2006巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
# 伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东：
Our gain in net worth during 2006 was $16.9 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 18.4%. Over the last 42 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $70,281, a rate of 21.4% compounded annually.*
我们的净值在2006年增长了169亿美元，使A股和B股的每股账面价值均增长了18.4%。过去42年（即现任管理层接管以来），账面价值从19美元增长至70,281美元，年复合增长率为21.4%。*
We believe that $16.9 billion is a record for a one-year gain in net worth – more than has ever been booked by any American business, leaving aside boosts that have occurred because of mergers (e.g., AOL’s purchase of Time Warner). Of course, Exxon Mobil and other companies earn far more than Berkshire, but their earnings largely go to dividends and/or repurchases, rather than to building net worth.
我们认为，这169亿美元的单年净值增长是美国企业史上前所未有的纪录（不包括因并购产生的增长，例如AOL收购时代华纳）。当然，埃克森美孚等公司盈利远超伯克希尔，但其利润主要用于派发股息或回购股票，而非积累净值。
All that said, a confession about our 2006 gain is in order. Our most important business, insurance, benefited from a large dose of luck: Mother Nature, bless her heart, went on vacation. After hammering us with hurricanes in 2004 and 2005 – storms that caused us to lose a bundle on super-cat insurance – she just vanished. Last year, the red ink from this activity turned black – very black.
尽管如此，我们必须坦承2006年增长的部分原因。我们最重要的业务——保险业——得益于极大的幸运：大自然母亲（愿她安好）去年彻底休假了。2004和2005年飓风曾让我们在超大型灾害保险上损失惨重，而她去年完全消失无踪。去年，这项业务的亏损转为巨额盈利。
In addition, the great majority of our 73 businesses did outstandingly well in 2006. Let me focus for a moment on one of our largest operations, GEICO. What management accomplished there was simply extraordinary.
此外，旗下73家企业的绝大多数在2006年表现优异。让我聚焦于最大的业务之一——盖可车险（GEICO）。管理层在此取得的成就是非凡的。
As I’ve told you before, Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, went to work at the company 45 years ago, two months after turning 18. He became CEO in 1992, and from then on the company’s growth exploded. In addition, Tony has delivered staggering productivity gains in recent years. Between yearend 2003 and yearend 2006, the number of GEICO policies increased from 5.7 million to 8.1 million, a jump of 42%. Yet during that same period, the company’s employees (measured on a fulltime-equivalent basis) fell 3.5%. So productivity grew 47%. And GEICO didn’t start fat.
正如我之前所述，盖可CEO托尼·奈斯利（Tony Nicely）在18岁两个月后加入公司，至今已45年。他于1992年出任CEO，此后公司增长迅猛。近年来，托尼更实现了惊人的生产力提升。2003年底至2006年底，保单数量从570万增至810万，增长42%；同期全职员工（按全职当量计算）减少3.5%，生产力因此增长47%。而盖可原本就并非臃肿机构。
That remarkable gain has allowed GEICO to maintain its all-important position as a low-cost producer, even though it has dramatically increased advertising expenditures. Last year GEICO spent $631 million on ads, up from $238 million in 2003 (and up from $31 million in 1995, when Berkshire took control). Today, GEICO spends far more on ads than any of its competitors, even those much larger. We will continue to raise the bar.
这一显著增长使盖可能维持其作为低成本生产者的地位，尽管广告支出大幅增加。2006年广告支出达6.31亿美元（2003年为2.38亿，1995年伯克希尔接管时仅3100万）。如今，盖可的广告支出超过所有竞争对手（包括规模更大的企业），且我们将持续提高投入。
Last year I told you that if you had a new son or grandson to be sure to name him Tony. But Don Keough, a Berkshire director, recently had a better idea. After reviewing GEICO’s performance in 2006, he wrote me, “Forget births. Tell the shareholders to immediately change the names of their present children to Tony or Antoinette.” Don signed his letter “Tony.”
去年我曾建议，若你有新生的儿子或孙子，请务必取名“托尼”。但伯克希尔董事唐·凯夫（Don Keough）提出更绝的建议。审阅盖可2006年业绩后，他写道：“别等新生儿了，让股东们直接给现有孩子改名为托尼或安东尼特吧。”他在信末署名“托尼”。
Charlie Munger – my partner and Berkshire’s vice chairman – and I run what has turned out to be a big business, one with 217,000 employees and annual revenues approaching $100 billion. We certainly didn’t plan it that way. Charlie began as a lawyer, and I thought of myself as a security analyst. Sitting in those seats, we both grew skeptical about the ability of big entities of any type to function well. Size seems to make many organizations slow-thinking, resistant to change and smug. In Churchill’s words: “We shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us.” Here’s a telling fact: Of the ten non-oil companies having the largest market capitalization in 1965 – titans such as General Motors, Sears, DuPont and Eastman Kodak – only one made the 2006 list.
我的搭档兼伯克希尔副董事长查理·芒格（Charlie Munger）和我，如今经营着一家拥有21.7万名员工、年营收近1000亿美元的庞大企业。这并非我们的初衷——查理起初是律师，我自认是证券分析师。从这些视角出发，我们逐渐怀疑任何大型组织的有效运作能力。规模往往使机构思维迟钝、抗拒变革且自满。丘吉尔曾言：“我们塑造建筑，之后建筑塑造我们。”一个鲜明的事实：1965年市值前十的非石油公司（如通用汽车、西尔斯、杜邦、伊士曼柯达）中，仅一家进入2006年榜单。
In fairness, we’ve seen plenty of successes as well, some truly outstanding. There are many giant-company managers whom I greatly admire; Ken Chenault of American Express, Jeff Immelt of G.E. and Dick Kovacevich of Wells Fargo come quickly to mind. But I don’t think I could do the management job they do. And I know I wouldn’t enjoy many of the duties that come with their positions – meetings, speeches, foreign travel, the charity circuit and governmental relations. For me, Ronald Reagan had it right: “It’s probably true that hard work never killed anyone – but why take the chance?”
当然，我们也见证了许多成功案例，其中不乏非凡成就。我钦佩许多大公司管理者，如美国运通的肯·切诺尔特（Ken Chenault）、通用电气的杰夫·伊梅尔特（Jeff Immelt）、富国银行的理查德·科瓦塞维奇（Dick Kovacevich）。但我自认无法胜任他们的管理工作，也深知自己不会享受随之而来的职责——会议、演讲、海外差旅、慈善活动及政府关系。正如罗纳德·里根所言：“努力工作或许不会致死，但何必冒险呢？”
So I’ve taken the easy route, just sitting back and working through great managers who run their own shows. My only tasks are to cheer them on, sculpt and harden our corporate culture, and make major capital-allocation decisions. Our managers have returned this trust by working hard and effectively.
因此，我选择了轻松的路径：放手让卓越的管理者自主经营。我的职责仅限于激励团队、塑造企业文化，并做出重大资本配置决策。管理层以勤奋和高效回报了这份信任。
For their performance over the last 42 years – and particularly for 2006 – Charlie and I thank them.
对于过去42年（尤其是2006年）的卓越表现，查理和我向他们致谢。
# Yardsticks
# 衡量标准
Charlie and I measure Berkshire’s progress and evaluate its intrinsic value in a number of ways. No single criterion is effective in doing these jobs, and even an avalanche of statistics will not capture some factors that are important. For example, it’s essential that we have managers much younger than I available to succeed me. Berkshire has never been in better shape in this regard – but I can’t prove it to you with numbers.
查理和我通过多种方式衡量伯克希尔的进展并评估其内在价值。单一标准无法胜任这些任务，即使海量数据也难以捕捉某些重要因素。例如，我们需要比我年轻得多的管理者接班。在这方面，伯克希尔从未如此健康——但这一结论无法用数字证明。
There are two statistics, however, that are of real importance. The first is the amount of investments (including cash and cash-equivalents) that we own on a per-share basis. Arriving at this figure, we exclude investments held in our finance operation because these are largely offset by borrowings.
然而，有两个统计指标至关重要：
- 每股投资持仓（含现金及现金等价物），但排除金融业务的投资（因其投资价值被借贷负债大幅抵消）。
Here’s the record since present management acquired control of Berkshire:
以下是现任管理层接管伯克希尔以来的数据记录：
| Year (年份) | Per-Share Investments* (每股投资金额*) |
|---|---|
| 1965 | $4 |
| 1975 | $159 |
| 1985 | $2,407 |
| 1995 | $21,817 |
| 2006 | $80,636 |
Compound Growth Rate 1965-2006: 27.5%
Compound Growth Rate 1995-2006: 12.6%
*Net of minority interests (扣除少数股东权益)
In our early years we put most of our retained earnings and insurance float into investments in marketable securities. Because of this emphasis, and because the securities we purchased generally did well, our growth rate in investments was for a long time quite high.
早期我们将大部分留存收益和保险浮存金投入可交易证券。由于专注投资且标的表现优异，投资组合长期保持高速增长。
Over the years, however, we have focused more and more on the acquisition of operating businesses. Using our funds for these purchases has both slowed our growth in investments and accelerated our gains in pre-tax earnings from non-insurance businesses, the second yardstick we use. Here’s how those earnings have looked:
然而近年来，我们越来越侧重收购运营企业。将资金用于收购虽放缓了投资增长，却加速了非保险业务税前收益（第二个衡量标准）的增长。以下是相关数据：
| Year (年份) | Pre-Tax Earnings from Non-Insurance Businesses (非保险业务税前收益) |
|---|---|
| 1965 | $4 |
| 1975 | $159 |
| 1985 | $2,407 |
| 1995 | $21,817 |
| 2006 | $80,636 |
*Figures adjusted for comparability (数据经调整以保证可比性)
Year Pre-Tax Earnings Per Share*
1965 ..................................................................... $ 4
1975 ..................................................................... 4
1985 ..................................................................... 52
1995 ..................................................................... 175
2006 ..................................................................... $3,625
Compound Growth Rate 1965-2006 .................... 17.9%
Compound Growth Rate 1995-2006 .................... 31.7%
*Excluding purchase-accounting adjustments and net of minority interests
| 年份 | 非保险业务每股税前收益* |
|---|---|
| 1965 | $4 |
| 1975 | $4 |
| 1985 | $52 |
| 1995 | $175 |
| 2006 | $3,625 |
复合增长率（1965–2006）：17.9%
复合增长率（1995–2006）：31.7%
*扣除购并会计调整，并已扣除少数股东权益
Last year we had a good increase in non-insurance earnings – 38%. Large gains from here on in, though, will come only if we are able to make major, and sensible, acquisitions. That will not be easy. We do, however, have one advantage: More and more, Berkshire has become “the buyer of choice” for business owners and managers. Initially, we were viewed that way only in the U.S. (and more often than not by private companies). We’ve long wanted, nonetheless, to extend Berkshire’s appeal beyond U.S. borders. And last year, our globe-trotting finally got underway.
去年我们在非保险业务上的盈利增长良好，达38%。但未来若想实现大幅增长，唯有通过重大且明智的收购。这并不容易。但我们有一个优势：越来越多企业主和经理人将伯克希尔视为“首选买家”。最初我们仅在美国被视为如此（而且多数是非上市公司）。尽管如此，我们一直希望拓展伯克希尔在国际市场的吸引力。去年，我们的全球扩张终于开始起步。
Acquisitions
收购
We began 2006 by completing the three acquisitions pending at yearend 2005, spending about $6 billion for PacifiCorp, Business Wire and Applied Underwriters. All are performing very well.
我们在2006年初完成了2005年底尚未完成的三项收购，共计花费约60亿美元购买太平洋电力公司（PacifiCorp）、企业通讯社（Business Wire）和应用承保公司（Applied Underwriters）。这些收购案表现都非常出色。
The highlight of the year, however, was our July 5th acquisition of most of ISCAR, an Israeli company, and our new association with its chairman, Eitan Wertheimer, and CEO, Jacob Harpaz. The story here began on October 25, 2005, when I received a 1¼-page letter from Eitan, of whom I then knew nothing. The letter began, “I am writing to introduce you to ISCAR,” and proceeded to describe a cutting-tool business carried on in 61 countries. Then Eitan wrote, “We have for some time considered the issues of generational transfer and ownership that are typical for large family enterprises, and have given much thought to ISCAR’s future. Our conclusion is that Berkshire Hathaway would be the ideal home for ISCAR. We believe that ISCAR would continue to thrive as a part of your portfolio of businesses.”
然而，去年的亮点是我们于7月5日对以色列公司伊斯卡（ISCAR）大部分股权的收购，以及与该公司董事长埃坦·韦特海默（Eitan Wertheimer）和CEO雅各布·哈帕斯（Jacob Harpaz）建立的新关系。故事始于2005年10月25日，我收到了一封来自当时尚不相识的埃坦的1又四分之一页信件。信中写道：“我写此信是想向您介绍伊斯卡。”接着描述了其在全球61个国家经营切削工具业务的情况。随后他写道：“我们长期以来一直在思考大型家族企业在代际传承和所有权方面所面临的典型问题，并认真考虑了伊斯卡的未来发展。我们的结论是，伯克希尔·哈撒韦将是伊斯卡的理想归属。我们认为，伊斯卡作为您旗下企业组合的一部分，将继续蓬勃发展。”
Overall, Eitan’s letter made the quality of the company and the character of its management leap off the page. It also made me want to learn more, and in November, Eitan, Jacob and ISCAR’s CFO, Danny Goldman, came to Omaha. A few hours with them convinced me that if we were to make a deal, we would be teaming up with extraordinarily talented managers who could be trusted to run the business after a sale with all of the energy and dedication that they had exhibited previously. However, having never bought a business based outside of the U.S. (though I had bought a number of foreign stocks), I needed to get educated on some tax and jurisdictional matters. With that task completed, Berkshire purchased 80% of ISCAR for $4 billion. The remaining 20% stays in the hands of the Wertheimer family, making it our valued partner.
总体而言，埃坦的信让我深刻感受到这家公司的质量以及管理层的品格。它促使我进一步了解。2005年11月，埃坦、雅各布及伊斯卡的CFO丹尼·戈德曼（Danny Goldman）来到奥马哈。短短几个小时的会面就让我确信，如果我们达成交易，我们将与一群极具才华的管理者合作，他们值得信赖，在交易完成后也会像以往一样充满热情地运营这家公司。不过，虽然我曾投资过不少外国股票，但我此前从未收购过一家美国以外的企业，因此我需要学习一些税务和司法管辖区的相关知识。完成这一任务后，伯克希尔以40亿美元收购了伊斯卡80%的股权。剩余20%仍由韦特海默家族持有，使他们成为我们宝贵的合作伙伴。
ISCAR’s products are small, consumable cutting tools that are used in conjunction with large and expensive machine tools. It’s a business without magic except for that imparted by the people who run it. But Eitan, Jacob and their associates are true managerial magicians who constantly develop tools that make their customers’ machines more productive. The result: ISCAR makes money because it enables its customers to make more money. There is no better recipe for continued success.
