1995巴菲特致股东的信
# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们)
Our gain in net worth during 1995 was $5.3 billion, or 45.0%. Per-share book value grew by a little less, 43.1%, because we paid stock for two acquisitions, increasing our shares outstanding by 1.3%. Over the last 31 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $14,426, or at a rate of 23.6% compounded annually.
1995年我们的净资产增长了53亿美元，即增长了45.0%。由于我们以股票支付了两起并购交易，流通股数量增加了1.3%，因此每股账面价值的增长略低，为43.1%。在过去31年里（也就是自现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值从19美元增长到了14,426美元，年复合增长率达到了23.6%。
There's no reason to do handsprings over 1995's gains. This was a year in which any fool could make a bundle in the stock market. And we did. To paraphrase President Kennedy, a rising tide lifts all yachts.
对于1995年的收益没有理由欣喜若狂。这一年在股市中傻瓜都能赚上一笔。我们也确实如此。借用肯尼迪总统的话来说：潮水上涨时，所有的游艇都会随之升高。
Putting aside the financial results, there was plenty of good news at Berkshire last year: We negotiated three acquisitions of exactly the type we desire. Two of these, Helzberg's Diamond Shops and R.C. Willey Home Furnishings, are included in our 1995 financial statements, while our largest transaction, the purchase of GEICO, closed immediately after the end of the year. (I'll tell you more about all three acquisitions later in the report.)
抛开财务结果不谈，去年伯克希尔还有很多好消息：我们达成了三笔正是我们所期望类型的收购交易。其中两家公司——Helzberg钻石店和R.C. Willey家居装饰公司——已包含在我们1995年的财务报表中，而我们最大的一笔交易——对GEICO的收购——则是在年底后立即完成的。（稍后我会在这份报告中详细介绍这三项收购。）
These new subsidiaries roughly double our revenues. Even so, the acquisitions neither materially increased our shares outstanding nor our debt. And, though these three operations employ over 11,000 people, our headquarters staff grew only from 11 to 12. (No sense going crazy.)
这些新子公司大致使我们的营收翻倍。即便如此，这些收购并未显著增加我们的流通股或债务。尽管这三家企业的员工总数超过11,000人，但我们的总部员工数仅仅从11人增加到12人。（没必要搞得太过复杂。）
Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I want to build a collection of companies - both wholly- and partly-owned - that have excellent economic characteristics and that are run by outstanding managers. Our favorite acquisition is the negotiated transaction that allows us to purchase 100% of such a business at a fair price. But we are almost as happy when the stock market offers us the chance to buy a modest percentage of an outstanding business at a pro-rata price well below what it would take to buy 100%. This double-barrelled approach - purchases of entire businesses through negotiation or purchases of part-interests through the stock market - gives us an important advantage over capital-allocators who stick to a single course. Woody Allen once explained why eclecticism works: "The real advantage of being bisexual is that it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night."
伯克希尔副董事长兼我的合伙人查理·芒格和我都希望打造一组拥有卓越经济特性的企业，无论是全资还是部分持股，这些企业都应由杰出的管理者经营。我们最喜欢的收购方式是通过协商达成交易，以合理价格购买一家企业的全部股份。不过，当股市提供机会让我们以远低于收购全部股权所需的价格按比例购入一家优秀企业的少量股份时，我们也会非常高兴。这种双管齐下的策略——通过谈判收购整家企业，或通过股市购入部分权益——使我们在资本配置方面比那些只坚持单一路径的人更具优势。伍迪·艾伦曾解释过为何多元化是有效的：“双性恋真正的优势在于它能让你周六晚上的约会机会翻倍。”
Over the years, we've been Woody-like in our thinking, attempting to increase our marketable investments in wonderful businesses, while simultaneously trying to buy similar businesses in their entirety. The following table illustrates our progress on both fronts. In the tabulation, we show the marketable securities owned per share of Berkshire at ten-year intervals. A second column lists our per-share operating earnings (before taxes and purchase-price adjustments but after interest and corporate overhead) from all other activities. In other words, the second column shows what we earned excluding the dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from investments. Purchase-price accounting adjustments are ignored for reasons we have explained at length in previous reports and which, as an act of mercy, we won't repeat. (We'll be glad to send masochists the earlier explanations, however.)
多年来，我们的思维方式一直像伍迪那样，在不断增加我们对优质企业可交易投资的同时，也试图整体买下类似的企业。以下表格展示了我们在两个方向上的进展。表中列出了每十年一个时间点伯克希尔每股所拥有的可交易证券情况。第二列列出的是我们每股营业利润（税前、不包括购并价格调整项目，但扣除利息和公司运营费用）来自其他所有业务活动的数据。换句话说，第二列显示的是我们不包括投资所得的股息、利息和资本利得在内的收入。有关购并价格的会计调整项目，我们在以前的报告中已经详细解释过，出于仁慈考虑，这里不再重复。（当然，如果有人想了解详情，我们很乐意将之前的解释寄给这些“受虐狂”。）
| Year | Marketable Securities Per Share（可交易证券每股金额） | Pre-tax Earnings Per Share Excluding All Income from Investments（不含投资收益的税前每股收益） |
|---|---|---|
| 1965 | $ 4 | $ 4.08 |
| 1975 | 159 | (6.48) |
| 1985 | 2,443 | 18.86 |
| 1995 | 22,088 | 258.20 |
| Yearly Growth Rate: 1965-95 | 33.4% | 14.7% |
These results have not sprung from some master plan that we concocted in 1965. In a general way, we knew then what we hoped to accomplish but had no idea what specific opportunities might make it possible. Today we remain similarly unstructured: Over time, we expect to improve the figures in both columns but have no road map to tell us how that will come about.
这些成果并非源于我们1965年就制定的一个宏伟蓝图。当时我们大致知道想要实现什么目标，但并不清楚具体的机会会是什么。如今我们依然保持这种非结构化的状态：我们预计长期来看这两栏的数据都会得到改善，但我们并没有明确的路线图告诉我们如何实现这一目标。
# Acquisitions (收购)
We proceed with two advantages: First, our operating managers are outstanding and, in most cases, have an unusually strong attachment to Berkshire. Second, Charlie and I have had considerable experience in allocating capital and try to go at that job rationally and objectively. The giant disadvantage we face is size: In the early years, we needed only good ideas, but now we need good big ideas. Unfortunately, the difficulty of finding these grows in direct proportion to our financial success, a problem that increasingly erodes our strengths.
我们拥有两个优势：首先，我们的运营经理人非常出色，在大多数情况下，他们对伯克希尔有着不同寻常的忠诚度。其次，查理和我在资本配置方面拥有丰富的经验，并且我们努力以理性、客观的态度来对待这项工作。我们面临的巨大劣势是公司规模：在早期，我们只需要好的想法，但现在我们需要的是既好又大的想法。遗憾的是，寻找这些大好机会的难度与我们的财务成功成正比增长，这个问题正在逐渐削弱我们的优势。
I will have more to say about Berkshire's prospects later in this report, when I discuss our proposed recapitalization.
有关伯克希尔前景的更多内容，我将在本报告后面讨论我们提议的资本重组时再作说明。
It may seem strange that we exult over a year in which we made three acquisitions, given that we have regularly used these pages to question the acquisition activities of most managers. Rest assured, Charlie and I haven't lost our skepticism: We believe most deals do damage to the shareholders of the acquiring company. Too often, the words from HMS Pinafore apply: "Things are seldom what they seem, skim milk masquerades as cream." Specifically, sellers and their representatives invariably present financial projections having more entertainment value than educational value. In the production of rosy scenarios, Wall Street can hold its own against Washington.
考虑到我们一贯在这份报告中质疑大多数经理人的收购行为，我们为一年内完成三笔收购而感到兴奋，这看起来或许有些奇怪。请放心，查理和并未失去我们的怀疑态度：我们认为大多数交易实际上损害了收购方股东的利益。“事情往往不像表面看上去那样，脱脂牛奶常常伪装成奶油”这句话说得恰到好处。具体来说，卖方及其代表总是会提供一些财务预测，这些预测更像娱乐作品而非教育资料。在制造乐观前景方面，华尔街丝毫不逊色于华盛顿。
In any case, why potential buyers even look at projections prepared by sellers baffles me. Charlie and I never give them a glance, but instead keep in mind the story of the man with an ailing horse. Visiting the vet, he said: "Can you help me? Sometimes my horse walks just fine and sometimes he limps." The vet's reply was pointed: "No problem - when he's walking fine, sell him." In the world of mergers and acquisitions, that horse would be peddled as Secretariat.
无论如何，我不明白为何潜在买家会去看卖方准备的那些预测数据。查理和我从不看这些东西，而是始终记住一个关于生病马匹的故事。有个人带着一匹病马去看兽医，他说：“你能帮我吗？有时候我的马走得很好，有时却会跛行。” 兽医的回答很尖锐：“没问题——它走得好的时候你就把它卖掉。” 在并购世界里，这样一匹马会被吹嘘成“秘书处”（Secretariat，美国传奇赛马）。
At Berkshire, we have all the difficulties in perceiving the future that other acquisition-minded companies do. Like they also, we face the inherent problem that the seller of a business practically always knows far more about it than the buyer and also picks the time of sale - a time when the business is likely to be walking "just fine."
在伯克希尔，我们在预判未来方面也面临其他有意进行收购的公司所具有的所有困难。同样地，我们也面对一个固有问题：企业出售者几乎总是比买方更了解这家企业，而且他们还会选择出售时机——通常是在企业的表现刚好“还不错”的时候。
Even so, we do have a few advantages, perhaps the greatest being that we don't have a strategic plan. Thus we feel no need to proceed in an ordained direction (a course leading almost invariably to silly purchase prices) but can instead simply decide what makes sense for our owners. In doing that, we always mentally compare any move we are contemplating with dozens of other opportunities open to us, including the purchase of small pieces of the best businesses in the world via the stock market. Our practice of making this comparison - acquisitions against passive investments - is a discipline that managers focused simply on expansion seldom use.
尽管如此，我们确实也有一些优势，其中最大的或许是——我们没有所谓的战略计划。因此，我们不必按照某种预定方向前进（这种路径几乎总会导致荒谬的购买价格），而是可以简单地决定什么对我们所有者最有意义。在做决策时，我们总是会在脑海中将任何拟议中的行动与其他数十个我们可能的机会进行比较，包括通过股市购买全球最优秀企业的少量股份。我们将主动收购与被动投资进行对比分析的做法，是一种专注于扩张的管理者很少使用的纪律。
Talking to Time Magazine a few years back, Peter Drucker got to the heart of things: "I will tell you a secret: Dealmaking beats working. Dealmaking is exciting and fun, and working is grubby. Running anything is primarily an enormous amount of grubby detail work . . . dealmaking is romantic, sexy. That's why you have deals that make no sense."
几年前在接受《时代》杂志采访时，彼得·德鲁克说到了问题的核心：“我告诉你一个秘密：谈交易胜过实干。谈交易令人兴奋有趣，而实干则显得琐碎麻烦。经营任何东西其实都主要是大量琐碎细节的工作……而谈交易则浪漫、性感。这就是为什么会出现很多毫无意义的交易。”
In making acquisitions, we have a further advantage: As payment, we can offer sellers a stock backed by an extraordinary collection of outstanding businesses. An individual or a family wishing to dispose of a single fine business, but also wishing to defer personal taxes indefinitely, is apt to find Berkshire stock a particularly comfortable holding. I believe, in fact, that this calculus played an important part in the two acquisitions for which we paid shares in 1995.
在进行收购时，我们还有一个额外的优势：作为支付手段，我们可以向卖方提供一种由一系列卓越企业组成的股票支持的股权。对于一位个人或一个家族而言，如果他们希望出售一家优质企业，同时又想无限期推迟缴纳个人税款，那么持有伯克希尔的股票可能会是一个特别合适的选择。事实上，我相信这一考虑在我们1995年用股票支付的两起收购中发挥了重要作用。
Beyond that, sellers sometimes care about placing their companies in a corporate home that will both endure and provide pleasant, productive working conditions for their managers. Here again, Berkshire offers something special. Our managers operate with extraordinary autonomy. Additionally, our ownership structure enables sellers to know that when I say we are buying to keep, the promise means something. For our part, we like dealing with owners who care what happens to their companies and people. A buyer is likely to find fewer unpleasant surprises dealing with that type of seller than with one simply auctioning off his business.
