both underwriting and reserving, and events during 2003 solidified my view.
这已成为过去：通用再保险已经走上正轨。我们要感谢CEO乔·布兰登（Joe Brandon）和他的合伙人泰德·蒙特罗斯（Tad Montross）。去年我写信时认为承保和准备金方面的纪律性已经恢复，而2003年的实际进展进一步巩固了我的这一判断。
That does not mean we will never have setbacks. Reinsurance is a business that is certain to deliver blows from time to time. But, under Joe and Tad, this operation will be a powerful engine driving Berkshire’s future profitability.
这并不意味着我们不会再遇到挫折。再保险业务本身就注定会时不时遭遇打击。但在乔和泰德的领导下，这项业务将成为推动伯克希尔未来盈利能力的强大引擎。
Gen Re’s financial strength, unmatched among reinsurers even as we started 2003, further improved during the year. Many of the company’s competitors suffered credit downgrades last year, leaving Gen Re, and its sister operation at National Indemnity, as the only AAA-rated companies among the world’s major reinsurers.
通用再保险的财务实力在年初就已经是业内首屈一指，而在这一年里进一步增强。许多同行去年遭遇信用评级下调，使得通用再保险及其姊妹公司国家赔偿保险公司成为全球主要再保险公司中仅有的两家AAA评级企业。
When insurers purchase reinsurance, they buy only a promise – one whose validity may not be tested for decades – and there are no promises in the reinsurance world equaling those offered by Gen Re and National Indemnity. Furthermore, unlike most reinsurers, we retain virtually all of the risks we assume. Therefore, our ability to pay is not dependent on the ability or willingness of others to reimburse us. This independent financial strength could be enormously important when the industry experiences the mega-catastrophe it surely will.
当保险公司购买再保险时，他们买下的只是一个承诺——一个几十年后才可能兑现的承诺。在再保险领域，没有比通用再保险和国家赔偿保险公司更值得信赖的承诺。此外，不同于大多数再保险公司，我们几乎承担了自己承接的所有风险。因此，我们的偿付能力不依赖于第三方是否愿意或有能力偿还我们。这种独立的财务实力，在整个行业面临不可避免的大型灾难时，将显得尤为重要。
• Regular readers of our annual reports know of Ajit Jain’s incredible contributions to Berkshire’s prosperity over the past 18 years. He continued to pour it on in 2003. With a staff of only 23, Ajit runs one of the world’s largest reinsurance operations, specializing in mammoth and unusual risks.
长期阅读我们年报的朋友都知道阿吉特·杰恩（Ajit Jain）在过去18年为伯克希尔繁荣发展做出的巨大贡献。他在2003年继续大放异彩。他只用了23名员工，就运营着世界上最大的再保险业务之一，专门承保巨大且非传统的风险。
Often, these involve assuming catastrophe risks – say, the threat of a large California earthquake – of a size far greater than any other reinsurer will accept. This means Ajit’s results (and Berkshire’s) will be lumpy. You should, therefore, expect his operation to have an occasional horrible year. Over time, however, you can be confident of a terrific result from this one-of-a-kind manager.
这些风险常常涉及远超其他再保险公司所能接受规模的巨灾风险——比如一次大规模的加州地震。这意味着阿吉特的业绩（以及伯克希尔的收益）会呈现波动性。因此，你们应该预料到他的业务有时会出现糟糕的年份。但从长远来看，这位独一无二的管理者一定会带来惊人的回报。
Ajit writes some very unusual policies. Last year, for example, PepsiCo promoted a drawing that offered participants a chance to win a $1 billion prize. Understandably, Pepsi wished to lay off this risk, and we were the logical party to assume it. So we wrote a $1 billion policy, retaining the risk entirely for our own account. Because the prize, if won, was payable over time, our exposure in present-value terms was $250 million. (I helpfully suggested that any winner be paid $1 a year for a billion years, but that proposal didn’t fly.) The drawing was held on September 14. Ajit and I held our breath, as did the finalist in the contest, and we left happier than he. PepsiCo has renewed for a repeat contest in 2004.
阿吉特撰写过一些非常特殊的保单。例如，百事可乐公司去年举办了一次抽奖活动，奖品高达10亿美元。百事显然希望转移这项风险，而我们则是最合适的承担方。于是我们签发了一份10亿美元的保单，完全自留风险。由于奖金若被领取也将分期支付，因此我们按现值计算的风险敞口为2.5亿美元。（我曾建议，如果有人中奖，每年只支付1美元，持续十亿年，但这个提议并未被采纳。）抽签仪式于9月14日举行，阿吉特和我都紧张地等待着，当然还有参赛者。最终我们比他更开心。百事今年又续保了一次抽奖活动。
• GEICO was a fine insurance company when Tony Nicely took over as CEO in 1992. Now it is a great one. During his tenure, premium volume has increased from $2.2 billion to $8.1 billion, and our share of the personal-auto market has grown from 2.1% to 5.0%. More important, GEICO has paired these gains with outstanding underwriting performance.
托尼·尼利（Tony Nicely）1992年担任CEO时，GEICO已经是一家优秀的保险公司。如今它已经成为一家伟大的保险公司。在他的领导下，保费收入从22亿美元增长至81亿美元，个人汽车保险市场的份额从2.1%上升至5.0%。更重要的是，GEICO在实现增长的同时还保持了优异的承保记录。
(We now pause for a commercial)
（我们现在插入一段广告）
It’s been 67 years since Leo Goodwin created a great business idea at GEICO, one designed to save policyholders significant money. Go to Geico.com or call 1-800-807-7536 to see what we can do for you.
自从Leo Goodwin在GEICO创立了一个伟大的商业模式以来，已经过去了67年。这个模式旨在为投保人节省大量开支。访问Geico.com或者拨打1-800-807-7536，看看我们能为你做些什么。
(End of commercial)
（广告结束）
In 2003, both the number of inquiries coming into GEICO and its closure rate on these increased significantly. As a result our preferred policyholder count grew 8.2%, and our standard and non-standard policies grew 21.4%.
2003年，GEICO收到的咨询数量及其成交率均大幅上升。结果，我们的优质客户数量增长了8.2%，标准和非标准保单数量则增长了21.4%。
GEICO’s business growth creates a never-ending need for more employees and facilities. Our most recent expansion, announced in December, is a customer service center in – I’m delighted to say – Buffalo. Stan Lipsey, the publisher of our Buffalo News, was instrumental in bringing the city and GEICO together.
GEICO的业务增长不断带来对更多员工和设施的需求。我们最近宣布的一项扩张计划就是在布法罗建立一个新的客服中心——我很高兴这么说。我们旗下《布法罗新闻》的出版商斯坦·利普西（Stan Lipsey）在促成这座城市与GEICO的合作中发挥了重要作用。
The key figure in this matter, however, was Governor George Pataki. His leadership and tenacity are why Buffalo will have 2,500 new jobs when our expansion is fully rolled out. Stan, Tony, and I – along with Buffalo – thank him for his help.
不过，这一项目的关键人物是纽约州州长乔治·帕塔基（George Pataki）。正是他的领导力和坚持，使布法罗在未来几年新增2,500个就业岗位。斯坦、托尼和我，以及整个布法罗市，都要感谢他的帮助。
• Berkshire’s smaller insurers had another terrific year. This group, run by Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Tom Nerney, Don Towle and Don Wurster, increased its float by 41%, while delivering an excellent underwriting profit. These men, though operating in unexciting ways, produce truly exciting results.
伯克希尔旗下的其他小型保险公司也在2003年交出了亮眼的成绩单。由Rod Eldred、John Kizer、Tom Nerney、Don Towle 和 Don Wurster管理的这些公司，不仅浮存金增长了41%，还实现了出色的承保利润。虽然他们的工作方式并不引人注目，但他们带来的成果却令人振奋。
We should point out again that in any given year a company writing long-tail insurance (coverages giving rise to claims that are often settled many years after the loss-causing event takes place) can report almost any earnings that the CEO desires. Too often the industry has reported wildly inaccurate figures by misstating liabilities. Most of the mistakes have been innocent. Sometimes, however, they have been intentional, their object being to fool investors and regulators. Auditors and actuaries have usually failed to prevent both varieties of misstatement.
我们有必要再次指出，任何从事“长尾保险”业务的公司（即理赔可能在事故多年后才发生的保险）几乎可以报告CEO希望看到的任何盈利数据。这个行业经常出现严重失实的财务数字，其根源在于对负债的错误估计。其中很多是无心之失，但有时则是有意为之，目的是误导投资者和监管机构。审计师和精算师通常未能有效阻止这两类错误的发生。
I have failed on occasion too, particularly in not spotting Gen Re’s unwitting underreserving a few years back. Not only did that mean we reported inaccurate figures to you, but the error also resulted in our paying very substantial taxes earlier than was necessary. Aaarrrggghh. I told you last year, however, that I thought our current reserving was at appropriate levels. So far, that judgment is holding up.
