1992巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. (伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司)
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our per-share book value increased 20.3% during 1992. Over the last 28 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $7,745, or at a rate of 23.6% compounded annually.
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东：
1992 年，我们每股账面价值增长了 20.3%。在过去 28 年中（即现任管理层接管以来），账面价值从每股 $19 增长至 $7,745，年均复合增长率达 23.6%。
During the year, Berkshire's net worth increased by $1.52 billion. More than 98% of this gain came from earnings and appreciation of portfolio securities, with the remainder coming from the issuance of new stock. These shares were issued as a result of our calling our convertible debentures for redemption on January 4, 1993, and of some holders electing to receive common shares rather than the cash that was their alternative. Most holders of the debentures who converted into common waited until January to do it, but a few made the move in December and therefore received shares in 1992. To sum up what happened to the $476 million of bonds we had outstanding: $25 million were converted into shares before yearend; $46 million were converted in January; and $405 million were redeemed for cash. The conversions were made at $11,719 per share, so altogether we issued 6,106 shares.
这一年，伯克希尔的净资产增加了 15.2 亿美元。其中超过 98% 的收益来自投资组合证券的盈利和增值，其余则来自于新股票的发行。这些股份的发行是由于我们于 1993 年 1 月 4 日宣布赎回可转换债券所致，部分持有人选择以普通股而非现金形式兑换。大多数持有人等到一月份才进行兑换，但有少数人在十二月完成兑换，因此在 1992 年收到了股份。总结一下我们未偿还的 4.76 亿美元债券的情况：2,500 万美元债券在年底之前被转换为股份；4,600 万美元债券在一月份被转换；而 4.05 亿美元则以现金赎回。转换价格为每股 11,719 美元，总共我们发行了 6,106 股。
Berkshire now has 1,152,547 shares outstanding. That compares, you will be interested to know, to 1,137,778 shares outstanding on October 1, 1964, the beginning of the fiscal year during which Buffett Partnership, Ltd. acquired control of the company.
目前，伯克希尔流通股总数为 1,152,547 股。值得一提的是，1964 年 10 月 1 日（即巴菲特合伙公司取得公司控制权的财年开始时）的流通股总数为 1,137,778 股。
We have a firm policy about issuing shares of Berkshire, doing so only when we receive as much value as we give. Equal value, however, has not been easy to obtain, since we have always valued our shares highly. So be it: We wish to increase Berkshire's size only when doing that also increases the wealth of its owners.
我们在发行伯克希尔股份方面有一项坚定政策，只有在我们所获得的价值与所付出的一样多时才会进行发行。然而，要获得等值并不容易，因为我们一直对自己的股票给予高度评价。就是这样：我们只在扩大公司规模的同时也能增加其所有者财富的情况下才愿意这么做。
Those two objectives do not necessarily go hand-in-hand as an amusing but value-destroying experience in our past illustrates. On that occasion, we had a significant investment in a bank whose management was hell-bent on expansion. (Aren't they all?) When our bank wooed a smaller bank, its owner demanded a stock swap on a basis that valued the acquiree's net worth and earning power at over twice that of the acquirer's. Our management - visibly in heat - quickly capitulated. The owner of the acquiree then insisted on one other condition: "You must promise me," he said in effect, "that once our merger is done and I have become a major shareholder, you'll never again make a deal this dumb."
这两个目标未必能同时实现，过去一次有趣但破坏价值的经历就说明了这一点。当时，我们对一家银行进行了重大投资，而该银行管理层热衷于扩张。（难道不都是这样吗？）当我们的银行试图收购一家较小的银行时，对方业主要求以股票交换的方式进行交易，其估值基础是将被收购方的净资产和盈利能力估价为收购方的两倍以上。我们的管理层（显然情绪高涨）迅速让步。收购完成后，对方业主又提出一个附加条件：“你必须向我承诺，”他实际上是在说，“一旦合并完成并且我成为主要股东后，你们永远不要再做如此愚蠢的交易。”
You will remember that our goal is to increase our per-share intrinsic value - for which our book value is a conservative, but useful, proxy - at a 15% annual rate. This objective, however, cannot be attained in a smooth manner. Smoothness is particularly elusive because of the accounting rules that apply to the common stocks owned by our insurance companies, whose portfolios represent a high proportion of Berkshire's net worth. Since 1979, generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) have required that these securities be valued at their market prices (less an adjustment for tax on any net unrealized appreciation) rather than at the lower of cost or market. Run-of-the-mill fluctuations in equity prices therefore cause our annual results to gyrate, especially in comparison to those of the typical industrial company.
您会记得，我们的目标是以每年 15% 的速度提升每股内在价值——而账面价值虽然是一个保守但有用的替代指标。然而，这一目标不可能平稳达成。尤其困难的是，适用于我们保险公司持有的普通股的会计规则造成了波动性。这些保险公司的投资组合占伯克希尔净资产的很大比例。自 1979 年以来，通用会计准则（GAAP）要求这些证券按市场价格计价（扣除对未实现增值部分的税收调整），而不是采用成本与市价孰低法。因此，股权价格的日常波动导致我们的年度业绩剧烈起伏，尤其是与典型的工业企业相比更是如此。
To illustrate just how volatile our progress has been - and to indicate the impact that market movements have on short-term results - we show on the facing page our annual change in per-share net worth and compare it with the annual results (including dividends) of the S&P 500.
为了说明我们的表现有多么波动——以及市场变动如何影响短期结果——我们在下一页展示了每股净值的年度变化，并将其与标准普尔 500 指数（包括分红）的年度回报率进行了比较。
You should keep at least three points in mind as you evaluate this data. The first point concerns the many businesses we operate whose annual earnings are unaffected by changes in stock market valuations. The impact of these businesses on both our absolute and relative performance has changed over the years.
评估这些数据时，请至少记住三个要点。第一点涉及我们经营的许多业务，它们的年度盈利不受股市估值变化的影响。多年来，这些业务对我们绝对表现和相对表现的影响发生了变化。
Early on, returns from our textile operation, which then represented a significant portion of our net worth, were a major drag on performance, averaging far less than would have been the case if the money invested in that business had instead been invested in the S&P 500. In more recent years, as we assembled our collection of exceptional businesses run by equally exceptional managers, the returns from our operating businesses have been high - usually well in excess of the returns achieved by the S&P.
早期，我们的纺织业务曾是我们净值的重要组成部分，但其回报严重拖累了整体表现，远低于如果将资金投入标普 500 所能获得的平均回报。近年来，随着我们聚集了一批由杰出管理者运营的卓越企业，我们的运营业务回报变得很高——通常远远超过标普 500 的回报。
A second important factor to consider - and one that significantly hurts our relative performance - is that both the income and capital gains from our securities are burdened by a substantial corporate tax liability whereas the S&P returns are pre-tax. To comprehend the damage, imagine that Berkshire had owned nothing other than the S&P index during the 28-year period covered. In that case, the tax bite would have caused our corporate performance to be appreciably below the record shown in the table for the S&P. Under present tax laws, a gain for the S&P of 18% delivers a corporate holder of that index a return well short of 13%. And this problem would be intensified if corporate tax rates were to rise. This is a structural disadvantage we simply have to live with; there is no antidote for it.
第二个重要考虑因素——也是显著损害我们相对表现的因素——是我们的证券投资所得收入和资本利得都需承担重大的公司税负担，而标普 500 的回报则是税前的。要理解这种损害的程度，可以设想伯克希尔在那 28 年间仅持有标普 500 指数。在这种情况下，税收负担将使我们的公司业绩明显低于表格中标普 500 所显示的记录。根据现行税法，标普 500 18% 的回报对于公司持有人来说，实际回报还不到 13%。如果公司税率上升，这个问题将进一步加剧。这是我们不得不接受的结构性劣势，没有解决办法。
The third point incorporates two predictions: Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I are virtually certain that the return over the next decade from an investment in the S&P index will be far less than that of the past decade, and we are dead certain that the drag exerted by Berkshire's expanding capital base will substantially reduce our historical advantage relative to the index.
第三点包含两个预测：查理·芒格（伯克希尔副主席兼我的合伙人）和我都几乎可以确定，未来十年投资于标普 500 指数的回报将远低于过去十年；我们完全确信，伯克希尔不断扩大的资本基础所带来的拖累将大幅削弱我们相对于指数的历史优势。
Making the first prediction goes somewhat against our grain: We've long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to make fortune tellers look good. Even now, Charlie and I continue to believe that short-term market forecasts are poison and should be kept locked up in a safe place, away from children and also from grown-ups who behave in the market like children. However, it is clear that stocks cannot forever overperform their underlying businesses, as they have so dramatically done for some time, and that fact makes us quite confident of our forecast that the rewards from investing in stocks over the next decade will be significantly smaller than they were in the last. Our second conclusion - that an increased capital base will act as an anchor on our relative performance - seems incontestable. The only open question is whether we can drag the anchor along at some tolerable, though slowed, pace.
做出第一个预测在某种程度上违背我们的习惯：我们长期以来认为，股票预测者的唯一价值就是让算命先生看起来更靠谱。即使到现在，查理和我仍然坚信短期市场预测是有害的毒药，应该锁起来，远离儿童，也远离那些在市场上行为如同儿童的成年人。然而，很明显，股票不可能永远超越其基本面业务的表现，正如它们在过去一段时间内那样戏剧性地表现。基于这个事实，我们非常有信心地预测，未来十年投资股票的回报将显著低于上一个十年。我们的第二个结论——即不断扩大的资本基础将成为我们相对表现的“锚”——似乎是无可争议的。唯一的开放问题是，我们是否能够以某种可容忍、尽管缓慢的速度拖着这个“锚”前进。
We will continue to experience considerable volatility in our annual results. That's assured by the general volatility of the stock market, by the concentration of our equity holdings in just a few companies, and by certain business decisions we have made, most especially our move to commit large resources to super-catastrophe insurance. We not only accept this volatility but welcome it: A tolerance for short-term swings improves our long-term prospects. In baseball lingo, our performance yardstick is slugging percentage, not batting average.
我们将继续经历显著的年度业绩波动。这由整个股市的普遍波动性、我们股权投资集中于少数几家公司，以及我们所做的某些商业决策（特别是我们对超级巨灾保险的大规模资源投入）所决定。我们不仅接受这种波动性，而且欢迎它：对短期波动的容忍度提高了我们的长期前景。用棒球术语来说，我们的绩效衡量标准是打击率中的长打率，而不是击球率。
# The Salomon Interlude (所罗门插曲)
Last June, I stepped down as Interim Chairman of Salomon Inc after ten months in the job. You can tell from Berkshire's 1991-92 results that the company didn't miss me while I was gone. But the reverse isn't true: I missed Berkshire and am delighted to be back full-time. There is no job in the world that is more fun than running Berkshire and I count myself lucky to be where I am.
