2012巴菲特致股东的信
# Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
伯克希尔哈撒韦公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东：
In 2012, Berkshire achieved a total gain for its shareholders of $24.1 billion. We used $1.3 billion of that to repurchase our stock, which left us with an increase in net worth of $22.8 billion for the year. The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 14.4%. Over the last 48 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $114,214, a rate of 19.7% compounded annually.
2012年，伯克希尔为股东实现了241亿美元的回报。我们动用13亿美元回购股票，使年度净资产增长达228亿美元。A/B类股每股账面价值增长14.4%。过去48年（现任管理层接管以来），账面价值从19美元增至114,214美元，年复合增长率达19.7%。
A number of good things happened at Berkshire last year, but let’s first get the bad news out of the way.
去年伯克希尔有诸多喜讯，但让我们先直面坏消息。
Š When the partnership I ran took control of Berkshire in 1965, I could never have dreamed that a year in which we had a gain of $24.1 billion would be subpar, in terms of the comparison we present on the facing page.
Š 当我在1965年通过合伙公司控股伯克希尔时，从未想过一个为股东创造241亿美元收益的年份会因与标普500指数的对比表现不佳而令人失望（见下页业绩对照）。
But subpar it was. For the ninth time in 48 years, Berkshire’s percentage increase in book value was less than the S&P’s percentage gain (a calculation that includes dividends as well as price appreciation). In eight of those nine years, it should be noted, the S&P had a gain of 15% or more. We do better when the wind is in our face.
但事实如此。过去48年中，这是第九次伯克希尔的账面价值增长率低于标普500指数（含分红与股价上涨）。需注意的是，此前八年中，标普500指数涨幅均超15%。当市场逆风时，我们的表现反而更优。
To date, we’ve never had a five-year period of underperformance, having managed 43 times to surpass the S&P over such a stretch. (The record is on page 103.) But the S&P has now had gains in each of the last four years, outpacing us over that period. If the market continues to advance in 2013, our streak of five-year wins will end.
迄今为止，我们从未出现五年期跑输标普500的情况（连续43次超越）。但标普500已连续四年增长，期间跑赢了我们。若2013年市场继续上涨，我们的五年期优势可能终结。
One thing of which you can be certain: Whatever Berkshire’s results, my partner Charlie Munger, the company’s Vice Chairman, and I will not change yardsticks. It’s our job to increase intrinsic business value – for which we use book value as a significantly understated proxy – at a faster rate than the market gains of the S&P. If we do so, Berkshire’s share price, though unpredictable from year to year, will itself outpace the S&P over time. If we fail, however, our management will bring no value to our investors, who themselves can earn S&P returns by buying a low-cost index fund.
您可以确信的一点是：无论伯克希尔表现如何，查理·芒格和我都不会改变衡量标准。我们的职责是以快于标普500的增速提升企业内在价值（我们以账面价值作为其低估的代理指标）。若成功，尽管股价短期波动不可预测，长期将跑赢标普500；若失败，我们的管理对投资者毫无价值——他们可直接购买低成本指数基金获得标普收益。
Charlie and I believe the gain in Berkshire’s intrinsic value will over time likely surpass the S&P returns by a small margin. We’re confident of that because we have some outstanding businesses, a cadre of terrific operating managers and a shareholder-oriented culture. Our relative performance, however, is almost certain to be better when the market is down or flat. In years when the market is particularly strong, expect us to fall short.
查理和我认为，伯克希尔的内在价值增长最终将小幅超越标普500。我们对此充满信心，因我们拥有卓越业务、杰出管理者团队与股东导向文化。但需注意：熊市或平盘时我们相对表现更优，强牛市年份则可能落后。
Š The second disappointment in 2012 was my inability to make a major acquisition. I pursued a couple of elephants, but came up empty-handed.
Š 2012年的第二大遗憾是我未能完成一笔大型收购。虽瞄准了几头“大象”，但最终空手而归。
Our luck, however, changed early this year. In February, we agreed to buy 50% of a holding company that will own all of H. J. Heinz. The other half will be owned by a small group of investors led by Jorge Paulo Lemann, a renowned Brazilian businessman and philanthropist.
幸运的是，今年年初形势逆转。2月我们达成协议，收购亨氏集团控股公司50%股权。另一半由巴西著名企业家与慈善家豪尔赫·保罗·莱曼（Jorge Paulo Lemann）领导的投资人持有。
We couldn’t be in better company. Jorge Paulo is a long-time friend of mine and an extraordinary manager. His group and Berkshire will each contribute about $4 billion for common equity in the holding company. Berkshire will also invest $8 billion in preferred shares that pay a 9% dividend. The preferred has two other features that materially increase its value: at some point it will be redeemed at a significant premium price and the preferred also comes with warrants permitting us to buy 5% of the holding company’s common stock for a nominal sum.
能与豪尔赫·保罗合作实属幸事。他是我的多年挚友，亦是顶尖管理人才。双方各出资约40亿美元购入普通股，伯克希尔另投资80亿美元购买9%分红的优先股。该优先股具备两大增值特性：（1）未来以显著溢价赎回；（2）附带认股权证，以象征性价格购买控股公司5%普通股。
Our total investment of about $12 billion soaks up much of what Berkshire earned last year. But we still have plenty of cash and are generating more at a good clip. So it’s back to work; Charlie and I have again donned our safari outfits and resumed our search for elephants.
此次120亿美元投资消耗了去年盈利的大部分。但我们仍有充沛现金储备且现金流持续增长。查理和我将重新穿上远征服，继续寻找“大象级收购”。
Now to some good news from 2012:
以下是2012年的喜讯：
Š Last year I told you that BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol, Marmon Group and MidAmerican Energy – our five most profitable non-insurance companies – were likely to earn more than $10 billion pre-tax in 2012. They delivered. Despite tepid U.S. growth and weakening economies throughout much of the world, our “powerhouse five” had aggregate earnings of $10.1 billion, about $600 million more than in 2011.
Š 去年我曾预测，BNSF、伊斯卡、路博润、马蒙集团及中美能源（五大非保险核心企业）2012年税前利润将超100亿美元。实际成绩为101亿美元，较2011年增6亿美元。
Of this group, only MidAmerican, then earning $393 million pre-tax, was owned by Berkshire eight years ago. Subsequently, we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, BNSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash, and for the remainder, issued shares that increased the amount outstanding by 6.1%. Consequently, the $9.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered by the five companies has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply growing, but rather increasing per-share results.
仅中美能源为八年前即持有的企业（当时税前利润3.93亿美元）。其余三家以全现金收购，BNSF收购中支付70%现金及6.1%增发股份（导致流通股增加）。五大企业贡献的97亿美元年利润增长仅伴随轻微股权稀释。这符合我们的目标：不仅总利润增长，更要提升每股收益。
Unless the U.S. economy tanks – which we don’t expect – our powerhouse five should again deliver higher earnings in 2013. The five outstanding CEOs who run them will see to that.
除非美国经济崩溃（我们不预期），五大企业2013年利润将继续增长。五位杰出CEO将确保这一目标实现。
Š Though I failed to land a major acquisition in 2012, the managers of our subsidiaries did far better. We had a record year for “bolt-on” purchases, spending about $2.3 billion for 26 companies that were melded into our existing businesses. These transactions were completed without Berkshire issuing any shares.
Š 虽然2012年我未完成大型收购，但子公司管理者表现出色。我们创纪录地完成26项“补充性收购”，耗资23亿美元融入现有业务。所有交易均未增发股份。
Charlie and I love these acquisitions: Usually they are low-risk, burden headquarters not at all, and expand the scope of our proven managers.
查理和我喜欢此类收购：通常低风险、总部零负担，且能拓展成熟管理者的施展空间。
Š Our insurance operations shot the lights out last year. While giving Berkshire $73 billion of free money to invest, they also delivered a $1.6 billion underwriting gain, the tenth consecutive year of profitable underwriting. This is truly having your cake and eating it too.
Š 保险业务去年表现亮眼。不仅为伯克希尔提供730亿美元浮存金供投资，还实现16亿美元承保利润，连续第十年盈利。这正是“鱼与熊掌兼得”。
GEICO led the way, continuing to gobble up market share without sacrificing underwriting discipline. Since 1995, when we obtained control, GEICO’s share of the personal-auto market has grown from 2.5% to 9.7%. Premium volume meanwhile increased from $2.8 billion to $16.7 billion. Much more growth lies ahead.
GEICO持续扩张市场份额的同时坚守承保纪律。自1995年收购以来，其个人车险市场份额从2.5%升至9.7%，保费收入从28亿美元增至167亿美元。未来增长空间巨大。
The credit for GEICO’s extraordinary performance goes to Tony Nicely and his 27,000 associates. And to that cast, we should add our Gecko. Neither rain nor storm nor gloom of night can stop him; the little lizard just soldiers on, telling Americans how they can save big money by going to GEICO.com.
GEICO的成功归功于托尼·尼利及其27,000名员工。此外，我们的“小壁虎”形象功不可没。无论风雨交加还是夜色沉沉，它始终坚守岗位，向美国人传递通过GEICO.com节省保费的信息。
When I count my blessings, I count GEICO twice.
当我盘点幸运时，我会为GEICO数两次——它值得。
- All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
- 本报告中所有每股数据均适用于A类股。B类股数据为A类股的1/1500。
# Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
伯克希尔哈撒韦公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东：
In 2012, Berkshire achieved a total gain for its shareholders of $24.1 billion. We used $1.3 billion of that to repurchase our stock, which left us with an increase in net worth of $22.8 billion for the year. The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 14.4%. Over the last 48 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $114,214, a rate of 19.7% compounded annually.
2012年，伯克希尔为股东实现241亿美元总收益。其中13亿美元用于回购股票，使年度净资产增长达228亿美元。A/B类股每股账面价值增长14.4%。过去48年（现任管理层接管以来），账面价值从19美元增至114,214美元，年复合增长率达19.7%。
# Investment Management: Todd Combs and Ted Weschler
投资管理：托德·康布斯与泰德·韦施勒
Š Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, our new investment managers, have proved to be smart, models of integrity, helpful to Berkshire in many ways beyond portfolio management, and a perfect cultural fit. We hit the jackpot with these two. In 2012 each outperformed the S&P 500 by double-digit margins. They left me in the dust as well.
Š 托德·康布斯与泰德·韦施勒作为新任投资经理，展现了智慧与正直，不仅在投资组合外为伯克希尔创造价值，更完美契合公司文化。两人2012年均跑赢标普500指数两位数。他们的成绩甚至超越了我的个人表现。
We have increased the funds managed by each to almost $5 billion (some of this emanating from the pension funds of our subsidiaries). Todd and Ted are young and will manage Berkshire’s massive portfolio long after Charlie and I have left. You can rest easy when they take over.
两人管理资金已接近50亿美元（含子公司养老金部分）。他们年轻且经验丰富，查理和我卸任后仍能长期稳健运营伯克希尔巨额资产。他们接棒时，您尽可安心。
# Workforce Growth and Strategic Investments
员工增长与战略投资
Š Berkshire’s yearend employment totaled a record 288,462 (see page 106 for details), up 17,604 from last year. Our headquarters crew, however, remained unchanged at 24. No sense going crazy.
Š 伯克希尔2012年末员工总数创纪录达288,462人（较上年增17,604人），总部团队维持24人不变。无需过度扩张。
Š Berkshire’s “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo – all had good years. Our ownership interest in each increased during the year.
Š “四大持仓”——美国运通、可口可乐、IBM与富国银行——均表现优异且持股比例上升：
- Wells Fargo：从7.6%增至8.7%
- IBM：从5.5%升至6.0%
- Coca-Cola与Amex因回购被动增持至8.9%与13.7%
Berkshire’s ownership interest in all four companies is likely to increase in the future. Mae West had it right: “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful.”
四家公司持股比例未来可能继续上升。正如梅·韦斯特（Mae West）所言：“优质资产持有过多，反而是好事。”
# Capital Allocation Philosophy
资本配置哲学
The four companies possess marvelous businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful business to owning 100% of a so-so business. Our flexibility in capital allocation gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves only to acquisitions they can operate.
四家公司由才华横溢且股东导向的管理层运营。我们更偏好持有优质企业的非控股但可观股份，而非全资拥有平庸企业。这种灵活性使我们在资本配置上优于仅限自营收购的企业。
Going by our yearend share count, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2012 earnings amounted to $3.9 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive – about $1.1 billion. But make no mistake: The $2.8 billion of earnings we do not report is every bit as valuable to us as what we record.
按年末持股计算，我们在“四大持仓”2012年收益中应占39亿美元，但报告中仅体现11亿美元股息。请勿误解：未报告的28亿美元收益与账面记录部分同样重要。
The earnings that the four companies retain are often used for repurchases – which enhance our share of future earnings – and also for funding business opportunities that are usually advantageous. Over time we expect substantially greater earnings from these four investees. If we are correct, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, so will our unrealized capital gains (which, for the four, totaled $26.7 billion at yearend).