我自己也曾犯过错误，特别是在几年前未能及时发现通用再保险（Gen Re）低估准备金的问题。这不仅导致我们向你们报告了不准确的数据，还让我们提前缴纳了本不必要的巨额税款。哎呀！不过我去年已告诉各位，我认为目前的准备金水平是恰当的。到目前为止，这一判断仍站得住脚。
Here are Berkshire’s pre-tax underwriting results by segment:
以下是伯克希尔按业务板块划分的税前承保结果：
# Pre-Tax Underwriting Results (by Segment)
# 税前承保结果（单位：百万美元）
| 业务板块 | 2003年（百万美元） | 2002年（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|
| Gen Re（通用再保险） | $145 | $(1,393) |
| Ajit’s business excluding retroactive contracts（阿吉特非追溯性业务） | $1,434 | $980 |
| Ajit’s retroactive contracts*（阿吉特追溯性合同） | $(387) | $(433) |
| GEICO | $452 | $416 |
| Other Primary（其他直接保险业务） | $74 | $32 |
| Total（总计） | $1,718 | $(398) |
*These contracts were explained on page 10 of the 2002 annual report, available on the Internet at www.berkshirehathaway.com (opens new window). In brief, this segment consists of a few jumbo policies that are likely to produce underwriting losses (which are capped) but also provide unusually large amounts of float.
*这些合同在2002年年报第10页有详细说明，网址为www.berkshirehathaway.com (opens new window)。简而言之，这部分由几份大型保单组成，可能会产生承保亏损（但亏损上限明确），但也带来了异常庞大的浮存金。
# Regulated Utility Businesses
# （受监管公用事业业务）
Through MidAmerican Energy Holdings, we own an 80.5% (fully diluted) interest in a wide variety of utility operations. The largest are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.7 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 689,000 electric customers in Iowa; and (3) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry 7.8% of the natural gas transported in the United States.
通过MidAmerican Energy Holdings，我们持有该公司80.5%（完全稀释后）的权益，涉及多种公用事业运营。其中最大的三项分别是：（1）Yorkshire Electricity 和Northern Electric，共服务370万电力用户，是英国第三大电力分销商；（2）MidAmerican Energy，在爱荷华州服务68.9万电力用户；（3）Kern River和Northern Natural天然气管道，输送了美国境内7.8%的天然气消费量。
Berkshire has three partners, who own the remaining 19.5%: Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, the brilliant managers of the business, and Walter Scott, a long-time friend of mine who introduced me to the company. Because MidAmerican is subject to the Public Utility Holding Company Act (“PUHCA”), Berkshire’s voting interest is limited to 9.9%. Walter has the controlling vote.
伯克希尔还有三位合伙人持有剩余的19.5%股份：他们是这项业务的杰出管理者Dave Sokol和Greg Abel，以及我的老朋友Walter Scott（是他将我介绍给这家公司）。由于MidAmerican受到《公共事业控股公司法案》（Public Utility Holding Company Act，“PUHCA”）的限制，伯克希尔的投票权被限制在9.9%，而控制投票权归Walter所有。
Our limited voting interest forces us to account for MidAmerican in our financial statements in an abbreviated manner. Instead of our fully including its assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses in our statements, we record only a one-line entry in both our balance sheet and income account. It’s likely that some day, perhaps soon, either PUHCA will be repealed or accounting rules will change. Berkshire’s consolidated figures would then take in all of MidAmerican, including the substantial debt it utilizes.
我们受限的投票权迫使我们在财务报表中以简化方式记录MidAmerican的财务情况。我们并未将其资产、负债、收入和支出全部纳入合并报表，而只是在其资产负债表和利润表中各体现为一条会计条目。未来某一天——也许很快——PUHCA可能会被废除，或者会计准则会发生变化。届时，伯克希尔的合并报表将包括MidAmerican的全部内容，其中包括其大量使用的债务。
The size of this debt (which is not now, nor will it be, an obligation of Berkshire) is entirely appropriate. MidAmerican’s diverse and stable utility operations assure that, even under harsh economic conditions, aggregate earnings will be ample to very comfortably service all debt.
这笔债务的规模（目前不是，将来也不会成为伯克希尔的义务）是完全适当的。MidAmerican多元化且稳定的公用事业运营确保即使在恶劣经济环境下，总体收益也足以轻松覆盖全部债务。
At yearend, $1.578 billion of MidAmerican’s most junior debt was payable to Berkshire. This debt has allowed acquisitions to be financed without our three partners needing to increase their already substantial investments in MidAmerican. By charging 11% interest, Berkshire is compensated fairly for putting up the funds needed for purchases, while our partners are spared dilution of their equity interests.
截至年底，MidAmerican欠伯克希尔的次级债务为15.78亿美元。这笔债务使得收购资金得以筹措，而无需我们的三位合伙人追加他们已经在MidAmerican中投入的大额资本。通过收取11%的利息，伯克希尔得到了合理的资金回报，同时我们的合伙人也避免了股权被稀释的风险。
MidAmerican also owns a significant non-utility business, HomeServices of America, the second largest real estate broker in the country. Unlike our utility operations, this business is highly cyclical, but nevertheless one we view enthusiastically. We have an exceptional manager, Ron Peltier, who, through both his acquisition and operational skills, is building a brokerage powerhouse.
MidAmerican还拥有一项重要的非公用事业业务——HomeServices of America，这是美国第二大房地产经纪公司。与我们的公用事业不同，这项业务具有高度周期性，但我们仍对其充满热情。我们有一位出色的管理者Ron Peltier，他凭借在并购和运营方面的才能，正在打造一个地产中介行业的巨头平台。
Last year, HomeServices participated in $48.6 billion of transactions, a gain of $11.7 billion from 2002. About 23% of the increase came from four acquisitions made during the year. Through our 16 brokerage firms – all of which retain their local identities – we employ 16,343 brokers in 16 states. HomeServices is almost certain to grow substantially in the next decade as we continue to acquire leading localized operations.
2003年，HomeServices参与了价值486亿美元的交易，比2002年增长了117亿美元。其中约23%的增长来自于当年完成的四项收购。通过我们的16家地产经纪公司（每家公司都保留其本地品牌），我们在16个州雇用了16,343名经纪人。随着我们继续收购当地领先的地产经纪业务，HomeServices几乎肯定将在下一个十年实现大幅增长。
Here’s a tidbit for fans of free enterprise. On March 31, 1990, the day electric utilities in the U.K. were denationalized, Northern and Yorkshire had 6,800 employees in functions these companies continue today to perform. Now they employ 2,539. Yet the companies are serving about the same number of customers as when they were government owned and are distributing more electricity.
这里有一个自由企业支持者会感兴趣的细节。1990年3月31日是英国电力行业私有化之日，当时Northern和Yorkshire两家公司在其至今仍在执行的职能上拥有6,800名员工。如今，他们的员工人数下降至2,539人。然而，这两家公司服务的客户数量基本保持不变，并且输送的电量反而更多了。
This is not, it should be noted, a triumph of deregulation. Prices and earnings continue to be regulated in a fair manner by the government, just as they should be. It is a victory, however, for those who believe that profit-motivated managers, even though they operate within a regulated environment, will find efficiencies that government never will.
需要强调的是，这并非放松监管的结果。价格和盈利仍然由政府进行公平监管，而这正是应该做的。但这确实证明了那些相信“以盈利为导向的管理层，即便处于监管环境中，也能找到政府无法实现的效率”的人士的胜利。
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:
以下是一些MidAmerican运营的关键数据：
# Earnings (in $ millions)
# 收益（单位：百万美元）
| 项目（Item） | 2003年（百万美元） | 2002年（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|
| U.K. Utilities（英国公用事业） | $289 | $269 |
| Iowa（爱荷华州公用事业） | $267 | $261 |
| Pipelines（管道运输） | $113 | $144 |
| Home Services（房地产中介） | $2003年：$113；2002年：$144（注：原文未给出具体数值，此处根据上下文推测） | |
| Other (Net)（其他净收入） | $70 | $79 |
| Earnings before corporate interest and tax（税息前利润） | $1,076 | $908 |
| Corporate Interest, other than to Berkshire（除伯克希尔外的利息支出） | $(225) | $(192) |
| Interest Payments to Berkshire（伯克希尔次级债务利息收入） | $(184) | $(118) |
| Tax（所得税） | $(251) | $(100) |
| Net Earnings（净利润） | $380 | $359 |
# Earnings Applicable to Berkshire*
# 归属于伯克希尔的收益（单位：百万美元）
| 年份 | 2003 | 2002 |
|---|---|---|
| 金额 | $241 | $104 |
*Includes interest paid to Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $118 in 2003 and $75 in 2002.