去年六月，在担任所罗门公司临时董事长十个月后，我正式卸任。从伯克希尔1991至1992年的业绩来看，很明显我在不在对公司的运营影响不大。但对我而言则并非如此：我很想念伯克希尔，并很高兴能全职回归。世界上没有任何工作比经营伯克希尔更有乐趣，我为自己目前的处境感到幸运。
The Salomon post, though far from fun, was interesting and worthwhile: In Fortune's annual survey of America's Most Admired Corporations, conducted last September, Salomon ranked second among 311 companies in the degree to which it improved its reputation. Additionally, Salomon Brothers, the securities subsidiary of Salomon Inc, reported record pre-tax earnings last year - 34% above the previous high.
尽管这份所罗门的工作远谈不上有趣，但却很有意义。在《财富》杂志去年九月发布的“美国最受尊敬企业”年度调查中，所罗门公司在企业声誉提升方面排名第二，仅次于311家公司中的其他领先者。此外，所罗门兄弟公司（Salomon Inc 的证券子公司）去年报告了创纪录的税前收益——比此前最高水平高出34%。
Many people helped in the resolution of Salomon's problems and the righting of the firm, but a few clearly deserve special mention. It is no exaggeration to say that without the combined efforts of Salomon executives Deryck Maughan, Bob Denham, Don Howard, and John Macfarlane, the firm very probably would not have survived. In their work, these men were tireless, effective, supportive and selfless, and I will forever be grateful to them.
许多人在解决所罗门问题和重建公司过程中提供了帮助，但有几位特别值得一提。毫不夸张地说，如果没有所罗门高管Deryck Maughan、Bob Denham、Don Howard 和 John Macfarlane的共同努力，公司很可能无法生存下来。他们在工作中表现出色，始终勤勉尽责、高效协作、积极支持并无私奉献，我对他们的贡献将永怀感激。
Salomon's lead lawyer in its Government matters, Ron Olson of Munger, Tolles & Olson, was also key to our success in getting through this trouble. The firm's problems were not only severe, but complex. At least five authorities - the SEC, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the U.S. Treasury, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice - had important concerns about Salomon. If we were to resolve our problems in a coordinated and prompt manner, we needed a lawyer with exceptional legal, business and human skills. Ron had them all.
在政府事务方面，所罗门的首席律师Ron Olson（来自Munger, Tolles & Olson律师事务所）也在我们度过危机的过程中起到了关键作用。所罗门面临的问题不仅严重，而且复杂。至少有五个机构——证券交易委员会（SEC）、纽约联邦储备银行、美国财政部、纽约南区联邦检察官办公室以及司法部反垄断司——都对所罗门表达了重要关切。如果我们希望以协调且迅速的方式解决问题，就需要一位具备卓越法律能力、商业洞察力和人际沟通技巧的律师。Ron完全具备这些素质。
# Acquisitions (并购活动)
Of all our activities at Berkshire, the most exhilarating for Charlie and me is the acquisition of a business with excellent economic characteristics and a management that we like, trust and admire. Such acquisitions are not easy to make but we look for them constantly. In the search, we adopt the same attitude one might find appropriate in looking for a spouse: It pays to be active, interested and open-minded, but it does not pay to be in a hurry.
在伯克希尔的所有业务活动中，查理和我最兴奋的就是收购一家具有优秀经济特征的企业，并由我们喜欢、信任和钦佩的管理层运营。这类交易并不容易达成，但我们始终在积极寻找机会。在寻找过程中，我们采取的态度就像人们寻找伴侣一样：保持活跃、有兴趣和开放的心态是有益的，但急于求成却适得其反。
In the past, I've observed that many acquisition-hungry managers were apparently mesmerized by their childhood reading of the story about the frog-kissing princess. Remembering her success, they pay dearly for the right to kiss corporate toads, expecting wondrous transfigurations. Initially, disappointing results only deepen their desire to round up new toads. ("Fanaticism," said Santyana, "consists of redoubling your effort when you've forgotten your aim.") Ultimately, even the most optimistic manager must face reality. Standing knee-deep in unresponsive toads, he then announces an enormous "restructuring" charge. In this corporate equivalent of a Head Start program, the CEO receives the education but the stockholders pay the tuition.
过去，我发现许多热衷于并购的管理者似乎被童年时读过的“亲吻青蛙公主”的故事迷住了。他们记住了公主的成功，于是不惜重金换取亲吻“公司癞蛤蟆”的权利，期望出现奇迹般的转变。起初，令人失望的结果只会加深他们寻找更多“癞蛤蟆”的欲望。（正如桑塔亚那所说：“狂热主义就是当你忘记了目标时仍加倍努力。”）最终，即使是再乐观的管理者也必须面对现实。当他们陷入一堆毫无反应的“癞蛤蟆”之中时，只能宣布巨额的“重组”费用。在这种企业版的“早期教育计划”中，CEO得到了教训，而股东们却承担了代价。
In my early days as a manager I, too, dated a few toads. They were cheap dates - I've never been much of a sport - but my results matched those of acquirers who courted higher-priced toads. I kissed and they croaked.
在我早期管理生涯中，我也曾“约会”过几个“癞蛤蟆”。虽然花费不高——我从来不是个爱冒险的人——但我的结果与那些追求高价“癞蛤蟆”的买家如出一辙。我亲吻它们，它们却死了。
After several failures of this type, I finally remembered some useful advice I once got from a golf pro (who, like all pros who have had anything to do with my game, wishes to remain anonymous). Said the pro: "Practice doesn't make perfect; practice makes permanent." And thereafter I revised my strategy and tried to buy good businesses at fair prices rather than fair businesses at good prices.
经历了几次这样的失败之后，我想起了一位高尔夫教练曾经给我的一条宝贵建议（这位教练像所有与我球技有关的专业人士一样，希望保持匿名）。他说：“练习不会让你完美，练习会让你固化。”此后，我调整了自己的策略，转而尝试以合理价格购买优质企业，而不是以低价购买平庸企业。
Last year, in December, we made an acquisition that is a prototype of what we now look for. The purchase was 82% of Central States Indemnity, an insurer that makes monthly payments for credit-card holders who are unable themselves to pay because they have become disabled or unemployed. Currently the company's annual premiums are about $90 million and profits about $10 million. Central States is based in Omaha and managed by Bill Kizer, a friend of mine for over 35 years. The Kizer family - which includes sons Bill, Dick and John - retains 18% ownership of the business and will continue to run things just as it has in the past. We could not be associated with better people.
去年十二月，我们完成了一笔符合当前投资标准的典型案例式收购：购入Central States Indemnity 82%的股份。这是一家保险公司，为因残疾或失业而无力支付信用卡账单的持卡人提供每月付款服务。目前该公司的年保费收入约为9,000万美元，利润约1,000万美元。Central States总部位于奥马哈，由我相识超过35年的朋友Bill Kizer管理。Kizer家族（包括Bill的儿子Dick和John）保留18%的股权，并将继续按照以往的方式经营。我们不可能找到更优秀的合作伙伴。
Coincidentally, this latest acquisition has much in common with our first, made 26 years ago. At that time, we purchased another Omaha insurer, National Indemnity Company (along with a small sister company) from Jack Ringwalt, another long-time friend. Jack had built the business from scratch and, as was the case with Bill Kizer, thought of me when he wished to sell. (Jack's comment at the time: "If I don't sell the company, my executor will, and I'd rather pick the home for it.") National Indemnity was an outstanding business when we bought it and continued to be under Jack's management. Hollywood has had good luck with sequels; I believe we, too, will.
巧合的是，这笔最新的收购与我们26年前完成的第一笔收购有很多相似之处。当时我们从另一位老友Jack Ringwalt手中买下了另一家奥马哈保险公司National Indemnity Company（连同一家小附属公司）。Jack白手起家创办了这家公司，并在想要出售时想到了我（正如Bill Kizer这次所做的那样）。（Jack当时的评论是：“如果我不卖公司，执行人也会卖，我宁愿亲自为它挑选一个归宿。”）我们在收购时，National Indemnity已是一家非常出色的企业，并在其管理下持续发展。好莱坞在续集上运气不错；我相信我们也能做到。
Berkshire's acquisition criteria are described on page 23. Beyond purchases made by the parent company, however, our subsidiaries sometimes make small "add-on" acquisitions that extend their product lines or distribution capabilities. In this manner, we enlarge the domain of managers we already know to be outstanding - and that's a low-risk and high-return proposition. We made five acquisitions of this type in 1992, and one was not so small: At yearend, H. H. Brown purchased Lowell Shoe Company, a business with $90 million in sales that makes Nursemates, a leading line of shoes for nurses, and other kinds of shoes as well. Our operating managers will continue to look for add-on opportunities, and we would expect these to contribute modestly to Berkshire's value in the future.
伯克希尔的并购标准详见第23页。除了母公司进行的收购外，我们的子公司有时还会进行一些小型“补充型”收购，用于扩展产品线或分销能力。通过这种方式，我们扩大了已知杰出管理者的能力范围——这是一种低风险、高回报的投资方式。1992年，我们完成了五笔此类交易，其中一笔规模不小：年底时，H.H. Brown收购了Lowell鞋业公司，该公司年销售额达9,000万美元，主打产品Nursemates是护士专用鞋领域的领先品牌，同时也生产其他类型的鞋子。我们的运营经理将继续寻找这类补充型机会，我们预计这些交易未来将适度提升伯克希尔的价值。
Then again, a trend has emerged that may make further acquisitions difficult. The parent company made one purchase in 1991, buying H. H. Brown, which is run by Frank Rooney, who has eight children. In 1992 our only deal was with Bill Kizer, father of nine. It won't be easy to keep this string going in 1993.
