2001巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKHSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
# 伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们：
Berkshire's loss in net worth during 2001 was $3.77 billion, which decreased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.2%. Over the last 37 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $37,920, a rate of 22.6% compounded annually.
2001年，伯克希尔的净资产减少了37.7亿美元，导致我们的A类和B类股票每股账面价值下降了6.2%。在过去37年里（也就是现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值从19美元增长到了37,920美元，年复合增长率达22.6%。
Per-share intrinsic grew somewhat faster than book value during these 37 years, and in 2001 it probably decreased a bit less. We explain intrinsic value in our Owner's Manual, which begins on page 62. I urge new shareholders to read this manual to become familiar with Berkshire's key economic principles.
在这37年中，每股内在价值的增长速度略快于账面价值，而在2001年，它可能也比账面价值少降了一些。我们在《所有者手册》中解释了内在价值的概念，《所有者手册》从第62页开始。我敦促新股东阅读这本手册，以熟悉伯克希尔的关键经济原则。
Two years ago, reporting on 1999, I said that we had experienced both the worst absolute and relative performance in our history. I added that "relative results are what concern us," a viewpoint I've had since forming my first investment partnership on May 5, 1956. Meeting with my seven founding limited partners that evening, I gave them a short paper titled "The Ground Rules" that included this sentence: "Whether we do a good job or a poor job is to be measured against the general experience in securities."
两年前，在回顾1999年的表现时，我说我们经历了历史上最糟糕的绝对和相对业绩。我还补充道，“我们关注的是相对结果”，这是我自1956年5月5日成立第一个投资合伙企业以来就一直坚持的观点。那天晚上，我与七位创始有限合伙人会面时，给他们一份题为《基本原则》的简短文件，其中包含这样一句话：“我们工作的好坏应以证券市场的整体表现为标准来衡量。”
We initially used the Dow Jones Industrials as our benchmark, but shifted to the S&P 500 when that index became widely used. Our comparative record since 1965 is chronicled on the facing page; last year Berkshire's advantage was 5.7 percentage points.
我们最初使用道琼斯工业平均指数作为基准，但当标普500指数广泛流行后，我们便转而采用该指数。自1965年以来我们的对比记录记录在对面页面上；去年，伯克希尔的优势是5.7个百分点。
Some people disagree with our focus on relative figures, arguing that "you can't eat relative performance." But if you expect — as Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I do — that owning the S&P 500 will produce reasonably satisfactory results over time, it follows that, for long-term investors, gaining small advantages annually over that index must prove rewarding. Just as you can eat well throughout the year if you own a profitable, but highly seasonal, business such as See's (which loses considerable money during the summer months) so, too, can you regularly feast on investment returns that beat the averages, however variable the absolute numbers may be.
有些人不同意我们对相对数据的关注，他们认为“你不能靠相对表现吃饭”。但如果你像伯克希尔副董事长查理·芒格和我一样相信，长期持有标普500指数将带来相当令人满意的结果，那么对于长期投资者来说，每年小幅跑赢该指数的表现必然是值得的。就像你如果拥有一家盈利但高度季节性的企业（比如See’s，它在夏季会亏损不少钱）也能全年吃得好一样，你也可以通过持续获得高于市场平均水平的投资回报来“饱餐”，尽管这些回报的绝对数值可能会波动。
Though our corporate performance last year was satisfactory, my performance was anything but. I manage most of Berkshire's equity portfolio, and my results were poor, just as they have been for several years. Of even more importance, I allowed General Re to take on business without a safeguard I knew was important, and on September 11th, this error caught up with us. I'll tell you more about my mistake later and what we are doing to correct it.
尽管我们公司在去年的整体表现尚可，但我个人的表现却远非如此。我管理着伯克希尔大部分的股票投资组合，我的表现并不理想，而且已经连续几年都是如此。更严重的是，我允许General Re承接某些业务，却没有采取我认为重要的保护措施，而这一错误在9月11日终于显现出来。稍后我会详细说明我的失误以及我们正在如何纠正它。
Another of my 1956 Ground Rules remains applicable: "I cannot promise results to partners." But Charlie and I can promise that your economic result from Berkshire will parallel ours during the period of your ownership: We will not take cash compensation, restricted stock or option grants that would make our results superior to yours.