四家被投企业的留存收益常用于回购自身股票及开拓业务机会，两者均提升我们未来收益占比。因此我们预计四家企业未来收益将大幅增长。若实现，伯克希尔的股息与未实现资本收益将同步上升（截至年末，未实现资本收益达267亿美元）。
# Capital Expenditures and Economic Outlook
资本支出与经济展望
Š There was a lot of hand-wringing last year among CEOs who cried “uncertainty” when faced with capital-allocation decisions (despite many of their businesses having enjoyed record levels of both earnings and cash). At Berkshire, we didn’t share their fears, instead spending a record $9.8 billion on plant and equipment in 2012, about 88% of it in the United States. That’s 19% more than we spent in 2011, our previous high. Charlie and I love investing large sums in worthwhile projects, whatever the pundits are saying.
Š 去年许多CEO面对资本配置决策时高喊“不确定性”，尽管其企业现金流与盈利均处历史高位。伯克希尔则逆风而行，2012年投入98亿美元用于厂房设备（88%用于美国本土），较2011年峰值再增19%。查理和我始终专注长期价值投资，无论外界如何喧嚣。
We will keep our foot to the floor and will almost certainly set another record for capital expenditures in 2013. Opportunities abound in America.
2013年我们将加大投入，资本支出再创新高。美国市场机会仍在。
# Message to Fellow CEOs
致同行CEO的建言
A thought for my fellow CEOs: Of course, the immediate future is uncertain; America has faced the unknown since 1776. It’s just that sometimes people focus on uncertainties while at other times they ignore them (usually because recent calm lulled them).
给同行CEO的思考：短期未来固然不确定，但美国自1776年以来始终面对未知。关键在于人们有时过度聚焦风险，有时又因平静而忽视风险（如2008年危机前的盲目乐观）。
American business will do fine over time. And stocks will do well just as certainly, since their fate is tied to business performance. Periodic setbacks will occur, yes, but investors and managers are in a game that is heavily stacked in their favor.
美国企业长期向好，股市亦然——因其命运与企业盈利绑定。虽然周期性挫折难免，但投资者与管理者的游戏规则已向他们倾斜。
The Dow Jones Industrials advanced from 66 to 11,497 in the 20th Century, a staggering 17,320% increase despite four costly wars, a Great Depression and many recessions. Shareholders received substantial dividends throughout the century as well.
道琼斯工业指数从66点涨至11,497点（20世纪内增长17,320%），期间历经四场战争、大萧条与多次衰退。股东还持续获得股息。
Since the basic game is so favorable, Charlie and I believe it’s a terrible mistake to dance in and out based on tarot cards, “expert” predictions or short-term business fluctuations. The risks of being out of the game are huge compared to the risks of being in it.
既然游戏规则如此有利，我们坚信基于“专家预测”或短期波动的进退是重大错误。相比留在市场内，离场的风险更大。
My own history provides a dramatic example: I made my first stock purchase in 1942 during U.S. losses in the Pacific War. Headlines screamed of setbacks. Yet every American I knew believed we would prevail.
我的经历佐证这一点：1942年太平洋战争失利时买入人生首笔股票。每日头条充满坏消息，但每位美国人都坚信胜利终将到来。
The country’s success since then boggles the mind: On an inflation-adjusted basis, GDP per capita quadrupled between 1941 and 2012. Every tomorrow has been uncertain. America’s destiny, however, has always been clear: ever-increasing abundance.
此后美国的成功令人惊叹：1941-2012年，人均GDP经通胀调整后增长四倍。尽管每日未来未定，但国家命运清晰：持续繁荣。
If you are a CEO who has some large, profitable project you are shelving because of short-term worries, call Berkshire. Let us unburden you.
若您是因短期担忧而搁置长期盈利项目的CEO，请致电伯克希尔。我们愿助您落地这些计划。
# Building Blocks for Future Value
未来价值的核心要素
In summary, Charlie and I hope to build per-share intrinsic value by:
综上，查理和我将通过以下方式提升每股内在价值：
Improving subsidiary earning power – through operational excellence and bolt-on acquisitions.
增强子公司盈利——通过卓越运营与补充性并购。Participating in investee growth – via our equity positions in major companies.
分享被投企业成长——通过持有大型企业股份。Repurchasing shares when available below intrinsic value.
股价低于内在价值时回购股份。Making occasional large acquisitions – when opportunity knocks.
把握大型收购机会——当机遇出现时果断出手。Rarely issuing shares – to avoid dilution.
极少增发股份——避免股权稀释。
Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy will continue to power the U.S. economy. Insurance will always be essential – and no company brings greater resources to that arena than Berkshire. As we view these strengths, Charlie and I like your company’s prospects.
这些战略建立在坚实基础上。百年后，BNSF铁路与中美能源仍将支撑美国经济。保险对企业和个人的重要性不变——而伯克希尔在人力与资金资源上的投入远超同行。基于这些优势，我们看好公司未来前景。
- All per-share figures apply to A shares. B shares are 1/1500th of A.
- 所有每股数据均适用于A类股。B类股为A类股的1/1500。
# Intrinsic Business Value
企业内在价值
As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (or, for that matter, any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements – one of which was qualitative – that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 104-105.
尽管查理和我经常讨论企业内在价值，但我们无法准确告知伯克希尔股票（或其他任何股票）的具体数值。在2010年年报中，我们曾列出三个要素（含一项定性因素），用于合理估算伯克希尔内在价值。完整讨论见第104-105页。
Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2012 our per-share investments increased 15.7% to $113,786, and our per-share pre-tax earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments also increased 15.7% to $8,085.
以下是两项定量要素的更新：2012年，我们每股投资组合增长15.7%至113,786美元，非保险及非投资业务的税前每股收益亦增长15.7%至8,085美元。
Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19.4% compounded annually, and our per-share earnings figure has grown at a 20.8% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the 42-year period has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both areas, but our strong emphasis will always be on building operating earnings.
自1970年以来，我们的每股投资以19.4%的年复合增长率增长，每股收益（含非保险及非投资业务）增长率达20.8%。42年间，伯克希尔股价增长速度与这两项价值指标非常接近绝非偶然。我们乐见两者增长，但更专注运营收益。
# Four Major Operational Sectors
四大核心业务板块
Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
现在让我们分析四大核心业务板块。每一块的资产负债表和利润表特征截然不同。合并分析会阻碍理解，因此我们将它们视为四个独立业务呈现——这也是查理和我的视角。
# Insurance Business
保险业务
Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.
让我们首先聚焦伯克希尔的核心业务——保险。它是我们多年扩张的核心引擎。
Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains quite stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
财产险（P/C）公司先收取保费，后支付理赔。极端情况下（如工伤赔偿事故），支付可能持续数十年。这种“先收后付”模式使我们持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——最终流向索赔者。在此期间，我们可利用这些资金进行投资。尽管具体保单和理赔不断变化，但浮存金规模通常与保费收入保持稳定比例。因此，随着业务增长，我们的浮存金也随之增长。以下数据展示了我们的成长历程：
| Year（年份） | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Float (in $ millions) | $39 | $237 | $1,632 | $27,871 | $65,832 | $73,125 |
Last year I told you that our float was likely to level off or even decline in the future. Our insurance CEOs set out to prove me wrong and did, increasing float last year by $2.5 billion. I now expect a further increase in 2013. But further gains will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO’s float will almost certainly grow. In National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, we have a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do experience a decline in float at some future time, it will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 2% in any year.
去年我曾预测浮存金未来可能持平或小幅下降，但保险业务负责人用事实反驳了这一观点，2012年浮存金增长25亿美元。我预计2013年浮存金将继续增加。不过未来增长难度加大。积极的一面是GEICO浮存金必然增长，但国家赔偿保险的再保险部门因部分合约到期，浮存金将缓慢下降。若未来出现下滑，年降幅将不超过2%。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. That’s like your taking out a loan and having the bank pay you interest.
若保费收入超过费用和最终损失总额，我们将实现承保利润——叠加到浮存金带来的投资收益中。当实现承保利润时，我们相当于免费使用资金——甚至还能因持有这些资金而获得报酬。这如同您贷款时银行反而支付利息。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company besides, incurred an underwriting loss in eight of the eleven years ending in 2011. (Their financials for 2012 are not yet available.) There are a lot of ways to lose money in insurance, and the industry never ceases searching for new ones.
不幸的是，所有保险公司追求这一理想结果导致激烈竞争，使财产险行业整体长期承保亏损。这种亏损本质上是行业为持有浮存金支付的代价。例如，美国最大且管理良好的保险公司State Farm在截至2011年的十一年中有八年承保亏损（2012年数据尚未公布）。保险业亏损方式多种多样，而行业从未停止寻找新路径。
As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for ten consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $18.6 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. If we do, our float will be better than free money.
如本报告首节所述，伯克希尔已连续十年实现承保利润，税前总收益达186亿美元。展望未来，我们预计多数年份仍将盈利。若如此，我们的浮存金不仅免费使用，还能创造额外收益。
# Float and Intrinsic Value
浮存金与内在价值
So how does our attractive float affect the calculations of intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and were unable to replenish it. But that’s an incorrect way to look at float, which should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. If float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe Berkshire’s will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability.
我们的优质浮存金如何影响内在价值计算？计算账面价值时，浮存金全额作为负债扣除，仿佛我们必须立即支付且无法补充。但这将浮存金视为纯粹负债是错误的，应被看作循环基金。若浮存金既无成本又长期存在，其真实负债价值将远低于会计负债。
A partial offset to this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of “goodwill” that is attributable to our insurance companies and included in book value as an asset. In effect, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance business sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
与高估负债对应的是一项价值155亿美元的“商誉”资产，计入保险公司的收购成本中并提升账面价值。在很大程度上，这一商誉代表了我们为保险业务浮存金生成能力支付的价格。但商誉的成本与其真实价值无关。例如，若保险公司长期承受巨额承保亏损，无论原始成本如何，其账面商誉均应视为毫无价值。
Fortunately, that’s not the case at Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay to purchase an insurance operation producing float of similar quality – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.
幸运的是，伯克希尔并非如此。查理和我认为，我们的保险商誉真实经济价值远高于历史账面价值——这是我们认为伯克希尔内在价值远超账面价值的关键原因之一。
Let me emphasize once again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: There is very little “Berkshire-quality” float existing in the insurance world. In 37 of the 45 years ending in 2011, the industry’s premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue.
必须再次强调，零成本浮存金并非整个财产险行业能预期的结果：保险业内“伯克希尔品质”的浮存金极为稀少。截至2011年的45年中，行业保费在37年里无法覆盖理赔与费用。因此几十年来，财产险行业有形权益回报率远低于美国企业平均水平，这一糟糕表现仍将持续。
A further unpleasant reality adds to the industry’s dim prospects: Insurance earnings are now benefitting from “legacy” bond portfolios that deliver much higher yields than will be available when funds are reinvested during the next few years – and perhaps for many years beyond that. Today’s bond portfolios are, in effect, wasting assets. Earnings of insurers will be hurt in a significant way as bonds mature and are rolled over.
另一残酷现实加剧行业前景黯淡：当前保险收益受益于历史债券组合的高收益率。未来几年再投资时收益率将大幅下降，甚至可能持续更久。当前债券组合实质上是衰减资产，债券到期再投资将显著冲击保险企业收益。
# Insurance Business and Float
保险业务与浮存金
Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running extraordinary insurance operations. Let me tell you about the major units.
伯克希尔的保险业务优势源于我们拥有一批卓越的管理者运营着非凡的保险业务。以下是核心单元介绍：
First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most importantly, brains in a manner unique to the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks inappropriate relative to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from a mega-catastrophe (about triple anything it has ever experienced), Berkshire would likely record a significant profit for the year due to its diversified earnings streams. Meanwhile, all other major insurers would be deep in the red, with some facing insolvency.
按浮存金规模首推伯克希尔再保险集团，由阿吉特·杰恩管理。他承担的都是其他机构不愿或无力承担的风险。他的运营模式在业内独树一帜：兼具资本实力、决策速度、决断力及智慧。但从未让伯克希尔承担与其资源不匹配的风险。事实上，我们规避风险的保守程度远超多数大型保险公司。例如，若行业遭遇2500亿美元的超级巨灾损失（约为历史最高损失的三倍），伯克希尔整体仍可能实现盈利，而其他大型保险公司可能深陷赤字甚至破产。
From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with $35 billion of float and significant cumulative underwriting profits – a feat no other insurance CEO has matched. He has added billions to Berkshire’s value. If you meet Ajit at the annual meeting, bow deeply.
1985年从零起步，阿吉特打造了一家拥有350亿美元浮存金且持续盈利的保险公司——这一成就无人能及。他为伯克希尔创造了数千亿美元价值。若在股东大会见到他，请深深鞠躬致敬。
We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
我们的另一大再保险力量是通用再保险（General Re），由泰德·蒙特罗斯（Tad Montross）管理。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation must adhere to four disciplines:
稳健的保险运营需遵循四大原则：
- Understand all exposures that might cause losses（理解所有可能导致亏损的风险敞口）；
- Conservatively assess likelihood & cost of losses（保守评估风险概率及成本）；
- Set premiums that ensure profit after losses & expenses（设定覆盖预期损失和费用后的盈利保费）；
- Walk away if premiums can’t meet those criteria（若无法获得合理保费则放弃业务）。
Many insurers pass the first three tests but fail the fourth. They can’t resist competing when peers write risky policies. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in insurance.
多数保险公司能通过前三项考验，但第四项失败。他们无法拒绝竞争对手热衷的业务。“别人这么做，我们也得做”的老话在保险业尤为致命。
Tad has observed all four commandments, and his results show it. Under his leadership, General Re’s float has been better than cost-free, and we expect this to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about its international life reinsurance business, which has grown profitably since 1998.