然而，一种趋势正在显现，可能会使未来的收购变得更加困难。母公司1991年仅完成一笔收购，即收购由Frank Rooney经营的H.H. Brown，他有八个孩子。1992年我们也只完成了一笔交易，对象是拥有九个孩子的Bill Kizer。要在1993年延续这一势头恐怕并不容易。
# Sources of Reported Earnings (报告收益的来源)
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing GAAP, which requires purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
以下表格展示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在本展示中，商誉摊销及其他重大购并价格会计调整并未直接计入相关业务实体，而是汇总后单独列出。这种做法可以让您看到我们的业务收益，就如同我们未曾收购这些企业时所呈现的一样。我在过去的报告中曾解释过，我们认为这种呈现方式比使用通用会计准则（GAAP）更为有用，因为GAAP要求对每个业务单位分别进行购并价格调整。当然，我们在表格中显示的总净收益与经审计财务报表中的GAAP总计完全一致。
# Operating Earnings: (运营收益：)
| 项目 | Pre-Tax Earnings 1992 (税前收益) | Pre-Tax Earnings 1991 | Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) 1992 (税后及少数股东权益后的净收益) | Net Earnings 1991 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 保险集团 | ||||
| - 承保损失 | $(108,961) | $(119,593) | $ (71,141) | $ (77,229) |
| - 净投资收益 | 355,067 | 331,846 | 305,763 | 285,173 |
| H.H. Brown (1991年7月1日收购) | 27,883 | 13,616 | 17,340 | 8,611 |
| 布法罗新闻 | 47,863 | 37,113 | 28,163 | 21,841 |
| Fechheimer | 13,698 | 12,947 | 7,267 | 6,843 |
| Kirby | 35,653 | 35,726 | 22,795 | 22,555 |
| 内布拉斯加家具商场 | 17,110 | 14,384 | 8,072 | 6,993 |
| Scott Fetzer 制造业 | 31,954 | 26,123 | 19,883 | 15,901 |
| See’s Candies | 42,357 | 42,390 | 25,501 | 25,575 |
| Wesco（除保险外） | 15,153 | 12,230 | 9,195 | 8,777 |
| World Book | 29,044 | 22,483 | 19,503 | 15,487 |
| 商誉摊销 | (4,702) | (4,113) | (4,687) | (4,098) |
| 其他购并调整项 | (7,385) | (6,021) | (8,383) | (7,019) |
| 利息支出* | (98,643) | (89,250) | (62,899) | (57,165) |
| 股东指定捐赠 | (7,634) | (6,772) | (4,913) | (4,388) |
| 其他收入/支出 | 72,223 | 77,399 | 36,267 | 47,896 |
| 运营收益合计 | $460,680 | $400,508 | $347,726 | $315,753 |
*注：不包括Scott Fetzer金融集团和互助储蓄贷款公司的利息支出。包含1992年2,250万美元和1991年570万美元用于提前赎回债务的溢价支付。
A large amount of additional information about these businesses is given on pages 37-47, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. Our goal is to give you all of the financial information that Charlie and I consider significant in making our own evaluation of Berkshire.
关于这些企业的更多详细信息请参见第37至47页，在那里您也可以找到按GAAP标准报告的分部收益。我们的目标是向您提供查理和我认为在评估伯克希尔时具有重要意义的所有财务信息。
# "Look-Through" Earnings ("穿透式"收益)
We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. Though no single figure can be perfect, we believe that the look-through number more accurately portrays the earnings of Berkshire than does the GAAP number.
我们之前讨论过“穿透式”收益，它由以下三部分组成：(1) 上表中报告的运营收益；(2) 按GAAP会计原则未反映在我们利润中的主要被投资企业的留存运营收益；(3) 如果这些留存收益被分配给伯克希尔时需缴纳的潜在税费预留。虽然没有一个单一数字可以完美反映真实情况，但我们认为“穿透式”收益比GAAP数据更能准确体现伯克希尔的真实收益水平。
I've told you that over time look-through earnings must increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic business value is to grow at that rate. Our look-through earnings in 1992 were $604 million, and they will need to grow to more than $1.8 billion by the year 2000 if we are to meet that 15% goal. For us to get there, our operating subsidiaries and investees must deliver excellent performances, and we must exercise some skill in capital allocation as well.
我曾告诉各位，如果我们内在的商业价值要以每年约15%的速度增长，“穿透式”收益也必须同步增长。1992年我们的“穿透式”收益为6.04亿美元，若要在2000年前实现这一目标，则需要在2000年前增长至超过18亿美元。为此，我们的运营子公司和被投资企业必须表现出色，同时我们也必须在资本配置方面展现一定技巧。
We cannot promise to achieve the $1.8 billion target. Indeed, we may not even come close to it. But it does guide our decision-making: When we allocate capital today, we are thinking about what will maximize look-through earnings in 2000.
我们无法承诺一定能达到18亿美元的目标，甚至可能远远达不到。但这个目标确实指导着我们的决策：今天在进行资本配置时，我们思考的是如何在2000年最大化“穿透式”收益。
We do not, however, see this long-term focus as eliminating the need for us to achieve decent short-term results as well. After all, we were thinking long-range thoughts five or ten years ago, and the moves we made then should now be paying off. If plantings made confidently are repeatedly followed by disappointing harvests, something is wrong with the farmer. (Or perhaps with the farm: Investors should understand that for certain companies, and even for some industries, there simply is no good long-term strategy.)
然而，我们并不认为长期聚焦可以忽视短期良好业绩的需求。毕竟，五到十年前我们就已具备长远眼光，并且当时的决策现在应该开始产生回报。如果信心满满的播种总是带来令人失望的收获，那一定是农民出了问题。（或者农场本身有问题：投资者应理解，某些公司、甚至某些行业，其实根本不存在良好的长期战略。）
Just as you should be suspicious of managers who pump up short-term earnings by accounting maneuvers, asset sales and the like, so also should you be suspicious of those managers who fail to deliver for extended periods and blame it on their long-term focus. (Even Alice, after listening to the Queen lecture her about "jam tomorrow," finally insisted, "It must come sometimes to jam today.")
正如您应警惕那些通过会计操纵、资产出售等手段人为提升短期收益的管理者一样，您也应对那些长期表现不佳却将其归咎于长期战略的管理者保持怀疑态度。（就像爱丽丝听完红心皇后讲述“明天才有果酱”的道理后终于坚持：“总得有时来点今天的果酱吧。”）
The following table shows you how we calculate look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 8, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
以下表格展示了我们如何计算“穿透式”收益，但我必须提醒您，这些数字必然是非常粗略的估计。（这些被投资企业支付给我们的股息已计入第8页运营收益分类中，主要体现在“保险集团：净投资收益”项下。）
# Look-Through Earnings Calculation (“穿透式”收益计算)
| 被投资企业 | 1992年持股比例 | 1991年持股比例 | 1992年未分配运营收益（百万美元） | 1991年未分配运营收益 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Cities/ABC Inc. | 18.2% | 18.1% | $70 | $61 |
| 可口可乐公司 | 7.1% | 7.0% | 82 | 69 |
| 联邦住房抵押贷款公司（Freddie Mac） | 8.2% (1) | 3.4% (1) | 29 (2) | 15 |
| GEICO Corp. | 48.1% | 48.2% | 34 (3) | 69 (3) |
| 通用动力公司 | 14.1% | -- | 11 (2) | -- |
| 吉列公司 | 10.9% | 11.0% | 38 | 23 (2) |
| Guinness PLC | 2.0% | 1.6% | 7 | -- |
| 华盛顿邮报公司 | 14.6% | 14.6% | 11 | 10 |
| 富国银行 | 11.5% | 9.6% | 16 (2) | (17) (2) |
| 伯克希尔所持未分配收益合计 | $298 | $230 | ||
| - 未分配收益对应的假设税负 | (42) | (30) | ||
| 报告的伯克希尔运营收益 | 348 | 316 | ||
| 总“穿透式”收益 | $604 | $516 |
注：
- (1) 扣除Wesco的少数股权
- (2) 按年度平均持股比例计算
- (3) 不包括已实现的资本利得，该部分既持续又显著
# Insurance Operations (保险业务运营)
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:
以下是我们常用的财产与意外险行业关键数据表格的最新版本：
| Year | Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%)（保费增长率） | Combined Ratio After Policyholder Dividends（综合赔付率，扣除保单持有人分红后） |
|---|---|---|
| 1981 | 3.8 | 106.0 |
| 1982 | 3.7 | 109.6 |
| 1983 | 5.0 | 112.0 |
| 1984 | 8.5 | 118.0 |
| 1985 | 22.1 | 116.3 |
| 1986 | 22.2 | 108.0 |
| 1987 | 9.4 | 104.6 |
| 1988 | 4.5 | 105.4 |
| 1989 | 3.2 | 109.2 |
| 1990 | 4.5 | 109.6 |
| 1991 (Revised) | 2.4 | 108.8 |
| 1992 (Est.) | 2.7 | 114.8 |
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 106 - 110 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.
综合赔付率表示总保险成本（已发生损失 + 费用）与保费收入的比例：低于100%表示承保盈利，高于100%表示承保亏损。比率越高，年景越差。当计入保险公司从持有保单持有人资金（即“浮存金”）中获得的投资收益后，综合赔付率在106-110区间通常意味着整体盈亏平衡，但不包括股东投入资金带来的收益。
About four points in the industry's 1992 combined ratio can be attributed to Hurricane Andrew, which caused the largest insured loss in history. Andrew destroyed a few small insurers. Beyond that, it awakened some larger companies to the fact that their reinsurance protection against catastrophes was far from adequate. (It's only when the tide goes out that you learn who's been swimming naked.) One major insurer escaped insolvency solely because it had a wealthy parent that could promptly supply a massive transfusion of capital.
1992年整个行业的综合赔付率中约有4个百分点源于安德鲁飓风，这是历史上造成最大保险损失的自然灾害。这场飓风摧毁了几家小型保险公司，并促使一些大型公司意识到其巨灾再保险保障远不充分。（只有潮水退去时，你才知道谁在裸泳。）一家主要保险公司之所以免于破产，仅因其拥有财力雄厚的母公司能及时提供巨额资本注入。
Bad as it was, however, Andrew could easily have been far more damaging if it had hit Florida 20 or 30 miles north of where it actually did and had hit Louisiana further east than was the case. All in all, many companies will rethink their reinsurance programs in light of the Andrew experience.
尽管如此，如果安德鲁飓风在佛罗里达更北20至30英里的位置登陆，或在路易斯安那州更东的位置登陆，造成的破坏可能更加严重。总体来看，许多公司将基于安德鲁的经验重新评估他们的再保险计划。
As you know we are a large writer — perhaps the largest in the world — of "super-cat" coverages, which are the policies that other insurance companies buy to protect themselves against major catastrophic losses. Consequently, we too took our lumps from Andrew, suffering losses from it of about $125 million, an amount roughly equal to our 1992 super-cat premium income. Our other super-cat losses, though, were negligible. This line of business therefore produced an overall loss of only $2 million for the year. (In addition, our investee, GEICO, suffered a net loss from Andrew, after reinsurance recoveries and tax savings, of about $50 million, of which our share is roughly $25 million. This loss did not affect our operating earnings, but did reduce our look-through earnings.)