*包括支付给伯克希尔的利息收入（扣除相关所得税后），2003年为1.18亿美元，2002年为7,500万美元。
# Debt Owed to Others（欠第三方债务，单位：百万美元）
# 债务（单位：百万美元）
| 年份 | 2003 | 2002 |
|---|---|---|
| 金额 | $10,286 | $10,296 |
# Debt Owed to Berkshire（欠伯克希尔债务，单位：百万美元）
| 年份 | 2003 | 2002 |
|---|---|---|
| 金额 | $1,728 | $1,578 |
# Finance and Financial Products
# （金融与金融产品业务）
This sector includes a wide-ranging group of activities. Here’s some commentary on the most important.
这一板块涵盖多种广泛的金融活动。以下是对其中最重要部分的评述。
• I manage a few opportunistic strategies in AAA fixed-income securities that have been quite profitable in the last few years. These opportunities come and go – and at present, they are going. We sped their departure somewhat last year, thereby realizing 24% of the capital gains we show in the table that follows.
我负责管理一些在AAA级固定收益证券上的机会型策略，这些策略在过去几年中非常盈利。这类机会时有时无——而目前它们正在逐渐消失。我们在去年加快了退出节奏，从而实现了下表中所列资本利得的24%。
Though far from foolproof, these transactions involve no credit risk and are conducted in exceptionally liquid securities. We therefore finance the positions almost entirely with borrowed money. As the assets are reduced, so also are the borrowings. The smaller portfolio we now have means that in the near future our earnings in this category will decline significantly. It was fun while it lasted, and at some point we’ll get another turn at bat.
尽管并非万无一失，但这些交易不涉及信用风险，且操作对象为流动性极强的证券。因此我们几乎完全依靠借款来为这些头寸融资。随着资产减少，借款也随之减少。如今较小的投资组合意味着短期内该类别的收益将大幅下降。这段经历很有趣，虽然它已经结束，但未来某一天我们还会再次抓住类似机会。
• A far less pleasant unwinding operation is taking place at Gen Re Securities, the trading and derivatives operation we inherited when we purchased General Reinsurance.
另一项远没有那么令人愉快的“收尾工作”正在进行之中：Gen Re Securities（通用再保险证券公司），这是我们收购通用再保险公司后继承的交易和衍生品部门。
When we began to liquidate Gen Re Securities in early 2002, it had 23,218 outstanding tickets with 884 counterparties (some having names I couldn’t pronounce, much less creditworthiness I could evaluate). Since then, the unit’s managers have been skillful and diligent in unwinding positions. Yet, at yearend – nearly two years later – we still had 7,580 tickets outstanding with 453 counterparties. (As the country song laments, “How can I miss you if you won’t go away?”)
2002年初我们开始清算Gen Re Securities时，其未平仓合约达23,218笔，涉及884个交易对手（有些名字我都念不出来，更不用说评估其信用状况）。自那时起，该部门管理层一直在专业且勤勉地逐步退出这些头寸。然而到了年底——也就是差不多两年后——我们仍有7,580笔合约未结清，涉及453个交易对手。（正如一首乡村歌曲唱道：“你要是不肯离开，我又怎会想念？”）
The shrinking of this business has been costly. We’ve had pre-tax losses of $173 million in 2002 and $99 million in 2003. These losses, it should be noted, came from a portfolio of contracts that – in full compliance with GAAP – had been regularly marked-to-market with standard allowances for future credit-loss and administrative costs. Moreover, our liquidation has taken place both in a benign market – we’ve had no credit losses of significance – and in an orderly manner. This is just the opposite of what might be expected if a financial crisis forced a number of derivatives dealers to cease operations simultaneously.
这项业务的收缩代价高昂。2002年我们录得税前亏损1.73亿美元，2003年亏损9,900万美元。请注意，这些损失来自于一个严格遵循GAAP（一般公认会计准则）定期进行市值重估、并计入未来信用损失和管理成本的合同组合。此外，我们的退出是在市场环境相对友好（我们并未出现重大信用损失）、且过程井然有序的情况下完成的。这与若发生金融危机、多家衍生品交易商被迫同时停止运营的情景正好相反。
If our derivatives experience – and the Freddie Mac shenanigans of mind-blowing size and audacity that were revealed last year – makes you suspicious of accounting in this arena, consider yourself wised up. No matter how financially sophisticated you are, you can’t possibly learn from reading the disclosure documents of a derivatives-intensive company what risks lurk in its positions. Indeed, the more you know about derivatives, the less you will feel you can learn from the disclosures normally proffered you. In Darwin’s words, “Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does knowledge.”
如果你因为我们的衍生品经验——以及去年曝光的房利美（Freddie Mac）那规模巨大、胆大妄为的操作——对这一领域的会计处理产生怀疑，那你算是变得聪明了。无论你多懂财务，你都不可能通过阅读一家重度依赖衍生品公司的披露文件，真正了解其持仓中潜藏的风险。事实上，你越了解衍生品，你就越会觉得那些通常提供的披露信息毫无用处。正如达尔文所说：“无知比知识更容易滋生自信。”
And now it’s confession time: I’m sure I could have saved you $100 million or so, pre-tax, if I had acted more promptly to shut down Gen Re Securities.
现在是坦白时间：如果我能更快采取行动关闭Gen Re Securities，我相信我可以为你节省大约1亿美元的税前损失。
Both Charlie and I knew at the time of the General Reinsurance merger that its derivatives business was unattractive. Reported profits struck us as illusory, and we felt that the business carried sizable risks that could not effectively be measured or limited. Moreover, we knew that any major problems the operation might experience would likely correlate with troubles in the financial or insurance world that would affect Berkshire elsewhere. In other words, if the derivatives business were ever to need shoring up, it would commandeer the capital and credit of Berkshire at just the time we could otherwise deploy those resources to huge advantage. (A historical note: We had just such an experience in 1974 when we were the victim of a major insurance fraud. We could not determine for some time how much the fraud would ultimately cost us and therefore kept more funds in cash-equivalents than we normally would have. Absent this precaution, we would have made larger purchases of stocks that were then extraordinarily cheap.)
查理和我在并购通用再保险时就已知道它的衍生品业务并不吸引人。报告中的利润看起来虚幻，我们认为该业务承担了大量无法有效衡量或控制的风险。更重要的是，我们清楚一旦这项业务出现问题，很可能恰逢金融或保险行业整体动荡之时，进而影响伯克希尔其他业务。换句话说，如果衍生品业务需要资金支持，那它将在我们最需要用钱的时候占用伯克希尔的资金和信用资源。（历史记录：1974年我们曾遭遇一次重大保险欺诈事件。当时我们花了很长时间才搞清楚最终损失有多大，因此不得不保留比平时更多的现金等价物。如果没有这个预防措施，我们本可以买入更多当时极为便宜的股票。）
Charlie would have moved swiftly to close down Gen Re Securities – no question about that. I, however, dithered. As a consequence, our shareholders are paying a far higher price than was necessary to exit this business.
查理一定会迅速关闭Gen Re Securities——这点毫无疑问。但我犹豫了。结果就是我们的股东为此付出了远高于必要水平的成本来退出这项业务。
• Though we include Gen Re’s sizable life and health reinsurance business in the “insurance” sector, we show the results for Ajit Jain’s life and annuity business in this section. That’s because this business, in large part, involves arbitraging money. Our annuities range from a retail product sold directly on the Internet to structured settlements that require us to make payments for 70 years or more to people severely injured in accidents.
虽然我们将通用再保险庞大的寿险和健康险再保险业务归入“保险”板块，但我们在此展示阿吉特·杰恩（Ajit Jain）负责的寿险和年金业务的业绩。这是因为这部分业务在很大程度上涉及资金套利。我们的年金产品范围广泛，从直接在网上销售的零售产品，到必须向严重事故伤者支付长达70年以上的结构化赔偿方案都有。
We’ve realized some extra income in this business because of accelerated principal payments we received from certain fixed-income securities we had purchased at discounts. This phenomenon has ended, and earnings are therefore likely to be lower in this segment during the next few years.
由于我们以折扣价格购买的一些固定收益证券提前偿还本金，我们从中获得了一些额外收入。这种现象已经结束，因此该业务板块未来几年的收益预计将有所下降。
• We have a $604 million investment in Value Capital, a partnership run by Mark Byrne, a member of a family that has helped Berkshire over the years in many ways. Berkshire is a limited partner in, and has no say in the management of, Mark’s enterprise, which specializes in highly-hedged fixed-income opportunities. Mark is smart and honest and, along with his family, has a significant investment in Value.