泰德严格遵守这四大原则，业绩印证了这一点。在他的领导下，通用再保险的浮存金成本低于零，且这一趋势预计将持续。我们尤其看好其国际人寿再保险业务——自1998年收购以来持续增长且盈利。
Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer where I cut my teeth 62 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined at 18 and completed 51 years of service in 2012.
最后是GEICO，这是我62年前初入保险业接触的公司。GEICO由托尼·尼利（Tony Nicely）管理，他18岁加入公司，在2012年完成51年职业生涯。
Last year, GEICO’s GAAP underwriting profit was $680 million, but a mid-year accounting rule change required us to deduct $410 million from underwriting earnings. This adjustment had nothing to do with operational results – it didn’t affect cash, revenues, expenses or taxes. In effect, the writedown simply widened the already huge gap between GEICO’s intrinsic value and book value.
2012年GEICO的GAAP承保利润为6.8亿美元，但因会计准则变更，我们需扣除4.1亿美元。这一调整与运营无关，未影响现金流、收入、费用或税务。实质上，这只是拉大了GEICO内在价值与账面价值的原有差距。
GEICO earned its profit despite suffering its largest single loss in history: Hurricane Sandy cost us over three times what Katrina did. We insured 46,906 vehicles destroyed or damaged in the storm – a staggering number reflecting GEICO在纽约地区的主导地位.
即便遭遇史上最大单一损失（桑迪飓风造成的损失是卡特里娜的三倍），GEICO仍实现盈利。我们在风暴中赔付了46,906辆汽车，这一庞大数字印证了GEICO在纽约都市圈的市场份额。
GEICO’s performance was also driven by improved policyholder retention rates (“persistency”) and quotation-to-sale conversion (“closures”). A one-point increase in persistency alone boosts intrinsic value by over $1 billion. Last year’s gains prove that when people compare prices, they find GEICO saves them money.
GEICO的增长动力来自保单续保率（“留存率”）与报价转化率（“成交率”的提升。仅留存率提升1个百分点即可增加10亿美元内在价值。2012年的数据证明，当客户比价时，GEICO总能帮他们节省保费。
# Smaller Insurance Units
小型保险公司
In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most operating in niche insurance markets. In aggregate, these businesses consistently deliver underwriting profits and substantial float. Charlie and I treasure them.
除三大核心保险业务外，我们还拥有一组小型保险公司，多数在保险业冷门领域运营。整体而言，这一组合是规模庞大、持续增长且盈利丰厚的业务。查理和我珍视这些企业及其管理者。
Late in 2012, we added Guard Insurance, a workers’ comp specialist for small businesses with $300 million in annual premiums. The company has strong growth potential in traditional and new lines.
2012年末，我们收购了Guard Insurance，一家专注中小企业的工伤保险商，年保费约3亿美元。该公司在传统业务及新业务线（如责任险）上具备增长潜力。
# Underwriting Profit and Float by Division
按部门划分的承保利润与浮存金（百万美元）
| Insurance Operations（保险业务） | Underwriting Profit 2012 | 2011 | Yearend Float 2012 | 2011 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BH Reinsurance（伯克希尔再保险） | $304 | $714 | $34,821 | $33,728 |
| General Re（通用再保险） | $355 | $144 | $20,128 | $19,714 |
| GEICO（政府雇员保险公司） | $680* | $576 | $11,578 | $11,169 |
| Other Primary（其他基础业务） | $286 | $242 | $6,598 | $5,960 |
| Total（总计） | $1,625 | $248 | $73,125 | $70,571 |
*After a $410 million charge against earnings from an industry-wide accounting change.
*扣除一项因行业会计准则变更导致的4.1亿美元调整后利润。
Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world. It was our lucky day when, in March 1967, Jack Ringwalt sold us his two property-casualty insurers for $8.6 million.
在大型保险运营中，伯克希尔堪称全球最佳。1967年3月，杰克·林格沃尔特以860万美元将两家财产险公司出售给我们时，那是伯克希尔最幸运的一天。
# Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受监管的重资本业务
We have two major operations, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, that share important characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.
我们有两个核心业务——BNSF铁路与中美能源——它们具备与其他业务显著不同的特征。因此我们将其财务数据单独列示，并在通用会计准则（GAAP）的资产负债表和利润表中合并呈现。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions will far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, BNSF’s interest coverage was 9.6x (our definition: pre-tax earnings/interest, not EBITDA/interest, a measure we view as deeply flawed).
两家公司的关键特征是对长期受监管资产的巨大投资，其中部分资金来自无需伯克希尔担保的长期债务。我们的信用背书并非必要，因为它们的盈利能力即使在极端经济环境下也远超利息需求。例如，BNSF去年的利息保障倍数达9.6倍（我们的定义是税前收益/利息，而非行业常用的EBITDA/利息，后者存在严重缺陷）。
At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two key factors ensure its ability to service debt under all circumstances:
中美能源方面，两大因素确保其偿债能力：
- Recession-resistant earnings from offering an essential service（因提供基础服务而具备抗衰退盈利）；
- Great diversity of earnings streams（盈利来源多样性）——使其免受单一监管机构重大影响。
This particular strength, supplemented by Berkshire’s ownership, has enabled MidAmerican and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This advantage benefits both us and our customers.
这一优势叠加伯克希尔的信用支持，使中美能源及子公司大幅降低债务成本。这一优势对股东与客户均有益处。
Every day, our two subsidiaries power the American economy in major ways:
我们的两家子公司每日以重大方式支撑美国经济运行：
Š BNSF carries about 15% (measured by ton-miles) of all inter-city freight, whether transported by truck, rail, water, air, or pipeline. Indeed, we move more ton-miles of goods than anyone else, a fact establishing BNSF as the most important artery in our economy’s circulatory system.
Š BNSF铁路运输美国城际货运量的约15%（按吨英里计算），无论运输方式为何。事实上，我们运输的货物吨英里量超过任何其他企业，这使得BNSF成为美国经济循环系统中最关键的动脉。
BNSF also moves cargo in a fuel-efficient way, carrying a ton of freight about 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel. Trucks guzzle about four times as much fuel.
BNSF与所有铁路一样，以极高的燃油效率运输货物。一加仑柴油可运送一吨货物约500英里，而卡车完成同样工作需消耗四倍燃料。
Š MidAmerican’s utilities serve regulated retail customers in ten states. No utility company stretches further. In addition, we are the leader in renewables:
Š 中美能源的公用事业覆盖美国十个州的受监管零售客户，业务地域跨度无人能及。此外，我们是可再生能源领域的领军者：
- 风电：九年前从零起步，现拥有全国6%产能；
- 太阳能：当前三个在建项目完成后，将占美国太阳能发电能力的14%。
Projects like these require $13 billion in capital. We relish such commitments if they promise reasonable returns – and on that front, we put large trust in future regulation.
此类项目需累计投入130亿美元。我们乐于持续投入，只要能带来合理回报。而这一点，我们对未来的监管环境抱有充分信任。
# Confidence in Infrastructure Investment
对基础设施投资的信心
Our confidence is justified by past experience and the knowledge that society will forever need massive investment in transportation and energy. Governments must treat capital providers fairly to ensure funds flow to essential projects. And we must operate in a way that earns regulators’ approval.
我们的信心既有历史经验支撑，也源于对社会将永续需要交通与能源巨额投资的认知。政府有义务以合理方式对待资本提供者，确保资金流向关键项目；而我们也有责任以赢得监管者及民众支持的方式运营。
Managers must think far ahead: Energy and transportation projects take years to materialize. A growing country can’t afford delays.
管理者必须前瞻布局：能源与交通项目需多年建设，成长中的国家无法承受延误。
We’ve been doing our part: Whatever you may have heard about U.S. infrastructure decay does not apply to BNSF or railroads generally. America’s rail system has never been in better shape due to industry investments. We are not resting on laurels: BNSF will spend $4 billion on the railroad in 2013 – double depreciation and a record for any railroad.
我们始终积极行动：无论外界如何评价美国基础设施老化，BNSF及铁路行业通过巨额投资已达到历史最佳状态。我们未止步不前：BNSF计划2013年投入40亿美元（为折旧费用两倍），创铁路业年度最高纪录。
# Key Figures for BNSF and MidAmerican
BNSF与中美能源核心数据
# MidAmerican (89.8% owned)
中美能源（持有89.8%）
| 项目（英文｜中文） | 2012 | 2011 |
|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities（英国公用事业） | $429 | $469 |
| Iowa utility（爱荷华州公用事业） | $236 | $279 |
| Western utilities（西部公用事业） | $737 | $771 |
| Pipelines（管道运输） | $383 | $388 |
| Home Services（房屋服务） | $82 | $39 |
| Other (net)（其他净项） | $91 | $36 |
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes（税息前运营利润） | $1,958 | $1,982 |
| Interest（利息） | $314 | $336 |
| Income taxes（所得税） | $172 | $315 |
| Net earnings（净利润） | $1,472 | $1,331 |
| Earnings applicable to Berkshire（归属伯克希尔收益） | $1,323 | $1,204 |
# BNSF
BNSF铁路公司
| 项目（英文｜中文） | 2012 | 2011 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenues（收入） | $20,835 | $19,548 |
| Operating expenses（运营费用） | $14,835 | $14,247 |
| Operating earnings before interest and taxes（税息前运营利润） | $6,000 | $5,301 |
| Interest (net)（净利息） | $623 | $560 |
| Income taxes（所得税） | $2,005 | $1,769 |
| Net earnings（净利润） | $3,372 | $2,972 |
# Home Services: Real Estate Expansion
房屋服务：房地产经纪扩张
Sharp-eyed readers will notice an incongruity in the MidAmerican earnings tabulation: Why is HomeServices, a real estate brokerage, listed in “Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses?”
细心的读者会发现中美能源收益分类中的矛盾：房屋服务（HomeServices），一个房地产经纪公司，为何出现在“受监管的重资本业务”板块？
Well, its ownership came with MidAmerican when we bought control in 2000. At that time, I focused on MidAmerican’s utility operations and barely noticed HomeServices, which then owned only a few brokerage companies.
这是因为我们在2000年收购中美能源时一并获得HomeServices。当时我关注公用事业，而HomeServices仅拥有几家地产经纪公司。
Since then, however, the company has regularly added residential brokers – three in 2012 – and now has about 16,000 agents across major U.S. cities. In 2012, our agents participated in $42 billion of home sales, up 33% from 2011.
此后HomeServices持续收购住宅地产经纪公司（2012年增三家），现拥有约16,000名经纪人，覆盖美国主要城市。2012年经手房产销售达420亿美元，较2011年增长33%。
Additionally, HomeServices last year purchased 67% of Prudential and Real Living’s franchise operations, which license 544 brokerage companies nationwide. We can buy the remaining 33% within five years and will rebrand all franchisees as Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices.
此外，HomeServices以67%持股收购普华永道与Real Living特许经营权，覆盖544家地产经纪公司。五年内可收购剩余股份，并将所有特许经营商更名为伯克希尔哈撒韦地产（Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices）。
Ron Peltier has done an outstanding job in managing HomeServices during a depressed period. Now, as the housing market strengthens, we expect earnings to rise significantly.
罗恩·佩尔蒂埃（Ron Peltier）在房地产低迷期管理HomeServices展现卓越才能。随着市场回暖，收益将大幅增长。
# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
制造、服务与零售业务
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
我们在这个板块的业务覆盖范围广泛。以下是该集团合并资产负债表和利润表摘要：
# Balance Sheet 12/31/12 (in millions)
资产负债表（百万美元）
| Assets（资产） | 2012年 |
|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents（现金及等价物） | $5,338 |
| Accounts and notes receivable（应收账款和票据） | $7,382 |
| Inventory（存货） | $9,675 |
| Other current assets（其他流动资产） | $734 |
| Total current assets（流动资产合计） | $23,129 |
| Goodwill and other intangibles（商誉及其他无形资产） | $26,017 |
| Fixed assets（固定资产） | $18,871 |
| Other assets（其他资产） | $3,416 |
| Total assets（资产总计） | $71,433 |
| Liabilities and Equity（负债及权益） | 2012年 |
|---|---|
| Notes payable（应付票据） | $1,454 |
| Other current liabilities（其他流动负债） | $8,527 |
| Total current liabilities（流动负债合计） | $9,981 |
| Deferred taxes（递延税项） | $4,907 |
| Term debt and other liabilities（长期债务及其他负债） | $5,826 |
| Non-controlling interests（非控股权益） | $2,062 |
| Berkshire equity（伯克希尔权益） | $48,657 |
| Total liabilities and equity（负债及权益总计） | $71,433 |
# Earnings Statement (in millions)
利润表（百万美元）
| 项目（英文｜中文） | 2012 | 2011* |
|---|---|---|
| Revenues（收入） | $83,255 | $72,406 |
| Operating expenses（运营费用） | $76,978 | $67,239 |
| Interest expense（利息支出） | $146 | $111 |
| Pre-tax earnings（税前收益） | $6,131 | $5,037 |
| Income taxes and non-controlling interests（所得税及非控股权益） | $2,432 | $1,998 |
| Net earnings（净利润） | $3,699 | $3,039 |
*Includes earnings of Lubrizol from September 16.