如您所知，伯克希尔是全球最大的“超级巨灾”（super-cat）保险承保商之一，这种保险是其他保险公司用来防范重大灾难性损失的。因此，我们也因安德鲁飓风遭受了约1.25亿美元的损失，这一数字大致等于我们在1992年的超级巨灾保费收入。不过，我们当年的其他超级巨灾损失微乎其微。因此，该业务全年总体亏损仅为200万美元。（此外，我们的被投资企业GEICO在扣除再保险赔偿和税收节省后，也因安德鲁飓风产生了约5,000万美元的净损失，其中我们承担约2,500万美元。此次损失未影响我们的运营利润，但减少了我们的“穿透式”收益。）
In last year's report I told you that I hoped that our super-cat business would over time achieve a 10% profit margin. But I also warned you that in any given year the line was likely to be "either enormously profitable or enormously unprofitable." Instead, both 1991 and 1992 have come in close to a break-even level. Nonetheless, I see these results as aberrations and stick with my prediction of huge annual swings in profitability from this business.
在去年的报告中我曾告诉各位，我希望我们的超级巨灾保险长期实现10%的利润率。但我同时也警告说，每年该业务的盈利可能是“要么大赚，要么大赔”。然而，1991和1992年都接近盈亏平衡。尽管如此，我认为这只是反常现象，仍坚持预测：该业务的年度盈利能力将出现巨大波动。
Let me remind you of some characteristics of our super-cat policies. Generally, they are activated only when two things happen. First, the direct insurer or reinsurer we protect must suffer losses of a given amount — that's the policyholder's "retention" — from a catastrophe; and second, industry-wide insured losses from the catastrophe must exceed some minimum level, which usually is $3 billion or more. In most cases, the policies we issue cover only a specific geographical area, such as a portion of the U.S., the entire U.S., or everywhere other than the U.S. Also, many policies are not activated by the first super-cat that meets the policy terms, but instead cover only a "second-event" or even a third- or fourth-event. Finally, some policies are triggered only by a catastrophe of a specific type, such as an earthquake. Our exposures are large: We have one policy that calls for us to pay $100 million to the policyholder if a specified catastrophe occurs. (Now you know why I suffer eyestrain: from watching The Weather Channel.)
让我提醒您一下我们的超级巨灾保单的一些特点。一般而言，只有当两个条件同时满足时才会触发理赔：第一，我们保护的直保公司或再保公司因灾难事件遭受特定金额的损失——这被称为保单持有人的“自留额”；第二，整个行业因该灾难产生的已保损失必须超过某个最低门槛，通常是30亿美元以上。在大多数情况下，我们的保单只涵盖特定地理区域，比如美国部分区域、全美范围，或除美国以外的所有地区。此外，许多保单不会因第一次符合条款的巨灾事件触发，而是仅覆盖“第二次”甚至第三或第四次灾害事件。最后，有些保单仅在特定类型的灾难下生效，例如地震。我们的风险敞口非常大：有一份保单规定，若某一特定灾难发生，我们需要向保单持有人支付1亿美元。（现在您知道为什么我会因为盯着天气频道而眼疲劳了吧。）
Currently, Berkshire is second in the U.S. property-casualty industry in net worth (the leader being State Farm, which neither buys nor sells reinsurance). Therefore, we have the capacity to assume risk on a scale that interests virtually no other company. We have the appetite as well: As Berkshire's net worth and earnings grow, our willingness to write business increases also. But let me add that means good business. The saying, "a fool and his money are soon invited everywhere," applies in spades in reinsurance, and we actually reject more than 98% of the business we are offered. Our ability to choose between good and bad proposals reflects a management strength that matches our financial strength: Ajit Jain, who runs our reinsurance operation, is simply the best in this business. In combination, these strengths guarantee that we will stay a major factor in the super-cat business so long as prices are appropriate.
目前，伯克希尔在美国财险行业中净资产排名第二（第一名是State Farm，该公司既不购买也不出售再保险）。因此，我们有能力承担几乎没有任何其他公司感兴趣的规模级风险。我们也有意愿承接这类业务：随着伯克希尔净值和收益的增长，我们愿意承保的风险也随之增加。但我要强调的是，我们只承接优质业务。“一个傻瓜和他的钱很快就会被邀请到任何地方”，这句话在再保险领域尤其适用，而我们实际上拒绝了超过98%的业务邀约。我们能在良莠不齐的提案中做出选择的能力，体现了与财务实力相匹配的管理优势：负责我们再保险业务的Ajit Jain无疑是业内最出色的专家。这些优势结合在一起，使我们能够在价格合理的情况下持续成为超级巨灾保险市场的重要参与者。
What constitutes an appropriate price, of course, is difficult to determine. Catastrophe insurers can't simply extrapolate past experience. If there is truly "global warming," for example, the odds would shift, since tiny changes in atmospheric conditions can produce momentous changes in weather patterns. Furthermore, in recent years there has been a mushrooming of population and insured values in U.S. coastal areas that are particularly vulnerable to hurricanes, the number one creator of super-cats. A hurricane that caused x dollars of damage 20 years ago could easily cost 10x now.
当然，“合理的价格”很难界定。巨灾保险商不能简单地依据过去经验进行推断。例如，如果确实存在“全球变暖”，概率将发生变化，因为大气条件的微小变化就可能导致天气模式的重大改变。此外，近年来美国沿海地区人口和资产投保价值迅速增长，而这些地区正是最容易受飓风侵袭的地方，也是超级巨灾的主要来源。二十年前造成x美元损失的飓风，如今很可能造成10x的损失。
Occasionally, also, the unthinkable happens. Who would have guessed, for example, that a major earthquake could occur in Charleston, S.C.? (It struck in 1886, registered an estimated 6.6 on the Richter scale, and caused 60 deaths.) And who could have imagined that our country's most serious quake would occur at New Madrid, Missouri, which suffered an estimated 8.7 shocker in 1812. By comparison, the 1989 San Francisco quake was a 7.1 — and remember that each one-point Richter increase represents a ten-fold increase in strength. Someday, a U.S. earthquake occurring far from California will cause enormous losses for insurers.
有时也会发生不可预见的灾难。谁能想到南卡罗来纳州查尔斯顿会发生一次大地震？（它在1886年发生，里氏震级估计为6.6，造成60人死亡。）又有谁会预料到我国最严重的地震发生在密苏里州的新马德里地区？1812年这里发生了估计达到8.7级的强震。相比之下，1989年旧金山地震仅为7.1级——请注意，每上升一级里氏震级，能量释放就增长十倍。终有一天，一场远离加州的美国大地震将会给保险公司带来巨大损失。
When viewing our quarterly figures, you should understand that our accounting for super-cat premiums differs from our accounting for other insurance premiums. Rather than recording our super-cat premiums on a pro-rata basis over the life of a given policy, we defer recognition of revenue until a loss occurs or until the policy expires. We take this conservative approach because the likelihood of super-cats causing us losses is particularly great toward the end of the year. It is then that weather tends to kick up: Of the ten largest insured losses in U.S. history, nine occurred in the last half of the year. In addition, policies that are not triggered by a first event are unlikely, by their very terms, to cause us losses until late in the year.
查看我们季度财务数据时，请理解我们在超级巨灾保险保费的会计处理上与其他保险不同。我们并不按保单期限分摊确认保费收入，而是在理赔发生或保单到期后才确认收入。我们采取这种保守做法，是因为超级巨灾导致损失的可能性往往集中在年末。此时天气更容易恶化：美国历史上十大保险损失中有九起发生在下半年。此外，那些需要多次事件才能触发的保单，在条款设计上本身就不太可能在年初造成损失。
The bottom-line effect of our accounting procedure for super-cats is this: Large losses may be reported in any quarter of the year, but significant profits will only be reported in the fourth quarter.
超级巨灾保险会计处理方式最终带来的影响是：重大损失可能出现在任意季度，但重要盈利通常只会体现在第四季度。
# Insurance Business and Float (保险业务与浮存金)
As I've told you in each of the last few years, what counts in our insurance business is "the cost of funds developed from insurance," or in the vernacular, "the cost of float." Float - which we generate in exceptional amounts - is the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. The cost of float is measured by our underwriting loss.
正如我过去几年反复提到的，我们保险业务中真正重要的是“保险带来的资金成本”，用通俗的话说就是“浮存金（float）的成本”。浮存金——我们拥有异常庞大的金额——是指损失准备金、理赔费用准备金和未赚取保费准备金的总和，减去代理人账户余额、预付取得成本以及适用于再保险的递延费用。浮存金的成本由我们的承保亏损来衡量。
The table below shows our cost of float since we entered the business in 1967.
以下表格展示了自我们1967年进入保险行业以来浮存金的成本情况：
| Year | Underwriting Loss（承保亏损） | Average Float（平均浮存金，单位：百万美元） | Cost of Funds（资金成本，= 承保亏损 / 浮存金） | Yearend Yield on Long-Term Govt. Bonds（年末长期国债收益率） |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1967 | profit | $17.3 | 小于零 | 5.50% |
| 1968 | profit | $19.9 | 小于零 | 5.90% |
| 1969 | profit | $23.4 | 小于零 | 6.79% |
| 1970 | $0.37 | $32.4 | 1.14% | 6.25% |
| 1971 | profit | $52.5 | 小于零 | 5.81% |
| 1972 | profit | $69.5 | 小于零 | 5.82% |
| 1973 | profit | $73.3 | 小于零 | 7.27% |
| 1974 | $7.36 | $79.1 | 9.30% | 8.13% |
| 1975 | $11.35 | $87.6 | 12.96% | 8.03% |
| 1976 | profit | $102.6 | 小于零 | 7.30% |
| 1977 | profit | $139.0 | 小于零 | 7.97% |
| 1978 | profit | $190.4 | 小于零 | 8.93% |
| 1979 | profit | $227.3 | 小于零 | 10.08% |
| 1980 | profit | $237.0 | 小于零 | 11.94% |
| 1981 | profit | $228.4 | 小于零 | 13.61% |
| 1982 | $21.56 | $220.6 | 9.77% | 10.64% |
| 1983 | $33.87 | $231.3 | 14.64% | 11.84% |
| 1984 | $48.06 | $253.2 | 18.98% | 11.58% |
| 1985 | $44.23 | $390.2 | 11.34% | 9.34% |
| 1986 | $55.84 | $797.5 | 7.00% | 7.60% |
| 1987 | $55.43 | $1,266.7 | 4.38% | 8.95% |
| 1988 | $11.08 | $1,497.7 | 0.74% | 9.00% |
| 1989 | $24.40 | $1,541.3 | 1.58% | 7.97% |
| 1990 | $26.65 | $1,637.3 | 1.63% | 8.24% |
| 1991 | $119.59 | $1,895.0 | 6.31% | 7.40% |
| 1992 | $108.96 | $2,290.4 | 4.76% | 7.39% |
Last year, our insurance operation again generated funds at a cost below that incurred by the U.S. Government on its newly-issued long-term bonds. This means that in 21 years out of the 26 years we have been in the insurance business we have beaten the Government's rate, and often we have done so by a wide margin. (If, on average, we didn't beat the Government's rate, there would be no economic reason for us to be in the business.)
