2008巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司致伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信)
Our decrease in net worth during 2008 was $11.5 billion, which reduced the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 9.6%. Over the last 44 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $70,530, a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.*
2008年我们的净资产减少了115亿美元，这使得我们的A类和B类股票每股账面价值均下降了9.6%。在过去44年里（即现任管理层接管以来），账面价值从每股19美元增长至70,530美元，年均复合增长率为20.3%。*
The table on the preceding page, recording both the 44-year performance of Berkshire’s book value and the S&P 500 index, shows that 2008 was the worst year for each. The period was devastating as well for corporate and municipal bonds, real estate and commodities. By yearend, investors of all stripes were bloodied and confused, much as if they were small birds that had strayed into a badminton game.
上一页的表格记录了伯克希尔账面价值和标普500指数44年的表现，显示2008年是二者表现最差的一年。同期公司债券、市政债券、房地产和大宗商品也遭遇重创。到年底时，各类投资者都损失惨重且困惑迷茫，就像误入羽毛球赛场的小鸟般狼狈。
As the year progressed, a series of life-threatening problems within many of the world’s great financial institutions was unveiled. This led to a dysfunctional credit market that in important respects soon turned non-functional. The watchword throughout the country became the creed I saw on restaurant walls when I was young: “In God we trust; all others pay cash.”
随着年份推进，全球多家大型金融机构暴露出一系列致命问题。这导致信贷市场功能紊乱，并在关键领域迅速完全失灵。全国上下流行起我年轻时在餐馆墙上看到的格言：“我们信仰上帝；其余人现金支付。”
By the fourth quarter, the credit crisis, coupled with tumbling home and stock prices, had produced a paralyzing fear that engulfed the country. A freefall in business activity ensued, accelerating at a pace that I have never before witnessed. The U.S. – and much of the world – became trapped in a vicious negative-feedback cycle. Fear led to business contraction, and that in turn led to even greater fear.
至第四季度，信贷危机叠加房价和股价暴跌，引发了席卷全国的恐慌情绪。商业活动随之自由落体式下滑，其加速之快为我生平未见。美国乃至全球大部陷入恶性负反馈循环：恐惧导致经济收缩，而收缩又加剧了恐惧。
This debilitating spiral has spurred our government to take massive action. In poker terms, the Treasury and the Fed have gone “all in.” Economic medicine that was previously meted out by the cupful has recently been dispensed by the barrel. These once-unthinkable dosages will almost certainly bring on unwelcome aftereffects. Their precise nature is anyone’s guess, though one likely consequence is an onslaught of inflation. Moreover, major industries have become dependent on Federal assistance, and they will be followed by cities and states bearing mind-boggling requests. Weaning these entities from the public teat will be a political challenge. They won’t leave willingly.
这一衰弱螺旋迫使政府采取大规模行动。用扑克术语来说，财政部和美联储已“全押”。过去以“杯”为单位的经济药剂如今正以“桶”倾泻而出。这些曾被认为不可思议的剂量几乎必然带来副作用。其具体表现难以预测，但通胀猛袭的可能性极高。此外，主要行业已依赖联邦援助，随后各州和城市也将提出令人咋舌的救助需求。让这些实体脱离公共救济将是一场政治挑战——它们绝不会主动退出。
Whatever the downsides may be, strong and immediate action by government was essential last year if the financial system was to avoid a total breakdown. Had one occurred, the consequences for every area of our economy would have been cataclysmic. Like it or not, the inhabitants of Wall Street, Main Street and the various Side Streets of America were all in the same boat.
无论负面后果如何，去年政府采取强有力且即时的行动是避免金融体系崩溃的关键。若危机爆发，经济各领域的后果将是灾难性的。无论是否情愿，华尔街、主街和美国各地“侧街”的居民实则同舟共济。
Amid this bad news, however, never forget that our country has faced far worse travails in the past. In the 20th Century alone, we dealt with two great wars (one of which we initially appeared to be losing); a dozen or so panics and recessions; virulent inflation that led to a 21 1/2% prime rate in 1980; and the Great Depression of the 1930s, when unemployment ranged between 15% and 25% for many years. America has had no shortage of challenges.
然而，在坏消息中切莫忘记，我国历史上曾遭遇更严峻的考验。仅20世纪就包括两次重大战争（其中一次初期看似必败）；十余次恐慌与衰退；1980年恶性通胀推高最优惠利率至21.5%；以及1930年代失业率长期维持在15%-25%的大萧条。美国从不缺乏挑战。
Without fail, however, we’ve overcome them. In the face of those obstacles – and many others – the real standard of living for Americans improved nearly seven-fold during the 1900s, while the Dow Jones Industrials rose from 66 to 11,497. Compare the record of this period with the dozens of centuries during which humans secured only tiny gains, if any, in how they lived. Though the path has not been smooth, our economic system has worked extraordinarily well over time. It has unleashed human potential as no other system has, and it will continue to do so. America’s best days lie ahead.
但无一例外，我们都挺过来了。面对这些障碍及其他挑战，20世纪美国人实际生活水平提升了近七倍，道琼斯工业指数从66点升至11,497点。对比人类历史数十个世纪中微乎其微的生活改善，这一成绩尤为突出。尽管道路曲折，我们的经济体系长期运转良好，释放的人类潜能无可比拟，并将持续如此。美国最美好的日子仍在前方。
*All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/30th of those shown for A.
*本报告所有每股数据均适用于伯克希尔A类股，B类股数据为A类股的1/30。
Take a look again at the 44-year table on page 2. In 75% of those years, the S&P stocks recorded a gain. I would guess that a roughly similar percentage of years will be positive in the next 44. But neither Charlie Munger, my partner in running Berkshire, nor I can predict the winning and losing years in advance. (In our usual opinionated view, we don’t think anyone else can either.) We’re certain, for example, that the economy will be in shambles throughout 2009 – and, for that matter, probably well beyond – but that conclusion does not tell us whether the stock market will rise or fall.
请再次查看第2页的44年数据表。其中75%的年份标普股票录得上涨。我猜测未来44年中，上涨年份的比例大致相近。但无论是我的搭档查理·芒格还是我本人，都无法提前预判哪些年份盈利或亏损。（按我们一贯的固执观点，我们认为其他人也无法做到。）例如，我们确信2009年全年经济都将深陷混乱——甚至持续更久——但这一结论无法告诉我们股市将涨或跌。
In good years and bad, Charlie and I simply focus on four goals:
(1) maintaining Berkshire’s Gibraltar-like financial position, which features huge amounts of excess liquidity, near-term obligations that are modest, and dozens of sources of earnings and cash;
(2) widening the “moats” around our operating businesses that give them durable competitive advantages;
(3) acquiring and developing new and varied streams of earnings;
(4) expanding and nurturing the cadre of outstanding operating managers who, over the years, have delivered Berkshire exceptional results.
无论年景好坏，查理和我始终专注于四个目标：
（1）保持伯克希尔如直布罗陀岩般稳固的财务地位，包括充足的流动性、较低的短期偿债压力，以及数十个盈利和现金流来源；
（2）拓宽旗下企业的“护城河”，巩固其持久竞争优势；
（3）收购并开发多元化的新兴盈利渠道；
（4）拓展并培养一支卓越的运营经理人队伍，他们多年来为伯克希尔创造了非凡业绩。
Berkshire in 2008
Most of the Berkshire businesses whose results are significantly affected by the economy earned below their potential last year, and that will be true in 2009 as well. Our retailers were hit particularly hard, as were our operations tied to residential construction. In aggregate, however, our manufacturing, service and retail businesses earned substantial sums and most of them – particularly the larger ones – continue to strengthen their competitive positions. Moreover, we are fortunate that Berkshire’s two most important businesses – our insurance and utility groups – produce earnings that are not correlated to those of the general economy. Both businesses delivered outstanding results in 2008 and have excellent prospects.
2008年的伯克希尔
受经济显著影响的伯克希尔企业大多在去年低于潜在盈利水平，2009年也将如此。我们的零售业务及住宅建筑相关业务尤其受创。但总体而言，制造、服务和零售业务仍赚取了可观利润，其中大部分——尤其是规模较大的企业——持续强化其竞争地位。此外，我们幸运地拥有两大核心业务：保险和公用事业集团，其盈利与整体经济无关。这两块业务在2008年表现优异，前景亦佳。
As predicted in last year’s report, the exceptional underwriting profits that our insurance businesses realized in 2007 were not repeated in 2008. Nevertheless, the insurance group delivered an underwriting gain for the sixth consecutive year. This means that our $58.5 billion of insurance “float” – money that doesn’t belong to us but that we hold and invest for our own benefit – cost us less than zero. In fact, we were paid $2.8 billion to hold our float during 2008. Charlie and I find this enjoyable.
正如去年报告所预测，保险业务2007年实现的非凡承保利润在2008年未能再现。然而，保险集团连续第六年取得承保盈利。这意味着我们的585亿美元保险“浮存金”——不属于我们但由我们持有并投资获利的资金——成本低于零。事实上，2008年我们持有浮存金反而获得了28亿美元收益。查理和我对此乐在其中。
Over time, most insurers experience a substantial underwriting loss, which makes their economics far different from ours. Of course, we too will experience underwriting losses in some years. But we have the best group of managers in the insurance business, and in most cases they oversee entrenched and valuable franchises. Considering these strengths, I believe that we will earn an underwriting profit over the years and that our float will therefore cost us nothing. Our insurance operation, the core business of Berkshire, is an economic powerhouse.
长期来看，大多数保险公司都会遭遇显著承保亏损，其经济模式与我们截然不同。当然，我们某些年份也会亏损。但我们拥有保险业最优秀的管理团队，且多数业务具备深厚而有价值的竞争优势。基于这些优势，我坚信我们长期将实现承保盈利，浮存金成本亦将为零。保险业务作为伯克希尔的核心，是经济领域的超级引擎。
Charlie and I are equally enthusiastic about our utility business, which had record earnings last year and is poised for future gains. Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, the managers of this operation, have achieved results unmatched elsewhere in the utility industry. I love it when they come up with new projects because in this capital-intensive business these ventures are often large. Such projects offer Berkshire the opportunity to put out substantial sums at decent returns.
查理和我对公用事业同样充满热情。该板块去年盈利创新高，且未来增长可期。管理者戴夫·索科尔和格雷格·阿贝尔在行业中无人能及。我尤其喜欢他们提出新项目时的状态，因这一资本密集型行业往往涉及大型投资。此类项目让伯克希尔得以大额注资并获取合理回报。
Things also went well on the capital-allocation front last year. Berkshire is always a buyer of both businesses and securities, and the disarray in markets gave us a tailwind in our purchases. When investing, pessimism is your friend, euphoria the enemy.
去年在资本配置方面也进展顺利。伯克希尔始终是企业和证券的买家，而市场的混乱为我们提供了顺风。投资时，悲观主义是你的朋友，狂热才是敌人。
In our insurance portfolios, we made three large investments on terms that would be unavailable in normal markets. These should add about $11⁄2 billion pre-tax to Berkshire’s annual earnings and offer possibilities for capital gains as well. We also closed on our Marmon acquisition (we own 64% of the company now and will purchase its remaining stock over the next six years). Additionally, certain of our subsidiaries made “tuck-in” acquisitions that will strengthen their competitive positions and earnings.
在保险投资组合中，我们以正常市场无法获得的条款完成了三笔大额投资。这些投资预计每年将为伯克希尔增加约15亿美元税前利润，并可能带来资本收益。我们还完成了对Marmon公司的收购（目前持有其64%股份，未来六年将收购剩余股份）。此外，部分子公司进行了“补强型”收购，将进一步强化其竞争地位和盈利水平。
That’s the good news. But there’s another less pleasant reality: During 2008 I did some dumb things in investments. I made at least one major mistake of commission and several lesser ones that also hurt. I will tell you more about these later. Furthermore, I made some errors of omission, sucking my thumb when new facts came in that should have caused me to re-examine my thinking and promptly take action.