*含Lubrizol自9月16日起的收益。
Our income and expense data conforming to GAAP is on page 29. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP and exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the real expenses and profits of the businesses.
我们的GAAP合规数据见第29页。上述运营费用为非GAAP口径，排除了部分并购会计项目（主要是特定无形资产的摊销）。我们采用此方式呈现，因查理和我认为调整后的数据更能准确反映表中聚合企业的实际经济成本和利润。
I won’t explain all adjustments – some are tiny and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets: Some deplete over time (e.g., software amortization), while others (e.g., customer relationships) do not. GAAP treats both as expenses, even though only some are real.
无需详述所有调整（部分金额微小且复杂），但严肃投资者应理解无形资产的差异：某些资产价值随时间消耗（如软件摊销），而其他（如客户关系）则不会贬值。GAAP准则未区分两者，均计入费用——但从投资者视角，二者本质截然不同。
In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 29, amortization charges of $600 million are deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real” – included in the table above – and the rest not. This difference has become significant due to our many acquisitions.
在第29页的GAAP合规数据中，本板块公司摊销费用6亿美元已被扣除。其中约20%为“真实费用”（已包含在上表中），其余为会计调整。这一差异因频繁并购变得显著。
A “non-real” amortization charge at Wells Fargo, however, is not highlighted by the company and never, to my knowledge, has been noted in analyst reports. The earnings that Wells Fargo reports are heavily burdened by an “amortization of core deposits” charge, implying deposits are disappearing rapidly. Yet core deposits regularly increase. The charge last year was about $1.5 billion. In no sense, except GAAP accounting, is this a real expense.
例如，富国银行的“非真实”摊销费用（核心存款摊销）未被公司强调，也未出现在分析师报告中。该公司财报中的“核心存款摊销”费用暗示存款正快速流失。但事实上核心存款持续增长。2012年该费用达15亿美元。除GAAP准则外，这一费用毫无实际意义。
And that ends today’s accounting lecture. Why is no one shouting “More, more?”
今天的会计讲座到此结束。为何没人喊“再来一点”？
# Performance and Mistakes
业务表现与错误
The crowd of companies in this section sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some enjoy terrific economics (25%-100% after-tax returns on unleveraged net tangible assets), others produce 12-20% returns. A few have poor returns due to my capital allocation mistakes.
这一板块企业产品从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机无所不包。部分企业基于无杠杆有形净资产的税后收益率达25%-100%，另一些在12%-20%之间。少数企业回报率低，这是我在资本配置上的重大失误。
More than 50 years ago, Charlie told me that it was far better to buy a wonderful business at a fair price than to buy a fair business at a wonderful price. Despite the logic, I’ve sometimes reverted to bargain-hunting, with results ranging from tolerable to terrible.
50年前查理就告诉我：以合理价格买入优质企业，优于以低价买入平庸企业。尽管道理清晰，我仍偶尔重拾“捡便宜”的旧习惯，结果从尚可到糟糕不等。
Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group employ $22.6 billion of net tangible assets and earn 16.3% after-tax. Of course, a business with great economics can be a bad investment if the purchase price is excessive. We paid premiums for most businesses, reflected in large goodwill. Overall, however, we’re getting decent returns, and intrinsic value exceeds carrying value by a good margin. Even so, the insurance and regulated-industry segments have far greater intrinsic-value premiums.
整体而言，这一板块使用226亿美元有形净资产，实现16.3%税后回报率。当然，若收购价格过高，优质企业也可能成为糟糕投资。我们为多数业务支付了溢价（体现在巨额商誉中），但整体回报率合理。此外，企业内在价值已显著高于账面价值，但保险及受监管业务的差距更大。
# Marmon Case Study: Book Value vs. Intrinsic Value
马蒙集团案例：账面价值 vs. 内在价值
Marmon provides an example of a clear and substantial gap between book value and intrinsic value.
马蒙集团是账面价值与内在价值存在显著差异的典型。
Last year we raised our ownership in Marmon from 64% to 80%. GAAP required us to immediately record the purchase at far less than what we paid. I’ve had a year to think about this weird rule but still can’t find a logical explanation – nor can Charlie or Marc Hamburg, our CFO.
2011年我们将马蒙持股从64%增至80%。GAAP要求以低于收购价的金额入账，但至今无法找到合理解释——查理和CFO马克·汉堡也未能解答。
In 2012 we acquired an additional 10% of Marmon, and the same bizarre accounting applied. The $700 million write-off immediately reduced book value but had no effect on earnings.
2012年我们再购入马蒙10%股权，同样遭遇怪异会计处理。7亿美元的减值直接降低账面价值，但未影响实际收益。
The cost of our recent purchase implies a $12.6 billion value for the 90% of Marmon we own. But its carrying value on our balance sheet is only $8 billion. Charlie and I believe our purchase represents excellent value. If correct, Marmon is worth at least $4.6 billion more than its accounting value.
此次收购成本暗示马蒙90%股权价值126亿美元，但资产负债表上仅体现80亿美元。查理和我认为这一投资极具价值——若判断正确，其真实价值应高出46亿美元。
Marmon is a diverse enterprise, comprised of about 150 companies in industries from tank cars to shippers like oil and chemical firms. Its largest business involves tank car leasing through Union Tank Car (U.S.) and Procor (Canada).
马蒙由约150家子公司组成，业务从油罐车租赁到为石油、化工公司提供运输服务。最大业务是通过Union Tank Car（美国）和Procor（加拿大）开展的油罐车租赁。
# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
制造、服务与零售业务
Union Tank Car has been around a long time, having been owned by the Standard Oil Trust until that empire was broken up in 1911. Look for its UTLX logo on tank cars when you watch trains roll by. As a Berkshire shareholder, you own the cars with that insignia. When you spot a UTLX car, puff out your chest a bit and enjoy the same satisfaction that John D. Rockefeller undoubtedly experienced as he viewed his fleet a century ago.
Union Tank Car（联合油罐车公司）的历史悠久，曾隶属于1911年被拆分的标准石油托拉斯。当您看到火车上的UTLX标志时，作为伯克希尔股东，您拥有这些车辆。看到UTLX油罐车时，请挺起胸膛——正如洛克菲勒百年前目睹自家车队时的自豪感。
Tank cars are owned by either shippers or lessors, not by railroads. At yearend Union Tank Car and Procor together owned 97,000 cars with a net book value of $4 billion. A new car costs upwards of $100,000. Union Tank Car is also a major manufacturer – some sold, most leased out. Today, its order book extends well into 2014.
油罐车由货主或租赁商持有，而非铁路公司。截至年末，联合油罐车公司（Union Tank Car）与加拿大子公司Procor共拥有97,000辆油罐车，净账面价值达40亿美元。新车单价超10万美元。联合公司亦是主要生产商，部分出售，多数自持并出租。当前订单已排至2014年。
At both BNSF and Marmon, we are benefitting from the resurgence of U.S. oil production. In fact, our railroad now transports about 500,000 barrels of oil daily, roughly 10% of the total produced in the “lower 48” (excluding Alaska and offshore). BNSF’s oil shipments are expected to grow substantially in coming years.
BNSF铁路与马蒙集团均受益于美国石油生产的复兴。事实上，我们的铁路每日运输约50万桶石油，占美国本土48州总产量的10%。未来几年，BNSF的石油运输量将大幅增长。
# Finance and Financial Products
金融及金融产品
This sector, our smallest, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), as well as Clayton Homes（克莱顿房屋公司）, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes. Aside from these 100%-owned subsidiaries, we also include financial assets and our 50% interest in Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.
该板块为伯克希尔最小业务单元，包含两家租赁公司——XTRA（半挂车）与CORT（家具），以及克莱顿房屋公司（美国最大预制房屋制造商与融资商）。除全资子公司外，该板块还包括金融资产及对伯克迪亚商业抵押公司（Berkadia Commercial Mortgage）的50%权益。
We include Clayton in this sector because it owns and services 332,000 mortgages, totaling $13.7 billion. These loans were made to lower and middle-income families. Yet they performed well during the housing collapse, validating our conviction: a reasonable down payment and a sensible payments-to-income ratio prevent outsized foreclosure losses, even during stressful times.
克莱顿归入此板块因其持有并管理332,000笔抵押贷款，总额137亿美元。贷款对象为中低收入家庭。尽管房地产崩盘，其表现优异，印证我们的判断：合理首付与偿债收入比可避免大规模止赎损失，即使经济低迷期。
Clayton produced 25,872 manufactured homes last year, up 13.5% from 2011. That output accounted for 4.8% of all single-family residences built in the U.S., making Clayton America’s number one homebuilder.
2012年，克莱顿生产了25,872套预制房屋，较2011年增长13.5%。占全美独户住宅建造量的4.8%，使其成为美国最大房屋制造商。
CORT and XTRA are leaders in their industries. Our expenditures for new rental equipment at XTRA totaled $256 million in 2012, more than double its depreciation expense. While competitors fret about today’s uncertainties, XTRA is preparing for tomorrow.
CORT与XTRA亦是行业领军者。XTRA去年投入2.56亿美元采购新租赁设备，为折旧费用的两倍。当同行担忧短期不确定性时，XTRA正为未来扩张做准备。
Berkadia continues to do well. Our partners at Leucadia do most of the work in this venture, an arrangement Charlie and I happily embrace.
伯克迪亚商业抵押公司持续表现优异。业务主要由合作方Leucadia主导，查理和我对此合作模式感到满意。
Here’s the pre-tax earnings recap for this sector:
以下是该板块税前收益数据：
| 项目（英文｜中文） | 2012 | 2011 |
|---|---|---|
| Berkadia（伯克迪亚） | $35 | $25 |
| Clayton（克莱顿房屋） | $255 | $154 |
| CORT（家具租赁） | $42 | $29 |
| XTRA（半挂车租赁） | $106 | $126 |
| Net financial income*（净金融收入*） | $410 | $440 |
| 总计 | $848 | $774 |
*Excludes capital gains or losses
- 排除资本损益
# Investments
投资组合
Below we list our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.
以下列出截至年末市值超10亿美元的普通股投资：
# Berkshire’s Top Equity Investments
伯克希尔前十大股票持仓
| Shares（持股数） | Percentage of Company Owned（持股比例） | Company（公司） | Cost（成本，百万美元） | Market (12/31/12)（市值，百万美元） |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | 13.7% | American Express Company（美国运通） | $1,287 | $8,715 |
| 400,000,000 | 8.9% | The Coca-Cola Company（可口可乐） | $1,299 | $14,500 |
| 24,123,911 | 2.0% | ConocoPhillips（康菲石油） | $1,219 | $1,399 |
| 22,999,600 | 3.8% | DIRECTV（达美航空） | $1,057 | $1,154 |
| 68,115,484 | 6.0% | International Business Machines Corp.（IBM） | $11,680 | $13,048 |
| 28,415,250 | 12.7% | Moody’s Corporation（穆迪公司） | $287 | $1,430 |
| 20,060,390 | 11.3% | Munich Re（慕尼黑再保险） | $2,990 | $3,599 |
| 20,668,118 | 3.3% | Phillips 66（菲利普66） | $660 | $1,097 |
| 3,947,555 | 5.1% | POSCO（韩国浦项制铁） | $768 | $1,295 |
| 52,477,678 | 1.9% | The Procter & Gamble Company（宝洁公司） | $336 | $3,563 |
| 25,848,838 | 2.0% | Sanofi（赛诺菲制药） | $2,073 | $2,438 |
| 415,510,889 | 5.2% | Tesco plc（英国乐购） | $2,401 | $2,268 |
| 78,060,769 | 4.2% | U.S. Bancorp（美国合众银行） | $2,837 | $3,741 |
| 54,823,433 | 1.6% | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.（沃尔玛） | $10,906 | $15,592 |
| 456,170,061 | 8.7% | Wells Fargo & Company（富国银行） | $7,646 | $45,617** |
| Others（其他） | — | — | — | $49,796 |
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market（按市值计价的普通股总值） | — | — | — | $87,662 |
This is our actual purchase price and tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases due to accounting adjustments.
2012年富国银行持股市值为456亿美元*，成本为7,646百万美元。
# Derivatives and Liquidity Management
衍生品与流动性管理
We continue to wind down the part of our derivatives portfolio that involved insurance-like risks. (Our utilities will keep using derivatives for operational purposes.) New commitments require collateral, which we avoid unless necessary. Markets can behave extraordinarily – we have no interest in exposure to unpredictable financial events.
我们持续退出承担类保险风险的衍生品头寸。（公用事业仍用衍生品管理运营。）新合约需抵押金，我们仅在必要时接受。市场可能极端波动——我们无意让伯克希尔暴露于突发金融事件。
Charlie and I believe in operating with many redundant layers of liquidity, avoiding obligations that could drain cash. That reduces returns in 99 years out of 100. But we will survive in the 100th while others fail. And we will sleep well in all 100.
查理和我坚持多重冗余流动性，规避重大资金消耗。这会降低99%年份的回报，但在第100年生存下来的同时，其他人已破产。我们将在所有年份安然入睡。
*This is our actual purchase price and tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs.
**One point about the composition of this list deserves mention. In Berkshire’s past reports, every stock here was bought by me. But starting this year, any investment by Todd Combs or Ted Weschler meeting the $1 billion threshold will be included. Above is the first such stock, DIRECTV, held by both managers.
