2021巴菲秀致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.（伯克希尔哈撒韦致全体股东）
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing a portion of your savings. We are honored by your trust.
伯克希尔哈撒韦致全体股东：
我和长期合作伙伴查理·芒格肩负着管理您部分储蓄的职责。我们深感您信任的珍贵。
Our position carries with it the responsibility to report to you what we would like to know if we were the absentee owner and you were the manager. We enjoy communicating directly with you through this annual letter, and through the annual meeting as well.
我们的职责是向您汇报——如果您是缺席的股东而我是管理者——我们希望了解的信息。我们乐于通过这封年度信函和股东大会与您直接沟通。
Our policy is to treat all shareholders equally. Therefore, we do not hold discussions with analysts nor large institutions. Whenever possible, also, we release important communications on Saturday mornings in order to maximize the time for shareholders and the media to absorb the news before markets open on Monday.
我们坚持平等对待所有股东的原则。因此，我们不与分析师或大型机构单独沟通。重要信息尽量在周六早晨发布，以便股东和媒体在周一市场开盘前有充足时间消化内容。
A wealth of Berkshire facts and figures are set forth in the annual 10-K that the company regularly files with the S.E.C. and that we reproduce on pages K-1 – K-119. Some shareholders will find this detail engrossing; others will simply prefer to learn what Charlie and I believe is new or interesting at Berkshire.
伯克希尔的大量事实和数据详见向美国证券交易委员会（SEC）提交的年度10-K报告（K-1至K-119页）。部分股东会沉浸于这些细节，另一些则更关注查理和我认为的新动态或亮点。
Alas, there was little action of that sort in 2021. We did, though, make reasonable progress in increasing the intrinsic value of your shares. That task has been my primary duty for 57 years. And it will continue to be.
遗憾的是，2021年并无太多新动作。但我们仍稳步推进您所持股份的内在价值增长。这是我在过去57年中的核心职责，也将持续如此。
# What You Own（您所拥有的）
Berkshire owns a wide variety of businesses, some in their entirety, some only in part. The second group largely consists of marketable common stocks of major American companies. Additionally, we own a few non-U.S. equities and participate in several joint ventures or other collaborative activities.
伯克希尔拥有多元化的业务组合，既有全资控股企业，也有部分持股。后者主要由美国大型上市公司的普通股构成，此外我们还持有少量非美国股票，并参与多个合资或合作项目。
Whatever our form of ownership, our goal is to have meaningful investments in businesses with both durable economic advantages and a first-class CEO. Please note particularly that we own stocks based upon our expectations about their long-term business performance and not because we view them as vehicles for timely market moves. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.
无论持股形式如何，我们的目标是投资具备持久经济优势和顶级CEO的企业。请特别注意：我们买入股票基于对企业长期业务表现的预期，而非将其视为短期交易工具。这一原则至关重要：查理和我不是选股者，而是选企业者。
I make many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses includes some enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many others that enjoy good economic characteristics, and a few that are marginal. One advantage of our common-stock segment is that – on occasion – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. That shooting-fish-in-a-barrel experience is very rare in negotiated transactions and never occurs en masse. It is also far easier to exit from a mistake when it has been made in the marketable arena.
我犯过许多错误。因此，我们庞大的企业组合中既有少数具备非凡经济特质的企业，也有大量具备良好特性的企业，以及少量仅勉强盈利的公司。被动持股的优势在于：市场周期性提供以低价购入优质企业的机会——这种“瓮中捉鳖”的体验在谈判交易中极其罕见，且无法批量复制。此外，在可交易市场犯错后退出也比谈判交易中更容易。
# Surprise, Surprise（意外，又一个意外）
Here are a few items about your company that often surprise even seasoned investors:
• Many people perceive Berkshire as a large and somewhat strange collection of financial assets. In truth, Berkshire owns and operates more U.S.-based “infrastructure” assets – classified on our balance sheet as property, plant and equipment – than are owned and operated by any other American corporation. That supremacy has never been our goal. It has, however, become a fact.
以下是许多投资者（甚至经验丰富的投资者）都感到意外的事实：
• 许多人认为伯克希尔是一家庞大且略显奇特的金融资产集合体。但事实上，我们拥有并运营的美国本土“基础设施资产”（资产负债表中的物业、厂房和设备）超过任何其他美国公司。这一地位并非我们的目标，但已成为现实。
At yearend, those domestic infrastructure assets were carried on Berkshire’s balance sheet at $158 billion. That number increased last year and will continue to increase. Berkshire always will be building.
截至年末，这些本土基础设施资产账面价值达1,580亿美元。这一数字去年进一步增长，未来还将持续上升。伯克希尔的建设永不停止。
• Every year, your company makes substantial federal income tax payments. In 2021, for example, we paid $3.3 billion while the U.S. Treasury reported total corporate income-tax receipts of $402 billion. Additionally, Berkshire pays substantial state and foreign taxes. “I gave at the office” is an unassailable assertion when made by Berkshire shareholders.
• 每年，伯克希尔都会缴纳巨额联邦所得税。例如，2021年我们缴纳了33亿美元，而美国财政部公布的全国企业所得税总收入为4,020亿美元。此外，伯克希尔还缴纳大量州税和境外税款。当股东说“我在办公室就已慷慨解囊”时，这一说法无可反驳。
Berkshire’s history vividly illustrates the invisible and often unrecognized financial partnership between government and American businesses. Our tale begins early in 1955, when Berkshire Fine Spinning and Hathaway Manufacturing agreed to merge their businesses. In their requests for shareholder approval, these venerable New England textile companies expressed high hopes for the combination.
伯克希尔的历史生动展现了政府与美国企业间隐性却至关重要的财务合作。故事始于1955年初，伯克希尔纺织公司与哈撒韦制造公司同意合并业务。在寻求股东批准时，这两家历史悠久的新英格兰纺织公司对合并充满期待。
The Hathaway solicitation, for example, assured its shareholders that “The combination of the resources and managements will result in one of the strongest and most efficient organizations in the textile industry.” That upbeat view was endorsed by the company’s advisor, Lehman Brothers (yes, that Lehman Brothers).