我在1956年制定的另一条《基本原则》至今依然适用：“我无法向合伙人承诺结果。”但查理和我可以向各位保证：在您持有伯克希尔股份期间，您的经济收益将与我们同步。我们不会接受任何现金薪酬、限制性股票或期权授予，这些都会使我们的收益优于您的收益。
Additionally, I will keep well over 99% of my net worth in Berkshire. My wife and I have never sold a share nor do we intend to. Charlie and I are disgusted by the situation, so common in the last few years, in which shareholders have suffered billions in losses while the CEOs, promoters, and other higher-ups who fathered these disasters have walked away with extraordinary wealth. Indeed, many of these people were urging investors to buy shares while concurrently dumping their own, sometimes using methods that hid their actions. To their shame, these business leaders view shareholders as patsies, not partners.
此外，我将把超过99%的净资产继续保留在伯克希尔。我和妻子从未卖出过一股，也绝无此打算。查理和我都对近年来常见的那种情况感到厌恶：股东们遭受了数十亿美元的损失，而那些造成灾难的CEO、发起人和其他高管却带着巨额财富离开。事实上，很多人一边鼓动投资者买入股票，一边悄悄抛售自己的持股，有时甚至采用隐瞒自身行为的方式。令人羞耻的是，这些商业领袖把股东看作傻瓜，而不是真正的合作伙伴。
Though Enron has become the symbol for shareholder abuse, there is no shortage of egregious conduct elsewhere in corporate America. One story I've heard illustrates the all-too-common attitude of managers toward owners: A gorgeous woman slinks up to a CEO at a party and through moist lips purrs, "I'll do anything — anything — you want. Just tell me what you would like." With no hesitation, he replies, "Reprice my options."
虽然安然已成为股东权益受侵害的象征，但在美国企业界，类似恶劣的行为并不少见。我听过一个故事，很好地反映了管理者对股东普遍存在的态度：一位美女在聚会上靠近一位CEO，用湿润的嘴唇轻声说：“只要你愿意，我什么都愿意做——什么都行。告诉我你想要什么。”这位CEO毫不犹豫地回答：“给我重新定价一下期权。”
One final thought about Berkshire: In the future we won't come close to replicating our past record. To be sure, Charlie and I will strive for above-average performance and will not be satisfied with less. But two conditions at Berkshire are far different from what they once were: Then, we could often buy businesses and securities at much lower valuations than now prevail; and more important, we were then working with far less money than we now have. Some years back, a good $10 million idea could do wonders for us (witness our investment in Washington Post in 1973 or GEICO in 1976). Today, the combination of ten such ideas and a triple in the value of each would increase the net worth of Berkshire by only o of 1%. We need "elephants" to make significant gains now — and they are hard to find.
关于伯克希尔，最后再说一点：未来我们不可能复制过去的辉煌纪录。当然，查理和我们将继续努力争取超越平均水平的表现，我们也绝不会满足于低于这个水平的成绩。但伯克希尔目前的两个条件已与过去大不相同：那时我们常常能以远低于现在市场价格的估值购买企业和证券；更重要的是，我们当时管理的资金远远少于现在。几年前，一个价值1,000万美元的好主意对我们而言都能带来巨大帮助（例如1973年投资《华盛顿邮报》或1976年投资GEICO）。如今，即使有十个这样的想法，并且每个都增值三倍，也只能让伯克希尔的净值增加不到1%。我们现在需要的是“大象级”的机会才能实现显著增长——但它们很难找到。
On the positive side, we have as fine an array of operating managers as exists at any company. (You can read about many of them in a new book by Robert P. Miles: The Warren Buffett CEO.) In large part, moreover, they are running businesses with economic characteristics ranging from good to superb. The ability, energy and loyalty of these managers is simply extraordinary. We now have completed 37 Berkshire years without having a CEO of an operating business elect to leave us to work elsewhere.