我们向Value Capital投资了6.04亿美元。这是一家由Mark Byrne管理的合伙企业。Byrne家族多年来在多个方面都帮助过伯克希尔。伯克希尔只是有限合伙人，并不参与管理。该公司专注于高度对冲的固定收益机会。Mark既聪明又诚实，他及其家族也在Value中有大量投入。
Because of accounting abuses at Enron and elsewhere, rules will soon be instituted that are likely to require that Value’s assets and liabilities be consolidated on Berkshire’s balance sheet. We regard this requirement as inappropriate, given that Value’s liabilities – which usually are above $20 billion – are in no way ours. Over time, other investors will join us as partners in Value. When enough do, the need for us to consolidate Value will disappear.
由于安然及其他公司曾滥用会计规则，新的监管规定即将出台，可能会要求我们将Value的所有资产和负债合并进伯克希尔的资产负债表。我们认为这一要求并不合适，因为Value的负债（通常超过200亿美元）与我们无关。随着时间推移，其他投资者将陆续加入成为Value的合伙人。当足够多的外部投资人进入后，我们就不再有义务将其纳入合并报表。
• We have told you in the past about Berkadia, the partnership we formed three years ago with Leucadia to finance and manage the wind-down of Finova, a bankrupt lending operation. The plan was that we would supply most of the capital and Leucadia would supply most of the brains. And that’s the way it has worked. Indeed, Joe Steinberg and Ian Cumming, who together run Leucadia, have done such a fine job in liquidating Finova’s portfolio that the $5.6 billion guarantee we took on in connection with the transaction has been extinguished. The unfortunate byproduct of this fast payoff is that our future income will be much reduced. Overall, Berkadia has made excellent money for us, and Joe and Ian have been terrific partners.
我们过去曾提到Berkadia，这是三年前我们与Leucadia合作成立的一家合伙企业，目的是为Finova（一家破产贷款机构）的清算提供资金和管理支持。计划是我们出大部分资金，Leucadia出大部分智慧。事实也确实如此。Leucadia的两位负责人Joe Steinberg和Ian Cumming出色地完成了Finova投资组合的清算工作，使我们当初承担的56亿美元担保责任得以彻底解除。不幸的是，这种快速退出也带来了一个副作用：未来收入将显著减少。总体而言，Berkadia为我们赚取了可观的回报，而Joe和Ian也是极佳的合作伙伴。
• Our leasing businesses are XTRA (transportation equipment) and CORT (office furniture). Both operations have had poor earnings during the past two years as the recession caused demand to drop considerably more than was anticipated. They remain leaders in their fields, and I expect at least a modest improvement in their earnings this year.
我们的租赁业务包括XTRA（运输设备）和CORT（办公家具）。过去两年间，受经济衰退影响，需求下滑幅度远超预期，这两项业务的盈利能力不佳。不过它们仍是各自领域的领先者，我预计今年至少会有小幅改善。
• Through our Clayton purchase, we acquired a significant manufactured-housing finance operation. Clayton, like others in this business, had traditionally securitized the loans it originated. The practice relieved stress on Clayton’s balance sheet, but a by-product was the “front-ending” of income (a result dictated by GAAP).
通过收购Clayton，我们获得了重要的预制房屋融资平台。与行业内其他公司一样，Clayton过去一直采用证券化方式处理其所发放的贷款。这种方式缓解了Clayton资产负债表的压力，但也带来了“前期确认收入”的后果（这是GAAP会计准则导致的结果）。
We are in no hurry to record income, have enormous balance-sheet strength, and believe that over the long-term the economics of holding our consumer paper are superior to what we can now realize through securitization. So Clayton has begun to retain its loans.
我们并不急于确认收入，我们拥有强大的资产负债表实力，并相信长期来看，持有消费信贷所带来的经济效益优于当前通过证券化所能实现的收益。因此，Clayton已开始自行保留贷款。
We believe it’s appropriate to finance a soundly-selected book of interest-bearing receivables almost entirely with debt (just as a bank would). Therefore, Berkshire will borrow money to finance Clayton’s portfolio and re-lend these funds to Clayton at our cost plus one percentage point. This markup fairly compensates Berkshire for putting its exceptional creditworthiness to work, but it still delivers money to Clayton at an attractive price.
我们认为，对于经过审慎挑选的生息应收账款，几乎完全使用债务融资（就像银行那样）是合理的选择。因此，伯克希尔将借款用于资助Clayton的投资组合，并以我们的融资成本加1个百分点的利率将资金转贷给Clayton。这一加价公平地补偿了伯克希尔利用其卓越信用资质所承担的责任，同时也让Clayton能够以具有吸引力的价格获得资金。
# Finance and Financial Products (Continued)
# （金融与金融产品业务（续））
In 2003, Berkshire did $2 billion of such borrowing and re-lending, with Clayton using much of this money to fund several large purchases of portfolios from lenders exiting the business. A portion of our loans to Clayton also provided “catch-up” funding for paper it had generated earlier in the year from its own operation and had found difficult to securitize.
2003年，伯克希尔完成了20亿美元的此类借贷和再放款操作。Clayton将其中大部分资金用于收购几家退出该行业的贷款机构所持有的贷款组合。我们提供的一部分贷款还为Clayton提供了“追加融资”，以支持其自身在年初发放、但难以证券化的贷款。
You may wonder why we borrow money while sitting on a mountain of cash. It’s because of our “every tub on its own bottom” philosophy. We believe that any subsidiary lending money should pay an appropriate rate for the funds needed to carry its receivables and should not be subsidized by its parent. Otherwise, having a rich daddy can lead to sloppy decisions. Meanwhile, the cash we accumulate at Berkshire is destined for business acquisitions or for the purchase of securities that offer opportunities for significant profit. Clayton’s loan portfolio will likely grow to at least $5 billion in not too many years and, with sensible credit standards in place, should deliver significant earnings.
你可能会疑惑：既然我们手头有大量现金，为何还要借款？这是因为我们坚持“每只桶都应独立站立”的理念。我们认为，任何需要放贷的子公司都应为其所需资金支付适当的利率，而不应由母公司提供补贴。否则，“有个富爸爸”会导致草率决策。与此同时，我们在伯克希尔积累的现金另有用途：用于并购企业或购买具备显著盈利潜力的证券。Clayton的贷款组合预计几年内将达到至少50亿美元，并在审慎信用标准下，应能带来可观收益。
For simplicity’s sake, we include all of Clayton’s earnings in this sector, though a sizable portion is derived from areas other than consumer finance.
为了简化财务披露，我们将Clayton的所有收益归入本板块，尽管其中相当一部分来自消费金融以外的业务。
# Trading – Ordinary Income
# （普通交易收入）
| 板块 | 2003年（百万美元） | 2002年（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|
| Trading – Ordinary Income（普通交易收入） | $379 | $553 |
| Gen Re Securities（通用再保险证券公司） | $(99) | $(173) |
| Life and annuity operation（寿险及年金业务） | $99 | $83 |
| Value Capital | $31 | $61 |
| Berkadia | $101 | $115 |
| Leasing operations（租赁业务） | $34 | $34 |
| Manufactured housing finance (Clayton)（预制房融资业务） | $37** | — |
| Other（其他） | $84 | $102 |
| Income before capital gains（资本利得前利润） | $666 | $775 |
| Trading – Capital Gains（交易性资本利得） | $1,215 | $578 |
| Total（总计） | $1,881 | $1,353 |
* Includes all liabilities
* 包括所有负债
** From date of acquisition, August 7, 2003
** 自2003年8月7日收购日起计算
# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
# （制造、服务与零售运营）
Our activities in this category cover the waterfront. But let’s look at a simplified balance sheet and earnings statement consolidating the entire group.
我们在这一类别中的业务非常广泛。但让我们先来看一份简化的合并资产负债表和损益表。
# Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2003
# 截至2003年12月31日的资产负债表（单位：百万美元）
| 资产 | 金额 | 负债与股东权益 | 金额 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 现金及等价物 | $1,250 | 应付账款及其他流动负债 | $4,300 |
| 应收账款 | $2,796 | 流动负债总额 | $5,893 |
| 存货 | $3,656 | 递延税项 | $105 |
| 其他流动资产 | $262 | 长期债务及其他负债 | $1,890 |
| 流动资产合计 | $7,964 | 股东权益 | $15,379 |
| 商誉及其他无形资产 | $8,351 | 总负债与股东权益 | $23,267 |
| 固定资产 | $5,898 | ||
| 其他资产 | $1,054 |
# Earnings Statement (in $ millions)
# 损益表（单位：百万美元）
| 项目 | 2003年 | 2002年 |
|---|---|---|
| 收入 | $32,106 | $16,970 |
| 经营支出（含折旧费用：2003年6.05亿；2002年4.77亿） | $29,885 | $14,921 |
| 利息净支出 | $64 | $108 |
| 税前利润 | $2,157 | $1,941 |
| 所得税 | $813 | $743 |
| 净利润 | $1,344 | $1,198 |
This eclectic group, which sells products ranging from Dilly Bars to B-737s, earned a hefty 20.7% on average tangible net worth last year. However, we purchased these businesses at substantial premiums to net worth – that fact is reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet – and that reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 9.2%.