以上是好消息。但还有另一个不那么愉快的现实：2008年我在投资中犯了一些愚蠢错误。至少犯了一次重大操作失误，还有几处较小失误也造成了损失。稍后我会详细说明。此外，我也犯了一些“不作为”的错误——当新事实出现时，我却袖手旁观，未能及时重新审视思路并采取行动。
Additionally, the market value of the bonds and stocks that we continue to hold suffered a significant decline along with the general market. This does not bother Charlie and me. Indeed, we enjoy such price declines if we have funds available to increase our positions. Long ago, Ben Graham taught me that “Price is what you pay; value is what you get.” Whether we’re talking about socks or stocks, I like buying quality merchandise when it is marked down.
此外，我们持有的债券和股票市值随市场整体下跌而显著缩水。这并未困扰查理和我。事实上，若有资金可用，我们反而乐见价格下跌，因为可以增持。很久以前，本·格雷厄姆教导我：“价格是你付出的，价值是你得到的。”无论是论袜子还是股票，我都喜欢在优质商品打折时买入。
# Yardsticks (衡量标准)
Berkshire has two major areas of value. The first is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend those totaled $122 billion (not counting the investments held by our finance and utility operations, which we assign to our second bucket of value). About $58.5 billion of that total is funded by our insurance float.
伯克希尔的价值分为两大领域。第一是投资组合：股票、债券和现金等价物。年末总值达1,220亿美元（不包括金融和公用事业部门持有的投资，我们将其归入第二类价值）。其中约585亿美元由保险浮存金提供资金。
Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance. These earnings are delivered by our 67 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 96. We exclude our insurance earnings from this calculation because the value of our insurance operation comes from the investable funds it generates, and we have already included this factor in our first bucket.
第二类价值来源于非投资和保险业务的盈利。这由我们的67家非保险公司贡献，明细见第96页。我们未将保险盈利计入此计算，因为保险业务的价值在于其产生的可投资金，而这一因素已包含在第一类中。
In 2008, our investments fell from $90,343 per share of Berkshire (after minority interest) to $77,793, a decrease that was caused by a decline in market prices, not by net sales of stocks or bonds. Our second segment of value fell from pre-tax earnings of $4,093 per Berkshire share to $3,921 (again after minority interest).
2008年，我们的投资组合（扣除少数股东权益后）每股账面价值从90,343美元降至77,793美元，跌幅源于市场价格下跌而非净售出证券。第二类价值（扣除少数股东权益后）每股税前盈利从4,093美元降至3,921美元。
Both of these performances are unsatisfactory. Over time, we need to make decent gains in each area if we are to increase Berkshire’s intrinsic value at an acceptable rate. Going forward, however, our focus will be on the earnings segment, just as it has been for several decades. We like buying underpriced securities, but we like buying fairly-priced operating businesses even more.
这两项表现均不理想。若要以可接受的速度提升伯克希尔内在价值，我们必须长期在这两个领域实现稳健增长。然而未来我们将延续数十年来的策略，聚焦于盈利板块。我们喜欢低价证券，但更钟情于合理定价的运营企业。
Now, let’s take a look at the four major operating sectors of Berkshire. Each of these has vastly different balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together, as is done in standard financial statements, impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
现在，让我们看看伯克希尔的四大核心运营板块。这些板块的资产负债表和损益表特征截然不同。因此，若像标准财务报表那样合并呈现会阻碍分析。我们将按四个独立业务分别呈现，这也是查理和我的视角。
# Regulated Utility Business (受监管的公用事业)
Berkshire has an 87.4% (diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million end users make it the U.K.’s third largest distributor of electricity; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 723,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 9% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.
伯克希尔持有MidAmerican Energy Holdings公司87.4%（稀释后）的权益，该公司拥有广泛的公用事业运营。其中最大的四项是：（1）英国Yorkshire Electricity和Northern Electric公司，服务380万终端用户，为英国第三大电力分销商；（2）MidAmerican Energy公司，主要在爱荷华州服务72.3万电力用户；（3）Pacific Power和Rocky Mountain Power公司，在西部六州服务约170万电力用户；（4）Kern River和Northern Natural天然气管道，输送美国约9%的天然气消费量。
Our partners in ownership of MidAmerican are its two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, and my long-time friend, Walter Scott. It’s unimportant how many votes each party has; we make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise. Nine years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have reinforced my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.
MidAmerican的共同所有者包括两位卓越管理者戴夫·索科尔和格雷格·阿贝尔，以及我的老友沃尔特·斯科特。各方持股比例和投票权并不重要；只有当我们一致认为决策明智时才会采取重大行动。与戴夫、格雷格和沃尔特合作九年后，我更加坚信：伯克希尔不可能找到更优秀的合作伙伴。
Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 21 locally-branded firms that have 16,000 agents. Last year was a terrible year for home sales, and 2009 looks no better. We will continue, however, to acquire quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices.
略显突兀的是，MidAmerican还拥有美国第二大房地产经纪公司HomeServices of America。该公司通过21家本地品牌公司运营，拥有16,000名经纪人。去年房地产销售遭遇寒冬，2009年前景亦不佳。但我们仍将继续在合理价格下收购优质经纪业务。
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:
U.K. utilities (英国公用事业) ............................................................
Iowa utility (爱荷华州公用事业) .............................................................
Western utilities (西部公用事业) .........................................................
Pipelines (天然气管道) ...............................................................
HomeServices (房地产业务) ...........................................................
Other (net) (其他净项) ..............................................................
Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes (扣除公司利息和税款前运营盈利) ...........................
Constellation Energy* (康斯托加能源公司*) .....................................................
Interest, other than to Berkshire (向伯克希尔以外支付的利息) .............................................
Interest on Berkshire junior debt (伯克希尔次级债务利息) .............................................
Income tax (所得税) ..............................................................
Net earnings (净利润).............................................................
Earnings applicable to Berkshire** (归属伯克希尔盈利) ..........................................
Debt owed to others (应付第三方债务) .......................................................
Debt owed to Berkshire (应付伯克希尔债务) ....................................................
Earnings (in millions) 盈利（百万美元）
| 2008 | 2007 | |
|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities (英国公用事业) | $ 339 | $ 337 |
| Iowa utility (爱荷华州公用事业) | 425 | 412 |
| Western utilities (西部公用事业) | 703 | 692 |
| Pipelines (天然气管道) | 595 | 473 |
| HomeServices (房地产业务) | 42 | - |
| Other (net) (其他净项) | (45) | - |
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes (扣除公司利息和税款前运营盈利) | 2,203 | 2,086 |
| Constellation Energy* (康斯托加能源公司*) | 1,092 | - |
| Interest, other than to Berkshire (向伯克希尔以外支付的利息) | (332) | (312) |
| Interest on Berkshire junior debt (伯克希尔次级债务利息) | (111) | (108) |
| Income tax (所得税) | (1,002) | (477) |
| Net earnings (净利润) | $ 1,850 | $ 1,189 |
| Earnings applicable to Berkshire** (归属伯克希尔盈利) | $ 1,704 | $ 1,114 |
| Debt owed to others (应付第三方债务) | 19,145 | 19,002 |
| Debt owed to Berkshire (应付伯克希尔债务) | 821 | 821 |
*Consists of a breakup fee of $175 million and a profit on our investment of $917 million.
*包括1.75亿美元分手费及9.17亿美元投资收益。
**Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $72 in 2008 and $70 in 2007.
**包含伯克希尔获得的利息收入（扣除相关所得税），2008年为7,200万美元，2007年为7,000万美元。
MidAmerican’s record in operating its regulated electric utilities and natural gas pipelines is truly outstanding. Here’s some backup for that claim.
MidAmerican在运营受监管的电力公用事业和天然气管道方面成绩斐然。以下数据可佐证这一说法。
Our two pipelines, Kern River and Northern Natural, were both acquired in 2002. A firm called Mastio regularly ranks pipelines for customer satisfaction. Among the 44 rated, Kern River came in 9th when we purchased it and Northern Natural ranked 39th. There was work to do.
我们的两条管道——Kern River和Northern Natural均于2002年收购。Mastio公司定期对管道进行客户满意度排名。在被评级的44家公司中，收购时Kern River排名第9，Northern Natural排名第39。仍有大量工作需完成。
In Mastio’s 2009 report, Kern River ranked 1st and Northern Natural 3rd. Charlie and I couldn’t be more proud of this performance. It came about because hundreds of people at each operation committed themselves to a new culture and then delivered on their commitment.
在Mastio 2009年报告中，Kern River跃居第1，Northern Natural升至第3。查理和我对这一成绩感到无比自豪。这一成就源于两家公司数百名员工致力于打造新文化，并兑现了他们的承诺。
Achievements at our electric utilities have been equally impressive. In 1995, MidAmerican became the major provider of electricity in Iowa. By judicious planning and a zeal for efficiency, the company has kept electric prices unchanged since our purchase and has promised to hold them steady through 2013.
电力公用事业的成就同样亮眼。1995年，MidAmerican成为爱荷华州主要电力供应商。通过审慎规划和追求效率，公司自收购以来始终保持电价不变，并承诺至2013年前维持价格稳定。
MidAmerican has maintained this extraordinary price stability while making Iowa number one among all states in the percentage of its generation capacity that comes from wind. Since our purchase, MidAmerican’s wind-based facilities have grown from zero to almost 20% of total capacity.
MidAmerican在维持电价稳定的同時，使爱荷华州成为全美风力发电占比最高的州。自收购以来，中美能源的风电设施从零增长至占总发电能力的近20%。
Similarly, when we purchased PacifiCorp in 2006, we moved aggressively to expand wind generation. Wind capacity was then 33 megawatts. It’s now 794, with more coming. (Arriving at PacifiCorp, we found “wind” of a different sort: The company had 98 committees that met frequently. Now there are 28. Meanwhile, we generate and deliver considerably more electricity, doing so with 2% fewer employees.)
同样，2006年收购PacifiCorp后，我们积极扩展风电产能。当时风电容量为33兆瓦，现已增至794兆瓦，且仍在增长。（接管PacifiCorp时发现另一种“风”：公司原有98个频繁开会的委员会，现精简至28个。同时，我们在员工减少2%的情况下，生产并输送了更多电力。）
In 2008 alone, MidAmerican spent $1.8 billion on wind generation at our two operations, and today the company is number one in the nation among regulated utilities in ownership of wind capacity. By the way, compare that $1.8 billion to the $1.1 billion of pre-tax earnings of PacifiCorp (shown in the table as “Western”) and Iowa. In our utility business, we spend all we earn, and then some, in order to fulfill the needs of our service areas. Indeed, MidAmerican has not paid a dividend since Berkshire bought into the company in early 2000. Its earnings have instead been reinvested to develop the utility systems our customers require and deserve. In exchange, we have been allowed to earn a fair return on the huge sums we have invested. It’s a great partnership for all concerned.
仅2008年，中美能源就向两家公司投入18亿美元发展风电，目前其风电持有量已居全美受监管公用事业首位。顺便比较一下：PacifiCorp（表中“西部”）和爱荷华州业务的税前盈利合计为11亿美元。在公用事业领域，我们不仅花光所有盈利，甚至投入更多以满足服务区域需求。事实上，自2000年初伯克希尔入股以来，中美能源从未分红，而是将利润再投资建设客户需要且应得的公用设施。作为回报，我们获得了对巨额投资的合理回报。这对所有相关方而言都是绝佳的合作。
Our long-avowed goal is to be the “buyer of choice” for businesses – particularly those built and owned by families. The way to achieve this goal is to deserve it. That means we must keep our promises; avoid leveraging up acquired businesses; grant unusual autonomy to our managers; and hold the purchased companies through thick and thin (though we prefer thick and thicker).
我们长期以来的目标是成为企业的“首选买家”——尤其是家族创建并拥有的企业。实现这一目标的方式是配得上它：这意味着我们必须遵守承诺；避免增加被收购企业的杠杆；给予管理者非凡的自主权；并在顺境逆境中持续持有企业（尽管我们更偏好顺境）。
Our record matches our rhetoric. Most buyers competing against us, however, follow a different path. For them, acquisitions are “merchandise.” Before the ink dries on their purchase contracts, these operators are contemplating “exit strategies.” We have a decided advantage, therefore, when we encounter sellers who truly care about the future of their businesses.