积极的一面是，我们拥有不逊色于任何其他公司的优秀运营经理团队。（你可以通过罗伯特·P·迈尔斯的新书《沃伦·巴菲特式的CEO》了解其中许多人。）而且，他们在很大程度上经营着从良好到卓越的企业。这些经理人的能力、精力和忠诚度堪称非凡。截至目前，我们已经走过了37个伯克希尔年度，没有一家运营企业的CEO选择离开去别处工作。
Our star-studded group grew in 2001. First, we completed the purchases of two businesses that we had agreed to buy in 2000 — Shaw and Johns Manville. Then we acquired two others, MiTek and XTRA, and contracted to buy two more: Larson-Juhl, an acquisition that has just closed, and Fruit of the Loom, which will close shortly if creditors approve our offer. All of these businesses are led by smart, seasoned and trustworthy CEOs.
我们的明星团队在2001年进一步壮大。首先，我们完成了两家早在2000年就已达成协议收购的企业——Shaw和Johns Manville。随后我们又收购了MiTek和XTRA，并签署了收购Larson-Juhl和Fruit of the Loom的协议。其中Larson-Juhl刚刚完成交割，Fruit of the Loom将在债权人批准我们的报价后不久完成交割。这些企业均由聪明、经验丰富且值得信赖的CEO领导。
Additionally, all of our purchases last year were for cash, which means our shareholders became owners of these additional businesses without relinquishing any interest in the fine companies they already owned. We will continue to follow our familiar formula, striving to increase the value of the excellent businesses we have, adding new businesses of similar quality, and issuing shares only grudgingly.
此外，我们去年的所有收购均为现金支付，这意味着我们的股东在不放弃现有优质公司股权的前提下，成为了这些新增企业的所有者。我们将继续沿用熟悉的策略：努力提升我们现有优秀企业的价值，不断添加质量相似的新企业，并谨慎发行新股。
# Acquisitions of 2001
# 2001年收购案
A few days before last year's annual meeting, I received a heavy package from St. Louis, containing an unprepossessing chunk of metal whose function I couldn't imagine. There was a letter in the package, though, from Gene Toombs, CEO of a company called MiTek. He explained that MiTek is the world's leading producer of this thing I'd received, a "connector plate," which is used in making roofing trusses. Gene also said that the U.K. parent of MiTek wished to sell the company and that Berkshire seemed to him the ideal buyer. Liking the sound of his letter, I gave Gene a call. It took me only a minute to realize that he was our kind of manager and MiTek our kind of business. We made a cash offer to the U.K. owner and before long had a deal.
在去年股东大会前几天，我收到了一个来自圣路易斯的沉重包裹，里面是一块其貌不扬的金属片，我根本猜不出它的用途。不过包裹中还有一封信，来自一家名为MiTek公司的CEO吉恩·图姆斯（Gene Toombs）。他在信中解释说，MiTek是这种被称为“连接板”（connector plate）产品的全球最大生产商，这种产品用于屋顶桁架制造。他还提到MiTek英国母公司有意出售公司，他认为伯克希尔是最理想的买家。读完信后，我觉得很有吸引力，于是拨通了吉恩的电话。只用了短短一分钟，我就意识到他正是我们所欣赏的那种经理人，而MiTek也是我们偏好的那类企业。我们向英国母公司提出了现金报价，很快便达成了交易。
Gene's managerial crew is exceptionally enthusiastic about the company and wanted to participate in the purchase. Therefore, we arranged for 55 members of the MiTek team to buy 10% of the company, with each putting up a minimum of $100,000 in cash. Many borrowed money so they could participate.
吉恩的管理团队对公司充满热情，也希望参与这次收购。因此，我们安排MiTek团队中的55名成员共同出资购买公司10%的股份，每人至少投入10万美元现金。许多人为此甚至借钱参与进来。
As they would not be if they had options, all of these managers are true owners. They face the downside of decisions as well as the upside. They incur a cost of capital. And they can't "reprice" their stakes: What they paid is what they live with.
不同于拥有期权的情况，这些管理者是真正意义上的所有者。他们不仅要承担决策带来的收益，也要面对潜在的风险。他们需要承担资本成本，而且无法“重新定价”他们的持股：他们付出了多少，就必须承担多少。
Charlie and I love the high-grade, truly entrepreneurial attitude that exists at MiTek, and we predict it will be a winner for all involved.