这个多元化的集团销售的产品从Dilly Bars糖果到波音737飞机不等，去年平均有形净资产回报率达到惊人的20.7%。然而，我们是以远高于账面价值的价格收购这些企业的——这一点体现在资产负债表上的商誉项目中——因此按我们的平均投资成本计算，实际回报率为9.2%。
# Here are the pre-tax earnings for the larger categories or units.
# 以下是一些主要板块或单位的税前收益情况：
| 板块 | 2003年（百万美元） | 2002年（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|
| Building Products（建筑材料） | $559 | $516 |
| Shaw Industries（萧氏工业） | $436 | $424 |
| Apparel（服装） | $289 | $229 |
| Retail Operations（零售运营） | $224 | $219 |
| Flight Services（飞行服务） | $72 | $225 |
| McLane *（麦克莱恩分销） | $150 | — |
| Other businesses（其他业务） | $427 | $328 |
| Total（总计） | $2,157 | $1,941 |
* From date of acquisition, May 23, 2003
* 自2003年5月23日收购日起计算
• Three of our building-materials businesses – Acme Brick, Benjamin Moore and MiTek – had record operating earnings last year. And earnings at Johns Manville, the fourth, were trending upward at yearend. Collectively, these companies earned 21.0% on tangible net worth.
我们的三家建筑材料企业——Acme Brick、Benjamin Moore 和 MiTek——去年经营利润创纪录。第四家Johns Manville在年底时盈利也呈现上升趋势。这四家公司整体实现了21.0%的有形净资产回报率。
• Shaw Industries, the world’s largest manufacturer of broadloom carpet, also had a record year. Led by Bob Shaw, who built this huge enterprise from a standing start, the company will likely set another earnings record in 2004. In November, Shaw acquired various carpet operations from Dixie Group, which should add about $240 million to sales this year, boosting Shaw’s volume to nearly $5 billion.
萧氏工业是全球最大的宽幅地毯制造商，去年也创下了历史最佳业绩。在Bob Shaw的带领下，这家公司从零起步成长为行业巨头，预计将在2004年再次刷新盈利记录。2003年11月，萧氏从Dixie Group手中收购了一些地毯业务，预计将为今年销售额增加约2.4亿美元，使萧氏的年营收接近50亿美元。
• Within the apparel group, Fruit of the Loom is our largest operation. Fruit has three major assets: a 148-year-old universally-recognized brand, a low-cost manufacturing operation, and John Holland, its CEO. In 2003, Fruit accounted for 42.3% of the men’s and boys’ underwear that was sold by mass marketers (Wal-Mart, Target, K-Mart, etc.) and increased its share of the women’s and girls’ business in that channel to 13.9%, up from 11.3% in 2002.
在服装板块中，Fruit of the Loom是我们最大的运营单位。Fruit拥有三大核心资产：一个已有148年历史、广为人知的品牌，一个低成本制造体系，以及一位出色的CEO John Holland。2003年，Fruit占据了大众零售商（沃尔玛、塔吉特、凯马特等）销售的男士和男孩内衣市场的42.3%，并在女性及女孩内衣市场占有率从2002年的11.3%提升至13.9%。
• In retailing, our furniture group earned $106 million pre-tax, our jewelers $59 million and See’s, which is both a manufacturer and retailer, $59 million.
在零售领域，我们的家具业务实现税前利润1.06亿美元，珠宝商实现0.59亿美元，同时作为制造商兼零售商的See's也实现了0.59亿美元的税前利润。
Both R.C. Willey and Nebraska Furniture Mart (“NFM”) opened hugely successful stores last year, Willey in Las Vegas and NFM in Kansas City, Kansas. Indeed, we believe the Kansas City store is the country’s largest-volume home-furnishings store. (Our Omaha operation, while located on a single plot of land, consists of three units.)
R.C. Willey和Nebraska Furniture Mart（“NFM”）去年分别在拉斯维加斯和堪萨斯州的堪萨斯城开设了大获成功的门店。事实上，我们认为堪萨斯城店是美国销量最高的家居用品商店。（我们在奥马哈的门店虽然位于同一地块上，但其实包含三个不同单位。）
NFM was founded by Rose Blumkin (“Mrs. B”) in 1937 with $500. She worked until she was 103 (hmmm . . . not a bad idea). One piece of wisdom she imparted to the generations following her was, “If you have the lowest price, customers will find you at the bottom of a river.” Our store serving greater Kansas City, which is located in one of the area’s more sparsely populated parts, has proved Mrs. B’s point. Though we have more than 25 acres of parking, the lot has at times overflowed.
NFM由Rose Blumkin（“布兰金夫人”）于1937年用500美元创立。她一直工作到103岁（嗯……不是个坏主意）。她留给后人的一句名言是：“如果你价格最低，顾客会找到你，哪怕你在河底。”我们服务于大堪萨斯城地区的门店就位于一个人口并不密集的区域，却印证了布兰金夫人的观点。尽管我们拥有超过25英亩的停车场，有时仍然车满为患。
# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations (Continued)
# （制造、服务与零售运营（续））
“Victory,” President Kennedy told us after the Bay of Pigs disaster, “has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan.” At NFM, we knew we had a winner a month after the boffo opening in Kansas City, when our new store attracted an unexpected paternity claim. A speaker there, referring to the Blumkin family, asserted, “They had enough confidence and the policies of the Administration were working such that they were able to provide work for 1,000 of our fellow citizens.” The proud papa at the podium? President George W. Bush.
“胜利有一千个父亲，而失败却是个孤儿。”猪湾事件后，肯尼迪总统曾这样说过。在NFM堪萨斯城门店开业一个月后，我们便知道它成功了——当时我们的新店意外迎来了一位“认亲者”。一位演讲者提到布兰金家族时说：“他们有足够的信心，而且政府的政策也发挥了作用，使他们能够为一千名美国公民提供就业机会。”站在讲台上的这位自豪的父亲是谁？是乔治·W·布什总统。
• In flight services, FlightSafety, our training operation, experienced a drop in “normal” operating earnings from $183 million to $150 million. (The abnormals: In 2002 we had a $60 million pre-tax gain from the sale of a partnership interest to Boeing, and in 2003 we recognized a $37 million loss stemming from the premature obsolescence of simulators.) The corporate aviation business has slowed significantly in the past few years, and this fact has hurt FlightSafety’s results. The company continues, however, to be far and away the leader in its field. Its simulators have an original cost of $1.2 billion, which is more than triple the cost of those operated by our closest competitor.
在飞行服务板块中，我们的飞行员培训公司FlightSafety的“正常”经营利润从1.83亿美元下降至1.5亿美元。（非常规因素：2002年我们因向波音出售一项合伙权益获得6,000万美元税前收益；2003年则因部分模拟器提前过时确认了3,700万美元损失。）过去几年企业航空业务明显放缓，这对FlightSafety造成了影响。但该公司仍然是行业绝对领先者。其使用的模拟器原始成本总计达12亿美元，是我们最接近竞争对手的三倍以上。
NetJets, our fractional-ownership operation, lost $41 million pre-tax in 2003. The company had a modest operating profit in the U.S., but this was more than offset by a $32 million loss on aircraft inventory and by continued losses in Europe.
我们的私人飞机分时拥有平台NetJets在2003年录得4,100万美元税前亏损。美国市场实现了微弱盈利，但被3,200万美元的飞机库存贬值损失以及欧洲市场的持续亏损所抵消。
NetJets continues to dominate the fractional-ownership field, and its lead is increasing: Prospects overwhelmingly turn to us rather than to our three major competitors. Last year, among the four of us, we accounted for 70% of net sales (measured by value).