我们的行动与言辞一致。然而，大多数竞争对手采取不同路径：对他们而言，收购是“商品”。合同墨迹未干，这些操盘手便开始构思“退出策略”。因此，当我们面对真正关心企业未来的卖家时，我们具有显著优势。
Some years back our competitors were known as “leveraged-buyout operators.” But LBO became a bad name. So in Orwellian fashion, the buyout firms decided to change their moniker. What they did not change, though, were the essential ingredients of their previous operations, including their cherished fee structures and love of leverage.
多年前，竞争对手被称为“杠杆收购操盘手”。但LBO（杠杆收购）逐渐成为贬义词。于是，这些收购公司以奥威尔式手法改头换面。然而，它们并未改变原有操作的核心要素，包括珍视的收费结构和对杠杆的热衷。
Their new label became “private equity,” a name that turns the facts upside-down: A purchase of a business by these firms almost invariably results in dramatic reductions in the equity portion of the acquiree’s capital structure compared to that previously existing. A number of these acquirees, purchased only two to three years ago, are now in mortal danger because of the debt piled on them by their private-equity buyers. Much of the bank debt is selling below 70¢ on the dollar, and the public debt has taken a far greater beating. The private- equity firms, it should be noted, are not rushing in to inject the equity their wards now desperately need. Instead, they’re keeping their remaining funds very private.
它们的新标签是“私募股权”，这一名称颠倒了事实：这些公司收购企业后，通常会导致被收购方资本结构中的股权比例大幅下降。许多仅在两三年前被收购的企业，如今因私募买家堆积的债务而陷入生存危机。银行债务大部分以低于面值70%的价格交易，公开债务更是遭受重创。值得注意的是，私募股权公司并未急于注资拯救急需资金的“被监护人”，反而将剩余资金牢牢把控在私人手中。
In the regulated utility field there are no large family-owned businesses. Here, Berkshire hopes to be the “buyer of choice” of regulators. It is they, rather than selling shareholders, who judge the fitness of purchasers when transactions are proposed.
在受监管的公用事业领域，鲜有大型家族企业存在。在此领域，伯克希尔希望成为监管机构的“首选买家”。当交易提议出现时，是监管者而非股东决定买家的适格性。
There is no hiding your history when you stand before these regulators. They can – and do – call their counterparts in other states where you operate and ask how you have behaved in respect to all aspects of the business, including a willingness to commit adequate equity capital.
在监管者面前，历史无处隐藏。他们会——也确实会——致电你在其他州的同行，询问你在业务各方面的表现，包括是否愿意投入充足的股权资本。
When MidAmerican proposed its purchase of PacifiCorp in 2005, regulators in the six new states we would be serving immediately checked our record in Iowa. They also carefully evaluated our financing plans and capabilities. We passed this examination, just as we expect to pass future ones.
2005年中美能源提议收购PacifiCorp时，我们即将进入服务的六个新州的监管者立即核查了我们在爱荷华州的记录，并仔细评估了我们的融资计划和能力。我们通过了这次审查，也预期未来能通过类似考验。
There are two reasons for our confidence. First, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel are going to run any businesses with which they are associated in a first-class manner. They don’t know of any other way to operate. Beyond that is the fact that we hope to buy more regulated utilities in the future – and we know that our business behavior in jurisdictions where we are operating today will determine how we are welcomed by new jurisdictions tomorrow.
我们的信心有两个来源：第一，戴夫·索科尔和格雷格·阿贝尔将以一流方式经营他们参与的所有业务，他们不知晓其他运作方式；第二，我们计划未来收购更多受监管的公用事业公司，而我们深知：今日在现有司法管辖区的行为，将决定明日新管辖区对我们的接纳程度。
# Insurance (保险业务)
Our insurance group has propelled Berkshire’s growth since we first entered the business in 1967. This happy result has not been due to general prosperity in the industry. During the 25 years ending in 2007, return on net worth for insurers averaged 8.5% versus 14.0% for the Fortune 500. Clearly our insurance CEOs have not had the wind at their back. Yet these managers have excelled to a degree Charlie and I never dreamed possible in the early days. Why do I love them? Let me count the ways.
自1967年首次涉足保险业以来，保险集团推动了伯克希尔的成长。这一成果并非源于行业普遍繁荣。截至2007年的25年间，保险公司净资产回报率平均为8.5%，而《财富》500强企业平均达14%。显然，我们的保险业务CEO们并未享受行业顺风。但这些管理者的卓越程度，甚至远超查理和我们早期的想象。为何我如此欣赏他们？请让我细数理由。
At GEICO, Tony Nicely – now in his 48th year at the company after joining it when he was 18 – continues to gobble up market share while maintaining disciplined underwriting. When Tony became CEO in 1993, GEICO had 2.0% of the auto insurance market, a level at which the company had long been stuck. Now we have a 7.7% share, up from 7.2% in 2007.
在GEICO，托尼·尼利——18岁加入公司，至今已任职48年——在保持审慎承保的同时持续夺取市场份额。1993年托尼出任CEO时，GEICO在美国汽车保险市场占比仅为2%，长期停滞于此。如今我们的份额已达7.7%（2007年为7.2%）。
The combination of new business gains and an improvement in the renewal rate on existing business has moved GEICO into the number three position among auto insurers. In 1995, when Berkshire purchased control, GEICO was number seven. Now we trail only State Farm and Allstate.
新增业务增长与现有客户续保率提升，使GEICO跃居美国第三大汽车保险公司。1995年伯克希尔控股时，GEICO排名第七。如今我们仅落后于State Farm和Allstate。
GEICO grows because it saves money for motorists. No one likes to buy auto insurance. But virtually everyone likes to drive. So, sensibly, drivers look for the lowest-cost insurance consistent with first-class service. Efficiency is the key to low cost, and efficiency is Tony’s specialty. Five years ago the number of policies per employee was 299. In 2008, the number was 439, a huge increase in productivity.
GEICO的增长源于为驾驶者节省开支。没人喜欢购买汽车保险，但几乎每个人都热爱驾车。因此，理性驾驶者会寻找与一流服务相匹配的最低成本保险。效率是低成本的关键，而效率正是托尼的专长。五年前，每位员工服务保单数为299份，2008年增至439份，生产力大幅提升。
As we view GEICO’s current opportunities, Tony and I feel like two hungry mosquitoes in a nudist camp. Juicy targets are everywhere. First, and most important, our new business in auto insurance is now exploding. Americans are focused on saving money as never before, and they are flocking to GEICO. In January 2009, we set a monthly record – by a wide margin – for growth in policyholders. That record will last exactly 28 days: As we go to press, it’s clear February’s gain will be even better.
面对GEICO当前的机遇，托尼和我仿佛置身裸体营的饥饿蚊子，鲜美目标无处不在。首先且最重要的是，我们的汽车保险新业务正爆发式增长。美国人前所未有地关注省钱，纷纷选择GEICO。2009年1月，我们以显著优势刷新了月度保单增长纪录。该纪录将持续28天：在本文付印时，2月增长已明确将更上一层楼。
Beyond this, we are gaining ground in allied lines. Last year, our motorcycle policies increased by 23.4%, which raised our market share from about 6% to more than 7%. Our RV and ATV businesses are also growing rapidly, albeit from a small base. And, finally, we recently began insuring commercial autos, a big market that offers real promise.
此外，我们在关联险种上亦稳步推进。去年摩托车保险业务增长23.4%，市场份额从约6%升至7%以上。房车（RV）和全地形车（ATV）业务虽基数小，但也快速增长。最后，我们近期开始涉足商业用车保险这一庞大市场，前景广阔。
GEICO is now saving money for millions of Americans. Go to GEICO.com or call 1-800-847-7536 and see if we can save you money as well.
GEICO现已成为数百万美国人的省钱利器。访问GEICO.com或拨打1-800-847-7536，看看我们能否为您节省开支。
General Re, our large international reinsurer, also had an outstanding year in 2008. Some time back, the company had serious problems (which I totally failed to detect when we purchased it in late 1998). By 2001, when Joe Brandon took over as CEO, assisted by his partner, Tad Montross, General Re’s culture had further deteriorated, exhibiting a loss of discipline in underwriting, reserving and expenses. After Joe and Tad took charge, these problems were decisively and successfully addressed. Today General Re has regained its luster. Last spring Joe stepped down, and Tad became CEO. Charlie and I are grateful to Joe for righting the ship and are certain that, with Tad, General Re’s future is in the best of hands.
我们的大型国际再保险公司General Re在2008年亦表现优异。此前该公司存在严重问题（1998年底收购时我完全未能察觉）。2001年乔·布兰登接任CEO（搭档塔德·蒙罗斯协助），彼时General Re文化进一步恶化，承保、准备金和费用管理均失去纪律。乔与塔德掌舵后，这些问题被果断解决。如今General Re已重焕光彩。去年春季乔卸任，塔德接任CEO。查理和我感谢乔力挽狂澜，并坚信在塔德领导下，General Re的未来稳如磐石。
Reinsurance is a business of long-term promises, sometimes extending for fifty years or more. This past year has retaught clients a crucial principle: A promise is no better than the person or institution making it. That’s where General Re excels: It is the only reinsurer that is backed by an AAA corporation. Ben Franklin once said, “It’s difficult for an empty sack to stand upright.” That’s no worry for General Re clients.
再保险是一项长期承诺的业务，有时甚至延续五十年以上。过去一年再次向客户揭示了一条关键原则：承诺的价值取决于做出承诺的人或机构。通用再保险公司（General Re）正是在此领域表现出色：它是唯一由AAA级企业背书的再保险公司。本·富兰克林曾说：“空袋子立不直。”这对通用再保险的客户而言绝非担忧。
Our third major insurance operation is Ajit Jain’s reinsurance division, headquartered in Stamford and staffed by only 31 employees. This may be one of the most remarkable businesses in the world, hard to characterize but easy to admire.
我们的第三大保险业务是阿吉特·贾恩（Ajit Jain）领导的再保险部门，总部位于斯坦福，仅配备31名员工。这可能是世界上最非凡的企业之一，难以描述但令人钦佩。
From year to year, Ajit’s business is never the same. It features very large transactions, incredible speed of execution and a willingness to quote on policies that leave others scratching their heads. When there is a huge and unusual risk to be insured, Ajit is almost certain to be called.
阿吉特的业务年年不同，其特点包括巨额交易、惊人的执行速度，以及愿意承保令其他同行摸不着头脑的保单。当出现巨大且异常的风险需投保时，几乎必然会被联系到阿吉特。
Ajit came to Berkshire in 1986. Very quickly, I realized that we had acquired an extraordinary talent. So I did the logical thing: I wrote his parents in New Delhi and asked if they had another one like him at home. Of course, I knew the answer before writing. There isn’t anyone like Ajit.
阿吉特于1986年加入伯克希尔。很快我便意识到，我们获得了一位非凡的人才。于是做了件合乎逻辑的事：我写信给他在新德里的父母，询问家中是否还有另一个像他一样的孩子。当然，写信前我就知道答案——世上再无第二个阿吉特。
Our smaller insurers are just as outstanding in their own way as the “big three,” regularly delivering valuable float to us at a negative cost. We aggregate their results below under “Other Primary.” For space reasons, we don’t discuss these insurers individually. But be assured that Charlie and I appreciate the contribution of each.
我们的中小型保险公司同样卓越，虽方式不同但均以负成本持续为我们提供宝贵的浮存金。我们将它们的业绩汇总在“其他主要业务”项下。因篇幅限制不再逐一讨论，但查理和我深知每家公司的贡献。
Here is the record for the four legs to our insurance stool. The underwriting profits signify that all four provided funds to Berkshire last year without cost, just as they did in 2007. And in both years our underwriting profitability was considerably better than that achieved by the industry. Of course, we ourselves will periodically have a terrible year in insurance. But, overall, I expect us to average an underwriting profit. If so, we will be using free funds of large size for the indefinite future.