例如，哈撒韦公司向股东承诺：“资源整合与管理层合并将打造纺织行业最强大、最高效的企业。”这一乐观预期得到了其顾问雷曼兄弟（是的，就是那家雷曼兄弟）的支持。
I’m sure it was a joyous day in both Fall River (Berkshire) and New Bedford (Hathaway) when the union was consummated. After the bands stopped playing and the bankers went home, however, the shareholders reaped a disaster.
合并完成时，法尔河（伯克希尔）和新贝德福德（哈撒韦）的股东们想必欢庆良久。但乐队停止演奏、银行家离开后，股东们迎来了一场灾难。
# 税务与历史教训（Tax Payments and Historical Lessons）
In the nine years following the merger, Berkshire’s owners watched the company’s net worth crater from $51.4 million to $22.1 million. In part, this decline was caused by stock repurchases, ill-advised dividends and plant shutdowns. But nine years of effort by many thousands of employees delivered an operating loss as well. Berkshire’s struggles were not unusual: The New England textile industry had silently entered an extended and non-reversible death march.
合并后的九年里，伯克希尔的净资产从5,140万美元暴跌至2,210万美元。部分原因在于股票回购、错误的分红决策和工厂关闭。尽管成千上万名员工努力工作，公司仍录得运营亏损。伯克希尔的困境并不罕见：新英格兰纺织业已悄然迈入长期不可逆的衰退期。
During the nine post-merger years, the U.S. Treasury suffered as well from Berkshire’s troubles. All told, the company paid the government only $337,359 in income tax during that period – a pathetic $100 per day.
合并后的九年里，美国财政部也深受伯克希尔困境影响。总计仅缴纳所得税337,359美元——每日仅100美元，堪称悲惨。
Early in 1965, things changed. Berkshire installed new management that redeployed available cash and steered essentially all earnings into a variety of good businesses, most of which remained good through the years. Coupling reinvestment of earnings with the power of compounding worked its magic, and shareholders prospered.
1965年初，转折点到来。伯克希尔引入新管理层，将可用现金重新配置，并将几乎所有盈利投入优质业务。复利效应与盈利再投资释放魔力，股东开始收获繁荣。
Berkshire’s owners, it should be noted, were not the only beneficiary of that course correction. Their “silent partner,” the U.S. Treasury, proceeded to collect many tens of billions of dollars from the company in income tax payments. Remember the $100 daily? Now, Berkshire pays roughly $9 million daily to the Treasury.
需强调的是，修正方向的受益者不仅是股东。“沉默的合作伙伴”——美国财政部——也通过所得税获得数千亿美元收入。还记得当年每日仅缴税100美元吗？如今伯克希尔每日向财政部缴税约900万美元。
# 浮存金的秘密（The Float Secret）
From an $8.6 million purchase of National Indemnity in 1967, Berkshire has become the world leader in insurance “float” – money we hold and can invest but that does not belong to us. Including a relatively small sum derived from life insurance, Berkshire’s total float has grown from $19 million when we entered the insurance business to $147 billion.
1967年以860万美元收购国家赔偿保险公司（National Indemnity）后，伯克希尔成为全球保险“浮存金”的领导者——即我们持有但不属于我们的资金。包括寿险浮存金在内，我们的浮存金从1,900万美元增长至1,470亿美元。
So far, this float has cost us less than nothing. Though we have experienced a number of years when insurance losses combined with operating expenses exceeded premiums, overall we have earned a modest 55-year profit from the underwriting activities that generated our float.
迄今为止，浮存金的成本甚至低于零。尽管曾有多年保险损失和费用超过保费收入，但从整体看，55年来我们通过承保活动赚取了微薄利润。
Of equal importance, float is very sticky. Funds attributable to our insurance operations come and go daily, but their aggregate total is immune from precipitous decline. When it comes to investing float, we can therefore think long-term.
同样重要的是，浮存金具有极强黏性。保险业务资金每日流动，但总额不会骤降。这使我们在投资浮存金时可采取长期视角。
If you are not already familiar with the concept of float, I refer you to a long explanation on page A-5. To my surprise, our float increased $9 billion last year, a buildup of value that is important to Berkshire owners though is not reflected in our GAAP presentation of earnings and net worth.
若您尚不熟悉浮存金概念，请参阅A-5页的详细说明。令人意外的是，去年浮存金增长90亿美元，这一价值积累对伯克希尔股东至关重要，但未体现在会计准则下的盈利和净资产中。
Much of our huge value creation in insurance is attributable to Berkshire’s good luck in my 1986 hiring of Ajit Jain. We first met on a Saturday morning, and I quickly asked Ajit what his insurance experience had been. He replied, “None.” I said, “Nobody’s perfect,” and hired him. That was my lucky day: Ajit actually was as perfect a choice as could have been made. Better yet, he continues to be – 35 years later.
保险业务创造的巨大价值，很大程度源于1986年我幸运地聘请Ajit Jain。我们初见于周六早晨，我问他保险从业经验，他回答：“没有。”我说：“人无完人”，随后录用了他。那是我的幸运日：35年后，Ajit仍是无可挑剔的人选。
One final thought about insurance: I believe that it is likely – but far from assured – that Berkshire’s float can be maintained without our incurring a long-term underwriting loss. I am certain, however, that there will be some years when we experience such losses, perhaps involving very large sums.
最后一点关于保险的思考：我认为维持浮存金而不产生长期承保亏损是可能的——但远非必然。我确定的是，某些年份会遭遇巨额承保亏损。
Berkshire is constructed to handle catastrophic events as no other insurer – and that priority will remain long after Charlie and I are gone.