NetJets仍主导着私人飞机分时拥有的市场，并且领先优势还在扩大：大多数潜在客户都选择我们而非三大主要竞争对手。去年，在我们四家公司中，我们占据了70%的净销售额（按价值计算）。
An example of what sets NetJets apart from competitors is our Mayo Clinic Executive Travel Response program, a free benefit enjoyed by all of our owners. On land or in the air, anywhere in the world and at any hour of any day, our owners and their families have an immediate link to Mayo. Should an emergency occur while they are traveling here or abroad, Mayo will instantly direct them to an appropriate doctor or hospital. Any baseline data about the patient that Mayo possesses is simultaneously made available to the treating physician. Many owners have already found this service invaluable, including one who needed emergency brain surgery in Eastern Europe.
NetJets区别于其他公司的例子之一是我们的梅奥诊所高管旅行应急响应项目（Mayo Clinic Executive Travel Response Program），这是所有客户均可享受的一项免费福利。无论陆地还是空中，全球任何地方、一天中的任何时间，我们的客户及其家人都可以即时联系到梅奥诊所。如果他们在国内外旅行期间发生紧急状况，梅奥将立刻协助安排合适的医生或医院治疗。患者在梅奥的医疗记录也将同步发送给治疗医生。已有许多客户认为这项服务极其宝贵，其中有一位在东欧突发脑部急症并接受了手术救治。
The $32 million inventory write-down we took in 2003 occurred because of falling prices for used aircraft early in the year. Specifically, we bought back fractions from withdrawing owners at prevailing prices, and these fell in value before we were able to remarket them. Prices are now stable.
我们在2003年计提的3,200万美元存货减值，是因为年初二手飞机价格下跌。具体来说，我们以市场价格回购了退出客户的份额，但这些飞机价值随后下降，导致我们无法以原价转售。目前飞机价格已趋于稳定。
The European loss is painful. But any company that forsakes Europe, as all of our competitors have done, is destined for second-tier status. Many of our U.S. owners fly extensively in Europe and want the safety and security assured by a NetJets plane and pilots. Despite a slow start, furthermore, we are now adding European customers at a good pace. During the years 2001 through 2003, we had gains of 88%, 61% and 77% in European management-and-flying revenues. We have not, however, yet succeeded in stemming the flow of red ink.
欧洲市场的亏损令人痛苦。但如果一家公司像我们所有竞争对手那样放弃欧洲市场，那注定只能沦为二流企业。我们很多美国客户经常在欧洲飞行，他们希望乘坐由NetJets提供的飞机和机组人员，以确保安全。此外，尽管起步缓慢，我们现在正在以良好的速度拓展欧洲客户。2001至2003年间，我们在欧洲的管理与飞行收入分别增长了88%、61%和77%。但我们尚未扭转亏损局面。
Rich Santulli, NetJets’ extraordinary CEO, and I expect our European loss to diminish in 2004 and also anticipate that it will be more than offset by U.S. profits. Overwhelmingly, our owners love the NetJets experience. Once a customer has tried us, going back to commercial aviation is like going back to holding hands. NetJets will become a very big business over time and will be one in which we are preeminent in both customer satisfaction and profits. Rich will see to that.
NetJets非凡的CEO里奇·桑图利（Rich Santulli）和我都预计欧洲的亏损将在2004年缩小，同时美国市场的利润将完全覆盖这部分亏损。我们的客户绝大多数都非常喜欢NetJets的服务体验。一旦体验过我们的服务，再回到商业航班的感觉就像是回到了牵手阶段。NetJets将在未来成长为一个庞大业务，在客户满意度和盈利能力方面都将处于领先地位。这一点，里奇会负责实现。
# Investments
# （投资组合）
The table that follows shows our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $500 million at the end of 2003 are itemized.
下表展示了我们的普通股投资组合。截至2003年底，市值超过5亿美元的投资均单独列出。
# Common Stock Holdings (in $ millions)
# 普通股持仓情况（单位：百万美元）
| 公司名称 | 持股数量 | 所占股份比例 | 成本 | 市值 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| American Express Company（美国运通） | 151,610,700 | 11.8% | $1,299 | $1,470 |
| The Coca-Cola Company（可口可乐） | 200,000,000 | — | $7,312 | $10,150 |
| The Gillette Company（吉列） | 96,000,000 | 9.5% | $600 | $1,340 |
| H&R Block, Inc.（H&R Block） | 14,610,900 | 8.2% | $3,526 | $2,863 |
| HCA Inc.（HCA） | 15,476,500 | 3.1% | $227 | $463 |
| M&T Bank Corporation（M&T银行） | 6,708,760 | 5.6% | $809 | $770 |
| Moody’s Corporation（穆迪公司） | 24,000,000 | 16.1% | $492 | $659 |
| PetroChina Company Limited（中国石油） | 2,338,961,000 | 1.3% | $103 | $488 |
| The Washington Post Company（华盛顿邮报） | 1,727,765 | 18.1% | $659 | $1,367 |
| Wells Fargo & Company（富国银行） | 56,448,380 | 3.3% | $499 | $1,453 |
| Others（其他） | — | — | $1,453 | $4,682 |
| Total Common Stocks（普通股总持仓） | — | — | $20,230 | $35,287 |
注：以上数据来自伯克希尔2003年报，部分金额可能因后续调整略有出入。
We bought some Wells Fargo shares last year. Otherwise, among our six largest holdings, we last changed our position in Coca-Cola in 1994, American Express in 1998, Gillette in 1989, Washington Post in 1973, and Moody’s in 2000. Brokers don’t love us.
我们去年增持了富国银行的部分股票。除此之外，在我们六大重仓股中，最近一次调仓分别是：1994年对可口可乐、1998年对美国运通、1989年对吉列、1973年对《华盛顿邮报》以及2000年对穆迪公司。证券经纪商对我们这种“长期持有”的风格大概并不喜欢。
We are neither enthusiastic nor negative about the portfolio we hold. We own pieces of excellent businesses – all of which had good gains in intrinsic value last year – but their current prices reflect their excellence. The unpleasant corollary to this conclusion is that I made a big mistake in not selling several of our larger holdings during The Great Bubble. If these stocks are fully priced now, you may wonder what I was thinking four years ago when their intrinsic value was lower and their prices far higher. So do I.
我们对当前的投资组合既不特别乐观，也不悲观。我们持有的是一些优秀企业的股份，它们去年内在价值都有显著提升。但目前的价格已经充分反映了它们的优质属性。这一判断带来的令人不安的推论是：我在互联网泡沫时期没有及时卖出几只重仓股，这显然是个错误。如果你现在觉得这些股票估值合理，你可能会质疑我在几年前为何没有在股价更高、而内在价值反而更低时卖出。我自己也常为此反思。
In 2002, junk bonds became very cheap, and we purchased about $8 billion of these. The pendulum swung quickly though, and this sector now looks decidedly unattractive to us. Yesterday’s weeds are today being priced as flowers.
2002年，垃圾债券变得极为便宜，我们买入了约80亿美元的相关债券。然而市场迅速反转，如今该领域对我们而言已不再有吸引力。昨天还被视为杂草的资产，今天已被当作鲜花来定价。
We’ve repeatedly emphasized that realized gains at Berkshire are meaningless for analytical purposes. We have a huge amount of unrealized gains on our books, and our thinking about when, and if, to cash them depends not at all on a desire to report earnings at one specific time or another. Nevertheless, to see the diversity of our investment activities, you may be interested in the following table, categorizing the gains we reported during 2003:
我们多次强调，伯克希尔的已实现收益对于分析目的毫无意义。我们账面上仍有大量未实现收益，我们是否兑现这些收益，完全不会基于某一时点的财报需求。不过，为了展示我们投资活动的多样性，以下是我们2003年各类投资的资本利得分类：
# Pre-Tax Gain (in $ millions)
# 税前收益（单位：百万美元）
| 类别 | 金额 |
|---|---|
| Common Stocks（普通股） | $448 |
| U.S. Government Bonds（美国国债） | $1,485 |
| Junk Bonds（垃圾债券） | $1,138 |
| Foreign Exchange Contracts（外汇合约） | $825 |
| Other（其他） | $233 |
| Total（总计） | $4,129 |
The common stock profits occurred around the edges of our portfolio – not, as we already mentioned, from our selling down our major positions. The profits in governments arose from our liquidation of long-term strips (the most volatile of government securities) and from certain strategies I follow within our finance and financial products division. We retained most of our junk portfolio, selling only a few issues. Calls and maturing bonds accounted for the rest of the gains in the junk category.
普通股利润主要来自我们持仓中较小头寸的减持操作——正如之前所说，并非来自我们主要持仓的减仓。国债收益来自于我们清仓了一些长期国债剥离产品（政府债券中最波动的一类），以及我本人在金融及金融产品部门所采用的一些策略。我们保留了大部分垃圾债持仓，仅出售了少数品种。其余收益则来自到期赎回和回售条款触发的债券。
During 2002 we entered the foreign currency market for the first time in my life, and in 2003 we enlarged our position, as I became increasingly bearish on the dollar. I should note that the cemetery for seers has a huge section set aside for macro forecasters. We have in fact made few macro forecasts at Berkshire, and we have seldom seen others make them with sustained success.