- 成本为实际购买价格及税务基础；少数情况下，GAAP准则调整导致差异。
**需强调一点：以往所有持仓由我决策买入，但自2012年起，托德·康布斯与泰德·韦施勒的持仓若达10亿美元门槛也将纳入此表。DIRECTV是首只此类股票，由两人分别持有。
# Derivatives and Liquidity Management
衍生品与流动性管理
The derivatives we have sold that provide credit protection for corporate bonds will all expire in the next year. It’s now almost certain that our profit from these contracts will approximate $1 billion pre-tax. We also received very substantial sums upfront on these derivatives, and the “float” attributable to them has averaged about $2 billion over their five-year lives. All told, these derivatives have provided a more-than-satisfactory result, especially considering the fact that we were guaranteeing corporate credits – mostly of the high-yield variety – throughout the financial panic and subsequent recession.
我们出售的为企业债券提供信用保护的衍生品将在下一年到期。目前几乎可以肯定这些合约将带来约10亿美元税前利润。我们还提前收取了巨额保费，过去五年平均浮存金约为20亿美元。总体而言，这些衍生品表现优异，尤其考虑到我们在金融危机和经济衰退期间承保的多为高收益债信用。
In our other major derivatives commitment, we sold long-term puts on four leading stock indices in the U.S., U.K., Europe and Japan. These contracts were initiated between 2004 and 2008 and even under the worst of circumstances have only minor collateral requirements. In 2010 we unwound about 10% of our exposure at a profit of $222 million. The remaining contracts expire between 2018 and 2026. Only the index value at expiration counts; our counterparties have no right to early termination.
另一大衍生品承诺是我们在2004-2008年间出售的四个主要股指长期看跌期权（美国、英国、欧洲及日本）。即使在最差环境下，这些合约也只需少量抵押金。2010年我们以2.22亿美元利润解除了10%的风险敞口。剩余合约将于2018-2026年到期，仅到期日指数价值决定赔付，交易对手无权提前终止。
Berkshire received premiums of $4.2 billion when we wrote the contracts that remain outstanding. If all of these contracts had come due at yearend 2011, we would have had to pay $6.2 billion; the corresponding figure at yearend 2012 was $3.9 billion. With this large drop in immediate settlement liability, we reduced our GAAP liability at yearend 2012 to $7.5 billion from $8.5 billion in 2011. Though it’s no sure thing, Charlie and I believe it likely that the final liability will be considerably less than the amount we currently carry on our books. In the meantime, we can invest the $4.2 billion of float derived from these contracts as we see fit.
我们从剩余合约中收取了42亿美元保费。若2011年末到期需赔付62亿美元，2012年末降至39亿美元。这一负债下降使GAAP会计准则下的负债从85亿减至75亿。查理和我预计最终赔付金额将远低于账面数值。在此期间，我们可以自由投资这42亿美元浮存金。
# Newspapers: A Contrarian Move
报纸业务：逆向投资
We Buy Some Newspapers . . . Newspapers?
购买报纸？这合理吗？
During the past fifteen months, we acquired 28 daily newspapers at a cost of $344 million. This may puzzle you for two reasons:
过去15个月，我们以3.44亿美元收购了28家日报。您或许会因以下两个原因感到困惑：
- 我长期在年报和股东大会上指出报纸业的发行量、广告与利润将持续下降——这一预测依旧成立；
- 这些报纸规模远低于我们通常对收购标的的要求。
We can address the second point easily. Charlie and I love newspapers and, if their economics make sense, will buy them even when they fall short of size thresholds. Addressing the first point requires a deeper explanation:
第二点容易解释：查理和我喜欢报纸，若其经济模型合理，即使规模未达标我们也会收购。至于第一点，让我们回顾新闻业的历史演变：
# Why Newspapers Still Matter
为何报纸仍有价值
News is what people don’t know but want to know. People seek news from sources offering the best mix of immediacy, accessibility, reliability, comprehensiveness and low cost. The relative importance of these factors varies by news type and audience.
新闻是人们未知但渴望的信息。人们选择能提供即时性、易获取性、可靠性、全面性和低成本的最佳组合渠道。不同新闻类型和受众对这些要素的权重不同。
Before TV and the Internet, newspapers were the primary source for diverse news, making them indispensable. Whether international, national, local, sports or stock quotes – your paper was first to deliver. Indeed, newspapers contained so much needed information that readers got their money’s worth, even if only a few pages matched their interests. Better yet, advertisers paid most of the cost, and readers rode their coattails.
电视与互联网出现前，报纸是多元新闻的唯一来源，不可或缺。无论国际、国内、本地、体育还是股市报价——报纸总是最先报道。当时，报纸包含的信息量远超读者支付的费用，即使仅有少数页面符合其兴趣。更关键的是，广告商承担了大部分成本，读者搭了便车。
Additionally, ads themselves delivered vital information to readers – job listings, apartment availability, supermarket specials, movie showtimes – which was far more important than opinionated editorials.
此外，广告本身提供了读者急需的信息：招聘、租房、超市特价、电影场次——这些比社论更受关注。
In turn, the local paper was indispensable to advertisers. If Sears or Safeway opened stores in Omaha, they needed a “megaphone” to attract customers. Big retailers competed with multi-page spreads, knowing advertised goods would sell. With no comparable megaphone, ads sold themselves.
对广告商而言，本地报纸同样关键。西尔斯或SafeWay在奥马哈开店时需要“扩音器”传播消息。百货与超市通过多页广告竞争，清楚促销商品会热销。由于当时无其他渠道可替代，广告销售水到渠成。
As long as a newspaper was the only one in its community, profits were extraordinary; management quality mattered little. (A Southern publisher famously said, “I owe my success to two great American institutions – nepotism and monopoly.”)
只要一城一报，利润必然丰厚；管理优劣影响甚微。（一位南方出版商曾自嘲：“我的成功归功于两大美国传统——裙带关系与垄断。”）
Over the years, cities became one-newspaper towns or duos that merged economically. This contraction was inevitable: Most people read only one paper. When competition existed, the circulation leader attracted most ads. This symbiosis spelled doom for weaker papers — the “survival of the fattest.”
多年后，多数城市成为一报独大或两报合并运营的格局。这是必然趋势：多数人只读一份报纸。当竞争存在时，发行量领先者自动获得广告，形成“广告吸引读者，读者带来更多广告”的良性循环。弱小报纸则被吞噬，这一过程被称为“肥者生存”。
Now the world has changed. Stock quotes and sports scores are old news before presses roll. The Internet offers job and housing data. TV bombards viewers with global news. Newspapers have therefore lost their “primacy” in many areas. As audiences fell, so did advertising. (“Help wanted” ads, once a major revenue source, have plunged 90% in 12 years.)
如今世界已变：股市行情与体育比分在印刷前已通过互联网和电视传播。报纸失去了“唯一信息源”的地位。随着读者流失，广告收入锐减。（分类招聘广告收入在过去12年下降90%。）
Newspapers continue to reign in local news delivery. If you want to know about your town – whether the mayor, taxes, or high school football – there’s no substitute for a dedicated local paper. A reader’s eyes may glaze over Canadian tariffs or Pakistan politics, but stories about themselves or neighbors will be read to the end. Wherever there’s a strong sense of community, a paper serving it will remain indispensable.
报纸仍统治本地新闻领域。若您想了解本地新闻（市长、税收或高中橄榄球），唯一替代品是本地报纸。读者可能对加拿大关税或巴基斯坦政治无感，但关于自身或邻居的故事会读到最后。只要社区归属感存在，服务该社区的报纸就不可或缺。
Even a valuable product can self-destruct from a faulty business strategy. And that process has been underway for a decade at most large papers. Publishers – including Berkshire’s Buffalo News – offered free online content while charging for print, leading to steady declines in physical sales. Falling circulation makes papers less essential to advertisers. Under these conditions, the “virtuous circle” reverses.
即使优质产品也可能因错误战略失败。过去十年，多数大报陷入此困境。包括伯克希尔旗下《布法罗新闻》在内的出版商免费提供网络版，同时收取印刷版费用。这一策略导致纸质版销量持续下滑。发行量下降使广告商失去兴趣，过去的“良性循环”逆转。
The Wall Street Journal adopted a paywall early. But the exemplar is the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, published by Walter Hussman, Jr. Walter also charged early, and over the past decade his paper retained circulation far better than any other major paper. Despite his example, only recently have others, including Berkshire, explored pay models. Whatever works – the answer isn’t clear yet – will be copied widely.
《华尔街日报》早期采用付费墙模式。但最佳案例是沃尔特·赫斯曼（Walter Hussman, Jr.）旗下的《阿肯色民主党人-公报》（Arkansas Democrat-Gazette）。他早在十年前便实施付费策略，过去十年其发行量保有率优于其他大报。尽管如此，直到最近才有其他报纸（包括伯克希尔旗下）探索付费模式。无论哪种模式最终胜出（答案尚不明朗），都将被广泛效仿。
Charlie and I believe that papers delivering comprehensive and reliable local news with a sensible Internet strategy will remain viable for a long time. We do not believe that success will come from cutting news content or publication frequency. Skimpy coverage will almost certainly lead to skimpy readership. And less-than-daily publication – though it may improve profits short-term – seems certain to diminish relevance over time. Our goal is to keep our papers loaded with community-relevant content and to be paid appropriately by those who find us useful, whether reading in print or online.
查理和我坚信，坚持提供全面可靠的本地新闻并制定合理互联网战略的报纸将长期生存。我们不认同削减新闻内容或出版频率能带来成功。内容稀薄必然导致读者流失。低于每日出版频率的尝试（虽短期改善利润），长期看将削弱影响力。我们的目标是：让报纸充满对读者有价值的内容，并向从我们获取信息的人合理收费——无论他们阅读纸质版还是网络版。
# Newspaper Operations (报业运营)
Our confidence is buttressed by the availability of Terry Kroeger’s outstanding management group at the Omaha World-Herald, a team that has the ability to oversee a large group of papers. The individual papers, however, will be independent in their news coverage and editorial opinions. (I voted for Obama; of our 12 dailies that endorsed a presidential candidate, 10 opted for Romney.)
我们之所以有信心，是因为奥马哈世界先驱报（Omaha World-Herald）有特里·克罗格（Terry Kroeger）带领的杰出管理团队，他们有能力管理一个大型报纸群。不过，每家报纸在新闻报道和社论观点上将保持独立。（我本人投票给了奥巴马；在我们的12家日报中，有10家支持了罗姆尼。）
Our newspapers are certainly not insulated from the forces that have been driving revenues downward. Still, the six small dailies we owned throughout 2012 had unchanged revenues for the year, a result far superior to that experienced by big-city dailies. Moreover, the two large papers we operated throughout the year – The Buffalo News and the Omaha World-Herald – held their revenue loss to 3%, which was also an above-average outcome. Among newspapers in America’s 50 largest metropolitan areas, our Buffalo and Omaha papers rank near the top in circulation penetration of their home territories.
当然，我们的报纸也无法免受导致收入下滑的大趋势影响。但我们在整个2012年拥有的6家小型日报实现了收入持平，远好于大城市日报的表现。此外，全年由我们运营的两家大报——布法罗新闻报（The Buffalo News）和奥马哈世界先驱报——收入仅下降了3%，这同样优于行业平均水平。在美国50个最大都市地区的报纸中，我们的布法罗和奥马哈报纸在本地发行量渗透率方面名列前茅。
This popularity is no accident: Credit the editors of those papers – Margaret Sullivan at the News and Mike Reilly at the World-Herald — for delivering information that has made their publications indispensable to community-interested readers. (Margaret, I regret to say, recently left us to join The New York Times, whose job offers are tough to turn down. That paper made a great hire, and we wish her the best.)
这种受欢迎程度并非偶然：应归功于这些报纸的编辑们——《新闻报》的玛格丽特·沙利文（Margaret Sullivan）和《世界先驱报》的迈克·赖利（Mike Reilly）——他们提供的信息使他们的出版物成为关注社区读者不可或缺的读物。（遗憾的是，玛格丽特最近离开我们，加入了《纽约时报》，这份工作的吸引力很难拒绝。该报做出了极佳的人才引进，我们也祝愿她一切顺利。）
Berkshire’s cash earnings from its papers will almost certainly trend downward over time. Even a sensible Internet strategy will not be able to prevent modest erosion. At our cost, however, I believe these papers will meet or exceed our economic test for acquisitions. Results to date support that belief.
从长期来看，伯克希尔从报纸业务获得的现金收益几乎肯定会呈下降趋势。即使采取合理的互联网战略，也难以完全阻止小幅下滑。但从我们的成本结构来看，我相信这些报纸仍能通过我们的收购经济标准检验。迄今为止的结果也印证了这一信念。
Charlie and I, however, still operate under economic principle 11 (detailed on page 99) and will not continue the operation of any business doomed to unending losses. One daily paper that we acquired in a bulk purchase from Media General was significantly unprofitable under that company’s ownership. After analyzing the paper’s results, we saw no remedy for the losses and reluctantly shut it down. All of our remaining dailies, however, should be profitable for a long time to come. (They are listed on page 108.) At appropriate prices – and that means at a very low multiple of current earnings – we will purchase more papers of the type we like.