此外，有些卖方还关心他们的公司将被安置在一个既能长久存续、又能为其管理层提供愉快高效工作环境的企业大家庭中。在这方面，伯克希尔再次提供了独特之处。我们的经理人们拥有极高的自主权。此外，我们的所有权结构使卖方能够确信，当我说我们是“永久持有”时，这个承诺是有分量的。就我们而言，我们也喜欢与那些真正关心自己企业和员工命运的业主打交道。相比那些只是单纯把企业拍卖出售的人，与这类卖家合作，买家通常更容易避免遭遇意外的负面情况。
In addition to the foregoing being an explanation of our acquisition style, it is, of course, a not-so-subtle sales pitch. If you own or represent a business earning $25 million or more before tax, and it fits the criteria listed on page 23, just give me a call. Our discussion will be confidential. And if you aren't interested now, file our proposition in the back of your mind: We are never going to lose our appetite for buying companies with good economics and excellent management.
以上所述不仅是对我们收购风格的解释，当然，也是一种并不太含蓄的推销。如果你拥有一家或代表一家税前盈利至少2,500万美元的企业，并且符合第23页列出的标准，请随时给我打电话。我们的谈话将是保密的。即使你现在没有兴趣，也请把我们的提议记在脑海深处：我们永远不会失去对收购具有良好经济特性和卓越管理团队公司的热情。
Concluding this little dissertation on acquisitions, I can't resist repeating a tale told me last year by a corporate executive. The business he grew up in was a fine one, with a long-time record of leadership in its industry. Its main product, however, was distressingly glamorless. So several decades ago, the company hired a management consultant who - naturally - advised diversification, the then-current fad. ("Focus" was not yet in style.) Before long, the company acquired a number of businesses, each after the consulting firm had gone through a long - and expensive - acquisition study. And the outcome? Said the executive sadly, "When we started, we were getting 100% of our earnings from the original business. After ten years, we were getting 150%."
在结束这篇关于收购的小论文之前，我忍不住要重复去年一位公司高管告诉我的一个故事。他成长于一家经营良好的企业，这家企业在业内长期保持领先地位。然而，它的主要产品却令人失望地缺乏吸引力。于是几十年前，这家公司聘请了一位管理顾问，这位顾问自然建议他们进行多元化发展——当时流行的潮流。（那时，“聚焦主业”还未流行起来。）不久之后，公司在每项收购前都让顾问进行了漫长而昂贵的研究。结果如何呢？这位高管悲伤地说：“刚开始时，我们100%的利润来自原有业务。十年后，我们竟然有150%的利润来自原有业务。”
# Helzberg's Diamond Shops (Helzberg钻石店)
A few years back, management consultants popularized a technique called "management by walking around" (MBWA). At Berkshire, we've instituted ABWA (acquisitions by walking around).
几年前，管理顾问们推广了一种被称为“走动式管理”（Management by Walking Around，简称MBWA）的方法。而在伯克希尔，我们也发展出自己的“走动式收购”（Acquisitions by Walking Around，简称ABWA）。
In May 1994, a week or so after the Annual Meeting, I was crossing the street at 58th and Fifth Avenue in New York, when a woman called out my name. I listened as she told me she'd been to, and had enjoyed, the Annual Meeting. A few seconds later, a man who'd heard the woman stop me did so as well. He turned out to be Barnett Helzberg, Jr., who owned four shares of Berkshire and had also been at our meeting.
1994年5月，在年度股东大会结束一周左右，我正穿过纽约第58街与第五大道交汇处的马路，一位女士喊了我的名字。她告诉我她参加了我们的年度股东大会，并且感到非常愉快。几秒钟后，另一个听到她说话并因此停下来的人也拦住了我。他就是小巴内特·赫尔兹伯格（Barnett Helzberg, Jr.），他是伯克希尔的股东之一，持有四股公司股票，并也曾出席过我们的会议。
In our few minutes of conversation, Barnett said he had a business we might be interested in. When people say that, it usually turns out they have a lemonade stand - with potential, of course, to quickly grow into the next Microsoft. So I simply asked Barnett to send me particulars. That, I thought to myself, will be the end of that.
我们简短交谈了几分钟，巴内特说他有一家企业可能引起我们的兴趣。当人们这样说时，通常他们拥有的只是一个柠檬水摊——当然，潜力巨大，可以迅速成长为下一个微软。所以我只是请巴内特寄一些详细资料给我。我心里想，这件事就此结束了。
Not long after, Barnett sent me the financial statements of Helzberg's Diamond Shops. The company had been started by his grandfather in 1915 from a single store in Kansas City and had developed by the time we met into a group with 134 stores in 23 states. Sales had grown from $10 million in 1974 to $53 million in 1984 and $282 million in 1994. We weren't talking lemonade stands.
不久之后，巴内特寄来了Helzberg钻石店的财务报表。这家公司由他的祖父于1915年在堪萨斯城开设了第一家门店，到我们见面时已发展成为一家拥有23个州共134家门店的连锁企业。销售额从1974年的1,000万美元增长到1984年的5,300万美元，再到1994年的2.82亿美元。这次显然不是什么柠檬水摊。
Barnett, then 60, loved the business but also wanted to feel free of it. In 1988, as a step in that direction, he had brought in Jeff Comment, formerly President of Wanamaker's, to help him run things. The hiring of Jeff turned out to be a homerun, but Barnett still found that he couldn't shake a feeling of ultimate responsibility. Additionally, he owned a valuable asset that was subject to the vagaries of a single, very competitive industry, and he thought it prudent to diversify his family's holdings.
当时60岁的巴内特热爱这家企业，但也希望从中解脱出来。于是他在1988年采取了一个措施：聘请曾任Wanamaker公司总裁的杰夫·康蒙特（Jeff Comment）来协助他经营。事实证明，聘请杰夫是一记全垒打，但巴内特仍觉得自己无法摆脱最终责任的感觉。此外，他还拥有一项资产，其价值受制于一个竞争极为激烈的单一行业，他认为分散家族资产是明智之举。
Berkshire was made to order for him. It took us awhile to get together on price, but there was never any question in my mind that, first, Helzberg's was the kind of business that we wanted to own and, second, Jeff was our kind of manager. In fact, we would not have bought the business if Jeff had not been there to run it. Buying a retailer without good management is like buying the Eiffel Tower without an elevator.
伯克希尔对他来说简直是量身定制。我们在价格上花了些时间才达成一致，但我始终坚信两点：第一，Helzberg是一家我们想要拥有的企业；第二，杰夫是我们欣赏的管理者类型。事实上，如果没有杰夫来运营，我们根本不会买下这家公司。购买一家没有优秀管理团队的零售企业，就像买了埃菲尔铁塔却没有电梯一样。
We completed the Helzberg purchase in 1995 by means of a tax-free exchange of stock, the only kind of transaction that interested Barnett. Though he was certainly under no obligation to do so, Barnett shared a meaningful part of his proceeds from the sale with a large number of his associates. When someone behaves that generously, you know you are going to be treated right as a buyer.
我们于1995年通过免税换股的方式完成了对Helzberg的收购，这也是巴内特唯一感兴趣的交易形式。尽管他完全没有义务这么做，但他还是将一部分出售所得慷慨地分享给了大量员工。当一个人如此大方时，你就知道作为买家你也会受到公正对待。
The average Helzberg's store has annual sales of about $2 million, far more than competitors operating similarly-sized stores achieve. This superior per-store productivity is the key to Helzberg's excellent profits. If the company continues its first-rate performance - and we believe it will - it could grow rather quickly to several times its present size.
Helzberg平均每家门店的年销售额约为200万美元，远高于其他竞争对手在相似规模门店中实现的销售水平。这种卓越的单店生产力是Helzberg获得优异利润的关键。如果公司继续保持一流的业绩表现——我们相信它会做到——它的规模可以在短时间内迅速增长至目前的数倍。
Helzberg's, it should be added, is an entirely different sort of operation from Borsheim's, our Omaha jewelry business, and the two companies will operate independently of each other. Borsheim's had an excellent year in 1995, with sales up 11.7%. Susan Jacques, its 36-year-old CEO, had an even better year, giving birth to her second son at the start of the Christmas season. Susan has proved to be a terrific leader in the two years since her promotion.
值得一提的是，Helzberg的经营模式与我们在奥马哈的珠宝业务Borsheim完全不同，两家公司将各自独立运营。Borsheim在1995年也有出色表现，销售额增长了11.7%。其36岁的CEO苏珊·雅克（Susan Jacques）更是迎来了人生中最美好的一年：她在圣诞节前夕生下了她的第二个儿子。自从升任CEO以来，苏珊已经用两年时间证明了自己是一位出色的领导者。
# R.C. Willey Home Furnishings (R.C. Willey家居装饰公司)
It was Nebraska Furniture Mart's Irv Blumkin who did the walking around in the case of R.C. Willey, long the leading home furnishings business in Utah. Over the years, Irv had told me about the strengths of that company. And he had also told Bill Child, CEO of R.C. Willey, how pleased the Blumkin family had been with its Berkshire relationship. So in early 1995, Bill mentioned to Irv that for estate tax and diversification reasons, he and the other owners of R.C. Willey might be interested in selling.
在这起关于R.C. Willey的案例中，“走动”的人是Nebraska Furniture Mart的Irv Blumkin。R.C. Willey长期以来一直是犹他州领先的家居装饰企业。多年来，Irv曾多次向我提起这家公司的优势。同时，他也告诉R.C. Willey的CEO比尔·柴尔德（Bill Child），布卢姆金家族对与伯克希尔的合作感到非常满意。因此在1995年初，比尔向Irv提到，出于遗产税和资产多元化的原因，他和其他股东可能有兴趣出售公司。
From that point forward, things could not have been simpler. Bill sent me some figures, and I wrote him a letter indicating my idea of value. We quickly agreed on a number, and found our personal chemistry to be perfect. By mid-year, the merger was completed.
从那以后，事情变得异常简单。比尔寄了一些数据给我，我写信告诉他我对公司价值的看法。我们很快就达成了价格共识，并发现彼此非常投缘。到年中，合并已完成。
R.C. Willey is an amazing story. Bill took over the business from his father-in-law in 1954 when sales were about $250,000. From this tiny base, Bill employed Mae West's philosophy: "It's not what you've got - it's what you do with what you've got." Aided by his brother, Sheldon, Bill has built the company to its 1995 sales volume of $257 million, and it now accounts for over 50% of the furniture business in Utah. Like Nebraska Furniture Mart, R.C. Willey sells appliances, electronics, computers and carpets in addition to furniture. Both companies have about the same sales volume, but NFM gets all of its business from one complex in Omaha, whereas R.C. Willey will open its sixth major store in the next few months.
R.C. Willey是一个令人惊叹的故事。1954年，比尔从他的岳父手中接管了这家公司，当时的销售额仅为约25万美元。在这个微小的基础上，比尔采用了梅·韦斯特（Mae West）的哲学：“重要的不是你拥有什么，而是你如何利用你所拥有的。” 在他弟弟谢尔顿（Sheldon）的帮助下，他将公司发展到1995年销售额达到2.57亿美元，如今占犹他州家具市场份额超过50%。与Nebraska Furniture Mart一样，R.C. Willey除销售家具外，还销售家电、电子产品、电脑和地毯。两家公司的销售额大致相当，但Nebraska Furniture Mart的所有业务都来自奥马哈的一个卖场，而R.C. Willey将在未来几个月内开设第六家大型门店。
Retailing is a tough business. During my investment career, I have watched a large number of retailers enjoy terrific growth and superb returns on equity for a period, and then suddenly nosedive, often all the way into bankruptcy. This shooting-star phenomenon is far more common in retailing than it is in manufacturing or service businesses. In part, this is because a retailer must stay smart, day after day. Your competitor is always copying and then topping whatever you do. Shoppers are meanwhile beckoned in every conceivable way to try a stream of new merchants. In retailing, to coast is to fail.
零售业是一项艰难的生意。在我的投资生涯中，我目睹了许多零售商一度享受惊人的增长和出色的股东回报率，然后却突然一落千丈，常常最终走向破产。这种“流星现象”在零售业中远比在制造业或服务业中更为常见。部分原因在于，零售商必须日复一日地保持聪明。你的竞争对手总是在模仿你的做法，然后超越你。与此同时，消费者被各种方式吸引去尝试新的商家。在零售业，一旦松懈就注定失败。
In contrast to this have-to-be-smart-every-day business, there is what I call the have-to-be-smart-once business. For example, if you were smart enough to buy a network TV station very early in the game, you could put in a shiftless and backward nephew to run things, and the business would still do well for decades. You'd do far better, of course, if you put in Tom Murphy, but you could stay comfortably in the black without him. For a retailer, hiring that nephew would be an express ticket to bankruptcy.
