1996巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
Chairman's Letter (董事长信函)
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
Our gain in net worth during 1996 was $6.2 billion, or 36.1%. Per-share book value, however, grew by less, 31.8%, because the number of Berkshire shares increased: We issued stock in acquiring FlightSafety International and also sold new Class B shares.* Over the last 32 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $19,011, or at a rate of 23.8% compounded annually.
1996年我们的净资产增加了62亿美元，即增长了36.1%。然而每股账面价值仅增长了31.8%，这是因为伯克希尔的股份数量有所增加：我们在收购FlightSafety International时发行了股票，同时也出售了新的B类股份。*在过去32年中（即自现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值已从19美元增长至19,011美元，复合年增长率达23.8%。
* Each Class B share has an economic interest equal to 1/30th of that possessed by a Class A share, which is the new designation for the only stock that Berkshire had outstanding before May 1996. Throughout this report, we state all per-share figures in terms of "Class A equivalents," which are the sum of the Class A shares outstanding and 1/30th of the Class B shares outstanding.
* 每一股B类股份在经济利益上相当于一股A类股份的1/30，A类股份是1996年5月之前伯克希尔唯一流通在外的股票的新名称。在本报告中，我们以“等同于A类股份”来表示所有每股数据，即流通在外的A类股份总数加上1/30的B类股份总数。
For technical reasons, we have restated our 1995 financial statements, a matter that requires me to present one of my less-than-thrilling explanations of accounting arcana. I'll make it brief.
由于技术原因，我们重述了1995年的财务报表，这需要我向各位解释一个令人不那么兴奋的会计术语。我会尽量简短说明。
The restatement was required because GEICO became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Berkshire on January 2, 1996, whereas it was previously classified as an investment. From an economic viewpoint - taking into account major tax efficiencies and other benefits we gained - the value of the 51% of GEICO we owned at year-end 1995 increased significantly when we acquired the remaining 49% of the company two days later. Accounting rules applicable to this type of "step acquisition," however, required us to write down the value of our 51% at the time we moved to 100%. That writedown - which also, of course, reduced book value - amounted to $478.4 million. As a result, we now carry our original 51% of GEICO at a value that is both lower than its market value at the time we purchased the remaining 49% of the company and lower than the value at which we carry that 49% itself.
重述的原因在于，GEICO已于1996年1月2日成为伯克希尔的全资子公司，而此前它被归类为一项投资。从经济角度来看——考虑到我们获得的重大税务效率及其他好处——我们在1995年底持有的GEICO 51%股权的价值，在两天后收购剩余49%股权时显著上升。然而，适用于此类“分步收购”的会计规则要求我们在持股比例提升至100%时对原有51%股权进行减值。该减值金额为4.784亿美元（当然也减少了账面价值）。因此，我们现在对原始51% GEICO股权的账面价值既低于我们购买剩余49%股权时的市场价值，也低于我们对那部分49%股权本身的账面价值。
There is an offset, however, to the reduction in book value I have just described: Twice during 1996 we issued Berkshire shares at a premium to book value, first in May when we sold the B shares for cash and again in December when we used both A and B shares as part-payment for FlightSafety. In total, the three non-operational items affecting book value contributed less than one percentage point to our 31.8% per-share gain last year.
不过，上述账面价值的减少也有抵消因素：1996年我们两次以高于账面价值的价格发行伯克希尔股份，第一次是在5月以现金形式出售B类股份，第二次是在12月使用A类和B类股份作为支付收购FlightSafety的部分对价。总的来说，影响账面价值的三项非运营性项目对我们去年每股31.8%的增长贡献不到一个百分点。
I dwell on this rise in per-share book value because it roughly indicates our economic progress during the year. But, as Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I have repeatedly told you, what counts at Berkshire is intrinsic value, not book value. The last time you got that message from us was in the Owner's Manual, sent to you in June after we issued the Class B shares. In that manual, we not only defined certain key terms - such as intrinsic value - but also set forth our economic principles.
我之所以强调每股账面价值的增长，是因为它大致反映了我们一年中的经济进展。但正如伯克希尔副主席查理·芒格和我多次告诉您的那样，在伯克希尔真正重要的是内在价值，而不是账面价值。我们上次向您传达这一信息是在《股东手册》中，该手册于我们发行B类股份后的6月寄送给您。在该手册中，我们不仅定义了一些关键术语——如内在价值——还列出了我们的经济原则。
For many years, we have listed these principles in the front of our annual report, but in this report, on pages 58 to 67, we reproduce the entire Owner's Manual. In this letter, we will occasionally refer to the manual so that we can avoid repeating certain definitions and explanations. For example, if you wish to brush up on "intrinsic value," see pages 64 and 65.
多年来，我们一直将这些原则列在年报的前面部分，而在今年的年报中（第58至67页）我们完整地复制了《股东手册》。在这封信中，我们将偶尔引用该手册，以避免重复某些定义和解释。例如，如果您想重温“内在价值”的概念，请参阅第64和65页。
Last year, for the first time, we supplied you with a table that Charlie and I believe will help anyone trying to estimate Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace two key indices of value. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments but after all interest and corporate overhead expenses. The operating-earnings column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect, the two columns show what Berkshire would have reported had it been broken into two parts.
去年，我们首次提供了一张表格，我们认为这张表格有助于任何试图估算伯克希尔内在价值的人。以下是我们更新后的版本，追踪了两个关键的价值指标。第一列列出的是我们每股所拥有的投资（包括现金及等价物），第二列显示的是伯克希尔经营业务在扣除所有利息和企业管理费用之后、但在税收和购并会计调整之前的每股收益。经营收益一栏排除了我们在第一列投资中实现的所有股息、利息和资本利得。实际上，这两列展示了如果伯克希尔被拆分为两部分会呈现怎样的财务结果。
| Year | Investments Per Share | Pre-tax Earnings Excluding All Income from Investments |
|---|---|---|
| 1965 | $ 4 | $ 4.08 |
| 1975 | 159 | (6.48) |
| 1985 | 2,443 | 18.86 |
| 1995 | 22,088 | 258.20 |
| 1996 | 28,500 | 421.39 |
| 年份 | 每股投资（英文）Investments Per Share | 每股税前经营收益（不含投资收入）Pre-tax Earnings Excluding All Income from Investments |
|---|---|---|
| 1965 | $ 4 | $ 4.08 |
| 1975 | 159 | (6.48) |
| 1985 | 2,443 | 18.86 |
| 1995 | 22,088 | 258.20 |
| 1996 | 28,500 | 421.39 |
Annual Growth Rate, 1965–95: 33.4% (每股投资年增长率) / 14.7% (每股经营收益年增长率)
One-Year Growth Rate, 1995–96: 29.0% (每股投资年增长率) / 63.2% (每股经营收益年增长率)
As the table tells you, our investments per share increased in 1996 by 29.0% and our non-investment earnings grew by 63.2%. Our goal is to keep the numbers in both columns moving ahead at a reasonable (or, better yet, unreasonable) pace.
正如表中所示，1996年我们每股投资增长了29.0%，非投资收益增长了63.2%。我们的目标是保持这两列数字以合理（或者更理想地说，超乎寻常）的速度持续增长。
Our expectations, however, are tempered by two realities. First, our past rates of growth cannot be matched nor even approached: Berkshire's equity capital is now large - in fact, fewer than ten businesses in America have capital larger - and an abundance of funds tends to dampen returns. Second, whatever our rate of progress, it will not be smooth: Year-to-year moves in the first column of the table above will be influenced in a major way by fluctuations in securities markets; the figures in the second column will be affected by wide swings in the profitability of our catastrophe-reinsurance business.
然而，我们的预期受到两个现实的制约。首先，我们过去增长的速度无法被复制，甚至难以接近：伯克希尔的权益资本现在已经很大——事实上，在美国拥有更大资本的企业不到十家——资金的充裕往往会抑制回报率。其次，无论我们以何种速度前进，这个过程都不会是平稳的：上表第一列的数据每年的变化将主要受证券市场波动的影响；第二列的数据则会受到我们巨灾再保险业务盈利能力大幅波动的影响。
In the table, the donations made pursuant to our shareholder-designated contributions program are charged against the second column, though we view them as a shareholder benefit rather than as an expense. All other corporate expenses are also charged against the second column. These costs may be lower than those of any other large American corporation: Our after-tax headquarters expense amounts to less than two basis points (1/50th of 1%) measured against net worth. Even so, Charlie used to think this expense percentage outrageously high, blaming it on my use of Berkshire's corporate jet, The Indefensible. But Charlie has recently experienced a "counter-revelation": With our purchase of FlightSafety, whose major activity is the training of corporate pilots, he now rhapsodizes at the mere mention of jets.
在表中，根据我们股东指定捐赠计划所进行的捐款被计入第二列，尽管我们认为这是一种对股东的福利而非支出。所有其他公司费用也都从第二列扣除。这些成本可能比任何其他大型美国公司的都要低：我们税后的总部运营费用相对于净资产而言还不到两个基点（即1%的1/50）。即便如此，查理过去一直认为这一比例高得离谱，并将其归咎于我对公司专机“The Indefensible”的使用。但查理最近经历了一次“反向启示”：随着我们收购了FlightSafety（其主要业务是培训企业飞行员），他现在一听到“飞机”就激动不已。
Seriously, costs matter. For example, equity mutual funds incur corporate expenses - largely payments to the funds' managers - that average about 100 basis points, a levy likely to cut the returns their investors earn by 10% or more over time. Charlie and I make no promises about Berkshire's results. We do promise you, however, that virtually all of the gains Berkshire makes will end up with shareholders. We are here to make money with you, not off you.
认真来说，成本确实重要。例如，股票型共同基金所产生的公司开支——主要是支付给基金经理的费用——平均约为100个基点，这种成本长期来看可能会使投资者的回报减少10%或更多。查理和我不会对伯克希尔的业绩做任何承诺。但我们的确可以向您保证，伯克希尔几乎所有的收益最终都会归属股东。我们是为了与您一起赚钱，而不是靠您赚钱。
# The Relationship of Intrinsic Value to Market Price
（内在价值与市场价格的关系）
In last year's letter, with Berkshire shares selling at $36,000, I told you: (1) Berkshire's gain in market value in recent years had outstripped its gain in intrinsic value, even though the latter gain had been highly satisfactory; (2) that kind of overperformance could not continue indefinitely; (3) Charlie and I did not at that moment consider Berkshire to be undervalued.
在去年的信中，当时伯克希尔的股价为每股36,000美元，我曾告诉过您三点：(1) 近年来伯克希尔的市场价值增长超过了其内在价值的增长，尽管后者本身已经非常令人满意；(2) 这种超额表现不可能无限持续下去；(3) 查理和我当时并不认为伯克希尔被低估了。
Since I set down those cautions, Berkshire's intrinsic value has increased very significantly - aided in a major way by a stunning performance at GEICO that I will tell you more about later - while the market price of our shares has changed little. This, of course, means that in 1996 Berkshire's stock underperformed the business. Consequently, today's price/value relationship is both much different from what it was a year ago and, as Charlie and I see it, more appropriate.
自从我写下那些警示之后，伯克希尔的内在价值显著上升——其中很大程度得益于GEICO令人惊艳的表现，稍后我会进一步说明——而我们的股价却几乎没有变化。这当然意味着，1996年伯克希尔的股票表现落后于公司基本面。因此，目前的价格/价值关系不仅与一年前大不相同，而且用查理和的眼光来看，也更为合理。
Over time, the aggregate gains made by Berkshire shareholders must of necessity match the business gains of the company. When the stock temporarily overperforms or underperforms the business, a limited number of shareholders - either sellers or buyers - receive outsized benefits at the expense of those they trade with. Generally, the sophisticated have an edge over the innocents in this game.
从长远来看，伯克希尔股东所获得的整体收益必然要与公司经营成果相匹配。当股票价格暂时优于或劣于公司基本面时，少数股东（无论是卖出者还是买入者）会在交易中获得不成比例的好处，而代价则是由与其交易的其他股东承担。通常在这个游戏中，精明的一方总是占优势，而纯朴的人往往吃亏。
Though our primary goal is to maximize the amount that our shareholders, in total, reap from their ownership of Berkshire, we wish also to minimize the benefits going to some shareholders at the expense of others. These are goals we would have were we managing a family partnership, and we believe they make equal sense for the manager of a public company. In a partnership, fairness requires that partnership interests be valued equitably when partners enter or exit; in a public company, fairness prevails when market price and intrinsic value are in sync. Obviously, they won't always meet that ideal, but a manager - by his policies and communications - can do much to foster equity.