伊斯卡的产品是小型可消耗的切削工具，用于配合大型昂贵的机床使用。这项业务本身并无神奇之处，唯一让它脱颖而出的是运营它的人。而埃坦、雅各布及其团队正是真正的管理魔术师，他们不断开发出能提升客户机器生产效率的工具。结果就是：伊斯卡之所以赚钱，是因为它帮助客户赚到了更多钱。没有比这更好的持续成功配方了。
In September, Charlie and I, along with five Berkshire associates, visited ISCAR in Israel. We – and I mean every one of us – have never been more impressed with any operation. At ISCAR, as throughout Israel, brains and energy are ubiquitous. Berkshire shareholders are lucky to have joined with Eitan, Jacob, Danny and their talented associates.
9月，查理和我连同五位伯克希尔同事一起访问了位于以色列的伊斯卡。我们——我说的是每一位——都被这家企业的运营深深震撼。在伊斯卡，正如整个以色列一样，智慧与活力无处不在。伯克希尔的股东们很幸运，能够与埃坦、雅各布、丹尼以及他们才华横溢的团队携手共进。
A few months later, Berkshire again became “the buyer of choice” in a deal brought to us by my friend, John Roach, of Fort Worth. John, many of you will remember, was Chairman of Justin Industries, which we bought in 2000. At that time John was helping John Justin, who was terminally ill, find a permanent home for his company. John Justin died soon after we bought Justin Industries, but it has since been run exactly as we promised him it would be.
几个月后，伯克希尔再次成为“首选买家”，这次是由我的朋友、来自沃思堡的约翰·罗奇（John Roach）带来的交易。许多人都还记得，约翰曾是贾斯汀工业公司（Justin Industries）的董事长，我们于2000年收购了该公司。当时，约翰正协助身患重病的贾斯汀先生为其公司寻找一个永久归属。贾斯汀先生在我们收购不久后去世，但此后公司一直按照我们承诺他的方式运营。
Visiting me in November, John Roach brought along Paul Andrews, Jr., owner of about 80% of TTI, a Fort Worth distributor of electronic components. Over a 35-year period, Paul built TTI from $112,000 of sales to $1.3 billion. He is a remarkable entrepreneur and operator.
11月来访时，约翰带来了保罗·安德鲁斯二世（Paul Andrews, Jr.），他是位于沃思堡的电子元件分销商TTI公司约80%股份的所有者。在过去35年里，保罗将TTI从销售额11.2万美元发展到13亿美元。他是一个非凡的企业家和经营者。
Paul, 64, loves running his business. But not long ago he happened to witness how disruptive the death of a founder can be both to a private company’s employees and the owner’s family. What starts out as disruptive, furthermore, often evolves into destructive. About a year ago, therefore, Paul began to think about selling TTI. His goal was to put his business in the hands of an owner he had carefully chosen, rather than allowing a trust officer or lawyer to conduct an auction after his death.
现年64岁的保罗热爱经营自己的事业。但不久前，他亲眼目睹了创始人去世对公司员工和家属可能造成的巨大冲击。起初只是干扰，但往往最终演变为破坏性影响。因此，大约一年前，保罗开始考虑出售TTI。他的目标是将公司交给一位自己精心挑选的买主，而不是让信托经理或律师在他去世后进行拍卖。
Paul rejected the idea of a “strategic” buyer, knowing that in the pursuit of “synergies,” an owner of that type would be apt to dismantle what he had so carefully built, a move that would uproot hundreds of his associates (and perhaps wound TTI’s business in the process). He also ruled out a private equity firm, which would very likely load the company with debt and then flip it as soon as possible.
保罗拒绝了“战略买家”的想法，因为他知道这类买家为了追求“协同效应”，往往会拆解他辛苦打造的业务，这种行为可能会动摇数百名员工的生计（甚至损害TTI的业务）。他也排除了私募股权公司，因为这类机构很可能会给公司加杠杆负债，并尽快转手出售。
That left Berkshire. Paul and I met on the morning of November 15th and made a deal before lunch. Later he wrote me: “After our meeting, I am confident that Berkshire is the right owner for TTI . . . I am proud of our past and excited about our future.” And so are Charlie and I.
剩下的选择只有伯克希尔。我和保罗于11月15日上午见面，并在午餐前达成了协议。之后他给我写信说：“在我们见面后，我坚信伯克希尔是TTI的最佳归宿……我对过去感到自豪，对未来充满期待。”查理和我也同样如此。
We also made some “tuck-in” acquisitions during 2006 at Fruit of the Loom (“Fruit”), MiTek, CTB, Shaw and Clayton. Fruit made the largest purchases. First, it bought Russell Corp., a leading producer of athletic apparel and uniforms for about $1.2 billion (including assumed debt) and in December it agreed to buy the intimate apparel business of VF Corp. Together, these acquisitions add about $2.2 billion to Fruit’s sales and bring with them about 23,000 employees.
我们在2006年还进行了几项“补充型”收购，涉及果篮公司（Fruit of the Loom，“Fruit”）、MiTek、CTB、Shaw和Clayton等子公司。其中果篮公司完成了最大规模的两笔收购。首先是以约12亿美元（含承担债务）收购运动服装和制服领先生产商拉塞尔公司（Russell Corp.），并在12月同意收购VF公司的内衣业务。这两项收购为果篮公司增加了约22亿美元的销售额，并带来约2.3万名员工。
Charlie and I love it when we can acquire businesses that can be placed under managers, such as John Holland at Fruit, who have already shown their stuff at Berkshire. MiTek, for example, has made 14 acquisitions since we purchased it in 2001, and Gene Toombs has delivered results from these deals far in excess of what he had predicted. In effect, we leverage the managerial talent already with us by these tuck-in deals. We will make many more.
当我们可以将新收购的公司交由已经在伯克希尔展现能力的管理者时，查理和我都非常高兴。例如，MiTek自2001年被我们收购以来已完成14次收购，其CEO吉恩·汤姆斯（Gene Toombs）的业绩远超预期。实际上，我们通过这些“补充型”收购放大了现有管理人才的能力。未来我们还会继续这样做。
We continue, however, to need “elephants” in order for us to use Berkshire’s flood of incoming cash. Charlie and I must therefore ignore the pursuit of mice and focus our acquisition efforts on much bigger game.
然而，我们需要“大象级”的收购，才能有效利用伯克希尔源源不断的现金流。因此，查理和我必须忽略“老鼠级”的机会，专注于更大规模的标的。
Our exemplar is the older man who crashed his grocery cart into that of a much younger fellow while both were shopping. The elderly man explained apologetically that he had lost track of his wife and was preoccupied searching for her. His new acquaintance said that by coincidence his wife had also wandered off and suggested that it might be more efficient if they jointly looked for the two women. Agreeing, the older man asked his new companion what his wife looked like. “She’s a gorgeous blonde,” the fellow answered, “with a body that would cause a bishop to go through a stained glass window, and she’s wearing tight white shorts. How about yours?” The senior citizen wasted no words: “Forget her, we’ll look for yours.”
我们的榜样是一位老人，他在购物时不小心撞上了另一位年轻得多的顾客的购物车。老人道歉地说他找不到妻子，正在四处寻找。这位新认识的人碰巧也说自己的妻子走丢了，并建议两人联手寻找两位女士也许更有效率。老人表示同意，并问对方的妻子长什么样。“她是个金发美女，身材好得能让主教撞破彩绘玻璃窗冲出来，穿着紧身白色短裤。你太太呢？”老人毫不犹豫地说：“别管我太太了，我们找你的吧。”
What we are looking for is described on page 25. If you have an acquisition candidate that fits, call me – day or night. And then watch me shatter a stained glass window.
我们寻找的目标已在第25页描述。如果您有符合标准的收购标的，请随时联系我——无论昼夜。然后见证我撞破彩绘玻璃窗的那一刻。
Now, let’s examine the four major operating sectors of Berkshire. Lumping their financial figures together impedes analysis. So we’ll look at them as four separate businesses, starting with the all–important insurance group.
现在，让我们分析伯克希尔的四大核心业务板块。若将财务数据合并分析会降低清晰度，因此我们将它们视为四个独立业务分别讨论，首先从至关重要的保险集团开始。
# Insurance (保险)
Next month marks the 40th anniversary of our entrance into the insurance business. It was on March 9, 1967, that Berkshire purchased National Indemnity and its companion company, National Fire & Marine, from Jack Ringwalt for $8.6 million.
下个月标志着伯克希尔进军保险业40周年。1967年3月9日，伯克希尔以860万美元从杰克·林戈尔特（Jack Ringwalt）手中收购了国家赔偿保险公司（National Indemnity）及其附属公司国家火灾与海上保险公司（National Fire & Marine）。
Jack was a long-time friend of mine and an excellent, but somewhat eccentric, businessman. For about ten minutes every year he would get the urge to sell his company. But those moods – perhaps brought on by a tiff with regulators or an unfavorable jury verdict – quickly vanished.
杰克是我多年好友，是一位出色但略显古怪的商人。每年他大约会有十分钟产生出售公司的冲动，但这些念头——可能是因与监管机构争执或不利的陪审团裁决引发——很快就会消退。
In the mid-1960s, I asked investment banker Charlie Heider, a mutual friend of mine and Jack’s, to alert me the next time Jack was “in heat.” When Charlie’s call came, I sped to meet Jack. We made a deal in a few minutes, with me waiving an audit, “due diligence” or anything else that would give Jack an opportunity to reconsider. We just shook hands, and that was that.
1960年代中期，我请投资银行家查理·海德（Charlie Heider）——我和杰克的共同好友——在杰克再次“发情期”时通知我。当查理来电时，我立即飞奔见杰克。我们仅用几分钟达成协议，我放弃审计、“尽职调查”或其他任何可能让杰克反悔的流程。我们握手成交，一切就此敲定。
When we were due to close the purchase at Charlie’s office, Jack was late. Finally arriving, he explained that he had been driving around looking for a parking meter with some unexpired time. That was a magic moment for me. I knew then that Jack was going to be my kind of manager.
在查理办公室完成交易时，杰克迟到了。他最终抵达后解释说，自己一直在绕圈寻找未到期的停车位。那一刻让我确信：杰克就是我想要的管理者类型。
When Berkshire purchased Jack’s two insurers, they had “float” of $17 million. We’ve regularly offered a long explanation of float in earlier reports, which you can read on our website. Simply put, float is money we hold that is not ours but which we get to invest.
伯克希尔收购杰克的两家保险公司时，其“浮存金”（float）为1,700万美元。我们在早年报告中曾多次详述浮存金概念（可查阅官网），简而言之，它是我们持有的非自有资金，但可用于投资。
At the end of 2006, our float had grown to $50.9 billion, and we have since written a huge retroactive reinsurance contract with Equitas – which I will describe in the next section – that boosts float by another $7 billion. Much of the gain we’ve made has come through our acquisition of other insurers, but we’ve also had outstanding internal growth, particularly at Ajit Jain’s amazing reinsurance operation. Naturally, I had no notion in 1967 that our float would develop as it has. There’s much to be said for just putting one foot in front of the other every day.
截至2006年底，我们的浮存金已增长至509亿美元，并与Equitas签署了巨额追溯再保险合同（下文详述），进一步增加70亿美元浮存金。这一增长主要来自保险公司收购，但内部扩张同样亮眼，尤其是阿吉特·杰恩（Ajit Jain）主导的再保险业务。1967年我绝未料到浮存金会发展至此。这印证了一个道理：日复一日稳步前行的力量不可忽视。
The float from retroactive reinsurance contracts, of which we have many, automatically drifts down over time. Therefore, it will be difficult for us to increase float in the future unless we make new acquisitions in the insurance field. Whatever its size, however, the all-important cost of Berkshire’s float over time is likely to be significantly below that of the industry, perhaps even falling to less than zero. Note the words “over time.” There will be bad years periodically. You can be sure of that.
追溯再保险合同产生的浮存金（我们拥有多份）会随时间自然缩减。因此，除非继续收购保险公司，未来浮存金增长将面临挑战。但无论规模如何，伯克希尔浮存金的长期成本预计将持续显著低于行业水平，甚至可能降至负值。请注意“长期”二字——周期性亏损不可避免，这一点毋庸置疑。
In 2006, though, everything went right in insurance – really right. Our managers – Tony Nicely (GEICO), Ajit Jain (B-H Reinsurance), Joe Brandon and Tad Montross (General Re), Don Wurster (National Indemnity Primary), Tom Nerney (U.S. Liability), Tim Kenesey (Medical Protective), Rod Eldred (Homestate Companies and Cypress), Sid Ferenc and Steve Menzies (Applied Underwriters), John Kizer (Central States) and Don Towle (Kansas Bankers Surety) – simply shot the lights out. When I recite their names, I feel as if I’m at Cooperstown, reading from the Hall of Fame roster. Of course, the overall insurance industry also had a terrific year in 2006. But our managers delivered results generally superior to those of their competitors.
不过2006年保险业务可谓顺风满帆。我们的经理人——托尼·奈斯利（GEICO）、阿吉特·杰恩（B-H再保险）、乔·布兰登与塔德·蒙罗斯（通用再保险）、唐·沃斯特（国家赔偿原保）、汤姆·纳尼（美国责任险）、蒂姆·肯西（医疗保护）、罗德·埃尔德里德（本州公司及塞浦路斯）、西德·费伦茨与史蒂夫·门齐斯（应用承保公司）、约翰·基泽（中央州保险）及唐·陶尔（堪萨斯银行家保险公司）——表现堪称惊艳。当我念出这些名字时，仿佛置身库珀斯敦（棒球名人堂），宣读入选名单。当然，整个保险行业在2006年都有不错表现，但我们的经理人普遍超越了竞争对手。
Below is the tally on our underwriting and float for each major sector of insurance. Enjoy the view, because you won’t soon see another like it.
以下是保险各主要板块的承保与浮存金数据。尽情欣赏吧，因为这样的景象不会常有：
| (in $ millions) | Underwriting Profit (Loss) (承保利润（亏损）) | Yearend Float (年末浮存金) | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Insurance Operations (保险业务) | 2006 | 2005 | 2006 | 2005 |
| General Re ....................... | $526 | $(334) | $22,827 | $22,920 |
| B-H Reinsurance.............. | 1,658 | (1,069) | 16,860 | 16,233 |
| GEICO ............................. | 1,314 | 1,221 | 7,171 | 6,692 |
| Other Primary................... | 340** | 235* | 4,029 | 3,442 |
| Total (总计) | $3,838 | $53 | $50,887 | $49,287 |
* Includes MedPro from June 30, 2005.