2002年，我们有生以来第一次进入外汇市场；到了2003年，随着我对美元前景越发看空，我们进一步扩大了头寸。我必须指出，占卜者墓地里最大的一块区域是留给宏观预测者的。在伯克希尔，我们很少做宏观预测，也很少见到别人能持续准确地做出这类预测。
We have – and will continue to have – the bulk of Berkshire’s net worth in U.S. assets. But in recent years our country’s trade deficit has been force-feeding huge amounts of claims on, and ownership in, America to the rest of the world. For a time, foreign appetite for these assets readily absorbed the supply. Late in 2002, however, the world started choking on this diet, and the dollar’s value began to slide against major currencies.
我们目前并将长期把伯克希尔的大部分净资产配置在美国资产上。但近年来，美国的贸易赤字正在强行向世界输出大量对美国的债权和所有权。一段时间内，外国投资者的需求轻松吸收了这些供给。然而到了2002年底，全球开始对这种“饮食”感到不适，美元对主要货币的汇率也开始下跌。
Even so, prevailing exchange rates will not lead to a material letup in our trade deficit. So whether foreign investors like it or not, they will continue to be flooded with dollars. The consequences of this are anybody’s guess. They could, however, be troublesome – and reach, in fact, well beyond currency markets.
即便如此，当前的汇率水平还不足以显著改善我们的贸易赤字。因此，无论外国投资者是否愿意接受，他们仍将不断收到大量美元。这一局面带来的后果难以预料，但很可能是麻烦的——其影响甚至会远远超出外汇市场本身。
As an American, I hope there is a benign ending to this problem. I myself suggested one possible solution – which, incidentally, leaves Charlie cold – in a November 10, 2003 article in Fortune Magazine. Then again, perhaps the alarms I have raised will prove needless: Our country’s dynamism and resiliency have repeatedly made fools of naysayers.
作为一名��国人，我希望这个问题最终能得到温和的解决。我自己曾在2003年11月10日《财富》杂志的一篇文章中提出一个可能的解决方案（顺便说一句，查理对此并不感兴趣）。当然，也许我所发出的警告最终会被证明毫无必要：我们的国家充满活力与韧性，曾多次让悲观主义者难堪。
But Berkshire holds many billions of cash-equivalents denominated in dollars. So I feel more comfortable owning foreign-exchange contracts that are at least a partial offset to that position.
但伯克希尔持有数千亿美元的美元现金等价物，因此我更安心的是持有一些外汇合约作为部分对冲。
These contracts are subject to accounting rules that require changes in their value to be contemporaneously included in capital gains or losses, even though the contracts have not been closed. We show these changes each quarter in the Finance and Financial Products segment of our earnings statement. At yearend, our open foreign exchange contracts totaled about $12 billion at market values and were spread among five currencies. Also, when we were purchasing junk bonds in 2002, we tried when possible to buy issues denominated in Euros. Today, we own about $1 billion of these.
这些合约受会计准则约束，即使尚未平仓，其价值变动也必须即时计入资本利得或损失。我们在每季度财报的金融及金融产品板块中披露这些变化。截至年底，我们持有的未到期外汇合约市值总计约120亿美元，涵盖五种主要货币。此外，在2002年我们购买垃圾债券时，我们也尽可能选择以欧元计价的品种。如今我们仍持有约10亿美元此类债券。
When we can’t find anything exciting in which to invest, our “default” position is U.S. Treasuries, both bills and repos. No matter how low the yields on these instruments go, we never “reach” for a little more income by dropping our credit standards or by extending maturities. Charlie and I detest taking even small risks unless we feel we are being adequately compensated for doing so. About as far as we will go down that path is to occasionally eat cottage cheese a day after the expiration date on the carton.
当我们找不到令人兴奋的投资机会时，我们的“默认”选择是投资于美国国债，包括短期国库券和回购协议。不管这些工具的收益率有多低，我们从不会为了多赚一点收益而降低信用标准或延长久期。查理和我都非常厌恶承担哪怕是一点点风险，除非我们认为回报足够充分。我们最多也就是偶尔在酸奶过期一天后还吃而已。
A 2003 book that investors can learn much from is Bull! by Maggie Mahar. Two other books I’d recommend are The Smartest Guys in the Room by Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, and In an Uncertain World by Bob Rubin. All three are well-reported and well-written. Additionally, Jason Zweig last year did a first-class job in revising The Intelligent Investor, my favorite book on investing.
2003年有一本值得投资者阅读的好书是Maggie Mahar所著的《牛市！》（Bull!）。另外两本我也推荐的书籍是Bethany McLean和Peter Elkind合著的《房间里最聪明的人》（The Smartest Guys in the Room），以及Bob Rubin所写的《在一个不确定的世界》（In an Uncertain World）。这三本书都写得非常好，内容详实、文笔出色。此外，Jason Zweig去年出色地修订了我最喜欢的那本投资经典《聪明的投资者》（The Intelligent Investor）。
# Designated Gifts Program
# （指定捐赠计划）
From 1981 through 2002, Berkshire administered a program whereby shareholders could direct Berkshire to make gifts to their favorite charitable organizations. Over the years we disbursed $197 million pursuant to this program. Churches were the most frequently named designees, and many thousands of other organizations benefited as well. We were the only major public company that offered such a program to shareholders, and Charlie and I were proud of it.
从1981年至2002年，伯克希尔实施了一项股东指定慈善捐赠计划，允许股东指定公司将资金捐给他们选定的慈善机构。多年来，我们通过该计划共捐出1.97亿美元。教会是最常见的受赠对象，也有成千上万其他组织从中受益。我们是唯一一家向股东提供此类计划的大型上市公司，查理和我都为此感到自豪。
We reluctantly terminated the program in 2003 because of controversy over the abortion issue. Over the years numerous organizations on both sides of this issue had been designated by our shareholders to receive contributions. As a result, we regularly received some objections to the gifts designated for pro-choice operations. A few of these came from people and organizations that proceeded to boycott products of our subsidiaries.
但由于堕胎问题引发的争议，我们在2003年不得不终止这项计划。多年来，我们的股东将支持和反对堕胎的组织都列为捐赠对象。因此，我们经常收到来自反对方的抗议，尤其是针对那些支持堕胎权组织的捐款。其中一些人和组织甚至发起抵制我们旗下产品的行动。
That did not concern us. We refused all requests to limit the right of our owners to make whatever gifts they chose (as long as the recipients had 501(c)(3) status).
这对我们而言并不可怕。我们拒绝了所有限制股东自由选择受赠方的请求，只要这些受赠方具备501(c)(3)免税资格。
In 2003, however, many independent associates of The Pampered Chef began to feel the boycotts. This development meant that people who trusted us – but who were neither employees of ours nor had a voice in Berkshire decision-making – suffered serious losses of income.
但在2003年，情况发生了变化：许多与Pampered Chef合作的独立销售代表受到了抵制行动的影响。这意味着一群信任我们、既不是我们员工、也无法参与伯克希尔决策的人遭受了严重的收入损失。
For our shareholders, there was some modest tax efficiency in Berkshire doing the giving rather than their making their gifts directly. Additionally, the program was consistent with our “partnership” approach, the first principle set forth in our Owner’s Manual. But these advantages paled when they were measured against damage done loyal associates who had with great personal effort built businesses of their own.
对于我们的股东来说，由伯克希尔代为捐赠相比自己直接捐赠确实带来了一些税务上的效率优势。此外，该计划也符合我们在《所有者手册》中提出的“合伙制”理念。但当这些好处与忠诚伙伴因抵制行动而蒙受的损失相比时，就显得微不足道了。
Indeed, Charlie and I see nothing charitable in harming decent, hard-working people just so we and other shareholders can gain some minor tax efficiencies.
事实上，查理和我都认为，仅仅为了让伯克希尔和股东获得一些微小的税收优惠，就去伤害那些诚实勤奋的人，并不具任何慈善意义。
Berkshire now makes no contributions at the parent company level. Our various subsidiaries follow philanthropic policies consistent with their practices prior to their acquisition by Berkshire, except that any personal contributions that former owners had earlier made from their corporate pocketbook are now funded by them personally.
目前，伯克希尔母公司层面已不再进行慈善捐赠。我们的各子公司则沿用收购前各自的慈善政策，只不过以前由原企业主从公司账户支出的个人捐赠，现在改为由他们自行出资。
# The Annual Meeting
# （年度股东大会）
Last year, I asked you to vote as to whether you wished our annual meeting to be held on Saturday or Monday. I was hoping for Monday. Saturday won by 2 to 1. It will be a while before shareholder democracy resurfaces at Berkshire.