与这种每天都必须聪明应对的零售业形成对比的是，我称之为“只需一次聪明”的生意。例如，如果你足够精明，在早期就买下了一家电视网络公司，即使你让一个懒惰又落后的侄子来管理，这家公司也能持续几十年表现良好。当然，如果你能像聘请汤姆·墨菲（Tom Murphy）那样出色的管理者，业绩会更好得多；但即便没有他，你也完全可以稳稳地保持盈利。而对于一家零售商来说，如果聘用这样的侄子，那无异于直接走向破产的快车。
The two retailing businesses we purchased this year are blessed with terrific managers who love to compete and have done so successfully for decades. Like the CEOs of our other operating units, they will operate autonomously: We want them to feel that the businesses they run are theirs. This means no second-guessing by Charlie and me. We avoid the attitude of the alumnus whose message to the football coach is "I'm 100% with you - win or tie." Our basic goal as an owner is to behave with our managers as we like our owners to behave with us.
我们今年收购的两家零售企业都拥有非常优秀的管理者，他们热爱竞争，并已成功经营数十年。和我们其他运营单位的CEO一样，他们将享有充分的自主权：我们希望他们感觉自己经营的就是自己的企业。这意味着查理和我都不会事后诸葛亮地指手画脚。我们避免那种校友对足球教练说“无论输赢我都支持你”的态度。作为所有者，我们的基本目标就是以我们自己也希望被股东如此对待的方式来对待我们的经理人。
As we add more operations, I'm sometimes asked how many people I can handle reporting to me. My answer to that is simple: If I have one person reporting to me and he is a lemon, that's one too many, and if I have managers like those we now have, the number can be almost unlimited. We are lucky to have Bill and Sheldon associated with us, and we hope that we can acquire other businesses that bring with them managers of similar caliber.
随着我们业务的不断扩展，我有时会被问到我能处理多少人向我汇报工作。我的回答很简单：如果我手下有一个报告者是个废物，那就是多了一个；而如果我们拥有的是像现在这些水平的管理者，那么人数几乎可以无限。我们很幸运能有比尔和谢尔顿加入我们，我们也希望未来能收购更多能带来同样水准管理者的公司。
# GEICO Corporation (GEICO公司)
Right after yearend, we completed the purchase of 100% of GEICO, the seventh largest auto insurer in the United States, with about 3.7 million cars insured. I've had a 45-year association with GEICO, and though the story has been told before, it's worth a short recap here.
在年底后不久，我们完成了对GEICO的全资收购。这是一家美国第七大汽车保险公司，承保车辆约370万辆。我和GEICO的关系已有45年历史，尽管这个故事曾被讲述过多次，但在本文中简要回顾仍是有价值的。
I attended Columbia University's business school in 1950-51, not because I cared about the degree it offered, but because I wanted to study under Ben Graham, then teaching there. The time I spent in Ben's classes was a personal high, and quickly induced me to learn all I could about my hero. I turned first to Who's Who in America, finding there, among other things, that Ben was Chairman of Government Employees Insurance Company, to me an unknown company in an unfamiliar industry.
我在1950至1951年间就读于哥伦比亚大学商学院，不是因为我在意它提供的学位，而是因为我渴望跟随本·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）学习。那段在格雷厄姆课堂上的时光是我人生中的高光时刻之一，也促使我迅速去了解这位我心目中的英雄的一切信息。我首先查阅了《美国名人录》（Who's Who in America），从中发现格雷厄姆担任政府雇员保险公司（Government Employees Insurance Company）董事长。对我而言，这是一家来自陌生行业、鲜为人知的公司。
A librarian next referred me to Best's Fire and Casualty insurance manual, where I learned that GEICO was based in Washington, DC. So on a Saturday in January, 1951, I took the train to Washington and headed for GEICO's downtown headquarters. To my dismay, the building was closed, but I pounded on the door until a custodian appeared. I asked this puzzled fellow if there was anyone in the office I could talk to, and he said he'd seen one man working on the sixth floor.
接着一位图书管理员建议我查阅Best’s Fire and Casualty保险手册，从中我了解到GEICO总部位于华盛顿特区。于是1951年1月的一个周六，我乘火车前往华盛顿，直奔GEICO市中心总部。令我失望的是大楼关闭了，但我不断敲门，直到一名看门人出现。我问这位满脸疑惑的人，办公室里是否有人可以和我聊聊，他说他看到六楼有一位工作人员正在工作。
And thus I met Lorimer Davidson, Assistant to the President, who was later to become CEO. Though my only credentials were that I was a student of Graham's, "Davy" graciously spent four hours or so showering me with both kindness and instruction. No one has ever received a better half-day course in how the insurance industry functions nor in the factors that enable one company to excel over others. As Davy made clear, GEICO's method of selling - direct marketing - gave it an enormous cost advantage over competitors that sold through agents, a form of distribution so ingrained in the business of these insurers that it was impossible for them to give it up. After my session with Davy, I was more excited about GEICO than I have ever been about a stock.
就这样，我遇到了时任总裁助理洛里默·戴维森（Lorimer Davidson），他后来成为公司CEO。尽管我当时唯一的资格只是格雷厄姆的学生，但“戴维”（Davy）还是慷慨地花了大约四个小时，给予我极大的友善和指导。没有人曾接受过比这更好的半天课程，关于保险行业的运作方式，以及使某家公司胜出的关键因素。戴维明确指出，GEICO采用直销模式销售保险，使其成本远低于通过代理销售的竞争对手。这种分销方式在其他保险公司中根深蒂固，以至于它们根本无法放弃。那次与戴维的交流之后，我对GEICO的热情远远超过了我对任何一只股票的热情。
When I finished at Columbia some months later and returned to Omaha to sell securities, I naturally focused almost exclusively on GEICO. My first sales call - on my Aunt Alice, who always supported me 100% - was successful. But I was then a skinny, unpolished 20-year-old who looked about 17, and my pitch usually failed. Undaunted, I wrote a short report late in 1951 about GEICO for "The Security I Like Best" column in The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, a leading financial publication of the time. More important, I bought stock for my own account.
几个月后我从哥伦比亚大学毕业，回到奥马哈从事证券销售工作时，我自然几乎只专注于GEICO。我第一次推销——对象是我的爱丽丝姑妈，她一向全力支持我——获得了成功。但当时我只是一个瘦弱、不成熟的20岁青年，看起来像17岁，因此我的推销常常失败。尽管如此，我在1951年底为当时的主流金融出版物《商业与金融纪事报》（The Commercial and Financial Chronicle）撰写了关于GEICO的“我最喜爱的投资标的”专栏文章。更重要的是，我为自己账户购买了该股。
You may think this odd, but I have kept copies of every tax return I filed, starting with the return for 1944. Checking back, I find that I purchased GEICO shares on four occasions during 1951, the last purchase being made on September 26. This pattern of persistence suggests to me that my tendency toward self-intoxication was developed early. I probably came back on that September day from unsuccessfully trying to sell some prospect and decided - despite my already having more than 50% of my net worth in GEICO - to load up further. In any event, I accumulated 350 shares of GEICO during the year, at a cost of $10,282. At yearend, this holding was worth $13,125, more than 65% of my net worth.
你可能觉得奇怪，但我保留了自1944年起每一份报税表的副本。回查后我发现，我在1951年分四次买入GEICO股票，最后一次是在9月26日。这种持续买入的行为表明，我很早就养成了自我陶醉的倾向。那天我可能刚因未能成功推销某产品回来，却决定继续加仓——尽管我当时净资产的50%以上已经投资在GEICO上。总之，那一年我总共购入了350股GEICO股票，总成本为10,282美元。到年底时，这笔持仓价值13,125美元，占我净资产的65%以上。
You can see why GEICO was my first business love. Furthermore, just to complete this stroll down memory lane, I should add that I earned most of the funds I used to buy GEICO shares by delivering The Washington Post, the chief product of a company that much later made it possible for Berkshire to turn $10 million into $500 million.
你可以理解为何GEICO是我钟爱的第一家企业。此外，为了完整回忆这段往事，我还要补充一点：我用来购买GEICO股票的资金，大部分来自于投递《华盛顿邮报》的工作收入。这家公司的主要产品多年后帮助伯克希尔将1,000万美元变成了5亿美元。
Alas, I sold my entire GEICO position in 1952 for $15,259, primarily to switch into Western Insurance Securities. This act of infidelity can partially be excused by the fact that Western was selling for slightly more than one times its current earnings, a p/e ratio that for some reason caught my eye. But in the next 20 years, the GEICO stock I sold grew in value to about $1.3 million, which taught me a lesson about the inadvisability of selling a stake in an identifiably-wonderful company.
可惜的是，我在1952年以15,259美元的价格卖掉了全部GEICO股票，主要是为了转投Western Insurance Securities。这次“背叛”行为部分可以解释为：当时Western的市盈率略高于1倍，这个数字不知为何吸引了我的注意。但在接下来的20年里，我卖出的GEICO股票市值增长到了约130万美元，这让我深刻认识到：出售一家明显优秀企业的股份是多么不明智的做法。
In the early 1970's, after Davy retired, the executives running GEICO made some serious errors in estimating their claims costs, a mistake that led the company to underprice its policies - and that almost caused it to go bankrupt. The company was saved only because Jack Byrne came in as CEO in 1976 and took drastic remedial measures.
上世纪70年代初，戴维退休后，GEICO管理层在估算理赔成本方面犯下了严重错误，导致公司保费定价偏低，险些破产。幸亏杰克·伯恩（Jack Byrne）于1976年出任CEO并采取果断措施，才挽救了公司。
Because I believed both in Jack and in GEICO's fundamental competitive strength, Berkshire purchased a large interest in the company during the second half of 1976, and also made smaller purchases later. By yearend 1980, we had put $45.7 million into GEICO and owned 33.3% of its shares. During the next 15 years, we did not make further purchases. Our interest in the company, nonetheless, grew to about 50% because it was a big repurchaser of its own shares.
由于我相信杰克本人及其领导下的GEICO所具备的基本竞争优势，伯克希尔于1976年下半年大量买入该公司股份，并在此后进行了少量增持。到1980年底，我们共投入4,570万美元，持股比例达到33.3%。此后15年，我们未再进一步买入，但由于公司大量回购自身股票，我们在该公司的权益逐渐上升至约50%。
Then, in 1995, we agreed to pay $2.3 billion for the half of the company we didn't own. That is a steep price. But it gives us full ownership of a growing enterprise whose business remains exceptional for precisely the same reasons that prevailed in 1951. In addition, GEICO has two extraordinary managers: Tony Nicely, who runs the insurance side of the operation, and Lou Simpson, who runs investments.
到了1995年，我们同意以23亿美元的价格收购我们尚未持有的另一半GEICO股份。这是一笔高昂的代价。但这也使我们完全拥有一家持续增长的企业，其业务之所以仍然卓越，正是基于1951年时的那些原因。此外，GEICO还拥有两位非凡的管理者：负责保险业务的托尼·尼利（Tony Nicely）和负责投资的卢·辛普森（Lou Simpson）。
Tony, 52, has been with GEICO for 34 years. There's no one I would rather have managing GEICO's insurance operation. He has brains, energy, integrity and focus. If we're lucky, he'll stay another 34 years.
托尼今年52岁，在GEICO已工作了34年。我不认为还有谁比他更适合管理GEICO的保险业务。他聪明、精力充沛、正直且专注。如果幸运的话，他还能再为我们效力34年。
Lou runs investments just as ably. Between 1980 and 1995, the equities under Lou's management returned an average of 22.8% annually vs. 15.7% for the S&P. Lou takes the same conservative, concentrated approach to investments that we do at Berkshire, and it is an enormous plus for us to have him on board. One point that goes beyond Lou's GEICO work: His presence on the scene assures us that Berkshire would have an extraordinary professional immediately available to handle its investments if something were to happen to Charlie and me.
卢在投资方面的管理同样出色。1980年至1995年间，由卢管理的股票组合年均回报率达到22.8%，而标普指数仅为15.7%。卢采用的是一种与伯克希尔相同的保守型集中投资策略，他的加入对我们来说是一个巨大的优势。还有一个超出GEICO层面的重要点：如果查理和我发生任何意外，卢的存在确保伯克希尔能立即有一位杰出的专业人士接手我们的投资管理工作。
GEICO, of course, must continue both to attract good policyholders and keep them happy. It must also reserve and price properly. But the ultimate key to the company's success is its rock-bottom operating costs, which virtually no competitor can match. In 1995, moreover, Tony and his management team pushed underwriting and loss adjustment expenses down further to 23.6% of premiums, nearly one percentage point below 1994's ratio. In business, I look for economic castles protected by unbreachable "moats." Thanks to Tony and his management team, GEICO's moat widened in 1995.