** Includes Applied Underwriters from May 19, 2006.
In 2007, our results from the bread-and-butter lines of insurance will deteriorate, though I think they will remain satisfactory. The big unknown is super-cat insurance. Were the terrible hurricane seasons of 2004-05 aberrations? Or were they our planet’s first warning that the climate of the 21st Century will differ materially from what we’ve seen in the past? If the answer to the second question is yes, 2006 will soon be perceived as a misleading period of calm preceding a series of devastating storms. These could rock the insurance industry. It’s naïve to think of Katrina as anything close to a worst-case event.
2007年，传统保险业务的业绩将下滑，尽管我认为仍属合理。最大未知数是巨灾保险。2004-05年的飓风季是异常现象吗？还是地球发出的21世纪气候将与过去显著不同的首个信号？若答案是后者，2006年将被视为一场灾难性风暴前虚假的平静期。这可能震动整个保险业。认为卡特里娜飓风接近最坏情况的想法是天真的。
Neither Ajit Jain, who manages our super-cat operation, nor I know what lies ahead. We do know that it would be a huge mistake to bet that evolving atmospheric changes are benign in their implications for insurers.
无论是负责巨灾保险的阿吉特·杰恩还是我，都无法预知未来。但我们确知一点：若押注大气变化对保险业影响无害，将是巨大错误。
Don’t think, however, that we have lost our taste for risk. We remain prepared to lose $6 billion in a single event, if we have been paid appropriately for assuming that risk. We are not willing, though, to take on even very small exposures at prices that don’t reflect our evaluation of loss probabilities. Appropriate prices don’t guarantee profits in any given year, but inappropriate prices most certainly guarantee eventual losses. Rates have recently fallen because a flood of capital has entered the super-cat field. We have therefore sharply reduced our wind exposures. Our behavior here parallels that which we employ in financial markets: Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful.
但别以为我们已丧失对风险的偏好。我们仍愿承担单一事件60亿美元的损失，前提是价格合理。但我们拒绝以低估损失概率的价格承接哪怕小额风险。合理定价不保证年度盈利，但不合理定价必然导致最终亏损。近期费率下跌因资本大量涌入巨灾领域，因此我们大幅削减风灾敞口。这一行为与我们在金融市场的原则一致：他人贪婪时恐惧，他人恐惧时贪婪。
# Lloyd’s, Equitas and Retroactive Reinsurance (劳合社、Equitas与追溯再保险)
Last year – we are getting now to Equitas – Berkshire agreed to enter into a huge retroactive reinsurance contract, a policy that protects an insurer against losses that have already happened, but whose cost is not yet known. I’ll give you details of the agreement shortly. But let’s first take a journey through insurance history, following the route that led to our deal.
去年——现在进入Equitas话题——伯克希尔签署了一项巨额追溯再保险合同，此类保单为保险公司提供已发生但成本尚未确定的损失保障。我将很快披露协议细节，但先让我们回顾一段保险史，正是这段历史引导我们达成交易。
Our tale begins around 1688, when Edward Lloyd opened a small coffee house in London. Though no Starbucks, his shop was destined to achieve worldwide fame because of the commercial activities of its clientele – shipowners, merchants and venturesome British capitalists. As these parties sipped Edward’s brew, they began to write contracts transferring the risk of a disaster at sea from the owners of ships and their cargo to the capitalists, who wagered that a given voyage would be completed without incident. These capitalists eventually became known as “underwriters at Lloyd’s.”
故事始于1688年，爱德华·劳埃德（Edward Lloyd）在伦敦开设了一家咖啡馆。尽管不是星巴克，但因其客户——船主、商人及冒险的英国资本家——的商业活动，这家咖啡馆注定扬名世界。当这些客户品尝着爱德华的咖啡时，他们开始起草合同，将船货损失风险从所有人转移给资本家，后者则押注某次航行能平安完成。这些资本家最终被称为“劳合社承保人”。
Though many people believe Lloyd’s to be an insurance company, that is not the case. It is instead a place where many member-insurers transact business, just as they did centuries ago.
尽管许多人认为劳合社是一家保险公司，实则不然。它是一个供众多会员保险公司开展业务的场所，延续着数百年前的模式。
Over time, the underwriters solicited passive investors to join in syndicates. Additionally, the business broadened beyond marine risks into every imaginable form of insurance, including exotic coverages that spread the fame of Lloyd’s far and wide. The underwriters left the coffee house, found grander quarters and formalized some rules of association. And those persons who passively backed the underwriters became known as “names.”
随着时间推移，承保人招募被动投资者加入辛迪加（syndicates）。业务范围也从海运风险扩展至各类保险形式，包括奇特险种，使劳合社声名远播。承保人离开咖啡馆，搬入更宏伟的场所并制定正式规则，而那些被动支持承保人的投资者被称为“名称”（Names）。
Eventually, the names came to include many thousands of people from around the world, who joined expecting to pick up some extra change without effort or serious risk. True, prospective names were always solemnly told that they would have unlimited and everlasting liability for the consequences of their syndicate’s underwriting – “down to the last cufflink,” as the quaint description went. But that warning came to be viewed as perfunctory. Three hundred years of retained cufflinks acted as a powerful sedative to the names poised to sign up.
最终，这些“名称”扩展至全球成千上万的人，他们加入时以为能轻松赚取外快而无实质风险。尽管新加入者总被严肃告知：需对辛迪加承保后果承担无限且永久的责任——用一句老话形容是“连最后一枚袖扣都赔光”。但这一警告逐渐被视为例行公事。过去三百年未曾动用的袖扣资产，成了安抚新成员加入的强大安慰剂。
Then came asbestos. When its prospective costs were added to the tidal wave of environmental and product claims that surfaced in the 1980s, Lloyd’s began to implode. Policies written decades earlier – and largely forgotten about – were developing huge losses. No one could intelligently estimate their total, but it was certain to be many tens of billions of dollars. The specter of unending and unlimited losses terrified existing names and scared away prospects. Many names opted for bankruptcy; some even chose suicide.
随后，石棉危机爆发。当其潜在成本叠加1980年代涌现的环境与产品责任索赔时，劳合社开始崩塌。数十年前签发的保单——早已被遗忘——突然产生巨额损失。无人能准确估算总额，但确定是数千亿美元级别。无限期且无限额的亏损前景，令现有“名称”恐慌，潜在投资者望而却步。许多“名称”选择破产，甚至有人因此自杀。
From these shambles, there came a desperate effort to resuscitate Lloyd’s. In 1996, the powers that be at the institution allotted £11.1 billion to a new company, Equitas, and made it responsible for paying all claims on policies written before 1993. In effect, this plan pooled the misery of the many syndicates in trouble. Of course, the money allotted could prove to be insufficient – and if that happened, the names remained liable for the shortfall.
在这片废墟中，劳合社启动了孤注一掷的复苏计划。1996年，机构管理层拨款111亿英镑成立新公司Equitas，负责支付所有1993年前签发保单的索赔。该计划实质上将多个困境辛迪加的损失集中处理。当然，若资金不足，原有“名称”仍需承担差额。
But the new plan, by concentrating all of the liabilities in one place, had the advantage of eliminating much of the costly intramural squabbling that went on among syndicates. Moreover, the pooling allowed claims evaluation, negotiation and litigation to be handled more intelligently than had been the case previously. Equitas embraced Ben Franklin’s thinking: “We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall hang separately.”
但新计划通过集中负债，消除了辛迪加间高昂的内部争斗。同时，索赔评估、谈判与诉讼也得以更高效处理。Equitas采纳了本杰明·富兰克林的智慧：“我们必须团结一致，否则必将各自灭亡。”
From the start, many people predicted Equitas would eventually fail. But as Ajit and I reviewed the facts in the spring of 2006 – 13 years after the last exposed policy had been written and after the payment of £11.3 billion in claims – we concluded that the patient was likely to survive. And so we decided to offer a huge reinsurance policy to Equitas.
起初，许多人预测Equitas终将失败。但2006年春季，阿吉特和我回顾事实时发现：距最后一份暴露风险保单签发已过去13年，且已支付113亿英镑索赔。我们判断患者已有望存活，因此决定向Equitas提供巨额再保险政策。
Because plenty of imponderables continue to exist, Berkshire could not provide Equitas, and its 27,972 names, unlimited protection. But we said – and I’m simplifying – that if Equitas would give us $7.12 billion in cash and securities (this is the float I spoke about), we would pay all of its future claims and expenses up to $13.9 billion. That amount was $5.7 billion above what Equitas had recently guessed its ultimate liabilities to be. Thus the names received a huge – and almost certainly sufficient – amount of future protection against unpleasant surprises. Indeed the protection is so large that Equitas plans a cash payment to its thousands of names, an event few of them had ever dreamed possible.
由于仍存在大量不确定性，伯克希尔无法为Equitas及其27,972名“名称”提供无限保障。但我们的协议（简化表述）是：若Equitas支付71.2亿美元现金及证券（即我提到的浮存金），我们将承担其未来最高139亿美元的索赔与费用。这一金额超出Equitas最新负债预估57亿美元。因此，“名称”获得了足以覆盖未来意外的巨额保障。事实上，保障规模之大甚至使Equitas计划向数千名“名称”返还现金，这是许多人从未敢设想的。
And how will Berkshire fare? That depends on how much “known” claims will end up costing us, how many yet-to-be-presented claims will surface and what they will cost, how soon claim payments will be made and how much we earn on the cash we receive before it must be paid out. Ajit and I think the odds are in our favor. And should we be wrong, Berkshire can handle it.
伯克希尔的收益如何？这取决于已知索赔的实际成本、未来新增索赔的数量与成本、赔付时效，以及资金在支付前的投资收益。阿吉特和我认为胜算较大，即使判断失误，伯克希尔也有能力承担。
Scott Moser, the CEO of Equitas, summarized the transaction neatly: “Names wanted to sleep easy at night, and we think we’ve just bought them the world’s best mattress.”
Equitas首席执行官Scott Moser精辟总结：“‘名称’希望夜夜安眠，而我们认为刚为他们购置了全球最安稳的床垫。”
Warning: It's time to eat your broccoli – I am now going to talk about accounting matters. I owe this to those Berkshire shareholders who love reading about debits and credits. I hope both of you find this discussion helpful. All others can skip this section; there will be no quiz.
警告：现在是时候吃西兰花了——我将开始讨论会计事务。这是对热衷借贷记账法的股东们的交代。希望两位读者觉得这段讨论有用。其他读者可直接跳过本节；不会有任何测验。
Berkshire has done many retroactive transactions – in both number and amount a multiple of such policies entered into by any other insurer. We are the reinsurer of choice for these coverages because the obligations that are transferred to us – for example, lifetime indemnity and medical payments to be made to injured workers – may not be fully satisfied for 50 years or more. No other company can offer the certainty that Berkshire can, in terms of guaranteeing the full and fair settlement of these obligations. This fact is important to the original insurer, policyholders and regulators.
伯克希尔已承接大量追溯性再保险交易，无论是数量还是金额都远超其他保险公司同类保单。我们是此类保障的首选再保险商，因为转移至我们的义务（如对工伤员工的终身赔偿与医疗支付）可能需50年以上才能完全履行。在确保这些义务得到全额公平履行方面，没有任何公司能像伯克希尔一样提供同等确定性。这对原始保险公司、保单持有人及监管机构至关重要。
The accounting procedure for retroactive transactions is neither well known nor intuitive. The best way for shareholders to understand it, therefore, is for us to simply lay out the debits and credits. Charlie and I would like to see this done more often. We sometimes encounter accounting footnotes about important transactions that leave us baffled, and we go away suspicious that the reporting company wished it that way. (For example, try comprehending transactions "described" in the old 10-Ks of Enron, even after you know how the movie ended.)
追溯性交易的会计处理既不广为人知也不直观。因此，股东理解它的最佳方式是直接展示借贷分录。查理和我希望这类披露更常见。我们有时会遇到重要交易的会计附注令人困惑，甚至怀疑报告公司刻意为之（例如，尝试理解安然旧版10-K报告中那些所谓"描述"的交易，即使你已知道结局如何）。
So let us summarize our accounting for the Equitas transaction. The major debits will be to Cash and Investments (现金及投资), Reinsurance Recoverable (再保险应收款), and Deferred Charges for Reinsurance Assumed ("DCRA", 已承担再保险递延费用). The major credit will be to Reserve for Losses and Loss Adjustment Expense (损失及理赔费用准备金). No profit or loss will be recorded at the inception of the transaction, but underwriting losses will thereafter be incurred annually as the DCRA asset is amortized downward. The amount of the annual amortization charge will be primarily determined by how our end-of-the-year estimates as to the timing and amount of future loss payments compare to the estimates made at the beginning of the year. Eventually, when the last claim has been paid, the DCRA account will be reduced to zero. That day is 50 years or more away.
让我们总结Equitas交易的会计处理：主要借方项目为现金及投资、再保险应收款和已承担再保险递延费用（DCRA）；主要贷方项目为损失及理赔费用准备金。交易初始不确认损益，但后续每年DCRA资产摊销时会产生承保亏损。年度摊销金额主要取决于年末对未来赔付时点与金额的预估与年初预估的差异。最终当最后一笔索赔支付完成后，DCRA账户将归零——这将是50年后的事。
What’s important to remember is that retroactive insurance contracts always produce underwriting losses for us. Whether these losses are worth experiencing depends on whether the cash we have received produces investment income that exceeds the losses. Recently our DCRA charges have annually delivered $300 million or so of underwriting losses, which have been more than offset by the income we have realized through use of the cash we received as a premium. Absent new retroactive contracts, the amount of the annual charge would normally decline over time. After the Equitas transaction, however, the annual DCRA cost will initially increase to about $450 million a year. This means that our other insurance operations must generate at least that much underwriting gain for our overall float to be cost-free. That amount is quite a hurdle but one that I believe we will clear in many, if not most, years.
需铭记的是，追溯性保险合同总会产生承保亏损。这些亏损是否值得承担，取决于收到的现金能否通过投资产生超额收益。近年DCRA费用每年约3亿美元，但通过保费现金的投资收益已完全覆盖。若无新追溯合同，年度费用通常会随时间下降。但Equitas交易后，DCRA成本首年将增至约4.5亿美元。这意味着其他保险业务必须至少创造同等承保利润，才能维持浮存金零成本。这虽是高门槛，但我相信在多数年份我们仍能跨越。
Aren’t you glad that I promised you there would be no quiz?