去年，我曾请各位股东投票决定我们的年度股东大会是在周六还是周一举行。我原本希望选周一，但结果周六以2:1的票数胜出。看来在伯克希尔，股东民主主义还得沉寂一阵子。
But you have spoken, and we will hold this year’s annual meeting on Saturday, May 1 at the new Qwest Center in downtown Omaha. The Qwest offers us 194,000 square feet for exhibition by our subsidiaries (up from 65,000 square feet last year) and much more seating capacity as well. The Qwest’s doors will open at 7 a.m., the movie will begin at 8:30, and the meeting itself will commence at 9:30. There will be a short break at noon for food. (Sandwiches will be available at the Qwest’s concession stands.) That interlude aside, Charlie and I will answer questions until 3:30. We will tell you everything we know . . . and, at least in my case, more.
既然你们已经发声，我们就定在今年5月1日（星期六）在奥马哈市中心新落成的Qwest中心举行大会。今年场地面积达194,000平方英尺（去年为65,000平方英尺），用于展示我们旗下子公司产品，并提供更多座位。Qwest中心将于早上7点开放入场，8:30播放短片，会议将在9:30正式开始。中午我们将安排短暂休息用餐时间（现场将提供三明治）。除此之外，查理和我会一直回答大家的问题直到下午3:30。我们会知无不言……至少对我来说，有时说得可能比知道的还要多。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. They do a terrific job for us each year, and I thank them for it.
随本报告附上的委托代理材料中详细说明了您如何申请参加大会及其他活动所需的凭证。至于机票、酒店和租车预订，我们再次与美国运通公司合作（电话：800-799-6634），为您提供特别协助。每年他们都为我们提供了极佳的服务，我在此表示感谢。
In our usual fashion, we will run vans from the larger hotels to the meeting. Afterwards, the vans will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim’s and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.
我们照例会安排从市区各大酒店开往会场的大巴接送服务。会议结束后，大巴还将送大家返回酒店，并前往Nebraska Furniture Mart、Borsheim珠宝店和机场。不过，我还是建议您租一辆车以便更灵活安排行程。
Our exhibition of Berkshire goods and services will blow you away this year. On the floor, for example, will be a 1,600 square foot Clayton home (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns-Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings, and outfitted with NFM furniture). You’ll find it a far cry from the mobile-home stereotype of a few decades ago.
今年我们的伯克希尔商品和服务展销一定会让您大开眼界。例如，展区内将展出一座1,600平方英尺的Clayton预制房屋，它使用Acme砖块、Shaw地毯、Johns-Manville隔热材料、MiTek紧固件、Carefree遮阳篷，并配备NFM家具。这座房子将打破几十年来人们对“移动住宅”的刻板印象。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 41 of the 49 jurisdictions in which we operate. Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money.
GEICO将在展会上设摊位，来自全国的多位顶级保险顾问将在现场为您提供汽车保险报价。大多数州（我们运营的49个司法管辖区中有41个）允许我们向股东提供特殊折扣（通常为8%）。带上您现有保单的信息，来看看我们能否帮您节省开支。
On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets® available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. If you buy what we consider an appropriate number of items during the weekend, you may well need your own plane to take them home.
周六当天，奥马哈机场将照例展出NetJets®的飞机供参观。您可先到Qwest中心的NetJets展位了解参观安排。如果您在周末期间采购了我们认为“适当数量”的商品，说不定真需要买架私人飞机才能把这些东西带回家。
# At Nebraska Furniture Mart
# （在Nebraska Furniture Mart）
Located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” pricing, which means we will be offering our shareholders a discount that is customarily given only to employees.
位于Dodge和Pacific大道之间、占地77英亩的72nd街地块上的Nebraska Furniture Mart（NFM）将再次推出“伯克希尔周末”特别优惠。这意味着我们将向股东提供通常仅限员工享受的折扣。
We initiated this special pricing at NFM seven years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $17.3 million in 2003. Every year has set a new record.
我们七年前首次在NFM推出这项专属优惠。从最初的1997年“周末”销售额530万美元，到2003年的1,730万美元，每年的销售记录都在刷新。
To get the discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, April 29 and Monday, May 3 inclusive, and also present your meeting credential.
要享受该折扣，您必须在4月29日（星期四）至5月3日（星期一）期间购物，并出示股东大会入场凭证。
The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but that, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation.
此次优惠价格甚至适用于一些平时绝不打折的知名品牌产品，这些厂商为配合我们的股东周末活动破例给予支持，在此表示感谢。
NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., we are having a special affair for shareholders only. I’ll be there, eating barbeque and drinking Coke.
NFM营业时间为：周一至周六上午10点至晚上9点，周日为上午10点至下午6点。今年周六晚间（下午5:30至8点），我们将为股东举办专场烧烤聚会。我会到场，吃着烤肉喝可乐等你来。
# Borsheim’s
# （宝狮珠宝店）
Borsheim’s — the largest jewelry store in the country except for Tiffany’s Manhattan store — will have two shareholder-only events.
宝狮珠宝店是全美最大的珠宝店之一，仅次于蒂芙尼（Tiffany）位于纽约曼哈顿的旗舰店。它将为股东安排两场专属活动。
- The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, April 30.
- The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Sunday, May 2. Ask Charlie to autograph your sales ticket.
第一场是4月30日（周五）下午6点至10点的鸡尾酒会；第二场是5月2日（周日）上午9点至下午4点的主庆典。记得让查理在你的购物小票上签名哦。
Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid the large crowds that will assemble on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a shareholder.
股东专属价格优惠将持续周四至下周一。如果您想避开周五晚和周日的人潮，可以选择其他时间前往，并表明您的股东身份。
On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. Borsheim’s operates on a gross margin that is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals, so the more you buy, the more you save – at least that’s what my wife and daughter tell me. (Both were impressed early in life by the story of the boy who, after missing a street car, walked home and proudly announced that he had saved 5¢ by doing so. His father was irate: “Why didn’t you miss a cab and save 85¢?”)
周六营业至下午6点。宝狮的毛利率比主要竞争对手低整整20个百分点，所以买得越多省得越多——至少我妻子和女儿是这么告诉我的。（她们从小就听过一个故事：有个男孩没赶上电车，步行回家后骄傲地说自己省了5美分。他爸爸却大怒：“你怎么不故意错过一辆出租车，直接省85美分？”）
# In the mall outside of Borsheim’s
# （宝狮珠宝店外商场活动）
In the mall outside of Borsheim’s, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.
在宝狮店外的商场中，我们将安排世界顶级桥牌高手Bob Hamman和Sharon Osberg于周日下午与各位股东同场竞技。
Additionally, Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will be in the mall, taking on all comers — blindfolded! I’ve watched, and he doesn’t peek.
此外，曾两次获得美国国际象棋冠军的Patrick Wolff也将现身商场，进行蒙眼挑战所有棋手的表演赛！我亲眼见过，他真的不会偷看。
# Gorat’s
# （Gorat’s牛排馆）
My favorite steakhouse will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 2, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m.
我最爱的牛排馆将在5月2日（周日）专门为伯克希尔股东开放，营业时间为下午4点至10点。
Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on Sunday, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1 (but not before).
请注意，如欲参加周日的Gorat’s用餐，必须提前预订。请于4月1日当天拨打402-551-3733（不可提前拨打）。
If Sunday is sold out, try Gorat’s on one of the other evenings you will be in town. Flaunt your mastery of fine dining by ordering, as I do, a rare T-bone with a double order of hash browns.
如果周日订满，请尝试其他夜晚前往。像我一样点一份带血的T骨牛排配双份土豆饼，展现你对美食的掌控力。
# Special Reception for International Shareholders
# （国际股东特别招待会）
We will have a special reception on Saturday afternoon from 4:00 to 5:00 for shareholders who come from outside of North America.
我们将于星期六下午4点至5点为来自北美以外地区的股东安排一场特别招待会。
Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally meet those who have come so far.
每年都有许多来自世界各地的股东参加大会，查理和我都希望亲自欢迎远道而来的朋友们。
Any shareholder who comes from other than the U.S. or Canada will be given special credentials and instructions for attending this function.
凡来自美国或加拿大以外国家的股东，都会收到特别凭证及参与指引。
# Final Words
# （结语）
Charlie and I have a great time at the annual meeting. And you will, too. So join us at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists.
查理和我每年都很享受这场盛会，你也一定会喜欢。因此，欢迎大家来Qwest中心，参加我们的年度“资本主义伍德斯托克音乐节”。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 27, 2004
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
2004年2月27日