1989巴菲特致股东的信

# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. (伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司)

# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: (致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们：)

Our gain in net worth during 1989 was $1.515 billion, or 44.4%. Over the last 25 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $4,296.01, or at a rate of 23.8% compounded annually.

1989年，我们的净值增长为15.15亿美元，即44.4%。在过去25年里（也就是在当前管理层接手以来），我们的每股账面价值从19.46美元增长至4296.01美元，年复合增长率为23.8%。

What counts, however, is intrinsic value - the figure indicating what all of our constituent businesses are rationally worth. With perfect foresight, this number can be calculated by taking all future cash flows of a business - in and out - and discounting them at prevailing interest rates. So valued, all businesses, from manufacturers of buggy whips to operators of cellular phones, become economic equals.

然而，真正重要的是内在价值——这个数字代表我们所有下属业务的合理价值。如果拥有完美的预见性，内在价值可以通过将一项业务所有未来的现金流入和流出按当前利率折现来计算。按照这种方式估值，从马鞭制造商到移动电话运营商，所有业务在经济层面上都是平等的。

Back when Berkshire's book value was $19.46, intrinsic value was somewhat less because the book value was entirely tied up in a textile business not worth the figure at which it was carried. Now most of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying values. This agreeable evolution from a discount to a premium means that Berkshire's intrinsic business value has compounded at a rate that somewhat exceeds our 23.8% annual growth in book value.

当伯克希尔的账面价值还是19.46美元时，其内在价值略低，因为当时的账面价值完全与纺织业务相关，而该业务的实际价值并不及账面上的金额。如今，我们大多数业务的价值都远高于其账面价值。这种从折价到溢价的可喜转变意味着，伯克希尔的内在业务价值年复合增长率略高于账面价值23.8%的年增长率。

The rear-view mirror is one thing; the windshield is another. A large portion of our book value is represented by equity securities that, with minor exceptions, are carried on our balance sheet at current market values. At yearend these securities were valued at higher prices, relative to their own intrinsic business values, than has been the case in the past. One reason is the buoyant 1989 stock market. More important, the virtues of these businesses have been widely recognized. Whereas once their stock prices were inappropriately low, they are not now.

后视镜（代表过去）是一回事，挡风玻璃（代表未来）是另一回事。我们账面价值的很大一部分由权益证券构成，除少数例外，这些证券在我们的资产负债表上按当前市场价值列示。年底时，这些证券的价格相对于其自身的内在业务价值而言，比过去更高。原因之一是1989年活跃的股市。更重要的是，这些业务的优点已得到广泛认可。它们的股价曾经被不适当地低估，而现在情况已非如此。

We will keep most of our major holdings, regardless of how they are priced relative to intrinsic business value. This 'til-death-do-us-part attitude, combined with the full prices these holdings command, means that they cannot be expected to push up Berkshire's value in the future as sharply as in the past. In other words, our performance to date has benefited from a double-dip: (1) the exceptional gains in intrinsic value that our portfolio companies have achieved; (2) the additional bonus we realized as the market appropriately "corrected" the prices of these companies, raising their valuations in relation to those of the average business. We will continue to benefit from good gains in business value that we feel confident our portfolio companies will make. But our "catch-up" rewards have been realized, which means we'll have to settle for a single-dip in the future.

我们将保留大部分主要持仓，无论其价格相对于内在业务价值如何。这种“至死不渝”的态度，再加上这些持仓所具有的充分估值，意味着它们未来推动伯克希尔价值增长的幅度不太可能像过去那样显著。换句话说，我们迄今为止的业绩受益于双重利好：（1）我们投资组合中的公司实现了非凡的内在价值增长；（2）随着市场对这些公司的股价进行适当“修正”，使其估值相对于普通公司有所提升，我们获得了额外收益。我们有信心，投资组合中的公司将继续实现良好的业务价值增长，我们也将从中受益。但我们的“追赶式”收益已经实现，这意味着未来我们只能依靠单一利好。

We face another obstacle: In a finite world, high growth rates must self-destruct. If the base from which the growth is taking place is tiny, this law may not operate for a time. But when the base balloons, the party ends: A high growth rate eventually forges its own anchor.

我们面临另一个障碍：在一个有限的世界里，高增长率必然会自我毁灭。如果增长的基数很小，这条规律可能暂时不发挥作用。但当基数膨胀时，增长盛宴就会结束：高增长率最终会成为自身的拖累。

Carl Sagan has entertainingly described this phenomenon, musing about the destiny of bacteria that reproduce by dividing into two every 15 minutes. Says Sagan: "That means four doublings an hour, and 96 doublings a day. Although a bacterium weighs only about a trillionth of a gram, its descendants, after a day of wild asexual abandon, will collectively weigh as much as a mountain...in two days, more than the sun - and before very long, everything in the universe will be made of bacteria." Not to worry, says Sagan: Some obstacle always impedes this kind of exponential growth. "The bugs run out of food, or they poison each other, or they are shy about reproducing in public."

卡尔·萨根曾有趣地描述过这种现象，他思考了每15分钟分裂一次繁殖的细菌的命运。萨根说：“这意味着每小时翻倍4次，每天翻倍96次。虽然一个细菌仅重约万亿分之一克，但经过一天不受约束的无性繁殖后，其后代的总重量将相当于一座山……两天后，将超过太阳——用不了多久，宇宙中的一切都将由细菌构成。”萨根说，不必担心：总会有某种障碍阻止这种指数增长。“细菌会耗尽食物，或者相互毒害，或者羞于在公开场合繁殖。”

Even on bad days, Charlie Munger (Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner) and I do not think of Berkshire as a bacterium. Nor, to our unending sorrow, have we found a way to double its net worth every 15 minutes. Furthermore, we are not the least bit shy about reproducing - financially - in public. Nevertheless, Sagan's observations apply. From Berkshire's present base of $4.9 billion in net worth, we will find it much more difficult to average 15% annual growth in book value than we did to average 23.8% from the $22 million we began with.

即便是在不顺的日子里，查理·芒格（伯克希尔的副董事长兼我的合伙人）和我也不会把伯克希尔看作细菌。令我们无尽遗憾的是，我们也没有找到每15分钟就让其净值翻倍的方法。此外，在财务上，我们一点也不羞于在公开场合“繁殖”（即增长）。尽管如此，萨根的观察仍然适用。以伯克希尔目前49亿美元的净值为基数，要实现账面价值年均15%的增长，将比我们从最初的2200万美元起步实现23.8%的年均增长困难得多。

# Taxes (税收)

Our 1989 gain of $1.5 billion was achieved after we took a charge of about $712 million for income taxes. In addition, Berkshire's share of the income taxes paid by its five major investees totaled about $175 million.

我们1989年15亿美元的收益是在扣除约7.12亿美元所得税之后实现的。此外，伯克希尔在其五大被投资公司所缴纳的所得税中所占份额总计约1.75亿美元。

Of this year's tax charge, about $172 million will be paid currently; the remainder, $540 million, is deferred. Almost all of the deferred portion relates to the 1989 increase in unrealized profits in our common stock holdings. Against this increase, we have reserved a 34% tax.

在今年的税费中，约1.72亿美元将当期支付；其余5.4亿美元为递延税费。递延部分几乎全部与1989年我们普通股持仓未实现利润的增长有关。针对这部分增长，我们预留了34%的税费。

We also carry reserves at that rate against all unrealized profits generated in 1987 and 1988. But, as we explained last year, the unrealized gains we amassed before 1987 - about $1.2 billion - carry reserves booked at the 28% tax rate that then prevailed.

我们对1987年和1988年产生的所有未实现利润也按该税率计提储备。但正如我们去年所解释的，我们在1987年之前积累的未实现收益——约12亿美元——是按当时适用的28%税率计提储备的。

A new accounting rule is likely to be adopted that will require companies to reserve against all gains at the current tax rate, whatever it may be. With the rate at 34%, such a rule would increase our deferred tax liability, and decrease our net worth, by about $71 million - the result of raising the reserve on our pre-1987 gain by six percentage points. Because the proposed rule has sparked widespread controversy and its final form is unclear, we have not yet made this change.

一项新的会计规则可能会被采用，该规则将要求公司按当前税率（无论税率是多少）为所有收益计提储备。在税率为34%的情况下，这一规则将使我们的递延税负债增加约7100万美元，同时使净值减少约7100万美元——这是由于我们将1987年之前收益的储备税率提高了6个百分点。由于拟议的规则引发了广泛争议，其最终形式尚不明确，我们尚未做出这一调整。

As you can see from our balance sheet on page 27, we would owe taxes of more than $1.1 billion were we to sell all of our securities at year-end market values. Is this $1.1 billion liability equal, or even similar, to a $1.1 billion liability payable to a trade creditor 15 days after the end of the year? Obviously not - despite the fact that both items have exactly the same effect on audited net worth, reducing it by $1.1 billion.

从第27页的资产负债表中可以看出，如果我们按年底的市场价值出售所有证券，我们将欠缴超过11亿美元的税款。这11亿美元的负债是否等同于，甚至类似于年底后15天应支付给贸易债权人的11亿美元负债？显然不是——尽管这两项对经审计的净值产生的影响完全相同，都会使其减少11亿美元。

On the other hand, is this liability for deferred taxes a meaningless accounting fiction because its payment can be triggered only by the sale of stocks that, in very large part, we have no intention of selling? Again, the answer is no.

另一方面，这种递延税负债是否是毫无意义的会计虚构，因为只有在出售股票时才需要支付，而我们在很大程度上并不打算出售这些股票？答案同样是否定的。

In economic terms, the liability resembles an interest-free loan from the U.S. Treasury that comes due only at our election (unless, of course, Congress moves to tax gains before they are realized). This "loan" is peculiar in other respects as well: It can be used only to finance the ownership of the particular, appreciated stocks and it fluctuates in size - daily as market prices change and periodically if tax rates change. In effect, this deferred tax liability is equivalent to a very large transfer tax that is payable only if we elect to move from one asset to another. Indeed, we sold some relatively small holdings in 1989, incurring about $76 million of "transfer" tax on $224 million of gains.

从经济角度而言，这种负债类似于来自美国财政部的无息贷款，只有在我们选择偿还时才到期（当然，除非国会决定对未实现收益征税）。这种“贷款”在其他方面也很特殊：它只能用于为特定的、已升值的股票的持有提供资金，其规模会波动——随着市场价格的变化每天波动，若税率变化则定期波动。实际上，这种递延税负债相当于一种非常大的转让税，只有当我们选择从一种资产转向另一种资产时才需要支付。事实上，1989年我们出售了一些规模相对较小的持仓，在2.24亿美元的收益中产生了约7600万美元的“转让”税。

Because of the way the tax law works, the Rip Van Winkle style of investing that we favor - if successful - has an important mathematical edge over a more frenzied approach. Let's look at an extreme comparison.

由于税法的运作方式，我们所青睐的“瑞普·凡·温克尔式”投资（如果成功的话）与更狂热的投资方式相比，在数学上具有重要优势。让我们来看一个极端的对比。

Imagine that Berkshire had only $1, which we put in a security that doubled by yearend and was then sold. Imagine further that we used the after-tax proceeds to repeat this process in each of the next 19 years, scoring a double each time. At the end of the 20 years, the 34% capital gains tax that we would have paid on the profits from each sale would have delivered about $13,000 to the government and we would be left with about $25,250. Not bad. If, however, we made a single fantastic investment that itself doubled 20 times during the 20 years, our dollar would grow to $1,048,576. Were we then to cash out, we would pay a 34% tax of roughly $356,500 and be left with about $692,000.

假设伯克希尔只有1美元，我们将其投入一项证券，该证券在年底翻倍，然后被出售。再假设我们用税后收益在接下来的19年里每年重复这一过程，每次都实现翻倍。20年后，我们为每次出售的利润支付34%的资本利得税，总共会向政府缴纳约1.3万美元，我们将剩下约2.525万美元。这还不错。然而，如果我们进行一项出色的单一投资，在20年里自身翻倍20次，我们的1美元将增长到1,048,576美元。如果我们届时套现，将支付34%的税款，约35.65万美元，剩下约69.2万美元。

The sole reason for this staggering difference in results would be the timing of tax payments. Interestingly, the government would gain from Scenario 2 in exactly the same 27:1 ratio as we - taking in taxes of $356,500 vs. $13,000 - though, admittedly, it would have to wait for its money.

这种结果上的巨大差异的唯一原因是纳税时间的不同。有趣的是，政府从第二种情景中获得的收益与我们的收益比例完全相同，都是27:1——税收收入分别为35.65万美元和1.3万美元——尽管不可否认，政府需要等待更长时间才能拿到这笔钱。

We have not, we should stress, adopted our strategy favoring long-term investment commitments because of these mathematics. Indeed, it is possible we could earn greater after-tax returns by moving rather frequently from one investment to another. Many years ago, that's exactly what Charlie and I did.

我们应当强调，我们采取倾向于长期投资承诺的策略，并非出于这些数学计算的考量。事实上，通过更频繁地从一项投资转向另一项投资，我们有可能获得更高的税后回报。许多年前，查理和我正是这么做的。

Now we would rather stay put, even if that means slightly lower returns. Our reason is simple: We have found splendid business relationships to be so rare and so enjoyable that we want to retain all we develop. This decision is particularly easy for us because we feel that these relationships will produce good - though perhaps not optimal - financial results. Considering that, we think it makes little sense for us to give up time with people we know to be interesting and admirable for time with others we do not know and who are likely to have human qualities far closer to average. That would be akin to marrying for money - a mistake under most circumstances, insanity if one is already rich.

如今我们更愿意坚守不动，即便这意味着回报会略低一些。我们的理由很简单：我们发现出色的商业关系极为罕见且令人愉悦，因此我们希望维系所有我们建立起来的这种关系。这个决定对我们而言格外容易，因为我们认为这些关系会带来不错的财务成果——尽管可能并非最优。鉴于此，我们认为，放弃与那些我们知道既有趣又令人钦佩的人相处的时间，转而与那些我们不了解、且很可能品性远趋平庸的人打交道，是毫无意义的。这就好比为了钱而结婚——在大多数情况下是个错误，要是已经很富有，那就是愚蠢了。

# Sources of Reported Earnings (报告收益来源)

The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表展示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在本报告中，商誉摊销和其他重大购价会计调整并未计入其适用的特定业务，而是汇总后单独列示。这种处理方式能让你看到，如果我们没有收购这些业务，它们原本会报告的收益情况。在过去的报告中，我已经解释过为什么在我们看来，这种列示方式比采用公认会计原则（GAAP）更对投资者和管理者有用，因为公认会计原则要求按业务逐项进行购价调整。当然，我们在表中显示的净收益总额与经审计财务报表中按公认会计原则计算的总额是一致的。

Further information about these businesses is given in the Business Segment section on pages 37-39, and in the Management's Discussion section on pages 40-44. In these sections you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. For information on Wesco's businesses, I urge you to read Charlie Munger's letter, which starts on page 54. In addition, we have reprinted on page 71 Charlie's May 30, 1989 letter to the U. S. League of Savings Institutions, which conveyed our disgust with its policies and our consequent decision to resign.