查理和我都非常欣赏MiTek所展现出来的高质量、真正的企业家精神，我们预测这对所有相关方都将是一个双赢的选择。
In early 2000, my friend, Julian Robertson, announced that he would terminate his investment partnership, Tiger Fund, and that he would liquidate it entirely except for four large holdings. One of these was XTRA, a leading lessor of truck trailers. I then called Julian, asking whether he might consider selling his XTRA block or whether, for that matter, the company's management might entertain an offer for the entire company. Julian referred me to Lew Rubin, XTRA's CEO. He and I had a nice conversation, but it was apparent that no deal was to be done.
2000年初，我的朋友朱利安·罗伯逊宣布将终止他的投资合伙企业Tiger Fund，并计划将其完全清算，仅保留四项大型投资。其中之一就是XTRA，这是一家领先的卡车拖车租赁公司。我打电话给朱利安，询问他是否考虑出售手中的XTRA股份，或者该公司管理层是否愿意接受对整个公司的收购要约。朱利安把我介绍给了XTRA的CEO刘·鲁宾（Lew Rubin）。我们聊得很愉快，但很明显当时并没有达成交易的可能。
Then in June 2001, Julian called to say that he had decided to sell his XTRA shares, and I resumed conversations with Lew. The XTRA board accepted a proposal we made, which was to be effectuated through a tender offer expiring on September 11th. The tender conditions included the usual "out," allowing us to withdraw if
然后到了2001年6月，朱利安来电表示他决定出售手中的XTRA股份，我再次与刘展开谈判。XTRA董事会接受了我们提出的方案，即通过一项截至9月11日的要约收购完成交易。要约条款中包括通常的“退出机制”，允许我们在某些特定条件下撤回报价。
Throughout much of the 11th, Lew went through a particularly wrenching experience: First, he had a son-in-law working in the World Trade Center who couldn't be located; and second, he knew we had the option of backing away from our purchase. The story ended happily: Lew's son-in-law escaped serious harm, and Berkshire completed the transaction.
9月11日当天，刘经历了一段极为煎熬的时间：第一，他的女婿在世贸中心上班，一度失联；第二，他知道我们有权根据合同条款选择退出交易。好在这个故事有了圆满的结局：刘的女婿并未受到严重伤害，而伯克希尔也完成了这笔交易。
Trailer leasing is a cyclical business but one in which we should earn decent returns over time. Lew brings a new talent to Berkshire, and we hope to expand in leasing.
拖车租赁是一项周期性较强的业务，但从长远来看，我们应该能够从中获得可观的回报。刘为我们带来了新的才能，我们希望在租赁领域进一步拓展。
On December 3rd, I received a call from Craig Ponzio, owner of Larson-Juhl, the U.S. leader in custom-made picture frames. Craig had bought the company in 1981 (after first working at its manufacturing plant while attending college) and thereafter increased its sales from $3 million to $300 million. Though I had never heard of Larson-Juhl before Craig's call, a few minutes talk with him made me think we would strike a deal. He was straightforward in describing the business, cared about who bought it, and was realistic as to price. Two days later, Craig and Steve McKenzie, his CEO, came to Omaha and in ninety minutes we reached an agreement. In ten days we had signed a contract.
12月3日，我接到了Larson-Juhl的所有者克雷格·庞齐奥（Craig Ponzio）的电话。Larson-Juhl是美国定制画框行业的领军企业。克雷格于1981年买下了这家公司（在此之前他曾在该公司工厂打工读大学），之后将销售额从300万美元提升至3亿美元。尽管在接到克雷格电话之前我从未听说过Larson-Juhl这个名字，但与他交谈几分钟后，我就觉得我们有可能达成交易。他对公司业务的描述坦率直接，非常在意谁来购买公司，并且对价格的看法也很现实。两天后，克雷格和他的CEO史蒂夫·麦肯齐（Steve McKenzie）来到奥马哈，我们在90分钟内就达成了协议。十天之内我们就签署了合同。
Larson-Juhl serves about 18,000 framing shops in the U.S. and is also the industry leader in Canada and much of Europe. We expect to see opportunities for making complementary acquisitions in the future.