当然，GEICO必须继续吸引优质保户并让他们满意。它还必须合理计提准备金并准确定价。但公司成功的关键最终在于其极低的运营成本，几乎没有任何竞争对手可以匹敌。此外，1995年，托尼及其管理团队进一步将承保及理赔调整费用压低至保费收入的23.6%，比1994年的比例又下降了近一个百分点。在商业中，我寻找的是被不可逾越的“护城河”保护的经济城堡。多亏托尼和他的团队，GEICO的护城河在1995年变得更加宽广。
Finally, let me bring you up to date on Davy. He's now 93 and remains my friend and teacher. He continues to pay close attention to GEICO and has always been there when the company's CEOs - Jack Byrne, Bill Snyder and Tony - have needed him. Our acquisition of 100% of GEICO caused Davy to incur a large tax. Characteristically, he still warmly supported the transaction.
最后，让我更新一下戴维的近况。他已经93岁，依然是我的朋友和导师。他依然密切关注GEICO的发展，并始终在公司历任CEO——杰克·伯恩、比尔·斯奈德和托尼——需要他的时候给予支持。我们全资收购GEICO的行为导致戴维需缴纳一笔大额税款。但他一如既往地热情支持这项交易。
Davy has been one of my heroes for the 45 years I've known him, and he's never let me down. You should understand that Berkshire would not be where it is today if Davy had not been so generous with his time on a cold Saturday in 1951. I've often thanked him privately, but it is fitting that I use this report to thank him on behalf of Berkshire's shareholders.
在我认识戴维的这45年里，他一直是我的英雄之一，而且从未让我失望过。你们应该明白，如果没有他在1951年那个寒冷的星期六慷慨地抽出时间接待我，伯克希尔今天不会处于这样的位置。我曾多次私下向他表示感谢，但在本报告中代表伯克希尔股东正式致谢，是再合适不过的事情了。
# Insurance Operations (保险业务)
In addition to acquiring GEICO, we enjoyed other favorable developments in insurance during 1995.
除了完成对GEICO的收购外，我们在1995年的保险业务方面也取得了其他积极进展。
As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our insurance business is, first, the amount of "float" we generate and, second, its cost to us. Float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because most policies require that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve loss claims.
正如我们在以往报告中所解释的那样，我们的保险业务关键在于两点：第一，我们产生的“浮存金”（Float）数量；第二，它的成本。所谓浮存金，是指我们持有但并不属于我们的资金。在保险业务中，浮存金产生于大多数保单要求预付保费，更重要的是，保险公司通常需要一段时间才能得知并处理索赔请求。
Typically, the premiums that an insurer takes in do not cover the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss" - and that loss is the cost of float. An insurance business is profitable over time if its cost of float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business has a negative value if the cost of its float is higher than market rates for money.
通常情况下，保险公司收取的保费不足以覆盖其必须支付的损失和费用，这就导致了一个“承保亏损”（Underwriting Loss），这个亏损就是浮存金的成本。如果浮存金的成本低于公司通过其他渠道融资所需的成本，那么该保险业务长期来看就是有利可图的；但如果浮存金的成本高于市场资金利率，则该保险业务就具有负价值。
As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's insurance business has been a huge winner. For the table, we have calculated our float - which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last three, our cost of float has been negative, which means we have calculated our insurance earnings by adding underwriting profit to float income.
如以下表格所示的数据表明，伯克希尔的保险业务表现非常优异。为了计算我们的浮存金（相对于我们的保费规模而言异常庞大），我们通过将损失准备金、理赔调整准备金、承担再保险责任下的资金余额、未赚取的保费准备金相加，再减去代理人账户余额、预付取得成本、预付税款以及适用于承担再保险部分的递延支出得出。浮存金的成本取决于我们的承保亏损或盈利。在像最近三年这样出现承保利润的年份中，我们的浮存金成本为负数，这意味着我们的保险收益等于承保利润加上浮存金带来的收益。
| 年份 | 承保损益（百万美元） | 平均浮存金（百万美元） | 资金成本比率（1/2） | 长期国债收益率 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1967 | 利润 | 17.3 | 小于零 | 5.50% |
| 1968 | 利润 | 19.9 | 小于零 | 5.90% |
| 1969 | 利润 | 23.4 | 小于零 | 6.79% |
| 1970 | -0.37 | 32.4 | 1.14% | 6.25% |
| 1971 | 利润 | 52.5 | 小于零 | 5.81% |
| 1972 | 利润 | 69.5 | 小于零 | 5.82% |
| 1973 | 利润 | 73.3 | 小于零 | 7.27% |
| 1974 | -7.36 | 79.1 | 9.30% | 8.13% |
| 1975 | -11.35 | 87.6 | 12.96% | 8.03% |
| 1976 | 利润 | 102.6 | 小于零 | 7.30% |
| 1977 | 利润 | 139.0 | 小于零 | 7.97% |
| 1978 | 利润 | 190.4 | 小于零 | 8.93% |
| 1979 | 利润 | 227.3 | 小于零 | 10.08% |
| 1980 | 利润 | 237.0 | 小于零 | 11.94% |
| 1981 | 利润 | 228.4 | 小于零 | 13.61% |
| 1982 | -21.56 | 220.6 | 9.77% | 10.64% |
| 1983 | -33.87 | 231.3 | 14.64% | 11.84% |
| 1984 | -48.06 | 253.2 | 18.98% | 11.58% |
| 1985 | -44.23 | 390.2 | 11.34% | 9.34% |
| 1986 | -55.84 | 797.5 | 7.00% | 7.60% |
| 1987 | -55.43 | 1,266.7 | 4.38% | 8.95% |
| 1988 | -11.08 | 1,497.7 | 0.74% | 9.00% |
| 1989 | -24.40 | 1,541.3 | 1.58% | 7.97% |
| 1990 | -26.65 | 1,637.3 | 1.63% | 8.24% |
| 1991 | -119.59 | 1,895.0 | 6.31% | 7.40% |
| 1992 | -108.96 | 2,290.4 | 4.76% | 7.39% |
| 1993 | 利润 | 2,624.7 | 小于零 | 6.35% |
| 1994 | 利润 | 3,056.6 | 小于零 | 7.88% |
| 1995 | 利润 | 3,607.2 | 小于零 | 5.95% |
Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float has grown at an annual compounded rate of 20.7%. In more years than not, our cost of funds has been less than nothing. This access to "free" money has boosted Berkshire's performance in a major way.
自1967年我们进入保险行业以来，我们的浮存金以每年20.7%的复合增长率不断增长。在多数年份里，我们的资金成本甚至低于零。这种获取“免费”资金的能力极大地提升了伯克希尔的整体业绩表现。
I actively participated in those early reinsurance decisions, and Berkshire paid a heavy tuition for my education in the business. Unfortunately, reinsurance students can't attend school on scholarship. GEICO, incidentally, suffered a similar, disastrous experience in the early 1980's, when it plunged enthusiastically into the writing of reinsurance and large risks. GEICO's folly was brief, but it will be cleaning things up for at least another decade. The well-publicized problems at Lloyd's further illustrate the perils of reinsurance and also underscore how vital it is that the interests of the people who write insurance business be aligned - on the downside as well as the upside - with those of the people putting up the capital. When that kind of symmetry is missing, insurers almost invariably run into trouble, though its existence may remain hidden for some time.
我曾积极参与早期的再保险决策，而伯克希尔为我在这一领域的学习付出了高昂代价。不幸的是，从事再保险的人无法获得奖学金。顺便提一句，GEICO在上世纪80年代初也经历了类似的灾难性经历——当时它热情地投入到了再保险和大额风险承保业务中。虽然GEICO的错误时间不长，但它至少还需要再花十年时间来收拾残局。Lloyd’s（劳合社）广为人知的问题进一步说明了再保险的风险，并突显了一个关键点：保险承保人的利益必须与出资方的利益保持一致，无论是在顺境还是逆境中都应如此。一旦这种对称性缺失，保险公司几乎总会陷入困境，尽管问题可能在一段时间内仍未被察觉。
A small, apocryphal story about an insurance CEO who was visited by an analyst tells a lot about this industry. To the analyst's questions about his business, the CEO had nothing but gloomy answers: Rates were ridiculously low; the reserves on his balance sheet weren't adequate for ordinary claims, much less those likely to arise from asbestos and environmental problems; most of his reinsurers had long since gone broke, leaving him holding the sack. But then the CEO brightened: "Still, things could be a lot worse," he said. "It could be my money." At Berkshire, it's our money.
有个关于一位保险CEO的小故事虽未经证实但流传甚广，很能说明这个行业的情况。当一位分析师拜访他并询问公司业务时，这位CEO的回答充满悲观情绪：费率低得离谱；资产负债表上的准备金连普通索赔都不够，更别提石棉和环境问题带来的潜在索赔了；大多数再保险公司早已破产，留下他自己承担损失。但随后这位CEO突然变得乐观起来：“不过，事情本来可能会更糟，”他说，“那笔钱要是我自己的就好了。”而在伯克希尔，那正是我们的钱。
Berkshire's other insurance operations, though relatively small, performed magnificently in 1995. National Indemnity's traditional business had a combined ratio of 84.2 and developed, as usual, a large amount of float compared to premium volume. Over the last three years, this segment of our business, run by Don Wurster, has had an average combined ratio of 85.6. Our homestate operation, managed by Rod Eldred, grew at a good rate in 1995 and achieved a combined ratio of 81.4. Its three-year combined ratio is an amazing 82.4. Berkshire's California workers' compensation business, run by Brad Kinstler, faced fierce price-cutting in 1995 and lost a great many renewals when we refused to accept inadequate rates. Though this operation's volume dropped materially, it produced an excellent underwriting profit. Finally, John Kizer, at Central States Indemnity, continues to do an extraordinary job. His premium volume was up 23% in 1995, and underwriting profit grew by 59%. Ajit, Don, Rod, Brad and John are all under 45, an embarrassing fact demolishing my theory that managers only hit their stride after they reach 70.
尽管伯克希尔其他保险业务规模相对较小，但在1995年表现优异。National Indemnity的传统业务综合比率达到了84.2，并一如既往地产生了大量浮存金，远高于其保费收入规模。过去三年里，在唐·沃斯特（Don Wurster）的管理下，该业务板块的平均综合比率为85.6。由罗德·埃尔德雷德（Rod Eldred）管理的本土保险业务在1995年增长迅速，综合比率达到81.4；其三年平均综合比率更是惊人地低至82.4。伯克希尔加州工人赔偿险业务由布拉德·金斯托（Brad Kinstler）负责，1995年面临激烈的价格战，由于我们拒绝接受不足的费率，失去了大量续保客户。尽管业务量大幅下降，但仍实现了出色的承保利润。最后，中陆保险（Central States Indemnity）的约翰·基泽（John Kizer）继续表现出色。他在1995年的保费收入增长了23%，承保利润增长了59%。阿吉特、唐、罗德、布拉德和约翰全都不到45岁，这一令人“尴尬”的事实彻底粉碎了我的理论——即管理者只有在70岁之后才会真正进入状态。
To sum up, we entered 1995 with an exceptional insurance operation of moderate size. By adding GEICO, we entered 1996 with a business still better in quality, much improved in its growth prospects, and doubled in size. More than ever, insurance is our core strength.