尽管我们的主要目标是最大化股东整体从伯克希尔所有权中获得的收益，我们也希望尽量减少一部分股东从另一部分股东身上获取不当利益的情况。如果我们在管理一个家族合伙企业，也会追求这样的目标，我们认为这对公众公司的管理者同样有意义。在合伙制中，公平意味着合伙人进入或退出时，合伙权益应被公正估值；在公众公司中，当市场价格与内在价值一致时，才体现了公平。显然，理想状态并非总能实现，但管理层可以通过政策和沟通在很大程度上促进公平。
Of course, the longer a shareholder holds his shares, the more bearing Berkshire's business results will have on his financial experience - and the less it will matter what premium or discount to intrinsic value prevails when he buys and sells his stock. That's one reason we hope to attract owners with long-term horizons. Overall, I think we have succeeded in that pursuit. Berkshire probably ranks number one among large American corporations in the percentage of its shares held by owners with a long-term view.
当然，股东持有股份的时间越长，伯克希尔的经营成果对其财务回报的影响就越显著，而他在买入或卖出股票时所支付的溢价或折价也就变得越不重要。这也是我们希望吸引具有长期投资视野股东的原因之一。总体而言，我认为我们在这一方面取得了成功。在美国大型企业中，伯克希尔的股份中由具备长期视角的股东持有的比例很可能排名第一。
# Acquisitions of 1996
（1996年的并购）
We made two acquisitions in 1996, both possessing exactly the qualities we seek - excellent business economics and an outstanding manager.
1996年我们完成了两笔收购，这两家公司都恰好具备我们所追求的特质——出色的商业模式经济性和杰出的管理者。
The first acquisition was Kansas Bankers Surety (KBS), an insurance company whose name describes its specialty. The company, which does business in 22 states, has an extraordinary underwriting record, achieved through the efforts of Don Towle, an extraordinary manager. Don has developed first-hand relationships with hundreds of bankers and knows every detail of his operation. He thinks of himself as running a company that is "his," an attitude we treasure at Berkshire. Because of its relatively small size, we placed KBS with Wesco, our 80%-owned subsidiary, which has wanted to expand its insurance operations.
第一笔收购是Kansas Bankers Surety（KBS），一家名字本身就揭示了其专业领域的保险公司。该公司在22个州开展业务，承保记录极为优异，这归功于一位非凡的经理人Don Towle。Don亲自与数百位银行家建立了良好关系，并对其业务的每个细节都了如指掌。他把自己当作这家公司的主人来经营，这种态度正是伯克希尔所珍视的。由于其规模相对较小，我们将KBS并入了Wesco（我们持股80%的子公司），该公司一直希望扩大其保险业务。
You might be interested in the carefully-crafted and sophisticated acquisition strategy that allowed Berkshire to nab this deal. Early in 1996 I was invited to the 40th birthday party of my nephew's wife, Jane Rogers. My taste for social events being low, I immediately, and in my standard, gracious way, began to invent reasons for skipping the event. The party planners then countered brilliantly by offering me a seat next to a man I always enjoy, Jane's dad, Roy Dinsdale - so I went.
您或许会对伯克希尔成功拿下这笔交易背后那精心设计且巧妙的战略感兴趣。1996年初，我受邀参加我侄媳妇Jane Rogers的40岁生日聚会。我对社交活动兴趣不大，立刻以一贯礼貌的方式开始找借口推脱。策划方随即灵机一动，安排我坐在一位我一直很欣赏的人旁边——Jane的父亲Roy Dinsdale。于是我去了。
The party took place on January 26. Though the music was loud - Why must bands play as if they will be paid by the decibel? - I just managed to hear Roy say he'd come from a directors meeting at Kansas Bankers Surety, a company I'd always admired. I shouted back that he should let me know if it ever became available for purchase.
聚会是在1月26日举行的。虽然音乐声震耳欲聋——为什么乐队非要演奏得像按分贝计费一样？——我还是勉强听清了Roy说他刚参加完Kansas Bankers Surety的董事会议，这家公司我一直非常钦佩。我大声回应他说，如果公司有出售意向，请务必通知我。
On February 12, I got the following letter from Roy: "Dear Warren: Enclosed is the annual financial information on Kansas Bankers Surety. This is the company that we talked about at Janie's party. If I can be of any further help, please let me know." On February 13, I told Roy we would pay $75 million for the company - and before long we had a deal. I'm now scheming to get invited to Jane's next party.
2月12日，我收到了Roy寄来的以下信件：“亲爱的沃伦：随信附上Kansas Bankers Surety的年度财务资料。这就是我们在Janie聚会上谈到的那家公司。如果我能提供进一步帮助，请随时告知。”2月13日，我告诉Roy我们愿意出价7,500万美元购买该公司——不久后我们就达成了协议。我现在正盘算着如何再次被邀请参加Jane的下一次聚会。
Our other acquisition in 1996 - FlightSafety International, the world's leader in the training of pilots - was far larger, at about $1.5 billion, but had an equally serendipitous origin. The heroes of this story are first, Richard Sercer, a Tucson aviation consultant, and second, his wife, Alma Murphy, an ophthalmology graduate of Harvard Medical School, who in 1990 wore down her husband's reluctance and got him to buy Berkshire stock. Since then, the two have attended all our Annual Meetings, but I didn't get to know them personally.
我们在1996年的另一项收购——FlightSafety International，全球飞行员培训行业的领军企业——规模要大得多，约为15亿美元，但它的来源也同样充满偶然性。这个故事的主角首先是理查德·瑟瑟（Richard Sercer），一位来自图森的航空顾问；其次是他的妻子阿尔玛·墨菲（Alma Murphy），哈佛医学院的眼科博士。1990年，她最终说服丈夫买进了伯克希尔的股票。从那时起，两人每年都参加我们的股东大会，但我并未与他们有过私人交往。
Fortunately, Richard had also been a long-time shareholder of FlightSafety, and it occurred to him last year that the two companies would make a good fit. He knew our acquisition criteria, and he thought that Al Ueltschi, FlightSafety's 79-year-old CEO, might want to make a deal that would both give him a home for his company and a security in payment that he would feel comfortable owning throughout his lifetime. So in July, Richard wrote Bob Denham, CEO of Salomon Inc, suggesting that he explore the possibility of a merger.
幸运的是，理查德也是FlightSafety的长期股东，他去年想到这两家公司或许可以结合。他了解我们的并购标准，并认为FlightSafety 79岁的CEO阿尔·尤尔奇（Al Ueltschi）可能希望达成一笔交易：既能为公司找到一个合适的归宿，又能获得一种他在有生之年都愿意持有的支付证券。于是，他在7月写信给所罗门公司的CEO鲍勃·丹纳姆（Bob Denham），建议他探索两家公司合并的可能性。
Bob took it from there, and on September 18, Al and I met in New York. I had long been familiar with FlightSafety's business, and in about 60 seconds I knew that Al was exactly our kind of manager. A month later, we had a contract. Because Charlie and I wished to minimize the issuance of Berkshire shares, the transaction we structured gave FlightSafety shareholders a choice of cash or stock but carried terms that encouraged those who were tax-indifferent to take cash. This nudge led to about 51% of FlightSafety's shares being exchanged for cash, 41% for Berkshire A and 8% for Berkshire B.
接下来由鲍勃推进，9月18日，我和阿尔在纽约见面。我早已熟悉FlightSafety的业务，在大约60秒内我就确信，阿尔正是我们想要的那种经理人。一个月后，我们便达成了协议。由于查理和我都希望尽量减少伯克希尔股票的发行，我们设计的交易方案允许FlightSafety的股东选择现金或股票支付，但条款上鼓励那些对税务不敏感的股东选择现金。这一引导促使约51%的股份以现金方式被收购，41%换成了伯克希尔A股，8%换成了B股。
Al has had a lifelong love affair with aviation and actually piloted Charles Lindbergh. After a barnstorming career in the 1930s, he began working for Juan Trippe, Pan Am's legendary chief. In 1951, while still at Pan Am, Al founded FlightSafety, subsequently building it into a simulator manufacturer and a worldwide trainer of pilots (single-engine, helicopter, jet and marine). The company operates in 41 locations, outfitted with 175 simulators of planes ranging from the very small, such as Cessna 210s, to Boeing 747s. Simulators are not cheap - they can cost as much as $19 million - so this business, unlike many of our operations, is capital intensive. About half of the company's revenues are derived from the training of corporate pilots, with most of the balance coming from airlines and the military.
阿尔一生都热爱航空事业，甚至曾为查尔斯·林德伯格（Charles Lindbergh）驾驶过飞机。他在1930年代从事过飞行表演，之后加入泛美航空的传奇领袖胡安·特里普（Juan Trippe）麾下工作。1951年，仍在泛美航空任职期间，阿尔创立了FlightSafety，并将其发展为一家模拟器制造商以及全球范围内的飞行员培训机构（涵盖单引擎、直升机、喷气式飞机及海事飞行员）。该公司在全球41个地点运营，配备了175台飞行模拟器，机型从小型飞机如塞斯纳210到波音747应有尽有。模拟器并不便宜——每台价格可达1,900万美元——因此这项业务与其他许多伯克希尔业务不同，属于资本密集型。公司约一半收入来自于企业飞行员的培训，其余大部分则来自航空公司和军方客户。
Al may be 79, but he looks and acts about 55. He will run operations just as he has in the past: We never fool with success. I have told him that though we don't believe in splitting Berkshire stock, we will split his age 2-for-1 when he hits 100.
尽管阿尔已经79岁，但他看起来和表现得像55岁一样。他将继续像过去那样管理运营：我们从不会去干扰成功的模式。我曾告诉他，虽然我们不相信拆分伯克希尔的股票，但等他年满100岁时，我们会把他的年龄按2比1的比例“拆分”。
An observer might conclude from our hiring practices that Charlie and I were traumatized early in life by an EEOC bulletin on age discrimination. The real explanation, however, is self-interest: It's difficult to teach a new dog old tricks. The many Berkshire managers who are past 70 hit home runs today at the same pace that long ago gave them reputations as young slugging sensations. Therefore, to get a job with us, just employ the tactic of the 76-year-old who persuaded a dazzling beauty of 25 to marry him. "How did you ever get her to accept?" asked his envious contemporaries. The comeback: "I told her I was 86."
有观察者可能会从我们的招聘习惯中得出结论：查理和我在年轻时曾因美国平等就业机会委员会（EEOC）发布的反年龄歧视公告而受到心理冲击。但真实原因其实出于私利：教一只新狗学会老把戏并不容易。伯克希尔旗下许多超过70岁的管理者如今依然保持着当年让他们成为年轻重炮手时的优异表现节奏。因此，想在我们这里获得职位？不妨效仿那位76岁的先生，成功追求了一位25岁的绝世美女。“你是怎么让她答应的？”羡慕他的同龄人问道。他的回答是：“我说我86岁了。”
And now we pause for our usual commercial: If you own a large business with good economic characteristics and wish to become associated with an exceptional collection of businesses having similar characteristics, Berkshire may well be the home you seek. Our requirements are set forth on page 21. If your company meets them - and if I fail to make the next birthday party you attend - give me a call.
现在插入我们惯常的广告：如果您拥有一家具有良好经济特征的大型企业，并希望加入一群拥有相似特征的杰出企业之中，伯克希尔很可能正是您寻找的归属。我们的并购要求详见第21页。如果您的公司符合这些条件——而且下次您参加生日聚会时我没到场——请务必给我打电话。
# Insurance Operations - Overview
保险运营 — 概览
Our insurance business was terrific in 1996. In both primary insurance, where GEICO is our main unit, and in our "super-cat" reinsurance business, results were outstanding.
1996年我们的保险业务表现出色。无论是以GEICO为主导的直接保险业务，还是我们的“超级巨灾”再保险业务，业绩都非常突出。
As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our insurance business is, first, the amount of "float" we generate and, second, its cost to us. These are matters that are important for you to understand because float is a major component of Berkshire's intrinsic value that is not reflected in book value.