伯克希尔的架构设计使其能应对其他保险公司无法承受的灾难性事件——这一优先级将在查理和我离世后仍持续存在。
# Our Four Giants（我们的四大巨头）
Through Berkshire, our shareholders own many dozens of businesses. Some of these, in turn, have a collection of subsidiaries of their own. For example, Marmon has more than 100 individual business operations, ranging from the leasing of railroad cars to the manufacture of medical devices.
通过伯克希尔，我们的股东持有数十家企业的权益，其中部分企业自身还拥有众多子公司。例如，Marmon集团旗下包含超过100项独立业务，从铁路货车租赁到医疗设备制造。
• Nevertheless, operations of our “Big Four” companies account for a very large chunk of Berkshire’s value. Leading this list is our cluster of insurers. Berkshire effectively owns 100% of this group, whose massive float value we earlier described. The invested assets of these insurers are further enlarged by the extraordinary amount of capital we invest to back up their promises.
然而，我们的“四大巨头”贡献了伯克希尔价值的大部分。首当其冲的是保险业务集群。伯克希尔全资控股这一集团，其浮存金规模此前已详述。我们投入巨额资本保障这些保险公司的承诺能力，进一步放大了其投资资产规模。
# 保险业务：伯克希尔的核心引擎（Insurance: Berkshire’s Core Engine）
The insurance business is made to order for Berkshire. The product will never be obsolete, and sales volume will generally increase along with both economic growth and inflation. Also, integrity and capital will forever be important. Our company can and will behave well.
保险业务与伯克希尔完美契合。这一产品不会过时，且销售规模随经济增长和通胀自然增长。诚信与资本实力始终是核心，而我们具备并坚持这些原则。
There are, of course, other insurers with excellent business models and prospects. Replication of Berkshire’s operation, however, would be almost impossible.
当然，其他保险公司也可能拥有优秀模式与前景。但复制伯克希尔的保险业务几乎不可能——因其独特的资本实力与文化。
# 苹果：非控股投资的典范（Apple: The Model of Passive Ownership）
• Apple – our runner-up Giant as measured by its yearend market value – is a different sort of holding. Here, our ownership is a mere 5.55%, up from 5.39% a year earlier. That increase sounds like small potatoes. But consider that each 0.1% of Apple’s 2021 earnings amounted to $100 million. We spent no Berkshire funds to gain our accretion. Apple’s repurchases did the job.
• 苹果——按年末市值衡量的第二大持仓——属于被动投资。我们持股比例仅5.55%（前一年为5.39%）。这一小幅增长看似微不足道，但需注意：2021年苹果每0.1%的收益即达1亿美元。我们未新增资金获取这一增值，完全由苹果自身回购推动。
It’s important to understand that only dividends from Apple are counted in the GAAP earnings Berkshire reports – and last year, Apple paid us $785 million of those. Yet our “share” of Apple’s earnings amounted to a staggering $5.6 billion. Much of what the company retained was used to repurchase Apple shares, an act we applaud. Tim Cook, Apple’s brilliant CEO, quite properly regards users of Apple products as his first love, but all of his other constituencies benefit from Tim’s managerial touch as well.
需明确的是，会计准则下的伯克希尔盈利数据仅计入苹果分红（2021年为7.85亿美元），但我们实际“享有”其56亿美元的利润。苹果留存收益主要用于回购股份，这一策略我们高度认可。CEO蒂姆·库克以用户为核心，但其管理智慧同样惠及所有股东。
# BNSF：美国商业的动脉（BNSF: The Artery of American Commerce）
• BNSF, our third Giant, continues to be the number one artery of American commerce, which makes it an indispensable asset for America as well as for Berkshire. If the many essential products BNSF carries were instead hauled by truck, America’s carbon emissions would soar.
• BNSF作为第三大巨头，仍是美国商业的首要动脉，对国家和伯克希尔均不可或缺。若BNSF运输的关键物资改由卡车运输，美国碳排放将激增。
Your railroad had record earnings of $6 billion in 2021. Here, it should be noted, we are talking about the old-fashioned sort of earnings that we favor: a figure calculated after interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization and all forms of compensation. (Our definition suggests a warning: Deceptive “adjustments” to earnings – to use a polite description – have become both more frequent and more fanciful as stocks have risen. Speaking less politely, I would say that bull markets breed bloviated bull . . ..)
您的铁路公司在2021年创收60亿美元盈利。需强调的是，这是我们偏好的传统盈利指标——扣除利息、税费、折旧、摊销及所有薪酬后的结果。（这一定义暗含警示：牛市催生了更频繁且更夸张的盈利“调整”——用委婉说法，直白讲则是牛市滋生了更多胡编乱造。）
BNSF trains traveled 143 million miles last year and carried 535 million tons of cargo. Both accomplishments far exceed those of any other American carrier. You can be proud of your railroad.
去年，BNSF列车行驶1.43亿英里，运输5.35亿吨货物。两项数据均远超其他美国运输商。您的铁路公司值得骄傲。
# BHE：能源转型的领军者（BHE: The Energy Transition Leader）
• BHE, our final Giant, earned a record $4 billion in 2021. That’s up more than 30-fold from the $122 million earned in 2000, the year that Berkshire first purchased a BHE stake. Now, Berkshire owns 91.1% of the company.
• BHE作为第四大巨头，在2021年盈利40亿美元，较2000年首次投资时的1.22亿美元增长超30倍。目前，伯克希尔持股91.1%。
BHE’s record of societal accomplishment is as remarkable as its financial performance. The company had no wind or solar generation in 2000. It was then regarded simply as a relatively new and minor participant in the huge electric utility industry. Subsequently, under David Sokol’s and Greg Abel’s leadership, BHE has become a utility powerhouse (no groaning, please) and a leading force in wind, solar and transmission throughout much of the United States.