关于这些业务的更多信息，请参见第37-39页的业务分部部分以及第40-44页的管理层讨论部分。在这些部分中，你还会看到我们按公认会计原则报告的分部收益。关于韦斯科的业务情况，我强烈建议你阅读查理·芒格的信，该信从第54页开始。此外，我们在第71页转载了查理1989年5月30日致美国储蓄机构联盟的信，信中表达了我们对该联盟政策的不满以及我们因此决定退出的态度。

	Pre-Tax Earnings (税前收益)		Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) (伯克希尔的净收益份额（税后及扣除少数股东权益后）)
	1989	1988	1989	1988
Operating Earnings (营业收益):
Insurance Group (保险集团):
Underwriting (承保)	$(24,400)	$(11,081)	$(12,259)	$ (1,045)
Net Investment Income (净投资收益)	243,599	231,250	213,642	197,779
Buffalo News (《布法罗新闻报》)	46,047	42,429	27,771	25,462
Fechheimer	12,621	14,152	6,789	7,720
Kirby	26,114	26,891	16,803	17,842
Nebraska Furniture Mart (内布拉斯加家具卖场)	17,070	18,439	8,441	9,099
Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group (斯科特·费策尔制造集团)	33,165	28,542	19,996	17,640
See's Candies (喜诗糖果)	34,235	32,473	20,626	19,671
Wesco - other than Insurance (韦斯科 - 非保险业务)	13,008	16,133	9,810	10,650
World Book (世界图书公司)	25,583	27,890	16,372	18,021
Amortization of Goodwill (商誉摊销)	(3,387)	(2,806)	(3,372)	(2,806)
Other Purchase-Price Accounting Charges (其他购价会计费用)	(5,740)	(6,342)	(6,668)	(7,340)
Interest Expense* (利息费用*)	(42,389)	(35,613)	(27,098)	(23,212)
Shareholder-Designated Contributions (股东指定捐赠)	(5,867)	(4,966)	(3,814)	(3,217)
Other (其他)	23,755	41,059	12,863	27,177
Operating Earnings (营业收益)	393,414	418,450	299,902	313,441
Sales of Securities (证券销售)	223,810	131,671	147,575	85,829
Total Earnings - All Entities (总收益 - 所有实体)	$617,224	$550,121	$447,477	$399,270

*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and Mutual Savings & Loan. (*不包括斯科特·费策尔金融集团和互助储蓄与贷款公司的利息费用。)

We refer you also to pages 45-51, where we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments. These correspond to the way Charlie and I think about the business and should help you calculate Berkshire's intrinsic value. Shown on these pages are balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our insurance operations, with their major investment positions itemized; (2) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; (3) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial; and (4) an all-other category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the companies in segment (2), all purchase price accounting adjustments, and various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.

我们还建议你查看第45-51页，在那里我们将伯克希尔的财务数据重新整理为四个部分。这些部分与查理和我思考业务的方式相符，应该能帮助你计算伯克希尔的内在价值。这些页面展示了以下内容的资产负债表和收益表：（1）我们的保险业务，及其主要投资头寸的明细；（2）我们的制造、出版和零售业务，剔除了某些非经营性资产和购价会计调整；（3）我们从事金融类业务的子公司，即互助储蓄公司和斯科特·费策尔金融公司；（4）“其他所有”类别，包括第（2）部分中的公司所持有的非经营性资产（主要是有价证券）、所有购价会计调整以及韦斯科和伯克希尔母公司的各类资产与负债。

If you combine the earnings and net worths of these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements. However, I want to emphasize that this four-category presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in no way bless it.

如果你将这四个部分的收益和净值相加，得出的总额将与我们按公认会计原则编制的报表中显示的总额一致。然而，我想强调的是，这种四分类列示不在我们审计师的职责范围内，他们对此不承担任何责任。

In addition to our reported earnings, we also benefit from significant earnings of investees that standard accounting rules do not permit us to report. On page 15, we list five major investees from which we received dividends in 1989 of about $45 million, after taxes. However, our share of the retained earnings of these investees totaled about $212 million last year, not counting large capital gains realized by GEICO and Coca-Cola. If this $212 million had been distributed to us, our own operating earnings, after the payment of additional taxes, would have been close to $500 million rather than the $300 million shown in the table.

除了我们报告的收益外，我们还从被投资公司的可观收益中获益，而标准会计规则不允许我们将这些收益计入报告。在第15页，我们列出了五大主要被投资公司，1989年我们从这些公司获得的税后股息约为4500万美元。然而，去年我们在这些被投资公司的留存收益中所占份额总计约为2.12亿美元，这还不包括GEICO和可口可乐实现的巨额资本利得。如果这2.12亿美元分配给我们，在支付额外税款后，我们自身的营业收益将接近5亿美元，而不是表中显示的3亿美元。

The question you must decide is whether these undistributed earnings are as valuable to us as those we report. We believe they are - and even think they may be more valuable. The reason for this a-bird-in-the-bush-may-be-worth-two-in-the-hand conclusion is that earnings retained by these investees will be deployed by talented, owner-oriented managers who sometimes have better uses for these funds in their own businesses than we would have in ours. I would not make such a generous assessment of most managements, but it is appropriate in these cases.

你必须判断的是，这些未分配的收益对我们而言是否与我们报告的收益同样有价值。我们认为它们是有价值的——甚至可能更有价值。这种“一鸟在林可能胜过双鸟在 hand”的结论的理由是，这些被投资公司留存的收益将由有才能、以所有者为导向的管理者进行配置，他们有时能在自己的业务中更好地利用这些资金，比我们在自己的业务中利用得更好。我不会对大多数管理层做出如此积极的评价，但在这些情况下，这种评价是恰当的。

In our view, Berkshire's fundamental earning power is best measured by a "look-through" approach, in which we append our share of the operating earnings retained by our investees to our own reported operating earnings, excluding capital gains in both instances. For our intrinsic business value to grow at an average of 15% per year, our "look-through" earnings must grow at about the same pace. We'll need plenty of help from our present investees, and also need to add a new one from time to time, in order to reach this 15% goal.

在我们看来，衡量伯克希尔的基本盈利能力的最佳方式是采用“透视”法，即我们将在被投资公司留存的营业收益中所占份额，附加到我们自己报告的营业收益中，两种情况下都不包括资本利得。要使我们的内在业务价值年均增长15%，我们的“透视”收益必须以大致相同的速度增长。为了实现这15%的目标，我们需要现有被投资公司的大力支持，同时还需要时不时地增加新的被投资公司。

# Non-Insurance Operations (非保险业务)

In the past, we have labeled our major manufacturing, publishing and retail operations "The Sainted Seven." With our acquisition of Borsheim's early in 1989, the challenge was to find a new title both alliterative and appropriate. We failed: Let's call the group "The Sainted Seven Plus One."

过去，我们将主要的制造、出版和零售业务称为“神圣七杰”。随着我们在1989年初收购博希姆，我们面临一个挑战，即找到一个既押头韵又合适的新名称。我们未能如愿：就称这个集团为“神圣七杰加一”吧。

This divine assemblage - Borsheim's, The Buffalo News, Fechheimer Bros., Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See's Candies, World Book - is a collection of businesses with economic characteristics that range from good to superb. Its managers range from superb to superb.

这个神圣的组合——博希姆、《布法罗新闻报》、费策尔兄弟公司、柯比公司、内布拉斯加家具卖场、斯科特·费策尔制造集团、喜诗糖果、世界图书公司——是一系列业务的集合，其经济特征从良好到卓越不等。而它们的管理者则都是卓越的。

Most of these managers have no need to work for a living; they show up at the ballpark because they like to hit home runs. And that's exactly what they do. Their combined financial statements (including those of some smaller operations), shown on page 49, illustrate just how outstanding their performance is. On an historical accounting basis, after-tax earnings of these operations were 57% on average equity capital. Moreover, this return was achieved with no net leverage: Cash equivalents have matched funded debt. When I call off the names of our managers - the Blumkin, Friedman and Heldman families, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph Schey - I feel the same glow that Miller Huggins must have experienced when he announced the lineup of his 1927 New York Yankees.

这些管理者大多无需为了生计而工作；他们出现在“球场”上是因为他们喜欢打出全垒打。而他们确实做到了这一点。第49页所示的他们的合并财务报表（包括一些较小业务的报表），恰恰说明了他们的业绩是多么出色。按历史会计基准计算，这些业务的税后收益占平均权益资本的57%。此外，这一回报是在没有净杠杆的情况下实现的：现金等价物与有资金支持的债务相当。当我念出我们管理者的名字——布卢姆金家族、弗里德曼家族和赫尔德曼家族、查克·哈金斯、斯坦·利普西以及拉尔夫·谢伊——我感受到的那种喜悦，想必与米勒·哈金斯在宣布他1927年纽约洋基队的阵容时所感受到的一样。

Let's take a look, business by business:

让我们逐个来看这些业务：

o In its first year with Berkshire, Borsheim's met all expectations. Sales rose significantly and are now considerably better than twice what they were four years ago when the company moved to its present location. In the six years prior to the move, sales had also doubled. Ike Friedman, Borsheim's managing genius - and I mean that - has only one speed: fast-forward.

在加入伯克希尔的第一年，博希姆达到了所有预期。销售额大幅增长，现在远超过四年前公司搬到现址时的两倍。在搬迁前的六年里，销售额也翻了一番。艾克·弗里德曼，博希姆的管理天才——我是认真的——只有一个速度：快进。

If you haven't been there, you've never seen a jewelry store like Borsheim's. Because of the huge volume it does at one location, the store can maintain an enormous selection across all price ranges. For the same reason, it can hold its expense ratio to about one-third that prevailing at jewelry stores offering comparable merchandise. The store's tight control of expenses, accompanied by its unusual buying power, enable it to offer prices far lower than those of other jewelers. These prices, in turn, generate even more volume, and so the circle goes 'round and 'round. The end result is store traffic as high as 4,000 people on seasonally-busy days.

如果你没去过那里，你就从未见过像博希姆这样的珠宝店。由于它在一个地点的销量巨大，这家店能够在所有价格区间保持丰富的选择。出于同样的原因，它能将费用率控制在提供同类商品的珠宝店普遍费用率的约三分之一。该店对费用的严格控制，再加上其非凡的购买力，使其能够提供远低于其他珠宝商的价格。而这些价格反过来又带来了更大的销量，如此循环往复。其最终结果是，在季节性繁忙的日子里，到店人数高达4000人。

Ike Friedman is not only a superb businessman and a great showman but also a man of integrity. We bought the business without an audit, and all of our surprises have been on the plus side. "If you don't know jewelry, know your jeweler" makes sense whether you are buying the whole business or a tiny diamond.

艾克·弗里德曼不仅是一位出色的商人、一位伟大的经营者，还是一个正直的人。我们在没有进行审计的情况下收购了这家企业，而我们所有的意外发现都是积极的。“如果你不懂珠宝，那就了解你的珠宝商”，这句话无论是在你收购整个企业还是购买一颗小钻石时都有道理。

A story will illustrate why I enjoy Ike so much: Every two years I'm part of an informal group that gathers to have fun and explore a few subjects. Last September, meeting at Bishop's Lodge in Santa Fe, we asked Ike, his wife Roz, and his son Alan to come by and educate us on jewels and the jewelry business.

有一个故事可以说明我为什么这么欣赏艾克：每两年，我都会参加一个非正式团体，大家聚在一起玩乐并探讨一些话题。去年9月，我们在圣达菲的主教旅馆聚会，我们邀请了艾克、他的妻子罗兹和他的儿子艾伦前来，为我们讲解珠宝和珠宝业务。

Ike decided to dazzle the group, so he brought from Omaha about $20 million of particularly fancy merchandise. I was somewhat apprehensive - Bishop's Lodge is no Fort Knox - and I mentioned my concern to Ike at our opening party the evening before his presentation. Ike took me aside. "See that safe?" he said. "This afternoon we changed the combination and now even the hotel management doesn't know what it is." I breathed easier. Ike went on: "See those two big fellows with guns on their hips? They'll be guarding the safe all night." I now was ready to rejoin the party. But Ike leaned closer: "And besides, Warren," he confided, "the jewels aren't in the safe."

艾克想让大家大开眼界，于是他从奥马哈带来了价值约2000万美元的特别高档的商品。我有些担心——主教旅馆可不是诺克斯堡（美国联邦黄金储备地）——在他演讲前一晚的开幕派对上，我向艾克表达了我的担忧。艾克把我拉到一边。“看到那个保险箱了吗？”他说，“今天下午我们换了密码，现在连酒店管理层都不知道密码是什么。”我松了口气。艾克接着说：“看到那两个腰上别着枪的大个子了吗？他们会整夜守着这个保险箱。”我这下准备好回到派对上去了。但艾克凑近了些，悄悄对我说：“而且，沃伦，珠宝不在保险箱里。”

How can we miss with a fellow like that - particularly when he comes equipped with a talented and energetic family, Alan, Marvin Cohn, and Don Yale.

有这样一个人，我们怎么可能失败呢——尤其是当他身边还有才华横溢、精力充沛的家人艾伦、马文·科恩和唐·耶尔的时候。

o At See's Candies we had an 8% increase in pounds sold, even though 1988 was itself a record year. Included in the 1989 performance were excellent same-store poundage gains, our first in many years.

在喜诗糖果，尽管1988年本身就是创纪录的一年，但1989年的销量仍增长了8%。1989年的业绩中包括了出色的同店销量增长，这是我们多年来的首次。

Advertising played an important role in this outstanding performance. We increased total advertising expenditures from $4 million to $5 million and also got copy from our agency, Hal Riney & Partners, Inc., that was 100% on the money in conveying the qualities that make See's special.

广告在这一出色业绩中发挥了重要作用。我们将广告总支出从400万美元增加到500万美元，并且从我们的广告公司哈尔·莱尼合伙公司那里获得的文案，在传达喜诗的独特品质方面非常到位。

In our media businesses, such as the Buffalo News, we sell advertising. In other businesses, such as See's, we are buyers. When we buy, we practice exactly what we preach when we sell. At See's, we more than tripled our expenditures on newspaper advertising last year, to the highest percentage of sales that I can remember. The payoff was terrific, and we thank both Hal Riney and the power of well-directed newspaper advertising for this result.

在我们的媒体业务中，比如《布法罗新闻报》，我们销售广告。在其他业务中，比如喜诗，我们是广告的购买者。当我们购买广告时，我们完全践行了我们在销售广告时所宣扬的理念。在喜诗，去年我们在报纸广告上的支出增加了两倍多，达到了我记忆中占销售额最高的比例。回报非常可观，我们要感谢哈尔·莱尼以及目标明确的报纸广告的力量带来了这一结果。

See's splendid performances have become routine. But there is nothing routine about the management of Chuck Huggins: His daily involvement with all aspects of production and sales imparts a quality-and-service message to the thousands of employees we need to produce and distribute over 27 million pounds of candy annually. In a company with 225 shops and a massive mail order and phone business, it is no small trick to run things so that virtually every customer leaves happy. Chuck makes it look easy.

喜诗出色的业绩已经变得常态化。但查克·哈金斯的管理绝非寻常：他每天都参与生产和销售的各个方面，向我们每年生产和配送超过2700万磅糖果所需的数千名员工传递着质量和服务的理念。在一家拥有225家门店以及庞大的邮购和电话业务的公司里，要做到几乎每个顾客都满意而归并非易事。但查克却让这一切看起来很轻松。

o The Nebraska Furniture Mart had record sales and excellent earnings in 1989, but there was one sad note. Mrs. B - Rose Blumkin, who started the company 52 years ago with $500 - quit in May, after disagreeing with other members of the Blumkin family/management about the remodeling and operation of the carpet department.

内布拉斯加家具卖场在1989年实现了创纪录的销售额和出色的收益，但也有一个令人遗憾的消息。B夫人——罗斯·布卢姆金，52年前用500美元创办了这家公司——在5月辞职，原因是她与布卢姆金家族/管理层的其他成员在地毯部门的改造和运营方面存在分歧。

Mrs. B probably has made more smart business decisions than any living American, but in this particular case I believe the other members of the family were entirely correct: Over the past three years, while the store's other departments increased sales by 24%, carpet sales declined by 17% (but not because of any lack of sales ability by Mrs. B, who has always personally sold far more merchandise than any other salesperson in the store).

B夫人做出的明智商业决策可能比任何一位在世的美国人都多，但在这件事上，我认为家族的其他成员是完全正确的：在过去三年里，商店其他部门的销售额增长了24%，而地毯部门的销售额却下降了17%（但这并非因为B夫人缺乏销售能力，她个人的销售额一直远远超过店里的任何其他销售人员）。

You will be pleased to know that Mrs. B continues to make Horatio Alger's heroes look like victims of tired blood. At age 96 she has started a new business selling - what else? - carpet and furniture. And as always, she works seven days a week.

你会很高兴地知道，B夫人让霍雷肖·阿尔杰笔下的英雄们都显得像精神不振的人。96岁高龄的她又开了一家新公司，销售的不是别的——正是地毯和家具。而且和往常一样，她一周工作七天。

At the Mart Louie, Ron, and Irv Blumkin continue to propel what is by far the largest and most successful home furnishings store in the country. They are outstanding merchants, outstanding managers, and a joy to be associated with. One reading on their acumen: In the fourth quarter of 1989, the carpet department registered a 75.3% consumer share in the Omaha market, up from 67.7% a year earlier and over six times that of its nearest competitor.