总而言之，我们在1995年初拥有一个规模适中但非常优秀的保险业务。通过收购GEICO，我们在1996年拥有了一个质量更高、成长前景更佳、规模翻倍的保险业务。如今，保险业务比以往任何时候都更能代表伯克希尔的核心竞争力。
# Sources of Reported Earnings (收益来源)
The table below shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-premium charges are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. This form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing GAAP, which requires purchase-premiums to be charged off, business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表列示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在此呈现方式中，购并溢价费用并未分摊到具体适用的业务单位，而是汇总后单独列出。这种方式使你能够看到这些业务在未被伯克希尔收购前本应呈现的盈利状况。我们认为，这种展示方式比遵循GAAP（要求按每项业务分别冲销购并溢价）更适合投资者和管理层理解。当然，表格中显示的总收益与经审计财务报表中的GAAP数据完全一致。
| 来源 | 税前收益（百万美元） | 伯克希尔股东应占净收益（扣除税款及少数股东权益后） | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1995年 | 1994年 | 1995年 | 1994年 | |
| 经营收益： | ||||
| 保险集团： | ||||
| 承保收益（Underwriting） | $ 20.5 | $129.9 | $11.3 | $80.9 |
| 投资净收益（Net Investment Income） | 501.6 | 419.4 | 417.7 | 350.5 |
| Buffalo News | 46.8 | 54.2 | 27.3 | 31.7 |
| Fechheimer | 16.9 | 14.3 | 8.8 | 7.1 |
| 金融业务 | 20.8 | 22.1 | 12.6 | 14.6 |
| 家居装饰（含R.C. Willey自1995年6月29日起） | 29.7 | 17.4 | 16.7 | 8.7 |
| 珠宝（含Helzberg自1995年4月30日起） | 33.9 | --- | 19.1 | --- |
| Kirby | 50.2 | 42.3 | 32.1 | 27.7 |
| Scott Fetzer制造集团 | 34.1 | 39.5 | 21.2 | 24.9 |
| See's Candies | 50.2 | 47.5 | 29.8 | 28.2 |
| 鞋类集团 | 58.4 | 85.5 | 37.5 | 55.8 |
| World Book | 8.8 | 24.7 | 7.0 | 17.3 |
| 购买溢价费用（Purchase-Price Premium Charges） | (27.0) | (22.6) | (23.4) | (19.4) |
| 利息支出（Interest Expense） | (56.0) | (60.1) | (34.9) | (37.3) |
| 股东指定捐赠（Shareholder-Designated Contributions） | (11.6) | (10.4) | (7.0) | (6.7) |
| 其他 | 37.4 | 35.7 | 24.4 | 22.3 |
| 经营收益合计 | $814.7 | $839.4 | $600.2 | $606.2 |
| 证券出售收益 | 194.1 | 91.3 | 125.0 | 61.1 |
| USAir优先股价值下跌 | --- | (268.5) | --- | (172.6) |
| 全部实体总收益 | $1,008.8 | $662.2 | $725.2 | $494.8 |
A large amount of information about these businesses is given on pages 41-52, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 57-63, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the financial information that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed.
有关这些业务的详细信息请参见第41至52页，其中也包括我们按照GAAP标准分段报告的收益情况。此外，在第57至63页，我们将伯克希尔的财务数据重新划分为四个非GAAP标准的业务板块，这更符合查理和我对公司的思考方式。我们的目标是向你们提供我们希望如果角色互换时你们会提供给我们的那种财务信息。
At Berkshire, we believe in Charlie's dictum - "Just tell me the bad news; the good news will take care of itself" - and that is the behavior we expect of our managers when they are reporting to us. Consequently, I also owe you - Berkshire's owners - a report on three operations that, though they continued to earn decent (or better) returns on invested capital, experienced a decline in earnings last year. Each encountered a different type of problem.
在伯克希尔，我们信奉查理的一句格言：“只告诉我坏消息；好消息自己会照顾自己。”这也是我们期待经理人在向我们汇报时所应采取的态度。因此，我也要向各位——伯克希尔的所有者们——汇报三项业务的情况。尽管它们去年仍然获得了不错（甚至更好）的投资回报率，但其盈利却出现了下滑。每个业务遭遇了不同类型的问题。
Our shoe business operated in an industry that suffered depressed earnings throughout last year, and many of our competitors made only marginal profits or worse. That means we at least maintained, and in some instances widened, our competitive superiority. So I have no doubt that our shoe operations will climb back to top-grade earnings in the future. In other words, though the turn has not yet occurred, we believe you should view last year's figures as reflecting a cyclical problem, not a secular one.
我们的鞋类业务所处的行业在整个去年都处于低迷状态，许多竞争对手仅取得微利甚至亏损。这意味着我们至少维持了竞争优势，某些情况下还进一步拉开了差距。因此我毫不怀疑，我们的鞋类业务未来将重新回到高盈利水平。换句话说，尽管拐点尚未出现，但我们认为你应该将去年的数据视为周期性问题的结果，而非结构性衰退。
The Buffalo News, though still doing very well in comparison to other newspapers, is another story. In this case, industry trends are not good. In the 1991 Annual Report, I explained that newspapers had lost a notch in their economic attractiveness from the days when they appeared to have a bullet-proof franchise. Today, the industry retains its excellent economics, but has lost still another notch. Over time, we expect the competitive strength of newspapers to gradually erode, though the industry should nevertheless remain a fine business for many years to come.
尽管《布法罗新闻》相比其他报纸仍表现良好，但它的处境有所不同。在这个案例中，行业趋势并不乐观。在1991年年度报告中，我曾指出，报纸行业的经济吸引力已不如当年看似拥有“坚不可摧特许权”时的状态。如今，该行业依然具备良好的经济特性，但吸引力又进一步减弱。从长期来看，我们预计报纸行业的竞争优势将逐渐削弱，尽管即便如此，该行业在未来多年仍将是一项不错的生意。
Berkshire's most difficult problem is World Book, which operates in an industry beset by increasingly tough competition from CD-ROM and on-line offerings. True, we are still profitable, a claim that perhaps no other print encyclopedia can make. But our sales and earnings trends have gone in the wrong direction. At the end of 1995, World Book made major changes in the way it distributes its product, stepped up its efforts with electronic products and sharply reduced its overhead costs. It will take time for us to evaluate the effects of these initiatives, but we are confident they will significantly improve our viability.
伯克希尔目前最棘手的问题来自世界百科出版社（World Book）。它所处的行业正面临日益激烈的竞争，尤其是来自CD-ROM和在线内容的冲击。诚然，我们仍然保持盈利——这可能是其他纸质百科全书无法做到的。但我们的销售额和利润趋势却在朝着不利方向发展。1995年底，世界百科出版社对其产品分销方式进行了重大调整，加大了对电子产品的投入，并大幅削减了运营成本。这些举措的效果尚需时间检验，但我们相信它们将显著提升我们的生存能力。
All of our operations, including those whose earnings fell last year, benefit from exceptionally talented and dedicated managers. Were we to have the choice of any other executives now working in their industries, there is not one of our managers we would replace.
我们所有的业务，包括那些去年盈利下降的业务，都得益于极其出色且敬业的管理团队。即使我们可以从各自行业中选择任何其他高管，我们也无意替换我们现有的任何一位经理人。
Many of our managers don't have to work for a living, but simply go out and perform every day for the same reason that wealthy golfers stay on the tour: They love both doing what they do and doing it well. To describe them as working may be a misnomer - they simply prefer spending much of their time on a productive activity at which they excel to spending it on leisure activities. Our job is to provide an environment that will keep them feeling this way, and so far we seem to have succeeded: Thinking back over the 1965-95 period, I can't recall that a single key manager has left Berkshire to join another employer.
我们的许多经理人其实并不需要靠工作谋生，但他们每天仍像职业高尔夫球手一样继续参赛：因为他们热爱自己所做的事，并且乐于把它做到最好。说他们“工作”也许不太准确——他们只是更愿意把大量时间花在擅长并能创造价值的事情上，而不是休闲活动上。我们的任务就是营造一个让他们持续保持这种状态的环境。到目前为止，我们似乎成功地做到了这一点：回顾1965至1995年这段时间，我想不起有任何一位核心经理人离开伯克希尔去为其他雇主效力。
# Common Stock Investments (普通股投资)
Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a market value of more than $600 million are itemized.
以下是我们持有的普通股投资情况。市场价值超过6亿美元的投资项目已单独列出。
| 股数 | 公司名称 | 成本（百万美元） | 市值（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 49,456,900 | 美国运通公司（American Express Company） | $1,392.7 | $2,046.3 |
| 20,000,000 | 资本城/美国广播公司（Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.） | $345.0 | $2,467.5 |
| 100,000,000 | 可口可乐公司（The Coca-Cola Company） | $1,298.9 | $7,425.0 |
| 12,502,500 | 联邦住房贷款抵押公司（Freddie Mac） | $260.1 | $1,044.0 |
| 34,250,000 | GEICO公司 | $45.7 | $2,393.2 |
| 48,000,000 | 吉列公司（The Gillette Company） | $600.0 | $2,502.0 |
| 6,791,218 | 富国银行（Wells Fargo & Company） | $423.7 | $1,466.9 |
| 其他（Others） | —— | $1,379.0 | $2,655.4 |
| 总计 | $5,745.1 | $22,000.3 |
We continue in our Rip Van Winkle mode: Five of our six top positions at yearend 1994 were left untouched during 1995. The sixth was American Express, in which we increased our ownership to about 10%.
我们继续保持“沉睡谷模式”（Rip Van Winkle mode）：1994年底我们前六大持仓中的五项在1995年未作变动。第六项是美国运通公司，我们在该公司的持股比例提高到了约10%。
In early 1996, two major events affected our holdings: First, our purchase of the GEICO stock we did not already own caused that company to be converted into a wholly-owned subsidiary. Second, we exchanged our Cap Cities shares for a combination of cash and Disney stock.
1996年初，两项重大事件影响了我们的持仓：第一，我们完成了对GEICO剩余股份的收购，使该公司成为伯克希尔全资子公司；第二，我们将资本城公司（Cap Cities）的股票换成了现金与迪士尼股票的组合。
In the Disney merger, Cap Cities shareholders had a choice of actions. If they chose, they could exchange each of their Cap Cities shares for one share of Disney stock plus $65. Or they could ask for - though not necessarily get - all cash or all stock, with their ultimate allotment of each depending on the choices made by other shareholders and certain decisions made by Disney. For our 20 million shares, we sought stock, but do not know, as this report goes to press, how much we were allocated. We are certain, however, to receive something over 20 million Disney shares. We have also recently bought Disney stock in the market.
在迪士尼并购资本城公司的交易中，股东们有多种选择。他们可以选择将每份资本城股票换成一股迪士尼股票加65美元现金；也可以申请全部现金或全部股票（尽管未必能得到）。最终获得多少现金或股票取决于其他股东的选择以及迪士尼方面的决定。对于我们持有的2,000万股，我们选择了股票形式，但在本报告发布时尚不确定具体分配数量。但我们确定至少会收到超过2,000万股的迪士尼股票。此外，我们最近也在市场上买入了一些迪士尼股票。
One more bit of history: I first became interested in Disney in 1966, when its market valuation was less than $90 million, even though the company had earned around $21 million pre-tax in 1965 and was sitting with more cash than debt. At Disneyland, the $17 million Pirates of the Caribbean ride would soon open. Imagine my excitement - a company selling at only five times rides!
再讲一段往事：我第一次对迪士尼产生兴趣是在1966年，当时它的市值还不到9,000万美元，而公司在1965年的税前利润就达到了约2,100万美元，并且账上的现金多于负债。就在那年，迪斯尼乐园耗资1,700万美元的“加勒比海盗”游乐设施即将开放。你能想象我当时多么兴奋吧——一家公司的估值竟然只有其游乐设施价格的五倍！
Duly impressed, Buffett Partnership Ltd. bought a significant amount of Disney stock at a split-adjusted price of 31½ per share. That decision may appear brilliant, given that the stock now sells for $66. But your Chairman was up to the task of nullifying it: In 1967 I sold out at 48½ per share.
受到震撼之后，巴菲特合伙公司以拆股调整后的每股31.5美元的价格买入了大量迪士尼股票。考虑到现在股价已经涨到66美元，这项决策看起来非常英明。但你们的董事长总能找到办法抹杀这种英明：我在1967年以每股48.5美元的价格将其全部卖出。
Oh well - we're happy to be once again a large owner of a business with both unique assets and outstanding management.
不过没关系——我们很高兴再次成为一家拥有独特资产和卓越管理团队的企业的大股东。
# Convertible Preferred Stocks (可转换优先股)
As many of you will remember, Berkshire made five private purchases of convertible preferred stocks during the 1987-91 period and the time seems right to discuss their status. Here are the particulars:
正如你们许多人还记得的那样，伯克希尔在1987至1991年间进行了五笔私募可转换优先股的投资，现在是时候来回顾一下它们的现状了。以下是详细情况：
| 公司名称 | 股息率 | 投资年份 | 成本（百万美元） | 市值（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Champion International Corp. | 9¼% | 1989 | $300 | $388（注1） |
| First Empire State Corp. | 9% | 1991 | $40 | $110 |
| 吉列公司（The Gillette Company） | 8¾% | 1989 | $600 | $2,502（注2） |
| 所罗门公司（Salomon Inc.） | 9% | 1987 | $700 | $728（注3） |
| USAir集团（USAir Group, Inc.） | 9¼% | 1989 | $358 | $215 |
注释： （1）通过1995年转换获得的普通股出售所得。 （2）1991年转换获得的普通股市值（截至1995年12月31日）。 （3）包含1995年部分赎回所得的1.4亿美元。
In each case we had the option of sticking with these preferreds as fixed-income securities or converting them into common stock. Initially, their value to us came primarily from their fixed-income characteristics. The option we had to convert was a kicker.