以下是保险业务四大支柱的记录。承保利润表明，2008年和2007年这四家业务均以零成本为伯克希尔提供资金。且这两年我们的承保盈利能力远超行业平均水平。当然，我们自身也会周期性遭遇保险业务亏损年份。但总体而言，我预计我们将实现承保利润均值化。若如此，我们将长期使用大额免费资金。
Underwriting Profit (承保利润)
| Insurance Operations (保险业务) | 2008 (百万美元) | 2007 (百万美元) |
|---|---|---|
| General Re (通用再保险) | $342 | $555 |
| BH Reinsurance (伯克希尔再保险) | 1,324 | 1,427 |
| GEICO | 916 | 1,113 |
| Other Primary (其他主要业务) | 210 | 279 |
| Total (总计) | $2,792 | $3,374 |
Yearend Float (年末浮存金)
| Insurance Operations (保险业务) | 2008 (百万美元) | 2007 (百万美元) |
|---|---|---|
| General Re (通用再保险) | $21,074 | $23,009 |
| BH Reinsurance (伯克希尔再保险) | 24,221 | 23,692 |
| GEICO | 8,454 | 7,768 |
| Other Primary (其他主要业务) | 4,739 | 4,229 |
| Total (总计) | $58,488 | $58,698 |
# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations (制造、服务与零售业务)
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
伯克希尔在这一领域的业务覆盖广泛。让我们先查看整个集团的简要资产负债表和损益表。
Balance Sheet (资产负债表) 12/31/08 (百万美元)
| Assets (资产) | Amount (金额) | Liabilities and Equity (负债与权益) | Amount (金额) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents (现金及等价物) | $2,497 | Notes payable (应付票据) | $2,212 |
| Accounts and notes receivable (应收票据及账款) | 5,047 | Other current liabilities (其他流动负债) | 8,087 |
| Inventory (存货) | 7,500 | Total current liabilities (流动负债总计) | 10,299 |
| Other current assets (其他流动资产) | 752 | Deferred taxes (递延税项) | 2,786 |
| Total current assets (流动资产总计) | 15,796 | Term debt and other liabilities (长期债务及其他负债) | 6,033 |
| Goodwill and other intangibles (商誉及其他无形资产) | 16,515 | Equity (权益) | 30,779 |
| Fixed assets (固定资产) | 16,338 | ||
| Other assets (其他资产) | 1,248 | ||
| Total assets (总资产) | $49,897 | Total liabilities and equity (负债与权益总计) | $49,897 |
Earnings Statement (损益表) (百万美元)
| Items (项目) | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues (营收) | $66,099 | $59,100 | $52,660 |
| Operating expenses (经营支出) (including depreciation of $1,280 in 2008, $955 in 2007 and $823 in 2006) （含折旧费用） | 61,937 | 55,026 | 49,002 |
| Interest expense (利息支出) | 139 | 127 | 132 |
| Pre-tax earnings (税前盈利) | $4,023 | $3,947 | $3,526 |
| Income taxes and minority interests (所得税及少数股东权益) | 1,740 | 1,594 | 1,395 |
| Net income (净利润) | $2,283 | $2,353 | $2,131 |
*Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.
*不含购买会计调整。
This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes, earned an impressive 17.9% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s also noteworthy that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth – a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on our balance sheet – and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 8.1%.
这支业务组合销售从棒棒糖到房车的各类产品，去年平均有形净资产回报率达令人印象深刻的17.9%。更值得注意的是，它们仅使用少量财务杠杆便实现这一回报。显然我们拥有一些卓越企业。然而，许多公司是以远高于净资产的价格购入的——这反映在资产负债表中的商誉项目上——导致我们账面价值的平均回报率降至8.1%。
Though the full-year result was satisfactory, earnings of many of the businesses in this group hit the skids in last year’s fourth quarter. Prospects for 2009 look worse. Nevertheless, the group retains strong earning power even under today’s conditions and will continue to deliver significant cash to the parent company. Overall, these companies improved their competitive positions last year, partly because our financial strength let us make advantageous tuck-in acquisitions. In contrast, many competitors were treading water (or sinking).
尽管全年结果尚可，但许多业务在去年第四季度盈利骤降。2009年前景更差。然而，该集团即便在当前环境下仍保持强劲盈利能力，并将持续为母公司输送现金流。总体而言，这些公司在去年提升了竞争地位，部分得益于我们的财务实力支持的补强型收购。相比之下，许多竞争对手仍在挣扎（甚至下沉）。
The most noteworthy of these acquisitions was Iscar’s late-November purchase of Tungaloy, a leading Japanese producer of small tools. Charlie and I continue to look with astonishment – and appreciation! – at the accomplishments of Iscar’s management. To secure one manager like Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz or Danny Goldman when we acquire a company is a blessing. Getting three is like winning the Triple Crown. Iscar’s growth since our purchase has exceeded our expectations – which were high – and the addition of Tungaloy will move performance to the next level.
其中最引人注目的收购是伊斯卡（Iscar）11月下旬对日本小型工具领先生产商Tungaloy的收购。查理和我至今仍对伊斯卡管理层的成就感到惊叹——并充满感激！当我们收购一家公司时，能获得埃坦·韦尔特海默（Eitan Wertheimer）、雅各布·哈帕兹（Jacob Harpaz）或丹尼·戈德曼（Danny Goldman）中的一位管理者已是幸运。而同时拥有三位则如同赢得三冠王。自收购以来，伊斯卡的增长已远超我们原本极高的预期，Tungaloy的加入将进一步提升其表现至新高度。
MiTek, Benjamin Moore, Acme Brick, Forest River, Marmon and CTB also made one or more acquisitions during the year. CTB, which operates worldwide in the agriculture equipment field, has now picked up six small firms since we purchased it in 2002. At that time, we paid $140 million for the company. Last year its pre-tax earnings were $89 million. Vic Mancinelli, its CEO, followed Berkshire-like operating principles long before our arrival. He focuses on blocking and tackling, day by day doing the little things right and never getting off course. Ten years from now, Vic will be running a much larger operation and, more important, will be earning excellent returns on invested capital.
MiTek、本杰明摩尔（Benjamin Moore）、Acme Brick、Forest River、Marmon和CTB也在年内完成了一项或多项收购。CTB在全球农业设备领域运营，自2002年我们收购该公司后已并购六家小型企业。当时我们支付了1.4亿美元，去年其税前盈利达8,900万美元。CEO维克·曼奇内利（Vic Mancinelli）早在我们介入前便遵循类似伯克希尔的经营理念。他专注于基础运营，日复一日将小事做对，从未偏离轨道。十年后，维克将管理更大的业务，并更重要地，实现卓越的资本回报率。
# Finance and Financial Products (金融与金融产品)
I will write here at some length about the mortgage operation of Clayton Homes and skip any financial commentary, which is summarized in the table at the end of this section. I do this because Clayton’s recent experience may be useful in the public-policy debate about housing and mortgages. But first a little background.
我将在此较长篇幅讨论克莱顿房屋（Clayton Homes）的抵押贷款业务，财务数据总结见本节末尾的表格。我之所以如此，是因为克莱顿近期的经历可能对公共住房与抵押贷款政策讨论有所启示。但首先简要背景介绍。
Clayton is the largest company in the manufactured home industry, delivering 27,499 units last year. This came to about 34% of the industry’s 81,889 total. Our share will likely grow in 2009, partly because much of the rest of the industry is in acute distress. Industrywide, units sold have steadily declined since they hit a peak of 372,843 in 1998.
克莱顿是预制房屋行业的最大公司，去年交付27,499套住房，占行业总销量81,889套的约34%。我们的市场份额有望在2009年进一步增长，部分因行业其余部分深陷困境。全行业销量自1998年峰值372,843套后持续下滑。
At that time, much of the industry employed sales practices that were atrocious. Writing about the period somewhat later, I described it as involving “borrowers who shouldn’t have borrowed being financed by lenders who shouldn’t have lent.”
当时，行业普遍采用恶劣的销售手段。事后回顾这一时期时，我曾形容其本质是“不该借款的借款人被不该放贷的放款人提供资金”。
To begin with, the need for meaningful down payments was frequently ignored. Sometimes fakery was involved. (“That certainly looks like a $2,000 cat to me” says the salesman who will receive a $3,000 commission if the loan goes through.) Moreover, impossible-to-meet monthly payments were being agreed to by borrowers who signed up because they had nothing to lose. The resulting mortgages were usually packaged (“securitized”) and sold by Wall Street firms to unsuspecting investors. This chain of folly had to end badly, and it did.
首先，行业普遍忽视真实首付的必要性，甚至存在欺诈行为。（“对我来说这猫看起来至少值2,000美元”——若贷款获批，销售员可获得3,000美元佣金。）此外，借款人签署明知无法偿还的高额月供合同，因其自知无利害风险。这些抵押贷款随后被打包（“证券化”）并由华尔街公司售予不知情的投资者。这场荒谬链条终将崩塌，且确实崩塌了。
Clayton, it should be emphasized, followed far more sensible practices in its own lending throughout that time. Indeed, no purchaser of the mortgages it originated and then securitized has ever lost a dime of principal or interest. But Clayton was the exception; industry losses were staggering. And the hangover continues to this day.
需强调的是，克莱顿在此期间始终遵循审慎的放贷原则。事实上，任何购买其发起并证券化抵押贷款的投资者从未损失过本金或利息。但克莱顿是例外，行业整体损失惨重，且影响至今未消。
This 1997-2000 fiasco should have served as a canary-in-the-coal-mine warning for the far-larger conventional housing market. But investors, government and rating agencies learned exactly nothing from the manufactured-home debacle. Instead, in an eerie rerun of that disaster, the same mistakes were repeated with conventional homes in the 2004-07 period: Lenders happily made loans that borrowers couldn’t repay out of their incomes, and borrowers just as happily signed up to meet those payments. Both parties counted on “house-price appreciation” to make this otherwise impossible arrangement work. It was Scarlett O’Hara all over again: “I’ll think about it tomorrow.” The consequences of this behavior are now reverberating through every corner of our economy.
1997-2000年的灾难本应成为传统住房市场的“煤矿中的金丝雀”预警信号。但投资者、政府和评级机构对此毫无领悟。相反，在2004-2007年间，传统住房市场诡异重演了这场灾难：放款人欣然发放超出借款人收入能力的贷款，借款人同样欣然签约。双方均依赖“房价上涨”支撑这一本不可能的安排。这简直是《乱世佳人》的现实翻版：“明天再想这个问题”。如今，这种行为的后果正冲击着美国经济的每个角落。
Clayton’s 198,888 borrowers, however, have continued to pay normally throughout the housing crash, handing us no unexpected losses. This is not because these borrowers are unusually creditworthy, a point proved by FICO scores (a standard measure of credit risk). Their median FICO score is 644, compared to a national median of 723, and about 35% are below 620, the segment usually designated “sub-prime.” Many disastrous pools of mortgages on conventional homes are populated by borrowers with far better credit, as measured by FICO scores.
然而，克莱顿的198,888名借款人在住房市场崩溃期间仍保持正常还款，未给我们带来意外损失。这并非因这些借款人信用异常优良——他们的FICO评分（信用风险标准指标）即可证明：中位数为644，远低于全国中位数723，约35%低于620（通常定义为“次级”）。许多传统住房抵押贷款池的借款人FICO评分远高于此，但最终仍遭遇灾难。
Yet at yearend, our delinquency rate on loans we have originated was 3.6%, up only modestly from 2.9% in 2006 and 2.9% in 2004. (In addition to our originated loans, we’ve also bought bulk portfolios of various types from other financial institutions.) Clayton’s foreclosures during 2008 were 3.0% of originated loans compared to 3.8% in 2006 and 5.3% in 2004.
但截至年末，我们发起贷款的违约率仅为3.6%，较2006年和2004年的2.9%仅小幅上升。（除自主发放贷款外，我们还从其他金融机构批量购入各类贷款组合。）2008年克莱顿的止赎率为发起贷款的3.0%，而2006年为3.8%，2004年为5.3%。
Why are our borrowers – characteristically people with modest incomes and far-from-great credit scores – performing so well? The answer is elementary, going right back to Lending 101. Our borrowers simply looked at how full-bore mortgage payments would compare with their actual – not hoped-for – income and then decided whether they could live with that commitment. Simply put, they took out a mortgage with the intention of paying it off, whatever the course of home prices.