在家具卖场，路易、罗恩和欧文·布卢姆金继续推动着这家目前全国最大、最成功的家居用品商店的发展。他们是杰出的商人，杰出的管理者，与他们合作是一件乐事。从一个数据可以看出他们的敏锐：1989年第四季度，地毯部门在奥马哈市场的消费者份额达到75.3%，高于一年前的67.7%，是其最接近的竞争对手的六倍多。

NFM and Borsheim's follow precisely the same formula for success: (1) unparalleled depth and breadth of merchandise at one location; (2) the lowest operating costs in the business; (3) the shrewdest of buying, made possible in part by the huge volumes purchased; (4) gross margins, and therefore prices, far below competitors'; and (5) friendly personalized service with family members on hand at all times.

内布拉斯加家具卖场和博希姆遵循着完全相同的成功模式：（1）在一个地点拥有无与伦比的商品深度和广度；（2）行业内最低的运营成本；（3）精明的采购，这在一定程度上得益于巨大的采购量；（4）毛利率以及因此而来的价格远低于竞争对手；（5）友好的个性化服务，家庭成员随时在场。

Another plug for newspapers: NFM increased its linage in the local paper by over 20% in 1989 - off a record 1988 - and remains the paper's largest ROP advertiser by far. (ROP advertising is the kind printed in the paper, as opposed to that in preprinted inserts.) To my knowledge, Omaha is the only city in which a home furnishings store is the advertising leader. Many retailers cut space purchases in 1989; our experience at See's and NFM would indicate they made a major mistake.

再为报纸说句好话：内布拉斯加家具卖场在1989年增加了在当地报纸上的广告篇幅，增幅超过20%——在1988年创纪录的基础上——并且至今仍是该报最大的ROP广告商。（ROP广告是指印刷在报纸上的广告，与预印插页中的广告相对。）据我所知，奥马哈是唯一一个家居用品商店成为广告领军者的城市。1989年，许多零售商减少了广告版面的购买；我们在喜诗和内布拉斯加家具卖场的经验表明，他们犯了一个重大错误。

o The Buffalo News continued to star in 1989 in three important ways: First, among major metropolitan papers, both daily and Sunday, the News is number one in household penetration - the percentage of local households that purchase it each day. Second, in "news hole" - the portion of the paper devoted to news - the paper stood at 50.1% in 1989 vs. 49.5% in 1988, a level again making it more news-rich than any comparable American paper. Third, in a year that saw profits slip at many major papers, the News set its seventh consecutive profit record.

《布法罗新闻报》在1989年继续在三个重要方面表现出色：第一，在主要的大都市报纸中，无论是日报还是周日版，该报在家庭渗透率方面均位居第一——即当地每天购买该报的家庭比例。第二，在“新闻版面占比”——报纸中用于新闻的部分——1989年为50.1%，而1988年为49.5%，这一水平再次使其比美国任何可比报纸的新闻含量都更高。第三，在许多主要报纸利润下滑的一年里，该报连续第七年创下利润纪录。

To some extent, these three factors are related, though obviously a high-percentage news hole, by itself, reduces profits significantly. A large and intelligently-utilized news hole, however, attracts a wide spectrum of readers and thereby boosts penetration. High penetration, in turn, makes a newspaper particularly valuable to retailers since it allows them to talk to the entire community through a single "megaphone." A low-penetration paper is a far less compelling purchase for many advertisers and will eventually suffer in both ad rates and profits.

在某种程度上，这三个因素是相互关联的，尽管显然高比例的新闻版面本身会显著降低利润。然而，一个篇幅大且得到明智利用的新闻版面，能吸引广泛的读者，从而提高渗透率。反过来，高渗透率使报纸对零售商来说特别有价值，因为这让他们可以通过一个“扩音器”与整个社区对话。对于许多广告商来说，一份低渗透率的报纸远不是那么有吸引力的购买选择，最终会在广告费率和利润上受到影响。

It should be emphasized that our excellent penetration is neither an accident nor automatic. The population of Erie County, home territory of the News, has been falling - from 1,113,000 in 1970 to 1,015,000 in 1980 to an estimated 966,000 in 1988. Circulation figures tell a different story. In 1975, shortly before we started our Sunday edition, the Courier-Express, a long-established Buffalo paper, was selling 207,500 Sunday copies in Erie County. Last year - with population at least 5% lower - the News sold an average of 292,700 copies. I believe that in no other major Sunday market has there been anything close to that increase in penetration.

需要强调的是，我们出色的渗透率既不是偶然的，也不是自然而然的。《布法罗新闻报》的主场伊利县的人口一直在下降——从1970年的111.3万到1980年的101.5万，再到1988年估计为96.6万。发行量数据则呈现出不同的情况。1975年，在我们推出周日版前不久，《信使快报》——布法罗一家历史悠久的报纸——在伊利县的周日发行量为20.75万份。去年——在人口至少减少5%的情况下——《布法罗新闻报》的平均发行量为29.27万份。我相信，在其他主要的周日报纸市场中，没有哪一个的渗透率增长能接近这一水平。

When this kind of gain is made - and when a paper attains an unequaled degree of acceptance in its home town - someone is doing something right. In this case major credit clearly belongs to Murray Light, our long-time editor who daily creates an informative, useful, and interesting product. Credit should go also to the Circulation and Production Departments: A paper that is frequently late, because of production problems or distribution weaknesses, will lose customers, no matter how strong its editorial content.

当取得这样的成绩时——当一份报纸在其家乡获得无与伦比的认可度时——一定是有人做对了事情。在这种情况下，主要的功劳显然属于默里·莱特，我们的长期编辑，他每天都在打造一份信息丰富、有用且有趣的报纸。发行量部门和生产部门也值得称赞：一份因生产问题或发行薄弱而经常迟到的报纸，无论其编辑内容多么出色，都会失去读者。

Stan Lipsey, publisher of the News, has produced profits fully up to the strength of our product. I believe Stan's managerial skills deliver at least five extra percentage points in profit margin compared to the earnings that would be achieved by an average manager given the same circumstances. That is an amazing performance, and one that could only be produced by a talented manager who knows - and cares - about every nut and bolt of the business.

《布法罗新闻报》的出版商斯坦·利普西所创造的利润与我们产品的实力完全相符。我相信，在相同的情况下，与普通经理所能实现的收益相比，斯坦的管理技能至少能多带来5个百分点的利润率。这是一项惊人的业绩，只有那些了解并关心业务每一个细节的有才华的经理才能做到。

Stan's knowledge and talents, it should be emphasized, extend to the editorial product. His early years in the business were spent on the news side and he played a key role in developing and editing a series of stories that in 1972 won a Pulitzer Prize for the Sun Newspaper of Omaha. Stan and I have worked together for over 20 years, through some bad times as well as good, and I could not ask for a better partner.

需要强调的是，斯坦的知识和才能还延伸到了编辑产品方面。他早年在新闻行业的工作是在新闻采编方面，他在策划和编辑一系列报道中发挥了关键作用，这些报道为奥马哈的《太阳报》赢得了1972年的普利策奖。斯坦和我一起工作了20多年，经历了顺境和逆境，我找不到比他更好的合作伙伴了。

o At Fechheimer, the Heldman clan - Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred - continue their extraordinary performance. Profits in 1989 were down somewhat because of problems the business experienced in integrating a major 1988 acquisition. These problems will be ironed out in time. Meanwhile, return on invested capital at Fechheimer remains splendid.

在费策尔，赫尔德曼家族——鲍勃、乔治、加里、罗杰和弗雷德——继续着他们非凡的表现。1989年的利润有所下降，因为公司在整合1988年的一项重大收购时遇到了问题。这些问题终将得到解决。与此同时，费策尔的投资资本回报率仍然很高。

Like all of our managers, the Heldmans have an exceptional command of the details of their business. At last year's annual meeting I mentioned that when a prisoner enters San Quentin, Bob and George probably know his shirt size. That's only a slight exaggeration: No matter what area of the country is being discussed, they know exactly what is going on with major customers and with the competition.

和我们所有的经理一样，赫尔德曼家族对他们业务的细节有着非凡的掌控力。在去年的年会上，我提到当一个囚犯进入圣昆廷监狱时，鲍勃和乔治可能知道他的衬衫尺寸。这只是略有夸张：无论讨论的是美国的哪个地区，他们都确切地知道主要客户和竞争对手的情况。

Though we purchased Fechheimer four years ago, Charlie and I have never visited any of its plants or the home office in Cincinnati. We're much like the lonesome Maytag repairman: The Heldman managerial product is so good that a service call is never needed.

尽管我们在四年前收购了费策尔，但查理和我从未参观过它的任何工厂或位于辛辛那提的总部。我们很像孤独的美泰克修理工：赫尔德曼家族的管理成果非常好，永远不需要“上门维修”。

o Ralph Schey continues to do a superb job in managing our largest group - World Book, Kirby, and the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Companies. Aggregate earnings of these businesses have increased every year since our purchase and returns on invested capital continue to be exceptional. Ralph is running an enterprise large enough, were it standing alone, to be on the Fortune 500. And he's running it in a fashion that would put him high in the top decile, measured by return on equity.

拉尔夫·谢伊在管理我们最大的集团——世界图书公司、柯比公司和斯科特·费策尔制造公司方面继续表现出色。自从我们收购这些业务以来，它们的总收益每年都在增长，投资资本回报率也一直非常高。拉尔夫经营的企业规模足够大，如果独立存在，足以进入《财富》500强。而且以净资产收益率来衡量，他的经营方式将使他处于前十分之一的高位。

For some years, World Book has operated out of a single location in Chicago's Merchandise Mart. Anticipating the imminent expiration of its lease, the business is now decentralizing into four locations. The expenses of this transition are significant; nevertheless profits in 1989 held up well. It will be another year before costs of the move are fully behind us.

多年来，世界图书公司一直在芝加哥商品市场的一个地点运营。由于预计租约即将到期，该公司现在正分散到四个地点。这一转型的费用很高；尽管如此，1989年的利润仍然保持良好。还需要一年时间，搬迁的成本才能完全过去。

Kirby's business was particularly strong last year, featuring large gains in export sales. International business has more than doubled in the last two years and quintupled in the past four; its share of unit sales has risen from 5% to 20%. Our largest capital expenditures in 1989 were at Kirby, in preparation for a major model change in 1990.

柯比去年的业务特别强劲，出口销售大幅增长。过去两年，国际业务增长了一倍多，过去四年增长了五倍；其在总销量中的占比从5%上升到20%。我们1989年最大的资本支出是在柯比，为1990年的重大型号变更做准备。

Ralph's operations contribute about 40% of the total earnings of the non-insurance group whose results are shown on page 49. When we bought Scott Fetzer at the start of 1986, our acquisition of Ralph as a manager was fully as important as our acquisition of the businesses. In addition to generating extraordinary earnings, Ralph also manages capital extremely well. These abilities have produced funds for Berkshire that, in turn, have allowed us to make many other profitable commitments.

拉尔夫管理的业务贡献了第49页所示的非保险集团总收益的约40%。1986年初我们收购斯科特·费策尔时，收购拉尔夫作为经理与收购这些业务本身同样重要。除了创造非凡的收益外，拉尔夫还非常善于管理资本。这些能力为伯克希尔创造了资金，进而使我们能够做出许多其他有利可图的投资。

And that completes our answer to the 1927 Yankees.

以上就是我们对1927年洋基队的“回应”。

# Insurance Operations (保险业务)

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:

以下是我们常用的表格的更新版本，展示了财产意外险行业的关键数据：

	Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%) (保费收入年度变化率（%）)	Statutory Combined Ratio After Policyholder Dividends (法定综合赔付率（扣除保户红利后）)	Yearly Change in Incurred Losses (%) (已发生损失年度变化率（%）)	Inflation Rate Measured by GNP Deflator (%) (以国民生产总值平减指数衡量的通货膨胀率（%）)
1981	3.8	106.0	6.5	9.6
1982	3.7	109.6	8.4	6.5
1983	5.0	112.0	6.8	3.8
1984	8.5	118.0	16.9	3.8
1985	22.1	116.3	16.1	3.0
1986	22.2	108.0	13.5	2.6
1987	9.4	104.6	7.8	3.1
1988	4.4	105.4	5.5	3.3
1989 (Est.) (1989（预估）)	2.1	110.4	8.7	4.2

Source: A.M. Best Co. (来源：A.M. 贝斯特公司)

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically produces an overall breakeven result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合赔付率是指总保险成本（已发生损失加上费用）与保费收入的比率：比率低于100表示承保盈利，高于100表示承保亏损。当考虑到保险公司从持有保户资金（“浮存金”）中获得的投资收益时，综合赔付率在107-111范围内通常会产生总体盈亏平衡的结果，不包括股东提供资金所产生的收益。

For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually, even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower. (Actually, over the last 25 years, incurred losses have grown at a still faster rate, 11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry's tendency to underreserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time.

出于之前报告中阐述的原因，我们预计行业的已发生损失将以每年约10%的速度增长，即使在一般通货膨胀率低得多的年份也是如此。（实际上，在过去25年里，已发生损失的增长速度更快，达到了11%。）如果与此同时，保费增长显著落后于10%的速度，承保损失将会增加，尽管当业务恶化时，行业倾向于计提不足的准备金，这可能会在一段时间内掩盖损失的规模。

Last year we said the climb in the combined ratio was "almost certain to continue - and probably will accelerate - for at least two more years." This year we will not predict acceleration, but otherwise must repeat last year's forecast. Premium growth is running far below the 10% required annually. Remember also that a 10% rate would only stabilize the combined ratio, not bring it down.

去年我们曾表示，综合赔付率的上升“几乎肯定会持续——而且可能会加速——至少再持续两年”。今年我们不会预测加速，但在其他方面必须重复去年的预测。保费增长远低于每年所需的10%。还要记住，10%的增长率只能稳定综合赔付率，而不能使其下降。

The increase in the combined ratio in 1989 was a little more than we had expected because catastrophes (led by Hurricane Hugo) were unusually severe. These abnormalities probably accounted for about two points of the increase. If 1990 is more of a "normal" year, the combined ratio should rise only minimally from the catastrophe-swollen base of 1989. In 1991, though, the ratio is apt to climb by a greater degree.

1989年综合赔付率的上升略高于我们的预期，因为灾难性事件（以雨果飓风为首）异常严重。这些异常情况可能导致了约两个百分点的增长。如果1990年更接近“正常”年份，综合赔付率相较于1989年因灾难而膨胀的基数，应该只会有微小上升。然而，到1991年，这一比率可能会有更大幅度的上升。

Commentators frequently discuss the "underwriting cycle" and speculate about its next turn. If that term is used to connote rhythmic qualities, it is in our view a misnomer that leads to faulty thinking about the industry's fundamental economics.

评论员们经常讨论“承保周期”，并猜测其下一个转折点。如果这个术语被用来暗示有节奏的特征，在我们看来，这是一个不当的名称，会导致对该行业基本经济状况的错误认识。

The term was appropriate some decades ago when the industry and regulators cooperated to conduct the business in cartel fashion. At that time, the combined ratio fluctuated rhythmically for two reasons, both related to lags. First, data from the past were analyzed and then used to set new "corrected" rates, which were subsequently put into effect by virtually all insurers. Second, the fact that almost all policies were then issued for a one-to three-year term - which meant that it took a considerable time for mispriced policies to expire - delayed the impact of new rates on revenues. These two lagged responses made combined ratios behave much like alternating current. Meanwhile, the absence of significant price competition guaranteed that industry profits, averaged out over the cycle, would be satisfactory.

几十年前，当该行业与监管机构合作以卡特尔方式开展业务时，这个术语是恰当的。当时，综合赔付率有节奏地波动，原因有两个，都与滞后性有关。首先，分析过去的数据，然后用其来设定新的“修正”费率，随后几乎所有保险公司都实施了这些费率。其次，当时几乎所有保单的期限都是1到3年，这意味着定价不当的保单需要相当长的时间才会到期，这就延迟了新费率对收入的影响。这两种滞后反应使得综合赔付率的表现很像交流电。与此同时，缺乏激烈的价格竞争保证了行业在整个周期内的平均利润会令人满意。

The cartel period is long gone. Now the industry has hundreds of participants selling a commodity-like product at independently-established prices. Such a configuration - whether the product being sold is steel or insurance policies - is certain to cause subnormal profitability in all circumstances but one: a shortage of usable capacity. Just how often these periods occur and how long they last determines the average profitability of the industry in question.