Larson-Juhl为美国约18,000家画框店提供服务，在加拿大和欧洲大部分地区也是行业领导者。我们预计未来将有机会进行一些互补性的收购。
As I write this letter, creditors are considering an offer we have made for Fruit of the Loom. The company entered bankruptcy a few years back, a victim both of too much debt and poor management. And, a good many years before that, I had some Fruit of the Loom experience of my own.
在我撰写这封信时，债权人正在考虑我们对Fruit of the Loom提出的报价。几年前这家公司进入了破产程序，是过度负债和糟糕管理的受害者。而在那许多年前，我自己也曾有过一段与Fruit of the Loom相关的经历。
In August 1955, I was one of five employees, including two secretaries, working for the three managers of Graham-Newman Corporation, a New York investment company. Graham-Newman controlled Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron ("P&R"), an anthracite producer that had excess cash, a tax loss carryforward, and a declining business. At the time, I had a significant portion of my limited net worth invested in P&R shares, reflecting my faith in the business talents of my bosses, Ben Graham, Jerry Newman and Howard (Micky) Newman.
1955年8月，我是Graham-Newman公司五名员工之一（包括两名秘书），这家纽约投资公司由三位经理人领导。Graham-Newman控制着Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron（简称“P&R”），这是一家拥有过剩现金、可结转税务亏损且业务不断下滑的无烟煤生产商。当时，我把有限净资产中的很大一部分都投在了P&R股票上，这反映了我对老板本·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）、杰里·纽曼（Jerry Newman）和霍华德（“米奇”）·纽曼（Howard “Micky” Newman）商业才能的信任。
This faith was rewarded when P&R purchased the Union Underwear Company from Jack Goldfarb for $15 million. Union (though it was then only a licensee of the name) produced Fruit of the Loom underwear. The company possessed $5 million in cash — $2.5 million of which P&R used for the purchase — and was earning about $3 million pre-tax, earnings that could be sheltered by the tax position of P&R. And, oh yes: Fully $9 million of the remaining $12.5 million due was satisfied by non-interest-bearing notes, payable from 50% of any earnings Union had in excess of $1 million. (Those were the days; I get goosebumps just thinking about such deals.)
这份信任在P&R以1,500万美元从杰克·戈德法布（Jack Goldfarb）手中购得Union Underwear公司时得到了回报。Union公司（尽管当时只是获得了品牌授权）生产Fruit of the Loom品牌的内衣。该公司拥有500万美元现金——其中250万美元被P&R用于支付收购款——税前盈利约为300万美元，这些利润可以通过P&R的税务结构得到保护。哦，还有：剩余应付的1,250万美元中，有900万美元是以无息票据形式支付，需从Union每年超过100万美元利润部分的50%中偿还。（那个年代啊；光是回想这样的交易就让我起鸡皮疙瘩。）
Subsequently, Union bought the licensor of the Fruit of the Loom name and, along with P&R, was merged into Northwest Industries. Fruit went on to achieve annual pre-tax earnings exceeding $200 million.
随后，Union又买下了Fruit of the Loom品牌的原始授权方，并与P&R一起并入Northwest Industries公司。从此以后，Fruit of the Loom实现了每年超过2亿美元的税前利润。
John Holland was responsible for Fruit's operations in its most bountiful years. In 1996, however, John retired, and management loaded the company with debt, in part to make a series of acquisitions that proved disappointing. Bankruptcy followed. John was then rehired, and he undertook a major reworking of operations. Before John's return, deliveries were chaotic, costs soared and relations with key customers deteriorated. While correcting these problems, John also reduced employment from a bloated 40,000 to 23,000. In short, he's been restoring the old Fruit of the Loom, albeit in a much more competitive environment.
约翰·霍兰德（John Holland）负责Fruit of the Loom最辉煌时期的运营。然而在1996年，约翰退休后，管理层让公司背上了沉重债务，部分是为了进行一系列令人失望的并购。随之而来的是破产。之后，公司重新聘请约翰出山，他主导了大规模的业务重组。在他回归之前，交货混乱、成本飙升、与关键客户的关系也恶化。约翰在解决这些问题的同时，还将员工人数从臃肿的4万人削减至2.3万人。简而言之，他在一个竞争更加激烈的环境中，重建了昔日的Fruit of the Loom。
Stepping into Fruit's bankruptcy proceedings, we made a proposal to creditors to which we attached no financing conditions, even though our offer had to remain outstanding for many months. We did, however, insist on a very unusual proviso: John had to be available to continue serving as CEO after we took over. To us, John and the brand are Fruit's key assets.