为何我们的借款人——典型的中低收入、信用评分不佳者——表现如此优异？答案源于基础信贷原则。我们的借款人会认真评估全额月供与自身实际收入（而非理想化预期）的匹配度，并据此决定是否承担这一承诺。简言之，他们购房时即以偿还贷款为目标，无论房价如何波动。
Just as important is what our borrowers did not do. They did not count on making their loan payments by means of refinancing. They did not sign up for “teaser” rates that upon reset were outsized relative to their income. And they did not assume that they could always sell their home at a profit if their mortgage payments became onerous. Jimmy Stewart would have loved these folks.
同样重要的是他们未做的事：不依赖再融资支付贷款；未签署“引诱利率”（重置后远超收入承受力）；未假设房价下跌时总能以盈利出售房产。吉米·斯图尔特（《美好生活》主角）定会欣赏这些人。
Of course, a number of our borrowers will run into trouble. They generally have no more than minor savings to tide them over if adversity hits. The major cause of delinquency or foreclosure is the loss of a job, but death, divorce and medical expenses all cause problems. If unemployment rates rise – as they surely will in 2009 – more of Clayton’s borrowers will have troubles, and we will have larger, though still manageable, losses. But our problems will not be driven to any extent by the trend of home prices.
当然，部分借款人终将遭遇困难。他们普遍缺乏足够储蓄应对突发逆境。违约或止赎的主因是失业，死亡、离婚和医疗开支也会引发问题。若失业率上升（2009年必然如此），克莱顿的借款人困境将增加，我们也将面临更大但可控的损失。但我们的风险与房价走势无直接关联。
Commentary about the current housing crisis often ignores the crucial fact that most foreclosures do not occur because a house is worth less than its mortgage (so-called “upside-down” loans). Rather, foreclosures take place because borrowers can’t pay the monthly payment that they agreed to pay. Homeowners who have made a meaningful down-payment – derived from savings and not from other borrowing – seldom walk away from a primary residence simply because its value today is less than the mortgage. Instead, they walk when they can’t make the monthly payments.
当前住房危机的讨论常忽视一个关键事实：多数止赎并非因房价低于贷款额（所谓“倒挂贷款”），而是借款人无力支付约定月供。那些以储蓄而非借贷支付首付的房主，很少仅因房价低于贷款额就放弃自住房产。他们放弃房产，是因为无法承担月供。
Home ownership is a wonderful thing. My family and I have enjoyed my present home for 50 years, with more to come. But enjoyment and utility should be the primary motives for purchase, not profit or refi possibilities. And the home purchased ought to fit the income of the purchaser.
拥有住房是美好的事。我和家人已享受现居所50年，并将继续。但购房首要动机应是居住需求而非盈利或再融资机会，且房屋价格必须匹配购房者收入。
The present housing debacle should teach home buyers, lenders, brokers and government some simple lessons that will ensure stability in the future. Home purchases should involve an honest-to-God down payment of at least 10% and monthly payments that can be comfortably handled by the borrower’s income. That income should be carefully verified.
当前住房危机应给购房者、放款人、中介和政府以简单教训，确保未来稳定。购房需真实支付至少10%的首付，月供需与借款人收入匹配，且收入需严格核实。
Putting people into homes, though a desirable goal, shouldn’t be our country’s primary objective. Keeping them in their homes should be the ambition.
尽管“人人有房住”是理想目标，但不应成为国家首要任务。让居民保有住房才是核心使命。
# Net Investment Income (净投资收益)
| Pre-Tax Earnings (税前盈利) | 2008 (百万美元) | 2007 (百万美元) |
|---|---|---|
| Net investment income (净投资收益) | $330 | $272 |
| Life and annuity operations (人寿与年金业务) | 23 | (60) |
| Leasing operations (租赁业务) | 87 | 141 |
| Manufactured-housing finance (克莱顿住房金融) | 206 | 526 |
| Other* (其他*) | 111 | 157 |
| Total (总计) | $787 | $1,006 |
*Includes $92 million in 2008 and $85 million in 2007 of fees that Berkshire charges Clayton for the use of Berkshire’s credit.
*包含伯克希尔向克莱顿收取的信用使用费：2008年9,200万美元，2007年8,500万美元。
# Tax-Exempt Bond Insurance (免税债券保险)
Early in 2008, we activated Berkshire Hathaway Assurance Company (“BHAC”) as an insurer of the tax-exempt bonds issued by states, cities and other local entities. BHAC insures these securities for issuers both at the time their bonds are sold to the public (primary transactions) and later, when the bonds are already owned by investors (secondary transactions).
2008年初，我们启动了伯克希尔哈撒韦担保公司（BHAC），为各州、城市及其他地方政府发行的免税债券提供保险。BHAC既在债券首次公开销售时（一级交易）为发行方提供担保，也在债券已被投资者持有后（二级交易）提供保障。
By yearend 2007, the half dozen or so companies that had been the major players in this business had all fallen into big trouble. The cause of their problems was captured long ago by Mae West: “I was Snow White, but I drifted.”
到2007年底，此前主导这一业务的五六家主要公司均陷入严重困境。其问题本质早被梅·韦斯特（Mae West）的一句话概括：“我曾是白雪公主，但我迷失了。”
The monolines (as the bond insurers are called) initially insured only tax-exempt bonds that were low-risk. But over the years competition for this business intensified, and rates fell. Faced with the prospect of stagnating or declining earnings, the monoline managers turned to ever-riskier propositions. Some of these involved the insuring of residential mortgage obligations. When housing prices plummeted, the monoline industry quickly became a basket case.
这些单线保险公司（债券保险商）最初仅承保低风险的免税债券。但随着竞争加剧，费率下降。面对盈利停滞或下滑的风险，管理者转向更高风险的业务，包括住宅按揭债务保险。当房价暴跌时，单线保险行业迅速沦为“问题行业”。
Early in the year, Berkshire offered to assume all of the insurance issued on tax-exempts that was on the books of the three largest monolines. These companies were all in life-threatening trouble (though they said otherwise.) We would have charged a 1 1⁄2% rate to take over the guarantees on about $822 billion of bonds. If our offer had been accepted, we would have been required to pay any losses suffered by investors who owned these bonds – a guarantee stretching for 40 years in some cases. Ours was not a frivolous proposal: For reasons we will come to later, it involved substantial risk for Berkshire.
年初，伯克希尔提出承接三大单线保险公司账面上所有免税债券的保险责任。这些公司当时均面临生存危机（尽管他们不愿承认）。我们要求收取1.5%的费率，覆盖约8,220亿美元债券的担保责任。若提议被接受，我们将承担投资者因债券违约遭受的损失——某些担保期限长达40年。这并非轻率提议：出于后文将说明的原因，此举对伯克希尔存在重大风险。
The monolines summarily rejected our offer, in some cases appending an insult or two. In the end, though, the turndowns proved to be very good news for us, because it became apparent that I had severely underpriced our offer.
这些单线保险公司断然拒绝了我们的提议，有些甚至附带了几句嘲讽。然而最终，拒绝反而成为我们的幸运：显而易见，我的报价严重低估了风险。
Thereafter, we wrote about $15.6 billion of insurance in the secondary market. And here’s the punch line: About 77% of this business was on bonds that were already insured, largely by the three aforementioned monolines. In these agreements, we have to pay for defaults only if the original insurer is financially unable to do so.
随后，我们在二级市场承保了约156亿美元债券保险。关键点在于：其中约77%的业务对应债券已由前述三家单线公司提供保险。根据协议，我们仅在原始保险公司无力偿付时才需承担违约损失。
We wrote this “second-to-pay” insurance for rates averaging 3.3%. That’s right; we have been paid far more for becoming the second to pay than the 1.5% we would have earlier charged to be the first to pay. In one extreme case, we actually agreed to be fourth to pay, nonetheless receiving about three times the 1% premium charged by the monoline that remains first to pay. In other words, three other monolines have to first go broke before we need to write a check.
我们为此类“第二偿付人”保险收取的平均费率为3.3%。没错，我们作为次级偿付人获得的保费远高于若作为首要偿付人收取的1.5%。在一个极端案例中，我们甚至同意成为第四偿付人，但仍获得原首要偿付人（收取1%费率）三倍的保费。换言之，只有前三家单线公司破产后，我们才需实际赔付。
Two of the three monolines to which we made our initial bulk offer later raised substantial capital. This, of course, directly helps us, since it makes it less likely that we will have to pay, at least in the near term, any claims on our second-to-pay insurance because these two monolines fail. In addition to our book of secondary business, we have also written $3.7 billion of primary business for a premium of $96 million. In primary business, of course, we are first to pay if the issuer gets in trouble.
最初拒绝我们大宗报价的三家单线公司中，有两家后来筹集了大量资本。这无疑对我们有利，因至少短期内我们因这两家公司破产而触发次级保险赔付的可能性降低。除二级市场业务外，我们还承保了37亿美元一级市场业务，收取9,600万美元保费。在一级业务中，若发行人违约，我们作为首要偿付人需立即赔付。
We have a great many more multiples of capital behind the insurance we write than does any other monoline. Consequently, our guarantee is far more valuable than theirs. This explains why many sophisticated investors have bought second-to-pay insurance from us even though they were already insured by another monoline. BHAC has become not only the insurer of preference, but in many cases the sole insurer acceptable to bondholders.
我们承保的保险背后拥有远超其他单线公司的资本倍数。因此，我们的担保价值远高于同行。这解释了为何许多专业投资者即便已有其他单线公司保险，仍选择向我们购买次级保险。BHAC不仅成为首选保险商，更在许多情况下成为债券持有人唯一接受的保险方。
Nevertheless, we remain very cautious about the business we write and regard it as far from a sure thing that this insurance will ultimately be profitable for us. The reason is simple, though I have never seen even a passing reference to it by any financial analyst, rating agency or monoline CEO.
尽管如此，我们对承保业务仍保持高度谨慎，并不认为此类保险最终必然盈利。原因简单明了——尽管我从未见过任何分析师、评级机构或单线公司CEO提及过这一点。
The rationale behind very low premium rates for insuring tax-exempts has been that defaults have historically been few. But that record largely reflects the experience of entities that issued uninsured bonds. Insurance of tax-exempt bonds didn’t exist before 1971, and even after that most bonds remained uninsured.
免税债券保险费率低廉的逻辑基于历史违约率极低。但这一记录主要反映的是未投保债券发行方的经验。1971年前，免税债券保险并不存在，此后多数债券仍无保险覆盖。
A universe of tax-exempts fully covered by insurance would be certain to have a somewhat different loss experience from a group of uninsured, but otherwise similar bonds, the only question being how different. To understand why, let’s go back to 1975 when New York City was on the edge of bankruptcy. At the time its bonds – virtually all uninsured – were heavily held by the city’s wealthier residents as well as by New York banks and other institutions. These local bondholders deeply desired to solve the city’s fiscal problems. So before long, concessions and cooperation from a host of involved constituencies produced a solution. Without one, it was apparent to all that New York’s citizens and businesses would have experienced widespread and severe financial losses from their bond holdings.
由保险全面覆盖的免税债券组合，其损失经验必然与未投保但其他条件相似的债券不同，区别仅在于差异程度。理解这一点需回顾1975年纽约市濒临破产时的情景。当时其债券（几乎全部无保险）主要由本市富裕居民、纽约银行及机构持有。这些本地债券持有人迫切希望解决市政财政问题。因此，多方利益相关者的让步与合作很快促成了解决方案。若无此方案，纽约市民和企业将因债券持仓遭受广泛且严重的损失。
Now, imagine that all of the city’s bonds had instead been insured by Berkshire. Would similar belt-tightening, tax increases, labor concessions, etc. have been forthcoming? Of course not. At a minimum, Berkshire would have been asked to “share” in the required sacrifices. And, considering our deep pockets, the required contribution would most certainly have been substantial.