去年，我们的保险业务再次以低于美国政府新发行长期债券利率的资金成本运作。这意味着在我们从事保险业务的26年中，有21年的资金成本低于政府债券利率，很多时候还大幅低于这一水平。（如果从平均水平来看，我们无法战胜政府债券利率，那么我们就没有理由继续从事这项业务了。）
In 1992, as in previous years, National Indemnity's commercial auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster, and our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred, made excellent contributions to our low cost of float. Indeed, both of these operations recorded an underwriting profit last year, thereby generating float at a less-than-zero cost. The bulk of our float, meanwhile, comes from large transactions developed by Ajit. His efforts are likely to produce a further growth in float during 1993.
如同往年一样，1992年Don Wurster领导下的National Indemnity公司的商业汽车险和一般责任险业务，以及Rod Eldred领导的本土运营，都对我们的低成本浮存金做出了重大贡献。事实上，这两项业务去年都实现了承保盈利，因此浮存金的成本甚至为负值。与此同时，我们大部分浮存金来源于Ajit主导的大额交易，他的努力很可能在1993年推动浮存金进一步增长。
Charlie and I continue to like the insurance business, which we expect to be our main source of earnings for decades to come. The industry is huge; in certain sectors we can compete world-wide; and Berkshire possesses an important competitive advantage. We will look for ways to expand our participation in the business, either indirectly as we have done through GEICO or directly as we did by acquiring Central States Indemnity.
查理和我都持续看好保险业务，并预计它将在未来几十年内成为我们收益的主要来源。这个行业规模巨大，在某些领域我们可以进行全球竞争；而伯克希尔具备重要的竞争优势。我们将寻找各种方式扩大在该行业的参与度，无论是通过GEICO这样的间接方式，还是像收购Central States Indemnity这样直接的方式。
# Common Stock Investments (普通股投资)
Below we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
以下是我们在1992年底持有的市值超过1亿美元的普通股投资列表。其中一小部分属于伯克希尔持股不足100%的子公司资产。
# Berkshire Hathaway 1992 年底主要股票持仓
| Shares | Company | Cost (百万美元) | Market Value (百万美元) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3,000,000 | Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. | $517.5 | $1,523.5 |
| 93,400,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | $1,023.9 | $3,911.1 |
| 16,196,700 | Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. ("Freddie Mac") | $414.3 | $783.5 |
| 34,250,000 | GEICO Corp. | $45.7 | $2,226.3 |
| 4,350,000 | General Dynamics Corp. | $312.4 | $450.8 |
| 24,000,000 | The Gillette Company | $600.0 | $1,365.0 |
| 38,335,000 | Guinness PLC | $333.0 | $299.6 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company | $9.7 | $396.9 |
| 6,358,418 | Wells Fargo & Company | $380.9 | $485.6 |
Leaving aside splits, the number of shares we held in these companies changed during 1992 in only four cases: We added moderately to our holdings in Guinness and Wells Fargo, we more than doubled our position in Freddie Mac, and we established a new holding in General Dynamics. We like to buy.
不考虑拆股因素，1992年我们在上述公司中的持股数量仅在四个案例中发生了变化：我们适度增持了Guinness和Wells Fargo的股份，将对Freddie Mac的投资翻倍以上，并新建仓了General Dynamics。我们喜欢买入。
Selling, however, is a different story. There, our pace of activity resembles that forced upon a traveler who found himself stuck in tiny Podunk's only hotel. With no T.V. in his room, he faced an evening of boredom. But his spirits soared when he spied a book on the night table entitled "Things to do in Podunk." Opening it, he found just a single sentence: "You're doing it."
然而，卖出操作则完全不同。我们在卖出上的节奏更像一个被困在小镇唯一旅馆房间里的旅客：房间里没有电视，他面临无聊的夜晚。但当他发现床头柜上一本名为《Podunk能做的事》的书时，精神为之一振。打开一看，里面只有一句话：“你正在做。”
We were lucky in our General Dynamics purchase. I had paid little attention to the company until last summer, when it announced it would repurchase about 30% of its shares by way of a Dutch tender. Seeing an arbitrage opportunity, I began buying the stock for Berkshire, expecting to tender our holdings for a small profit. We've made the same sort of commitment perhaps a half-dozen times in the last few years, reaping decent rates of return for the short periods our money has been tied up.
我们在General Dynamics的投资是幸运的。直到去年夏天该公司宣布将以荷兰式招标回购约30%的股份之前，我几乎没怎么关注这家公司。看到套利机会后，我开始为伯克希尔买入该股票，原计划是以小幅利润售出。在过去几年里，我们大约做过六次类似的操作，每次都在短期锁定资金后获得合理回报。
But then I began studying the company and the accomplishments of Bill Anders in the brief time he'd been CEO. And what I saw made my eyes pop: Bill had a clearly articulated and rational strategy; he had been focused and imbued with a sense of urgency in carrying it out; and the results were truly remarkable.
但随后我开始研究这家公司及其CEO Bill Anders在短暂任期内的表现，结果令我震惊：Bill制定的战略清晰且理性；执行过程中专注并充满紧迫感；成果也确实令人瞩目。
In short order, I dumped my arbitrage thoughts and decided that Berkshire should become a long-term investor with Bill. We were helped in gaining a large position by the fact that a tender greatly swells the volume of trading in a stock. In a one-month period, we were able to purchase 14% of the General Dynamics shares that remained outstanding after the tender was completed.
很快，我抛开了套利思维，决定让伯克希尔成为Bill的长期投资者。此次大额建仓之所以可行，是因为招标回购大幅提升了该股的成交量。在一个多月的时间里，我们买下了通用动力公司在完成回购后剩余流通股的14%。
# Negotiated Purchases and Accounting Reflections (协商交易与会计反思)
To date, our negotiated purchases, as a group, have fulfilled but not exceeded the expectation we set forth in our 1989 Annual Report:
"Our preferred stock investments should produce returns modestly above those achieved by most fixed-income portfolios."
In truth, we would have done better if we could have put the money that went into our negotiated transactions into open-market purchases of the type we like. But both our size and the general strength of the markets made that difficult to do.
迄今为止，我们通过协商达成的投资交易整体上仅达到了我们在1989年年报中提出的预期：
“我们的优先股投资应产生略高于大多数固定收益组合的回报。”
但事实上，如果我们能将这些资金用于我们偏好的公开市场投资，回报可能更佳。然而，由于我们的资产规模以及当时市场的强劲表现，这种做法并不现实。
There was one other memorable line in the 1989 Annual Report:
"We have no ability to forecast the economics of the investment banking business, the airline industry, or the paper industry."
At the time some of you may have doubted this confession of ignorance. Now, however, even my mother acknowledges its truth.
1989年的年报中还有一句令人印象深刻的话：
“我们无法预测投资银行业、航空业或造纸业的经济前景。”
当时有些人可能对这一坦率的承认表示怀疑。但现在，连我母亲都认可了这句话的真实性。
In the case of our commitment to USAir, industry economics had soured before the ink dried on our check. As I've previously mentioned, it was I who happily jumped into the pool; no one pushed me. Yes, I knew the industry would be ruggedly competitive, but I did not expect its leaders to engage in prolonged kamikaze behavior. In the last two years, airline companies have acted as if they are members of a competitive tontine, which they wish to bring to its conclusion as rapidly as possible.
以我们对USAir的投资为例，在支票开出之前，行业经济形势就已经恶化。正如我曾提到的，是我主动跳入了这池水，没有人推我下去。是的，我知道这个行业竞争激烈，但我没想到管理层会如此长时间地进行自杀式经营。在过去两年里，航空公司仿佛在参与一场死亡竞赛，只求尽快淘汰对手。
Amidst this turmoil, Seth Schofield, CEO of USAir, has done a truly extraordinary job in repositioning the airline. He was particularly courageous in accepting a strike last fall that, had it been lengthy, might well have bankrupted the company. Capitulating to the striking union, however, would have been equally disastrous: The company was burdened with wage costs and work rules that were considerably more onerous than those encumbering its major competitors, and it was clear that over time any high-cost producer faced extinction. Happily for everyone, the strike was settled in a few days.
在这场动荡中，USAir的CEO塞思·斯科菲尔德展现了非凡的领导能力，成功重塑了公司战略。他在去年秋天果断接受了一次罢工谈判，尽管若罢工持续太久，公司可能会破产。但向工会妥协同样危险：公司的工资成本和工作规则远比主要竞争对手苛刻，长期来看高成本生产商终将被淘汰。幸运的是，罢工几天内就得以解决。
A competitively-beset business such as USAir requires far more managerial skill than does a business with fine economics. Unfortunately, though, the near-term reward for skill in the airline business is simply survival, not prosperity.
像USAir这样面临激烈竞争的企业，对管理能力的要求远高于顺风顺水的公司。遗憾的是，在航空业，卓越的管理技能短期内带来的只是生存，而非繁荣。
In early 1993, USAir took a major step toward assuring survival - and eventual prosperity - by accepting British Airways' offer to make a substantial, but minority, investment in the company. In connection with this transaction, Charlie and I were asked to join the USAir board. We agreed, though this makes five outside board memberships for me, which is more than I believe advisable for an active CEO. Even so, if an investee's management and directors believe it particularly important that Charlie and I join its board, we are glad to do so. We expect the managers of our investees to work hard to increase the value of the businesses they run, and there are times when large owners should do their bit as well.
1993年初，USAir迈出关键一步，接受了英国航空的大额（但非控股）投资，为未来的生存和最终繁荣打下基础。作为交易的一部分，查理和我受邀加入USAir董事会。我们同意了这一安排，虽然这是我目前担任的第五个外部董事职位，而我认为对于一位活跃的CEO来说这已超出合理范围。即便如此，如果被投资企业的管理层和董事认为我们的参与至关重要，我们也乐于配合。我们期望我们的管理者尽最大努力提升企业价值，而在某些时候，大股东也应尽一份力。
# Two New Accounting Rules and a Plea for One More (两项新会计准则与一项呼吁)
A new accounting rule having to do with deferred taxes becomes effective in 1993. It undoes a dichotomy in our books that I have described in previous annual reports and that relates to the accrued taxes carried against the unrealized appreciation in our investment portfolio. At yearend 1992, that appreciation amounted to $7.6 billion. Against $6.4 billion of that, we carried taxes at the current 34% rate. Against the remainder of $1.2 billion, we carried an accrual of 28%, the tax rate in effect when that portion of the appreciation occurred. The new accounting rule says we must henceforth accrue all deferred tax at the current rate, which to us seems sensible.