正如我们在以往报告中所解释的那样，保险业务的关键首先是它产生的“浮存金”数量，其次才是其成本。这些内容对您理解非常重要，因为浮存金是伯克希尔内在价值的重要组成部分，但它并未体现在账面价值中。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid. Secondly, the premiums that an insurer takes in typically do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is an albatross if the cost of its float is higher than market rates for money.
首先，浮存金是我们持有但不属于我们的资金。在保险业务中，浮存金产生于保费先于理赔支出到账的情况。其次，保险公司收取的保费通常不足以覆盖其最终必须支付的损失和费用。这导致出现“承保亏损”，即浮存金的成本。如果某保险业务的浮存金成本长期低于公司获取资金的其他成本，那么这项业务就具备价值。但如果浮存金成本高于市场资金利率，则该业务就会变成一种负担。
As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's insurance business has been a huge winner. For the table, we have calculated our float - which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last four, our cost of float has been negative. In effect, we have been paid for holding money.
如下表所示，伯克希尔的保险业务表现极为出色。为了编制此表，我们计算了浮存金——相对于我们的保费规模而言数量巨大——方法是将损失准备金、理赔调整准备金、再保险承担下的资金、未赚取保费准备金相加，然后减去代理余额、预付获取成本、预缴税款以及适用于再保险承担的递延费用。我们的浮存金成本由承保亏损或利润决定。在我们实现承保盈利的年份（如最近四年），浮存金成本为负数。实际上，我们因持有这些资金而获得了报酬。
| Year | Underwriting Loss (百万美元) | Average Float (百万美元) | Cost of Funds (第1列与第2列之比) | Yearend Yield on Long-Term Govt. Bonds |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1967 | profit | 17.3 | 小于零 | 5.50% |
| 1968 | profit | 19.9 | 小于零 | 5.90% |
| 1969 | profit | 23.4 | 小于零 | 6.79% |
| 1970 | 0.37 | 32.4 | 1.14% | 6.25% |
| 1971 | profit | 52.5 | 小于零 | 5.81% |
| 1972 | profit | 69.5 | 小于零 | 5.82% |
| 1973 | profit | 73.3 | 小于零 | 7.27% |
| 1974 | 7.36 | 79.1 | 9.30% | 8.13% |
| 1975 | 11.35 | 87.6 | 12.96% | 8.03% |
| 1976 | profit | 102.6 | 小于零 | 7.30% |
| 1977 | profit | 139.0 | 小于零 | 7.97% |
| 1978 | profit | 190.4 | 小于零 | 8.93% |
| 1979 | profit | 227.3 | 小于零 | 10.08% |
| 1980 | profit | 237.0 | 小于零 | 11.94% |
| 1981 | profit | 228.4 | 小于零 | 13.61% |
| 1982 | 21.56 | 220.6 | 9.77% | 10.64% |
| 1983 | 33.87 | 231.3 | 14.64% | 11.84% |
| 1984 | 48.06 | 253.2 | 18.98% | 11.58% |
| 1985 | 44.23 | 390.2 | 11.34% | 9.34% |
| 1986 | 55.84 | 797.5 | 7.00% | 7.60% |
| 1987 | 55.43 | 1,266.7 | 4.38% | 8.95% |
| 1988 | 11.08 | 1,497.7 | 0.74% | 9.00% |
| 1989 | 24.40 | 1,541.3 | 1.58% | 7.97% |
| 1990 | 26.65 | 1,637.3 | 1.63% | 8.24% |
| 1991 | 119.59 | 1,895.0 | 6.31% | 7.40% |
| 1992 | 108.96 | 2,290.4 | 4.76% | 7.39% |
| 1993 | profit | 2,624.7 | 小于零 | 6.35% |
| 1994 | profit | 3,056.6 | 小于零 | 7.88% |
| 1995 | profit | 3,607.2 | 小于零 | 5.95% |
| 1996 | profit | 6,702.0 | 小于零 | 6.64% |
Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float has grown at an annual compounded rate of 22.3%. In more years than not, our cost of funds has been less than nothing. This access to "free" money has boosted Berkshire's performance in a major way. Moreover, our acquisition of GEICO materially increases the probability that we can continue to obtain "free" funds in increasing amounts.
自1967年我们进入保险行业以来，浮存金以年复合增长率22.3%的速度增长。在多数年份中，我们的资金成本都低于零。这种获得“免费”资金的能力极大地提升了伯克希尔的整体表现。此外，我们收购GEICO也显著提高了未来持续获得更多“免费”资金的可能性。
# Super-Cat Insurance
超级巨灾保险
As in the past three years, we once again stress that the good results we are reporting for Berkshire stem in part from our super-cat business having a lucky year. In this operation, we sell policies that insurance and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of mega-catastrophes. Since truly major catastrophes are rare occurrences, our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits in most years - and to record a huge loss occasionally. In other words, the attractiveness of our super-cat business will take a great many years to measure. What you must understand, however, is that a truly terrible year in the super-cat business is not a possibility - it's a certainty. The only question is when it will come.
与过去三年一样，我们再次强调：伯克希尔今年报告的良好业绩部分归功于我们的超级巨灾保险业务恰好迎来了一个幸运年景。在这项业务中，我们向保险公司和再保险公司出售保单，帮助它们防范大规模灾难事件的影响。由于真正重大的灾难极为罕见，因此我们的超级巨灾业务大多数年份会带来可观利润，偶尔也会出现巨额亏损。换句话说，这项业务的吸引力需要经过多年才能衡量清楚。但您必须明白的是，在超级巨灾保险领域遭遇极端糟糕的一年并不是一种可能性——而是必然会发生的事。唯一的问题是何时发生。
I emphasize this lugubrious point because I would not want you to panic and sell your Berkshire stock upon hearing that some large catastrophe had cost us a significant amount. If you would tend to react that way, you should not own Berkshire shares now, just as you should entirely avoid owning stocks if a crashing market would lead you to panic and sell. Selling fine businesses on "scary" news is usually a bad decision. (Robert Woodruff, the business genius who built Coca-Cola over many decades and who owned a huge position in the company, was once asked when it might be a good time to sell Coke stock. Woodruff had a simple answer: "I don't know. I've never sold any.")
我之所以强调这个令人沮丧的观点，是因为我不希望当您听到某次重大灾难导致我们遭受重大损失的消息时惊慌抛售伯克希尔股票。如果您倾向于这样反应，那么现在就不应持有伯克希尔股份；就像如果市场暴跌会让您恐慌并抛售股票，那您也应该完全避免持有任何股票。在“坏消息”下抛售优质企业通常是一个错误决策。（罗伯特·伍德拉夫是一位历经数十年打造可口可乐帝国的商业天才，他本人持有大量公司股份。曾有人问他什么时候适合卖出可口可乐股票。他的回答很简单：“我不知道。我从未卖过。”）
In our super-cat operation, our customers are insurers that are exposed to major earnings volatility and that wish to reduce it. The product we sell - for what we hope is an appropriate price - is our willingness to shift that volatility to our own books. Gyrations in Berkshire's earnings don't bother us in the least: Charlie and I would much rather earn a lumpy 15% over time than a smooth 12%. (After all, our earnings swing wildly on a daily and weekly basis - why should we demand that smoothness accompany each orbit that the earth makes of the sun?) We are most comfortable with that thinking, however, when we have shareholder/partners who can also accept volatility, and that's why we regularly repeat our cautions.
在超级巨灾保险业务中，我们的客户是那些面临巨大盈利波动风险并希望减少该风险的保险公司。我们所销售的产品——希望是以合理价格——是我们愿意将这种波动性转移到自己账簿上的承诺。伯克希尔盈利的波动对我们来说毫不困扰：查理和我都宁愿长期获得起伏不定的15%，也不愿获得平稳的12%。（毕竟，我们的盈利每天和每周都在剧烈波动——为什么我们要期待每年地球绕太阳一圈时都保持平稳呢？）不过，只有当我们拥有能够接受波动性的股东/合伙人时，我们才最安心地坚持这一理念，这也是我们不断重复提醒的原因。
We took on some major super-cat exposures during 1996. At mid-year we wrote a contract with Allstate that covers Florida hurricanes, and though there are no definitive records that would allow us to prove this point, we believe that to have then been the largest single catastrophe risk ever assumed by one company for its own account. Later in the year, however, we wrote a policy for the California Earthquake Authority that goes into effect on April 1, 1997, and that exposes us to a loss more than twice that possible under the Florida contract. Again we retained all the risk for our own account. Large as these coverages are, Berkshire's after-tax "worst-case" loss from a true mega-catastrophe is probably no more than $600 million, which is less than 3% of our book value and 1.5% of our market value. To gain some perspective on this exposure, look at the table on page 2 and note the much greater volatility that security markets have delivered us.
我们在1996年承担了一些重大的超级巨灾风险。年中，我们与Allstate签订了一份涵盖佛罗里达飓风的合同，虽然没有确切记录可以证明这一点，但我们相信这是当时一家公司为自己账户承保的最大单一灾难风险。然而，当年晚些时候，我们又为加州地震管理局签发了一项将于1997年4月1日生效的保单，其可能导致的损失超过佛罗里达合同可能损失的两倍以上。同样，我们自行保留了全部风险。尽管这些保障范围巨大，伯克希尔在一次真正超级灾难下的税后“最坏情况”损失估计不超过6亿美元，仅占账面价值的不到3%，市值的1.5%。为了更好地理解这一风险敞口，请参阅第2页的表格，并注意证券市场本身带来的波动远大于此。
In the super-cat business, we have three major competitive advantages. First, the parties buying reinsurance from us know that we both can and will pay under the most adverse of circumstances. Were a truly cataclysmic disaster to occur, it is not impossible that a financial panic would quickly follow. If that happened, there could well be respected reinsurers that would have difficulty paying at just the moment that their clients faced extraordinary needs. Indeed, one reason we never "lay off" part of the risks we insure is that we have reservations about our ability to collect from others when disaster strikes. When it's Berkshire promising, insureds know with certainty that they can collect promptly.
在超级巨灾保险领域，我们拥有三大竞争优势。首先，从我们这里购买再保险的客户知道，在最不利的情况下我们不仅有能力支付赔款，也有意愿履行赔付义务。如果真的发生一场毁灭性的灾难，随之而来的是金融恐慌，这并非不可能。在这种情况下，一些受人尊敬的再保险公司可能会在客户最需要赔付时陷入支付困难。事实上，我们从不“转嫁”部分我们承保的风险，其中一个原因就是我们对灾难发生时能否从其他公司追偿持怀疑态度。当是由伯克希尔做出承诺时，投保方确信他们能迅速获得赔付。
Our second advantage - somewhat related - is subtle but important. After a mega-catastrophe, insurers might well find it difficult to obtain reinsurance even though their need for coverage would then be particularly great. At such a time, Berkshire would without question have very substantial capacity available - but it will naturally be our long-standing clients that have first call on it. That business reality has made major insurers and reinsurers throughout the world realize the desirability of doing business with us. Indeed, we are currently getting sizable "stand-by" fees from reinsurers that are simply nailing down their ability to get coverage from us should the market tighten.
我们的第二个优势——某种程度上与此相关——虽不显眼但至关重要。在一次超级灾难之后，保险公司即使急需保障也可能难以获得再保险。在这种时刻，伯克希尔无疑将具备相当大的承保能力——但优先使用权自然属于我们长期合作的老客户。这一现实使全球主要保险公司和再保险公司认识到与我们合作的重要性。事实上，目前我们已开始从再保险公司那里收取可观的“备用”费用，他们只是为了确保在市场紧缩时能够从我们这里获得保障。
Our final competitive advantage is that we can provide dollar coverages of a size neither matched nor approached elsewhere in the industry. Insurers looking for huge covers know that a single call to Berkshire will produce a firm and immediate offering.
我们的最后一个竞争优势在于，我们能提供的美元保障金额度在整个行业中无人能及或接近。寻找巨额保障的保险公司知道，只需给伯克希尔打一通电话，就能立即获得明确且坚定的报价。
A few facts about our exposure to California earthquakes - our largest risk - seem in order. The Northridge quake of 1994 laid homeowners' losses on insurers that greatly exceeded what computer models had told them to expect. Yet the intensity of that quake was mild compared to the "worst-case" possibility for California. Understandably, insurers became - ahem - shaken and started contemplating a retreat from writing earthquake coverage into their homeowners' policies.