在每笔投资中，我们都有两个选择：要么作为固定收益证券持有这些优先股，要么将其转换为普通股。最初，我们看重的是它们的固定收益特性。而是否转换为普通股的权利，则是一种额外的奖励选项。
Our $300 million private purchase of American Express "Percs" - described in the 1991 Annual Report - is not included in the table because that security was a modified form of common stock whose fixed-income characteristics contributed only a minor portion of its initial value. Three years after we bought them, the Percs automatically were converted to common stock. In contrast, the five securities in the table were set to become common stocks only if we wished them to - a crucial difference.
我们在1991年年报中提到的对美国运通公司“Percs”（参与型可赎回证券）的3亿美元私募投资并未列入上表，因为该证券本质上是一种改良形式的普通股，其固定收益特征在其初始价值中仅占很小比例。在我们买入三年后，这些证券自动转换为普通股。相比之下，上表中的五种证券只有在我们主动选择时才会转为普通股——这是关键区别。
When we purchased our convertible securities, I told you that we expected to earn after-tax returns from them that "moderately" exceeded what we could earn from the medium-term fixed-income securities they replaced. We beat this expectation - but only because of the performance of a single issue. I also told you that these securities, as a group, would "not produce the returns we can achieve when we find a business with wonderful economic prospects." Unfortunately, that prediction was fulfilled. Finally, I said that "under almost any conditions, we expect these preferreds to return us our money plus dividends." That's one I would like to have back. Winston Churchill once said that "eating my words has never given me indigestion." My assertion, however, that it was almost impossible for us to lose money on our preferreds has caused me some well-deserved heartburn.
当初购买这些可转换证券时，我曾告诉各位，我们预期它们带来的税后回报将“适度”高于我们所替代的中期固定收益证券。我们确实超过了这一预期——但只是因为其中一项投资表现突出。我还曾指出，从整体来看，这些证券“无法带来我们找到拥有卓越经济前景企业时所能获得的回报。”遗憾的是，这一预测也应验了。最后，我曾表示：“几乎在任何情况下，我们都预计这些优先股会返还我们的本金并支付股息。”这句话我现在希望收回。温斯顿·丘吉尔曾说过：“吞下自己的话从未让我消化不良。”然而，我当时坚称我们几乎不可能在这些优先股上亏钱的说法，确实让我付出了应得的心痛代价。
Our best holding has been Gillette, which we told you from the start was a superior business. Ironically, though, this is also the purchase in which I made my biggest mistake - of a kind, however, never recognized on financial statements.
我们最成功的投资是吉列公司。我们一开始就告诉大家这是一家卓越的企业。讽刺的是，这项投资也是我犯过最大错误的地方——只不过这种错误在财务报表上永远体现不出来。
We paid $600 million in 1989 for Gillette preferred shares that were convertible into 48 million (split-adjusted) common shares. Taking an alternative route with the $600 million, I probably could have purchased 60 million shares of common from the company. The market on the common was then about $10.50, and given that this would have been a huge private placement carrying important restrictions, I probably could have bought the stock at a discount of at least 5%. I can't be sure about this, but it's likely that Gillette's management would have been just as happy to have Berkshire opt for common.
1989年，我们以6亿美元投资吉列公司的可转换优先股，该优先股可转换为4,800万股（拆股调整后）普通股。如果换一种方式使用这6亿美元，我本可以购买该公司约6,000万股普通股。当时普通股市场价格约为10.5美元，考虑到这是一笔规模巨大的私募交易且附带重要限制条件，我本可以至少以5%的折价购入。虽然不能百分之百确定，但我相信吉列管理层应该也会同样乐意接受我们直接购买普通股。
But I was far too clever to do that. Instead, for less than two years, we received some extra dividend income (the difference between the preferred's yield and that of the common), at which point the company - quite properly - called the issue, moving to do that as quickly as was possible. If I had negotiated for common rather than preferred, we would have been better off at yearend 1995 by $625 million, minus the "excess" dividends of about $70 million.
但我当时自作聪明地选择了优先股。结果，在不到两年的时间里，我们获得了一些额外的股息收入（优先股收益率与普通股股息之间的差额），随后公司合理地迅速行使了赎回权。如果我们当初谈判购买的是普通股而非优先股，到1995年底时我们将多赚6.25亿美元，扣除约7,000万美元“超额”股息后的净收益仍高出许多。
In the case of Champion, the ability of the company to call our preferred at 115% of cost forced a move out of us last August that we would rather have delayed. In this instance, we converted our shares just prior to the pending call and offered them to the company at a modest discount.
Champion公司有权以成本价115%的价格赎回我们的优先股，这迫使我们在去年8月不得不采取行动，而我们原本更希望推迟这一操作。在这种情况下，我们在赎回前将股份转换为普通股，并以小幅折扣向公司出售。
Charlie and I have never had a conviction about the paper industry - actually, I can't remember ever owning the common stock of a paper producer in my 54 years of investing - so our choice in August was whether to sell in the market or to the company. Champion's management had always been candid and honorable in dealing with us and wished to repurchase common shares, so we offered our stock to the company. Our Champion capital gain was moderate - about 19% after tax from a six-year investment - but the preferred delivered us a good after-tax dividend yield throughout our holding period. (That said, many press accounts have overstated the after-tax yields earned by property-casualty insurance companies on dividends paid to them. What the press has failed to take into account is a change in the tax law that took effect in 1987 and that significantly reduced the dividends received credit applicable to insurers. For details, see our 1986 Annual Report.)
查理和我对造纸行业一直没什么特别信心——事实上，在我54年的投资生涯中，我不记得自己曾经持有过任何一家造纸企业的普通股。因此，去年8月我们面临的选择是在市场上卖出还是卖给公司。Champion管理层一直以来都与我们坦诚相待、诚信合作，并有意回购普通股，于是我们决定将股票卖回给公司。这笔投资在六年内实现了约19%的税后资本收益，而且在整个持有期间，优先股为我们带来了不错的税后股息回报。（不过需要说明的是，许多媒体报道夸大了财险公司从股息中实现的实际税后收益率。他们忽略了1987年生效的一项税法变更，大幅削减了保险公司适用的股息抵税额度。详情请参见我们1986年的年报。）
Our First Empire preferred will be called on March 31, 1996, the earliest date allowable. We are comfortable owning stock in well-run banks, and we will convert and keep our First Empire common shares. Bob Wilmers, CEO of the company, is an outstanding banker, and we love being associated with him.
我们持有的First Empire优先股将于1996年3月31日（最早允许日期）被赎回。我们乐于投资管理良好的银行股，因此我们计划将其转换为普通股并继续持有。公司CEO鲍勃·威尔默斯（Bob Wilmers）是一位杰出的银行家，我们非常愿意与他保持合作关系。
Our other two preferreds have been disappointing, though the Salomon preferred has modestly outperformed the fixed-income securities for which it was a substitute. However, the amount of management time Charlie and I have devoted to this holding has been vastly greater than its economic significance to Berkshire. Certainly I never dreamed I would take a new job at age 60 - Salomon interim chairman, that is - because of an earlier purchase of a fixed-income security.
另外两项优先股投资令人失望，尽管所罗门优先股的表现略优于它所替代的固定收益证券。然而，查理和我在该持仓上投入的时间远远超过它对伯克希尔的经济意义。当然，我做梦也没想到会在60岁时接手一份新工作——担任所罗门临时董事长——仅仅因为我早先买了一项固定收益产品。
Soon after our purchase of the Salomon preferred in 1987, I wrote that I had "no special insights regarding the direction or future profitability of investment banking." Even the most charitable commentator would conclude that I have since proved my point.
1987年我们购买所罗门优先股不久后，我就写道：“我对投资银行业的未来方向或盈利能力并无特殊见解。”即使是最宽容的评论者也会认为，我此后用自己的经历证明了这一点。
To date, our option to convert into Salomon common has not proven of value. Furthermore, the Dow Industrials have doubled since I committed to buy the preferred, and the brokerage group has performed equally as well. That means my decision to go with Salomon because I saw value in the conversion option must be graded as very poor. Even so, the preferred has continued under some trying conditions to deliver as a fixed-income security, and the 9% dividend is currently quite attractive.
截至目前，我们拥有的转换成所罗门普通股的权利并未带来任何实际价值。此外，自我们决定购买该优先股以来，道琼斯工业指数已翻倍，整个券商板块的表现也相当不错。这意味着我当初因看好转换权而选择所罗门的决策，必须被评为非常糟糕。即便如此，在一些困难条件下，该优先股依然作为固定收益工具表现出色，目前9%的股息率仍然极具吸引力。
Unless the preferred is converted, its terms require redemption of 20% of the issue on October 31 of each year, 1995-99, and $140 million of our original $700 million was taken on schedule last year. (Some press reports labeled this a sale, but a senior security that matures is not "sold.") Though we did not elect to convert the preferred that matured last year, we have four more bites at the conversion apple, and I believe it quite likely that we will yet find value in our right to convert.
除非我们选择转换，否则根据条款规定，所罗门优先股须在1995至1999年每年10月31日赎回发行总额的20%。去年，我们原始投资中的1.4亿美元已按计划被赎回。（一些媒体报道将此称为“出售”，但到期的高级证券并不是“被卖出”的。）尽管我们未选择对去年到期的部分进行转换，但我们还有四次转换机会，我仍然相信我们最终会发现行使转换权是值得的。
I discussed the USAir investment at length in last year's report. The company's results improved in 1995, but it still faces significant problems. On the plus side for us is the fact that our preferred is structurally well-designed: For example, though we have not been paid dividends since June 1994, the amounts owed us are compounding at 5% over the prime rate. On the minus side is the fact that we are dealing with a weak credit.
我在去年年报中曾详细讨论过对USAir的投资。该公司1995年的经营状况有所改善，但仍面临重大问题。对我们有利的一点是：我们的优先股结构设计良好。例如，尽管自1994年6月以来我们未收到任何股息，但欠付金额以高于优惠利率5%的速度复利累积。不利的一面是我们面对的是一个信用较弱的企业。
We feel much better about our USAir preferred than we did a year ago, but your guess is as good as mine as to its ultimate value. (Indeed, considering my record with this investment, it's fair to say that your guess may be better than mine.) At yearend we carried our preferred (in which there is no public market) at 60% of par, though USAir also has outstanding a junior preferred that is significantly inferior to ours in all respects except conversion price and that was then trading at 82% of par. As I write this, the junior issue has advanced to 97% of par. Let's hope the market is right.
相比一年前，我们对USAir优先股的看法要乐观得多，但至于其最终价值如何，你我的判断可能差不多。（考虑到我在这一投资上的历史记录，甚至可以说你的判断可能更准确。）年底时，我们将该优先股（无公开市场）估值为其面值的60%，而USAir还有一只次级优先股，除转换价格外，在所有方面都远逊于我们的优先股，当时交易价为面值的82%。在我撰写此文时，这只次级优先股的价格已经上涨至面值的97%。希望市场是对的。
Overall, our preferreds have performed well, but that is true only because of one huge winner, Gillette. Leaving aside Gillette, our preferreds as a group have delivered us after-tax returns no more than equal to those we could have earned from the medium-term fixed-income issues that they replaced.
总体而言，我们的可转换优先股表现不错，但这主要归功于吉列一项大赢家。若剔除吉列的影响，其余优先股整体带来的税后回报并未超过我们原本可以通过中期固定收益证券获得的回报。
# A Proposed Recapitalization (一项拟议的资本重组)
At the Annual Meeting you will be asked to approve a recapitalization of Berkshire, creating two classes of stock. If the plan is adopted, our existing common stock will be designated as Class A Common Stock and a new Class B Common Stock will be authorized.
在年度股东大会上，股东们将投票决定是否批准伯克希尔的一项资本重组计划，即设立两类股票。若该计划获准通过，我们现有的普通股将被重新指定为A类普通股，并授权发行新的B类普通股。
Each share of the "B" will have the rights of 1/30th of an "A" share with these exceptions: First, a B share will have 1/200th of the vote of an A share (rather than 1/30th of the vote). Second, the B will not be eligible to participate in Berkshire's shareholder-designated charitable contributions program.