卡特尔时期早已过去。现在，该行业有数百个参与者，以独立设定的价格销售类似商品的产品。这种格局——无论销售的产品是钢铁还是保险单——在所有情况下都必然导致低于正常水平的盈利能力，只有一种情况除外：可用产能短缺。这些时期发生的频率和持续时间决定了相关行业的平均盈利能力。

In most industries, capacity is described in physical terms. In the insurance world, however, capacity is customarily described in financial terms; that is, it's considered appropriate for a company to write no more than X dollars of business if it has Y dollars of net worth. In practice, however, constraints of this sort have proven ineffective. Regulators, insurance brokers, and customers are all slow to discipline companies that strain their resources. They also acquiesce when companies grossly overstate their true capital. Hence, a company can write a great deal of business with very little capital if it is so inclined. At bottom, therefore, the amount of industry capacity at any particular moment primarily depends on the mental state of insurance managers.

在大多数行业中，产能是用物理术语来描述的。然而，在保险领域，产能通常用财务术语来描述；也就是说，如果一家公司拥有Y美元的净值，那么其承保业务不超过X美元被认为是合适的。然而，在实践中，这种限制被证明是无效的。监管机构、保险经纪人和客户在约束那些过度使用资源的公司方面都行动迟缓。当公司严重高估其实际资本时，他们也会默许。因此，如果一家公司有此倾向，它可以用很少的资本承保大量业务。因此，归根结底，在任何特定时刻，行业的产能主要取决于保险经理们的心态。

All this understood, it is not very difficult to prognosticate the industry's profits. Good profits will be realized only when there is a shortage of capacity. Shortages will occur only when insurers are frightened. That happens rarely - and most assuredly is not happening now.

明白了这一切，预测该行业的利润就不是很困难了。只有当产能短缺时，才能实现良好的利润。只有当保险公司感到恐慌时，才会出现短缺。这种情况很少发生——而且现在肯定没有发生。

Some analysts have argued that the more onerous taxes recently imposed on the insurance industry and 1989's catastrophes - Hurricane Hugo and the California earthquake - will cause prices to strengthen significantly. We disagree. These adversities have not destroyed the eagerness of insurers to write business at present prices. Therefore, premium volume won't grow by 10% in 1990, which means the negative underwriting trend will not reverse.

一些分析师认为，最近对保险业征收的更繁重的税收以及1989年的灾难——雨果飓风和加利福尼亚地震——将导致价格大幅上涨。我们不同意这种观点。这些逆境并没有消除保险公司以当前价格承保业务的热情。因此，1990年保费规模不会增长10%，这意味着负面的承保趋势不会逆转。

The industry will meantime say it needs higher prices to achieve profitability matching that of the average American business. Of course it does. So does the steel business. But needs and desires have nothing to do with the long-term profitability of industries. Instead, economic fundamentals determine the outcome. Insurance profitability will improve only when virtually all insurers are turning away business despite higher prices. And we're a long way from that point.

与此同时，该行业会说，它需要更高的价格才能实现与美国普通企业相当的盈利能力。当然它需要。钢铁行业也是如此。但需求和愿望与行业的长期盈利能力无关。相反，经济基本面决定了结果。只有当几乎所有保险公司都在价格上涨的情况下拒绝承保业务时，保险业的盈利能力才会改善。而我们离这一点还有很长的路要走。

Berkshire's premium volume may drop to $150 million or so in 1990 (from a high of $1 billion in 1986), partly because our traditional business continues to shrink and partly because the contract under which we received 7% of the business of Fireman's Fund expired last August. Whatever the size of the drop, it will not disturb us. We have no interest in writing insurance that carries a mathematical expectation of loss; we experience enough disappointments doing transactions we believe to carry an expectation of profit.

伯克希尔的保费规模在1990年可能会降至1.5亿美元左右（从1986年10亿美元的高点下降），部分原因是我们的传统业务持续萎缩，部分原因是我们获得消防员基金7%业务的合同于去年8月到期。无论下降幅度如何，都不会让我们感到不安。我们对承保那些在数学上存在损失预期的保险没有兴趣；在进行我们认为有利润预期的交易时，我们已经经历了足够多的失望。

However, our appetite for appropriately-priced business is ample, as one tale from 1989 will tell. It concerns "CAT covers," which are reinsurance contracts that primary insurance companies (and also reinsurers themselves) buy to protect themselves against a single catastrophe, such as a tornado or hurricane, that produces losses from a large number of policies. In these contracts, the primary insurer might retain the loss from a single event up to a maximum of, say, $10 million, buying various layers of reinsurance above that level. When losses exceed the retained amount, the reinsurer typically pays 95% of the excess up to its contractual limit, with the primary insurer paying the remainder. (By requiring the primary insurer to keep 5% of each layer, the reinsurer leaves him with a financial stake in each loss settlement and guards against his throwing away the reinsurer's money.)

然而，我们对定价合理的业务有浓厚的兴趣，1989年的一个故事就能说明这一点。它涉及“巨灾保障”，即原保险公司（以及再保险公司自身）购买的再保险合同，以保护自己免受单一巨灾（如龙卷风或飓风）的影响，这种巨灾会导致大量保单产生损失。在这些合同中，原保险公司可能会保留单次事件造成的损失，上限为例如1000万美元，然后购买该水平以上的多层再保险。当损失超过自留金额时，再保险公司通常会支付超出部分的95%，直至达到合同限额，剩余部分由原保险公司支付。（通过要求原保险公司保留每一层的5%，再保险公司让其在每次损失理赔中拥有经济利益，并防止其浪费再保险公司的资金。）

CAT covers are usually one-year policies that also provide for one automatic reinstatement, which requires a primary insurer whose coverage has been exhausted by a catastrophe to buy a second cover for the balance of the year in question by paying another premium. This provision protects the primary company from being "bare" for even a brief period after a first catastrophic event. The duration of "an event" is usually limited by contract to any span of 72 hours designated by the primary company. Under this definition, a wide-spread storm, causing damage for three days, will be classified as a single event if it arises from a single climatic cause. If the storm lasts four days, however, the primary company will file a claim carving out the 72 consecutive hours during which it suffered the greatest damage. Losses that occurred outside that period will be treated as arising from a separate event.

巨灾保障通常是一年期保单，还包含一次自动恢复条款，即当原保险公司的保障因巨灾而耗尽时，需支付另一笔保费，为该年度剩余时间购买第二份保障。这一条款保护原保险公司在首次巨灾事件后不会有哪怕短暂的“裸露”期。“一次事件”的持续时间通常在合同中限定为原保险公司指定的任何72小时时段。根据这一定义，如果一场大范围风暴由单一气候原因引发，造成三天的损失，将被归类为单次事件。然而，如果风暴持续四天，原保险公司会提出索赔，划定损失最严重的连续72小时。该时段之外发生的损失将被视为由另一次事件引起。

In 1989, two unusual things happened. First, Hurricane Hugo generated $4 billion or more of insured loss, at a pace, however, that caused the vast damage in the Carolinas to occur slightly more than 72 hours after the equally severe damage in the Caribbean. Second, the California earthquake hit within weeks, causing insured damage that was difficult to estimate, even well after the event. Slammed by these two - or possibly three - major catastrophes, some primary insurers, and also many reinsurers that had themselves bought CAT protection, either used up their automatic second cover or became uncertain as to whether they had done so.

1989年发生了两件不寻常的事。首先，雨果飓风造成了40亿美元或更多的保险损失，但卡罗来纳州的巨大损失发生在加勒比地区遭受同等严重损失之后略多于72小时。其次，几周内加利福尼亚地震发生，即使在事件发生后很久，其造成的保险损失也难以估计。受到这两次——或可能三次——重大巨灾的冲击，一些原保险公司以及许多自身购买了巨灾保障的再保险公司，要么用尽了自动恢复的第二份保障，要么不确定自己是否已经用尽。

At that point sellers of CAT policies had lost a huge amount of money - perhaps twice because of the reinstatements - and not taken in much in premiums. Depending upon many variables, a CAT premium might generally have run 3% to 15% of the amount of protection purchased. For some years, we've thought premiums of that kind inadequate and have stayed away from the business.

当时，巨灾保单的卖方已经损失了巨额资金——由于恢复条款，可能损失了两倍——而收取的保费却不多。根据多种变量，巨灾保费通常可能为所购买保障金额的3%至15%。多年来，我们一直认为这类保费不足，因此远离了这项业务。

But because the 1989 disasters left many insurers either actually or possibly bare, and also left most CAT writers licking their wounds, there was an immediate shortage after the earthquake of much-needed catastrophe coverage. Prices instantly became attractive, particularly for the reinsurance that CAT writers themselves buy. Just as instantly, Berkshire Hathaway offered to write up to $250 million of catastrophe coverage, advertising that proposition in trade publications. Though we did not write all the business we sought, we did in a busy ten days book a substantial amount.

但由于1989年的灾难使许多保险公司实际上或可能处于无保障状态，且大多数巨灾保单卖方元气大伤，地震后急需的巨灾保障立即出现短缺。价格随即变得具有吸引力，特别是对于巨灾保单卖方自身购买的再保险。伯克希尔·哈撒韦立即提出承保高达2.5亿美元的巨灾保障，并在行业出版物上宣传这一业务。尽管我们没有承保到所有寻求的业务，但在忙碌的十天内确实承保了相当数量的业务。

Our willingness to put such a huge sum on the line for a loss that could occur tomorrow sets us apart from any reinsurer in the world. There are, of course, companies that sometimes write $250 million or even far more of catastrophe coverage. But they do so only when they can, in turn, reinsure a large percentage of the business with other companies. When they can't "lay off" in size, they disappear from the market.

我们愿意为可能明天就发生的损失投入如此巨额资金，这使我们有别于世界上任何再保险公司。当然，有些公司有时会承保2.5亿美元甚至更多的巨灾保障。但它们只有在能够将大部分业务再保险给其他公司时才会这样做。当它们无法大规模“分保”时，就会退出市场。

Berkshire's policy, conversely, is to retain the business we write rather than lay it off. When rates carry an expectation of profit, we want to assume as much risk as is prudent. And in our case, that's a lot.

相反，伯克希尔的政策是保留我们承保的业务，而不是分保出去。当费率具有利润预期时，我们希望承担尽可能多的审慎风险。就我们而言，这个量很大。

We will accept more reinsurance risk for our own account than any other company because of two factors: (1) by the standards of regulatory accounting, we have a net worth in our insurance companies of about $6 billion - the second highest amount in the United States; and (2) we simply don't care what earnings we report quarterly, or even annually, just as long as the decisions leading to those earnings (or losses) were reached intelligently.

我们愿意为自己账户承担比任何其他公司更多的再保险风险，原因有二：（1）按照监管会计标准，我们保险公司的净值约为60亿美元——在美国排名第二；（2）我们根本不在乎季度甚至年度报告的收益如何，只要导致这些收益（或损失）的决策是明智的。

Obviously, if we write $250 million of catastrophe coverage and retain it all ourselves, there is some probability that we will lose the full $250 million in a single quarter. That probability is low, but it is not zero. If we had a loss of that magnitude, our after-tax cost would be about $165 million. Though that is far more than Berkshire normally earns in a quarter, the damage would be a blow only to our pride, not to our well-being.

显然，如果我们承保2.5亿美元的巨灾保障并全部自留，存在单季度损失全部2.5亿美元的可能性。这种概率很低，但并非为零。如果发生这样的损失，我们的税后成本约为1.65亿美元。尽管这远高于伯克希尔通常一个季度的收益，但这种损失只会打击我们的自尊心，不会影响我们的财务健康。

This posture is one few insurance managements will assume. Typically, they are willing to write scads of business on terms that almost guarantee them mediocre returns on equity. But they do not want to expose themselves to an embarrassing single-quarter loss, even if the managerial strategy that causes the loss promises, over time, to produce superior results. I can understand their thinking: What is best for their owners is not necessarily best for the managers. Fortunately Charlie and I have both total job security and financial interests that are identical with those of our shareholders. We are willing to look foolish as long as we don't feel we have acted foolishly.

这种态度是很少有保险管理层会采取的。通常，他们愿意按照几乎保证股本回报率平庸的条款承保大量业务。但他们不愿让自己面临尴尬的单季度损失，即使导致损失的管理策略长期来看有望产生卓越成果。我能理解他们的想法：对所有者最有利的不一定对管理者最有利。幸运的是，查理和我都有完全的工作保障，且财务利益与股东完全一致。只要我们不觉得自己的行为愚蠢，就愿意看起来愚蠢。

Our method of operation, incidentally, makes us a stabilizing force in the industry. We add huge capacity when capacity is short and we become less competitive only when capacity is abundant. Of course, we don't follow this policy in the interest of stabilization - we follow it because we believe it to be the most sensible and profitable course of action. Nevertheless, our behavior steadies the market. In this case, Adam Smith's invisible hand works as advertised.

顺便说一句，我们的运营方式使我们成为行业中的稳定力量。当产能短缺时，我们增加大量产能；当产能充足时，我们降低竞争力。当然，我们遵循这一政策并非为了稳定行业——而是因为我们认为这是最明智且最有利可图的做法。尽管如此，我们的行为稳定了市场。在这种情况下，亚当·斯密的看不见的手发挥了应有的作用。

Currently, we hold an exceptional amount of float compared to premium volume. This circumstance should produce quite favorable insurance results for us during the next few years as it did in 1989. Our underwriting losses should be tolerable and our investment income from policyholder funds large. This pleasant situation, however, will gradually deteriorate as our float runs off.

目前，相对于保费规模，我们持有的浮存金数量异常庞大。这种情况应该会在未来几年为我们带来相当有利的保险业绩，就像1989年一样。我们的承保损失应该是可承受的，来自保户资金的投资收益将会丰厚。然而，随着浮存金的减少，这种良好局面将逐渐恶化。

At some point, however, there will be an opportunity for us to write large amounts of profitable business. Mike Goldberg and his management team of Rod Eldred, Dinos Iordanou, Ajit Jain, Phil Urban, and Don Wurster continue to position us well for this eventuality.

然而，在某个时候，我们将会有机会承保大量盈利业务。迈克·戈德堡及其管理团队（罗德·埃尔德雷德、迪诺斯·约尔达努、阿吉特·贾恩、菲尔·厄本和唐·沃斯特）继续为我们做好准备，以应对这种情况。

# Marketable Securities (可交易证券)

In selecting marketable securities for our insurance companies, we generally choose among five major categories: (1) long-term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed income securities, (3) long-term fixed income securities, (4) short-term cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.

在为我们的保险公司选择可交易证券时，我们通常在五大类中进行选择：（1）长期普通股投资，（2）中期固定收益证券，（3）长期固定收益证券，（4）短期现金等价物，（5）短期套利承诺。

We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories; we just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax returns as measured by "mathematical expectation," limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal, rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.

在选择这些类别时，我们没有特别的偏好；我们只是不断在其中寻找以“数学预期”衡量的最高税后回报，始终局限于我们认为自己理解的投资选择。我们的标准与最大化即时可报告收益无关；相反，我们的目标是最大化最终净值。

o Below we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

Shares (股数)	Company (公司)	Cost (成本)	Market (市值)
		(000s omitted) (单位：千，省略)
3,000,000	Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (首都/美国广播公司)	$ 517,500	$1,692,375
23,350,000	The Coca-Cola Co. (可口可乐公司)	1,023,920	1,803,787
2,400,000	Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (联邦住房贷款抵押公司)	71,729	161,100
6,850,000	GEICO Corp. (政府雇员保险公司)	45,713	1,044,625
1,727,765	The Washington Post Company (华盛顿邮报公司)	9,731	486,366

This list of companies is the same as last year's and in only one case has the number of shares changed: Our holdings of Coca-Cola increased from 14,172,500 shares at the end of 1988 to 23,350,000.