不过，查理和我仍然遵循第11条经济原则（详见第99页），不会继续经营注定长期亏损的企业。我们从Media General一次性收购的一家日报在其原公司经营下已严重亏损。分析其业绩后，我们认为无法扭转亏损局面，最终不得不关闭。然而，我们其余的所有日报预计在未来很长一段时间内都将保持盈利。（它们列示在第108页上。）只要价格合适——也就是说，以当前收益的非常低的倍数来计算——我们将继续收购我们喜欢类型的报纸。
A milestone in Berkshire’s newspaper operations occurred at yearend when Stan Lipsey retired as publisher of The Buffalo News. It’s no exaggeration for me to say that the News might now be extinct were it not for Stan.
斯坦·利普西（Stan Lipsey）在年底辞去布法罗新闻报出版人职务，标志着伯克希尔报业运营的一个里程碑。毫不夸张地说，如果没有斯坦，这家报纸可能早已消亡。
Charlie and I acquired the News in April 1977. It was an evening paper, dominant on weekdays but lacking a Sunday edition. Throughout the country, the circulation trend was toward morning papers. Moreover, Sunday was becoming ever more critical to the profitability of metropolitan dailies. Without a Sunday paper, the News was destined to lose out to its morning competitor, which had a fat and entrenched Sunday product.
查理和我在1977年4月买下了这家报纸。当时它是一份晚报，在工作日占据主导地位，但没有周日版。全国范围内，报纸发行趋势正转向晨报。此外，周日报对都市日报的盈利能力变得越来越重要。由于缺乏周日版，《新闻报》注定会被拥有强大且根深蒂固的周日版的晨报竞争对手击败。
We therefore began to print a Sunday edition late in 1977. And then all hell broke loose. Our competitor sued us, and District Judge Charles Brieant, Jr. authored a harsh ruling that crippled the introduction of our paper. His ruling was later reversed – after 17 long months – in a 3-0 sharp rebuke by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, we lost circulation, hemorrhaged money and stood in constant danger of going out of business.
因此，我们在1977年底开始印刷周日版。随后便陷入混乱。我们的竞争对手对我们提起了诉讼，地区法官小查尔斯·布里昂特（Charles Brieant, Jr.）作出严厉裁决，严重阻碍了我们报纸的推出。这项裁决在17个月后被第二巡回上诉法院以3比0的压倒性裁定推翻。在上诉期间，我们失去了大量读者，资金不断流失，并始终面临倒闭的风险。
Enter Stan Lipsey, a friend of mine from the 1960s, who, with his wife, had sold Berkshire a small Omaha weekly. I found Stan to be an extraordinary newspaperman, knowledgeable about every aspect of circulation, production, sales and editorial. (He was a key person in gaining that small weekly a Pulitzer Prize in 1973.) So when I was in big trouble at the News, I asked Stan to leave his comfortable way of life in Omaha to take over in Buffalo.
这时，斯坦·利普西登场了。他是我在上世纪60年代认识的朋友，他和他的妻子曾将一份位于奥马哈的小型周刊卖给了伯克希尔。我发现斯坦是一位非凡的新闻人，精通发行、生产、销售和编辑等各个方面。（他是那家小型周刊于1973年赢得普利策奖的关键人物。）所以当我在《新闻报》遇到巨大困境时，我请求斯坦放弃他在奥马哈舒适的生活，前往布法罗接管报社。
He never hesitated. Along with Murray Light, our editor, Stan persevered through four years of very dark days until the News won the competitive struggle in 1982. Ever since, despite a difficult Buffalo economy, the performance of the News has been exceptional. As both a friend and as a manager, Stan is simply the best.
他从未犹豫。与我们的编辑默里·莱特（Murray Light）一道，斯坦坚持度过了四年的艰难岁月，直到1982年《新闻报》赢得了竞争。从那以后，尽管布法罗经济困难重重，但《新闻报》的表现一直十分优异。无论是作为朋友还是管理者，斯坦都是最出色的。
# Dividends (股息)
A number of Berkshire shareholders – including some of my good friends – would like Berkshire to pay a cash dividend. It puzzles them that we relish the dividends we receive from most of the stocks that Berkshire owns, but pay out nothing ourselves. So let’s examine when dividends do and don’t make sense for shareholders.
许多伯克希尔股东——包括一些我的好朋友——都希望伯克希尔发放现金股息。他们感到困惑的是，我们乐于收取伯克希尔所持多数股票带来的股息，却自己分文不发。因此，让我们来看看在什么情况下股息对股东是有意义的，什么时候则不然。
A profitable company can allocate its earnings in various ways (which are not mutually exclusive). A company’s management should first examine reinvestment possibilities offered by its current business – projects to become more efficient, expand territorially, extend and improve product lines or to otherwise widen the economic moat separating the company from its competitors.
一家盈利公司可以以多种方式配置其利润（这些方式并不互斥）。管理层首先应审视现有业务所带来的再投资机会——例如提升效率、地域扩张、拓展和改进产品线，或以其他方式拓宽企业与竞争对手之间的“经济护城河”。
I ask the managers of our subsidiaries to unendingly focus on moat-widening opportunities, and they find many that make economic sense. But sometimes our managers misfire. The usual cause of failure is that they start with the answer they want and then work backwards to find a supporting rationale. Of course, the process is subconscious; that’s what makes it so dangerous.
我要求旗下子公司的经理们持续专注于拓宽护城河的机会，他们找到了很多具有经济价值的项目。但有时我们的经理也会判断失误。通常失败的原因是，他们从自己希望得到的答案出发，再反过来寻找支撑这一结论的理由。当然，这个过程往往是潜意识的；这正是它危险的地方。
Your chairman has not been free of this sin. In Berkshire’s 1986 annual report, I described how twenty years of management effort and capital improvements in our original textile business were an exercise in futility. I wanted the business to succeed and wished my way into a series of bad decisions. (I even bought another New England textile company.) But wishing makes dreams come true only in Disney movies; it’s poison in business.
我自己也未能幸免于这种错误。在伯克希尔1986年的年报中，我描述了我们最初的纺织业务中，二十年的管理努力和资本投入最终只是徒劳无功。我当时希望业务成功，并一厢情愿地做出了一系列糟糕决策。（甚至我还收购了另一家新英格兰地区的纺织公司。）但只有在迪士尼电影中，愿望才能实现梦想；在商业中，这是毒药。
Despite such past miscues, our first priority with available funds will always be to examine whether they can be intelligently deployed in our various businesses. Our record $12.1 billion of fixed-asset investments and bolt-on acquisitions in 2012 demonstrate that this is a fertile field for capital allocation at Berkshire. And here we have an advantage: Because we operate in so many areas of the economy, we enjoy a range of choices far wider than that open to most corporations. In deciding what to do, we can water the flowers and skip over the weeds.
尽管过去也曾犯过这样的错误，但我们对可用资金的首要任务始终是评估是否能将其明智地投入到各项业务中。2012年创纪录的121亿美元固定资产投资和补充性并购表明，这是伯克希尔资本配置的重要领域。而且我们具备优势：由于我们在经济多个领域开展业务，因此我们所能选择的投资范围远远超过大多数公司。在决定如何使用资金时，我们可以浇灌鲜花，而忽略杂草。
Even after we deploy hefty amounts of capital in our current operations, Berkshire will regularly generate a lot of additional cash. Our next step, therefore, is to search for acquisitions unrelated to our current businesses. Here our test is simple: Do Charlie and I think we can effect a transaction that is likely to leave our shareholders wealthier on a per-share basis than they were prior to the acquisition?
即便我们在现有业务中部署了大量资金，伯克希尔仍将定期产生大量额外现金流。因此，我们的下一步是寻找与现有业务无关的收购机会。这里的标准很简单：查理和我认为我们能否进行一项交易，使得每股股东财富在交易完成后高于交易前水平？
I have made plenty of mistakes in acquisitions and will make more. Overall, however, our record is satisfactory, which means that our shareholders are far wealthier today than they would be if the funds we used for acquisitions had instead been devoted to share repurchases or dividends.
我在并购方面犯过不少错误，未来还会继续犯错。但总体而言，我们的记录是令人满意的，这意味着如今股东的财富要远高于如果我们把用于并购的资金用于回购股票或发放股息的情况。
But, to use the standard disclaimer, past performance is no guarantee of future results. That’s particularly true at Berkshire: Because of our present size, making acquisitions that are both meaningful and sensible is now more difficult than it has been during most of our years.
当然，按照惯例声明，过去的业绩并不能保证未来的成果。这一点在伯克希尔尤其适用：由于目前的规模庞大，现在要做成既有意义又合理的大宗并购，要比我们以往大多数年份都更加困难。
Nevertheless, a large deal still offers us possibilities to add materially to per-share intrinsic value. BNSF is a case in point: It is now worth considerably more than our carrying value. Had we instead allocated the funds required for this purchase to dividends or repurchases, you and I would have been worse off. Though large transactions of the BNSF kind will be rare, there are still some whales in the ocean.
尽管如此，一笔重大交易仍有可能显著提升每股内在价值。BNSF就是典型案例：它的当前价值已远超我们的账面价值。如果当初我们将这笔资金用于分红或回购，你我都会更吃亏。虽然像BNSF这样的大宗交易极为罕见，但海洋中仍有鲸鱼存在。
The third use of funds – repurchases – is sensible for a company when its shares sell at a meaningful discount to conservatively calculated intrinsic value. Indeed, disciplined repurchases are the surest way to use funds intelligently: It’s hard to go wrong when you’re buying dollar bills for 80¢ or less. We explained our criteria for repurchases in last year’s report and, if the opportunity presents itself, we will buy large quantities of our stock. We originally said we would not pay more than 110% of book value, but that proved unrealistic. Therefore, we increased the limit to 120% in December when a large block became available at about 116% of book value.
资金使用的第三个方向是回购。当一家公司的股价低于保守估算的内在价值时，回购是有意义的。事实上，有纪律的回购是最稳妥的资金使用方式之一：当你以80美分甚至更低的价格购买1美元的资产时，很难出错。我们在去年的报告中解释了回购的标准，一旦机会出现，我们会大量回购本公司股票。我们最初表示不会支付超过账面价值110%的价格，但后来发现这一限制并不现实。因此，当一批大额股份以约账面价值116%的价格出现时，我们在12月将上限提高到了120%。
# Dividends (股息)（续）
But never forget: In repurchase decisions, price is all-important. Value is destroyed when purchases are made above intrinsic value. The directors and I believe that continuing shareholders are benefitted in a meaningful way by purchases up to our 120% limit.
但请永远记住：在回购决策中，价格至关重要。当回购价格高于内在价值时，股东价值就会被摧毁。董事们和我都相信，以不超过账面价值120%的价格进行回购，将对持续持股的股东产生实质性的积极影响。
And that brings us to dividends. Here we have to make a few assumptions and use some math. The numbers will require careful reading, but they are essential to understanding the case for and against dividends. So bear with me.
这也就引出了关于股息的话题。这里我们需要做一些假设，并借助一些数学计算。这些数字需要仔细阅读，但它们对于理解支持或反对分红的观点至关重要。所以，请耐心听我解释。
We’ll start by assuming that you and I are the equal owners of a business with $2 million of net worth. The business earns 12% on tangible net worth – $240,000 – and can reasonably expect to earn the same 12% on reinvested earnings. Furthermore, there are outsiders who always wish to buy into our business at 125% of net worth. Therefore, the value of what we each own is now $1.25 million.
我们先做一个假设：你和我共同拥有一家净资产为200万美元的企业。这家企业每年能获得12%的有形净资产回报率——也就是24万美元，并且可以合理预期再投资部分也能获得同样的12%回报。此外，总有一些外部人士愿意以净资产的125%来购买我们的股份。因此，我们现在各自所持股份的价值是125万美元。
You would like to have the two of us shareholders receive one-third of our company’s annual earnings and have two-thirds be reinvested. That plan, you feel, will nicely balance your needs for both current income and capital growth. So you suggest that we pay out $80,000 of current earnings and retain $160,000 to increase the future earnings of the business. In the first year, your dividend would be $40,000, and as earnings grew and the one- third payout was maintained, so too would your dividend. In total, dividends and stock value would increase 8% each year (12% earned on net worth less 4% of net worth paid out).
你希望我们两个股东每年领取公司利润的三分之一，把剩下的三分之二用于再投资。你觉得这个计划很好地平衡了当前收入与资本增长的需求。于是你建议分配8万美元的当年利润，保留16万美元用于提升未来盈利能力。第一年你的股息收益是4万美元，随着利润增长并保持三分之一的分红比例，你的股息也会随之增长。总体来看，股息和股价每年都会增长8%（12%的净资产收益率减去4%的分红比率）。
After ten years our company would have a net worth of $4,317,850 (the original $2 million compounded at 8%) and your dividend in the upcoming year would be $86,357. Each of us would have shares worth $2,698,656 (125% of our half of the company’s net worth). And we would live happily ever after – with dividends and the value of our stock continuing to grow at 8% annually.
十年后，公司的净资产将达到4,317,850美元（原始200万美元按8%复利增长），下一年度你的股息将是86,357美元。我们每人持有的股份价值2,698,656美元（即公司净资产的一半乘以125%）。从此以后，我们将幸福地生活下去——股息和股票价值每年继续以8%的速度增长。
There is an alternative approach, however, that would leave us even happier. Under this scenario, we would leave all earnings in the company and each sell 3.2% of our shares annually. Since the shares would be sold at 125% of book value, this approach would produce the same $40,000 of cash initially, a sum that would grow annually. Call this option the “sell-off” approach.