每份B类股份享有相当于1/30份A类股份的权利，但有两个例外：第一，B类股份的表决权仅为A类股份的1/200（而非1/30）；第二，B类股份不能参与伯克希尔的股东指定慈善捐赠计划。
When the recapitalization is complete, each share of A will become convertible, at the holder's option and at any time, into 30 shares of B. This conversion privilege will not extend in the opposite direction. That is, holders of B shares will not be able to convert them into A shares.
一旦完成资本重组，每一股A类股份均可由持有人自主选择、随时转换为30股B类股份。但此转换权利仅限单向，即B类股份持有人不得将其转换为A类股份。
We expect to list the B shares on the New York Stock Exchange, where they will trade alongside the A stock. To create the shareholder base necessary for a listing - and to ensure a liquid market in the B stock - Berkshire expects to make a public offering for cash of at least $100 million of new B shares. The offering will be made only by means of a prospectus.
我们计划将B类股份在纽约证券交易所上市，与A类股份并行交易。为建立必要的股东基础并确保B类股份具有流动性，伯克希尔计划公开发行至少1亿美元的新B类股份，用于募集现金。此次发行将仅通过招股说明书方式进行。
The market will ultimately determine the price of the B shares. Their price, though, should be in the neighborhood of 1/30th of the price of the A shares.
B类股份的市场价格最终将由市场决定。不过，理论上其价格应接近A类股份价格的1/30。
Class A shareholders who wish to give gifts may find it convenient to convert a share or two of their stock into Class B shares. Additionally, arbitrage-related conversions will occur if demand for the B is strong enough to push its price to slightly above 1/30th of the price of A.
有意赠送股份的A类股东可能会发现，将一两股股份转换为B类股份是较为便利的选择。此外，如果市场对B类股份的需求足够强劲，推动其价格略高于A类股份价格的1/30，那么也会出现套利相关的转换行为。
However, because the Class A stock will entitle its holders to full voting rights and access to Berkshire's contributions program, these shares will be superior to the Class B shares and we would expect most shareholders to remain holders of the Class A - which is precisely what the Buffett and Munger families plan to do, except in those instances when we ourselves might convert a few shares to facilitate gifts. The prospect that most shareholders will stick to the A stock suggests that it will enjoy a somewhat more liquid market than the B.
然而，由于A类股份拥有完整的表决权和参与伯克希尔股东指定捐赠计划的权利，因此A类股份明显优于B类股份。我们预计大多数股东将继续持有A类股份——这也是巴菲特家族和芒格家族的计划，除非我们在赠与股份时自行少量转换。多数股东继续持有A类股份的可能性表明，A类股份的流动性将略微强于B类股份。
There are tradeoffs for Berkshire in this recapitalization. But they do not arise from the proceeds of the offering - we will find constructive uses for the money - nor in any degree from the price at which we will sell the B shares. As I write this - with Berkshire stock at $36,000 - Charlie and I do not believe it undervalued. Therefore, the offering we propose will not diminish the per-share intrinsic value of our existing stock. Let me also put our thoughts about valuation more baldly: Berkshire is selling at a price at which Charlie and I would not consider buying it.
此次资本重组确实带来了某些取舍。但这些代价并非来自发行所得资金（我们会将其用于有益用途），也非源自B类股份的发行价格。正如我现在所写——当伯克希尔股价为36,000美元时，查理和我都认为它并不低估。因此，我们提议的发行不会摊薄现有每股的内在价值。让我再坦率一点表达我们的估值观点：目前这个价位的伯克希尔，查理和我都不会考虑买入。
What Berkshire will incur by way of the B stock are certain added costs, including those involving the mechanics of handling a larger number of shareholders. On the other hand, the stock should be a convenience for people wishing to make gifts. And those of you who have hoped for a split have gained a do-it-yourself method of bringing one about.
发行B类股份将带来一定附加成本，包括因股东人数增加而导致的操作复杂性。但从另一方面看，对于想送礼的人来说，B类股份提供了一种方便。那些一直希望拆细股份的人现在也有了一种“自助式”实现方式。
We are making this move, though, for other reasons - having to do with the appearance of expense-laden unit trusts purporting to be low-priced "clones" of Berkshire and sure to be aggressively marketed. The idea behind these vehicles is not new: In recent years, a number of people have told me about their wish to create an "all-Berkshire" investment fund to be sold at a low dollar price. But until recently, the promoters of these investments heard out my objections and backed off.
不过，我们推出B类股份还有另一个重要原因：最近市场上出现了许多费用高昂的单位信托基金，号称是低价版“伯克希尔克隆品”，并准备大力营销。这类产品的概念并不新鲜：近年来有不少人告诉我，他们希望创建一种“纯伯克希尔”的投资基金，以较低的单价对外销售。但直到最近以前，这些产品发起人都听取了我的反对意见而放弃了这一想法。
I did not discourage these people because I prefer large investors over small. Were it possible, Charlie and I would love to turn $1,000 into $3,000 for multitudes of people who would find that gain an important answer to their immediate problems.
我之所以劝阻这些人，并非因为我偏爱大投资者胜过小投资者。如果真能做到，查理和我都非常愿意帮助千千万万手头紧张的人把1,000美元变成3,000美元，这将切实解决他们眼前的困难。
In order to quickly triple small stakes, however, we would have to just as quickly turn our present market capitalization of $43 billion into $129 billion (roughly the market cap of General Electric, America's most highly valued company). We can't come close to doing that. The very best we hope for is - on average - to double Berkshire's per-share intrinsic value every five years, and we may well fall far short of that goal.
然而，若要迅速让小额投资翻三倍，我们必须同样迅速地将伯克希尔当前430亿美元的市值提升到1,290亿美元（大致相当于美国市值最高的公司通用电气的水平）。这显然远远超出我们的能力范围。我们所能期望的最佳结果，是在平均意义上，每五年令伯克希尔每股的内在价值翻一番，而且我们也可能无法达到这一目标。
In the end, Charlie and I do not care whether our shareholders own Berkshire in large or small amounts. What we wish for are shareholders of any size who are knowledgeable about our operations, share our objectives and long-term perspective, and are aware of our limitations, most particularly those imposed by our large capital base.
归根结底，查理和我们都无意区分大小股东。我们真正期待的是，无论持股多少，我们的股东都能了解我们的业务、认同我们的目标与长期视角，并清楚我们的局限——尤其是受庞大资本规模制约所带来的限制。
The unit trusts that have recently surfaced fly in the face of these goals. They would be sold by brokers working for big commissions, would impose other burdensome costs on their shareholders, and would be marketed en masse to unsophisticated buyers, apt to be seduced by our past record and beguiled by the publicity Berkshire and I have received in recent years. The sure outcome: a multitude of investors destined to be disappointed.
最近出现的这些单位信托基金（unit trusts）完全违背了我们的初衷。它们将由追求高额佣金的经纪人销售，给投资者带来额外沉重的成本，并面向缺乏经验的散户投资者大规模营销。这些买家容易被我们过去的成绩和近年来伯克希尔及我个人所获得的广泛关注所吸引。其必然结果是：大量投资者终将感到失望。
Through our creation of the B stock - a low-denomination product far superior to Berkshire-only trusts - we hope to make the clones unmerchandisable.
通过推出B类股份——一种比所谓“纯伯克希尔”信托更优质、面值更低的产品——我们希望让这些仿制品失去市场吸引力。
But both present and prospective Berkshire shareholders should pay special attention to one point: Though the per-share intrinsic value of our stock has grown at an excellent rate during the past five years, its market price has grown still faster. The stock, in other words, has outperformed the business.
但无论是现有股东还是潜在股东，都应该特别注意一个事实：尽管在过去五年中，我们每股内在价值以优异的速度增长，但股价的增长速度更快。换句话说，股票的表现跑赢了公司本身的实际表现。
That kind of market overperformance cannot persist indefinitely, neither for Berkshire nor any other stock. Inevitably, there will be periods of underperformance as well. The price volatility that results, though endemic to public markets, is not to our liking. What we would prefer instead is to have the market price of Berkshire precisely track its intrinsic value. Were the stock to do that, every shareholder would benefit during his period of ownership in exact proportion to the progress Berkshire itself made in the period.
这种市场的过度表现不可能无限持续下去，不仅对伯克希尔如此，对任何股票都是如此。不可避免地，也会有表现落后于公司的时期。由此产生的价格波动虽属股市常态，却并非我们所乐见。我们更希望的是伯克希尔的市场价格能精准反映其内在价值。如果真能做到这一点，每一位股东在其持股期间所获得的回报，将与伯克希尔本身的进步完全成正比。
Obviously, the market behavior of Berkshire's stock will never conform to this ideal. But we will come closer to this goal than we would otherwise if our present and prospective shareholders are informed, business-oriented and not exposed to high-commission salesmanship when making their investment decisions. To that end, we are better off if we can blunt the merchandising efforts of the unit trusts - and that is the reason we are creating the B stock.
显然，伯克希尔的股价永远无法真正达到这一理想状态。但如果我们的现有和潜在股东具备足够的商业知识、关注企业本质、并能在投资决策时免受高佣金推销的影响，我们将比现在更接近这一目标。为此，我们最好能削弱那些单位信托基金的营销攻势——这也是我们推出B类股份的原因所在。
We look forward to answering your questions about the recapitalization at the Annual Meeting.
我们期待在年度股东大会上就资本重组计划回答各位的提问。
# Miscellaneous (杂项)
Berkshire isn't the only American corporation utilizing the new, exciting ABWA strategy. At about 1:15 p.m. on July 14, 1995, Michael Eisner, CEO of The Walt Disney Company, was walking up Wildflower Lane in Sun Valley. At the same time, I was leaving a lunch at Herbert Allen's home on that street to meet Tom Murphy, CEO of Cap Cities/ABC, for a golf game.
伯克希尔并不是唯一一家运用“走动式收购”（ABWA）策略的美国公司。1995年7月14日下午约1点15分，华特迪士尼公司CEO迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）正在太阳谷的Wildflower Lane路上行走。与此同时，我刚刚在赫伯特·艾伦家吃完午饭，准备去与Cap Cities/ABC的CEO汤姆·墨菲（Tom Murphy）打高尔夫球。
That morning, speaking to a large group of executives and money managers assembled by Allen's investment bank, Michael had made a brilliant presentation about Disney, and upon seeing him, I offered my congratulations. We chatted briefly - and the subject of a possible combination of Disney and Cap Cities came up. This wasn't the first time a merger had been discussed, but progress had never before been made, in part because Disney wanted to buy with cash and Cap Cities desired stock.
那天早上，迈克尔面对艾伦旗下投行召集的一大批高管和基金经理人做了一场精彩绝伦的关于迪士尼的演讲。见面后，我向他表示祝贺。我们简单交谈了几句，提到了迪士尼与资本城可能合并的想法。这并非第一次讨论并购事宜，但之前从未取得进展，部分原因在于迪士尼希望以现金支付，而资本城则更倾向于换取股票。
Michael and I waited a few minutes for Murph to arrive, and in the short conversation that ensued, both Michael and Murph indicated they might bend on the stock/cash question. Within a few weeks, they both did, at which point a contract was put together in three very busy days.
我和迈克尔等了墨菲几分钟，随后三人简短交谈中，迈克尔和墨菲都表示愿意在股票/现金比例问题上作出妥协。几周之内，双方果然让步，合同也在三天紧张谈判后迅速达成。
The Disney/Cap Cities deal makes so much sense that I'm sure it would have occurred without that chance encounter in Sun Valley. But when I ran into Michael that day on Wildflower Lane, he was heading for his plane, so without that accidental meeting the deal certainly wouldn't have happened in the time frame it did. I believe both Disney and Cap Cities will benefit from the fact that we all serendipitously met that day.
迪士尼与资本城的交易本身就极具逻辑性，即使没有那次在太阳谷的偶遇，这笔交易也迟早会发生。不过，当时我在Wildflower Lane路上偶然遇到迈克尔时，他正赶往机场；如果没有这次意外相遇，这笔交易肯定不会在那个时间框架内完成。我相信，那一天的机缘巧合，将为迪士尼和资本城双方都带来巨大好处。
It's appropriate that I say a few words here about Murph. To put it simply, he is as fine an executive as I have ever seen in my long exposure to business. Equally important, he possesses human qualities every bit the equal of his managerial qualities. He's an extraordinary friend, parent, husband and citizen. In those rare instances in which Murph's personal interests diverged from those of shareholders, he unfailingly favored the owners. When I say that I like to be associated with managers whom I would love to have as a sibling, in-law, or trustee of my will, Murph is the exemplar of what I mean.