这份公司名单与去年相同，只有一处股数发生了变化：我们持有的可口可乐股份从1988年底的14,172,500股增加到23,350,000股。

This Coca-Cola investment provides yet another example of the incredible speed with which your Chairman responds to investment opportunities, no matter how obscure or well-disguised they may be. I believe I had my first Coca-Cola in either 1935 or 1936. Of a certainty, it was in 1936 that I started buying Cokes at the rate of six for 25 cents from Buffett & Son, the family grocery store, to sell around the neighborhood for 5 cents each. In this excursion into high-margin retailing, I duly observed the extraordinary consumer attractiveness and commercial possibilities of the product.

这笔可口可乐投资再次证明，你的董事长对投资机会的反应速度之快令人难以置信，无论这些机会多么隐蔽或伪装得多么好。我记得我第一次喝可口可乐是在1935年或1936年。可以肯定的是，1936年，我开始从家族杂货店巴菲特父子公司以25美分6瓶的价格购买可乐，然后在附近以每瓶5美分的价格出售。在这次高利润率的零售尝试中，我充分观察到了这款产品非凡的消费者吸引力和商业潜力。

I continued to note these qualities for the next 52 years as Coke blanketed the world. During this period, however, I carefully avoided buying even a single share, instead allocating major portions of my net worth to street railway companies, windmill manufacturers, anthracite producers, textile businesses, trading-stamp issuers, and the like. (If you think I'm making this up, I can supply the names.) Only in the summer of 1988 did my brain finally establish contact with my eyes.

在接下来的52年里，随着可口可乐风靡全球，我一直注意到这些特质。然而，在此期间，我刻意避免购买哪怕一股可口可乐股票，而是将大部分净值配置到街头铁路公司、风车制造商、无烟煤生产商、纺织企业、交易印花发行商等类似公司。（如果你认为我是编造的，我可以提供公司名称。）直到1988年夏天，我的大脑才终于与眼睛建立了联系（意指终于认清了投资机会）。

What I then perceived was both clear and fascinating. After drifting somewhat in the 1970's, Coca-Cola had in 1981 become a new company with the move of Roberto Goizueta to CEO. Roberto, along with Don Keough, once my across-the-street neighbor in Omaha, first rethought and focused the company's policies and then energetically carried them out. What was already the world's most ubiquitous product gained new momentum, with sales overseas virtually exploding.

当时我所察觉到的情况既清晰又令人着迷。在20世纪70年代经历了一段动荡之后，随着罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔出任首席执行官，可口可乐在1981年焕然一新。罗伯托与唐·基奥（我在奥马哈的前街邻居）一起，首先重新思考并聚焦公司战略，然后积极执行。这款已然是世界上最普及的产品获得了新的动力，海外销售额几乎呈爆发式增长。

Through a truly rare blend of marketing and financial skills, Roberto has maximized both the growth of his product and the rewards that this growth brings to shareholders. Normally, the CEO of a consumer products company, drawing on his natural inclinations or experience, will cause either marketing or finance to dominate the business at the expense of the other discipline. With Roberto, the mesh of marketing and finance is perfect and the result is a shareholder's dream.

凭借罕见的营销与财务技能的完美结合，罗伯托既最大化了产品的增长，也最大化了这种增长给股东带来的回报。通常，消费品公司的首席执行官会根据自身的天性或经验，让营销或财务中的一方主导业务，而牺牲另一方。而在罗伯托的领导下，营销与财务完美融合，其结果是股东的梦想成真。

Of course, we should have started buying Coke much earlier, soon after Roberto and Don began running things. In fact, if I had been thinking straight I would have persuaded my grandfather to sell the grocery store back in 1936 and put all of the proceeds into Coca-Cola stock. I've learned my lesson: My response time to the next glaringly attractive idea will be slashed to well under 50 years.

当然，我们本应该更早开始买入可口可乐股票，就在罗伯托和唐开始执掌公司后不久。事实上，如果我当时思路清晰，早在1936年就会说服祖父卖掉杂货店，把所有收益都投入可口可乐股票。我吸取了教训：对于下一个极具吸引力的想法，我的反应时间将大幅缩短至远不到50年。

As I mentioned earlier, the yearend prices of our major investees were much higher relative to their intrinsic values than theretofore. While those prices may not yet cause nosebleeds, they are clearly vulnerable to a general market decline. A drop in their prices would not disturb us at all - it might in fact work to our eventual benefit - but it would cause at least a one-year reduction in Berkshire's net worth. We think such a reduction is almost certain in at least one of the next three years. Indeed, it would take only about a 10% year-to-year decline in the aggregate value of our portfolio investments to send Berkshire's net worth down.

正如我 earlier 提到的，我们主要被投资公司的年底股价相对于其内在价值而言，比以往高得多。虽然这些价格可能还不至于高到离谱，但显然容易受到整体市场下跌的影响。它们的价格下跌根本不会让我们不安——事实上，这可能最终对我们有利——但这至少会导致伯克希尔的净值在一年内下降。我们认为，未来三年内至少有一年出现这种下降几乎是肯定的。实际上，我们投资组合的总价值只需同比下降约10%，就会导致伯克希尔的净值下降。

We continue to be blessed with extraordinary managers at our portfolio companies. They are high-grade, talented, and shareholder-oriented. The exceptional results we have achieved while investing with them accurately reflect their exceptional personal qualities.

我们投资组合中的公司继续拥有卓越的管理层，这是我们的幸运。他们素质高、有才华且以股东为导向。我们在投资这些公司时取得的卓越成果，准确地反映了他们非凡的个人品质。

o We told you last year that we expected to do little in arbitrage during 1989, and that's the way it turned out. Arbitrage positions are a substitute for short-term cash equivalents, and during part of the year we held relatively low levels of cash. In the rest of the year we had a fairly good-sized cash position and even so chose not to engage in arbitrage. The main reason was corporate transactions that made no economic sense to us; arbitraging such deals comes too close to playing the greater-fool game. (As Wall Streeter Ray DeVoe says: "Fools rush in where angels fear to trade.") We will engage in arbitrage from time to time - sometimes on a large scale - but only when we like the odds.

我们去年曾告诉过大家，预计1989年在套利方面不会有太多动作，结果确实如此。套利头寸是短期现金等价物的替代品，年内有一段时间我们持有的现金水平相对较低。在其余时间里，我们持有相当数量的现金，但即便如此，我们也选择不进行套利。主要原因是那些对我们来说没有经济意义的公司交易；对这类交易进行套利，与玩“博傻游戏”太过接近。（正如华尔街人士雷·德沃所说：“傻瓜冲进天使不敢交易的地方。”）我们会时不时进行套利——有时规模还很大——但只有在我们看好胜算的时候才会这样做。

o Leaving aside the three convertible preferreds discussed in the next section, we substantially reduced our holdings in both medium- and long-term fixed-income securities. In the long-terms, just about our only holdings have been Washington Public Power Supply Systems (WPPSS) bonds carrying coupons ranging from low to high. During the year we sold a number of the low-coupon issues, which we originally bought at very large discounts. Many of these issues had approximately doubled in price since we purchased them and in addition had paid us 15%-17% annually, tax-free. Our prices upon sale were only slightly cheaper than typical high-grade tax-exempts then commanded. We have kept all of our high-coupon WPPSS issues. Some have been called for redemption in 1991 and 1992, and we expect the rest to be called in the early to mid-1990s.

暂且不考虑下一节讨论的三种可转换优先股，我们大幅减持了中期和长期固定收益证券。在长期证券中，我们几乎仅持有华盛顿公共电力供应系统（WPPSS）的债券，其票面利率高低不等。年内，我们出售了一些低票面利率的债券，这些债券最初是按很大的折扣购买的。其中许多债券的价格自我们购买以来大约翻了一番，此外还为我们带来了15%-17%的年化免税收益。我们的出售价格仅略低于当时典型的高评级免税债券的价格。我们保留了所有高票面利率的WPPSS债券。其中一些已被要求在1991年和1992年赎回，我们预计其余的将在90年代初至中期被赎回。

We also sold many of our medium-term tax-exempt bonds during the year. When we bought these bonds we said we would be happy to sell them - regardless of whether they were higher or lower than at our time of purchase - if something we liked better came along. Something did - and concurrently we unloaded most of these issues at modest gains. Overall, our 1989 profit from the sale of tax-exempt bonds was about $51 million pre-tax.

年内我们还出售了许多中期免税债券。我们购买这些债券时曾说过，如果出现我们更喜欢的投资标的，我们会很乐意出售它们——无论其价格高于还是低于我们的购买价。后来确实出现了更心仪的标的——因此我们以适度的收益抛售了大部分这类债券。总体而言，我们1989年出售免税债券的税前利润约为5100万美元。

o The proceeds from our bond sales, along with our excess cash at the beginning of the year and that generated later through earnings, went into the purchase of three convertible preferred stocks. In the first transaction, which took place in July, we purchased $600 million of The Gillette Co. preferred with an 8 3/4% dividend, a mandatory redemption in ten years, and the right to convert into common at $50 per share. We next purchased $358 million of USAir Group, Inc. preferred stock with mandatory redemption in ten years, a dividend of 9 1/4%, and the right to convert into common at $60 per share. Finally, late in the year we purchased $300 million of Champion International Corp. preferred with mandatory redemption in ten years, a 9 1/4% dividend, and the right to convert into common at $38 per share.

我们出售债券的收益，加上年初的超额现金以及后来通过盈利产生的现金，用于购买了三种可转换优先股。第一笔交易发生在7月，我们以6亿美元购买了吉列公司的优先股，股息率为8.75%，十年内强制赎回，可按每股50美元转换为普通股。接下来，我们以3.58亿美元购买了美国航空公司集团的优先股，十年内强制赎回，股息率为9.25%，可按每股60美元转换为普通股。最后，在年底，我们以3亿美元购买了冠军国际公司的优先股，十年内强制赎回，股息率为9.25%，可按每股38美元转换为普通股。

Unlike standard convertible preferred stocks, the issues we own are either non-salable or non-convertible for considerable periods of time and there is consequently no way we can gain from short-term price blips in the common stock. I have gone on the board of Gillette, but I am not on the board of USAir or Champion. (I thoroughly enjoy the boards I am on, but can't handle any more.)

与标准的可转换优先股不同，我们持有的这些优先股在相当长的时间内要么不可出售，要么不可转换，因此我们无法从普通股的短期价格波动中获利。我已加入吉列的董事会，但未加入美国航空或冠军国际的董事会。（我非常喜欢我所在的董事会，但无法再承担更多了。）

Gillette's business is very much the kind we like. Charlie and I think we understand the company's economics and therefore believe we can make a reasonably intelligent guess about its future. (If you haven't tried Gillette's new Sensor razor, go right out and get one.) However, we have no ability to forecast the economics of the investment banking business (in which we have a position through our 1987 purchase of Salomon convertible preferred), the airline industry, or the paper industry. This does not mean that we predict a negative future for these industries: we're agnostics, not atheists. Our lack of strong convictions about these businesses, however, means that we must structure our investments in them differently from what we do when we invest in a business appearing to have splendid economic characteristics.

吉列的业务非常符合我们的喜好。查理和我认为我们理解该公司的经济状况，因此相信我们能对其未来做出合理明智的猜测。（如果你还没试过吉列的新款Sensor剃须刀，赶紧去买一个。）然而，我们无法预测投资银行业（我们通过1987年购买所罗门兄弟的可转换优先股持有该行业的头寸）、航空业或造纸业的经济前景。这并不意味着我们预测这些行业的未来是负面的：我们是不可知论者，不是无神论者。然而，我们对这些业务缺乏强烈的信心，这意味着我们在这些业务中的投资结构必须与我们投资那些看起来具有卓越经济特征的业务时不同。

In one major respect, however, these purchases are not different: We only want to link up with people whom we like, admire, and trust. John Gutfreund at Salomon, Colman Mockler, Jr. at Gillette, Ed Colodny at USAir, and Andy Sigler at Champion meet this test in spades.

然而，在一个重要方面，这些投资是相同的：我们只希望与我们喜欢、钦佩和信任的人合作。所罗门的约翰·古特弗罗因德、吉列的小科尔曼·莫克勒、美国航空的埃德·科洛德尼以及冠军国际的安迪·西格勒都完全符合这一标准。

They in turn have demonstrated some confidence in us, insisting in each case that our preferreds have unrestricted voting rights on a fully-converted basis, an arrangement that is far from standard in corporate finance. In effect they are trusting us to be intelligent owners, thinking about tomorrow instead of today, just as we are trusting them to be intelligent managers, thinking about tomorrow as well as today.

反过来，他们也向我们展示了一定的信心，在每一笔交易中都坚持我们的优先股在完全转换的基础上拥有不受限制的投票权，这种安排在公司财务中远非标准做法。实际上，他们信任我们会成为明智的所有者，着眼于未来而非当下，就像我们信任他们会成为明智的管理者，既着眼于当下也着眼于未来一样。

The preferred-stock structures we have negotiated will provide a mediocre return for us if industry economics hinder the performance of our investees, but will produce reasonably attractive results for us if they can earn a return comparable to that of American industry in general. We believe that Gillette, under Colman's management, will far exceed that return and believe that John, Ed, and Andy will reach it unless industry conditions are harsh.

如果行业经济状况阻碍了我们被投资公司的业绩，我们协商的优先股结构将为我们带来平庸的回报，但如果它们能获得与美国行业平均水平相当的回报，将会为我们带来相当有吸引力的结果。我们相信，在科尔曼的管理下，吉列将远远超过这一回报，并且相信约翰、埃德和安迪将达到这一水平，除非行业状况严峻。

Under almost any conditions, we expect these preferreds to return us our money plus dividends. If that is all we get, though, the result will be disappointing, because we will have given up flexibility and consequently will have missed some significant opportunities that are bound to present themselves during the decade. Under that scenario, we will have obtained only a preferred-stock yield during a period when the typical preferred stock will have held no appeal for us whatsoever. The only way Berkshire can achieve satisfactory results from its four preferred issues is to have the common stocks of the investee companies do well.

在几乎任何情况下，我们都预计这些优先股将为我们带来本金加股息的回报。然而，如果这就是我们得到的全部，结果将令人失望，因为我们将失去灵活性，从而错过这十年中必然会出现的一些重要机会。在这种情况下，在一段典型优先股对我们毫无吸引力的时期，我们仅获得了优先股的收益率。伯克希尔要从这四项优先股投资中取得令人满意的结果，唯一的途径是被投资公司的普通股表现良好。

Good management and at least tolerable industry conditions will be needed if that is to happen. But we believe Berkshire's investment will also help and that the other shareholders of each investee will profit over the years ahead from our preferred-stock purchase. The help will come from the fact that each company now has a major, stable, and interested shareholder whose Chairman and Vice Chairman have, through Berkshire's investments, indirectly committed a very large amount of their own money to these undertakings. In dealing with our investees, Charlie and I will be supportive, analytical, and objective. We recognize that we are working with experienced CEOs who are very much in command of their own businesses but who nevertheless, at certain moments, appreciate the chance to test their thinking on someone without ties to their industry or to decisions of the past.

要实现这一点，需要良好的管理以及至少尚可的行业环境。但我们相信，伯克希尔的投资也会有所帮助，而且每家被投资公司的其他股东在未来几年也将从我们的优先股购买中获益。这种帮助源于这样一个事实：每家公司现在都有了一个重要、稳定且有兴趣的股东，其董事长和副董事长通过伯克希尔的投资，间接将自己大量的资金投入到这些事业中。在与被投资公司打交道时，查理和我会给予支持、进行分析且保持客观。我们认识到，我们合作的是经验丰富的首席执行官，他们对自己的业务了如指掌，但在某些时刻，他们也乐于有机会向与所在行业或过去决策无关的人验证自己的想法。

As a group, these convertible preferreds will not produce the returns we can achieve when we find a business with wonderful economic prospects that is unappreciated by the market. Nor will the returns be as attractive as those produced when we make our favorite form of capital deployment, the acquisition of 80% or more of a fine business with a fine management. But both opportunities are rare, particularly in a size befitting our present and anticipated resources.