BHE的社会贡献记录与其财务表现同样卓越。2000年，它尚无风电或太阳能发电业务，仅是美国电力行业的新兴小角色。在David Sokol和Greg Abel的领导下，BHE如今已成为公用事业巨头，并在美国多地主导风能、太阳能和输电网络建设。（请勿吐槽“powerhouse”——这是事实。）
Greg’s report on these accomplishments appears on pages A-3 and A-4. The profile you will find there is not in any way one of those currently-fashionable “green-washing” stories. BHE has been faithfully detailing its plans and performance in renewables and transmissions every year since 2007.
Greg对这些成就的报告详见年报A-3至A-4页。您会发现，BHE绝非当下流行的“漂绿”叙事。自2007年起，该公司每年如实披露可再生能源与输电网络的规划及进展。
To further review this information, visit BHE’s website at brkenergy.com. There, you will see that the company has long been making climate-conscious moves that soak up all of its earnings. More opportunities lie ahead. BHE has the management, the experience, the capital and the appetite for the huge power projects that our country needs.
欲深入了解，请访问BHE官网brkenergy.com。您会发现，该公司长期践行气候友好型投资，几乎所有收益均用于大型电力项目。未来机遇仍在前方：BHE拥有管理能力、经验、资本和意愿，足以承担美国所需的巨型能源工程。
# Investments（股权投资）
Now let’s talk about companies we don’t control, a list that again references Apple. Below we list our fifteen largest equity holdings, several of which are selections of Berkshire’s two long-time investment managers, Todd Combs and Ted Weschler. At yearend, this valued pair had total authority in respect to $34 billion of investments, many of which do not meet the threshold value we use in the table. Also, a significant portion of the dollars that Todd and Ted manage are lodged in various pension plans of Berkshire-owned businesses, with the assets of these plans not included in this table.
现在让我们谈谈我们不控股的企业，其中包括再次提及苹果。以下是我们最大的十五家股权投资公司，其中若干由伯克希尔长期投资经理Todd Combs和Ted Weschler挑选。年末，这对资深投资经理对340亿美元的投资拥有决策权，许多投资未达到表格中使用的门槛值。此外，Todd和Ted管理的资金中有相当一部分投入伯克希尔旗下企业的养老金计划，这些计划的资产未包含在本表中。
# 我们的十五大股权投资（Our Fifteen Largest Equity Holdings）
| 12/31/21 | Shares Company | Percentage of Company Owned | Cost* | Market (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 American Express Company .................... | 19.9% | 成本* | 1,287 | 市值24,804 |
| 907,559,761 Apple Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 5.6% | 31,089 | 161,155 | |
| 1,032,852,006 Bank of America Corp. ........................ | 12.8% | 14,631 | 45,952 | |
| 66,835,615 The Bank of New York Mellon Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . | 8.3% | 2,918 | 3,882 | |
| 225,000,000 BYD Co. Ltd.**. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 7.7% | 232 | 7,693 | |
| 3,828,941 Charter Communications, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.2% | 643 | 2,496 | |
| 38,245,036 Chevron Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.0% | 3,420 | 4,488 | |
| 400,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 9.2% | 1,299 | 23,684 | |
| 52,975,000 General Motors Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 3.6% | 1,616 | 3,106 | |
| 89,241,000 ITOCHU Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 5.6% | 2,099 | 2,728 | |
| 81,714,800 Mitsubishi Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 5.5% | 2,102 | 2,593 | |
| 93,776,200 Mitsui & Co., Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 5.7% | 1,621 | 2,219 | |
| 24,669,778 Moody’s Corporation ......................... | 13.3% | 248 | 9,636 | |
| 143,456,055 U.S. Bancorp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 9.7% | 5,384 | 8,058 | |
| 158,824,575 Verizon Communications Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 3.8% | 9,387 | 8,253 | |
| Others*** .................................. | — | — | 26,629 | 39,972 |
| ** 由BHE持有；因此，伯克希尔股东仅拥有该头寸的91.1%。 | *** 包括对西方石油公司的100亿美元投资，包含优先股和认股权证，目前估值为107亿美元。 |
Total Equity Investments Carried at Market ........ $ 104,605 $ 350,719
按市值计量的总投资额：成本1046.05亿美元，市值3507.19亿美元。
- This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.
- 这是我们实际购入成本及税务计税基础。
** Held by BHE; consequently, Berkshire shareholders have only a 91.1% interest in this position.
** 由BHE持有；因此，伯克希尔股东仅拥有该头寸的91.1%。
*** Includes a $10 billion investment in Occidental Petroleum, consisting of preferred stock and warrants to buy common stock, a combination now being valued at $10.7 billion.
*** 包括对西方石油公司的100亿美元投资，包含优先股和认股权证，目前估值为107亿美元。
In addition to the footnoted Occidental holding and our various common-stock positions, Berkshire also owns a 26.6% interest in Kraft Heinz (accounted for on the “equity” method, not market value, and carried at $13.1 billion) and 38.6% of Pilot Corp., a leader in travel centers that had revenues last year of $45 billion.
除上述西方石油公司和普通股投资外，伯克希尔还持有卡夫亨氏26.6%的股权（采用“权益法”核算，非市值计量，账面价值131亿美元），以及旅行中心行业领军企业Pilot Corp. 38.6%的股份（去年营收达450亿美元）。
Since we purchased our Pilot stake in 2017, this holding has warranted “equity” accounting treatment. Early in 2023, Berkshire will purchase an additional interest in Pilot that will raise our ownership to 80% and lead to our fully consolidating Pilot’s earnings, assets and liabilities in our financial statements.
自2017年投资以来，Pilot Corp.采用“权益法”核算。2023年初，伯克希尔将增持Pilot股份至80%，此后其盈利、资产与负债将全面并入我们的财务报表。
# U.S. Treasury Bills（美国国债）
Berkshire’s balance sheet includes $144 billion of cash and cash equivalents (excluding the holdings of BNSF and BHE). Of this sum, $120 billion is held in U.S. Treasury bills, all maturing in less than a year. That stake leaves Berkshire financing about 1⁄2 of 1% of the publicly-held national debt.