假设当时所有市政债券均由伯克希尔保险，类似的紧缩开支、增税、劳资让步等措施还会出现吗？当然不会。至少我们会被告知需“共同承担”所需牺牲。鉴于伯克希尔的雄厚财力，所需承担的金额必然巨大。
Local governments are going to face far tougher fiscal problems in the future than they have to date. The pension liabilities I talked about in last year’s report will be a huge contributor to these woes. Many cities and states were surely horrified when they inspected the status of their funding at yearend 2008. The gap between assets and a realistic actuarial valuation of present liabilities is simply staggering.
未来地方政府将面临比以往更严峻的财政问题。去年报告中提到的养老金负债将成为主要诱因。2008年底审查财政状况时，许多城市和州政府必定震惊不已——资产与当前负债的精算估值缺口之大令人咋舌。
When faced with large revenue shortfalls, communities that have all of their bonds insured will be more prone to develop “solutions” less favorable to bondholders than those communities that have uninsured bonds held by local banks and residents. Losses in the tax-exempt arena, when they come, are also likely to be highly correlated among issuers. If a few communities stiff their creditors and get away with it, the chance that others will follow in their footsteps will grow. What mayor or city council is going to choose pain to local citizens in the form of major tax increases over pain to a far-away bond insurer?
当面临巨额收入缺口时，债券全数投保的社区更可能采取不利于债券持有人的“解决方案”，而非由本地银行和居民持有债券的社区。免税债券领域的损失一旦发生，不同发行方的损失很可能高度相关。若少数社区成功拖欠债权人且未受惩罚，其他社区效仿的可能性将上升。哪位市长或市议会会选择通过大幅增税让本地居民承受痛苦，而非让远方的债券保险公司承担损失？
Insuring tax-exempts, therefore, has the look today of a dangerous business – one with similarities, in fact, to the insuring of natural catastrophes. In both cases, a string of loss-free years can be followed by a devastating experience that more than wipes out all earlier profits. We will try, therefore, to proceed carefully in this business, eschewing many classes of bonds that other monolines regularly embrace.
因此，当前免税债券保险看似危险业务——事实上与自然灾害保险有相似之处。两者均可能经历多年无损失期，随后遭遇一次灾难性事件吞噬所有前期利润。因此，我们将谨慎行事，避开其他单线公司常承保的许多债券类别。
The type of fallacy involved in projecting loss experience from a universe of non-insured bonds onto a deceptively-similar universe in which many bonds are insured pops up in other areas of finance. “Back-tested” models of many kinds are susceptible to this sort of error. Nevertheless, they are frequently touted in financial markets as guides to future action. (If merely looking up past financial data would tell you what the future holds, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.)
将未投保债券的损失经验简单套用于看似相似但大量投保的债券组合，这种谬误在金融领域普遍存在。“回溯测试”模型常犯此类错误，却仍被金融市场频繁吹捧为未来行动指南。（若仅凭查阅历史金融数据即可预知未来，福布斯400富豪榜上将挤满图书管理员。）
Indeed, the stupefying losses in mortgage-related securities came in large part because of flawed, history-based models used by salesmen, rating agencies and investors. These parties looked at loss experience over periods when home prices rose only moderately and speculation in houses was negligible. They then made this experience a yardstick for evaluating future losses. They blissfully ignored the fact that house prices had recently skyrocketed, loan practices had deteriorated and many buyers had opted for houses they couldn’t afford. In short, universe “past” and universe “current” had very different characteristics. But lenders, government and media largely failed to recognize this all-important fact.
事实上，抵押贷款相关证券的惨重损失很大程度源于销售员、评级机构和投资者使用的错误历史模型。他们依据房价温和上涨、房产投机低迷时期的损失数据，将其作为评估未来损失的基准，却天真地忽视了房价暴涨、放贷标准恶化及许多买家购置超出支付能力房屋的现实。简言之，“过去”与“当下”的市场环境截然不同，但放款人、政府和媒体几乎完全忽略了这一关键事实。
Investors should be skeptical of history-based models. Constructed by a nerdy-sounding priesthood using esoteric terms such as beta, gamma, sigma and the like, these models tend to look impressive. Too often, though, investors forget to examine the assumptions behind the symbols. Our advice: Beware of geeks bearing formulas.
投资者应对基于历史数据的模型保持怀疑态度。这些模型由一群使用β、γ、σ等晦涩术语的“极客”构建，看似精密但常令人误入歧途。投资者往往忽视符号背后的假设条件。我们的建议：警惕带着公式而来的“极客”。
# Investments (投资组合)
Because of accounting rules, we divide our large holdings of common stocks this year into two categories. The table below, presenting the first category, itemizes investments that are carried on our balance sheet at market value and that had a yearend value of more than $500 million.
受会计准则影响，今年我们将主要普通股持仓分为两类。下表展示第一类持仓，即按市价计入资产负债表、年末市值超5亿美元的投资明细。
Common Stocks Carried at Market (按市价计价的普通股)
| Company (公司) | Shares (持股数量) | Percentage of Company Owned (持股比例) | Cost (成本) (百万美元)* | Market (市值) (百万美元) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| American Express Company (美国运通公司) | 151,610,700 | 13.1% | $1,287 | $2,812 |
| The Coca-Cola Company (可口可乐公司) | 200,000,000 | 8.6% | 1,299 | 9,054 |
| ConocoPhillips (康菲石油公司) | 84,896,273 | 5.7% | 7,008 | 4,398 |
| Johnson & Johnson (强生公司) | 30,009,591 | 1.1% | 1,847 | 1,795 |
| Kraft Foods Inc. (卡夫食品公司) | 130,272,500 | 8.9% | 4,330 | 3,498 |
| POSCO (韩国浦项制铁) | 3,947,554 | 5.2% | 768 | 1,191 |
| The Procter & Gamble Company (宝洁公司) | 91,941,010 | 3.1% | 643 | 5,684 |
| Sanofi-Aventis (赛诺菲-安万特) | 22,111,966 | 1.7% | 1,827 | 1,404 |
| Swiss Re (瑞士再保险) | 11,262,000 | 3.2% | 773 | 530 |
| Tesco plc (乐购公司) | 227,307,000 | 2.9% | 1,326 | 1,193 |
| U.S. Bancorp (美国合众银行) | 75,145,426 | 4.3% | 2,337 | 1,879 |
| Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (沃尔玛) | 19,944,300 | 0.5% | 942 | 1,118 |
| The Washington Post Company (华盛顿邮报公司) | 1,727,765 | 18.4% | 11 | 674 |
| Wells Fargo & Company (富国银行) | 304,392,068 | 7.2% | 6,702 | 8,973 |
| Others (其他) | - | - | 6,035 | 4,870 |
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market (按市价计价的普通股总计) | - | - | $37,135 | $49,073 |
*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
*为我们实际买入成本及税务基础；部分情况下GAAP“成本”因需调整而不同。
In addition, we have holdings in Moody’s and Burlington Northern Santa Fe that we now carry at “equity value” – our cost plus retained earnings since our purchase, minus the tax that would be paid if those earnings were paid to us as dividends. This accounting treatment is usually required when ownership of an investee company reaches 20%.
此外，我们持有的穆迪公司和伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路公司股份按“权益法价值”计价——即成本加上自买入后留存收益，扣除若收益以股息形式发放所需缴税。当持股比例达20%时，通常需采用此会计方法。
We purchased 15% of Moody’s some years ago and have not since bought a share. Moody’s, though, has repurchased its own shares and, by late 2008, those repurchases reduced its outstanding shares to the point that our holdings rose above 20%. Burlington Northern has also repurchased shares, but our increase to 20% primarily occurred because we continued to buy this stock.
数年前我们买入穆迪公司15%股份后未增持。但穆迪回购股份导致2008年底流通股减少，使我们持股比例升至20%以上。伯灵顿北方亦回购股份，但我们的持股比例升至20%主要因持续增持。
Unless facts or rules change, you will see these holdings reflected in our balance sheet at “equity accounting” values, whatever their market prices. You will also see our share of their earnings (less applicable taxes) regularly included in our quarterly and annual earnings.
除非事实或规则变更，这些持仓将以“权益法会计”价值计入资产负债表，与市场价无关。其盈利的相应份额（扣除相关税费）将定期计入季度和年度收益。
I told you in an earlier part of this report that last year I made a major mistake of commission (and maybe more; this one sticks out). Without urging from Charlie or anyone else, I bought a large amount of ConocoPhillips stock when oil and gas prices were near their peak. I in no way anticipated the dramatic fall in energy prices that occurred in the last half of the year. I still believe the odds are good that oil sells far higher in the future than the current $40-$50 price. But so far I have been dead wrong. Even if prices should rise, moreover, the terrible timing of my purchase has cost Berkshire several billion dollars.
我在报告前文提到去年犯了重大操作失误（可能更多，但这一项最突出）。未经查理或其他人敦促，我在油气价格接近峰值时大量买入康菲石油公司股票。我完全未预料到下半年能源价格的暴跌。我仍认为未来油价远高于当前40-50美元的概率较高，但目前判断完全错误。即便价格回升，糟糕的买入时机已令伯克希尔损失数百亿美元。
I made some other already-recognizable errors as well. They were smaller, but unfortunately not that small. During 2008, I spent $244 million for shares of two Irish banks that appeared cheap to me. At yearend we wrote these holdings down to market: $27 million, for an 89% loss. Since then, the two stocks have declined even further. The tennis crowd would call my mistakes “unforced errors.”
我还犯了其他明显错误，虽规模较小但损失不小。2008年我以2.44亿美元买入两家爱尔兰银行股票，年末计提至市价2,700万美元，亏损89%。此后股价进一步下跌。网球界会将我的错误称为“非受迫性失误”。
On the plus side last year, we made purchases totaling $14.5 billion in fixed-income securities issued by Wrigley, Goldman Sachs and General Electric. We very much like these commitments, which carry high current yields that, in themselves, make the investments more than satisfactory. But in each of these three purchases, we also acquired a substantial equity participation as a bonus. To fund these large purchases, I had to sell portions of some holdings that I would have preferred to keep (primarily Johnson & Johnson, Procter & Gamble and ConocoPhillips). However, I have pledged – to you, the rating agencies and myself – to always run Berkshire with more than ample cash. We never want to count on the kindness of strangers in order to meet tomorrow’s obligations. When forced to choose, I will not trade even a night’s sleep for the chance of extra profits.
另一方面，去年我们以145亿美元购买了箭牌、高盛和通用电气发行的固定收益证券。这些投资附带高收益率，本身已足够令人满意。但三笔交易中我们还获得可观的股权参与权作为附加收益。为筹措资金，我不得不减持部分本想保留的持仓（主要是强生、宝洁和康菲石油）。但我向您、评级机构和自己承诺：伯克希尔将始终保持充足现金，绝不依赖他人援助履行未来义务。若必须选择，我不会为额外利润牺牲一夜安眠。
The investment world has gone from underpricing risk to overpricing it. This change has not been minor; the pendulum has covered an extraordinary arc. A few years ago, it would have seemed unthinkable that yields like today’s could have been obtained on good-grade municipal or corporate bonds even while risk-free governments offered near-zero returns on short-term bonds and no better than a pittance on long-terms. When the financial history of this decade is written, it will surely speak of the Internet bubble of the late 1990s and the housing bubble of the early 2000s. But the U.S. Treasury bond bubble of late 2008 may be regarded as almost equally extraordinary.
投资界已从低估风险转向过度规避风险。这一转变并非微小，而是剧烈摆动。几年前，若说优质市政或企业债券能获得如今的收益率，即便无风险国债短期回报接近零、长期回报微薄，也令人难以置信。当书写本十年金融史时，必将提及1990年代末的互联网泡沫和2000年代初的住房泡沫。但2008年底的美国国债泡沫或许同样堪称奇观。
Clinging to cash equivalents or long-term government bonds at present yields is almost certainly a terrible policy if continued for long. Holders of these instruments, of course, have felt increasingly comfortable – in fact, almost smug – in following this policy as financial turmoil has mounted. They regard their judgment confirmed when they hear commentators proclaim “cash is king,” even though that wonderful cash is earning close to nothing and will surely find its purchasing power eroded over time.