关于我们在加州地震方面的风险敞口——这是我们最大的风险之一——有必要说明一些事实。1994年的北岭地震造成的房屋损失远超保险公司计算机模型预测的预期。然而，那次地震的强度与加州可能面临的“最坏情况”相比仍属温和。可以理解的是，保险公司变得——咳咳——惊慌失措，并开始考虑从住宅保险政策中撤回地震保障。
In a thoughtful response, Chuck Quackenbush, California's insurance commissioner, designed a new residential earthquake policy to be written by a state-sponsored insurer, The California Earthquake Authority. This entity, which went into operation on December 1, 1996, needed large layers of reinsurance - and that's where we came in. Berkshire's layer of approximately $1 billion will be called upon if the Authority's aggregate losses in the period ending March 31, 2001 exceed about $5 billion. (The press originally reported larger figures, but these would have applied only if all California insurers had entered into the arrangement; instead only 72% signed up.)
作为深思熟虑的应对措施，加州保险专员查克·夸肯布什（Chuck Quackenbush）设计了一种新的住宅地震保险产品，由州政府支持的机构“加州地震管理局”（California Earthquake Authority）承保。该机构于1996年12月1日开始运作，需要大量再保险保障——而我们正是在这一环节发挥作用。伯克希尔承担了大约10亿美元的风险层，当截至2001年3月31日管理局的累计损失超过约50亿美元时，我们将负责赔付。（媒体最初报道的金额更大，但那些数字只适用于所有加州保险公司都加入该计划的情况；实际上只有72%的公司签署了协议。）
So what are the true odds of our having to make a payout during the policy's term? We don't know - nor do we think computer models will help us, since we believe the precision they project is a chimera. In fact, such models can lull decision-makers into a false sense of security and thereby increase their chances of making a really huge mistake. We've already seen such debacles in both insurance and investments. Witness "portfolio insurance," whose destructive effects in the 1987 market crash led one wag to observe that it was the computers that should have been jumping out of windows.
那么，在这份保单期限内我们必须进行赔付的真实概率是多少呢？我们也不知道——而且我们认为计算机模型也无法帮助我们，因为我们相信它们所展示的精确性其实是一种幻觉。事实上，这类模型会让决策者陷入虚假的安全感，从而增加他们犯下重大错误的可能性。我们在保险和投资领域都已经看到过这样的灾难性后果。“组合保险”（Portfolio Insurance）就是一个例子，它在1987年股灾中的破坏性之大，甚至让一位评论者调侃说：跳楼的应该是电脑，而不是人。
Even if perfection in assessing risks is unattainable, insurers can underwrite sensibly. After all, you need not know a man's precise age to know that he is old enough to vote nor know his exact weight to recognize his need to diet. In insurance, it is essential to remember that virtually all surprises are unpleasant, and with that in mind we try to price our super-cat exposures so that about 90% of total premiums end up being eventually paid out in losses and expenses. Over time, we will find out how smart our pricing has been, but that will not be quickly. The super-cat business is just like the investment business in that it often takes a long time to find out whether you knew what you were doing.
即便在风险评估方面无法做到完美，保险公司仍然可以做出明智的承保决策。毕竟，你不需要知道一个人的确切年龄就能判断他是否已达到投票年龄，也不需要知道他的确切体重就能看出他需要节食。在保险业中，我们必须牢记一点：几乎所有意外都是负面的。基于这一点，我们在为超级巨灾风险定价时力求使总保费的大约90%最终用于赔付损失和支出。随着时间推移，我们会知道自己当初的定价有多聪明——但这个过程不会很快。超级巨灾保险业务就像投资业务一样，往往需要很长时间才能判断你是否真正了解自己在做什么。
What I can state with certainty, however, is that we have the best person in the world to run our super-cat business: Ajit Jain, whose value to Berkshire is simply enormous. In the reinsurance field, disastrous propositions abound. I know that because I personally embraced all too many of these in the 1970s and also because GEICO has a large runoff portfolio made up of foolish contracts written in the early-1980s, able though its then-management was. Ajit, I can assure you, won't make mistakes of this type.
但我可以肯定地说，我们拥有世界上最适合运营超级巨灾保险业务的人：阿吉特·杰恩（Ajit Jain），他对伯克希尔的价值简直无可估量。在再保险领域，失败的提案比比皆是。我对此非常清楚，因为我本人在1970年代就曾参与过太多此类错误交易，此外GEICO也有一大笔“清盘”资产，是由上世纪80年代初虽然有能力但判断失误的管理层签署的愚蠢合同。我可以向您保证，阿吉特绝不会犯这种错误。
I have mentioned that a mega-catastrophe might cause a catastrophe in the financial markets, a possibility that is unlikely but not far-fetched. Were the catastrophe a quake in California of sufficient magnitude to tap our coverage, we would almost certainly be damaged in other ways as well. For example, See's, Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac could be hit hard. All in all, though, we can handle this aggregation of exposures.
我之前提到过，一场超级灾难可能会引发金融市场上的连锁灾难，这虽不常见但也并非天方夜谭。如果加州发生了一场足以触发我们保障责任的大地震，我们几乎肯定会遭受其他方面的损失。例如，See's糖果、富国银行（Wells Fargo）和房地美（Freddie Mac）都可能受到严重冲击。不过总体而言，我们能够承受这些风险的叠加效应。
In this respect, as in others, we try to "reverse engineer" our future at Berkshire, bearing in mind Charlie's dictum: "All I want to know is where I'm going to die so I'll never go there." (Inverting really works: Try singing country western songs backwards and you will quickly regain your house, your car and your wife.) If we can't tolerate a possible consequence, remote though it may be, we steer clear of planting its seeds. That is why we don't borrow big amounts and why we make sure that our super-cat business losses, large though the maximums may sound, will not put a major dent in Berkshire's intrinsic value.
在这方面，正如在其他方面一样，我们努力以“逆向工程”的方式来规划伯克希尔的未来，牢记查理的一句名言：“我只想知道我会死在哪里，那我就永远不去那个地方。”（逆向思维真的有用：试着倒着唱乡村西部歌曲，你很快就能重新赢回你的房子、车子和妻子。）如果我们不能容忍某种潜在后果，即使它发生的可能性极低，我们也坚决避免埋下它的种子。这就是为什么我们不会大量借贷，以及为什么我们要确保即使听起来最大规模的超级巨灾损失也不会对伯克希尔的内在价值造成实质性打击。
# Insurance - GEICO and Other Primary Operations
保险业务 — GEICO及其他主营业务
When we moved to total ownership of GEICO early last year, our expectations were high - and they are all being exceeded. That is true from both a business and personal perspective: GEICO's operating chief, Tony Nicely, is a superb business manager and a delight to work with. Under almost any conditions, GEICO would be an exceptionally valuable asset. With Tony at the helm, it is reaching levels of performance that the organization would only a few years ago have thought impossible.
去年年初完成对GEICO的全资收购时，我们的期望值很高——而现在这些期望正在被不断超越。无论是从业务还是个人角度来看都是如此：GEICO的运营主管托尼·尼利（Tony Nicely）是一位极其出色的企业管理者，与他共事令人愉快。在几乎任何情况下，GEICO都是一项极为宝贵的资产。而在托尼的领导下，公司的业绩表现达到了几年前还被认为不可能实现的高度。
There's nothing esoteric about GEICO's success: The company's competitive strength flows directly from its position as a low-cost operator. Low costs permit low prices, and low prices attract and retain good policyholders. The final segment of a virtuous circle is drawn when policyholders recommend us to their friends. GEICO gets more than one million referrals annually and these produce more than half of our new business, an advantage that gives us enormous savings in acquisition expenses - and that makes our costs still lower.
GEICO的成功并没有什么神秘之处：它的竞争优势直接来自于其低成本运营模式。低成本意味着低价位，而低价吸引并留住优质客户。良性循环的最后一个环节是客户主动将我们推荐给朋友。GEICO每年获得超过一百万次客户推荐，其中超过一半转化为新业务，这一优势为我们节省了巨额获客成本——进一步降低了我们的运营成本。
This formula worked in spades for GEICO in 1996: Its voluntary auto policy count grew 10%. During the previous 20 years, the company's best-ever growth for a year had been 8%, a rate achieved only once. Better yet, the growth in voluntary policies accelerated during the year, led by major gains in the nonstandard market, which has been an underdeveloped area at GEICO. I focus here on voluntary policies because the involuntary business we get from assigned risk pools and the like is unprofitable. Growth in that sector is most unwelcome.
这一模式在1996年为GEICO带来了巨大成功：其自愿购买的汽车保单数量增长了10%。在过去20年中，该公司年度最佳增长率仅为8%，而且仅出现过一次。更令人振奋的是，自愿型保单的增长速度在年内持续加快，主要得益于非标准市场（nonstandard market）的重大突破——这是GEICO过去相对薄弱的领域。我之所以强调“自愿型”保单，是因为我们通过分配风险池等渠道被动获得的业务并不盈利，这部分业务的增长是我们极不欢迎的。
GEICO's growth would mean nothing if it did not produce reasonable underwriting profits. Here, too, the news is good: Last year we hit our underwriting targets and then some. Our goal, however, is not to widen our profit margin but rather to enlarge the price advantage we offer customers. Given that strategy, we believe that 1997's growth will easily top that of last year.
如果GEICO的增长未能带来合理的承保利润，那么这种增长就没有意义。在这方面，好消息同样存在：去年我们不仅达成了承保目标，甚至还有所超越。但我们的目标不是扩大利润率，而是进一步扩大提供给客户的价格优势。基于这一战略，我们相信1997年的增长将轻松超过去年水平。
We expect new competitors to enter the direct-response market, and some of our existing competitors are likely to expand geographically. Nonetheless, the economies of scale we enjoy should allow us to maintain or even widen the protective moat surrounding our economic castle. We do best on costs in geographical areas in which we enjoy high market penetration. As our policy count grows, concurrently delivering gains in penetration, we expect to drive costs materially lower. GEICO's sustainable cost advantage is what attracted me to the company way back in 1951, when the entire business was valued at $7 million. It is also why I felt Berkshire should pay $2.3 billion last year for the 49% of the company that we didn't then own.
我们预计会有新的竞争者进入直销市场，一些现有竞争对手也可能扩大地域覆盖范围。尽管如此，我们享受的规模经济应能使我们维持甚至进一步拓宽围绕我们经济城堡的护城河。我们在市场渗透率高的地区成本控制得最好。随着保单数量的增长，市场渗透率同步提升，我们预计成本还将显著下降。GEICO可持续的成本优势是我早在1951年首次投资这家公司时就被吸引的原因，当时整个企业的估值仅为700万美元。这也是我为何认为去年支付23亿美元收购剩余49%股权是合理之举。
Maximizing the results of a wonderful business requires management and focus. Lucky for us, we have in Tony a superb manager whose business focus never wavers. Wanting also to get the entire GEICO organization concentrating as he does, we needed a compensation plan that was itself sharply focused - and immediately after our purchase, we put one in.
要充分发挥一家优秀企业的潜力，需要出色的管理和专注力。对我们来说幸运的是，托尼就是这样一位始终专注于业务的卓越管理者。为了让GEICO全体员工都能像他一样专注，我们需要制定一套本身也非常聚焦的薪酬激励机制——在完成收购后不久，我们就实施了这一机制。
Today, the bonuses received by dozens of top executives, starting with Tony, are based upon only two key variables: (1) growth in voluntary auto policies and (2) underwriting profitability on "seasoned" auto business (meaning policies that have been on the books for more than one year). In addition, we use the same yardsticks to calculate the annual contribution to the company's profit-sharing plan. Everyone at GEICO knows what counts.
如今，包括托尼在内的数十位高级管理人员的奖金完全取决于两个关键指标：(1) 自愿型汽车保单的增长；(2) “成熟期”汽车业务（即持有时间超过一年的保单）的承保盈利能力。此外，我们还使用相同的衡量标准来计算公司利润分享计划的年度拨款。GEICO的每一位员工都知道什么是最重要的。
The GEICO plan exemplifies Berkshire's incentive compensation principles: Goals should be (1) tailored to the economics of the specific operating business; (2) simple in character so that the degree to which they are being realized can be easily measured; and (3) directly related to the daily activities of plan participants. As a corollary, we shun "lottery ticket" arrangements, such as options on Berkshire shares, whose ultimate value - which could range from zero to huge - is totally out of the control of the person whose behavior we would like to affect. In our view, a system that produces quixotic payoffs will not only be wasteful for owners but may actually discourage the focused behavior we value in managers.