然而，还有一种替代方案会让我们的幸福感更强。在这种情景下，我们将所有利润留在公司，并每年出售各自3.2%的股份。由于股份是以账面价值的125%出售的，这种方法最初也能带来4万美元的现金，而且金额会逐年增加。我们称这种选择为“出售股份”策略。
Under this “sell-off” scenario, the net worth of our company increases to $6,211,696 after ten years ($2 million compounded at 12%). Because we would be selling shares each year, our percentage ownership would have declined, and, after ten years, we would each own 36.12% of the business. Even so, your share of the net worth of the company at that time would be $2,243,540. And, remember, every dollar of net worth attributable to each of us can be sold for $1.25. Therefore, the market value of your remaining shares would be $2,804,425, about 4% greater than the value of your shares if we had followed the dividend approach.
在这种“出售股份”策略下，公司净资产将在十年后增至6,211,696美元（200万美元按12%复利增长）。由于我们每年都卖出股份，持股比例会下降，到第十年末，我们各自只拥有公司36.12%的股份。即便如此，届时你在公司净资产中的份额仍为2,243,540美元。别忘了，每一美元属于你的净资产都可以以1.25美元的价格售出。因此，你剩余股份的市场价值将是2,804,425美元，比采用分红策略下的股份价值高出约4%。
Moreover, your annual cash receipts from the sell-off policy would now be running 4% more than you would have received under the dividend scenario. Voila! – you would have both more cash to spend annually and more capital value.
此外，你从“出售股份”策略中获得的年度现金收入也将比分红方式高出4%。瞧！——你现在不仅每年有更多可支配现金，同时资本价值也更高。
This calculation, of course, assumes that our hypothetical company can earn an average of 12% annually on net worth and that its shareholders can sell their shares for an average of 125% of book value. To that point, the S&P 500 earns considerably more than 12% on net worth and sells at a price far above 125% of that net worth. Both assumptions also seem reasonable for Berkshire, though certainly not assured.
当然，这一计算基于两个假设：我们假想的公司可以在净资产上获得平均12%的年回报率；股东可以以账面价值的125%出售股份。就这点而言，标普500指数成分股公司通常的净资产回报率远高于12%，其市价也远高于净资产的125%。这两个假设对伯克希尔来说似乎也是合理的，尽管不能完全保证。
Moreover, on the plus side, there also is a possibility that the assumptions will be exceeded. If they are, the argument for the sell-off policy becomes even stronger. Over Berkshire’s history – admittedly one that won’t come close to being repeated – the sell-off policy would have produced results for shareholders dramatically superior to the dividend policy.
此外，还有可能实际表现超过这些假设。如果确实如此，“出售股份”策略的优势将进一步增强。回顾伯克希尔的历史——虽然那段历史几乎不可能重复——“出售股份”的结果明显优于分红政策。
Aside from the favorable math, there are two further – and important – arguments for a sell-off policy. First, dividends impose a specific cash-out policy upon all shareholders. If, say, 40% of earnings is the policy, those who wish 30% or 50% will be thwarted. Our 600,000 shareholders cover the waterfront in their desires for cash. It is safe to say, however, that a great many of them – perhaps even most of them – are in a net-savings mode and logically should prefer no payment at all.
除了有利的数学计算外，“出售股份”策略还有另外两个重要优势。首先，分红意味着对所有股东实行统一的现金分配政策。例如，如果规定将40%的利润用于分红，那么希望拿30%或50%的人都会感到不满。我们的60万名股东对现金流的需求各不相同。但可以肯定地说，其中许多人——甚至可能是大多数人——处于净储蓄模式，理性上应该更倾向于不分红。
The sell-off alternative, on the other hand, lets each shareholder make his own choice between cash receipts and capital build-up. One shareholder can elect to cash out, say, 60% of annual earnings while other shareholders elect 20% or nothing at all. Of course, a shareholder in our dividend-paying scenario could turn around and use his dividends to purchase more shares. But he would take a beating in doing so: He would both incur taxes and also pay a 25% premium to get his dividend reinvested. (Keep remembering, open-market purchases of the stock take place at 125% of book value.)
而“出售股份”则允许每位股东自行决定如何在现金收入与资本积累之间做取舍。一位股东可以选择兑现60%的年利润，另一位股东可以选择20%或干脆分文不取。当然，在分红的情况下，股东也可以用分红资金再次买入股份。但这样做他将遭受双重打击：既要缴税，又要以账面价值125%的价格重新投资。（别忘了，我们在市场上买入股份的价格是账面价值的125%。）
The second disadvantage of the dividend approach is of equal importance: The tax consequences for all taxpaying shareholders are inferior – usually far inferior – to those under the sell-off program. Under the dividend program, all of the cash received by shareholders each year is taxed whereas the sell-off program results in tax on only the gain portion of the cash receipts.
其次，分红策略还有一个同样重要的劣势：对所有需纳税的股东来说，税收后果通常要差得多。在分红策略下，股东每年收到的所有现金都要纳税；而在“出售股份”策略下，只需对现金收入中的增值部分缴税。
Let me end this math exercise – and I can hear you cheering as I put away the dentist drill – by using my own case to illustrate how a shareholder’s regular disposals of shares can be accompanied by an increased investment in his or her business.
让我以自己的亲身经历作为结尾——我知道你们一定在欢呼我终于放下了牙钻——来说明一个股东即使定期出售股份，也能实现对企业的更大投入。
For the last seven years, I have annually given away about 4¼% of my Berkshire shares. Through this process, my original position of 712,497,000 B-equivalent shares (split-adjusted) has decreased to 528,525,623 shares. Clearly my ownership percentage of the company has significantly decreased.
过去七年里，我每年大约捐赠出我所持伯克希尔股份的4又1/4%。通过这种方式，我的持股从最初的712,497,000股B类等值股份（经拆股调整）减少至528,525,623股。显然，我对公司的持股比例大幅下降。
Yet my investment in the business has actually increased: The book value of my current interest in Berkshire considerably exceeds the book value attributable to my holdings of seven years ago. (The actual figures are $28.2 billion for 2005 and $40.2 billion for 2012.) In other words, I now have far more money working for me at Berkshire even though my ownership of the company has materially decreased. It’s also true that my share of both Berkshire’s intrinsic business value and the company’s normal earning power is far greater than it was in 2005. Over time, I expect this accretion of value to continue – albeit in a decidedly irregular fashion – even as I now annually give away more than 4½% of my shares (the increase having occurred because I’ve recently doubled my lifetime pledges to certain foundations).
但我在企业的投资实际上却增加了：我现在在伯克希尔的股份账面价值远远超过了七年前的水平。（具体数据是：2005年为282亿美元，2012年为402亿美元。）换句话说，尽管我对公司的持股比例显著减少，但我现在在伯克希尔的资金运作规模反而更大。事实上，我对伯克希尔内在商业价值和正常盈利能力的贡献也远高于2005年。随着时间推移，我预计这种价值的增长将继续——尽管过程会相当不规则——即使我现在每年捐赠的股份已超过4.5%（因为最近我已将终身承诺捐赠给某些基金会的股份翻了一倍）。
Above all, dividend policy should always be clear, consistent and rational. A capricious policy will confuse owners and drive away would-be investors. Phil Fisher put it wonderfully 54 years ago in Chapter 7 of his Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, a book that ranks behind only The Intelligent Investor and the 1940 edition of Security Analysis in the all-time-best list for the serious investor. Phil explained that you can successfully run a restaurant that serves hamburgers or, alternatively, one that features Chinese food. But you can’t switch capriciously between the two and retain the fans of either.
最重要的是，分红政策必须始终清晰、一致且理性。反复无常的政策只会让股东困惑，并吓跑潜在投资者。菲利普·费雪（Phil Fisher）早在54年前就在他的著作《普通股与不普通的利润》（Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits）第七章中精彩地阐述过这一点。这本书在严肃投资者心中的地位仅次于格雷厄姆的《聪明的投资者》（The Intelligent Investor）和1940版的《证券分析》（Security Analysis）。费雪解释道：你可以成功经营一家卖汉堡包的餐厅，或者开一家主打中国菜的餐馆。但如果你随意在这两者之间切换，你就无法留住任何一方的忠实顾客。
Most companies pay consistent dividends, generally trying to increase them annually and cutting them very reluctantly. Our “Big Four” portfolio companies follow this sensible and understandable approach and, in certain cases, also repurchase shares quite aggressively.
大多数公司都支付稳定的股息，通常努力每年提高股息，并且只有在万不得已时才削减股息。我们的“四大重仓股”公司遵循这种理智且易于理解的做法，在某些情况下，它们还会非常积极地回购股票。
We applaud their actions and hope they continue on their present paths. We like increased dividends, and we love repurchases at appropriate prices.
我们赞赏他们的行为，并希望他们继续沿着目前的道路前行。我们喜欢股息增长，也非常欢迎在合适价格下的股票回购。
At Berkshire, however, we have consistently followed a different approach that we know has been sensible and that we hope has been made understandable by the paragraphs you have just read. We will stick with this policy as long as we believe our assumptions about the book-value buildup and the market-price premium seem reasonable. If the prospects for either factor change materially for the worse, we will reexamine our actions.
不过在伯克希尔，我们一直采取一种不同的做法。我们确信这种做法是明智的，也希望上面的文字已经清楚地传达了这一点。只要我们认为账面价值的增长和市场价格溢价的假设仍然合理，我们就会坚持这项政策。如果其中一个因素的前景发生实质性恶化，我们会重新审视我们的行动。
# The Annual Meeting (年度股东大会)
The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 4th at the CenturyLink Center. Carrie Sova will be in charge. (Though that’s a new name, it’s the same wonderful Carrie as last year; she got married in June to a very lucky guy.) All of our headquarters group pitches in to help her; the whole affair is a homemade production, and I couldn’t be more proud of those who put it together.
年度股东大会将于5月4日（星期六）在CenturyLink中心举行。由Carrie Sova负责组织。（虽然名字听起来是新人，但其实她就是去年那位出色的Carrie；她在6月份嫁给了一个非常幸运的家伙。）我们总部的所有成员都会协助她的工作；整场活动完全是我们自己策划制作的，我对参与筹备的同事们感到无比自豪。
The doors will open at 7 a.m., and at 7:30 we will have our second International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. The target will be the porch of a Clayton Home, precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. Last year I successfully fought off all challengers. But now Berkshire has acquired a large number of newspapers and with them came much tossing talent (or so the throwers claim). Come see whether their talent matches their talk. Better yet, join in. The papers will be 36 to 42 pages and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands).
会场将于早上7点开放入场，7点半我们将举办第二届国际报纸投掷挑战赛。目标是距投掷线正好35英尺远的一座Clayton住宅的门廊。去年我成功击败了所有挑战者。但现在伯克希尔已经收购了许多报纸，随之而来的是一大批自诩擅长投掷的高手。来看看他们是否真有实力吧。更棒的是，欢迎你也加入比赛。每份报纸为36到42页，参赛者必须自行折叠（不可使用橡皮筋）。
At 8:30, a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
上午8点半将放映一部新的伯克希尔影片。一小时后，我们将开始问答环节，并持续至下午3点半（中间可在CenturyLink的摊位上用午餐）。短暂休息后，查理和我将在3点45分正式召开年度股东大会。如果你打算在当天问答环节期间离席，请尽量在查理发言时离开。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do so by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,090 pairs of Justin boots, (that’s a pair every 30 seconds), 10,010 pounds of See’s candy, 12,879 Quikut knives (24 knives per minute) and 5,784 pairs of Wells Lamont gloves, always a hot item. But you can do better. Remember: Anyone who says money can’t buy happiness simply hasn’t shopped at our meeting.
当然，离席的最佳理由就是购物。我们会安排一个面积达194,300平方英尺、紧邻会议区的大厅，展出来自伯克希尔数十家子公司的产品。去年大家表现踊跃，大多数展位都创下销售纪录。在短短九小时内，我们售出1,090双Justin靴子（平均每30秒卖出一双）、10,010磅See’s糖果、12,879把Quikut刀具（每分钟24把），以及5,784双Wells Lamont手套——这始终是最抢手的商品之一。但你们还可以做得更好。请记住：任何说“金钱买不到幸福”的人，只是还没来过我们的股东大会。
Last year, Brooks, our running shoe company, exhibited for the first time and ran up sales of $150,000. Brooks is on fire: Its volume in 2012 grew 34%, and that was on top of a similar 34% gain in 2011. The company’s management expects another jump of 23% in 2013. We will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting.
去年，我们的跑鞋公司Brooks首次参展，销售额达到15万美元。Brooks正处在高速成长期：其2012年销量增长34%，而在2011年也实现了同样幅度的增长。管理层预计2013年还将再增长23%。今年我们仍将推出专为股东大会设计的纪念版跑鞋。
On Sunday at 8 a.m., we will initiate the “Berkshire 5K,” a race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that you will receive with your credentials for the meeting. We will have plenty of categories for competition, including one for the media. (It will be fun to report on their performance.) Regretfully, I will forego running; someone has to man the starting gun.