伯克希尔的资产负债表中包含1440亿美元现金及现金等价物（不包括BNSF和BHE的持有）。其中1200亿美元以美国国债形式持有，所有国债期限均短于一年。这一规模占美国公众持有国债总额约0.5%。
Charlie and I have pledged that Berkshire (along with our subsidiaries other than BNSF and BHE) will always hold more than $30 billion of cash and equivalents. We want your company to be financially impregnable and never dependent on the kindness of strangers (or even that of friends). Both of us like to sleep soundly, and we want our creditors, insurance claimants and you to do so as well.
查理和我承诺，伯克希尔（及除BNSF和BHE外的子公司）将始终持有超过300亿美元的现金及等价物。我们希望公司具备不可撼动的财务实力，绝不依赖陌生人的善意（甚至朋友也未必可靠）。我们都希望安稳入睡，也希望债权人、保险索赔方和您同样安心。
But $144 billion? That imposing sum, I assure you, is not some deranged expression of patriotism. Nor have Charlie and I lost our overwhelming preference for business ownership. Indeed, I first manifested my enthusiasm for that 80 years ago, on March 11, 1942, when I purchased three shares of Cities Services preferred stock. Their cost was $114.75 and required all of my savings. (The Dow Jones Industrial Average that day closed at 99, a fact that should scream to you: Never bet against America.)
但为何持有1440亿美元？我可以明确，这绝非盲目爱国的表现。查理和我从未放弃对商业投资的偏好。事实上，早在80年前的1942年3月11日，我首次买入三股Cities Services优先股时便已展现这一偏好。当时花费全部积蓄114.75美元购入，而道琼斯指数当日收于99点——这一事实应向您呐喊：永远不要做空美国。
After my initial plunge, I always kept at least 80% of my net worth in equities. My favored status throughout that period was 100% – and still is. Berkshire’s current 80%-or-so position in businesses is a consequence of my failure to find entire companies or small portions thereof (that is, marketable stocks) which meet our criteria for long-term holding.
首次投资后，我始终将净资产的至少80%配置在股票中。此后长期维持100%的股票持仓——至今未变。伯克希尔当前业务资产占比约80%，源于我未能找到符合长期持有标准的整家公司或部分股权（即可交易股票）。
Charlie and I have endured similar cash-heavy positions from time to time in the past. These periods are never pleasant; they are also never permanent. And, fortunately, we have had a mildly attractive alternative during 2020 and 2021 for deploying capital. Read on.
过去，查理和我偶尔也经历过高现金比例的时期。这些阶段从不令人愉快，但也绝非永久状态。幸运的是，在2020-2021年期间，我们找到了相对有吸引力的资本配置替代方案。请继续阅读下文。
# Share Repurchases（股票回购）
There are three ways that we can increase the value of your investment. The first is always front and center in our minds: Increase the long-term earning power of Berkshire’s controlled businesses through internal growth or by making acquisitions. Today, internal opportunities deliver far better returns than acquisitions. The size of those opportunities, however, is small compared to Berkshire’s resources.
提升您投资价值的三大路径：第一是我们的核心目标——通过内部增长或并购增强控股企业的长期盈利能力。当前，内部增长的回报远超并购。但与伯克希尔资源相比，这类机会规模有限。
Our second choice is to buy non-controlling part-interests in the many good or great businesses that are publicly traded. From time to time, such possibilities are both numerous and blatantly attractive. Today, though, we find little that excites us.
第二选择是收购优质上市公司的部分股权（非控股）。某些时期这类机会既丰富且显而易见，但当前我们难以找到令我们兴奋的标的。
That’s largely because of a truism: Long-term interest rates that are low push the prices of all productive investments upward, whether these are stocks, apartments, farms, oil wells, whatever. Other factors influence valuations as well, but interest rates will always be important.
这一困境主要源于一个真理：低长期利率推高所有生产性资产价格（无论是股票、公寓、农场还是油井）。其他因素也影响估值，但利率始终是关键变量。
Our final path to value creation is to repurchase Berkshire shares. Through that simple act, we increase your share of the many controlled and non-controlled businesses Berkshire owns. When the price/value equation is right, this path is the easiest and most certain way for us to increase your wealth. (Alongside the accretion of value to continuing shareholders, a couple of other parties gain: Repurchases are modestly beneficial to the seller of the repurchased shares and to society as well.)
第三路径是回购伯克希尔股票。这一简单操作可提升您对伯克希尔控股及非控股业务的参与度。当价格/价值关系合理时，这是最直接且确定的财富增值方式。（持续股东获益的同时，两类群体也受益：卖出股份的股东与社会整体均小幅受益。）
Periodically, as alternative paths become unattractive, repurchases make good sense for Berkshire’s owners. During the past two years, we therefore repurchased 9% of the shares that were outstanding at yearend 2019 for a total cost of $51.7 billion. That expenditure left our continuing shareholders owning about 10% more of all Berkshire businesses, whether these are wholly-owned (such as BNSF and GEICO) or partly-owned (such as Coca-Cola and Moody’s).
当其他路径失去吸引力时，回购对伯克希尔股东而言意义重大。过去两年，我们以517亿美元回购了2019年底流通股的9%。此举使留存股东对伯克希尔全部业务（全资拥有的BNSF、GEICO，或部分持股的可口可乐、穆迪等）的参与度提升约10%。
# 回购的严格条件（Repurchases: Price-Value Equation）
I want to underscore that for Berkshire repurchases to make sense, our shares must offer appropriate value. We don’t want to overpay for the shares of other companies, and it would be value-destroying if we were to overpay when we are buying Berkshire. As of February 23, 2022, since yearend we repurchased additional shares at a cost of $1.2 billion. Our appetite remains large but will always remain price-dependent.