GEICO的激励机制体现了伯克希尔的薪酬激励原则：目标应当（1）根据具体业务的经济特性量身定制；（2）结构简单，便于衡量实际达成程度；（3）与参与者日常工作的核心内容直接挂钩。因此，我们拒绝采用类似“彩票”的安排，比如伯克希尔股票期权，因为其最终价值（可能从零到极高）完全不受相关人员行为的影响。我们认为，一种会产生非理性回报的体系不仅会浪费股东资源，反而可能削弱我们希望管理者具备的专注精神。
Every quarter, all 9,000 GEICO associates can see the results that determine our profit-sharing plan contribution. In 1996, they enjoyed the experience because the plan literally went off the chart that had been constructed at the start of the year. Even I knew the answer to that problem: Enlarge the chart. Ultimately, the results called for a record contribution of 16.9% ($40 million), compared to a five-year average of less than 10% for the comparable plans previously in effect. Furthermore, at Berkshire, we never greet good work by raising the bar. If GEICO's performance continues to improve, we will happily keep on making larger charts.
每季度，GEICO全部9,000名员工都能看到决定利润分享计划拨款的数据。1996年，他们享受了这一过程，因为实际结果远远超出了年初设定的图表范围。连我自己都知道这个问题的解决办法：把图表做大一点。最终结果要求我们做出创纪录的16.9%拨款（即4,000万美元），相比之下，此前类似计划过去五年的平均拨款还不到10%。此外，在伯克希尔，我们从不会因为出色表现而人为提高门槛。如果GEICO的表现继续提升，我们会心甘情愿地继续制作更大的图表。
Lou Simpson continues to manage GEICO's money in an outstanding manner: Last year, the equities in his portfolio outdid the S&P 500 by 6.2 percentage points. In Lou's part of GEICO's operation, we again tie compensation to performance - but to investment performance over a four-year period, not to underwriting results nor to the performance of GEICO as a whole. We think it foolish for an insurance company to pay bonuses that are tied to overall corporate results when great work on one side of the business - underwriting or investment - could conceivably be completely neutralized by bad work on the other. If you bat .350 at Berkshire, you can be sure you will get paid commensurately even if the rest of the team bats .200. In Lou and Tony, however, we are lucky to have Hall-of-Famers in both key positions.
路易·辛普森继续以卓越的方式管理GEICO的资金：去年，他投资组合中的股票回报率跑赢标普500指数6.2个百分点。在GEICO业务中负责投资的部分，我们再次将薪酬与绩效挂钩——但这次是基于四年期的投资绩效，而不是承保结果或GEICO整体表现。我们认为，保险公司若将奖金与公司整体业绩挂钩是非常愚蠢的做法，因为一方面（承保或投资）表现出色可能被另一方面糟糕的表现完全抵消。在伯克希尔，如果你打出.350的击球率，你就能确保获得相应的报酬，即使其他队员只打出.200的水平也没关系。不过，我们非常幸运的是，托尼和路易分别在两个关键岗位上都堪称“名人堂”级人物。
Though they are, of course, smaller than GEICO, our other primary insurance operations turned in equally stunning results last year. National Indemnity's traditional business had a combined ratio of 74.2 and, as usual, developed a large amount of float compared to premium volume. Over the last three years, this segment of our business, run by Don Wurster, has had an average combined ratio of 83.0. Our homestate operation, managed by Rod Eldred, recorded a combined ratio of 87.1 even though it absorbed the expenses of expanding to new states. Rod's three-year combined ratio is an amazing 83.2. Berkshire's workers' compensation business, run out of California by Brad Kinstler, has now moved into six other states and, despite the costs of that expansion, again achieved an excellent underwriting profit. Finally, John Kizer, at Central States Indemnity, set new records for premium volume while generating good earnings from underwriting. In aggregate, our smaller insurance operations (now including Kansas Bankers Surety) have an underwriting record virtually unmatched in the industry. Don, Rod, Brad and John have all created significant value for Berkshire, and we believe there is more to come.
尽管这些业务规模当然比不上GEICO，但我们的其他主要保险运营在去年同样取得了令人瞩目的成绩。National Indemnity的传统业务综合比率仅为74.2，并一如既往地创造了远高于保费收入的浮存金。在过去三年里，由唐·沃斯特（Don Wurster）领导的这部分业务平均综合比率为83.0。由罗德·埃尔德（Rod Eldred）管理的本地业务录得87.1的综合比率，尽管它承担了向新州扩张的成本。罗德三年来的平均综合比率更是低至惊人的83.2。伯克希尔加州的劳工赔偿业务由布拉德·金斯勒（Brad Kinstler）负责，目前已扩展到另外六个州，尽管扩张带来了成本压力，但仍再次实现了出色的承保盈利。最后，约翰·凯泽（John Kizer）在Central States Indemnity创下保费规模新纪录的同时也实现了良好的承保收益。总体而言，我们规模较小的保险业务（现在包括Kansas Bankers Surety）拥有几乎无可匹敌的承保记录。唐、罗德、布拉德和约翰都为伯克希尔创造了巨大价值，我们相信未来还有更多值得期待的成绩。
# Taxes
税务
In 1961, President Kennedy said that we should ask not what our country can do for us, but rather ask what we can do for our country. Last year we decided to give his suggestion a try - and who says it never hurts to ask? We were told to mail $860 million in income taxes to the U.S. Treasury.
1961年，肯尼迪总统曾说过：“我们不应问国家能为我们做什么，而应问我们能为国家做什么。”去年，我们决定试试这个建议——谁说尝试没坏处？结果我们收到通知，要向美国财政部邮寄8.6亿美元的所得税支票。
Here's a little perspective on that figure: If an equal amount had been paid by only 2,000 other taxpayers, the government would have had a balanced budget in 1996 without needing a dime of taxes - income or Social Security or what have you - from any other American. Berkshire shareholders can truly say, "I gave at the office."
对这个数字做一个简单类比：如果只有另外2,000名纳税人缴纳相同金额，那么1996年联邦政府就无需再从任何其他美国人那里征收一分钱的税款——无论是所得税、社会保障税或其他任何税种。伯克希尔的股东们可以真正地说：“我在办公室已经捐过了。”
Charlie and I believe that large tax payments by Berkshire are entirely fitting. The contribution we thus make to society's well-being is at most only proportional to its contribution to ours. Berkshire prospers in America as it would nowhere else.
查理和我都认为，伯克希尔缴纳税款数额巨大是完全恰当的。我们对社会福祉所做的贡献最多也只是与社会对我们所做的一切成比例而已。伯克希尔在美国才能繁荣发展，换作其他任何地方都不可能达到这样的程度。
# Sources of Reported Earnings
（报告收益来源）
The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on pages 65 and 66, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally-accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表展示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在此呈现方式中，购并会计调整并未分配到具体业务部门，而是统一汇总并单独列出。这种做法可以让您看到各业务部门在未被收购时原本会如何报告其收益。基于第65和66页所讨论的原因，我们认为这种展示方式比采用公认会计准则（GAAP）的方式更有助于投资者和管理层理解公司运营情况——后者要求将购并溢价按部门分摊冲销。当然，我们在表格中显示的总收益与经审计财务报表中的GAAP总收益完全一致。
| Business Segment | Pre-tax Earnings 1996 (百万美元) | Pre-tax Earnings 1995 (百万美元) | Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) 1996 | Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) 1995 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 保险集团 | ||||
| 承保利润 | $222.1 | $20.5 | $142.8 | $11.3 |
| 投资净收益 | $726.2 | $501.6 | $593.1 | $417.7 |
| 布法罗新闻 | $50.4 | $46.8 | $29.5 | $27.3 |
| Fechheimer | $17.3 | $16.9 | $9.3 | $8.8 |
| 金融业务 | $23.1 | $20.8 | $14.9 | $12.6 |
| 家居用品 | $43.8 | $29.7（注2） | $24.8 | $16.7（注2） |
| 珠宝 | $27.8 | $33.9（注3） | $16.1 | $19.1（注3） |
| Kirby | $58.5 | $50.2 | $39.9 | $32.1 |
| Scott Fetzer制造集团 | $50.6 | $34.1 | $32.2 | $21.2 |
| See's糖果 | $51.9 | $50.2 | $30.8 | $29.8 |
| 鞋业集团 | $61.6 | $58.4 | $41.0 | $37.5 |
| World Book | $12.6 | $8.8 | $9.5 | $7.0 |
| 购并会计调整 | $(75.7) | $(27.0) | $(70.5) | $(23.4) |
| 利息支出（注4） | $(94.3) | $(56.0) | $(56.6) | $(34.9) |
| 股东指定捐赠 | $(13.3) | $(11.6) | $(8.5) | $(7.0) |
| 其他 | $58.8 | $37.4 | $34.8 | $24.4 |
| 经营性收益总计 | $1,221.4 | $814.7 | $883.1 | $600.2 |
| 证券出售收益 | $2,484.5 | $194.1 | $1,605.5 | $125.0 |
| 全部实体总收益 | $3,705.9 | $1,008.8 | $2,488.6 | $725.2 |
注释：
(1) 在GEICO相关重述前。
(2) 包括R.C. Willey自1995年6月29日起的数据。
(3) 包括Helzberg's自1995年4月30日起的数据。
(4) 不包括金融业务的利息支出。
In this section last year, I discussed three businesses that reported a decline in earnings - Buffalo News, Shoe Group and World Book. All, I'm happy to say, recorded gains in 1996.
去年本节中，我曾提到三家报告收益下降的企业——布法罗新闻、鞋业集团和World Book。令人欣慰的是，这三家企业在1996年均实现了增长。
World Book, however, did not find it easy: Despite the operation's new status as the only direct-seller of encyclopedias in the country (Encyclopedia Britannica exited the field last year), its unit volume fell. Additionally, World Book spent heavily on a new CD-ROM product that began to take in revenues only in early 1997, when it was launched in association with IBM. In the face of these factors, earnings would have evaporated had World Book not revamped distribution methods and cut overhead at headquarters, thereby dramatically reducing its fixed costs. Overall, the company has gone a long way toward assuring its long-term viability in both the print and electronic marketplaces.
然而，World Book的转型并不轻松：尽管它已成为全国唯一一家百科全书直销商（大英百科全书已于去年退出该市场），但其销售数量却出现下滑。此外，该公司在一款新的CD-ROM产品上投入巨大，直到1997年初才与IBM合作推出并开始产生收入。面对这些挑战，若不是World Book彻底改革了分销方式并在总部大幅削减开支从而显著降低了固定成本，其利润几乎就会消失殆尽。总体来看，该公司已大大增强了在印刷和电子出版两个市场的长期生存能力。
Our only disappointment last year was in jewelry: Borsheim's did fine, but Helzberg's suffered a material decline in earnings. Its expense levels had been geared to a sizable increase in same-store sales, consistent with the gains achieved in recent years. When sales were instead flat, profit margins fell. Jeff Comment, CEO of Helzberg's, is addressing the expense problem in a decisive manner, and the company's earnings should improve in 1997.
我们去年唯一的失望来自珠宝业务：Borsheim的表现尚可，但Helzberg's则出现了明显的盈利下滑。其费用水平原是为同店销售大幅增长而设定的，与近年来的增长趋势相符。当销售额未能增长而只是持平后，利润率随之下降。Helzberg's的CEO杰夫·康蒙特（Jeff Comment）正果断应对这一费用问题，预计公司1997年的盈利将有所改善。
Overall, our operating businesses continue to perform exceptionally, far outdoing their industry norms. For this, Charlie and I thank our managers. If you should see any of them at the Annual Meeting, add your thanks as well.
总体而言，我们的运营企业继续表现卓越，远超行业平均水平。对此，查理和我要感谢各位管理者。如果您在年度股东大会上见到他们中的任何一位，请也向他们表达您的谢意。
More information about our various businesses is given on pages 36-46, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 51-57, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the financial information that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed.
有关我们各项业务的更多信息请参阅第36至46页，在那里您还可以看到以GAAP为基础划分的业务板块收益数据。此外，在第51至57页，我们以非GAAP标准将伯克希尔的财务数据重新划分为四个板块进行展示，这种方式更符合查理和我们对公司整体的理解思路。我们的目的是为您提供我们认为在立场互换时也希望获得的财务信息。
# "Look-Through" Earnings
（透视盈余）
Reported earnings are a poor measure of economic progress at Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table presented earlier include only the dividends we receive from investees - though these dividends typically represent only a small fraction of the earnings attributable to our ownership. Not that we mind this division of money, since on balance we regard the undistributed earnings of investees as more valuable to us than the portion paid out. The reason is simple: Our investees often have the opportunity to reinvest earnings at high rates of return. So why should we want them paid out?