是不是庆幸我承诺过不会测验？
# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations (制造、服务与零售业务)
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
伯克希尔在这一板块的业务覆盖广泛。让我们先看整个集团的简要资产负债表与利润表。
# Balance Sheet 12/31/06 (in millions)
# 2006年12月31日资产负债表（单位：百万美元）
| Assets (资产) | Liabilities and Equity (负债及权益) |
|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents (现金及等价物) .............................. | $1,543 |
| Accounts and notes receivable (应收及应收票据) ............... | 3,793 |
| Inventory (存货) ................................................ | 5,257 |
| Other current assets (其他流动资产) ................................ | 363 |
| Total current assets (流动资产合计)................................. | 10,956 |
| Goodwill and other intangibles (商誉及其他无形资产)............... | 13,314 |
| Fixed assets (固定资产)............................................. | 8,934 |
| Other assets (其他资产)............................................. | 1,168 |
| Total (总资产) ................................................. | $34,372 |
# Earnings Statement (in millions)
# 利润表（单位：百万美元）
| 项目 (Year) | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues (营收) ................................................................................. | $52,660 | $46,896 | $44,142 |
| Operating expenses (including depreciation of $823 in 2006, $699 in 2005 and $676 in 2004) (运营开支（含折旧）) ....................................... | 49,002 | 44,190 | 41,604 |
| Interest expense (利息支出) ....................................................................... | 132 | 83 | 57 |
| Pre-tax earnings (税前利润)....................................................................... | 3,526* | 2,623* | 2,481* |
| Income taxes and minority interests (所得税及少数股东权益) ........................................ | 1,395 | 977 | 941 |
| Net income (净利润) .............................................................................. | $2,131 | $1,646 | $1,540 |
*Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments (不含购并会计调整)
This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes, earned a pleasing 25% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s noteworthy also that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth – a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet – and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 10.8%.
这个业务组合销售的产品从棒棒糖到房车应有尽有，去年平均有形净资产回报率达可观的25%。值得注意的是，这些业务仅使用了极低的财务杠杆即实现该回报。显然我们拥有一些卓越企业。不过，许多企业是以显著高于账面价值的价格收购的（反映在资产负债表的商誉项目上），因此按平均账面价值计算的回报率降至10.8%。
Here are a few newsworthy items about companies in this sector:
以下是本板块值得关注的企业动态：
• Bob Shaw, a remarkable entrepreneur who from a standing start built Shaw Industries into the country’s largest carpet producer, elected last year, at age 75, to retire. To succeed him, Bob recommended Vance Bell, a 31-year veteran at Shaw, and Bob, as usual, made the right call. Weakness in housing has caused the carpet business to slow. Shaw, however, remains a powerhouse and a major contributor to Berkshire’s earnings.
• 鲍勃·肖（Bob Shaw）是一位非凡的企业家，他白手起家将肖工业（Shaw Industries）打造为美国最大地毯生产商。去年75岁的他选择退休，并推荐了在肖工业任职31年的老将万斯·贝尔（Vance Bell）继任。鲍勃一如既往做出了正确决策。受房地产市场疲软影响，地毯业务增速放缓，但肖工业仍是行业巨头，为伯克希尔的重要盈利来源。
• MiTek, a manufacturer of connectors for roof trusses at the time we purchased it in 2001, is developing into a mini-conglomerate. At the rate it is growing, in fact, “mini” may soon be inappropriate. In purchasing MiTek for $420 million, we lent the company $200 million at 9% and bought $198 million of stock, priced at $10,000 per share. Additionally, 55 employees bought 2,200 shares for $22 million. Each employee paid exactly the same price that we did, in most cases borrowing money to do so.
• MiTek在2001年被收购时主营屋顶桁架连接件，如今已发展为一家小型综合企业。按当前增长速度，“小型”这个词很快将不再适用。我们以4.2亿美元收购MiTek时，向其提供2亿美元贷款（利率9%），并以每股1万美元价格购买1.98亿美元股票。此外，55名员工自筹2,200万美元购买2,200股，每股成本与我们完全一致（多数人靠借款完成购买）。
And are they ever glad they did! Five years later, MiTek’s sales have tripled and the stock is valued at $71,699 per share. Despite its making 14 acquisitions, at a cost of $291 million, MiTek has paid off its debt to Berkshire and holds $35 million of cash. We celebrated the fifth anniversary of our purchase with a party in July. I told the group that it would be embarrassing if MiTek’s stock price soared beyond that of Berkshire “A” shares. Don’t be surprised, however, if that happens (though Charlie and I will try to make our shares a moving target).
他们绝对庆幸当初的决定！五年后，MiTek营收增长三倍，股价升至71,699美元。尽管斥资2.91亿美元完成14次收购，MiTek已还清伯克希尔全部债务，并持有3,500万美元现金。7月我们庆祝收购五周年时，我开玩笑说如果MiTek股价超过伯克希尔A股将是尴尬的事。不过，若真发生也别惊讶（尽管查理和我会努力让自家股票成为移动靶）。
Not all of our businesses are destined to increase profits. When an industry’s underlying economics are crumbling, talented management may slow the rate of decline. Eventually, though, eroding fundamentals will overwhelm managerial brilliance. (As a wise friend told me long ago, “If you want to get a reputation as a good businessman, be sure to get into a good business.”) And fundamentals are definitely eroding in the newspaper industry, a trend that has caused the profits of our Buffalo News to decline. The skid will almost certainly continue.
并非所有业务都能持续增长。当行业基本面恶化时，卓越的管理只能延缓衰退速度。最终，基本面恶化会压倒管理能力。（正如一位智者曾说：“若想成为优秀商人，务必进入好行业。”）报纸行业基本面正在恶化，导致《布法罗新闻报》利润下滑，这一趋势几乎必然延续。
When Charlie and I were young, the newspaper business was as easy a way to make huge returns as existed in America. As one not-too-bright publisher famously said, “I owe my fortune to two great American institutions: monopoly and nepotism.” No paper in a one-paper city, however bad the product or however inept the management, could avoid gushing profits.
查理和我年轻时，报纸业是美国最轻松的暴利生意。正如某位平庸出版商的名言：“我的财富归功于两大美国制度：垄断与裙带关系。”在单报城市中，无论产品多差或管理多糟，报纸都能赚得盆满钵满。
The industry’s staggering returns could be simply explained. For most of the 20th Century, newspapers were the primary source of information for the American public. Whether the subject was sports, finance, or politics, newspapers reigned supreme. Just as important, their ads were the easiest way to find job opportunities or to learn the price of groceries at your town’s supermarkets.
行业暴利源于简单逻辑：20世纪大部分时间，报纸是美国公众的主要信息源。无论是体育、财经还是政治，报纸都占据主导地位。更重要的是，其广告是求职或了解超市物价的最便捷渠道。
The great majority of families therefore felt the need for a paper every day, but understandably most didn’t wish to pay for two. Advertisers preferred the paper with the most circulation, and readers tended to want the paper with the most ads and news pages. This circularity led to a law of the newspaper jungle: Survival of the Fattest.
因此，多数家庭每天都需要报纸，但没人愿付双份费用。广告商倾向发行量最大的报纸，读者则偏好广告与新闻页最多的报纸。这种循环催生报纸丛林法则：“最肥者生存”。
Thus, when two or more papers existed in a major city (which was almost universally the case a century ago), the one that pulled ahead usually emerged as the stand-alone winner. After competition disappeared, the paper’s pricing power in both advertising and circulation was unleashed. Typically, rates for both advertisers and readers would be raised annually – and the profits rolled in. For owners this was economic heaven. (Interestingly, though papers regularly – and often in a disapproving way – reported on the profitability of, say, the auto or steel industries, they never enlightened readers about their own Midas-like situation. Hmmm . . .)
因此，当一座大城市存在多份报纸（百年前普遍现象），领先者通常成为唯一赢家。竞争消失后，报纸在广告与发行上获得定价权。广告与订阅费每年上涨，利润滚滚而来。对业主而言，这是经济天堂。（有趣的是，尽管报纸经常批评汽车或钢铁业的利润，却从不透露自身点石成金的境遇。嗯……）
As long ago as my 1991 letter to shareholders, I nonetheless asserted that this insulated world was changing, writing that “the media businesses . . . will prove considerably less marvelous than I, the industry, or lenders thought would be the case only a few years ago.” Some publishers took umbrage at both this remark and other warnings from me that followed. Newspaper properties, moreover, continued to sell as if they were indestructible slot machines. In fact, many intelligent newspaper executives who regularly chronicled and analyzed important worldwide events were either blind or indifferent to what was going on under their noses.
早在1991年致股东信中，我便指出这一封闭世界正在改变：“媒体行业……将远不如我和业界或贷款方几年前预期的那样辉煌。”某些出版商对此不满，甚至对我后续警告也颇为抵触。报纸资产继续被当作永动机出售。事实上，许多能洞察全球大事的报业高管，对自己眼皮底下发生的变化却视而不见。
Now, however, almost all newspaper owners realize that they are constantly losing ground in the battle for eyeballs. Simply put, if cable and satellite broadcasting, as well as the internet, had come along first, newspapers as we know them probably would never have existed.
如今，几乎所有报业主都意识到他们在争夺注意力的战斗中节节败退。简而言之，若先有有线电视、卫星广播和互联网，报纸可能根本不会存在。
In Berkshire’s world, Stan Lipsey does a terrific job running the Buffalo News, and I am enormously proud of its editor, Margaret Sullivan. The News’ penetration of its market is the highest among that of this country’s large newspapers. We also do better financially than most metropolitan newspapers, even though Buffalo’s population and business trends are not good. Nevertheless, this operation faces unrelenting pressures that will cause profit margins to slide.
在伯克希尔体系内，斯坦·利普西（Stan Lipsey）将《布法罗新闻报》经营得相当出色，我对其主编玛格丽特·沙利文（Margaret Sullivan）亦深感自豪。该报市场渗透率位居美国大报首位，财务表现优于多数都市报纸（尽管布法罗人口与商业趋势不佳）。但该业务仍面临持续压力，利润率将下滑。
True, we have the leading online news operation in Buffalo, and it will continue to attract more viewers and ads. However, the economic potential of a newspaper internet site – given the many alternative sources of information and entertainment that are free and only a click away – is at best a small fraction of that existing in the past for a print newspaper facing no competition.
确实，我们在布法罗拥有领先的在线新闻平台，将继续吸引流量与广告。但考虑到免费替代信息源与娱乐内容触手可得，在线报纸的经济潜力仅相当于过去无竞争纸质报纸的一小部分。
For a local resident, ownership of a city’s paper, like ownership of a sports team, still produces instant prominence. With it typically comes power and influence. These are ruboffs that appeal to many people with money. Beyond that, civic-minded, wealthy individuals may feel that local ownership will serve their community well. That’s why Peter Kiewit bought the Omaha paper more than 40 years ago.
对本地居民而言，拥有城市报纸如同拥有体育队，能迅速提升地位与影响力，这吸引着许多富豪。此外，热心公益的富人可能认为本地化拥有更利于服务社区。这正是彼得·基威特（Peter Kiewit）40多年前收购奥马哈报纸的原因。
We are likely therefore to see non-economic individual buyers of newspapers emerge, just as we have seen such buyers acquire major sports franchises. Aspiring press lords should be careful, however: There’s no rule that says a newspaper’s revenues can’t fall below its expenses and that losses can’t mushroom. Fixed costs are high in the newspaper business, and that’s bad news when unit volume heads south. As the importance of newspapers diminishes, moreover, the “psychic” value of possessing one will wane, whereas owning a sports franchise will likely retain its cachet.
因此，未来可能出现非经济动机的个人买家收购报纸，就像收购体育特许经营权。但报业新贵需谨慎：没有规则能阻止报纸收入低于支出，亏损可能迅速扩大。报纸业固定成本高企，当销量下滑时尤为致命。随着报纸重要性下降，“心理价值”也将消退，而体育队所有权魅力或能延续。
Unless we face an irreversible cash drain, we will stick with the News, just as we’ve said that we would. (Read economic principle 11, on page 76.) Charlie and I love newspapers – we each read five a day – and believe that a free and energetic press is a key ingredient for maintaining a great democracy. We hope that some combination of print and online will ward off economic doomsday for newspapers, and we will work hard in Buffalo to develop a sustainable business model. I think we will be successful. But the days of lush profits from our newspaper are over.
除非遭遇不可逆的现金流失，我们将继续持有《布法罗新闻报》（详见第76页经济原则11）。查理和我都热爱报纸——我们每天各读五份——并坚信自由且活跃的媒体是维系伟大民主的关键。我们希望纸质与在线结合能延缓报业经济末日，并在布法罗努力开发可持续模式。我相信我们会成功，但报纸带来丰厚利润的时代已终结。
• A much improved situation is emerging at NetJets, which sells and manages fractionally-owned aircraft. This company has never had a problem growing: Revenues from flight operations have increased 596% since our purchase in 1998. But profits had been erratic.
• NetJets（尼特杰）情况显著改善，该公司主营分时拥有的飞机销售与管理。自1998年收购以来，飞行运营收入增长596%，但利润一度波动剧烈。
Our move to Europe, which began in 1996, was particularly expensive. After five years of operation there, we had acquired only 80 customers. And by mid-year 2006 our cumulative pre-tax loss had risen to $212 million. But European demand has now exploded, with a net of 589 customers having been added in 2005-2006. Under Mark Booth’s brilliant leadership, NetJets is now operating profitably in Europe, and we expect the positive trend to continue.
1996年进军欧洲尤其昂贵：五年仅获80名客户，至2006年中期累计税前亏损达2.12亿美元。但欧洲需求如今爆发，2005-2006年净增589名客户。在马克·布斯（Mark Booth）卓越领导下，尼特杰欧洲业务已盈利，我们预计这一趋势将持续。
Our U.S. operation also had a good year in 2006, which led to worldwide pre-tax earnings of $143 million at NetJets last year. We made this profit even though we suffered a loss of $19 million in the first quarter.
美国业务2006年同样表现良好，推动尼特杰全年全球税前利润达1.43亿美元。即使第一季度亏损1,900万美元，仍达成这一成绩。
Credit Rich Santulli, along with Mark, for this turnaround. Rich, like many of our managers, has no financial need to work. But you’d never know it. He’s absolutely tireless – monitoring operations, making sales, and traveling the globe to constantly widen the already-enormous lead that NetJets enjoys over its competitors. Today, the value of the fleet we manage is far greater than that managed by our three largest competitors combined.