总体而言，这些可转换优先股带来的回报，不会比得上我们发现具有极佳经济前景却被市场低估的企业时所获得的回报。其回报也不会像我们最青睐的资本配置方式——收购一家优秀企业80%或更多股权（且该企业拥有优秀管理团队）——所产生的回报那样有吸引力。但这两种机会都很罕见，尤其是在规模与我们当前及预期资源相匹配的情况下。

In summation, Charlie and I feel that our preferred stock investments should produce returns moderately above those achieved by most fixed-income portfolios and that we can play a minor but enjoyable and constructive role in the investee companies.

总而言之，查理和我认为，我们的优先股投资产生的回报应该会略高于大多数固定收益投资组合，而且我们能在被投资公司中发挥微小但令人愉快且具有建设性的作用。

# Zero-Coupon Securities (零息债券)

In September, Berkshire issued $902.6 million principal amount of Zero-Coupon Convertible Subordinated Debentures, which are now listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Salomon Brothers handled the underwriting in superb fashion, providing us helpful advice and a flawless execution.

9月，伯克希尔发行了本金为9.026亿美元的零息可转换次级债券，目前已在纽约证券交易所上市。所罗门兄弟以出色的方式处理了承销工作，为我们提供了有益的建议并完美执行。

Most bonds, of course, require regular payments of interest, usually semi-annually. A zero-coupon bond, conversely, requires no current interest payments; instead, the investor receives his yield by purchasing the security at a significant discount from maturity value. The effective interest rate is determined by the original issue price, the maturity value, and the amount of time between issuance and maturity.

当然，大多数债券要求定期支付利息，通常为每半年一次。相反，零息债券不要求当期支付利息；投资者通过以远低于到期价值的折扣价购买债券来获得收益。实际利率由发行价、到期价值以及发行至到期的时间决定。

In our case, the bonds were issued at 44.314% of maturity value and are due in 15 years. For investors purchasing the bonds, that is the mathematical equivalent of a 5.5% current payment compounded semi-annually. Because we received only 44.31 cents on the dollar, our proceeds from this offering were $400 million (less about $9.5 million of offering expenses).

就我们而言，这些债券以到期价值的44.314%发行，15年后到期。对于购买债券的投资者来说，这在数学上相当于每半年复利5.5%的当期支付。由于我们每美元仅收到44.31美分，此次发行的净收入为4亿美元（扣除约950万美元的发行费用）。

The bonds were issued in denominations of $10,000 and each bond is convertible into .4515 shares of Berkshire Hathaway. Because a $10,000 bond cost $4,431, this means that the conversion price was $9,815 per Berkshire share, a 15% premium to the market price then existing. Berkshire can call the bonds at any time after September 28, 1992 at their accreted value (the original issue price plus 5.5% compounded semi-annually) and on two specified days, September 28 of 1994 and 1999, the bondholders can require Berkshire to buy the securities at their accreted value.

这些债券以1万美元为面值发行，每张债券可转换为0.4515股伯克希尔·哈撒韦股票。由于1万美元的债券成本为4431美元，这意味着转换价格为每股伯克希尔股票9815美元，较当时的市场价格溢价15%。伯克希尔可在1992年9月28日后随时按债券的增值价值（发行价加上每半年复利5.5%）赎回债券，而在1994年和1999年的9月28日这两个特定日期，债券持有人可要求伯克希尔按增值价值赎回债券。

For tax purposes, Berkshire is entitled to deduct the 5.5% interest accrual each year, even though we make no payments to the bondholders. Thus the net effect to us, resulting from the reduced taxes, is positive cash flow. That is a very significant benefit. Some unknowable variables prevent us from calculating our exact effective rate of interest, but under all circumstances it will be well below 5.5%. There is meanwhile a symmetry to the tax law: Any taxable holder of the bonds must pay tax each year on the 5.5% interest, even though he receives no cash.

在税务方面，伯克希尔有权每年扣除5.5%的应计利息，即使我们不向债券持有人支付任何款项。因此，减税给我们带来的净效应是正现金流。这是一项非常显著的好处。一些未知变量使我们无法计算确切的实际利率，但在任何情况下，该利率都将远低于5.5%。同时，税法具有对称性：任何应税债券持有人每年都必须就5.5%的利息缴税，即使他们没有收到现金。

Neither our bonds nor those of certain other companies that issued similar bonds last year (notably Loews and Motorola) resemble the great bulk of zero-coupon bonds that have been issued in recent years. Of these, Charlie and I have been, and will continue to be, outspoken critics. As I will later explain, such bonds have often been used in the most deceptive of ways and with deadly consequences to investors. But before we tackle that subject, let's travel back to Eden, to a time when the apple had not yet been bitten.

我们的债券以及去年其他一些公司（特别是洛斯公司和摩托罗拉）发行的类似债券，都与近年来发行的大多数零息债券不同。对于这些债券，查理和我一直并将继续直言不讳地提出批评。正如我稍后会解释的，这类债券常常被以极具欺骗性的方式使用，给投资者带来致命后果。但在讨论这个话题之前，让我们回到“伊甸园”，回到苹果尚未被咬一口的时代。

If you're my age you bought your first zero-coupon bonds during World War II, by purchasing the famous Series E U. S. Savings Bond, the most widely-sold bond issue in history. (After the war, these bonds were held by one out of two U. S. households.) Nobody, of course, called the Series E a zero-coupon bond, a term in fact that I doubt had been invented. But that's precisely what the Series E was.

如果你和我年纪相仿，你第一次购买零息债券是在二战期间，通过购买著名的E系列美国储蓄债券——历史上发行量最大的债券。（战后，每两个美国家庭中就有一个持有这种债券。）当然，没有人把E系列称为零息债券，事实上，我怀疑当时这个术语还未被发明。但E系列本质上就是零息债券。

These bonds came in denominations as small as $18.75. That amount purchased a $25 obligation of the United States government due in 10 years, terms that gave the buyer a compounded annual return of 2.9%. At the time, this was an attractive offer: the 2.9% rate was higher than that generally available on Government bonds and the holder faced no market-fluctuation risk, since he could at any time cash in his bonds with only a minor reduction in interest.

这些债券的面值低至18.75美元。用这个金额可以购买美国政府10年后到期的25美元债务，这一条款给购买者带来2.9%的年化复合回报。当时，这是一个有吸引力的报价：2.9%的利率高于一般政府债券的利率，而且持有者无需面临市场波动风险，因为他可以随时兑现债券，仅需支付少量利息损失。

A second form of zero-coupon U. S. Treasury issue, also benign and useful, surfaced in the last decade. One problem with a normal bond is that even though it pays a given interest rate - say 10% - the holder cannot be assured that a compounded 10% return will be realized. For that rate to materialize, each semi-annual coupon must be reinvested at 10% as it is received. If current interest rates are, say, only 6% or 7% when these coupons come due, the holder will be unable to compound his money over the life of the bond at the advertised rate. For pension funds or other investors with long-term liabilities, "reinvestment risk" of this type can be a serious problem. Savings Bonds might have solved it, except that they are issued only to individuals and are unavailable in large denominations. What big buyers needed was huge quantities of "Savings Bond Equivalents."

过去十年，出现了第二种形式的零息美国国债，同样无害且有用。普通债券存在一个问题：即使它支付给定的利率（比如10%），持有者也无法确保实现10%的复利回报。要实现这一利率，每半年收到的利息必须以10%的利率再投资。如果这些利息到期时的当前利率仅为6%或7%，持有者就无法在债券存续期内以宣传的利率让资金复利增长。对于养老基金或其他有长期负债的投资者来说，这种“再投资风险”可能是一个严重问题。储蓄债券本可以解决这个问题，但它们仅向个人发行，且没有大面值的。大买家需要的是大量的“储蓄债券等价物”。

Enter some ingenious and, in this case, highly useful investment bankers (led, I'm happy to say, by Salomon Brothers). They created the instrument desired by "stripping" the semi-annual coupons from standard Government issues. Each coupon, once detached, takes on the essential character of a Savings Bond since it represents a single sum due sometime in the future. For example, if you strip the 40 semi-annual coupons from a U. S. Government Bond due in the year 2010, you will have 40 zero-coupon bonds, with maturities from six months to 20 years, each of which can then be bundled with other coupons of like maturity and marketed. If current interest rates are, say, 10% for all maturities, the six-month issue will sell for 95.24% of maturity value and the 20-year issue will sell for 14.20%. The purchaser of any given maturity is thus guaranteed a compounded rate of 10% for his entire holding period. Stripping of government bonds has occurred on a large scale in recent years, as long-term investors, ranging from pension funds to individual IRA accounts, recognized these high-grade, zero-coupon issues to be well suited to their needs.

于是，一些富有创意且在这种情况下非常有用的投资银行家（我很高兴地说，以所罗门兄弟为首）登场了。他们通过从标准政府债券中“剥离”每半年一次的利息，创造出了所需的工具。每个利息一旦被剥离，就具有了储蓄债券的基本特征，因为它代表了未来某个时间到期的一笔款项。例如，如果你从2010年到期的美国政府债券中剥离40个半年期利息，你将得到40个零息债券，期限从6个月到20年不等，每个债券都可以与其他相同期限的利息捆绑销售。如果所有期限的当前利率都是10%，6个月期的债券将以到期价值的95.24%出售，20年期的债券将以14.20%出售。因此，任何特定期限的购买者都能保证在整个持有期内获得10%的复利。近年来，政府债券的剥离大规模进行，因为从养老基金到个人IRA账户的长期投资者都认识到这些高评级零息债券非常符合他们的需求。

But as happens in Wall Street all too often, what the wise do in the beginning, fools do in the end. In the last few years zero-coupon bonds (and their functional equivalent, pay-in-kind bonds, which distribute additional PIK bonds semi-annually as interest instead of paying cash) have been issued in enormous quantities by ever-junkier credits. To these issuers, zero (or PIK) bonds offer one overwhelming advantage: It is impossible to default on a promise to pay nothing. Indeed, if LDC governments had issued no debt in the 1970's other than long-term zero-coupon obligations, they would now have a spotless record as debtors.

但正如华尔街经常发生的那样，聪明人一开始做的事，傻瓜最后也会去做。过去几年，信用越来越差的发行人大量发行零息债券（及其功能等价物——实物支付债券，每半年分发额外的PIK债券作为利息，而非支付现金）。对这些发行人来说，零息（或PIK）债券有一个巨大优势：承诺不支付任何款项是不可能违约的。事实上，如果发展中国家政府在20世纪70年代只发行长期零息债券而不发行其他债务，它们现在作为债务人会有着无懈可击的记录。

This principle at work - that you need not default for a long time if you solemnly promise to pay nothing for a long time - has not been lost on promoters and investment bankers seeking to finance ever-shakier deals. But its acceptance by lenders took a while: When the leveraged buy-out craze began some years back, purchasers could borrow only on a reasonably sound basis, in which conservatively-estimated free cash flow - that is, operating earnings plus depreciation and amortization less normalized capital expenditures - was adequate to cover both interest and modest reductions in debt.

这一原则——如果你郑重承诺在很长一段时间内不支付任何款项，你在很长一段时间内就无需违约——并没有被那些寻求为越来越不稳定的交易融资的发起人和投资银行家忽视。但贷款人接受这一原则花了一些时间：几年前杠杆收购热潮开始时，收购方只能在相当稳健的基础上借款，即保守估计的自由现金流——也就是营业收入加上折旧和摊销，减去正常化的资本支出——足以覆盖利息和适度的债务减少。

Later, as the adrenalin of deal-makers surged, businesses began to be purchased at prices so high that all free cash flow necessarily had to be allocated to the payment of interest. That left nothing for the paydown of debt. In effect, a Scarlett O'Hara "I'll think about it tomorrow" position in respect to principal payments was taken by borrowers and accepted by a new breed of lender, the buyer of original-issue junk bonds. Debt now became something to be refinanced rather than repaid. The change brings to mind a New Yorker cartoon in which the grateful borrower rises to shake the hand of the bank's lending officer and gushes: "I don't know how I'll ever repay you."

后来，随着交易撮合者的热情高涨，企业的收购价格变得如此之高，以至于所有自由现金流都必然要用于支付利息。这就没有剩余资金用于偿还债务本金了。实际上，借款人对本金支付采取了斯嘉丽·奥哈拉式的“明天再说吧”的态度，而新一代贷款人——原始发行垃圾债券的购买者——接受了这种态度。债务现在变成了需要再融资而非偿还的东西。这种变化让人想起《纽约客》的一幅漫画：心怀感激的借款人起身与银行信贷员握手，激动地说：“我不知道我该怎么还你钱。”

Soon borrowers found even the new, lax standards intolerably binding. To induce lenders to finance even sillier transactions, they introduced an abomination, EBDIT - Earnings Before Depreciation, Interest and Taxes - as the test of a company's ability to pay interest. Using this sawed-off yardstick, the borrower ignored depreciation as an expense on the theory that it did not require a current cash outlay.

很快，借款人发现即使是新的、宽松的标准也束缚得让人无法忍受。为了诱使贷款人给更愚蠢的交易融资，他们引入了一个令人憎恶的指标——EBDIT（息税折旧前收益），作为衡量公司支付利息能力的标准。使用这个不完整的标准，借款人将折旧视为非费用而忽略，理由是折旧不需要当期现金支出。

Such an attitude is clearly delusional. At 95% of American businesses, capital expenditures that over time roughly approximate depreciation are a necessity and are every bit as real an expense as labor or utility costs. Even a high school dropout knows that to finance a car he must have income that covers not only interest and operating expenses, but also realistically-calculated depreciation. He would be laughed out of the bank if he started talking about EBDIT.

这种态度显然是妄想。在美国95%的企业中，随着时间的推移，大致与折旧相当的资本支出是必要的，而且与劳动力或公用事业成本一样，都是真实的费用。即使是高中辍学生也知道，要贷款买车，他的收入不仅要覆盖利息和运营费用，还要覆盖实际计算的折旧。如果他开始谈论EBDIT，会被银行嘲笑赶出来。

Capital outlays at a business can be skipped, of course, in any given month, just as a human can skip a day or even a week of eating. But if the skipping becomes routine and is not made up, the body weakens and eventually dies. Furthermore, a start-and-stop feeding policy will over time produce a less healthy organism, human or corporate, than that produced by a steady diet. As businessmen, Charlie and I relish having competitors who are unable to fund capital expenditures.

当然，企业在任何一个月都可以跳过资本支出，就像人可以一天甚至一周不吃饭一样。但如果经常跳过且不弥补，身体会变弱并最终死亡。此外，无论是人还是企业，长期断断续续的“供给”政策会比稳定的“供给”产生更不健康的机体。作为商人，查理和我乐于看到竞争对手无法为资本支出提供资金。

You might think that waving away a major expense such as depreciation in an attempt to make a terrible deal look like a good one hits the limits of Wall Street's ingenuity. If so, you haven't been paying attention during the past few years. Promoters needed to find a way to justify even pricier acquisitions. Otherwise, they risked - heaven forbid! - losing deals to other promoters with more "imagination."

你可能会认为，为了让一笔糟糕的交易看起来不错而无视折旧等主要费用，已经达到了华尔街聪明才智的极限。如果是这样，那你在过去几年就没怎么关注了。发起人们需要找到一种方法来证明甚至更昂贵的收购是合理的。否则，他们可能会——天啊，但愿不会！——把交易输给更有“想象力”的其他发起人。

So, stepping through the Looking Glass, promoters and their investment bankers proclaimed that EBDIT should now be measured against cash interest only, which meant that interest accruing on zero-coupon or PIK bonds could be ignored when the financial feasibility of a transaction was being assessed. This approach not only relegated depreciation expense to the let's-ignore-it corner, but gave similar treatment to what was usually a significant portion of interest expense. To their shame, many professional investment managers went along with this nonsense, though they usually were careful to do so only with clients' money, not their own. (Calling these managers "professionals" is actually too kind; they should be designated "promotees.")