一项关于递延税的新会计准则将于1993年生效。它改变了此前我们账面上的一项二元处理方式——即针对未实现增值部分所计提的税率差异问题。截至1992年底，我们的投资组合未实现增值达76亿美元。其中64亿美元按现行税率34%计提税费；剩余12亿美元则按照当年适用的28%税率计提。新准则要求我们统一采用当前税率计算递延税负债，我们认为这一调整合情合理。
The new marching orders mean that in the first quarter of 1993 we will apply a 34% rate to all of our unrealized appreciation, thereby increasing the tax liability and reducing net worth by $70 million. The new rule also will cause us to make other minor changes in our calculation of deferred taxes.
根据新规定，我们将在1993年第一季度对全部未实现增值统一使用34%税率，导致递延税负债增加，并使净值减少7,000万美元。此外，该规则还将促使我们在其他递延税计算方面做出小幅调整。
Future changes in tax rates will be reflected immediately in the liability for deferred taxes and, correspondingly, in net worth. The impact could well be substantial. Nevertheless, what is important in the end is the tax rate at the time we sell securities, when unrealized appreciation becomes realized.
未来税率变动将立即反映在递延税负债上，从而影响净值。这种影响可能是显著的。然而归根结底，真正重要的是我们在出售证券时适用的实际税率，也就是未实现增值转为已实现增值时的税率。
Another major accounting change, whose implementation is required by January 1, 1993, mandates that businesses recognize their present-value liability for post-retirement health benefits. Though GAAP has previously required recognition of pensions to be paid in the future, it has illogically ignored the costs that companies will then have to bear for health benefits. The new rule will force many companies to record a huge balance-sheet liability (and a consequent reduction in net worth) and also henceforth to recognize substantially higher costs when they are calculating annual profits.
另一项重大会计变革自1993年1月1日起强制实施，要求企业必须确认退休后医疗福利的现值负债。尽管GAAP过去要求企业确认未来养老金支出，却荒谬地忽略了退休医疗费用的负担。新规则将迫使许多企业大幅调整资产负债表，记录巨额负债（并相应减少净值），同时在未来利润计算中体现更高的年度成本。
In making acquisitions, Charlie and I have tended to avoid companies with significant post-retirement liabilities. As a result, Berkshire's present liability and future costs for post-retirement health benefits - though we now have 22,000 employees - are inconsequential. I need to admit, though, that we had a near miss: In 1982 I made a huge mistake in committing to buy a company burdened by extraordinary post-retirement health obligations. Luckily, though, the transaction fell through for reasons beyond our control. Reporting on this episode in the 1982 annual report, I said: "If we were to introduce graphics to this report, illustrating favorable business developments of the past year, two blank pages depicting this blown deal would be the appropriate centerfold."
在并购过程中，查理和我倾向于避开拥有沉重退休后医疗义务的企业。因此，尽管我们现在拥有22,000名员工，伯克希尔当前及未来的相关责任几乎可以忽略不计。但我要承认，我们曾在1982年差点犯下大错：当时决定收购一家背负巨额退休医疗义务的公司，幸好交易因不可控因素未能完成。我在当年年报中写道：“如果我们为这份报告引入图表来展示今年的好消息，那么描述这笔失败交易的两页空白纸就是最恰当的中心插页。”
Even so, I wasn't expecting things to get as bad as they did. Another buyer appeared, the business soon went bankrupt and was shut down, and thousands of workers found those bountiful health-care promises to be largely worthless.
即便如此，我也未曾料到情况会如此糟糕。后来有其他买家接手，但这家公司很快破产倒闭，数千名员工发现当初承诺的医疗保障几乎毫无价值。
In recent decades, no CEO would have dreamed of going to his board with the proposition that his company become an insurer of uncapped post-retirement health benefits that other corporations chose to install. A CEO didn't need to be a medical expert to know that lengthening life expectancies and soaring health costs would guarantee an insurer a financial battering from such a business. Nevertheless, many a manager blithely committed his own company to a self-insurance plan embodying precisely the same promises - and thereby doomed his shareholders to suffer the inevitable consequences.
近几十年来，没有哪位CEO敢向董事会提议让自己的公司成为无限承担退休医疗义务的保险人。即使不是医学专家也能预见到，寿命延长和医疗成本上升将带来财务灾难。然而，许多管理者轻率地让公司承担起这类自我保险计划，使得股东不得不承受其后果。
In health-care, open-ended promises have created open-ended liabilities that in a few cases loom so large as to threaten the global competitiveness of major American industries.
在医疗领域，无上限的承诺创造了无上限的负债，有些案例中的金额之大甚至威胁到美国一些大型产业的全球竞争力。
I believe part of the reason for this reckless behavior was that accounting rules did not, for so long, require the booking of post-retirement health costs as they were incurred. Instead, the rules allowed cash-basis accounting, which vastly understated the liabilities that were building up. In effect, the attitude of both managements and their accountants toward these liabilities was "out-of-sight, out-of-mind." Ironically, some of these same managers would be quick to criticize Congress for employing "cash-basis" thinking in respect to Social Security promises or other programs creating future liabilities of size.
我认为造成这种鲁莽行为的部分原因在于，长期以来会计准则不要求在发生退休医疗成本时立即确认。取而代之的是现金收付制，严重低估了逐渐累积的负债。实际上，管理层和会计师对此类债务的态度就是“眼不见心不烦”。讽刺的是，同一批经理人却常常批评国会用“现金收付制”处理社保等未来负债的做法。
Managers thinking about accounting issues should never forget one of Abraham Lincoln's favorite riddles:
"How many legs does a dog have if you call his tail a leg?"
The answer:
"Four, because calling a tail a leg does not make it a leg."
It behooves managers to remember that Abe's right even if an auditor is willing to certify that the tail is a leg.
在思考会计问题时，管理者绝不能忘记林肯总统最爱的一道谜语：
“如果你把狗的尾巴称为一条腿，那它有多少条腿？”
答案是：
“四条腿，因为称尾巴为腿并不会让它真的变成腿。”
管理者应当牢记这一点，即使审计师愿意证明“尾巴就是腿”。
# Stock Options and Accounting Reality (股票期权与会计现实)
The most egregious case of let's-not-face-up-to-reality behavior by executives and accountants has occurred in the world of stock options. In Berkshire's 1985 annual report, I laid out my opinions about the use and misuse of options. But even when options are structured properly, they are accounted for in ways that make no sense. The lack of logic is not accidental: For decades, much of the business world has waged war against accounting rulemakers, trying to keep the costs of stock options from being reflected in the profits of the corporations that issue them.
高管和会计人员回避现实的最典型例子发生在股票期权领域。在1985年伯克希尔年报中，我就曾表达过对期权使用与滥用的看法。即使期权结构设计得当，它们的会计处理方式依然不合逻辑。这种混乱并非偶然：几十年来，商界一直在对抗会计准则制定者，试图不让期权成本反映在企业利润中。
Typically, executives have argued that options are hard to value and that therefore their costs should be ignored. At other times managers have said that assigning a cost to options would injure small start-up businesses. Sometimes they have even solemnly declared that "out-of-the-money" options (those with an exercise price equal to or above the current market price) have no value when they are issued.
通常，高管们辩称期权难以估值，因此不应计入成本。有时他们又声称，若将期权视为支出，会对初创企业造成伤害。更有甚者郑重宣称，“虚值期权”（行权价等于或高于市价）在授予时毫无价值。
Oddly, the Council of Institutional Investors has chimed in with a variation on that theme, opining that options should not be viewed as a cost because they "aren't dollars out of a company's coffers." I see this line of reasoning as offering exciting possibilities to American corporations for instantly improving their reported profits. For example, they could eliminate the cost of insurance by paying for it with options. So if you're a CEO and subscribe to this "no cash-no cost" theory of accounting, I'll make you an offer you can't refuse: Give us a call at Berkshire and we will happily sell you insurance in exchange for a bundle of long-term options on your company's stock.
奇怪的是，机构投资者委员会也加入了这场讨论，认为期权不应被视为成本，因为“它不涉及公司现金流”。我认为这种思路给美国公司提供了迅速美化财报的机会。比如，公司可以用期权支付保险费用来“消除成本”。所以，如果你是一位信奉“没有现金流出就没有成本”的CEO，我有个你无法拒绝的提议：请致电伯克希尔，我们很乐意接受你的长期股票期权来换取为你提供保险服务。
Shareholders should understand that companies incur costs when they deliver something of value to another party and not just when cash changes hands. Moreover, it is both silly and cynical to say that an important item of cost should not be recognized simply because it can't be quantified with pinpoint precision. Right now, accounting abounds with imprecision. After all, no manager or auditor knows how long a 747 is going to last, which means he also does not know what the yearly depreciation charge for the plane should be. No one knows with any certainty what a bank's annual loan loss charge ought to be. And the estimates of losses that property-casualty companies make are notoriously inaccurate.
股东们应当明白，公司成本不仅出现在现金实际支出时，也出现在公司将有价值的东西交付给他人时。此外，仅仅因为某项重要成本无法精确计量就主张不予确认，这种说法既荒唐又虚伪。目前的会计体系本身就充满了估算与不确定性。毕竟，没有任何经理人或审计师能准确知道一架波音747还能使用多久，这意味着他们也无法确定这架飞机每年应计提多少折旧费用。没有人能确切知道银行每年应计提多少贷款坏账准备金。财产与意外险公司对损失的预估更是出了名地不准。
Does this mean that these important items of cost should be ignored simply because they can't be quantified with absolute accuracy? Of course not. Rather, these costs should be estimated by honest and experienced people and then recorded. When you get right down to it, what other item of major but hard-to-precisely-calculate cost - other, that is, than stock options - does the accounting profession say should be ignored in the calculation of earnings?
难道这些重要的成本项目只因无法绝对精确计量就被忽视？当然不是。相反，这些成本应该由诚实且有经验的人进行合理估计，并据此入账记录。说到底，除了股票期权之外，还有哪一项重大但难以精准计算的成本被会计行业排除在利润计算之外？
Moreover, options are just not that difficult to value. Admittedly, the difficulty is increased by the fact that the options given to executives are restricted in various ways. These restrictions affect value. They do not, however, eliminate it. In fact, since I'm in the mood for offers, I'll make one to any executive who is granted a restricted option, even though it may be out of the money: On the day of issue, Berkshire will pay him or her a substantial sum for the right to any future gain he or she realizes on the option. So if you find a CEO who says his newly-issued options have little or no value, tell him to try us out. In truth, we have far more confidence in our ability to determine an appropriate price to pay for an option than we have in our ability to determine the proper depreciation rate for our corporate jet.