长期持有现金等价物或长期国债（当前收益率下）几乎是糟糕的策略。然而随着金融动荡加剧，持有者遵循此策略时愈发自得，甚至沾沾自喜。当听到评论员高呼“现金为王”，他们更坚信判断正确——尽管这笔“优质现金”几乎零收益，且购买力必将随时间侵蚀。
Approval, though, is not the goal of investing. In fact, approval is often counter-productive because it sedates the brain and makes it less receptive to new facts or a re-examination of conclusions formed earlier. Beware the investment activity that produces applause; the great moves are usually greeted by yawns.
投资的目标不是获得认可。事实上，认可往往适得其反，因其麻痹思维，阻碍新信息吸收或早期结论的重新审视。警惕那些引发掌声的投资行为——真正伟大的决策往往伴随沉默。
# Derivatives (衍生品)
Derivatives are dangerous. They have dramatically increased the leverage and risks in our financial system. They have made it almost impossible for investors to understand and analyze our largest commercial banks and investment banks. They allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to engage in massive misstatements of earnings for years. So indecipherable were Freddie and Fannie that their federal regulator, OFHEO, whose more than 100 employees had no job except the oversight of these two institutions, totally missed their cooking of the books.
衍生品是危险的。它们大幅提升了金融系统的杠杆和风险，使投资者几乎无法理解并分析最大商业银行和投行。房利美和房地美曾多年虚报盈利，而其联邦监管机构OFHEO（逾百人专职监管两家机构）竟完全未能发现账目操纵。
Indeed, recent events demonstrate that certain big-name CEOs (or former CEOs) at major financial institutions were simply incapable of managing a business with a huge, complex book of derivatives. Include Charlie and me in this hapless group: When Berkshire purchased General Re in 1998, we knew we could not get our minds around its book of 23,218 derivatives contracts, made with 884 counterparties (many of which we had never heard of). So we decided to close up shop. Though we were under no pressure and were operating in benign markets as we exited, it took us five years and more than $400 million in losses to largely complete the task. Upon leaving, our feelings about the business mirrored a line in a country song: “I liked you better before I got to know you so well.”
事实上，最近的事件证明，一些大型金融机构的知名CEO（或前任CEO）根本无法管理拥有庞大复杂衍生品组合的业务。查理和我也属于这个不幸的群体：1998年伯克希尔收购通用再保险公司时，我们明知自己无法理解其与884家交易对手（其中许多我们闻所未闻）签订的23,218份衍生品合同，因此决定彻底退出。尽管我们当时并未承受压力且市场环境良好，但仍耗费五年时间并亏损超4亿美元才基本完成清算。退出后，我们对这项业务的感受正如一首乡村歌曲中的歌词：“认识你之前，我更喜欢你。”
Improved “transparency” – a favorite remedy of politicians, commentators and financial regulators for averting future train wrecks – won’t cure the problems that derivatives pose. I know of no reporting mechanism that would come close to describing and measuring the risks in a huge and complex portfolio of derivatives. Auditors can’t audit these contracts, and regulators can’t regulate them. When I read the pages of “disclosure” in 10-Ks of companies that are entangled with these instruments, all I end up knowing is that I don’t know what is going on in their portfolios (and then I reach for some aspirin).
“增强透明度”——政客、评论员和金融监管者预防未来灾难的万能药——无法解决衍生品带来的问题。我找不到任何报告机制能准确描述和衡量庞大复杂衍生品组合的风险。审计师无法审计这些合同，监管者也无法监管它们。当我阅读深陷衍生品的公司10-K报告中的“披露”章节时，唯一明确的是我完全不了解它们的持仓（然后只能去拿阿司匹林）。
For a case study on regulatory effectiveness, let’s look harder at the Freddie and Fannie example. These giant institutions were created by Congress, which retained control over them, dictating what they could and could not do. To aid its oversight, Congress created OFHEO in 1992, admonishing it to make sure the two behemoths were behaving themselves. With that move, Fannie and Freddie became the most intensely-regulated companies of which I am aware, as measured by manpower assigned to the task.
以房利美和房地美的案例研究监管有效性：这两家巨头由国会创立并直接控制，国会规定了它们的权限。为加强监管，国会于1992年设立联邦住房企业监管办公室（OFHEO），要求其监督两家机构的行为。这一安排下，房利美和房地美成为我所知被监管最严格的公司，监管人力投入空前。
On June 15, 2003, OFHEO (whose annual reports are available on the Internet) sent its 2002 report to Congress – specifically to its four bosses in the Senate and House, among them none other than Messrs. Sarbanes and Oxley. The report’s 127 pages included a self-congratulatory cover-line: “Celebrating 10 Years of Excellence.” The transmittal letter and report were delivered nine days after the CEO and CFO of Freddie had resigned in disgrace and the COO had been fired. No mention of their departures was made in the letter, even while the report concluded, as it always did, that “Both Enterprises were financially sound and well managed.”
2003年6月15日，OFHEO（年度报告可在网上查阅）向国会提交2002年报告，收件人包括参众两院四位负责人（其中就有萨班斯和奥克斯利先生）。这份127页的报告封面写着自夸的标语：“庆祝十年卓越”。然而，报告提交时距房地美CEO和CFO因丑闻辞职、COO被解雇仅过去九天，信中却只字未提人事变动，反而一如既往地宣称“两家企业财务稳健且管理良好”。
In truth, both enterprises had engaged in massive accounting shenanigans for some time. Finally, in 2006, OFHEO issued a 340-page scathing chronicle of the sins of Fannie that, more or less, blamed the fiasco on every party but – you guessed it – Congress and OFHEO.
事实上，两家机构长期存在大规模会计舞弊。直到2006年，OFHEO才发布长达340页的严厉报告，将房利美的灾难归咎于几乎所有相关方——唯独国会和OFHEO除外。
The Bear Stearns collapse highlights the counterparty problem embedded in derivatives transactions, a time bomb I first discussed in Berkshire’s 2002 report. On April 3, 2008, Tim Geithner, then the able president of the New York Fed, explained the need for a rescue: “The sudden discovery by Bear’s derivative counterparties that important financial positions they had put in place to protect themselves from financial risk were no longer operative would have triggered substantial further dislocation in markets. This would have precipitated a rush by Bear’s counterparties to liquidate the collateral they held against those positions and to attempt to replicate those positions in already very fragile markets.” This is Fedspeak for “We stepped in to avoid a financial chain reaction of unpredictable magnitude.” In my opinion, the Fed was right to do so.
贝尔斯登的崩盘凸显了衍生品交易中潜藏的交易对手风险——这是我早在2002年伯克希尔报告中警告过的“定时炸弹”。2008年4月3日，时任纽约联储主席的蒂姆·盖特纳解释了救援必要性：“若贝尔斯登的衍生品交易对手突然发现其用于对冲风险的重要头寸失效，将引发市场更大动荡。这会迫使贝尔斯登的交易对手急于清算抵押品，并试图在本已脆弱的市场重建头寸。”用美联储语言翻译就是：“我们介入是为了避免不可控的金融连锁反应。”我认为美联储的决策是正确的。
A normal stock or bond trade is completed in a few days with one party getting its cash, the other its securities. Counterparty risk therefore quickly disappears, which means credit problems can’t accumulate. This rapid settlement process is key to maintaining the integrity of markets. That, in fact, is a reason for NYSE and NASDAQ shortening the settlement period from five days to three days in 1995.
普通股票或债券交易通常在几天内完成交割，一方获得现金，另一方获得证券。因此交易对手风险迅速消失，信用问题不会累积。这种快速结算机制是维护市场完整性的关键。事实上，这也是纽交所和纳斯达克在1995年将交割周期从5天缩短至3天的原因。
Derivatives contracts, in contrast, often go unsettled for years, or even decades, with counterparties building up huge claims against each other. “Paper” assets and liabilities – often hard to quantify – become important parts of financial statements though these items will not be validated for many years. Additionally, a frightening web of mutual dependence develops among huge financial institutions. Receivables and payables by the billions become concentrated in the hands of a few large dealers who are apt to be highly-leveraged in other ways as well. Participants seeking to dodge troubles face the same problem as someone seeking to avoid venereal disease: It’s not just whom you sleep with, but also whom they are sleeping with.
相比之下，衍生品合约往往数年甚至数十年未结算，交易对手间形成巨额债权债务。“纸面”资产和负债（往往难以量化）成为财务报表的重要组成部分，尽管这些项目需多年后才能验证。此外，大型金融机构间形成令人不安的相互依赖网络。数千亿美元的应收应付集中在少数大型交易商手中，而这些机构往往在其他方面也高度杠杆化。试图规避风险的参与者面临的困境与躲避性病无异：不仅要看和谁交易，还要看交易对手的交易对手是谁。
Sleeping around, to continue our metaphor, can actually be useful for large derivatives dealers because it assures them government aid if trouble hits. In other words, only companies having problems that can infect the entire neighborhood – I won’t mention names – are certain to become a concern of the state (an outcome, I’m sad to say, that is proper). From this irritating reality comes The First Law of Corporate Survival for ambitious CEOs who pile on leverage and run large and unfathomable derivatives books: Modest incompetence simply won’t do; it’s mindboggling screw-ups that are required.
延续比喻，大型衍生品交易商“滥交”反而可能带来政府援助。换言之，只有可能拖累整个金融系统的公司——此处不点名——才会成为政府关切对象（尽管遗憾，但这是合理的）。由此诞生了雄心勃勃的高杠杆CEO生存法则：平庸的无能已不够格，必须犯下令人震惊的灾难性错误。
Considering the ruin I’ve pictured, you may wonder why Berkshire is a party to 251 derivatives contracts (other than those used for operational purposes at MidAmerican and the few left over at Gen Re). The answer is simple: I believe each contract we own was mispriced at inception, sometimes dramatically so. I both initiated these positions and monitor them, a set of responsibilities consistent with my belief that the CEO of any large financial organization must be the Chief Risk Officer as well. If we lose money on our derivatives, it will be my fault.
考虑到上述灾难性风险，您可能疑惑为何伯克希尔仍参与251份衍生品合约（不包括中美能源运营需求及通用再保险遗留的少量合约）。答案很简单：我认为每份合约在签订时定价均有误，有时甚至是严重误判。这些头寸由我亲自发起并监控，这与我的信念一致——任何大型金融机构的CEO都必须兼任首席风险官。若衍生品导致亏损，责任在我。
Our derivatives dealings require our counterparties to make payments to us when contracts are initiated. Berkshire therefore always holds the money, which leaves us assuming no meaningful counterparty risk. As of yearend, the payments made to us less losses we have paid – our derivatives “float,” so to speak – totaled $8.1 billion. This float is similar to insurance float: If we break even on an underlying transaction, we will have enjoyed the use of free money for a long time. Our expectation, though it is far from a sure thing, is that we will do better than break even and that the substantial investment income we earn on the funds will be frosting on the cake.
我们的衍生品交易要求交易对手在签约时即向我们付款。因此伯克希尔始终掌握资金，承担的交易对手风险微乎其微。年末时，我们收到的合约付款扣除已支付亏损（所谓衍生品“浮存金”）总计81亿美元。这类浮存金与保险浮存金类似：若基础交易盈亏平衡，我们便免费使用这笔资金多年。尽管结果存在不确定性，但我们预期收益将超过盈亏平衡点，资金产生的可观投资收益将成为额外甜头。
Only a small percentage of our contracts call for any posting of collateral when the market moves against us. Even under the chaotic conditions existing in last year’s fourth quarter, we had to post less than 1% of our securities portfolio. (When we post collateral, we deposit it with third parties, meanwhile retaining the investment earnings on the deposited securities.) In our 2002 annual report, we warned of the lethal threat that posting requirements create, real-life illustrations of which we witnessed last year at a variety of financial institutions (and, for that matter, at Constellation Energy, which was within hours of bankruptcy when MidAmerican arrived to effect a rescue).
仅极小比例的合约在市场不利时需要追加保证金。即使在去年四季度混乱环境下，我们追加的抵押品也不到证券组合的1%。（追加抵押时，我们委托第三方保管抵押证券，同时保留其投资收益。）2002年年报中，我们已警告保证金要求的致命威胁，这一教训在去年多家金融机构（以及Constellation Energy，中美能源在该公司濒临破产时出手相救）的危机中再次得到验证。
Our contracts fall into four major categories. With apologies to those who are not fascinated by financial instruments, I will explain them in excruciating detail.