需强调的是，伯克希尔回购必须满足价值条件。我们不会高价收购其他公司股份，更不会以高估价格回购自家股票。截至2022年2月23日，年初以来我们追加回购12亿美元。我们的胃口始终庞大，但永远受价格制约。
It should be noted that Berkshire’s buyback opportunities are limited because of its high-class investor base. If our shares were heavily held by short-term speculators, both price volatility and transaction volumes would materially increase. That kind of reshaping would offer us far greater opportunities for creating value by making repurchases. Nevertheless, Charlie and I far prefer the owners we have, even though their admirable buy-and-keep attitudes limit the extent to which long-term shareholders can profit from opportunistic repurchases.
需注意的是，伯克希尔的回购机会受限于其优质股东结构。若股份由短期投机者主导，价格波动和交易量将显著上升。这类市场环境会为我们创造更多回购机遇。但查理和我更珍视现有股东的长期持有态度，尽管这限制了我们通过回购为长期股东创造收益的空间。
Finally, one easily-overlooked value calculation specific to Berkshire: As we’ve discussed, insurance “float” of the right sort is of great value to us. As it happens, repurchases automatically increase the amount of “float” per share. That figure has increased during the past two years by 25% – going from $79,387 per “A” share to $99,497, a meaningful gain that, as noted, owes some thanks to repurchases.
最后，一个常被忽视的价值计算：正如我们讨论的保险“浮存金”具有巨大价值。巧合的是，回购自动推高每股浮存金。过去两年，伯克希尔A股的浮存金从79,387美元增至99,497美元（增幅25%），这一增长部分得益于回购策略。
# A Wonderful Man and a Wonderful Business（一位杰出的人与一家卓越的企业）
Last year, Paul Andrews died. Paul was the founder and CEO of TTI, a Fort Worth-based subsidiary of Berkshire. Throughout his life – in both his business and his personal pursuits – Paul quietly displayed all the qualities that Charlie and I admire. His story should be told.
去年，保罗·安德鲁斯去世。他是伯克希尔子公司TTI的创始人兼CEO，这家企业位于沃思堡。他一生中——无论是商业还是个人生活——始终默默展现了查理和我所钦佩的所有品质。他的故事值得被讲述。
# 从失业到创业：保罗的起点（From Layoff to Founding TTI）
In 1971, Paul was working as a purchasing agent for General Dynamics when the roof fell in. After losing a huge defense contract, the company fired thousands of employees, including Paul. With his first child due soon, Paul decided to bet on himself, using $500 of his savings to found Tex-Tronics (later renamed TTI). The company set itself up to distribute small electronic components, and first-year sales totaled $112,000. Today, TTI markets more than one million different items with annual volume of $7.7 billion.
1971年，保罗在通用动力公司担任采购代理时遭遇职业生涯的转折点。公司因失去巨额国防合同而裁员数千人，他也在其中。面对即将出生的第一个孩子，他决定自立门户，用500美元积蓄创立了Tex-Tronics（后更名为TTI）。公司起步时销售电子元件，首年销售额仅11.2万美元。如今，TTI年销售额达77亿美元，分销超过一百万种产品。
# 2006年的抉择：为何选择伯克希尔？（The 2006 Dilemma: Why Berkshire?）
But back to 2006: Paul, at 63, then found himself happy with his family, his job, and his associates. But he had one nagging worry, heightened because he had recently witnessed a friend’s early death and the disastrous results that followed for that man’s family and business. What, Paul asked himself in 2006, would happen to the many people depending on him if he should unexpectedly die?
回到2006年：63岁的保罗事业家庭双全，但一个隐忧挥之不去——一位好友的早逝及其企业、家庭的崩塌让他警觉。他自问：若自己突发意外，依赖他的员工、客户和社区将何去何从？
For a year, Paul wrestled with his options. Sell to a competitor? From a strictly economic viewpoint, that course made the most sense. After all, competitors could envision lucrative “synergies” – savings that would be achieved as the acquiror slashed duplicated functions at TTI. But . . . Such a purchaser would most certainly also retain its CFO, its legal counsel, its HR unit. Their TTI counterparts would therefore be sent packing. And ugh! If a new distribution center were to be needed, the acquirer’s home city would certainly be favored over Fort Worth.
整整一年，他权衡各种选择。卖给竞争对手？从纯经济角度看这最合理——买家能通过削减TTI重复职能实现“协同效应”。但这类买家必然保留自身高管团队，TTI原有部门将被裁撤。更糟的是，若需新建配送中心，新东家定会优先考虑总部所在地，而非沃思堡。
Whatever the financial benefits, Paul quickly concluded that selling to a competitor was not for him. He next considered seeking a financial buyer, a species once labeled – aptly so – a leveraged buyout firm. Paul knew, however, that such a purchaser would be focused on an “exit strategy.” And who could know what that would be? Brooding over it all, Paul found himself having no interest in handing his 35-year-old creation over to a reseller.
尽管财务回报可能更高，保罗很快否定了这一选项。他转而考虑财务投资者——即杠杆收购公司。但他深知这类买家只关心“退出策略”，未来不可控。最终，他不愿将35年心血交给逐利的投机者。
When Paul met me, he explained why he had eliminated these two alternatives as buyers. He then summed up his dilemma by saying – in far more tactful phrasing than this – “After a year of pondering the alternatives, I want to sell to Berkshire because you are the only guy left.” So, I made an offer and Paul said “Yes.” One meeting; one lunch; one deal.
当保罗与我见面时，他解释了为何放弃前两个选项，并委婉地总结道：“经过一年思考，我想卖给伯克希尔——因为除了你们，已别无选择。”我随即报价，他点头同意。一次会面、一顿午餐、一笔交易。
To say we both lived happily ever after is an understatement. When Berkshire purchased TTI, the company employed 2,387. Now the number is 8,043. A large percentage of that growth took place in Fort Worth and environs. Earnings have increased 673%.