于是，发起人和他们的投资银行家像是穿过了镜子（意指陷入荒谬），宣称现在EBDIT只需与现金利息对比，这意味着在评估交易的财务可行性时，可以忽略零息或PIK债券的应计利息。这种方法不仅把折旧费用归入“忽略不计”的角落，还对通常占很大比例的利息费用采取了同样的处理方式。令人羞耻的是，许多专业投资经理认同这种荒谬说法，尽管他们通常只敢用客户的钱这么做，而不是自己的钱。（称这些经理为“专业人士”其实太客气了；他们应该被称为“推销工具”。）

Under this new standard, a business earning, say, $100 million pre-tax and having debt on which $90 million of interest must be paid currently, might use a zero-coupon or PIK issue to incur another $60 million of annual interest that would accrue and compound but not come due for some years. The rate on these issues would typically be very high, which means that the situation in year 2 might be $90 million cash interest plus $69 million accrued interest, and so on as the compounding proceeds. Such high-rate reborrowing schemes, which a few years ago were appropriately confined to the waterfront, soon became models of modern finance at virtually all major investment banking houses.

在这一新标准下，一家税前盈利1亿美元、有9000万美元当期必须支付的债务利息的企业，可能会通过发行零息或PIK债券再产生6000万美元的年度利息，这些利息会累积复利，但几年内无需支付。这些债券的利率通常非常高，这意味着第二年的情况可能是9000万美元现金利息加上6900万美元应计利息，复利持续下去依此类推。这种高利率再融资方案，几年前还只应局限在 waterfront（意指边缘地带），很快就几乎成为所有主要投资银行的现代金融典范。

When they make these offerings, investment bankers display their humorous side: They dispense income and balance sheet projections extending five or more years into the future for companies they barely had heard of a few months earlier. If you are shown such schedules, I suggest that you join in the fun: Ask the investment banker for the one-year budgets that his own firm prepared as the last few years began and then compare these with what actually happened.

在进行这些发行时，投资银行家展现了他们幽默的一面：他们为几个月前才刚刚听说的公司提供未来五年或更久的收入和资产负债表预测。如果你看到这样的报表，我建议你也来凑个热闹：向投资银行家索要他所在公司过去几年年初编制的一年期预算，然后将其与实际情况进行比较。

Some time ago Ken Galbraith, in his witty and insightful The Great Crash, coined a new economic term: "the bezzle," defined as the current amount of undiscovered embezzlement. This financial creature has a magical quality: The embezzlers are richer by the amount of the bezzle, while the embezzlees do not yet feel poorer.

不久前，肯·加尔布雷思在其诙谐且富有洞察力的《大崩盘》一书中创造了一个新的经济术语：“bezzle”，定义为当前未被发现的盗用金额。这种金融产物具有一种神奇的特质：盗用者因bezzle而变得更富有，而被盗者尚未感到更贫穷。

Professor Galbraith astutely pointed out that this sum should be added to the National Wealth so that we might know the Psychic National Wealth. Logically, a society that wanted to feel enormously prosperous would both encourage its citizens to embezzle and try not to detect the crime. By this means, "wealth" would balloon though not an erg of productive work had been done.

加尔布雷思教授敏锐地指出，这一金额应该被添加到国民财富中，这样我们才能知道“心理国民财富”。从逻辑上讲，一个想要感觉极度繁荣的社会，会鼓励其公民盗用公款，并尽量不发现这种犯罪。通过这种方式，“财富”会膨胀，尽管没有完成任何一尔格的生产性工作。

The satirical nonsense of the bezzle is dwarfed by the real-world nonsense of the zero-coupon bond. With zeros, one party to a contract can experience "income" without his opposite experiencing the pain of expenditure. In our illustration, a company capable of earning only $100 million dollars annually - and therefore capable of paying only that much in interest - magically creates "earnings" for bondholders of $150 million. As long as major investors willingly don their Peter Pan wings and repeatedly say "I believe," there is no limit to how much "income" can be created by the zero-coupon bond.

Bezzle的讽刺性荒谬与零息债券的现实荒谬相比，相形见绌。有了零息债券，合同的一方可以获得“收入”，而另一方却不会感受到支出的痛苦。在我们的例子中，一家每年只能盈利1亿美元——因此只能支付这么多利息的公司——神奇地为债券持有人创造了1.5亿美元的“收益”。只要主要投资者愿意戴上彼得·潘的翅膀，反复说“我相信”，零息债券能创造的“收入”就没有上限。

Wall Street welcomed this invention with the enthusiasm less-enlightened folk might reserve for the wheel or the plow. Here, finally, was an instrument that would let the Street make deals at prices no longer limited by actual earning power. The result, obviously, would be more transactions: Silly prices will always attract sellers. And, as Jesse Unruh might have put it, transactions are the mother's milk of finance.

华尔街对这项发明的热情，不亚于未开化的人们对轮子或犁的珍视。终于有了一种工具，能让华尔街以不再受实际盈利能力限制的价格进行交易。显然，结果将是更多的交易：愚蠢的价格总会吸引卖家。正如杰西·昂鲁可能会说的，交易是金融的母乳。

The zero-coupon or PIK bond possesses one additional attraction for the promoter and investment banker, which is that the time elapsing between folly and failure can be stretched out. This is no small benefit. If the period before all costs must be faced is long, promoters can create a string of foolish deals - and take in lots of fees - before any chickens come home to roost from their earlier ventures.

零息或PIK债券对发起人和投资银行家还有一个额外吸引力，那就是从愚蠢行为到失败之间的时间可以被拉长。这是一个不小的好处。如果需要面对所有成本之前的时间很长，发起人可以创造一系列愚蠢的交易——并收取大量费用——而在此之前，他们早期冒险的恶果还不会显现。

But in the end, alchemy, whether it is metallurgical or financial, fails. A base business can not be transformed into a golden business by tricks of accounting or capital structure. The man claiming to be a financial alchemist may become rich. But gullible investors rather than business achievements will usually be the source of his wealth.

但最终，炼金术，无论是冶金的还是金融的，都会失败。一个糟糕的企业不能通过会计手段或资本结构的技巧变成一个优秀的企业。声称是金融炼金术士的人可能会变得富有。但他的财富来源通常是轻信的投资者，而非商业成就。

Whatever their weaknesses, we should add, many zero-coupon and PIK bonds will not default. We have in fact owned some and may buy more if their market becomes sufficiently distressed. (We've not, however, even considered buying a new issue from a weak credit.) No financial instrument is evil per se; it's just that some variations have far more potential for mischief than others.

我们应该补充的是，无论它们有什么缺点，许多零息和PIK债券不会违约。事实上，我们已经持有一些，如果它们的市场价格足够低迷，我们可能会购买更多。（然而，我们甚至没有考虑过从信用不佳的发行人那里购买新发行的债券。）没有任何金融工具本身是邪恶的；只是有些变种比其他变种有更大的 mischief 潜力。

The blue ribbon for mischief-making should go to the zero-coupon issuer unable to make its interest payments on a current basis. Our advice: Whenever an investment banker starts talking about EBDIT - or whenever someone creates a capital structure that does not allow all interest, both payable and accrued, to be comfortably met out of current cash flow net of ample capital expenditures - zip up your wallet. Turn the tables by suggesting that the promoter and his high-priced entourage accept zero-coupon fees, deferring their take until the zero-coupon bonds have been paid in full. See then how much enthusiasm for the deal endures.

制造麻烦的蓝丝带应该颁发给那些无法当期支付利息的零息债券发行人。我们的建议是：每当投资银行家开始谈论EBDIT时——或者每当有人设计的资本结构使得所有利息（无论是应付的还是应计的）不能从扣除充足资本支出后的当期现金流中轻松支付时——请合上你的钱包。不妨反过来建议发起人和他高薪的随从接受零息费用，将他们的收入推迟到零息债券全额支付后再领取。看看那时他们对这笔交易还能有多少热情。

Our comments about investment bankers may seem harsh. But Charlie and I - in our hopelessly old-fashioned way - believe that they should perform a gatekeeping role, guarding investors against the promoter's propensity to indulge in excess. Promoters, after all, have throughout time exercised the same judgment and restraint in accepting money that alcoholics have exercised in accepting liquor. At a minimum, therefore, the banker's conduct should rise to that of a responsible bartender who, when necessary, refuses the profit from the next drink to avoid sending a drunk out on the highway. In recent years, unfortunately, many leading investment firms have found bartender morality to be an intolerably restrictive standard. Lately, those who have traveled the high road in Wall Street have not encountered heavy traffic.

我们对投资银行家的评论可能看起来很严厉。但查理和我——以我们无可救药的老式方式——认为他们应该扮演守门人的角色，保护投资者免受发起人过度放纵的倾向影响。毕竟，发起人们在接受资金时所表现出的判断力和克制力，与酒鬼在接受酒时所表现出的别无二致。因此，银行家的行为至少应该达到负责任的调酒师的水平，在必要时拒绝下一杯酒的利润，以避免让醉汉上路。不幸的是，近年来，许多领先的投资公司认为调酒师的道德标准是难以忍受的限制。最近，那些在华尔街走正道的人并没有遇到拥挤的交通（意指很少有人走正道）。

One distressing footnote: The cost of the zero-coupon folly will not be borne solely by the direct participants. Certain savings and loan associations were heavy buyers of such bonds, using cash that came from FSLIC-insured deposits. Straining to show splendid earnings, these buyers recorded - but did not receive - ultra-high interest income on these issues. Many of these associations are now in major trouble. Had their loans to shaky credits worked, the owners of the associations would have pocketed the profits. In the many cases in which the loans will fail, the taxpayer will pick up the bill. To paraphrase Jackie Mason, at these associations it was the managers who should have been wearing the ski masks.

一个令人痛心的补充说明：零息债券闹剧的成本不会仅由直接参与者承担。某些储蓄贷款协会是这类债券的大量购买者，所用资金来自联邦储蓄贷款保险公司（FSLIC）承保的存款。这些购买者为了显示出色的收益，记录了——但并未收到——这些债券的超高利息收入。许多这样的协会现在陷入了大麻烦。如果他们给信用不佳者的贷款成功了，协会的所有者会将利润收入囊中。在许多贷款失败的情况下，纳税人将承担这笔账单。套用杰基·梅森的话来说，在这些协会中，应该戴滑雪面罩的是经理们。

# Mistakes of the First Twenty-five Years (A Condensed Version) (前二十五年的错误（精简版）)

To quote Robert Benchley, "Having a dog teaches a boy fidelity, perseverance, and to turn around three times before lying down." Such are the shortcomings of experience. Nevertheless, it's a good idea to review past mistakes before committing new ones. So let's take a quick look at the last 25 years.

引用罗伯特·本奇利的话：“养一条狗能教会男孩忠诚、坚韧，以及躺下前要转三圈。”这就是经验的不足之处。尽管如此，在犯新错误之前回顾过去的错误是个好主意。所以让我们快速回顾一下过去25年。

o My first mistake, of course, was in buying control of Berkshire. Though I knew its business - textile manufacturing - to be unpromising, I was enticed to buy because the price looked cheap. Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably rewarding in my early years, though by the time Berkshire came along in 1965 I was becoming aware that the strategy was not ideal.

我的第一个错误，当然是收购伯克希尔的控制权。尽管我知道它的业务——纺织品制造——前景不佳，但我被低价所吸引而买入。这类股票购买在我早年被证明能带来不错的回报，不过到1965年伯克希尔出现时，我开始意识到这种策略并不理想。

If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even though the long-term performance of the business may be terrible. I call this the "cigar butt" approach to investing. A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke, but the "bargain purchase" will make that puff all profit.

如果你以足够低的价格买入一只股票，通常这家公司的命运会出现一些波折，让你有机会以不错的利润卖出，即使这家公司的长期表现可能很糟糕。我把这种投资方法称为“雪茄烟蒂”法。在街上捡到一个还剩一口的雪茄烟蒂，或许抽不了多少，但“便宜买入”会让这一口全是利润。

Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original "bargain" price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces - never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen. Second, any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that the business earns. For example, if you buy a business for $8 million that can be sold or liquidated for $10 million and promptly take either course, you can realize a high return. But the investment will disappoint if the business is sold for $10 million in ten years and in the interim has annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost. Time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre.

除非你是清算师，否则这种购买企业的方法是愚蠢的。首先，最初的“便宜”价格最终可能根本算不上便宜。在一个艰难的行业里，一个问题刚解决，另一个问题就会出现——厨房里从来不会只有一只蟑螂。其次，你获得的任何初始优势都会被企业的低回报率迅速侵蚀。例如，如果你以800万美元买下一家企业，能以1000万美元出售或清算，并且立即采取其中一种做法，你能获得高回报。但如果这家企业在十年后以1000万美元出售，在此期间每年仅赚取并分配成本的几个百分点，那么这项投资就会令人失望。时间是优秀企业的朋友，是平庸企业的敌人。

You might think this principle is obvious, but I had to learn it the hard way - in fact, I had to learn it several times over. Shortly after purchasing Berkshire, I acquired a Baltimore department store, Hochschild Kohn, buying through a company called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire. I bought at a substantial discount from book value, the people were first-class, and the deal included some extras - unrecorded real estate values and a significant LIFO inventory cushion. How could I miss? So-o-o - three years later I was lucky to sell the business for about what I had paid. After ending our corporate marriage to Hochschild Kohn, I had memories like those of the husband in the country song, "My Wife Ran Away With My Best Friend and I Still Miss Him a Lot."

你可能认为这个原则显而易见，但我是通过惨痛的教训才明白的——事实上，我还反复吸取了好几次教训。收购伯克希尔后不久，我通过一家名为多元化零售的公司收购了巴尔的摩的一家百货公司Hochschild Kohn，这家公司后来与伯克希尔合并。我是以大幅低于账面价值的价格买入的，那里的人很优秀，而且这笔交易还包含一些额外好处——未记录的房地产价值和大量的后进先出法存货缓冲。我怎么会失手呢？可是——三年后，我很幸运地以大约买入价卖掉了这家公司。与Hochschild Kohn的“企业婚姻”结束后，我的感受就像一首乡村歌曲里的丈夫那样：“我妻子和我最好的朋友跑了，可我还是很想念他。”

I could give you other personal examples of "bargain-purchase" folly but I'm sure you get the picture: It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price. Charlie understood this early; I was a slow learner. But now, when buying companies or common stocks, we look for first-class businesses accompanied by first-class managements.

我还能举出其他自己“便宜买入”的愚蠢例子，但我相信你已经明白了：以合理价格买入一家优秀的公司，远比以优惠价格买入一家平庸的公司要好得多。查理很早就明白了这一点，我则学得很慢。但现在，在收购公司或购买普通股时，我们要找的是一流的企业，并且配有一流的管理层。

o That leads right into a related lesson: Good jockeys will do well on good horses, but not on broken-down nags. Both Berkshire's textile business and Hochschild, Kohn had able and honest people running them. The same managers employed in a business with good economic characteristics would have achieved fine records. But they were never going to make any progress while running in quicksand.

这直接引出了一个相关的教训：好骑师在好马上会表现出色，但在劣马上则不然。伯克希尔的纺织业务和Hochschild Kohn都是由有能力且诚实的人经营的。如果这些管理者在具有良好经济特征的企业工作，也会取得不错的业绩。但在流沙中奔跑，他们永远无法取得进展。

I've said many times that when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact. I just wish I hadn't been so energetic in creating examples. My behavior has matched that admitted by Mae West: "I was Snow White, but I drifted."

我多次说过，当一个以精明著称的管理层去经营一个以糟糕经济状况闻名的企业时，最终保持完好的是企业的名声。我只希望自己没有那么积极地去创造这样的例子。我的行为与梅·韦斯特所承认的一致：“我曾是白雪公主，但我堕落了。”

o A further related lesson: Easy does it. After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them. To the extent we have been successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying one-foot hurdles that we could step over rather than because we acquired any ability to clear seven-footers.

还有一个相关的教训：慢慢来。在收购和管理各种各样的企业25年后，查理和我并没有学会如何解决棘手的商业问题。我们学到的是如何避开它们。在某种程度上，我们之所以成功，是因为我们专注于寻找一英尺高的栏杆跨过去，而不是因为我们具备了跨越七英尺高栏杆的能力。

The finding may seem unfair, but in both business and investments it is usually far more profitable to simply stick with the easy and obvious than it is to resolve the difficult. On occasion, tough problems must be tackled as was the case when we started our Sunday paper in Buffalo. In other instances, a great investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business encounters a one-time huge, but solvable, problem as was the case many years back at both American Express and GEICO. Overall, however, we've done better by avoiding dragons than by slaying them.