此次扭亏为盈应归功于里奇·桑图利（Rich Santulli）与马克。里奇和许多经理人一样无需为生计工作，但他毫无懈怠——监控运营、开拓销售、全球奔波，不断扩大尼特杰相对于竞争对手的领先优势。如今，我们管理的机队价值远超三大竞争对手总和。
There’s a reason NetJets is the runaway leader: It offers the ultimate in safety and service. At Berkshire, and at a number of our subsidiaries, NetJets aircraft are an indispensable business tool. I also have a contract for personal use with NetJets and so do members of my family and most Berkshire directors. (None of us, I should add, gets a discount.) Once you’ve flown NetJets, returning to commercial flights is like going back to holding hands.
尼特杰能一骑绝尘自有其道理：提供极致的安全与服务。在伯克希尔及多家子公司，尼特杰飞机是不可或缺的商务工具。我个人、家人及多数伯克希尔董事也都签约使用其服务（且无人享受折扣）。一旦体验过尼特杰，再坐民航航班就如同回到牵手阶段。
# Regulated Utility Business (受监管公用事业)
Berkshire has an 86.6% (fully diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are:
伯克希尔持有美地亚能源控股公司（MidAmerican Energy Holdings）86.6%（完全稀释后）股权，该公司拥有多种公用事业资产，其中最大四家为：
Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric (英国约克郡电力与北方电力公司)
- 3.7 million electric customers (370万电力用户)
- Third largest electricity distributor in the U.K. (英国第三大电力分销商)
MidAmerican Energy (美地亚能源)
- 706,000 electric customers (70.6万电力用户)
- Primarily in Iowa (主要服务爱荷华州)
Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power (太平洋电力与落基山电力)
- Serve 1.7 million electric customers in six western states (服务西部六州约170万电力用户)
Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines (科恩河与北方天然气管道)
- Carry 8% of U.S. natural gas consumption (输送美国8%的天然气消耗量)
Our partners in ownership of MidAmerican are Walter Scott, and its two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. It’s unimportant how many votes each party has; we will make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise. Six years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have underscored my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.
美地亚的共同持有者包括沃尔特·斯科特（Walter Scott）及其两位杰出管理者戴夫·索科尔（Dave Sokol）与格雷格·阿贝尔（Greg Abel）。股权投票权并不重要，我们仅在意见一致时才推进重大决策。过去六年合作印证了我的最初判断：伯克希尔无法找到更优秀的合作伙伴。
Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 20 locally-branded firms with 20,300 agents. Despite HomeServices’ purchase of two operations last year, the company’s overall volume fell 9% to $58 billion, and profits fell 50%.
令人略感意外的是，美地亚还拥有美国第二大房地产经纪公司HomeServices of America。该公司通过20家本地品牌公司及20,300名经纪人运营。尽管去年收购两家机构，但整体交易额仍同比下降9%至580亿美元，利润暴跌50%。
The slowdown in residential real estate activity stems in part from the weakened lending practices of recent years. The “optional” contracts and “teaser” rates that have been popular have allowed borrowers to make payments in the early years of their mortgages that fall far short of covering normal interest costs. Naturally, there are few defaults when virtually nothing is required of a borrower. As a cynic has said, “A rolling loan gathers no loss.” But payments not made add to principal, and borrowers who can’t afford normal monthly payments early on are hit later with above-normal monthly obligations. This is the Scarlett O’Hara scenario: “I’ll think about that tomorrow.” For many home owners, “tomorrow” has now arrived. Consequently there is a huge overhang of offerings in several of HomeServices’ markets.
住宅地产交易放缓部分源于近年宽松的信贷政策。流行的“选择性”贷款合同和“引诱利率”使借款人初期月供远低于正常利息成本。当还款要求近乎为零时，违约率自然低企。正如愤世嫉俗者所言：“滚动的贷款不会产生坏账。”但未支付的利息计入本金后，初期无力承担正常月供的借款人最终将面临超常还款压力。这正是斯嘉丽·奥哈拉的困境：“明天再想吧。”对许多业主而言，“明天”已如期而至。因此，HomeServices多个市场的房源供应严重过剩。
Nevertheless, we will be seeking to purchase additional brokerage operations. A decade from now, HomeServices will almost certainly be much larger.
尽管如此，我们将继续收购经纪业务。十年后，HomeServices规模几乎必然显著扩大。
# Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:
# 美地亚核心运营数据
| Earnings (in $ millions) (收益，单位：百万美元) | 2006 | 2005 |
|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities (英国公用事业) ......................... | $338 | $308 |
| Iowa utility (爱荷华州公用事业) ....................... | 348 | 288 |
| Western utilities (acquired March 21, 2006) (西部公用事业，2006年3月21日收购) | 356 | N/A |
| Pipelines (管道运输) ..................................... | 376 | 309 |
| HomeServices ............................................. | 74 | 148 |
| Other (net) (其他净收益) ................................. | 226 | 115 |
| Earnings before corporate interest and taxes (税息前利润) | 1,718 | 1,168 |
| Interest, other than to Berkshire (非伯克希尔利息支出) | (261) | (200) |
| Interest on Berkshire junior debt (伯克希尔次级债利息) | (134) | (157) |
| Income tax (所得税) ........................................ | (407) | (248) |
| Net earnings (净利润) .................................. | $916 | $563 |
| Earnings applicable to Berkshire* (归属伯克希尔收益*) | $885 | $523 |
| Debt owed to others (应付第三方债务) ................... | $16,946 | $10,296 |
| Debt owed to Berkshire (应付伯克希尔债务) .............. | $1,055 | $1,289 |
*Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $87 in 2006 and $102 in 2005.
**含伯克希尔利息收入（扣除相关所得税）：2006年8700万美元，2005年1.02亿美元。
# Finance and Financial Products (金融及金融产品)
You will be happy to hear – and I’m even happier – that this will be my last discussion of the losses at Gen Re’s derivative operation. When we started to wind this business down early in 2002, we had 23,218 contracts outstanding. Now we have 197. Our cumulative pre-tax loss from this operation totals $409 million, but only $5 million occurred in 2006. Charlie says that if we had properly classified the $409 million on our 2001 balance sheet, it would have been labeled “Good Until Reached For.” In any event, a Shakespearean thought – slightly modified – seems appropriate for the tombstone of this derivative business: “All’s well that ends.”
你们会很高兴——我也同样欣慰——这将是最后一次讨论通用再保险（Gen Re）衍生品业务的亏损。2002年初启动清算时，我们持有23,218份未到期合约，如今仅剩197份。该业务累计税前亏损4.09亿美元，其中2006年仅500万美元。查理调侃说，若在2001年资产负债表中正确分类这笔4.09亿美元，应标注为“用到为止”。无论如何，稍作修改的莎士比亚名言恰如其分地总结这一衍生品业务的墓志铭：“结局好，一切都好。”
We’ve also wound up our investment in Value Capital. So earnings or losses from these two lines of business are making their final appearance in the table that annually appears in this section.
我们亦已清算对Value Capital的投资。因此，这两项业务的损益将最后一次出现在本节年度财务表中。
# Clayton Homes (克莱顿房屋公司)
Clayton Homes remains an anomaly in the manufactured-housing industry, which last year recorded its lowest unit sales since 1962. Indeed, the industry’s volume last year was only about one-third that of 1999. Outside of Clayton, I doubt if the industry, overall, made any money in 2006.
克莱顿房屋公司仍是预制房屋行业的异类。该行业去年销量创1962年以来最低，全年销量仅约为1999年的三分之一。除克莱顿外，我怀疑整个行业2006年整体盈利微薄甚至亏损。
Yet Clayton earned $513 million pre-tax and paid Berkshire an additional $86 million as a fee for our obtaining the funds to finance Clayton’s $10 billion portfolio of installment receivables. Berkshire’s financial strength has clearly been of huge help to Clayton. But the driving force behind the company’s success is Kevin Clayton. Kevin knows the business forward and backward, is a rational decision-maker and a joy to work with. Because of acquisitions, Clayton now employs 14,787 people, compared to 6,661 at the time of our purchase.
然而克莱顿实现税前利润5.13亿美元，并向伯克希尔支付8,600万美元费用（用于为其100亿美元分期应收款组合融资）。伯克希尔的财务实力显然为克莱顿带来巨大助力，但其成功核心是凯文·克莱顿（Kevin Clayton）。他深谙行业全貌，是理性决策者且合作愉快。通过收购扩张，克莱顿员工人数从收购时的6,661人增至14,787人。
We have two leasing operations: CORT (furniture), run by Paul Arnold, and XTRA (truck trailers), run by Bill Franz. CORT’s earnings improved significantly last year, and XTRA’s remained at the high level attained in 2005. We continue to look for tuck-in acquisitions to be run by Paul or Bill, and also are open to ideas for new leasing opportunities.
我们拥有两家租赁公司：由保罗·阿诺德（Paul Arnold）管理的CORT（家具租赁）和比尔·弗兰茨（Bill Franz）管理的XTRA（卡车拖车租赁）。CORT去年盈利显著改善，XTRA则维持2005年的高水平。我们持续寻找可由保罗或比尔运营的补充型收购机会，也欢迎新的租赁业务创意。
# Here’s a breakdown of earnings in this sector:
# 本板块收益明细
| (in millions) | Pre-Tax Earnings (税前收益) | Interest-Bearing Liabilities (计息负债) |
|---|---|---|
| 2006 | 2005 | 2006 |
| Trading – ordinary income (交易-普通收入) ............................ | $274 | $200 |
| Gen Re Securities (loss) (通用再保险证券亏损) ......................... | (5) | (104) |
| Life and annuity operation (寿险与年金业务) ............................. | 29 | 11 |
| Value Capital (loss) (价值资本亏损) ....................................... | 6 | (33) |
| Leasing operations (租赁业务) ......................................... | 182 | 173 |
| Manufactured-housing finance (Clayton) (预制房屋融资（克莱顿）)....... | 513 | 416 |
| Other (其他)............................................................... | 158 | 159 |
| Income before capital gains (扣除资本利得前收益)............................ | 1,157 | 822 |
| Trading – capital gains (losses) (交易-资本收益（亏损）) ..................... | 938 | (234) |
| Total (总计) .............................................................. | $2,095 | $588 |
*Includes all liabilities
*含全部负债*
# Investments (投资)
We show below our common stock investments. With two exceptions, those that had a market value of more than $700 million at the end of 2006 are itemized. We don’t itemize the two securities referred to, which have a market value of $1.9 billion, because we continue to buy them. I could, of course, tell you their names. But then I would have to kill you.
以下是我们持有的普通股投资。除两笔持续增持的证券（市值19亿美元）外，其余2006年底市值超7亿美元的持仓均列示如下。当然，若透露那两笔证券名称，我只能“灭口”——
# 12/31/06 投资组合明细
| Shares (持股量) | Company (公司名称) | Percentage of Company Owned (持股比例) | Cost* (成本) | Market (市值) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company (美国运通公司) | 12.6% | $1,287 | $9,198 |
| 36,417,400 | Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc. (安海斯-布希公司) | 4.7% | 1,761 | 1,792 |
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company (可口可乐公司) | 8.6% | 1,299 | 9,650 |
| 17,938,100 | Conoco Phillips (康菲石油) | 1.1% | 1,066 | 1,291 |
| 21,334,900 | Johnson & Johnson (强生公司) | 0.7% | 1,250 | 1,409 |
| 6,708,760 | M&T Bank Corporation (M&T银行) | 6.1% | 103 | 820 |
| 48,000,000 | Moody’s Corporation (穆迪公司) | 17.2% | 499 | 3,315 |
| 2,338,961,000 | PetroChina “H” shares (or equivalents) (中国石油H股（或等价物）) | 1.3% | 488 | 3,313 |
| 3,486,006 | POSCO (韩国浦项制铁) | 4.0% | 572 | 1,158 |
| 100,000,000 | The Procter & Gamble Company (宝洁公司) | 3.2% | 940 | 6,427 |
| 229,707,000 | Tesco (乐购超市) | 2.9% | 1,340 | 1,820 |
| 31,033,800 | US Bancorp (美国合众银行) | 1.8% | 969 | 1,123 |
| 17,072,192 | USG Corp (USG公司) | 19.0% | 536 | 936 |
| 19,944,300 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (沃尔玛) | 0.5% | 942 | 921 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company (华盛顿邮报公司) | 18.0% | 11 | 1,288 |
| 218,169,300 | Wells Fargo & Company (富国银行) | 6.5% | 3,697 | 7,758 |
| 1,724,200 | White Mountains Insurance (怀特山保险) | 16.0% | 369 | 999 |
| Others (其他) ...................................................... | - | - | 5,866 | 8,315 |
| Total Common Stocks (普通股总计) | - | - | $22,995 | $61,533 |
*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
*成本为实际买入价格及税务计价基础；部分项目按会计准则调整后账面成本不同（因减值或增值）*
We are delighted by the 2006 business performance of virtually all of our investees. Last year, we told you that our expectation was that these companies, in aggregate, would increase their earnings by 6% to 8% annually, a rate that would double their earnings every ten years or so. In 2006 American Express, Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble and Wells Fargo, our largest holdings, increased per-share earnings by 18%, 9%, 8% and 11%. These are stellar results, and we thank their CEOs.
我们对几乎所有被投公司在2006年的表现感到满意。去年我们曾预测这些公司整体盈利将以每年6%-8%的速度增长（约每十年翻倍）。2006年我们的四大持仓——美国运通、可口可乐、宝洁和富国银行——每股盈利分别增长18%、9%、8%和11%。这一成绩堪称卓越，感谢各家CEO的卓越贡献。
We’ve come close to eliminating our direct foreign-exchange position, from which we realized about $186 million in pre-tax profits in 2006 (earnings that were included in the Finance and Financial Products table shown earlier). That brought our total gain since inception of this position in 2002 to $2.2 billion. Here’s a breakdown by currency:
我们已接近清空直接外汇头寸，该头寸为我们在2006年带来约1.86亿美元税前利润（包含于前述金融与金融产品表）。自2002年建立该头寸以来，累计总收益达22亿美元。按货币分类如下：
| 货币 | 总收益（亏损）（单位：百万美元） |
|---|---|
| 澳元 | $247.1 |
| 英镑 | 287.2 |
| 加元 | 398.3 |
| 人民币 | (12.7) |
| 欧元 | 839.2 |
| 港元 | $106.1 |
| 日元 | 102.6 |
| 墨西哥比索 | (2.5) |
| 新西兰元 | 261.3 |
| 韩元 | 9.6 |
| 新加坡元 | (45.3) |
| 瑞士法郎 | 22.9 |
| 台币 | 1.9（其他期权） |
We’ve made large indirect currency profits as well, though I’ve never tallied the precise amount. For example, in 2002-2003 we spent about $82 million buying – of all things – Enron bonds, some of which were denominated in Euros. Already we’ve received distributions of $179 million from these bonds, and our remaining stake is worth $173 million. That means our overall gain is $270 million, part of which came from the appreciation of the Euro that took place after our bond purchase.