事实上，期权并不难估值。诚然，高管获得的期权通常受到各种限制，这些限制会影响其价值。但它们并未使其失去全部价值。既然说到这个话题，我可以向任何获得受限期权（即使为虚值期权）的高管提出一个建议：在期权授予当日，伯克希尔愿意支付一笔可观金额来换取该期权未来可能产生的收益。如果你遇到一位CEO声称他刚获得的期权毫无价值，请让他来找我们试试看。坦白地说，我们对自己判断期权合理价格的能力，远比我们决定公司公务喷气机折旧率的信心更强。
It seems to me that the realities of stock options can be summarized quite simply: If options aren't a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation isn't an expense, what is it? And, if expenses shouldn't go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world should they go?
在我看来，股票期权的本质可以简单概括如下：如果期权不是一种报酬形式，那它是什么？如果报酬不算是企业支出，那什么才算？如果支出不应该计入盈利计算中，那它们究竟应该放在哪里？
The accounting profession and the SEC should be shamed by the fact that they have long let themselves be muscled by business executives on the option-accounting issue. Additionally, the lobbying that executives engage in may have an unfortunate by-product: In my opinion, the business elite risks losing its credibility on issues of significance to society - about which it may have much of value to say - when it advocates the incredible on issues of significance to itself.
会计行业和证券交易委员会（SEC）长期以来屈服于企业高管在期权会计问题上的压力，这一点令人遗憾。此外，高管们的游说行为也可能带来负面后果：我认为当商业精英们在涉及社会公众利益的问题上本可提供有价值的见解时，却因为他们在自身利益相关问题上坚持不可信的立场，而冒着失去信誉的风险。
# Miscellaneous (其他事项)
We have two pieces of regrettable news this year. First, Gladys Kaiser, my friend and assistant for twenty-five years, will give up the latter post after the 1993 annual meeting, though she will certainly remain my friend forever. Gladys and I have been a team, and though I knew her retirement was coming, it is still a jolt.
今年我们有两个令人遗憾的消息。第一，Gladys Kaiser——我25年来的朋友兼助理——将在1993年年度股东大会后卸任，尽管她将永远是我的朋友。Gladys和我一直是一个团队，虽然我知道她的退休计划早晚会到来，但这仍让我感到震惊。
Secondly, in September, Verne McKenzie relinquished his role as Chief Financial Officer after a 30-year association with me that began when he was the outside auditor of Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Verne is staying on as a consultant, and though that job description is often a euphemism, in this case it has real meaning. I expect Verne to continue to fill an important role at Berkshire but to do so at his own pace. Marc Hamburg, Verne's understudy for five years, has succeeded him as Chief Financial Officer.
第二，在九月，Verne McKenzie结束了与我共事30年的关系，辞去了首席财务官一职。他最初在我还是巴菲特合伙公司时期担任外部审计师。Verne将继续以顾问身份为我们效力，虽然“顾问”这一头衔常常是委婉的说法，但这次它是真实有效的。我相信Verne会按照自己的节奏继续为伯克希尔做出重要贡献。Marc Hamburg作为Verne五年的副手，已接替成为新的首席财务官。
I recall that one woman, upon being asked to describe the perfect spouse, specified an archeologist: "The older I get," she said, "the more he'll be interested in me." She would have liked my tastes: I treasure those extraordinary Berkshire managers who are working well past normal retirement age and who concomitantly are achieving results much superior to those of their younger competitors. While I understand and empathize with the decision of Verne and Gladys to retire when the calendar says it's time, theirs is not a step I wish to encourage. It's hard to teach a new dog old tricks.
我记得有位女士在被问到理想配偶的标准时开玩笑说：“我希望他是考古学家，因为越老，我会越吸引他。”她也许会欣赏我的口味：我特别珍视那些超过退休年龄仍持续工作、并取得远超年轻同行业绩的伯克希尔管理者们。尽管我理解并尊重Verne和Gladys选择在时间允许时退休的决定，但我并不希望鼓励这样的做法。新面孔很难迅速掌握那些久经考验的老经验。
I am a moderate in my views about retirement compared to Rose Blumkin, better known as Mrs. B. At 99, she continues to work seven days a week. And about her, I have some particularly good news.
与Rose Blumkin（也就是大家熟知的B夫人）相比，我在退休问题上的看法其实算温和派。现年99岁的她仍然每周工作七天。关于她，我有个特别的好消息要分享。
You will remember that after her family sold 80% of Nebraska Furniture Mart (NFM) to Berkshire in 1983, Mrs. B continued to be Chairman and run the carpet operation. In 1989, however, she left because of a managerial disagreement and opened up her own operation next door in a large building that she had owned for several years. In her new business, she ran the carpet section but leased out other home-furnishings departments.
您还记得，1983年她的家族将Nebraska家具商场80%的股权出售给我们之后，B夫人继续担任董事长并负责地毯业务。但在1989年，由于管理分歧，她离开了公司，并在隔壁一栋自己多年持有的大楼里开设了自己的业务。她在新公司继续经营地毯业务，同时把部分家居部门出租运营。
At the end of last year, Mrs. B decided to sell her building and land to NFM. She'll continue, however, to run her carpet business at its current location (no sense slowing down just when you're hitting full stride). NFM will set up shop alongside her, in that same building, thereby making a major addition to its furniture business.
去年年底，B夫人决定将她的建筑和土地出售给NFM。但她将继续在原址经营地毯业务（当你正处在事业巅峰时，完全没有理由放慢脚步）。NFM将在同一栋楼内扩展业务，大幅增强其家具业务规模。
I am delighted that Mrs. B has again linked up with us. Her business story has no parallel and I have always been a fan of hers, whether she was a partner or a competitor. But believe me, partner is better.
我很高兴B夫人再次与我们携手合作。她的创业故事无人能及，无论她是我们的合作伙伴还是竞争对手，我都一直钦佩她。不过请相信我，做合作伙伴远比做对手好得多。
This time around, Mrs. B graciously offered to sign a non-compete agreement — and I, having been incautious on this point when she was 89, snapped at the deal. Mrs. B belongs in the Guinness Book of World Records on many counts. Signing a non-compete at 99 merely adds one more.
这一次，B夫人欣然同意签署竞业禁止协议；而我也从过去的经验中学到了教训——当年她89岁时我在这方面考虑不够周全。现在我立刻接受了这份协议。B夫人在许多方面都堪称吉尼斯世界纪录候选人，如今99岁签下竞业协议，不过是再添一笔而已。
# Ralph Schey and Scott Fetzer (拉尔夫·谢与斯科特·费策公司)
Ralph Schey, CEO of Scott Fetzer and a manager who I hope is with us at 99 also, hit a grand slam last year when that company earned a record $110 million pre-tax. What's even more impressive is that Scott Fetzer achieved such earnings while employing only $116 million of equity capital. This extraordinary result is not the product of leverage: The company uses only minor amounts of borrowed money (except for the debt it employs - appropriately - in its finance subsidiary).
Scott Fetzer的CEO拉尔夫·谢（Ralph Schey）是一位我希望能在99岁依然与我们同行的管理者。去年他带领公司实现了创纪录的1.1亿美元税前利润，堪称“全垒打”。更令人印象深刻的是，这家公司仅用了1.16亿美元的股东权益资本就达成了这一业绩。这一非凡成果并非来自高杠杆操作：公司几乎没有使用多少借款资金（除了其金融子公司适当使用的债务）。
Scott Fetzer now operates with a significantly smaller investment in both inventory and fixed assets than it had when we bought it in 1986. This means the company has been able to distribute more than 100% of its earnings to Berkshire during our seven years of ownership while concurrently increasing its earnings stream - which was excellent to begin with - by a lot. Ralph just keeps on outdoing himself, and Berkshire shareholders owe him a great deal.
相比我们1986年收购它时，如今的Scott Fetzer在存货和固定资产上的投入已大幅减少。这意味着，在我们持有的七年中，公司不仅将其盈利的100%以上回馈给伯克希尔，同时自身的盈利能力也大幅提升。拉尔夫不断超越自我，伯克希尔的股东们对他心怀深深的感激之情。
# Corporate Expense Reduction (公司运营费用削减)
Those readers with particularly sharp eyes will note that our corporate expense fell from $5.6 million in 1991 to $4.2 million in 1992. Perhaps you will think that I have sold our corporate jet, The Indefensible. Forget it! I find the thought of retiring the plane even more revolting than the thought of retiring the Chairman. (In this matter I've demonstrated uncharacteristic flexibility: For years I argued passionately against corporate jets. But finally my dogma was run over by my karma.)
眼光敏锐的读者会注意到，我们的公司管理费用从1991年的560万美元下降至1992年的420万美元。也许你们会猜测我是不是卖掉了公司的公务机“The Indefensible”（不可辩驳号）。别猜了！我对卖掉飞机的想法感到比对董事长退休还反感。（当然，我在这件事上确实表现得有些反常：多年来我一直强烈反对企业拥有公务机，但最终我的教条被现实击溃了。）
Our reduction in corporate overhead actually came about because those expenses were especially high in 1991, when we incurred a one-time environmental charge relating to alleged pre-1970 actions of our textile operation. Now that things are back to normal, our after-tax overhead costs are under 1% of our reported operating earnings and less than 1/2 of 1% of our look-through earnings. We have no legal, personnel, public relations, investor relations, or strategic planning departments. In turn this means we don't need support personnel such as guards, drivers, messengers, etc. Finally, except for Verne, we employ no consultants. Professor Parkinson would like our operation - though Charlie, I must say, still finds it outrageously fat.
实际上，1991年费用偏高是因为当年我们承担了一项一次性环保赔偿责任，源于纺织业务在1970年前的行为指控。现在一切恢复正常，我们的税后管理费用不到报告运营收益的1%，甚至不到“穿透式”收益的0.5%。我们没有法律、人事、公关、投资者关系或战略规划部门，因此也不需要保安、司机、信使等辅助人员。除维恩外，我们不雇佣任何顾问。帕金森教授（讽刺官僚主义的代表人物）一定会喜欢我们的运作模式——尽管查理坚持认为这仍然过于臃肿。
At some companies, corporate expense runs 10% or more of operating earnings. The tithing that operations thus makes to headquarters not only hurts earnings, but more importantly slashes capital values. If the business that spends 10% on headquarters' costs achieves earnings at its operating levels identical to those achieved by the business that incurs costs of only 1%, shareholders of the first enterprise suffer a 9% loss in the value of their holdings simply because of corporate overhead. Charlie and I have observed no correlation between high corporate costs and good corporate performance. In fact, we see the simpler, low-cost operation as more likely to operate effectively than its bureaucratic brethren. We're admirers of the Wal-Mart, Nucor, Dover, GEICO, Golden West Financial and Price Co. models.