这个发现可能看起来不公平，但在商业和投资中，通常简单地坚持容易且明显的事情，比解决困难的事情更有利可图。有时候，必须解决棘手的问题，比如我们在布法罗推出周日版报纸时就是如此。在其他情况下，当一家优秀的企业遇到一次性的、但可解决的大问题时，就会出现绝佳的投资机会，就像多年前美国运通和GEICO的情况一样。然而，总体而言，我们避开“巨龙”比斩杀“巨龙”做得更好。

o My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call "the institutional imperative." In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn't so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play.

我最令人惊讶的发现是：在商业中，一种我们可以称之为“机构惯性”的无形力量极其重要。在商学院时，没有人告诉我这种惯性的存在，进入商界后，我也没有凭直觉理解它。那时我认为，正派、聪明且有经验的管理者会自动做出理性的商业决策。但随着时间的推移，我发现并非如此。相反，当机构惯性起作用时，理性往往会退缩。

For example: (1) As if governed by Newton's First Law of Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction; (2) Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds; (3) Any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and strategic studies prepared by his troops; and (4) The behavior of peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting executive compensation or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.

例如：（1）就像受牛顿第一运动定律支配一样，一个机构会抵制任何改变其当前方向的行为；（2）就像工作会自动填满可用时间一样，公司项目或收购会不断出现，以消耗可用资金；（3）领导者的任何业务渴望，无论多么愚蠢，都会很快得到其下属准备的详细回报率和战略研究的支持；（4）同行公司的行为，无论是扩张、收购、制定高管薪酬还是其他方面，都会被盲目模仿。

Institutional dynamics, not venality or stupidity, set businesses on these courses, which are too often misguided. After making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the imperative, I have tried to organize and manage Berkshire in ways that minimize its influence. Furthermore, Charlie and I have attempted to concentrate our investments in companies that appear alert to the problem.

是机构动态，而非贪婪或愚蠢，使企业走上这些道路，而这些道路往往是错误的。因为忽视了这种惯性的力量，我犯了一些代价高昂的错误，之后我努力以尽量减少其影响的方式来组织和管理伯克希尔。此外，查理和我试图将投资集中在那些似乎能意识到这个问题的公司。

o After some other mistakes, I learned to go into business only with people whom I like, trust, and admire. As I noted before, this policy of itself will not ensure success: A second-class textile or department-store company won't prosper simply because its managers are men that you would be pleased to see your daughter marry. However, an owner - or investor - can accomplish wonders if he manages to associate himself with such people in businesses that possess decent economic characteristics. Conversely, we do not wish to join with managers who lack admirable qualities, no matter how attractive the prospects of their business. We've never succeeded in making a good deal with a bad person.

在犯了其他一些错误后，我学会了只和我喜欢、信任和钦佩的人做生意。正如我之前所说，这一政策本身并不能确保成功：一家二流的纺织厂或百货公司不会仅仅因为其管理者是你愿意让女儿嫁的人就兴旺起来。然而，如果所有者——或投资者——能在具有良好经济特征的企业中与这样的人合作，就能创造奇迹。相反，我们不愿意与缺乏优秀品质的管理者合作，无论他们的业务前景多么诱人。我们从未成功地与坏人做成一笔好交易。

o Some of my worst mistakes were not publicly visible. These were stock and business purchases whose virtues I understood and yet didn't make. It's no sin to miss a great opportunity outside one's area of competence. But I have passed on a couple of really big purchases that were served up to me on a platter and that I was fully capable of understanding. For Berkshire's shareholders, myself included, the cost of this thumb-sucking has been huge.

我一些最严重的错误并没有公开显现。这些错误是我明白某些股票和企业的优点，却没有买入。错过自己能力范围之外的绝佳机会并不是罪过。但我曾放过几次真正的大收购机会，这些机会唾手可得，而且我完全有能力理解。对于伯克希尔的股东，包括我自己在内，这种犹豫不决的代价是巨大的。

o Our consistently-conservative financial policies may appear to have been a mistake, but in my view were not. In retrospect, it is clear that significantly higher, though still conventional, leverage ratios at Berkshire would have produced considerably better returns on equity than the 23.8% we have actually averaged. Even in 1965, perhaps we could have judged there to be a 99% probability that higher leverage would lead to nothing but good. Correspondingly, we might have seen only a 1% chance that some shock factor, external or internal, would cause a conventional debt ratio to produce a result falling somewhere between temporary anguish and default.

我们一贯保守的财务政策可能看起来是个错误，但在我看来并非如此。回想起来，很明显，如果伯克希尔采用明显更高但仍属常规的杠杆率，股本回报率会比我们实际平均的23.8%高得多。即使在1965年，我们或许可以判断，有99%的概率更高的杠杆只会带来好处。相应地，我们可能认为只有1%的概率，某些外部或内部的冲击因素会导致常规的债务比率产生介于暂时困境和违约之间的结果。

We wouldn't have liked those 99:1 odds - and never will. A small chance of distress or disgrace cannot, in our view, be offset by a large chance of extra returns. If your actions are sensible, you are certain to get good results; in most such cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I have never been in a big hurry: We enjoy the process far more than the proceeds - though we have learned to live with those also.

我们不会喜欢这种99:1的概率——而且永远不会。在我们看来，小小的陷入困境或蒙羞的可能性，不能被获得额外回报的巨大可能性所抵消。如果你的行为是明智的，你肯定会得到好结果；在大多数情况下，杠杆只是让事情进展得更快。查理和我从不急于求成：我们享受过程远胜于结果——尽管我们也学会了接受结果。

We hope in another 25 years to report on the mistakes of the first 50. If we are around in 2015 to do that, you can count on this section occupying many more pages than it does here.

我们希望在另一个25年后，能报告前50年的错误。如果2015年我们还在的话，你可以相信这部分内容会比现在长得多。

# Miscellaneous (其他事项)

We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.

我们希望收购更多与我们现有业务相似的企业，我们也需要一些帮助。如果你有符合以下标准的企业，请打电话给我，或者最好是写信。

Here's what we're looking for:

我们的要求如下：

(1) Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),

（1）大规模收购（税后收益至少1000万美元），

(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are "turnaround" situations),

（2）具有持续稳定的盈利能力（我们对未来预测不感兴趣，对“扭亏为盈”的情况也不感兴趣），

(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,

（3）权益回报率高，且很少或不使用债务，

(4) management in place (we can't supply it),

（4）有现成的管理层（我们无法提供），

(5) simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we won't understand it),

（5）业务简单（如果涉及大量技术，我们无法理解），

(6) an offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

（6）有明确的报价（在价格未知的情况下，我们不想浪费自己或卖方的时间，即使是初步谈论交易也不行）。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.

我们不会进行不友好的收购。我们可以保证完全保密，并且会非常迅速地给出是否感兴趣的答复——通常在五分钟内。我们倾向于现金收购，但如果能收到与我们付出的内在业务价值相当的股票，也会考虑发行股票。

Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company's owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.

我们最喜欢的收购形式是符合布卢姆金、弗里德曼、赫尔德曼模式的。在这种情况下，公司的所有者兼管理者希望获得大量现金，有时是为自己， but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.

Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. Our interest in new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales can best be expressed by a Goldwynism: "Please include me out."

查理和我经常遇到一些不符合我们标准的收购机会：我们发现，如果你宣称有兴趣买柯利犬，很多人会打电话来，希望把他们的可卡犬卖给你。我们对新企业、扭亏为盈项目或拍卖式销售的兴趣，可以用高德温式的话来表达：“请不要算上我。”

Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir and Champion. Last year we said we had a special interest in large purchases of convertible preferreds. We still have an appetite of that kind, but it is limited since we now are close to the maximum position we feel appropriate for this category of investment.

除了有兴趣按上述条件收购企业外，我们还对通过谈判收购大量（但非控股）股票感兴趣，规模与我们持有的首都/美国广播公司、所罗门兄弟、吉列、美国航空和冠军国际的股票相当。去年我们说过，我们对大规模收购可转换优先股特别感兴趣。我们仍然有这样的兴趣，但这种兴趣是有限的，因为我们现在已接近我们认为适合这类投资的最大持仓。

Two years ago, I told you about Harry Bottle, who in 1962 quickly cured a major business mess at the first industrial company I controlled, Dempster Mill Manufacturing (one of my "bargain" purchases) and who 24 years later had reappeared to again rescue me, this time from problems at K&W Products, a small Berkshire subsidiary that produces automotive compounds. As I reported, in short order Harry reduced capital employed at K&W, rationalized production, cut costs, and quadrupled profits. You might think he would then have paused for breath. But last year Harry, now 70, attended a bankruptcy auction and, for a pittance, acquired a product line that is a natural for K&W. That company's profitability may well be increased 50% by this coup. Watch this space for future bulletins on Harry's triumphs.

两年前，我跟你们讲过哈里·博特尔的事，1962年，在我控制的第一家工业公司登普斯特 mills 制造公司（我的“便宜收购”之一），他迅速解决了一个重大的业务困境，24年后，他再次出现拯救我，这次是解决K&W产品公司的问题，这是伯克希尔的一家小型子公司，生产汽车化合物。正如我所报道的，哈里在短时间内就减少了K&W的资本投入，优化了生产，降低了成本，使利润翻了两番。你可能会认为他会停下来喘口气。但去年，70岁的哈里参加了一场破产拍卖会，以极低的价格收购了一条非常适合K&W的产品线。这次成功很可能使该公司的盈利能力提高50%。请继续关注哈里未来的成功消息。

With more than a year behind him of trading Berkshire's stock on the New York Stock Exchange, our specialist, Jim Maguire of Henderson Brothers, Inc. ("HBI"), continues his outstanding performance. Before we listed, dealer spreads often were 3% or more of market price. Jim has maintained the spread at 50 points or less, which at current prices is well under 1%. Shareholders who buy or sell benefit significantly from this reduction in transaction costs.

我们的专业交易商，亨德森兄弟公司（“HBI”）的吉姆·马奎尔在纽约证券交易所交易伯克希尔股票已有一年多，他的表现持续出色。在我们上市之前，经销商的买卖价差通常为市价的3%或更多。吉姆将价差维持在50个点或更少，按当前价格计算，远低于1%。买卖股票的股东从交易成本的降低中显著受益。

Because we are delighted by our experience with Jim, HBI and the NYSE, I said as much in ads that have been run in a series placed by the NYSE. Normally I shun testimonials, but I was pleased in this instance to publicly compliment the Exchange.

由于我们对与吉姆、HBI和纽约证券交易所的合作体验感到满意，我在纽约证券交易所投放的一系列广告中也表达了这一点。通常我回避推荐，但在这件事上，我很高兴公开赞扬该交易所。

Last summer we sold the corporate jet that we purchased for $850,000 three years ago and bought another used jet for $6.7 million. Those of you who recall the mathematics of the multiplying bacteria on page 5 will understandably panic: If our net worth continues to increase at current rates, and the cost of replacing planes also continues to rise at the now-established rate of 100% compounded annually, it will not be long before Berkshire's entire net worth is consumed by its jet.

去年夏天，我们卖掉了三年前以85万美元购买的公司喷气式飞机，又以670万美元买了另一架二手机。那些记得第5页关于细菌繁殖数学计算的人，可能会恐慌，这是可以理解的：如果我们的净值继续以当前速度增长，而且更换飞机的成本也继续以现在确定的每年100%的复合增长率上升，那么用不了多久，伯克希尔的全部净值就会被这架飞机耗尽。

Charlie doesn't like it when I equate the jet with bacteria; he feels it's degrading to the bacteria. His idea of traveling in style is an air-conditioned bus, a luxury he steps up to only when bargain fares are in effect. My own attitude toward the jet can be summarized by the prayer attributed, apocryphally I'm sure, to St. Augustine as he contemplated leaving a life of secular pleasures to become a priest. Battling the conflict between intellect and glands, he pled: "Help me, Oh Lord, to become chaste - but not yet."

查理不喜欢我把这架飞机比作细菌，他觉得这是对细菌的侮辱。他认为的奢华旅行是乘坐有空调的巴士，而且只有在有特价票时他才会选择这种“奢侈”方式。我自己对这架飞机的态度，可以用一句据说是圣奥古斯丁的祈祷来概括（我敢肯定这是伪托的），当时他正考虑放弃世俗享乐的生活去当牧师。在理智和欲望之间挣扎时，他祈求道：“主啊，帮助我变得纯洁吧——但不是现在。”

Naming the plane has not been easy. I initially suggested "The Charles T. Munger." Charlie countered with "The Aberration." We finally settled on "The Indefensible."

给这架飞机命名并不容易。我最初建议叫“查尔斯·T·芒格号”。查理则反击说叫“异常号”。我们最终定名为“无可辩解号”。

About 96.9% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1989 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $5.9 million, and 2,550 charities were recipients.

约96.9%的合格股票参与了伯克希尔1989年的股东指定捐赠计划。通过该计划做出的捐赠为590万美元，2550家慈善机构成为受赠方。

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 52-53. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1990 will be ineligible for the 1990 program.

我们敦促新股东阅读第52-53页关于我们股东指定捐赠计划的说明。如果你希望参与未来的计划，我们强烈建议你立即确保你的股票是以实际所有者的名义登记的，而不是以经纪人、银行或存托机构的名义登记的。在1990年8月31日未按此方式登记的股票，将没有资格参与1990年的计划。

The annual meeting this year will take place at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 30, 1990. Attendance grew last year to about 1,000, very close to the seating capacity of the Witherspoon Hall at Joslyn Museum. So this year's meeting will be moved to the Orpheum Theatre, which is in downtown Omaha, about one-quarter of a mile from the Red Lion Hotel. The Radisson-Redick Tower, a much smaller but nice hotel, is located across the street from the Orpheum. Or you may wish to stay at the Marriott, which is in west Omaha, about 100 yards from Borsheim's. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting and return after it ends.

今年的年会将于1990年4月30日（星期一）上午9:30举行。去年的出席人数增至约1000人，非常接近乔斯林博物馆威瑟斯庞厅的座位容量。因此，今年的会议将移至奥菲姆剧院，该剧院位于奥马哈市中心，距离红狮酒店约四分之一英里。雷迪森-雷迪克大厦酒店规模小得多，但环境不错，就在奥菲姆剧院对面。或者你可能希望住在万豪酒店，它位于奥马哈西部，距离博希姆约100码。我们会在万豪酒店安排巴士，分别于8:30和8:45出发前往会场，会议结束后返回。

Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent, owner-related questions.

查理和我总是很享受年会，希望你能参加。我们股东的素质体现在我们收到的问题的质量上：我们从未在任何地方参加过这样的年会，能持续收到如此高水平的、与所有者相关的明智问题。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. Because weekday parking can be tight around the Orpheum, we have lined up a number of nearby lots for our shareholders to use. The attachment also contains information about them.

我们委托书材料的附件说明了如何获取出席会议所需的入场券。由于工作日奥菲姆剧院周围的停车位可能很紧张，我们已安排了一些附近的停车场供股东使用。附件中也包含了这些停车场的信息。

As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you to downtown hotels or to the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays, and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays.

和往常一样，会议结束后我们会安排巴士送你去内布拉斯加家具卖场和博希姆，之后还会送你去市中心的酒店或机场。我希望你能留出足够的时间，充分了解这两家店的魅力。提前到达的人可以在一周中的任何一天参观家具卖场；周六的营业时间是上午10点至下午5:30，周日是中午至下午5:30。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday, but we will open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 29th. Ike likes to put on a show, and you can rely on him to produce something very special for our shareholders.

博希姆通常周日不营业，但4月29日（周日）我们将为股东及其客人开放，时间是中午至下午6点。艾克喜欢搞点热闹，你可以相信他会为我们的股东准备一些非常特别的东西。

In this letter we've had a lot to say about rates of compounding. If you can bear having your own rate turn negative for a day - not a pretty thought, I admit - visit Ike on the 29th.

在这封信中，我们说了很多关于复利的话题。如果你能忍受自己的（财富）增长率在一天内变为负数——我承认这不是个好想法——那就在29日去看看艾克吧。

Warren E. Buffett

March 2, 1990 Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特

1990年3月2日董事长

编辑

上次更新: 2025/11/13, 11:34:16

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