我们还通过间接方式获得巨额货币利润（尽管从未精确统计）。例如，2002-2003年我们以8,200万美元购入安然债券（其中部分以欧元计价），目前已获分配1.79亿美元，剩余持仓价值1.73亿美元，总收益达2.7亿美元，其中部分来自购入债券后欧元升值。
When we first began making foreign exchange purchases, interest-rate differentials between the U.S. and most foreign countries favored a direct currency position. But that spread turned negative in 2005. We therefore looked for other ways to gain foreign-currency exposure, such as the ownership of foreign equities or of U.S. stocks with major earnings abroad. The currency factor, we should emphasize, is not dominant in our selection of equities, but is merely one of many considerations.
初始外汇交易时，美国与多数国家的利差支持直接货币头寸。但这一利差在2005年转为负值。因此我们转而寻找其他方式获取外币敞口，如持有外国股票或海外盈利占比高的美国公司股票。需强调的是，货币因素并非选股主导因素，仅是众多考量之一。
As our U.S. trade problems worsen, the probability that the dollar will weaken over time continues to be high. I fervently believe in real trade – the more the better for both us and the world. We had about $1.44 trillion of this honest-to-God trade in 2006. But the U.S. also had $.76 trillion of pseudo-trade last year – imports for which we exchanged no goods or services. (Ponder, for a moment, how commentators would describe the situation if our imports were $.76 trillion – a full 6% of GDP – and we had no exports.) Making these purchases that weren’t reciprocated by sales, the U.S. necessarily transferred ownership of its assets or IOUs to the rest of the world. Like a very wealthy but self-indulgent family, we peeled off a bit of what we owned in order to consume more than we produced.
随着美国贸易问题加剧，美元长期贬值的可能性持续存在。我坚信真实贸易——对我们和世界而言越多越好。2006年真实贸易额达1.44万亿美元，但去年美国还有0.76万亿美元“伪贸易”——未以商品或服务换回的进口（试想一下，若进口额达0.76万亿美元——占GDP的6%——且无出口，评论家会如何形容这一局面）。这些单向采购必然导致美国资产或欠条所有权转移至全球。如同富裕却挥霍的家庭，我们出售部分资产以换取超量消费。
The U.S. can do a lot of this because we are an extraordinarily rich country that has behaved responsibly in the past. The world is therefore willing to accept our bonds, real estate, stocks and businesses. And we have a vast store of these to hand over.
美国能长期如此，因其过去是极其富裕且负责任的国家。全球因此愿意接受我们的债券、房地产、股票及企业。我们拥有海量此类资产可供转让。
These transfers will have consequences, however. Already the prediction I made last year about one fall-out from our spending binge has come true: The “investment income” account of our country – positive in every previous year since 1915 – turned negative in 2006. Foreigners now earn more on their U.S. investments than we do on our investments abroad. In effect, we’ve used up our bank account and turned to our credit card. And, like everyone who gets in hock, the U.S. will now experience “reverse compounding” as we pay ever-increasing amounts of interest on interest.
但此类转移终将产生后果。去年我预测的过度消费后果之一已成真：美国的“投资收入”账户自1915年以来首次转负。外国人持有的美国资产收益已超过我们海外投资收益。实际上，我们已耗尽银行账户，开始依赖信用卡透支。如同陷入债务的人，美国将面临“反向复利”——利息的利息持续增长。
I want to emphasize that even though our course is unwise, Americans will live better ten or twenty years from now than they do today. Per-capita wealth will increase. But our citizens will also be forced every year to ship a significant portion of their current production abroad merely to service the cost of our huge debtor position. It won’t be pleasant to work part of each day to pay for the over-consumption of your ancestors. I believe that at some point in the future U.S. workers and voters will find this annual “tribute” so onerous that there will be a severe political backlash. How that will play out in markets is impossible to predict – but to expect a “soft landing” seems like wishful thinking.
需强调的是，即使当前路径不智，美国人十年或二十年后的生活仍优于当下。人均财富将增长。但公民每年需将大量产出输往海外以偿还巨额债务成本。每天工作部分时间只为偿还祖先的过度消费绝非乐事。我预测未来某天，美国劳动者与选民将发现这笔年度“贡金”过于沉重，从而引发严重政治反弹。市场将如何反应难以预测——但期待“软着陆”不过是幻想。
I should mention that all of the direct currency profits we have realized have come from forward contracts, which are derivatives, and that we have entered into other types of derivatives contracts as well. That may seem odd, since you know of our expensive experience in unwinding the derivatives book at Gen Re and also have heard me talk of the systemic problems that could result from the enormous growth in the use of derivatives. Why, you may wonder, are we fooling around with such potentially toxic material?
需说明的是，我们的直接外汇利润均来自远期合约（属于衍生品），且我们还参与其他类型衍生品交易。这或许显得矛盾，毕竟你们知晓通用再保险清算衍生品头寸的高昂代价，也听过我对衍生品滥用导致系统性风险的警告。为何我们仍涉足此类潜在毒药？
The answer is that derivatives, just like stocks and bonds, are sometimes wildly mispriced. For many years, accordingly, we have selectively written derivative contracts – few in number but sometimes for large dollar amounts. We currently have 62 contracts outstanding. I manage them personally, and they are free of counterparty credit risk. So far, these derivative contracts have worked out well for us, producing pre-tax profits in the hundreds of millions of dollars (above and beyond the gains I’ve itemized from forward foreign-exchange contracts). Though we will experience losses from time to time, we are likely to continue to earn – overall – significant profits from mispriced derivatives.
答案在于衍生品如同股票债券，有时定价严重偏离。因此我们多年来选择性签订衍生品合约——数量极少但单笔金额巨大。目前我们持有62份未到期合约，由我亲自管理且无交易对手信用风险。迄今为止这些合约表现良好，税前利润达数亿美元（不含外汇远期合约收益）。尽管偶有亏损，我们仍可能通过错误定价的衍生品获得长期显著收益。
I have told you that Berkshire has three outstanding candidates to replace me as CEO and that the Board knows exactly who should take over if I should die tonight. Each of the three is much younger than I. The directors believe it’s important that my successor have the prospect of a long tenure.
我曾说明伯克希尔有三位优秀CEO继任人选，董事会清楚若我今晚离世谁将接任。三位均比我年轻许多，董事们认为继任者需具备长期任职潜力。
Frankly, we are not as well-prepared on the investment side of our business. There’s a history here: At one time, Charlie was my potential replacement for investing, and more recently Lou Simpson has filled that slot. Lou is a top-notch investor with an outstanding long-term record of managing GEICO’s equity portfolio. But he is only six years younger than I. If I were to die soon, he would fill in magnificently for a short period. For the long-term, though, we need a different answer.
坦率而言，投资领域的准备远不及管理接班充分。历史上，查理曾是我的投资继任者，近期路易斯·辛普森（Lou Simpson）接替此职。路易斯是顶尖投资者，曾长期卓越管理盖可投资组合。但他仅比我年轻六岁，若我短期内离世，他能短期完美接棒，但长期仍需新方案。
At our October board meeting, we discussed that subject fully. And we emerged with a plan, which I will carry out with the help of Charlie and Lou.
10月董事会上，我们深入讨论此议题并制定计划，我将在查理与路易斯协助下执行。
Under this plan, I intend to hire a younger man or woman with the potential to manage a very large portfolio, who we hope will succeed me as Berkshire’s chief investment officer when the need for someone to do that arises. As part of the selection process, we may in fact take on several candidates.
根据计划，我将聘请一位年轻男女（或多人），具备管理大规模投资组合潜力，希望其成为我的投资总监继任者。选拔过程中可能同时引入多位候选人。
Picking the right person(s) will not be an easy task. It’s not hard, of course, to find smart people, among them individuals who have impressive investment records. But there is far more to successful long-term investing than brains and performance that has recently been good.
挑选合适人选绝非易事。当然，找到聪明且近期业绩亮眼的人不难，但长期成功投资所需远超智力与短期表现。
Over time, markets will do extraordinary, even bizarre, things. A single, big mistake could wipe out a long string of successes. We therefore need someone genetically programmed to recognize and avoid serious risks, including those never before encountered. Certain perils that lurk in investment strategies cannot be spotted by use of the models commonly employed today by financial institutions.
市场长期将呈现非凡甚至怪异波动。一次重大错误即可抹去多年成就。我们需要天生能识别并规避风险（包括前所未见的风险）的人。某些投资策略潜藏的风险，现有金融机构常用模型无法捕捉。
Temperament is also important. Independent thinking, emotional stability, and a keen understanding of both human and institutional behavior is vital to long-term investment success. I’ve seen a lot of very smart people who have lacked these virtues.
性格同样关键。独立思考、情绪稳定、深刻理解人性与机构行为，是长期投资成功的要素。我见过太多聪明人缺乏这些品质。
Finally, we have a special problem to consider: our ability to keep the person we hire. Being able to list Berkshire on a resume would materially enhance the marketability of an investment manager. We will need, therefore, to be sure we can retain our choice, even though he or she could leave and make much more money elsewhere.
最后需考虑特殊问题：留住所聘人才。能将伯克希尔列入履历，将极大提升投资经理的市场价值。因此我们必须确保即使其离职可获更高收入，也能挽留人选。
There are surely people who fit what we need, but they may be hard to identify. In 1979, Jack Byrne and I felt we had found such a person in Lou Simpson. We then made an arrangement with him whereby he would be paid well for sustained overperformance. Under this deal, he has earned large amounts. Lou, however, could have left us long ago to manage far greater sums on more advantageous terms. If money alone had been the object, that’s exactly what he would have done. But Lou never considered such a move. We need to find a younger person or two made of the same stuff.
必定有人符合我们的需求，但识别他们并不容易。1979年，杰克·伯尼（Jack Byrne）和我认为路易斯·辛普森（Lou Simpson）正是这样的人选。我们与他达成协议，只要长期跑赢市场即可获得丰厚回报。按此协议，他已赚取巨额报酬。但路易斯本可早在多年前就另谋高就，管理规模更大的资金并享受更优厚待遇。若仅以金钱为目标，他早该离开。但他从未考虑此选项。我们需要找到同样品质的年轻一两人选。
# The good news: At 76, I feel terrific and, according to all measurable indicators, am in excellent health. It’s amazing what Cherry Coke and hamburgers will do for a fellow.
# 好消息：76岁的我感觉极佳，按所有可测量指标来看健康状况优异。樱桃可乐与汉堡对一个人的“疗效”真是令人惊叹。
# Some Changes on Berkshire’s Board (伯克希尔董事会成员变动)
The composition of our board will change in two ways this spring. One change will involve the Chace family (蔡斯家族), which has been connected to Berkshire and its predecessor companies for more than a century. In 1929, the first Malcolm G. Chace played an important role in merging four New England textile operations into Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates (伯克希尔精细纺纱协会). That company merged with Hathaway Manufacturing (哈撒韦制造公司) in 1955 to form Berkshire Hathaway, and Malcolm G. Chace, Jr. became its chairman.
今年春季董事会将发生两处变动。其一是蔡斯家族成员的更替——该家族与伯克希尔及其前身公司合作已超一个世纪。1929年，初代马尔科姆·G·蔡斯（Malcolm G. Chace）在整合新英格兰四家纺织企业成立伯克希尔精细纺纱协会中发挥关键作用。1955年该协会与哈撒韦制造公司合并成立伯克希尔·哈撒韦，其子小马尔科姆·G·蔡斯成为董事长。
Early in 1965, Malcolm arranged for Buffett Partnership Ltd. to buy a key block of Berkshire shares and welcomed us as the new controlling shareholder of the company. Malcolm continued as non-executive chairman until 1969. He was both a wonderful gentleman and helpful partner.
1965年初，马尔科姆安排巴菲特合伙公司（Buffett Partnership Ltd.）购入伯克希尔关键股份，并欢迎我们成为新控股股东。他本人担任非执行董事长至1969年，既是谦谦君子，也是得力伙伴。
That description also fits his son, Malcolm “Kim” Chace, who succeeded his father on Berkshire’s board in 1992. But last year Kim, now actively and successfully running a community bank that he founded in 1996, suggested that we find a younger person to replace him on our board. We have done so, and Kim will step down as a director at the annual meeting. I owe much to the Chaces and wish to thank Kim for his many years of service to Berkshire.
这一评价同样适用于其子马尔科姆“金”·蔡斯（Malcolm “Kim” Chace）——他1992年接任家族董事席位。但去年金先生（现正成功经营自己1996年创办的社区银行）建议我们寻找更年轻的董事人选。我们已照做，金将在年度股东大会卸任。我深感蔡斯家族恩情，感谢金多年来对伯克希尔的贡献。
In selecting a new director, we were guided by our long-standing criteria, which are that board members be owner-oriented (以股东为导向), business-savvy (深谙商业), interested (具备兴趣) and truly independent (真正独立). I say “truly” because many directors deemed independent by authorities today are far from that, relying heavily on directors’ fees to maintain their standard of living. These payments, which come in many forms, often range between $150,000 and $250,000 annually, compensation that may approach or even exceed all other income of the “independent” director. And – surprise, surprise – director compensation has soared in recent years, pushed up by recommendations from corporate America’s favorite consultant, Ratchet, Ratchet and Bingo (美国企业最爱的咨询公司“拉链、拉链与宾果”). (The name may be phony, but the action it conveys is not.)
新董事遴选遵循四大标准：以股东为导向、深谙商业、具备兴趣及真正独立。强调“真正”是因为许多所谓“独立”董事实则依赖董事津贴维持生活水平。此类报酬形式多样，年度津贴常达15-25万美元，甚至可能超过其其他全部收入。惊人的是，董事薪酬近年飙升，背后推手正是美国企业最爱的咨询公司Ratchet, Ratchet and Bingo（名字或为虚构，但行为真实存在）。
Charlie and I believe our four criteria are essential if directors are to do their job – which, by law, is to faithfully represent owners. Yet these criteria are usually ignored. Instead, consultants and CEOs seeking board candidates will often say, “We’re looking for a woman,” or “a Hispanic,” or “someone from abroad,” or what have you. It sometimes sounds as if the mission is to stock Noah’s ark. Over the years I’ve been queried many times about potential directors and have yet to hear anyone ask, “Does he think like an intelligent owner?”
查理和我坚信，董事履行其法律职责（即忠实代表股东）必须满足这四大标准，但业界往往忽视这些要素。咨询公司与CEO们寻找董事时常说：“需要一位女性”、“西班牙裔”或“海外人士”等，听起来仿佛在组建诺亚方舟。多年来我多次被问及董事人选，却从未听人问：“此人是否具备股东思维？”
The questions I instead get would sound ridiculous to someone seeking candidates for, say, a football team, or an arbitration panel or a military command. In those cases, the selectors would look for people who had the specific talents and attitudes required for a specialized job. At Berkshire, we are in the specialized activity of running a business well, and therefore we seek business judgment.