我们的衍生品合约分为四大类。向不热衷金融工具的读者致歉后，我将以极度详尽的方式解释这些合约。
# Equity Puts (股权认沽期权)
We have added modestly to the “equity put” portfolio I described in last year’s report. Some of our contracts come due in 15 years, others in 20. We must make a payment to our counterparty at maturity if the reference index to which the put is tied is then below what it was at the inception of the contract. Neither party can elect to settle early; it’s only the price on the final day that counts.
我们在去年报告中描述的“股权认沽期权”组合中新增少量头寸。部分合约期限为15年，另一些为20年。若到期时挂钩指数低于签约时水平，我们需要向交易对手支付差额。双方均无权提前结算，最终价值仅取决于到期日价格。
To illustrate, we might sell a $1 billion 15-year put contract on the S&P 500 when that index is at, say, 1300. If the index is at 1170 – down 10% – on the day of maturity, we would pay $100 million. If it is above 1300, we owe nothing. For us to lose $1 billion, the index would have to go to zero. In the meantime, the sale of the put would have delivered us a premium – perhaps $100 million to $150 million – that we would be free to invest as we wish.
举例说明：当标普500指数为1300点时，我们出售一份15年期10亿美元认沽期权。若到期时指数跌至1170点（下跌10%），我们需支付1亿美元；若指数高于1300点则无需支付。要让我们损失10亿美元，指数必须归零。与此同时，我们已获得1亿至1.5亿美元权利金，可自由投资。
Our put contracts total $37.1 billion (at current exchange rates) and are spread among four major indices: the S&P 500 in the U.S., the FTSE 100 in the U.K., the Euro Stoxx 50 in Europe, and the Nikkei 225 in Japan. Our first contract comes due on September 9, 2019 and our last on January 24, 2028. We have received premiums of $4.9 billion, money we have invested. We, meanwhile, have paid nothing, since all expiration dates are far in the future. Nonetheless, we have used Black-Scholes valuation methods to record a yearend liability of $10 billion, an amount that will change on every reporting date. The two financial items – this estimated loss of $10 billion minus the $4.9 billion in premiums we have received – means that we have so far reported a mark-to-market loss of $5.1 billion from these contracts.
我们的认沽期权总规模为371亿美元（按当前汇率计算），覆盖四大指数：美国标普500、英国富时100、欧洲Euro Stoxx 50、日本日经225。首份合约于2019年9月9日到期，最后一份于2028年1月24日到期。我们已收取49亿美元权利金并进行投资，至今未支付任何款项（因所有合约均远未到期）。然而，根据布莱克-舒尔斯定价模型，我们计提了100亿美元年末负债（随报告日变动）。将100亿美元账面损失与49亿美元权利金相减，该组合迄今已报告51亿美元市值损失。
# The Annual Meeting (年度股东大会)
Our meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 2nd. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
今年的股东大会将于5月2日（星期六）举行。一如往常，Qwest中心将于上午7点开门，8:30播放新的伯克希尔影片。9:30正式进入问答环节（中午在展位简单用餐），持续至下午3点。短暂休息后，查理和我将于3:15召开年度会议。若您计划在问答期间离场，请在查理发言时离开。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, the 31,000 people who came to the meeting did their part, and almost every location racked up record sales. But you can do better. (A friendly warning: If I find sales are lagging, I lock the exits.)
当然，最佳离场理由是购物。我们将在毗邻会议区的194,300平方英尺展厅陈列伯克希尔子公司产品。去年31,000名参会者助力多个展区刷新销售记录，但您仍可做得更好。（友情提示：若发现销售疲软，我将锁住出口。）
This year Clayton will showcase its new i-house that includes Shaw flooring, Johns Manville insulation and MiTek fasteners. This innovative “green” home, featuring solar panels and numerous other energy-saving products, is truly a home of the future. Estimated costs for electricity and heating total only about $1 per day when the home is sited in an area like Omaha. After purchasing the i-house, you should next consider the Forest River RV and pontoon boat on display nearby. Make your neighbors jealous.
今年Clayton将展示其全新i-house住宅，配备Shaw地板、Johns Manville隔热材料和MiTek紧固件。这款创新“绿色住宅”集成太阳能板等多项节能技术，堪称未来之家。在奥马哈等地区，预估每日水电费用仅约1美元。购买i-house后，不妨顺便关注附近的Forest River房车和船艇展区，让邻居们羡慕去吧。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.
GEICO将在展位安排全国顶尖顾问团队，为您提供即时车险报价。44个州（占运营区域的88%）允许股东享受8%优惠折扣。（补充说明：若您符合其他折扣条件，此优惠不可叠加。）带上现有保单详情来比较，我相信至少50%的参会者能在此节省开支。
On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of NetJets aircraft available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane. And take along – with no fear of a strip search – the Ginsu knives that you’ve purchased at the exhibit of our Quikut subsidiary.
星期六在奥马哈机场，我们将照例展出NetJets机队供您参观。在Qwest中心NetJets展位可预约看机，乘车来？乘新飞机走！此外，您可放心携带从子公司Quikut展位购买的Ginsu刀具，安检绝不会没收。
Next, if you have any money left, visit the Bookworm, which will be selling about 30 books and DVDs. A shipping service will be available for those whose thirst for knowledge exceeds their carrying capacity.
若您仍有预算，不妨光顾Bookworm书摊，提供约30种书籍和DVD。知识渴求者可选择邮寄服务（若您买得太多背不动）。
Finally, we will have three fascinating cars on the exhibition floor, including one from the past and one of the future. Paul Andrews, CEO of our subsidiary, TTI, will bring his 1935 Duesenberg, a car that once belonged to Mrs. Forrest Mars, Sr., parent and grandparent of our new partners in the Wrigley purchase. The future will be represented by a new plug-in electric car developed by BYD, an amazing Chinese company in which we have a 10% interest.
最后，展会将展出三辆特色汽车，包括经典古董车和未来概念车。子公司TTI CEO保罗·安德鲁斯将带来其1935年杜森伯格跑车——这辆车曾属于玛氏家族成员福雷斯特·马尔斯夫人（即箭牌收购新伙伴的祖辈）。未来代表则是比亚迪（BYD）开发的插电式电动车，我们持有这家中国公司10%股份。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.
随本报告附上的委托材料附件详细说明如何获取参会凭证。关于机票、酒店和租车预订，我们再次与美国运通（800-799-6634）合作提供特别协助。卡罗尔·佩德森每年为此尽心尽力，特此感谢。奥马哈酒店紧张？找卡罗尔帮忙准行。
# Berkshire Weekend Events (伯克希尔周末特别活动)
At Nebraska Furniture Mart (NFM), located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM twelve years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to a record $33.3 million in 2008. On Saturday of that weekend, we also set a single day record of $7.2 million. Ask any retailer what he thinks of such volume.
位于Dodge与Pacific之间72街、占地77英亩的内布拉斯加家具商城（NFM），将推出“伯克希尔周末”特别折扣。该活动始于12年前，销售额从1997年的530万美元跃升至2008年的3,330万美元纪录。其中周六单日销售额达720万美元。问问零售商们对这种销量有何感想？
To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, April 30th and Monday, May 4th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation.
要享受伯克希尔折扣，您需在**4月30日（周四）至5月4日（周一）**购物并出示参会凭证。连平日坚持不打折的知名厂商也破例加入，我们对此深表感谢。
NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a western cookout to which you are all invited.
NFM营业时间：周一至周六10:00-21:00，周日10:00-18:00。今年周六17:30-20:00将举办西部烧烤派对，全体欢迎参加。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 1st. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 3rd, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.
**波仙珠宝（Borsheims）**将举办两场股东专属活动：
- 5月1日（周五）18:00-22:00鸡尾酒会；
- 5月3日（周日）09:00-16:00主会晚宴。
周六营业至18:00。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 27th through Saturday, May 9th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
本周末波仙珠宝将人潮涌动，为此股东优惠价延长至4月27日（周一）至5月9日（周六）。期间请出示参会凭证或持股证明以享特权。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.
周日波仙商场将上演特别表演：
- 双届美国国际象棋冠军帕特里克·沃尔夫（蒙眼）与六位挑战者对战（对手睁眼）；
- 达拉斯魔术师诺曼·贝克现场秀；
- 世界桥牌大师鲍勃·哈曼和莎伦·奥斯伯格将在下午与股东切磋牌技。
Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 3rd, and will be serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. Last year Gorat’s, which seats 240, served 975 dinners on Shareholder Sunday. The three-day total was 2,448 including 702 T-bone steaks, the entrée preferred by the cognoscenti. Please don’t embarrass me by ordering foie gras. Remember: To come to Gorat’s on that day, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before).
Gorat’s牛排馆将于**5月3日（周日）**仅对股东开放，13:00-22:00营业。去年该日容纳240人的餐厅服务了975桌，三天总计2,448桌（含702份纽约客牛排）。请勿点鹅肝让我难堪。重要提醒：当日需提前预订，4月1日致电402-551-3733预约（不可提前）。
We will again have a reception at 4 p.m. on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far. Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 700 of you from many dozens of countries. Any shareholder who comes from outside the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.
周六下午4点将为北美以外股东举办欢迎酒会。每年都有来自数十国家的股东远道而来，查理和我期待亲自致意。凡非美加股东将获特别凭证及参会指引。
# Important Changes to Q&A Format (问答环节重大调整)
This year we will be making important changes in how we handle the meeting’s question periods. In recent years, we have received only a handful of questions directly related to Berkshire and its operations. Last year there were practically none. So we need to steer the discussion back to Berkshire’s businesses.
今年我们将对股东大会提问环节的安排进行重大调整。近年来，我们收到的与伯克希尔及其运营直接相关的问题寥寥无几，去年几乎无人提问。因此，我们需要将讨论重新聚焦于公司业务。
In a related problem, there has been a mad rush when the doors open at 7 a.m., led by people who wish to be first in line at the 12 microphones available for questioners. This is not desirable from a safety standpoint, nor do we believe that sprinting ability should be the determinant of who gets to pose questions. (At age 78, I’ve concluded that speed afoot is a ridiculously overrated talent.) Again, a new procedure is desirable.
另一个相关问题是，会议区7点开门时出现人群蜂拥而至的混乱局面——人们争抢12个提问麦克风的前列位置。这种现象存在安全隐患，且我们不认同“谁跑得快谁优先提问”的逻辑。（78岁的我深信，徒手奔跑的速度被严重高估了。）因此，我们需要更合理的流程。
In our first change, several financial journalists from organizations representing newspapers, magazines and television will participate in the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are:
Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be emailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com;
Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com;
Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
我们的第一项改革：邀请来自报纸、杂志和电视媒体的财经记者参与问答环节，代股东提出通过邮件提交的问题。记者及邮箱如下：
《财富》的卡罗尔·卢米斯（cloomis@fortunemail.com）；
CNBC的贝基·奎克（BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com）；
《纽约时报》的安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金（arsorkin@nytimes.com）。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
每位记者将从股东来信中筛选约12个自认为最有趣且重要的问题。（若希望提问时署名，请在邮件中注明。）
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists will pick some tough ones and that’s the way we like it.
查理和我都不会提前得知问题内容。我们期待记者们提出尖锐问题——这正是我们所乐见的。
In our second change, we will have a drawing at 8:15 at each microphone for those shareholders hoping to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. At least half the questions – those selected by the panel from your submissions – are therefore certain to be Berkshire-related. We will meanwhile continue to get some good – and perhaps entertaining – questions from the audience as well.
第二项改革：在每个麦克风旁设8:15的抽奖环节，确定现场提问者。会议中，我将交替回答记者提问和获奖股东提问。至少半数问题（由记者筛选的股东邮件）必与伯克希尔相关，同时现场股东的问题也可能带来精彩内容。
So join us at our Woodstock for Capitalists and let us know how you like the new format. Charlie and I look forward to seeing you.
欢迎参加“资本家的伍德斯托克音乐节”，亲身体验新形式并反馈意见。查理和我期待与您见面。
February 27, 2009
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
2009年2月27日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席