仅凭报告收益难以准确衡量伯克希尔的经济进展，部分原因在于前面表格中所列数字只包含我们从投资对象收到的股息——而这些股息通常只占我们应享收益的一小部分。其实我们并不介意这种分配方式，因为总体来看，我们认为投资对象保留下来的收益对我们来说更具价值。原因很简单：我们的投资对象常常有机会以高回报率再投资留存收益。那么我们为何还要希望它们把钱分给我们呢？
To depict something closer to economic reality at Berkshire than reported earnings, though, we employ the concept of "look-through" earnings. As we calculate these, they consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) our share of the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating "operating earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting adjustments as well as capital gains and other major non-recurring items.
为了更贴近伯克希尔的真实经济状况，我们采用了“透视盈余”（Look-Through Earnings）的概念。按照我们的计算方法，“透视盈余”由以下三部分构成：(1) 上一节报告的经营性收益；(2) 我们应享有主要投资对象所保留的经营收益份额（这部分在GAAP会计下并未反映在我们的利润中）；减去(3) 若这些保留收益被实际分配给我们会产生的预估税费。在统计“经营性收益”时，我们排除了购并会计调整、资本利得以及其他重大非经常性项目。
The following table sets forth our 1996 look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures can be no more than approximate, since they are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 12, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
下表列示了我们1996年的“透视盈余”（Look-Through Earnings），不过我要提醒您，这些数字只能是近似值，因为它们基于若干主观判断。（这些投资对象支付给我们的股息已包含在第12页列出的经营性收益中，主要体现在“保险集团：投资净收益”项下。）
| Berkshire's Major Investees | Berkshire's Ownership at Yearend(1) | Berkshire's Share of Undistributed Operating Earnings (in millions)(2) |
|---|---|---|
| American Express Company...... | 10.5% | $132 |
| The Coca-Cola Company......... | 8.1% | $180 |
| The Walt Disney Company....... | 3.6% | $50 |
| Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. | 8.4% | $77 |
| The Gillette Company.......... | 8.6% | $73 |
| McDonald's Corporation........ | 4.3% | $38 |
| The Washington Post Company... | 15.8% | $27 |
| Wells Fargo & Company......... | 8.0% | $84 |
| ------ | ||
| Total | $661 | |
| Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings(3) | ($93) | |
| Reported operating earnings of Berkshire | $954 | |
| ------ | ||
| Total look-through earnings of Berkshire | $1,522 |
注释：
(1) 不包括少数权益所对应的股份。
(2) 按年度平均持股比例计算。
(3) 所得税率采用14%，即伯克希尔对收到的股息所适用的税率。
# Common Stock Investments
（普通股投资）
Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a market value of more than $500 million are itemized.
以下是我们持有的普通股投资。市值超过5亿美元的投资项目单独列出。
| Shares | Company | Cost* (百万美元) | Market (百万美元) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 49,456,900 | American Express Company | $1,392.7 | $2,794.3 |
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | $1,298.9 | $10,525.0 |
| 24,614,214 | The Walt Disney Company | $577.0 | $1,716.8 |
| 64,246,000 | Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp | $333.4 | $1,772.8 |
| 48,000,000 | The Gillette Company | $600.0 | $3,732.0 |
| 30,156,600 | McDonald's Corporation | $1,265.3 | $1,368.4 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company | $10.6 | $579.0 |
| 7,291,418 | Wells Fargo & Company | $497.8 | $1,966.9 |
| 其他（Others） | —— | $1,934.5 | $3,295.4 |
| 总计（Total Common Stocks） | —— | $7,910.2 | $27,750.6 |
* 表示税务基础成本，在合计上比GAAP成本低12亿美元。
Our portfolio shows little change: We continue to make more money when snoring than when active.
我们的投资组合几乎没有变化：我们继续“躺着赚钱”，而不是频繁交易。
Inactivity strikes us as intelligent behavior. Neither we nor most business managers would dream of feverishly trading highly-profitable subsidiaries because a small move in the Federal Reserve's discount rate was predicted or because some Wall Street pundit had reversed his views on the market. Why, then, should we behave differently with our minority positions in wonderful businesses? The art of investing in public companies successfully is little different from the art of successfully acquiring subsidiaries. In each case you simply want to acquire, at a sensible price, a business with excellent economics and able, honest management. Thereafter, you need only monitor whether these qualities are being preserved.
我们认为不作为本身就是一种明智的行为。我们和大多数企业管理者都不会因为美联储贴现率的一点预测变动，或华尔街某位评论员改变了市场观点，就疯狂交易盈利能力极强的子公司。那么，为何我们在持有优秀企业的少数股权时要采取不同做法呢？成功投资上市公司的艺术与成功收购子公司的艺术几乎无异。关键都在于以合理价格买入具备出色经济特性、拥有能干且诚实管理团队的企业，之后只需关注这些特质是否得以保持。
When carried out capably, an investment strategy of that type will often result in its practitioner owning a few securities that will come to represent a very large portion of his portfolio. This investor would get a similar result if he followed a policy of purchasing an interest in, say, 20% of the future earnings of a number of outstanding college basketball stars. A handful of these would go on to achieve NBA stardom, and the investor's take from them would soon dominate his royalty stream. To suggest that this investor should sell off portions of his most successful investments simply because they have come to dominate his portfolio is akin to suggesting that the Bulls trade Michael Jordan because he has become so important to the team.
如果执行得当，这种类型的投资策略往往会使得投资者最终只持有几只证券，但这些证券在其投资组合中占据非常大的比重。这就像一位投资者投资于几位大学篮球明星未来收入的20%，其中个别球员最终成为NBA巨星，他们的贡献很快就会主导这位投资者的收入流。仅因这些投资变得过于集中而建议其卖出部分头寸，就好比建议公牛队卖掉迈克尔·乔丹，仅仅因为他太重要了一样。
In studying the investments we have made in both subsidiary companies and common stocks, you will see that we favor businesses and industries unlikely to experience major change. The reason for that is simple: Making either type of purchase, we are searching for operations that we believe are virtually certain to possess enormous competitive strength ten or twenty years from now. A fast-changing industry environment may offer the chance for huge wins, but it precludes the certainty we seek.
从我们对子公司和普通股的投资可以看出，我们偏好那些不太可能发生重大变化的行业和企业。原因很简单：无论是哪一类投资，我们都在寻找那些我们相信在未来十到二十年内仍具有巨大竞争优势的企业。快速变化的产业环境虽然可能带来巨大的回报机会，但同时也排除了我们所追求的那种确定性。
I should emphasize that, as citizens, Charlie and I welcome change: Fresh ideas, new products, innovative processes and the like cause our country's standard of living to rise, and that's clearly good. As investors, however, our reaction to a fermenting industry is much like our attitude toward space exploration: We applaud the endeavor but prefer to skip the ride.
我必须强调的是，作为公民，查理和我都欢迎变革：新思想、新产品、创新流程等推动了我国生活水平的提升，这是明显的好事。然而，作为投资者，我们对一个剧烈变化的行业的态度，就像我们对太空探索的态度一样：我们赞赏这一努力，但更愿意选择不亲自参与冒险。
Obviously all businesses change to some extent. Today, See's is different in many ways from what it was in 1972 when we bought it: It offers a different assortment of candy, employs different machinery and sells through different distribution channels. But the reasons why people today buy boxed chocolates, and why they buy them from us rather than from someone else, are virtually unchanged from what they were in the 1920s when the See family was building the business. Moreover, these motivations are not likely to change over the next 20 years, or even 50.
显然，所有企业都会在一定程度上发生变化。如今的See’s与1972年我们收购时已有许多不同之处：它提供不同的糖果组合，使用不同的机器，并通过不同的分销渠道销售。但人们今天购买礼盒巧克力的原因，以及他们选择我们而非其他品牌的原因，与See家族在上世纪20年代创业时几乎完全一致。而且，这些动机在未来20年甚至50年内都不太可能发生改变。
We look for similar predictability in marketable securities. Take Coca-Cola: The zeal and imagination with which Coke products are sold has burgeoned under Roberto Goizueta, who has done an absolutely incredible job in creating value for his shareholders. Aided by Don Keough and Doug Ivester, Roberto has rethought and improved every aspect of the company. But the fundamentals of the business - the qualities that underlie Coke's competitive dominance and stunning economics - have remained constant through the years.
我们在可交易证券中也寻求类似的可预见性。以可口可乐为例：在Roberto Goizueta的领导下，公司在产品营销方面的热情与创意大大增强，他为股东创造了令人难以置信的价值。在他与Don Keough和Doug Ivester的合作下，公司每一个方面都被重新思考并不断优化。但这家企业的基本要素——支撑可口可乐竞争主导地位和惊人盈利能力的核心品质——多年来始终未变。
I was recently studying the 1896 report of Coke (and you think that you are behind in your reading!). At that time Coke, though it was already the leading soft drink, had been around for only a decade. But its blueprint for the next 100 years was already drawn. Reporting sales of $148,000 that year, Asa Candler, the company's president, said: "We have not lagged in our efforts to go into all the world teaching that Coca-Cola is the article, par excellence, for the health and good feeling of all people." Though "health" may have been a reach, I love the fact that Coke still relies on Candler's basic theme today - a century later. Candler went on to say, just as Roberto could now, "No article of like character has ever so firmly entrenched itself in public favor." Sales of syrup that year, incidentally, were 116,492 gallons versus about 3.2 billion in 1996.
我最近在研究可口可乐公司1896年的年报（您可能觉得自己读书都还没读到这么远！）。当时，尽管可口可乐已经是领先的软饮料品牌，但它成立才不过十年。然而，它未来百年的蓝图已经初现雏形。那一年的销售额为148,000美元，公司总裁阿萨·坎德勒（Asa Candler）表示：“我们从未懈怠过向全世界推广的努力，告诉人们可口可乐是提升全民健康与幸福感的最佳产品。”虽然“健康”这个说法略显夸张，但我喜欢的是——整整一个世纪之后，可口可乐依然延续着坎德勒当年提出的核心理念。他还说道了一句话，如今听起来也像是罗伯托（Roberto Goizueta）会说的一样：“没有哪一种同类商品能如此牢固地占据公众的青睐。”顺便提一句，那年售出的糖浆量为116,492加仑，而到了1996年，这一数字已高达约32亿加仑。
I can't resist one more Candler quote: "Beginning this year about March 1st ... we employed ten traveling salesmen by means of which, with systematic correspondence from the office, we covered almost the territory of the Union." That's my kind of sales force.
我还忍不住再引用一次坎德勒的话：“从今年3月1日起……我们雇佣了十名外出销售人员，配合办公室有条不紊的通信跟进，几乎覆盖了整个联邦地区。”这才是我喜欢的销售团队。
Companies such as Coca-Cola and Gillette might well be labeled "The Inevitables." Forecasters may differ a bit in their predictions of exactly how much soft drink or shaving-equipment business these companies will be doing in ten or twenty years. Nor is our talk of inevitability meant to play down the vital work that these companies must continue to carry out, in such areas as manufacturing, distribution, packaging and product innovation. In the end, however, no sensible observer—not even these companies' most vigorous competitors, assuming they are assessing the matter honestly—questions that Coke and Gillette will dominate their fields worldwide for an investment lifetime. Indeed, their dominance will probably strengthen. Both companies have significantly expanded their already huge shares of market during the past ten years, and all signs point to their repeating that performance in the next decade.
像可口可乐和吉列这样的公司，完全可以被称为“必然赢家”（The Inevitables）。对于它们在未来十年或二十年内将在软饮料或剃须设备市场中占据多少份额，预测者或许会有不同看法。但需要强调的是，我们所说的“必然性”并不意味着这些企业可以忽视制造、分销、包装和产品创新等关键领域的持续努力。然而归根结底，任何理智的观察者——甚至包括这两家公司最激烈的竞争对手（如果他们能够诚实评估局势）——都不会怀疑，在投资者一生的投资周期里，可口可乐和吉列仍将在全球范围内主导其行业领域。事实上，它们的统治地位还可能进一步增强。过去十年间，两家公司的市场份额均已显著扩大，而且目前所有迹象都表明这种增长势头将在下一个十年继续。
Obviously many companies in high-tech businesses or embryonic industries will grow much faster in percentage terms than will The Inevitables. But I would rather be certain of a good result than hopeful of a great one.