说我们皆大欢喜过于保守。收购时TTI员工仅2,387人，如今已增至8,043人，其中多数新增岗位在沃思堡及周边。公司盈利增长673%。
# 保罗的遗产：超越商业的贡献（Paul’s Legacy: Beyond Business）
Annually, I would call Paul and tell him his salary should be substantially increased. Annually, he would tell me, “We can talk about that next year, Warren; I’m too busy now.”
每年我会致电保罗，建议大幅加薪。他总以“明年再议，我现在太忙”回应。
When Greg Abel and I attended Paul’s memorial service, we met children, grandchildren, long-time associates (including TTI’s first employee) and John Roach, the former CEO of a Fort Worth company Berkshire had purchased in 2000. John had steered his friend Paul to Omaha, instinctively knowing we would be a match.
格雷格·阿贝尔和我参加保罗追悼会时，见到了他的子女、孙辈、老同事（包括TTI首位员工）以及2000年被伯克希尔收购的沃思堡企业前CEO约翰·罗奇。正是约翰将保罗引荐至奥马哈，他直觉判断我们是理想买方。
At the service, Greg and I heard about the multitudes of people and organizations that Paul had silently supported. The breadth of his generosity was extraordinary – geared always to improving the lives of others, particularly those in Fort Worth. In all ways, Paul was a class act.
在追悼会上，我们了解到保罗默默资助的大量个人和组织。他的慷慨超越商业范畴，始终聚焦改善沃思堡居民的生活。无论从哪方面看，保罗都堪称典范。
# 好运与关键转折（Good Luck and the BNSF Connection）
Good luck – occasionally extraordinary luck – has played its part at Berkshire. If Paul and I had not enjoyed a mutual friend – John Roach – TTI would not have found its home with us. But that ample serving of luck was only the beginning. TTI was soon to lead Berkshire to its most important acquisition.
伯克希尔的成功离不开运气。若非共同好友约翰·罗奇的引荐，TTI不会成为我们的一员。但这份幸运只是开端，TTI随后为伯克希尔带来另一笔关键收购。
Every fall, Berkshire directors gather for a presentation by a few of our executives. We sometimes choose the site based upon the location of a recent acquisition, by that means allowing directors to meet the new subsidiary’s CEO and learn more about the acquiree’s activities.
每年秋季，伯克希尔董事们会实地考察一家子公司。我们常选择新收购企业所在地，让董事们直接接触管理层并了解业务细节。
In the fall of 2009, we consequently selected Fort Worth so that we could visit TTI. At that time, BNSF, which also had Fort Worth as its hometown, was the third-largest holding among our marketable equities. Despite that large stake, I had never visited the railroad’s headquarters.
2009年秋，我们选择沃思堡访问TTI。巧合的是，当时我们第三大持仓——BNSF铁路——同样总部位于沃思堡。尽管持股规模庞大，我从未到访其总部。
Deb Bosanek, my assistant, scheduled our board’s opening dinner for October 22. Meanwhile, I arranged to arrive earlier that day to meet with Matt Rose, CEO of BNSF, whose accomplishments I had long admired. When I made the date, I had no idea that our get-together would coincide with BNSF’s third-quarter earnings report, which was released late on the 22nd.
助理黛比将董事会晚宴定于10月22日。我提前抵达，与BNSF CEO马特·罗斯会面——我早已钦佩他的业绩。但当时未料到，我们的会面恰逢BNSF发布三季度财报（当晚发布）。
# 经济危机中的机遇（Opportunity Amid Crisis）
The market reacted badly to the railroad’s results. The Great Recession was in full force in the third quarter, and BNSF’s earnings reflected that slump. The economic outlook was also bleak, and Wall Street wasn’t feeling friendly to railroads – or much else.
市场对铁路财报反应消极。2009年三季度，大衰退正处高峰，BNSF盈利随经济滑坡。华尔街对铁路业乃至整个市场都充满悲观情绪。
# The BNSF Acquisition: An Unplanned Outcome（BNSF收购的偶然性）
On the following day, I again got together with Matt and suggested that Berkshire would offer the railroad a better long-term home than it could expect as a public company. I also told him the maximum price that Berkshire would pay.
次日，我与马特再次会面，建议伯克希尔能为BNSF提供比上市企业更优质的长期归属。同时，我向他透露了伯克希尔愿意支付的最高价格。
Matt relayed the offer to his directors and advisors. Eleven busy days later, Berkshire and BNSF announced a firm deal. And here I’ll venture a rare prediction: BNSF will be a key asset for Berkshire and our country a century from now.
马特将这一报价传达给了董事会和顾问团队。经过11天紧张谈判，伯克希尔与BNSF正式达成协议。在此，我愿做出一个罕见预测：百年后，BNSF仍将是伯克希尔和美国的核心资产。
# 保罗·安德鲁斯的决策（Paul Andrews’ Decision: A Legacy of Trust）
The BNSF acquisition would never have happened if Paul Andrews hadn’t sized up Berkshire as the right home for TTI.
若非保罗·安德鲁斯当年判定伯克希尔是TTI的合适归宿，BNSF的收购便不会发生。
# 教学与自我成长（Teaching and Personal Growth）
Thanks
I taught my first investing class 70 years ago. Since then, I have enjoyed working almost every year with students of all ages, finally “retiring” from that pursuit in 2018.
感谢
70年前，我开设了人生第一堂投资课。此后几乎每年，我都与不同年龄的学生互动，直到2018年才“退休”。
Along the way, my toughest audience was my grandson’s fifth-grade class. The 11-year-olds were squirming in their seats and giving me blank stares until I mentioned Coca-Cola and its famous secret formula. Instantly, every hand went up, and I learned that “secrets” are catnip to kids.