这些问题若用于选拔足球队员、仲裁员或军事指挥官，提问者会被认为荒谬。那些岗位会选择具备特定技能与态度的专家。伯克希尔的专长是高效经营企业，因此我们寻找商业判断力。
That’s exactly what we’ve found in Susan Decker, CFO of Yahoo!, who will join our board at the annual meeting. We are lucky to have her: She scores very high on our four criteria and additionally, at 44, is young – an attribute, as you may have noticed, that your Chairman has long lacked. We will seek more young directors in the future, but never by slighting the four qualities that we insist upon.
苏珊·德克尔（Susan Decker，雅虎CFO）正是我们要找的人选。她将在年度股东大会加入董事会。我们幸运地获得她——四项标准均表现卓越，且44岁正值盛年（主席您显然已失去的特质）。未来我们将继续物色年轻董事，但绝不会牺牲对四大核心品质的坚持。
# This and That (杂谈)
Berkshire will pay about $4.4 billion in federal income tax on its 2006 earnings. In its last fiscal year the U.S. Government spent $2.6 trillion, or about $7 billion per day. Thus, for more than half of one day, Berkshire picked up the tab for all federal expenditures, ranging from Social Security and Medicare payments to the cost of our armed services. Had there been only 600 taxpayers like Berkshire, no one else in America would have needed to pay any federal income or payroll taxes.
伯克希尔2006年需缴纳联邦所得税约44亿美元。美国政府上财年支出2.6万亿美元，日均70亿。换言之，我们一己之力覆盖了联邦政府超过半天的所有开支——从社保医保到军费。若有600个伯克希尔级纳税人，全美其他人都无需缴纳联邦所得税与工薪税。
Our federal return last year, we should add, ran to 9,386 pages. To handle this filing, state and foreign tax returns, a myriad of SEC requirements, and all of the other matters involved in running Berkshire, we have gone all the way up to 19 employees at World Headquarters.
补充说明：去年联邦报税表长达9,386页。为处理税务申报、SEC合规要求及所有运营事项，全球总部员工最多时达19人。
This crew occupies 9,708 square feet of space, and Charlie – at World Headquarters West in Los Angeles – uses another 655 square feet. Our home-office payroll, including benefits and counting both locations, totaled $3,531,978 last year. We’re careful when spending your money.
这支团队占据9,708平方英尺办公空间，查理在洛杉矶的西区总部另占655平方英尺。包含福利支出，去年两地办公室总薪酬支出为3,531,978美元。我们花您的钱一向谨慎。
Corporate bigwigs often complain about government spending, criticizing bureaucrats who they say spend taxpayers’ money differently from how they would if it were their own. But sometimes the financial behavior of executives will also vary based on whose wallet is getting depleted. Here’s an illustrative tale from my days at Salomon. In the 1980s the company had a barber, Jimmy by name, who came in weekly to give free haircuts to the top brass. A manicurist was also on tap. Then, because of a cost-cutting drive, patrons were told to pay their own way. One top executive (not the CEO) who had previously visited Jimmy weekly went immediately to a once-every-three-weeks schedule.
企业高管常抱怨政府支出，批评官员花钱方式与自掏腰包不同。但高管们的财务行为也会因资金归属而改变。所罗门时期有个例子：1980年代公司聘请理发师吉米为高管提供免费理发，还有美甲师服务。成本削减后，高管需自费消费。有位非CEO高管过去每周理发，立即改为每三周一次。
Every now and then Charlie and I catch on early to a tide-like trend, one brimming over with commercial promise. For example, though American Airlines (with its “miles”) and American Express (with credit card points) are credited as being trailblazers in granting customers “rewards,” Charlie and I were far ahead of them in spotting the appeal of this powerful idea. Excited by our insight, the two of us jumped into the reward business way back in 1970 by buying control of a trading stamp operation, Blue Chip Stamps. In that year, Blue Chip had sales of $126 million, and its stamps papered California.
查理和我偶尔能率先察觉浪潮般趋势。例如，尽管美国航空（里程）和美国运通（信用卡积分）被誉为“客户奖励”先驱，我们早在1970年便洞察这一理念的潜力。当年我们收购蓝筹印花公司（Blue Chip Stamps），该公司年销售额1.26亿美元，其印花贴纸曾铺满加州。
In 1970, indeed, about 60 billion of our stamps were licked by savers, pasted into books, and taken to Blue Chip redemption stores. Our catalog of rewards was 116 pages thick and chock full of tantalizing items. When I was told that even certain brothels and mortuaries gave stamps to their patrons, I felt I had finally found a sure thing.
1970年，储户舔贴600亿枚印花至集邮册，并在蓝筹兑换店换取奖品。我们的奖品目录厚达116页，琳琅满目。当听说某些妓院与殡仪馆也向顾客发放印花时，我确信这是稳赚不赔的生意。
Well, not quite. From the day Charlie and I stepped into Blue Chip, the business went straight downhill. By 1980, sales had fallen to $19.4 million. And by 1990, sales were bumping along at $1.5 million. No quitter, I redoubled my managerial efforts.
结果却非如此。自1970年查理和我入主蓝筹印花公司起，业务直线滑坡。1980年销售额跌至1,940万美元，1990年更降至150万美元。即便如此，我仍未放弃，加倍努力管理。
Sales then fell another 98%. Last year, in Berkshire’s $98 billion of revenues, all of $25,920 (no zeros omitted) came from Blue Chip. Ever hopeful, Charlie and I soldier on.
销售额再跌98%。2006年伯克希尔980亿美元营收中，蓝筹仅贡献25,920美元（无零省略）。查理和我仍怀抱希望，继续前行。
I mentioned last year that in my service on 19 corporate boards (not counting Berkshire or other controlled companies), I have been the Typhoid Mary of compensation committees (薪酬委员会的“伤寒玛丽”). At only one company was I assigned to comp committee duty, and then I was promptly outvoted on the most crucial decision that we faced. My ostracism has been peculiar, considering that I certainly haven’t lacked experience in setting CEO pay. At Berkshire, after all, I am a one-man compensation committee who determines the salaries and incentives for the CEOs of around 40 significant operating businesses.
去年我曾提及，在服务过的19家上市公司董事会（不含伯克希尔及旗下企业）中，我堪称薪酬委员会的“伤寒玛丽”（指代传播者）。唯一一次参与薪酬委员会时，我在最关键决策中被集体否决。考虑到我为旗下约40家重要企业CEO制定薪酬激励的丰富经验，这种排斥实在古怪。
How much time does this aspect of my job take? Virtually none. How many CEOs have voluntarily left us for other jobs in our 42-year history? Precisely none.
我在这一职责上花费多少时间？几乎为零。在伯克希尔42年历史中，有多少CEO主动离职另谋高就？答案是零人。
Berkshire employs many different incentive arrangements, with their terms depending on such elements as the economic potential or capital intensity of a CEO’s business. Whatever the compensation arrangement, though, I try to keep it both simple and fair.
伯克希尔采用多种激励机制，其条款依据CEO业务的经济潜力或资本密集度调整。无论何种薪酬结构，我始终追求简洁与公平。
When we use incentives – and these can be large – they are always tied to the operating results for which a given CEO has authority. We issue no lottery tickets that carry payoffs unrelated to business performance. If a CEO bats .300, he gets paid for being a .300 hitter, even if circumstances outside of his control cause Berkshire to perform poorly. And if he bats .150, he doesn’t get a payoff just because the successes of others have enabled Berkshire to prosper mightily.
我们的激励机制（可能金额巨大）始终与CEO可控的经营成果挂钩。我们不发“彩票”，即与业绩无关的报酬。若CEO打击率为.300，即使外部环境导致伯克希尔整体低迷，他仍按此水平获酬；若打击率.150，即使他人成功推动伯克希尔繁荣，他也不会因此受益。
An example: We now own $61 billion of equities at Berkshire, whose value can easily rise or fall by 10% in a given year. Why in the world should the pay of our operating executives be affected by such $6 billion swings, however important the gain or loss may be for shareholders?
例如：伯克希尔当前持有610亿美元股票，价值可能年波动10%（即610亿美元浮动）。为何运营高管的薪酬应受此影响？对股东而言，这些损益虽重要，但与高管个人贡献无关。
You’ve read loads about CEOs who have received astronomical compensation for mediocre results. Much less well-advertised is the fact that America’s CEOs also generally live the good life. Many, it should be emphasized, are exceptionally able, and almost all work far more than 40 hours a week. But they are usually treated like royalty in the process. (And we’re certainly going to keep it that way at Berkshire. Though Charlie still favors sackcloth and ashes, I prefer to be spoiled rotten. Berkshire owns The Pampered Chef; our wonderful office group has made me The Pampered Chief.)
你可能读过无数CEO因平庸业绩仍获天价薪酬的报道。但鲜少提及的是，美国CEO普遍享有优渥生活。需强调的是，许多CEO能力超群，且每周工作远超40小时。但他们往往被当作贵族对待。（伯克希尔会延续这一传统。查理偏爱苦行僧式生活，我却偏好被宠坏——伯克希尔拥有“宠坏厨师”公司，我的办公室团队已让我成为“宠坏主席”。）
CEO perks at one company are quickly copied elsewhere. “All the other kids have one” may seem a thought too juvenile to use as a rationale in the boardroom. But consultants employ precisely this argument, phrased more elegantly of course, when they make recommendations to comp committees.
CEO福利一旦出现，便迅速被模仿。“其他孩子都有”看似幼稚的借口，却是顾问向薪酬委员会推荐方案时的核心逻辑，只不过他们换了个优雅说法。
Irrational and excessive comp practices will not be materially changed by disclosure or by “independent” comp committee members. Indeed, I think it’s likely that the reason I was rejected for service on so many comp committees was that I was regarded as too independent. Compensation reform will only occur if the largest institutional shareholders – it would only take a few – demand a fresh look at the whole system. The consultants’ present drill of deftly selecting “peer” companies to compare with their clients will only perpetuate present excesses.
不理性且过度的薪酬实践，不会因公开披露或所谓“独立”薪酬委员会成员而改变。我认为自己屡遭薪酬委员会排斥，正是因为“独立性”过强。唯有最大机构投资者（仅需少数）要求全面改革，薪酬体系才可能改善。目前顾问们惯用手法——精心挑选“对标公司”——只会让过度薪酬持续蔓延。
Last year I arranged for the bulk of my Berkshire holdings to go to five charitable foundations, thus carrying out part of my lifelong plan to eventually use all of my shares for philanthropic purposes. Details of the commitments I made, as well as the rationale for them, are posted on our website, www.berkshirehathaway.com. Taxes, I should note, had nothing to do with my decision or its timing. My federal and state income taxes in 2006 were exactly what they would have been had I not made my first contributions last summer, and the same point will apply to my 2007 contributions.
去年我将所持伯克希尔股份的大部分捐给五家慈善基金会，这是践行终身计划的一部分——最终将全部股份用于慈善事业。捐赠细节与原因详见官网。需强调的是，税收与此决策完全无关。2006年联邦与州税额与我未作捐赠时一致，2007年捐赠亦将遵循此原则。
In my will I’ve stipulated that the proceeds from all Berkshire shares I still own at death are to be used for philanthropic purposes within ten years after my estate is closed. Because my affairs are not complicated, it should take three years at most for this closing to occur. Adding this 13-year period to my expected lifespan of about 12 years (though, naturally, I’m aiming for more) means that proceeds from all of my Berkshire shares will likely be distributed for societal purposes over the next 25 years or so.
我的遗嘱规定，去世后所持伯克希尔股份的收益需在遗产清算后十年内用于慈善。因遗产结构简单，清算最多三年完成。加上这13年期限，结合我预期约12年的剩余寿命（当然希望更久），所有股份收益将在未来25年左右分配完毕。
I’ve set this schedule because I want the money to be spent relatively promptly by people I know to be capable, vigorous and motivated. These managerial attributes sometimes wane as institutions – particularly those that are exempt from market forces – age. Today, there are terrific people in charge at the five foundations. So at my death, why should they not move with dispatch to judiciously spend the money that remains?
我设定此计划，是希望资金由我信任的高效团队尽快投入社会事业。但随着机构（尤其是不受市场约束者）老化，管理活力可能衰退。目前五家基金会由卓越团队领导，因此在我身后，为何不应由他们迅速合理分配剩余资金？
Those people favoring perpetual foundations argue that in the future there will most certainly be large and important societal problems that philanthropy will need to address. I agree. But there will then also be many super-rich individuals and families whose wealth will exceed that of today’s Americans and to whom philanthropic organizations can make their case for funding. These funders can then judge firsthand which operations have both the vitality and the focus to best address the major societal problems that then exist. In this way, a market test of ideas and effectiveness can be applied. Some organizations will deserve major support while others will have outlived their usefulness. Even if the people above ground make their decisions imperfectly, they should be able to allocate funds more rationally than a decedent six feet under will have ordained decades earlier.
支持永久基金会者认为，未来必有重大社会问题需慈善应对。我同意这点，但届时超级富豪及其家族的财富将远超今日美国水平，慈善机构可向其争取资金。这些资助者将亲身判断哪些组织最具活力与针对性，以应对当时社会问题。通过这种理念与成效的“市场测试”，资源将流向真正有效的机构。即使地面上的人决策不完美，也比地下之人几十年前预设的分配更合理。
Wills, of course, can always be rewritten, but it’s very unlikely that my thinking will change in a material way.
当然遗嘱可随时修改，但我对这一计划的思考几乎不会发生重大改变。
A few shareholders have expressed concern that sales of Berkshire by the foundations receiving shares will depress the stock. These fears are unwarranted. The annual trading volume of many stocks exceeds 100% of the outstanding shares, but nevertheless these stocks usually sell at prices approximating their intrinsic value. Berkshire also tends to sell at an appropriate price, but with annual volume that is only 15% of shares outstanding. At most, sales by the foundations receiving my shares will add three percentage points to annual trading volume, which will still leave Berkshire with a turnover ratio that is the lowest around.
有股东担忧基金会出售股份会压低股价。这种担忧并无必要。许多股票年交易量超流通股100%，但价格仍贴近内在价值。伯克希尔股价通常合理，年交易量仅占流通股15%。基金会抛售最多增加3个百分点，总交易量仍属市场最低水平。
Overall, Berkshire’s business performance will determine the price of our stock, and most of the time it will sell in a zone of reasonableness. It’s important that the foundations receive appropriate prices as they periodically sell Berkshire shares, but it’s also important that incoming shareholders don’t overpay. (See economic principle 14 on page 77.) By both our policies and shareholder communications, Charlie and I will do our best to ensure that Berkshire sells at neither a large discount nor large premium to intrinsic value.