一些企业的总部费用高达运营利润的10%或更高。这种“总部抽成”不仅损害利润，更重要的是削弱了股东价值。如果一家公司将10%的资源用于总部开销，而另一家只用1%，两者运营利润相同，那么前者股东的持股价值无形中损失了9%。查理和我都未发现高额管理成本与企业绩效之间存在任何正相关关系。事实上，我们认为结构简单、成本低的企业远比那些官僚体系健全的企业运行效率更高。我们是沃尔玛、纽柯钢铁、道达尔、GEICO、Golden West金融和Price Co等企业模式的坚定拥护者。
# Stock Price and Gifting Issues (股价与赠股难题)
Late last year Berkshire's stock price crossed $10,000. Several shareholders have mentioned to me that the high price causes them problems: They like to give shares away each year and find themselves impeded by the tax rule that draws a distinction between annual gifts of $10,000 or under to a single individual and those above $10,000. That is, those gifts no greater than $10,000 are completely tax-free; those above $10,000 require the donor to use up a portion of his or her lifetime exemption from gift and estate taxes, or, if that exemption has been exhausted, to pay gift taxes.
去年末，伯克希尔的股价突破了1万美元大关。有几位股东告诉我，这对他们每年赠送股票造成了困扰。因为美国税法规定，向单一受赠人年度赠予金额不超过1万美元可免税，超过此额则需动用一生一次的遗产税/赠与税豁免额度，或直接缴纳赠与税。
I can suggest three ways to address this problem. The first would be useful to a married shareholder, who can give up to $20,000 annually to a single recipient, as long as the donor files a gift tax return containing his or her spouse's written consent to gifts made during the year.
以下是我建议的三种应对方式：
- 已婚股东可以每年向单个对象赠予最多2万美元，前提是提交一份包含配偶书面同意的赠与税申报表。
Secondly, a shareholder, married or not, can make a bargain sale. Imagine, for example, that Berkshire is selling for $12,000 and that one wishes to make only a $10,000 gift. In that case, sell the stock to the giftee for $2,000. (Caution: You will be taxed on the amount, if any, by which the sales price to your giftee exceeds your tax basis.)
- 股东无论是否结婚，均可进行“折价销售”。例如，若伯克希尔股价为12,000美元，您希望只送出10,000美元的价值，您可以以2,000美元的价格将股份卖给受赠人。（注意：若您售出价格高于您的税务计税基础，则可能产生应税义务。）
Finally, you can establish a partnership with people to whom you are making gifts, fund it with Berkshire shares, and simply give percentage interests in the partnership away each year. These interests can be for any value that you select. If the value is $10,000 or less, the gift will be tax-free.
- 您可以与受赠人共同设立一个合伙实体，并由伯克希尔股票出资，每年只需赠与该合伙体的部分权益即可。只要每份赠与价值控制在1万美元以内，便可享受完全免税待遇。
We issue the customary warning: Consult with your own tax advisor before taking action on any of the more esoteric methods of gift-making.
我们照例提醒：在采用上述较复杂的赠与方法前，请务必咨询您的税务顾问。
# No Stock Splits — Our Philosophy (不分拆股票：我们的理念)
We hold to the view about stock splits that we set forth in the 1983 Annual Report. Overall, we believe our owner-related policies - including the no-split policy - have helped us assemble a body of shareholders that is the best associated with any widely-held American corporation. Our shareholders think and behave like rational long-term owners and view the business much as Charlie and I do. Consequently, our stock consistently trades in a price range that is sensibly related to intrinsic value.
我们在1983年年报中曾阐明对股票分拆的立场，至今未曾改变。总体而言，我们相信包括“不分拆”在内的股东政策帮助我们聚集了一批美国上市公司中最优秀的长期股东群体。我们的股东像真正的企业主一样思考和行动，他们的看法与查理和我们高度一致。因此，我们的股价始终维持在一个与内在价值合理匹配的区间。
Additionally, we believe that our shares turn over far less actively than do the shares of any other widely-held company. The frictional costs of trading - which act as a major "tax" on the owners of many companies - are virtually non-existent at Berkshire. (The market-making skills of Jim Maguire, our New York Stock Exchange specialist, definitely help to keep these costs low.) Obviously a split would not change this situation dramatically. Nonetheless, there is no way that our shareholder group would be upgraded by the new shareholders enticed by a split. Instead we believe that modest degradation would occur.
此外，我们相信伯克希尔的股票换手率远低于其他大型公众公司。交易摩擦成本——这是许多公司股东面临的“隐形税收”——在伯克希尔几乎不存在。（我们的纽交所专业做市商Jim Maguire功不可没。）显然，股票分拆不会显著改变这一现状。但我们坚信，因分拆而新增的股东只会稀释现有股东群体的质量，而非提升。
# Zero-Coupon Debentures Redemption (零息可转债赎回说明)
As I mentioned earlier, on December 16th we called our zero-coupon, convertible debentures for payment on January 4, 1993. These obligations bore interest at 5 1/2%, a low cost for funds when they were issued in 1989, but an unattractive rate for us at the time of call.
正如我之前提到的，我们在1992年12月16日宣布赎回将于1993年1月4日支付的零息可转换债券。这些债券在1989年发行时的利率为5.5%，当时融资成本较低；但在赎回时，这一利率对我们来说已不再具有吸引力。
The debentures could have been redeemed at the option of the holder in September 1994, and 5 1/2% money available for no longer than that is not now of interest to us. Furthermore, Berkshire shareholders are disadvantaged by having a conversion option outstanding. At the time we issued the debentures, this disadvantage was offset by the attractive interest rate they carried; by late 1992, it was not.
这些债券持有人原本可在1994年9月选择提前赎回，而我们发现再持有到那时也无利可图。此外，流通在外的转换权对伯克希尔股东不利。在债券发行之初，这一劣势被低廉的利息部分抵消；但到了1992年底，这一优势已经消失。
In general, we continue to have an aversion to debt, particularly the short-term kind. But we are willing to incur modest amounts of debt when it is both properly structured and of significant benefit to shareholders.
总体而言，我们仍厌恶负债，尤其是短期债务。但在债务结构合理且能明显造福股东的情况下，我们也愿意适度接受负债。
# Shareholder-Designated Contributions Program (股东指定捐赠计划)
About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1992 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $7.6 million, and 2,810 charities were recipients. I'm considering increasing these contributions in the future at a rate greater than the increase in Berkshire's book value, and I would be glad to hear from you as to your thinking about this idea.
1992年，伯克希尔股东指定捐赠计划吸引了97%的符合条件股份参与。通过该计划，我们向2,810家慈善机构捐赠了760万美元。我正在考虑未来将这笔捐款的增长速度设定得略高于账面价值增长速度，欢迎各位股东就此提出意见。
We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 48-49. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1993 will be ineligible for the 1993 program.
我们建议新股东阅读年报第48至49页关于股东指定捐赠计划的详细说明。要参与今后的计划，请确保您的股票登记在实际持有人名下，而非证券经纪人、银行或托管机构的名义之下。截至1993年8月31日仍未完成注册的股份将不具备参加1993年计划的资格。
In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses make contributions, including merchandise, averaging about $2.0 million annually. These contributions support local charities, such as The United Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.
除了股东指定捐赠外，我们的运营业务管理层也会进行捐赠（包括实物），平均每年约200万美元，主要用于支持联合劝募协会（United Way）等地方慈善事业，这些行为也为我们的业务带来了相应的社会回报。
However, neither our operating managers nor officers of the parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad national programs or charitable activities of special personal interest to them, except to the extent they do so as shareholders. If your employees, including your CEO, wish to give to their alma maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal attachment, we believe they should use their own money, not yours.
不过，无论是运营业务经理人还是母公司高管，都不会擅自使用伯克希尔的资金来支持全国性项目或个人兴趣慈善活动，除非他们作为股东自愿捐赠。如果您员工（包括CEO）希望资助母校或其他与其私人关系密切的机构，我们认为应该动用自己的钱，而不是公司的钱。
# This Year’s Annual Meeting (今年的年度股东大会)
This year the Annual Meeting will be held at the Orpheum Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 26, 1993. A record 1,700 people turned up for the meeting last year, but that number still leaves plenty of room at the Orpheum.
今年的伯克希尔年度股东大会将于 1993年4月26日（星期一）上午9:30 在奥马哈市中心的 Orpheum 剧院 举行。去年参会人数创纪录地达到1,700人，但剧院仍有充足的空间。
We recommend that you get your hotel reservations early at one of these hotels:
我们建议您尽早预订以下酒店之一：
- Radisson-Redick Tower：一家小型但舒适的酒店（88间客房），正对 Orpheum 剧院；
- Red Lion Hotel：规模更大，步行约五分钟即可抵达剧院；
- Marriott：位于奥马哈西部，距离 Borsheim's 珠宝店仅百码之遥，离市中心约二十分钟车程。我们将安排从 Marriott 出发的巴士于 早上8:30 和 8:45 发车前往会议，并在会议结束后返回。
Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent, owner-related questions.
查理和我都非常享受与股东们的见面交流，也希望您能出席。我们的股东素质体现在他们提出的问题上：我们从未在任何其他年度股东大会中见过如此持续高水平、富有智慧且以企业主思维为导向的问题。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With the admission card, we will enclose information about parking facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have to walk a few blocks.
我们的委托书材料附录中详细说明了如何获取入场凭证。凭此卡，我们会附上附近停车场的信息。如果您自驾前来，请尽量早些到达——剧院附近的停车位很快会被占满，您可能需要步行几个街区。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to downtown hotels or the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays. While there, stop at the See's Candy Cart and find out for yourself why Charlie and I are a good bit wider than we were back in 1972 when we bought See's.
照例，会后我们将安排巴士接送大家前往 Nebraska家具商场 和 Borsheim's珠宝店，之后再从那里送至市中心酒店或机场。希望您预留足够时间，细细体验这两家店铺的魅力。提前抵达的朋友们可在每周任意一天前往家具商场；周六营业时间为上午10点至下午5:30，周日为中午12点至下午5:30。别忘了到See's糖果摊前尝一尝——这也是我和查理为何比1972年收购这家公司时胖了不少的原因。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 25. Charlie and I will be in attendance, sporting our jeweler's loupes, and ready to give advice about gems to anyone foolish enough to listen. Also available will be plenty of Cherry Cokes, See's candies, and other lesser goodies. I hope you will join us.
Borsheim's珠宝店通常周日不营业，但在 4月25日（周日）将特别为股东及嘉宾开放，时间从 中午12点到下午6点。查理和我会亲自到场，戴上珠宝商放大镜，随时准备为愿意听讲的朋友提供宝石建议。现场还将提供樱桃味可乐、See's糖果及其他美味小食。希望您能来参加！
Warren E. Buffett
March 1, 1993
Chairman of the Board
沃伦·E·巴菲特
1993年3月1日
董事会主席