最挑战性的听众是我孙子的五年级班级。11岁的孩子们起初躁动不安、眼神空洞，直到我提及可口可乐及其著名秘方。瞬间举手如林，我意识到“秘密”对孩子有如猫薄荷般吸引力。
Teaching, like writing, has helped me develop and clarify my own thoughts. Charlie calls this phenomenon the orangutan effect: If you sit down with an orangutan and carefully explain to it one of your cherished ideas, you may leave behind a puzzled primate, but will yourself exit thinking more clearly.
教学如同写作，促使我梳理并深化自身思考。查理称这种现象为“猩猩效应”：若你耐心向一只猩猩解释你的观点，它可能一头雾水，但你自己的思路却会更清晰。
# 对长期股东的感恩（Gratitude to Long-Term Shareholders）
Talking to university students is far superior. I have urged that they seek employment in (1) the field and (2) with the kind of people they would select, if they had no need for money. Economic realities, I acknowledge, may interfere with that kind of search. Even so, I urge the students never to give up the quest, for when they find that sort of job, they will no longer be “working.”
与大学生交流更为高效。我常建议他们选择（1）热爱的领域和（2）即便无需谋生也愿共事的伙伴。我承认现实经济压力可能干扰这一理想，但坚持寻找至关重要——当找到这样的工作时，“上班”便不再是“工作”。
Charlie and I, ourselves, followed that liberating course after a few early stumbles. We both started as part-timers at my grandfather’s grocery store, Charlie in 1940 and I in 1942. We were each assigned boring tasks and paid little, definitely not what we had in mind. Charlie later took up law, and I tried selling securities. Job satisfaction continued to elude us.
查理和我本人便是在早期试错后遵循这一自由路径。我们均在祖父杂货店担任兼职起步（查理1940年，我1942年），分配的任务无趣且收入微薄——显然不是我们期待的职业。查理转投法律，我尝试证券销售，但职业满足感仍未至。
Finally, at Berkshire, we found what we love to do. With very few exceptions, we have now “worked” for many decades with people whom we like and trust. It’s a joy in life to join with managers such as Paul Andrews or the Berkshire families I told you about last year. In our home office, we employ decent and talented people – no jerks. Turnover averages, perhaps, one person per year.
最终，伯克希尔让我们找到热爱的事业。过去数十年，我们与绝大多数志同道合的伙伴共事——如保罗·安德鲁斯或去年提及的伯克希尔家族成员。总部办公室员工优秀且友善——每年仅约一人离职。
# 股东的信任（Shareholder Trust: A Privileged Partnership）
I would like, however, to emphasize a further item that turns our jobs into fun and satisfaction – working for you. There is nothing more rewarding to Charlie and me than enjoying the trust of individual long-term shareholders who, for many decades, have joined us with the expectation that we would be a reliable custodian of their funds.
但更让我珍惜的是：为您工作本身即是乐趣。查理和我最大的回报，是长期股东几十年来托付积蓄的信任——他们期望我们成为可靠的资金保管者。
Obviously, we can’t select our owners, as we could do if our form of operation were a partnership. Anyone can buy shares of Berkshire today with the intention of soon reselling them. For sure, we get a few of that type of shareholder, just as we get index funds that own huge amounts of Berkshire simply because they are required to do so.
显然，上市公司无法像合伙制那样筛选股东。今日买入伯克希尔股票者，可能明日便卖出。我们确实存在短期交易型股东，正如指数基金因被动跟踪而持有大量伯克希尔股份。
To a truly unusual degree, however, Berkshire has as owners a very large corps of individuals and families that have elected to join us with an intent approaching “til death do us part.” Often, they have trusted us with a large – some might say excessive – portion of their savings.
但伯克希尔的独特之处在于：大量股东和家庭选择“终身持有”，甚至将积蓄近乎全部托付于我们（有人会说过于集中）。
Berkshire, these shareholders would sometimes acknowledge, might be far from the best selection they could have made. But they would add that Berkshire would rank high among those with which they would be most comfortable. And people who are comfortable with their investments will, on average, achieve better results than those who are motivated by ever-changing headlines, chatter and promises.
这些股东坦言，伯克希尔或许并非最优选择，但却是他们最安心的长期搭档。安心持有者终将跑赢被新闻、谣言和承诺左右的交易者。
Long-term individual owners are both the “partners” Charlie and I have always sought and the ones we constantly have in mind as we make decisions at Berkshire. To them we say, “It feels good to ‘work’ for you, and you have our thanks for your trust.”
长期个人股东正是查理和我始终追寻的“合伙人”。在决策时，我们始终铭记这些股东的存在。对他们，我们想说：“为您‘工作’是一种荣幸，感谢您给予的信任。”
# 年度股东大会邀约（Annual Meeting Invitation）
Clear your calendar! Berkshire will have its annual gathering of capitalists in Omaha on Friday, April 29th through Sunday, May 1st. The details regarding the weekend are laid out on pages A-1 and A-2. Omaha eagerly awaits you, as do I.
清空日程！伯克希尔2022年股东大会将于4月29日至5月1日在奥马哈举行。活动细节详见年报A-1至A-2页。奥马哈热切期待您的到来。
I will end this letter with a sales pitch. “Cousin” Jimmy Buffett has designed a pontoon “party” boat that is now being manufactured by Forest River, a Berkshire subsidiary. The boat will be introduced on April 29 at our Berkshire Bazaar of Bargains. And, for two days only, shareholders will be able to purchase Jimmy’s masterpiece at a 10% discount. Your bargain-hunting chairman will be buying a boat for his family’s use. Join me.
以一则促销结束此信：我的“表亲”吉米·巴菲特设计了一款“派对”平底船，由伯克希尔子公司Forest River生产。4月29日将在伯克希尔折扣展会上首发，并限时两天提供10%折扣。本人将为家人购置一艘——期待与您共享这一“投资”乐趣。
February 26, 2022
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
2022年2月26日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席