周日上午8点，我们将首次举办“伯克希尔5公里跑”，起点位于CenturyLink中心。完整的参赛信息将在您领取参会证件时附赠的《访客指南》中提供。比赛设有多个参赛组别，包括媒体组。（报道他们的表现一定会很有趣。）遗憾的是，我将不参加跑步——总得有人来发令枪吧。
I should warn you that we have a lot of home-grown talent. Ted Weschler has run the marathon in 3:01. Jim Weber, Brooks’ dynamic CEO, is another speedster with a 3:31 best. Todd Combs specializes in the triathlon, but has been clocked at 22 minutes in the 5K.
我得提醒各位，我们有不少本土好手。Ted Weschler马拉松成绩为3小时01分；Brooks活力四射的CEO Jim Weber个人最好成绩为3小时31分；Todd Combs专攻铁人三项，但他在5公里跑中的成绩为22分钟。
That, however, is just the beginning: Our directors are also fleet of foot (that is, some of our directors are). Steve Burke has run an amazing 2:39 Boston marathon. (It’s a family thing; his wife, Gretchen, finished the New York marathon in 3:25.) Charlotte Guyman’s best is 3:37, and Sue Decker crossed the tape in New York in 3:36. Charlie did not return his questionnaire.
但这只是个开始：我们的董事们也都是飞毛腿（或者说其中一些是）。Steve Burke在波士顿马拉松中跑出了惊人的2小时39分。（这是家族传统；他的妻子Gretchen在纽约马拉松的成绩是3小时25分。）Charlotte Guyman的个人最佳是3小时37分，Sue Decker则在纽约以3小时36分冲线。至于查理，他没有交回问卷。
GEICO will have a booth in the shopping area, staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.
GEICO将在购物区设立展位，由来自全国各地的多位顶级保险顾问驻场。欢迎前来咨询报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO可为您提供股东专属折扣（通常为8%）。这一特别优惠已在我们运营的51个司法管辖区中的44个获得许可。（补充一点：若您已符合其他折扣条件，如某些团体折扣，则此折扣不能叠加使用。）带上您目前的保单详情，看看我们是否能帮您省钱。我相信至少有一半的人可以从中受益。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, including a couple of new ones. Carol Loomis, who has been invaluable to me in editing this letter since 1977, has recently authored Tap Dancing to Work: Warren Buffett on Practically Everything. She and I have cosigned 500 copies, available exclusively at the meeting.
一定要去“书虫”展位。这里将展出约35种图书和DVD，其中包括几本新书。自1977年以来一直协助我编辑这封致股东信的Carol Loomis最近出版了《踮脚起舞：沃伦·巴菲特谈一切》（Tap Dancing to Work: Warren Buffett on Practically Everything）。她与我共同签名的500册限量版仅在股东大会现场出售。
The Outsiders, by William Thorndike, Jr., is an outstanding book about CEOs who excelled at capital allocation. It has an insightful chapter on our director, Tom Murphy, overall the best business manager I’ve ever met. I also recommend The Clash of the Cultures by Jack Bogle and Laura Rittenhouse’s Investing Between the Lines. Should you need to ship your book purchases, a shipping service will be available nearby.
小威廉·桑代克（William Thorndike, Jr.）所著的《局外人》（The Outsiders）是一部关于资本配置大师们的杰出著作。书中专门有一章深入介绍了我们的董事Tom Murphy，他是我所见过最优秀的商业管理者。我也推荐Jack Bogle的《文化冲突》（The Clash of the Cultures）和Laura Rittenhouse的《字里行间看投资》（Investing Between the Lines）。如果您需要邮寄所购书籍，现场附近将提供快递服务。
The Omaha World-Herald will again have a booth, offering a few books it has recently published. Red-blooded Husker fans – is there any Nebraskan who isn’t one? – will surely want to purchase Unbeatable. It tells the story of Nebraska football during 1993-97, a golden era in which Tom Osborne’s teams went 60-3.
奥马哈世界先驱报（Omaha World-Herald）也将再次设立展位，展售其近期出版的一些书籍。真正的内布拉斯加橄榄球队（Husker）球迷——内布拉斯加州有谁不是呢？——一定会想购买《无敌》（Unbeatable）。这本书讲述了1993年至1997年间内布拉斯加大学橄榄球队的辉煌历史，在Tom Osborne的带领下，他们取得了60胜3负的骄人战绩。
If you are a big spender – or aspire to become one – visit Signature Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet. Live a little.
如果您是大买家——或者梦想成为其中之一——请于周六中午12点至下午5点前往奥马哈机场东侧的Signature Aviation参观。届时我们将展示NetJets旗下的多架私人飞机，让您的心跳加速。您可以乘大巴来，乘坐私人喷气机离开。尽情享受一下吧。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2½ hours, and it may be that you can save significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. Spend the savings with us.
随本报告附上的委托材料中包含一份附件，详细说明了如何获取参加股东大会及其他活动所需的证件。航空公司有时会在伯克希尔周末期间抬高票价。如果您从外地赶来，建议比较飞往堪萨斯城与飞往奥马哈的成本。两城之间的车程约为两个半小时，您或许能节省一大笔费用，特别是如果您原本计划在奥马哈租车的话。把这些省下来的钱花在我们这里吧。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year the store did $35.9 million of business during its annual meeting sale, an all-time record that makes other retailers turn green. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 30th and Monday, May 6th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.
位于Dodge与Pacific大道之间第72街占地77英亩的Nebraska Furniture Mart（NFM）将继续推出“伯克希尔周末”特价优惠。去年股东大会期间，该店销售额高达3,590万美元，创下了历史新高，也让其他零售商艳羡不已。要享受伯克希尔专属折扣，您需在4月30日（周二）至5月6日（周一）期间购物，并出示您的大会证件。此次特价甚至适用于几家一向对折扣政策极为严格的高端制造商，但为了配合我们的股东周末，他们破例为您提供了优惠。我们感谢他们的合作。NFM营业时间为周一至周六上午10点至晚上9点，周日为上午10点至下午6点。今年周六晚5:30至8点，NFM将举办一场野餐会，诚邀各位光临。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 3rd. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 5th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. In recent years, our three-day volume has far exceeded sales in all of December, normally a jeweler’s best month.
在Borsheims珠宝店，我们也将举办两场仅限股东参加的活动。第一场是5月3日（周五）下午6点至9点的鸡尾酒会；第二场为主宴会，定于5月5日（周日）上午9点至下午4点举行。周六我们将延长营业至下午6点。近年来，我们三天的销售总额已远超12月整月的业绩，而12月通常是珠宝商一年中最旺的月份。
Around 1 p.m. on Sunday, I will begin clerking at Borsheims. Last year my sales totaled $1.5 million. This year I won’t quit until I hit $2 million. Because I need to leave well before sundown, I will be desperate to do business. Come take advantage of me. Ask for my “Crazy Warren” price.
周日下午1点左右，我将在Borsheims珠宝店担任销售员。去年我��销售额达到150万美元，今年我计划突破200万美元才收工。由于我需要在日落前离开，届时我会极度渴望成交——快来“占我便宜”吧。请直接向我索要“疯狂沃伦”特惠价。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 29th through Saturday, May 11th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
本周末Borsheims将迎来大量顾客。为方便大家，股东专属优惠价格将从4月29日（周一）持续至5月11日（周六）。在此期间，请出示您的大会证件或显示您持有伯克希尔股份的券商证明文件以确认股东身份。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don’t play them for money.
周日当天，在Borsheims外的商场中，蒙眼参加比赛的美国国际象棋双料冠军Patrick Wolff将接受挑战者六人一组的轮番挑战（挑战者可睁眼）。附近，来自达拉斯的著名魔术师Norman Beck将用神奇表演让观众惊叹。此外，世界顶级桥牌专家Bob Hamman和Sharon Osberg也将于周日下午与股东们切磋桥牌技艺。不过请注意：千万别和他们赌钱。
Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 5th. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038. At Piccolo’s, order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one. (I once saw Bill Gates polish off two of the giant variety after a full-course dinner; that’s when I knew he would make a great director.)
5月5日（周日）当天，Gorat’s和Piccolo’s两家餐厅将再次仅对伯克希尔股东开放。两家居家营业至晚上10点，其中Gorat’s于下午1点、Piccolo’s于下午4点开始营业。这两家是我最爱的餐厅，周日晚间我将光顾它们。温馨提示：预订Gorat’s请于4月1日当天拨打402-551-3733（不提前开放预约），预订Piccolo’s请拨打402-342-9038。在Piccolo’s请务必点巨无霸根汁汽水冰淇淋作为甜点——只有胆小鬼才会点小份的。（我记得比尔·盖茨曾在正餐后轻松消灭两份巨型版本，当时我就觉得他肯定能成为优秀董事。）
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be emailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
本次大会问答环节将继续由三位财经记者主导，他们将向查理和我提出股东通过电子邮件提交的问题。记者及邮箱地址如下：《财富》杂志Carol Loomis（cloomis@fortunemail.com）；CNBC频道Becky Quick（BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com）；《纽约时报》Andrew Ross Sorkin（arsorkin@nytimes.com）。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any email you send them. (In your email, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
每位记者将从提交问题中挑选他们认为最有趣且最重要的六个问题。记者们建议：若希望问题被选中，请保持简洁、避免压哨提交、聚焦伯克希尔相关议题，且每封邮件最多包含两个问题。（如希望问题被采纳时提及您的姓名，请在邮件中说明。）
Last year we had a second panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. All were insurance specialists, and shareholders subsequently indicated they wanted a little more variety. Therefore, this year we will have one insurance analyst, Cliff Gallant of Nomura Securities. Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb will join the analyst panel to ask questions that deal with our non-insurance operations.
去年我们新增了由三位伯克希尔分析师组成的第二小组，但三人均专注于保险领域，股东反馈希望增加多样性。因此今年我们将保留一位保险分析师——野村证券的Cliff Gallant，同时新增Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb公司的Jonathan Brandt加入分析师小组，负责提出非保险业务相关问题。
Finally – to spice things up – we would like to add to the panel a credentialed bear on Berkshire, preferably one who is short the stock. Not yet having a bear identified, we would like to hear from applicants. The only requirement is that you be an investment professional and negative on Berkshire. The three analysts will bring their own Berkshire-specific questions and alternate with the journalists and the audience in asking them.
最后，为了增添讨论深度——我们希望邀请一位持伯克希尔空头观点的分析师加入小组，优先考虑实际做空该股的人士。目前尚未确定人选，欢迎符合条件者自荐。唯一要求是具备专业投资背景且看空伯克希尔。三位分析师将各自准备针对伯克希尔的具体问题，并与记者及现场观众交替提问。
Charlie and I believe that all shareholders should have access to new Berkshire information simultaneously and should also have adequate time to analyze it, which is why we try to issue financial information after the market close on a Friday and why our annual meeting is held on Saturdays. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts. Our hope is that the journalists and analysts will ask questions that will further educate shareholders about their investment.
查理和我都坚信，所有股东应同时获取伯克希尔最新信息，并拥有充分时间进行分析。这正是我们选择周五收市后发布财报、并坚持周六召开股东大会的原因。我们不会与大型机构投资者或分析师进行单独沟通。我们期待记者和分析师提出的问题能进一步帮助股东加深对其投资的理解。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists and analysts will come up with some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it. All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and 18 from the audience. If there is some extra time, we will take more from the audience. Audience questioners will be determined by drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. at each of the 11 microphones located in the arena and main overflow room.
无论是查理还是我，都不会提前获知任何提问内容。我们期待记者和分析师带来尖锐的问题，这也正是我们所希望的。预计整个问答环节将至少涵盖54个问题：每位分析师和记者各提6个，现场观众贡献18个。若时间充裕，我们将增加观众提问。现场提问者将通过抽签决定，抽签仪式将于上午8:15在主会场及扩展区域的11个麦克风位置同步进行。
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars, who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe their mindset to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most have no financial need to work; the joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
我经常称赞我们的运营经理们，这是有充分理由的。他们确实是全明星团队，经营企业时视之为家族唯一资产。我认为他们的股东导向思维，在上市公司中堪称典范。大多数人并无经济压力需要工作；对他们而言，完成商业“全垒打”的喜悦与薪酬同等重要。
Equally important, however, are the 23 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!).
同样重要的是，在总部与我共事的23位男女同事（我们始终保持着全员同楼层办公的传统）！
This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 21,500-page Federal income tax return as well as state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities – and the list goes on and on.
这个团队高效处理着SEC及其他监管机构的各类要求，提交长达21,500页的联邦所得税申报表及州级、境外申报文件，回应数以千计的股东和媒体咨询，发布年度报告，筹备全国最大规模的年度股东大会，协调董事会运作——其职责清单还在不断延伸。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year they dealt with 48 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day.
他们以令人惊叹的效率和积极态度完成所有工作，让我生活轻松愉快。他们的付出远超伯克希尔本职范畴：去年协助接待了从200所申请院校中筛选出的48所大学师生来奥马哈参加“与沃伦问答日”。他们还处理我收到的各种请求、安排差旅，甚至为我准备午餐汉堡。没有哪位CEO享受过更好的支持，我确实每天都感觉像踩着踢踏舞步去上班。
This home office crew, along with our operating managers, has my deepest thanks and deserves yours as well. Come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – on May 4th and chime in.
这支总部团队与我们的运营经理们一样，值得我最深的感谢，也理应获得你们的赞誉。5月4日，请来到资本主义的摇篮——奥马哈，与我们共同见证这场盛会。
March 1, 2013
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
2013年3月1日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席