显然，高科技企业或新兴行业的许多公司在百分比增长率上可能会远远超过“必然赢家”。但我宁愿获得一个确定的好结果，也不愿仅仅抱着对伟大成果的希望去冒险。
Of course, Charlie and I can identify only a few Inevitables, even after a lifetime of looking for them. Leadership alone provides no certainties: Witness the shocks some years back at General Motors, IBM and Sears, all of which had enjoyed long periods of seeming invincibility. Though some industries or lines of business exhibit characteristics that endow leaders with virtually insurmountable advantages, and that tend to establish Survival of the Fattest as almost a natural law, most do not. Thus, for every Inevitable, there are dozens of Impostors, companies now riding high but vulnerable to competitive attacks. Considering what it takes to be an Inevitable, Charlie and I recognize that we will never be able to come up with a Nifty Fifty or even a Twinkling Twenty. To the Inevitables in our portfolio, therefore, we add a few "Highly Probables."
当然，即便穷尽一生寻找，查理和我也只能识别出少数几家“必然赢家”。仅凭领导地位本身并不能保证成功：看看通用汽车、IBM和西尔斯当年所经历的冲击吧，它们都曾长期看似不可战胜。虽然某些行业或业务线确实具备让龙头企业建立几乎无法逾越的优势，并使“大者恒大”几近自然法则，但大多数行业并非如此。因此，每有一家“必然赢家”，就有十几家“伪强者”——目前风光无限却极易受到竞争冲击的企业。考虑到“必然赢家”的稀缺性，我们也清楚自己永远不可能列出一份“漂亮50”或“闪亮20”的名单。因此，在投资组合中纳入“必然赢家”的同时，我们也会加入一些“高概率赢家”（Highly Probables）。
You can, of course, pay too much for even the best of businesses. The overpayment risk surfaces periodically and, in our opinion, may now be quite high for the purchasers of virtually all stocks, The Inevitables included. Investors making purchases in an overheated market need to recognize that it may often take an extended period for the value of even an outstanding company to catch up with the price they paid.
当然，即使是最好的企业，你也可能为其支付过高价格。过度支付的风险会周期性显现，我们认为目前几乎所有股票——包括“必然赢家”在内——的买方都面临相当高的这一风险。在过热市场中买入的投资者必须认识到，即使是一家卓越公司的内在价值，也可能需要很长时间才能追上你所支付的价格。
A far more serious problem occurs when the management of a great company gets sidetracked and neglects its wonderful base business while purchasing other businesses that are so-so or worse. When that happens, the suffering of investors is often prolonged. Unfortunately, that is precisely what transpired years ago at both Coke and Gillette. (Would you believe that a few decades back they were growing shrimp at Coke and exploring for oil at Gillette?) Loss of focus is what most worries Charlie and me when we contemplate investing in businesses that in general look outstanding. All too often, we've seen value stagnate in the presence of hubris or of boredom that caused the attention of managers to wander. That's not going to happen again at Coke and Gillette, however—not given their current and prospective managements.
更严重的问题出现在一家优秀企业的管理层偏离主业、忽视核心优势，转而去收购平庸甚至糟糕的业务时。一旦发生这种情况，投资者往往要忍受长期的痛苦。不幸的是，多年前的可口可乐和吉列就曾陷入这样的困境。（您相信吗？几十年前，可口可乐居然在养虾，吉列则在搞石油勘探。）当我们在考虑投资那些表面看起来非常出色的公司时，“战略失焦”是我们和查理最为担忧的问题之一。我们多次看到，由于管理者因傲慢或无聊而将注意力转移，导致公司价值长期停滞。不过，凭借当前以及未来的管理团队，这种情况不会再发生在可口可乐和吉列身上。
Let me add a few thoughts about your own investments. Most investors, both institutional and individual, will find that the best way to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees. Those following this path are sure to beat the net results (after fees and expenses) delivered by the great majority of investment professionals.
让我再补充几点关于您自身投资的想法。对大多数投资者——无论是机构还是个人而言——持有普通股的最佳方式是通过收取极低费用的指数基金。采取这种方式的人，最终一定会跑赢绝大多数专业投资者扣除费用后的净回报。
Should you choose, however, to construct your own portfolio, there are a few thoughts worth remembering. Intelligent investing is not complex, though that is far from saying that it is easy. What an investor needs is the ability to correctly evaluate selected businesses. Note that word "selected": You don't have to be an expert on every company, or even many. You only have to be able to evaluate companies within your circle of competence. The size of that circle is not very important; knowing its boundaries, however, is vital.
当然，如果您选择亲自构建投资组合，也有几点值得牢记。聪明的投资并不复杂，但这绝不等于说它容易。一位投资者真正需要的能力，是对某些选定的企业进行准确评估。请注意“选定”这个词：你不需要成为每一家公司、甚至很多公司的专家，只需要有能力评估处于你能力圈范围内的企业即可。你的能力圈大小并不重要；关键在于你知道它的边界在哪里。
To invest successfully, you need not understand beta, efficient markets, modern portfolio theory, option pricing or emerging markets. You may, in fact, be better off knowing nothing of these. That, of course, is not the prevailing view at most business schools, whose finance curriculum tends to be dominated by such subjects. In our view, though, investment students need only two well-taught courses - How to Value a Business, and How to Think About Market Prices.
要成功投资，你并不需要理解贝塔系数、有效市场假说、现代投资组合理论、期权定价或新兴市场等概念。事实上，对这些一无所知，可能反而更有利。当然，这并不是大多数商学院所持的观点，它们的金融课程往往被这些内容所主导。在我们看来，投资者只需要两门真正讲透的课程就够了：《如何评估一家企业》 和 《如何思考市场价格》。
Your goal as an investor should simply be to purchase, at a rational price, a part interest in an easily-understandable business whose earnings are virtually certain to be materially higher five, ten and twenty years from now. Over time, you will find only a few companies that meet these standards - so when you see one that qualifies, you should buy a meaningful amount of stock. You must also resist the temptation to stray from your guidelines: If you aren't willing to own a stock for ten years, don't even think about owning it for ten minutes. Put together a portfolio of companies whose aggregate earnings march upward over the years, and so also will the portfolio's market value.
作为一名投资者，你的目标其实很简单：以合理的价格购买一家易于理解、且在未来五到十年内收益几乎肯定会大幅增长的企业的一部分权益。随着时间推移，你会发现只有少数公司符合这些标准——所以当你发现符合条件的企业时，就应该买入足够大的份额。你还必须抵制偏离原则的诱惑：如果你不愿意持有某只股票十年，那连十分钟都不该考虑拥有它。构建一个整体盈利持续上升的投资组合，它的市值也将在长期随之增长。
Though it's seldom recognized, this is the exact approach that has produced gains for Berkshire shareholders: Our look-through earnings have grown at a good clip over the years, and our stock price has risen correspondingly. Had those gains in earnings not materialized, there would have been little increase in Berkshire's value.
尽管这一点很少被提及，但正是这种方法为伯克希尔股东创造了回报：我们的“透视盈余”多年来稳步增长，股价也随之上涨。如果这些盈利没有实现，伯克希尔的价值也不会有太大提升。
The greatly enlarged earnings base we now enjoy will inevitably cause our future gains to lag those of the past. We will continue, however, to push in the directions we always have. We will try to build earnings by running our present businesses well - a job made easy because of the extraordinary talents of our operating managers - and by purchasing other businesses, in whole or in part, that are not likely to be roiled by change and that possess important competitive advantages.
如今我们庞大的盈利基础不可避免地会使得未来增长速度慢于过去。然而，我们将继续沿着一贯的方向努力推进。我们会通过把现有业务经营好（这得益于我们管理层卓越的能力），以及收购那些不太容易受变化影响、并具备重要竞争优势的企业（无论是全资还是部分持股）来推动盈利增长。
# USAir
When Richard Branson, the wealthy owner of Virgin Atlantic Airways, was asked how to become a millionaire, he had a quick answer: "There's really nothing to it. Start as a billionaire and then buy an airline." Unwilling to accept Branson's proposition on faith, your Chairman decided in 1989 to test it by investing $358 million in a 9.25% preferred stock of USAir.
当维珍大西洋航空的富有创始人理查德·布兰森被问及如何成为百万富翁时，他给出了一个机智的回答：“其实很简单。先做个亿万富翁，然后买一家航空公司。”我这位董事长当时不愿仅凭信仰就接受这个说法，于是决定亲自验证一下——1989年，我向USAir投资了3.58亿美元，购入其年息9.25%的优先股。
I liked and admired Ed Colodny, the company's then-CEO, and I still do. But my analysis of USAir's business was both superficial and wrong. I was so beguiled by the company's long history of profitable operations, and by the protection that ownership of a senior security seemingly offered me, that I overlooked the crucial point: USAir's revenues would increasingly feel the effects of an unregulated, fiercely-competitive market whereas its cost structure was a holdover from the days when regulation protected profits. These costs, if left unchecked, portended disaster, however reassuring the airline's past record might be. (If history supplied all of the answers, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.)
我喜欢并尊重当时的CEO埃德·科洛德尼（Ed Colodny），至今依然如此。但我对USAir业务的分析却既肤浅又错误。我被公司长期盈利的历史和优先证券看似提供的保护所迷惑，忽略了关键问题：USAir的收入将越来越多地受到无管制、高度竞争市场的冲击，而它的成本结构却仍停留在监管保护时代的产物。如果不加以控制，这种成本结构终将带来灾难，无论它过去的表现多么令人安心。（如果历史能解答一切问题，那么福布斯400富豪榜上应该全是图书管理员。）
To rationalize its costs, however, USAir needed major improvements in its labor contracts - and that's something most airlines have found it extraordinarily difficult to get, short of credibly threatening, or actually entering, bankruptcy. USAir was to be no exception. Immediately after we purchased our preferred stock, the imbalance between the company's costs and revenues began to grow explosively. In the 1990–1994 period, USAir lost an aggregate of $2.4 billion, a performance that totally wiped out the book equity of its common stock.
为了合理化成本，USAir亟需大幅改善劳资合同条款——而这恰恰是大多数航空公司极难做到的一件事，除非真的面临破产威胁或已经破产。USAir也不例外。就在我们买入优先股后不久，公司的成本与收入之间的失衡便迅速恶化。从1990至1994年间，USAir累计亏损达24亿美元，这一表现彻底抹去了普通股的账面价值。
For much of this period, the company paid us our preferred dividends, but in 1994 payment was suspended. A bit later, with the situation looking particularly gloomy, we wrote down our investment by 75%, to $89.5 million. Thereafter, during much of 1995, I offered to sell our shares at 50% of face value. Fortunately, I was unsuccessful.
在这段时期内，公司大部分时间都按时支付了优先股股息，但在1994年停止支付。随后局势变得格外严峻，我们不得不将这项投资减值75%，降至8,950万美元。此后，在1995年大部分时间里，我甚至愿意以票面价值的50%出售股份。幸运的是，没人愿意接盘。
Mixed in with my many mistakes at USAir was one thing I got right: Making our investment, we wrote into the preferred contract a somewhat unusual provision stipulating that "penalty dividends" - to run five percentage points over the prime rate - would be accrued on any arrearages. This meant that when our 9.25% dividend was omitted for two years, the unpaid amounts compounded at rates ranging between 13.25% and 14%.
在这笔投资中我的诸多失误之外，也有一件事情做对了：我们在签订优先股合同时加入了一项略显特殊的条款，规定对于拖欠的股息，公司将计付“惩罚性利息”，即在基准利率基础上再加五个百分点。这意味着，当我们应得的9.25%股息被暂停支付两年后，未支付金额将以13.25%至14%的复利方式累积起来。
Facing this penalty provision, USAir had every incentive to pay arrearages just as promptly as it could. And in the second half of 1996, when USAir turned profitable, it indeed began to pay, giving us $47.9 million. We owe Stephen Wolf, the company's CEO, a huge thank-you for extracting a performance from the airline that permitted this payment. Even so, USAir's performance has recently been helped significantly by an industry tailwind that may be cyclical in nature. The company still has basic cost problems that must be solved.