在此，我想谈谈墨菲（Murph）。简单地说，在我漫长的商业生涯中，我所见过最出色的执行官之一就是他。同样重要的是，他的为人品质丝毫不逊色于他的管理能力。他是一位非凡的朋友、父亲、丈夫和公民。在他个人利益与股东利益偶尔发生冲突时，他始终坚定地站在股东一边。当我说我喜欢与那种我可以放心地将其当作兄弟姐妹、亲属或遗嘱执行人来看待的经理人合作时，墨菲正是我所说的典范。
If Murph should elect to run another business, don't bother to study its value - just buy the stock. And don't later be as dumb as I was two years ago when I sold one-third of our holdings in Cap Cities for $635 million (versus the $1.27 billion those shares would bring in the Disney merger).
如果墨菲决定经营另一家企业，请不要再去研究那家公司值不值得买——直接买入它的股票就行。同时，也别像我两年前那样愚蠢地犯错：当时我把资本城三分之一的股份以6.35亿美元卖出，而根据迪士尼的合并方案，这部分股份本可以换得12.7亿美元。
About 96.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1995 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made were $11.6 million and 3,600 charities were recipients. A full description of the shareholder-designated contributions program appears on pages 54-55.
1995年，伯克希尔股东指定捐赠计划中，共有96.3%的符合资格股份参与。总捐款金额为1,160万美元，共惠及3,600家慈善机构。有关该计划的完整说明请参见第54至55页。
Every year a few shareholders miss out on the program because they don't have their shares registered in their own names on the prescribed record date or because they fail to get their designation form back to us within the 60-day period allowed. That second problem pained me especially this year because two good friends with substantial holdings missed the deadline. We had to deny their requests to be included because we can't make exceptions for some shareholders while refusing to make them for others.
每年都有少数股东因未在指定登记日以其本人名义持有股份，或未能在60天期限内提交指定表格而错过该计划。今年尤其让我感到遗憾的是，两位持有大量股份的好友错过了截止日期。我们不得不拒绝他们的加入请求，因为我们不能为某些股东破例，却不为其他股东破例。
To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1996, will be ineligible for the 1996 program. When you get the form, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten.
若要参与未来年度的捐赠计划，您持有的A类股份必须登记在实际持有人名下，而非券商、银行或托管机构的名义账户之下。凡是在1996年8月31日未以实际持有人身份登记的股份，均不具备参加1996年计划的资格。收到表格后，请尽快寄回，以免搁置遗忘。
# Miscellaneous (杂项)（续）
When it comes to our Annual Meetings, Charlie and I are managerial oddballs: We thoroughly enjoy the event. So come join us on Monday, May 6. At Berkshire, we have no investor relations department and don't use financial analysts as a channel for disseminating information, earnings "guidance," or the like. Instead, we prefer direct manager-to-owner communication and believe that the Annual Meeting is the ideal place for this interchange of ideas. Talking to you there is efficient for us and also democratic in that all present simultaneously hear what we have to say.
说到我们的年度股东大会，查理和我可以说是管理层中的“另类”：我们非常享受这个活动。所以请在5月6日星期一加入我们吧。伯克希尔没有投资者关系部门，也不通过金融分析师来传递信息、提供盈利“指引”等。相反，我们更倾向于直接的经理人与股东之间的沟通，并认为年度股东大会正是这种交流的最佳场所。与你们面对面交流对我们来说既高效又公平，因为现场所有人都能同时听到我们想表达的内容。
Last year, for the first time, we had the Annual Meeting at the Holiday Convention Centre and the logistics seemed to work. The ballroom there was filled with about 3,200 people, and we had a video feed into a second room holding another 800 people. Seating in the main room was a little tight, so this year we will probably configure it to hold 3,000. This year we will also have two rooms for the overflow.
去年，我们首次将股东大会移师Holiday Convention中心举行，整体安排运作良好。主会场可容纳约3,200人，另外还通过视频向另一个房间转播，容纳了约800人。由于主会场略显拥挤，今年我们将调整布局，使主会场容纳3,000人，并增设两个备用分会场以应对超额人流。
All in all, we will be able to handle 5,000 shareholders. The meeting will start at 9:30 a.m., but be warned that last year the main ballroom was filled shortly after 8:00 a.m.
总体上，我们可以接待最多5,000名股东。会议将于上午9:30开始，但请注意：去年主会场在早上8点刚过就已座无虚席。
Shareholders from 49 states attended our 1995 meeting - where were you, Vermont? - and a number of foreign countries, including Australia, Sweden and Germany, were represented. As always, the meeting attracted shareholders who were interested in Berkshire's business - as contrasted to shareholders who are primarily interested in themselves - and the questions were all good. Charlie and I ate lunch on stage and answered questions for about five hours.
去年的股东大会吸引了来自美国49个州的股东——佛蒙特州的朋友，你们去哪儿了？此外还有来自澳大利亚、瑞典和德国等国家的股东出席。一如既往地，这次大会吸引的是真正关心伯克希尔业务的股东，而非只关注自己利益的人。会上提出的问题都非常精彩。我和查理一边在台上吃午饭，一边回答问题达五个小时之久。
We feel that if owners come from all over the world, we should try to make sure they have an opportunity to ask their questions. Most shareholders leave about noon, but a thousand or so hardcore types usually stay to see whether we will drop. Charlie and I are in training to last at least five hours again this year.
我们认为，既然有股东从世界各地赶来参会，我们就应该确保他们有机会提问。大多数股东在中午左右离开，但通常仍有上千位铁杆股东留下来，看看我们是否撑得住。为了迎接今年的挑战，查理和我正在积极“训练”，目标是再坚持至少五个小时。
We will have our usual array of Berkshire products at the meeting and this year will add a sales representative from GEICO. At the 1995 meeting, we sold 747 pounds of candy, 759 pairs of shoes, and over $17,500 of World Books and related publications. In a move that might have been dangerous had our stock been weak, we added knives last year from our Quikut subsidiary and sold 400 sets of these. (We draw the line at soft fruit, however.) All of these goods will again be available this year. We don't consider a cultural event complete unless a little business is mixed in.
大会上，我们将一如既往地展示伯克希尔旗下各公司的产品，并在今年新增GEICO的销售代表参展。去年的会议上，我们售出了747磅糖果、759双鞋，以及超过17,500美元的世界百科全书及相关出版物。尽管如果公司股价疲软的话，这一举动可能有些冒险，但我们还是在去年推出了子公司Quikut的产品——刀具，并成功售出400套。（不过水果类产品我们就不再尝试了。）这些商品在今年也将继续供应。我们认为，文化活动若不夹带一点商业气息，就不算完整。
Because we expect a large crowd for the meeting, we recommend that you promptly get both plane and hotel reservations. Those of you who like to be downtown (about six miles from the Centre) may wish to stay at the Radisson Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel, or at the much larger Red Lion Hotel a few blocks away. In the vicinity of the Centre are the Holiday Inn (403 rooms), Homewood Suites (118 rooms) and Hampton Inn (136 rooms). Another recommended spot is the Marriott, whose west Omaha location is about 100 yards from Borsheim's and a ten-minute drive from the Centre. There will be buses at the Marriott that will leave at 7:30, 8:00 and 8:30 for the meeting and return after it ends.
鉴于预计今年参会人数众多，我们建议您尽早预订机票和酒店。如果您希望住在市中心（距离会议中心约六英里），可以选择Radisson Redick Tower酒店（小型，88间客房）或不远处更大的Red Lion酒店。会议中心附近还有Holiday Inn（403间客房）、Homewood Suites（118间客房）和Hampton Inn（136间客房）。另一个推荐选择是Marriott酒店，它位于奥马哈西部，距离Borsheim珠宝店仅百码之遥，距会议中心也只需十分钟车程。Marriott酒店将在早上7:30、8:00和8:30发车前往会议中心，并在会议结束后送回原处。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. A good-sized parking area is available at the Centre, while those who stay at the Holiday Inn, Homewood Suites and Hampton Inn will be able to walk to the meeting. As usual, we will have buses to take you to the Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to hotels or the airport later.
我们的委托书材料中附有一份说明，解释了如何获得入场所需的证件。会议中心设有大型停车场；而入住Holiday Inn、Homewood Suites和Hampton Inn的股东步行即可抵达会场。和往年一样，我们还将安排巴士接送大家在会后前往Nebraska Furniture Mart和Borsheim珠宝店，并随后送至酒店或机场。
NFM's main store, on its 64-acre site about two miles north of the Centre, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays, and noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. Rose Blumkin - "Mrs. B" - is now 102, but will be hard at work in Mrs. B's Warehouse. She was honored in November at the opening of The Rose, a classic downtown theater of the 20's that has been magnificently restored, but that would have been demolished had she not saved it. Ask her to tell you the story.
Nebraska Furniture Mart总部位于会议中心以北约两英里处，占地64英亩。该店营业时间为工作日上午10点至晚上9点，周六上午10点至下午6点，周日中午12点至下午6点。“布卢姆金夫人”（Rose Blumkin，“Mrs. B”）现年102岁，仍每天在Mrs. B’s Warehouse辛勤工作。去年11月，当地一家建于上世纪二十年代的经典剧院“The Rose”在修复后重新开放，她也因此受到表彰。这家剧院原本面临拆除命运，幸亏她出手才得以保存。不妨亲自向她请教这段历史。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders and their guests from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 5th. Additionally, we will have a special opening for shareholders on Saturday, the 4th, from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. Last year, on Shareholders Day, we wrote 1,733 tickets in the six hours we were open - which is a sale every 13 seconds. Remember, though, that records are made to be broken.
Borsheim珠宝店平时周日不营业，但在5月5日（周日）将特别为股东及宾客开放，时间从上午10点到下午6点。此外，我们还将在5月4日（周六）晚间6点至9点开设特别专场。去年的股东专属购物日，我们在六小时内共接待了1,733位顾客——平均每13秒卖出一件商品。记住，纪录就是为了被打破的。
At Borsheim's, we will also have the world's largest faceted diamond on display. Two years in the cutting, this inconspicuous bauble is 545 carats in size. Please inspect this stone and let it guide you in determining what size gem is appropriate for the one you love.
Borsheim珠宝店还将展出世界上最大的刻面钻石。这颗钻石耗时两年切割完成，重达545克拉，外表并不张扬。欢迎您亲临鉴赏，让它帮您决定应为心爱之人挑选多大尺寸的宝石。
On Saturday evening, May 4, there will be a baseball game at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and the Louisville Redbirds. I expect to make the opening pitch - owning a quarter of the team assures me of one start per year - but our manager, Mike Jirschele, will probably make his usual mistake and yank me immediately after. About 1,700 shareholders attended last year's game. Unfortunately, we had a rain-out, which greatly disappointed the many scouts in the stands. But the smart ones will be back this year, and I plan to show them my best stuff.
5月4日（周六）晚上，罗森布拉特体育场（Rosenblatt Stadium）将上演一场棒球赛，由奥马哈皇家队（Omaha Royals）对阵路易斯维尔红雀队（Louisville Redbirds）。我预计将投出开幕第一球——毕竟我拥有球队四分之一股份，每年都能获得一次出场机会。但我们的主教练迈克·吉尔谢勒（Mike Jirschele）照例会在我投完球后立刻换下我。去年约有1,700位股东观看了比赛。可惜因天公不作美，比赛被迫取消，令看台上许多球探失望不已。不过聪明人都会再来，我也准备再次展现我的最佳表现。
Our proxy statement will include information about obtaining tickets to the game. We will also offer an information packet this year listing restaurants that will be open on Sunday night and describing various things that you can do in Omaha on the weekend.
我们的委托书材料中将包含获取球赛门票的信息。今年我们还将提供一份信息手册，列出周日晚上营业的餐厅，并介绍本周末在奥马哈可以参与的各项活动。
For years, I've unsuccessfully tried to get my grade school classmate, "Pal" Gorat, to open his steakhouse for business on the Sunday evening preceding the meeting. But this year he's relented. Gorat's is a family-owned enterprise that has thrived for 52 years, and if you like steaks, you'll love this place. I've told Pal he will get a good crowd, so call Gorat's at 402-551-3733 for a reservation. You'll spot me there - I'll be the one eating the rare T-bone with a double order of hash browns.
多年来，我一直试图说服我小学同学、“帕尔”戈拉特（Pal Gorat）在他的牛排馆在会议前的周日晚间营业，但始终未能如愿。今年他终于答应了。Gorat's是一家家族经营的餐厅，已有52年历史，如果你喜欢牛排，一定不会失望。我已经告诉帕尔，这里会很热闹，所以请拨打402-551-3733预约座位。届时你很容易就能认出我来——我就是那个在吃三分熟T骨牛排配双份土豆煎饼的人。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 1, 1996