总体而言，伯克希尔的业绩决定股价，且多数时间会维持合理区间。基金会定期减持时需获得合理价格，新股东也需避免高估支付。（详见第77页经济原则14）通过政策与股东沟通，查理和我将竭力确保股价既无大幅折价，也无过度溢价。
The existence of foundation ownership will in no way influence our board’s decisions about dividends, repurchases, or the issuance of shares. We will follow exactly the same rule that has guided us in the past: What action will be likely to deliver the best result for shareholders over time?
基金会持股的存在绝不会影响董事会对分红、回购或增发的决策。我们将延续唯一标准：何种行动能长期为股东创造最佳结果？
In last year’s report I allegorically described the Gotrocks family – a clan that owned all of America’s businesses and that counterproductively attempted to increase its investment returns by paying ever-greater commissions and fees to “helpers.” Sad to say, the “family” continued its self-destructive ways in 2006.
去年报告中，我用寓言描述了“戈特罗克斯家族”——拥有全美企业却通过向“帮手”支付高额佣金提升回报的群体。遗憾的是，这个“家族”在2006年仍延续自我毁灭模式。
In part the family persists in this folly because it harbors unrealistic expectations about obtainable returns. Sometimes these delusions are self-serving. For example, private pension plans can temporarily overstate their earnings, and public pension plans can defer the need for increased taxes, by using investment assumptions that are likely to be out of reach. Actuaries and auditors go along with these tactics, and it can be decades before the chickens come home to roost (at which point the CEO or public official who misled the world is apt to be gone).
部分原因在于家族对回报率抱有不切实际的期待，有时甚至自欺欺人。例如，私人养老金计划可通过高估投资假设虚增收益，公共养老金则借此延迟加税需求。精算师与审计员默许这种操作，直到几十年后恶果显现（届时误导世界的CEO或官员早已离任）。
Meanwhile, Wall Street’s Pied Pipers of Performance will have encouraged the futile hopes of the family. The hapless Gotrocks will be assured that they all can achieve above-average investment performance – but only by paying ever-higher fees. Call this promise the adult version of Lake Woebegon.
与此同时，华尔街的“业绩花衣魔笛手”助长了家族的徒劳希望。不幸的戈特罗克斯家族被灌输：只要支付更高费用，人人皆可跑赢市场——这简直是成年人版的“沃尔格林之湖”（虚构小镇中“所有孩子都高于平均水平”）。
In 2006, promises and fees hit new highs. A flood of money went from institutional investors to the 2-and-20 crowd. For those innocent of this arrangement, let me explain: It’s a lopsided system whereby 2% of your principal is paid each year to the manager even if he accomplishes nothing – or, for that matter, loses you a bundle – and, additionally, 20% of your profit is paid to him if he succeeds, even if his success is due simply to a rising tide.
2006年，承诺与费用再创新高。机构投资者资金如潮水般涌向“2%管理费+20%业绩提成”群体。对不了解该模式者说明：这是一个不对称系统——无论经理是否赚钱（甚至亏钱），每年收取2%本金费用；若赚钱，再抽成20%利润，哪怕收益仅来自市场普涨。例如，某经理年化10%收益，扣除2%固定费用及20%利润提成后，投资者仅获6.4%回报。若基金规模30亿美元，经理即可坐收1.08亿美元，而指数基金可能提供15%回报并收取微薄费用。
For example, a manager who achieves a gross return of 10% in a year will keep 3.6 percentage points – two points off the top plus 20% of the residual 8 points – leaving only 6.4 percentage points for his investors. On a $3 billion fund, this 6.4% net “performance” will deliver the manager a cool $108 million. He will receive this bonanza even though an index fund might have returned 15% to investors in the same period and charged them only a token fee.
例如，某经理实现10%年化收益，收取2%固定费用及20%超额利润（即3.6个百分点），投资者仅得6.4%。若基金规模30亿美元，经理可获1.08亿美元。即使指数基金同期提供15%回报仅收微量费用，他仍坐享暴利。
The inexorable math of this grotesque arrangement is certain to make the Gotrocks family poorer over time than it would have been had it never heard of these “hyper-helpers.” Even so, the 2-and-20 action spreads. Its effects bring to mind the old adage: When someone with experience proposes a deal to someone with money, too often the fellow with money ends up with the experience, and the fellow with experience ends up with the money.
这种荒谬安排的数学逻辑注定会让“戈特罗克斯家族”随着时间推移变得比从未接触“超级帮手”更贫穷。然而，“2%管理费+20%提成”的模式仍在蔓延。其后果印证了一句老话：当有经验的人向有钱人提议交易时，往往有钱人最终获得经验，而有经验的人获得金钱。
# Let me end this section by telling you about one of the good guys of Wall Street
# 最后让我讲述一位华尔街真正的“好人”
Let me end this section by telling you about one of the good guys of Wall Street, my long-time friend Walter Schloss, who last year turned 90. From 1956 to 2002, Walter managed a remarkably successful investment partnership, from which he took not a dime unless his investors made money. My admiration for Walter, it should be noted, is not based on hindsight. A full fifty years ago, Walter was my sole recommendation to a St. Louis family who wanted an honest and able investment manager.
结束本节前，请允许我介绍一位华尔街真正的“好人”——我多年挚友沃尔特·施洛斯（Walter Schloss）。他去年迎来90岁生日。1956至2002年间，沃尔特管理的投资合伙企业取得卓越成绩，但若投资者未盈利，他分文不取。需强调的是，我对他的钦佩并非事后诸葛亮。早在50年前，当一个圣路易斯家族寻求诚实能干的基金经理时，沃尔特是我唯一的推荐人选。
Walter did not go to business school, or for that matter, college. His office contained one file cabinet in 1956; the number mushroomed to four by 2002. Walter worked without a secretary, clerk or bookkeeper, his only associate being his son, Edwin, a graduate of the North Carolina School of the Arts. Walter and Edwin never came within a mile of inside information. Indeed, they used “outside” information only sparingly, generally selecting securities by certain simple statistical methods Walter learned while working for Ben Graham. When Walter and Edwin were asked in 1989 by Outstanding Investors Digest, “How would you summarize your approach?” Edwin replied, “We try to buy stocks cheap.” So much for Modern Portfolio Theory, technical analysis, macroeconomic thoughts and complex algorithms.
沃尔特未上过商学院，甚至未读过大学。1956年办公室只有一个文件柜，到2002年增至四个。他没有秘书、文员或会计，唯一搭档是儿子埃德温（Edwin），后者毕业于北卡罗来纳艺术学院。沃尔特父子从未接触内幕信息，甚至极少依赖外部信息，而是运用沃尔特在格雷厄姆手下工作时学到的简单统计方法选股。1989年《杰出投资者文摘》问及投资哲学时，埃德温回答：“我们只买便宜的股票。”现代投资组合理论、技术分析、宏观经济预测与复杂算法在他们面前黯然失色。
Following a strategy that involved no real risk – defined as permanent loss of capital – Walter produced results over his 47 partnership years that dramatically surpassed those of the S&P 500. It’s particularly noteworthy that he built this record by investing in about 1,000 securities, mostly of a lackluster type. A few big winners did not account for his success. It’s safe to say that had millions of investment managers made trades by a) drawing stock names from a hat; b) purchasing these stocks in comparable amounts when Walter made a purchase; and then c) selling when Walter sold his pick, the luckiest of them would not have come close to equaling his record. There is simply no possibility that what Walter achieved over 47 years was due to chance.
沃尔特的投资策略毫无真实风险（即资本永久损失），却在47年合伙期间大幅跑赢标普500指数。更值得注意的是，他的记录来自投资约1,000只平庸股票，少数大赢家并非成功关键。可以肯定的是，若数百万基金经理通过以下方式交易：a) 闭眼抽股票代码；b) 沃尔特买入时同步买入；c) 沃尔特卖出时卖出，最幸运者也无法匹敌他的记录。沃尔特47年的成绩绝非运气使然。
I first publicly discussed Walter’s remarkable record in 1984. At that time “efficient market theory” (EMT) was the centerpiece of investment instruction at most major business schools. This theory, as then most commonly taught, held that the price of any stock at any moment is not demonstrably mispriced, which means that no investor can be expected to overperform the stock market averages using only publicly-available information (though some will do so by luck). When I talked about Walter 23 years ago, his record forcefully contradicted this dogma.
我于1984年首次公开讨论沃尔特的惊人记录。当时多数商学院将“有效市场理论”（EMT）奉为圭臬。该理论认为，任何股票价格在任何时刻均不存在明显错误定价，因此投资者无法仅凭公开信息跑赢市场（除非运气好）。23年前提及沃尔特时，他的记录直接挑战了这一教条。
And what did members of the academic community do when they were exposed to this new and important evidence? Unfortunately, they reacted in all-too-human fashion: Rather than opening their minds, they closed their eyes. To my knowledge no business school teaching EMT made any attempt to study Walter’s performance and what it meant for the school’s cherished theory.
学术界面对这一新证据时作何反应？遗憾的是，他们选择了人类最本能的应对：非但未开放思维，反而闭目塞听。据我所知，没有一所教授EMT的商学院研究沃尔特的业绩及其对理论的冲击。
Instead, the faculties of the schools went merrily on their way presenting EMT as having the certainty of scripture. Typically, a finance instructor who had the nerve to question EMT had about as much chance of major promotion as Galileo had of being named Pope.
相反，各校教师继续将EMT当作圣经宣讲。质疑EMT的金融讲师获得晋升的机会，堪比伽利略被选为教皇的可能性。
Tens of thousands of students were therefore sent out into life believing that on every day the price of every stock was “right” (or, more accurately, not demonstrably wrong) and that attempts to evaluate businesses – that is, stocks – were useless. Walter meanwhile went on overperforming, his job made easier by the misguided instructions that had been given to those young minds. After all, if you are in the shipping business, it’s helpful to have all of your potential competitors be taught that the earth is flat.
数十万学生因此步入社会时坚信：每天所有股价都是“正确”的（更准确地说，无法证明错误），分析企业（即股票）纯属徒劳。与此同时，沃尔特持续跑赢市场，而年轻一代接受的错误教导让他的工作更轻松。毕竟，若你从事航海业，对手们被灌输“地平说”显然是巨大优势。
Maybe it was a good thing for his investors that Walter didn’t go to college.
或许对沃尔特的投资者而言，他未上过大学反而是件好事。
# The Annual Meeting (年度股东大会)
Our meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 5th. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
今年股东大会将于5月5日（星期六）举行。一如往年，奎斯特中心（Qwest Center）于上午7点开放入场，8:30播放新的伯克希尔纪录片。9:30开始问答环节（中午在展馆用餐休息），持续至下午3点。短暂休会后，查理和我将于3:15召开正式股东大会。若您需提前离场，请趁查理发言时离开。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300 square foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, the 24,000 people who came to the meeting did their part, and almost every location racked up record sales. But records are made to be broken, and I know you can do better.
当然，最佳离场理由是购物。我们将把会议区旁194,300平方英尺的展厅填满伯克希尔子公司产品。去年24,000名与会者合力创下销售纪录。但纪录就是用来打破的，我相信你们能做到更好。
This year we will again showcase a Clayton home (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings and NFM furniture). You will find that the home, priced at $139,900, delivers excellent value. Last year, a helper at the Qwest bought one of two homes on display well before we opened the doors to shareholders. Flanking the Clayton home on the exhibition floor this year will be an RV and pontoon boat from Forest River.
今年展厅将再次展示克莱顿房屋（配备Acme砖块、肖氏地毯、约翰·马尼维尔保温材料、MiTek紧固件、Carefree遮阳篷与NFM家具），售价139,900美元的房屋物超所值。去年展会正式开幕前，一名奎斯特中心员工已抢先购买两套展示房屋之一。今年克莱顿房屋两侧将展出森林河公司的房车与浮桥船。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 45 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can. And while you’re at it, sign up for the new GEICO credit card. It’s the one I now use (sparingly, of course).
盖可将在展会设摊位，由全国顶尖顾问驻守，为您即时提供车险报价。大多数州（50个司法管辖区中有45个）允许股东专属折扣（通常为8%）。（补充说明：若您符合其他折扣条件，如特定群体优惠，折扣不可叠加。）携带现有保单详情前来咨询，我确信至少50%的股东能节省开支。顺便注册盖可新信用卡（本人也在使用，当然用得节制）。
On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane. And take all the hair gel that you wish on board with you.
星期六奥马哈机场将照例展出尼特杰机队。请先到奎斯特中心尼特杰展位了解参观安排。您可以乘大巴来，驾驶新飞机走。登机时带多少发胶都随您便。
In the Bookworm’s corner of our bazaar, there will be about 25 books and DVDs – all discounted – led again by Poor Charlie’s Almanack. (One hapless soul last year asked Charlie what he should do if he didn’t enjoy the book. Back came a Mungerism: “No problem – just give it to someone more intelligent.”) We’ve added a few titles this year. Among them are Seeking Wisdom: From Darwin to Munger by Peter Bevelin, a long-time Swedish shareholder of Berkshire, and Fred Schwed’s classic, Where are the Customers’ Yachts? This book was first published in 1940 and is now in its 4th edition. The funniest book ever written about investing, it lightly delivers many truly important messages on the subject.
“书虫角”将提供约25种折扣书籍与DVD，主角仍是《查理·芒格的箴言录》（Poor Charlie’s Almanack）。（去年有观众问查理，若自己不喜欢这本书该怎么办。查理经典回应：“没问题，送给更聪明的人。”）今年新增书籍包括：瑞典股东彼得·贝维林（Peter Bevelin）所著《从达尔文到芒格的智慧》（Seeking Wisdom），以及弗雷德·施韦德（Fred Schwed）的经典之作《客户的游艇在哪里？》（Where are the Customers’ Yachts?）。后者1940年初版，现为第四版。这本史上最幽默的投资书籍，以轻松笔触传递深刻洞见。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.
随本报告附上的委托材料附件详细说明参会凭证获取方式。关于机票、酒店与租车预订，我们再次与美国运通（电话800-799-6634）合作提供特别协助。卡罗尔·佩德森（Carol Pedersen）每年为此尽心尽力，特此致谢。酒店房间虽紧张，但与卡罗尔合作定能解决。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM ten years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $30 million in 2006. I get goose bumps just thinking about this volume.
位于道奇与太平洋街之间第72大道占地77英亩的内布拉斯加家具商城（NFM）将再次推出“伯克希尔周末”折扣。这项活动始于十年前，销售额始于1997年530万美元，至2006年已达3,000万美元。光是想到这个数字，我就起鸡皮疙瘩。