面对这一惩罚机制，USAir有充分动力尽快偿还拖欠款项。果然，在1996年下半年扭亏为盈后，它开始逐步偿付，共计向我们支付了4,790万美元。我们要特别感谢当时的CEO史蒂夫·沃尔夫（Stephen Wolf），是他让公司实现了这样的转变。不过，USAir近期业绩的改善也受益于整个航空业的一轮顺风期，这种顺境可能是周期性的。公司仍然存在根本性的成本问题，有待解决。
In any event, the prices of USAir's publicly-traded securities tell us that our preferred stock is now probably worth its par value of $358 million, give or take a little. In addition, we have over the years collected an aggregate of $240.5 million in dividends (including $30 million received in 1997).
无论如何，从USAir公开交易证券的价格来看，我们的优先股现在很可能已恢复到票面价值3.58亿美元左右，上下浮动不大。此外，多年来我们也陆续收到了总计2.405亿美元的股息收入（其中包括1997年收到的3,000万美元）。
Early in 1996, before any accrued dividends had been paid, I tried once more to unload our holdings - this time for about $335 million. You're lucky: I again failed in my attempt to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
早在任何累计股息兑现之前，1996年初我又一次试图抛售手中持股——这次开价约3.35亿美元。你们真该庆幸：我再次失败了，又一次从胜利边缘硬生生制造了一场失败。
In another context, a friend once asked me: "If you're so rich, why aren't you smart?" After reviewing my sorry performance with USAir, you may conclude he had a point.
还有一位朋友曾对我说过一句意味深长的话：“你既然这么有钱，怎么不显得聪明些？”回顾我在USAir这笔投资上的惨痛教训，您或许会觉得他这话还真有点道理。
About 97.2% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1996 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made were $13.3 million, and 3,910 charities were recipients. A full description of the shareholder-designated contributions program appears on pages 48–49.
约有97.2%的符合条件股份参与了伯克希尔1996年的股东指定捐赠计划。该年度共捐赠了1,330万美元，共有3,910家慈善机构成为受赠对象。关于股东指定捐赠计划的完整说明请参见第48至49页。
Every year a few shareholders miss out on the program because they don't have their shares registered in their own names on the prescribed record date or because they fail to get the designation form back to us within the 60-day period allowed. This is distressing to Charlie and me. But if replies are received late, we have to reject them because we can't make exceptions for some shareholders while refusing to make them for others.
每年都有少数股东因未能在规定登记日将股份以自己名义注册，或未能在60天期限内将指定表格返回给我们而错过这一计划。查理和我都对此感到遗憾。但若收到回复的时间晚于截止日期，我们只能予以拒绝，因为我们不能为某些股东破例，却拒绝其他股东同样的请求。
To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1997, will be ineligible for the 1997 program. When you get the form, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten.
如欲参加今后的计划，请确保您所持有的A类股份是以实际持有人而非经纪人、银行或托管机构的名义登记的。凡未于1997年8月31日前完成此等登记的股份，将不具备参与1997年计划的资格。当您收到表格时，请尽快寄回，以免搁置遗忘。
# The Annual Meeting
（股东大会）
Our capitalist's version of Woodstock—the Berkshire Annual Meeting—will be held on Monday, May 5. Charlie and I thoroughly enjoy this event, and we hope that you come. We will start at 9:30 a.m., break for about 15 minutes at noon (food will be available—but at a price, of course), and then continue talking to hard-core attendees until at least 3:30. Last year we had representatives from all 50 states, as well as Australia, Greece, Israel, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The annual meeting is a time for owners to get their business-related questions answered, and therefore Charlie and I will stay on stage until we start getting punchy. (When that happens, I hope you notice a change.)
我们将把股东大会称为资本主义版的伍德斯托克音乐节（Woodstock）。今年股东大会将于5月5日（星期一）举行。查理和我都很享受这一活动，也希望您能出席。会议将在上午9:30开始，中午休息大约15分钟（期间可以购买食物——当然价格不菲），然后我们将继续与忠实的参会者交流至下午3:30之后。去年，来自美国所有50个州以及澳大利亚、希腊、以色列、葡萄牙、新加坡、瑞典、瑞士和英国的代表均有出席。这是属于股东们的盛会，是大家就公司事务提问并获得解答的场合，因此只要问题不断，我和查理就会一直坐在台上，直到我们两人筋疲力尽为止。（到那时，希望你们能注意到我们的变化。）
Last year we had attendance of 5,000 and strained the capacity of the Holiday Convention Centre, even though we spread out over three rooms. This year, our new Class B shares have caused a doubling of our stockholder count, and we are therefore moving the meeting to the Aksarben Coliseum, which holds about 10,000 and also has a huge parking lot. The doors will open for the meeting at 7:00 a.m., and at 8:30 we will—upon popular demand—show a new Berkshire movie produced by Marc Hamburg, our CFO. (In this company, no one gets by with doing only a single job.)
去年我们在Holiday Convention Centre举办会议，尽管分设三个会场，仍吸引了5,000人参会，场地几近饱和。今年由于B类股份的引入，我们的股东人数翻倍，因此今年我们将移师可容纳约1万人且拥有大型停车场的Aksarben竞技场举行。会议当日早晨7点开放入场，8:30我们将应广大股东要求放映由首席财务官马克·汉堡（Marc Hamburg）制作的一部全新的伯克希尔主题影片。（在这个公司里，没人只做单一工作。）
Overcoming our legendary repugnance for activities even faintly commercial, we will also have an abundant array of Berkshire products for sale in the halls outside the meeting room. Last year we broke all records, selling 1,270 pounds of See's candy, 1,143 pairs of Dexter shoes, $29,000 of World Books and related publications, and 700 sets of knives manufactured by our Quikut subsidiary. Additionally, many shareholders made inquiries about GEICO auto policies. If you would like to investigate possible insurance savings, bring your present policy to the meeting. We estimate that about 40% of our shareholders can save money by insuring with us. (We'd like to say 100%, but the insurance business doesn't work that way: Because insurers differ in their underwriting judgments, some of our shareholders are currently paying rates that are lower than GEICO's.)
虽然我们一向对任何稍显商业化的活动都避之不及，但今年我们也将首次在会场外大厅安排销售各类伯克希尔产品。去年我们打破了以往所有纪录：售出了1,270磅See’s糖果、1,143双Dexter鞋、价值29,000美元的World Book及相关出版物，以及由子公司Quikut制造的700套刀具。此外，还有许多股东咨询了GEICO汽车保险业务。如果您想看看换为我们客户是否更省钱，请带上您目前的保单前来。我们估计约有40%的股东通过我们投保可以节省保费支出。（我们很想说这个比例是100%，但保险业并非如此运作：因为不同保险公司承保判断标准各异，部分股东当前支付的保费甚至低于GEICO的报价。）
An attachment to the proxy material enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. We expect a large crowd, so get both plane and hotel reservations promptly. American Express (800-799-6634) will be happy to help you with arrangements. As usual, we will have buses servicing the larger hotels to take you to and from the meeting, and also to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim's and the airport after it is over.
随附本报告的委托书材料中有一份附件详细说明了您如何获取入场所需的凭证卡。我们预计今年会有大量参会者，因此请您尽早预订机票和酒店。美国运通公司（电话：800-799-6634）很乐意为您提供协助。一如既往，我们将安排巴士往返于主要酒店与会场之间，并在大会结束后接送前往Nebraska家具商场（NFM）、Borsheim珠宝店及机场的股东。
NFM's main store, located on a 75-acre site about a mile from Aksarben, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays, and noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. Come by and say hello to "Mrs. B" (Rose Blumkin). She's 103 now and sometimes operates with an oxygen mask that is attached to a tank on her cart. But if you try to keep pace with her, it will be you who needs oxygen. NFM did about $265 million of business last year—a record for a single-location home furnishings operation—and you'll see why once you check out its merchandise and prices.
NFM主店位于距Aksarben约一英里、占地75英亩的区域，营业时间为：周一至周五上午10点至晚上9点，周六上午10点至下午6点，周日中午12点至下午6点。欢迎前来拜访“布卢姆金夫人”（Mrs. B，全名Rose Blumkin）。她今年已经103岁，有时会推着装有氧气罐的小车佩戴面罩工作。但如果您试图跟上她的节奏，恐怕需要氧气的是您本人。NFM去年销售额达2.65亿美元，创下单一门店家居用品销售纪录，届时您参观其商品和价格后便会明白其中缘由。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 4th. Last year on "Shareholder Sunday" we broke every Borsheim's record in terms of tickets, dollar volume and, no doubt, attendees per square inch. Because we expect a capacity crowd this year as well, all shareholders attending on Sunday must bring their admission cards. Shareholders who prefer a somewhat less frenzied experience will get the same special treatment on Saturday, when the store is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., or on Monday between 10 a.m. and 8 p.m. Come by at any time this year and let Susan Jacques, Borsheim's CEO, and her skilled associates perform a painless walletectomy on you.
Borsheim珠宝店通常周日关门，但在5月4日（星期日）特向股东开放上午10点至下午6点。去年“股东专属周日”当天，我们打破了销售笔数、交易金额乃至单位面积顾客密度等多项纪录。鉴于今年也预计将人满为患，所有周日来访的股东必须携带入场卡。若您希望体验相对轻松一些的购物氛围，也可选择周六（上午10点至下午5:30）或周一（上午10点至晚上8点）前往。今年无论何时造访，Borsheim的CEO苏珊·雅克布斯（Susan Jacques）及其专业团队都将为您奉上愉快的购物体验——让您的钱包不知不觉变薄。
My favorite steakhouse, Gorat's, was sold out last year on the weekend of the annual meeting, even though it added an additional seating at 4 p.m. on Sunday. You can make reservations beginning on April 1st (but not earlier) by calling 402-551-3733. I will be at Gorat's on Sunday after Borsheim's, having my usual rare T-bone and double order of hash browns. I can also recommend—this is the standard fare when Debbie Bosanek, my invaluable assistant, and I go to lunch—the hot roast beef sandwich with mashed potatoes and gravy. Mention Debbie's name and you will be given an extra boat of gravy.
我最喜欢的牛排馆Gorat's在去年股东大会周末即使加开了周日下午4点一场，仍然座无虚席。您可以自4月1日起拨打电话402-551-3733预订（仅限此日后开始）。周日我会在Borsheim之后前往Gorat's，照例享用三分熟T骨牛排和两份土豆煎饼。我也推荐一个午餐组合——这也是我得力助手黛比·博萨内克（Debbie Bosanek）和我常点的套餐：热牛肉三明治配土豆泥和肉汁。只要提到黛比的名字，服务生还会多给您一份肉汁。
The Omaha Royals and Indianapolis Indians will play baseball on Saturday evening, May 3rd, at Rosenblatt Stadium. Pitching in my normal rotation—one throw a year—I will start.
奥马哈皇家队（Omaha Royals）与印第安纳波利斯印第安人队（Indianapolis Indians）将于5月3日（星期六）晚在Rosenblatt体育场进行棒球赛。按照惯例，我将登场投出一年中唯一一球。
Though Rosenblatt is normal in appearance, it is anything but: The field sits on a unique geological structure that occasionally emits short gravitational waves causing even the most smoothly-delivered pitch to sink violently. I have been the victim of this weird phenomenon several times in the past but am hoping for benign conditions this year. There will be lots of opportunities for photos at the ball game, but you will need incredibly fast reflexes to snap my fast ball en route to the plate.
尽管Rosenblatt球场外观普通，但它其实非常特殊：这片场地建在一个独特的地质结构之上，偶尔会产生短波重力扰动，使得即便是最平稳的投球也会突然下沉。过去我曾多次被这种奇怪现象“袭击”，今年我希望能风平浪静。比赛现场将提供大量拍照机会，但若您想拍下我的快球飞向本垒的瞬间，那可得多准备几张胶卷。
Our proxy statement includes information about obtaining tickets to the game. We will also provide an information packet listing restaurants that will be open on Sunday night and describing various things that you can do in Omaha on the weekend. The entire gang at Berkshire looks forward to seeing you.
代理声明中包括有关获取球票的信息。我们还将提供一份信息包，列出周日晚间营业的餐厅及周末在奥马哈可参与的各项活动。伯克希尔全体成员期待与您的见面。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 28, 1997
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
1997年2月28日