我们介入了Fruit of the Loom的破产程序，向债权人提出了报价，并且没有附加任何融资条件，尽管我们的报价需要维持好几个月有效。但我们坚持了一个非常特别的前提条件：约翰必须愿意在我们接管后继续担任CEO。对我们来说，约翰和品牌就是Fruit of the Loom最重要的资产。
I was helped in this transaction by my friend and former boss, Micky Newman, now 81. What goes around truly does come around.
在这笔交易中，我的朋友兼前老板米奇·纽曼（Micky Newman）现年81岁，也给予了我帮助。因果轮回，真实不虚。
Our operating companies made several "bolt-on" acquisitions during the year, and I can't resist telling you about one. In December, Frank Rooney called to tell me H.H. Brown was buying the inventory and trademarks of Acme Boot for $700,000.
我们的运营公司在今年进行了几项“补充性”收购，我忍不住要向你讲述其中一例。12月，弗兰克·鲁尼（Frank Rooney）打电话告诉我，H.H. Brown将以70万美元的价格收购Acme Boot的存货和商标。
That sounds like small potatoes. But — would you believe it? — Acme was the second purchase of P&R, an acquisition that took place just before I left Graham-Newman in the spring of 1956. The price was $3.2 million, part of it again paid with non-interest bearing notes, for a business with sales of $7 million.
这听起来像是小菜一碟。但你能相信吗？Acme正是P&R收购的第二家公司，那次收购就发生在我于1956年春离开Graham-Newman公司前不久。当时价格是320万美元，其中一部分再次用无息票据支付，而这家企业的年销售额为700万美元。
After P&R merged with Northwest, Acme grew to be the world's largest bootmaker, delivering annual profits many multiples of what the company had cost P&R. But the business eventually hit the skids and never recovered, and that resulted in our purchasing Acme's remnants.
在P&R与Northwest合并后，Acme成长为世界上最大的制靴商，其年利润远超当初P&R收购它时的成本。但最终业务陷入困境并再未恢复，这也导致我们最终只能购回Acme的残余部分。
In the frontispiece to Security Analysis, Ben Graham and Dave Dodd quoted Horace: "Many shall be restored that now are fallen and many shall fall that are now in honor." Fifty-two years after I first read those lines, my appreciation for what they say about business and investments continues to grow.
本杰明·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）和戴维·多德（Dave Dodd）在《证券分析》的扉页上引用了贺拉斯（Horace）的话：“今日沦落者他日或将复兴，今朝显赫者他日或将陨落。”在我第一次读到这句话的52年后，我对它所揭示的商业与投资真理的理解仍在不断加深。
In addition to bolt-on acquisitions, our managers continually look for ways to grow internally. In that regard, here's a postscript to a story I told you two years ago about R.C. Willey's move to Boise. As you may remember, Bill Child, R.C. Willey's chairman, wanted to extend his home-furnishings operation beyond Utah, a state in which his company does more than $300 million of business (up, it should be noted, from $250,000 when Bill took over 48 years ago). The company achieved this dominant position, moreover, with a "closed on Sunday" policy that defied conventional retailing wisdom. I was skeptical that this policy could succeed in Boise or, for that matter, anyplace outside of Utah. After all, Sunday is the day many consumers most like to shop.
除了进行补充性收购之外，我们的经理人也在不断寻找内部增长的方式。在这方面，我想对两年前讲过的一个关于R.C. Willey迁至博伊西（Boise）的故事做一个后续说明。你可能还记得，R.C. Willey董事长比尔·奇尔德（Bill Child）希望将其家居用品业务扩展到犹他州以外地区——目前他在该州的年营业额超过3亿美元（值得注意的是，当他48年前接手公司时仅为25万美元）。此外，该公司之所以能取得这一主导地位，很大程度上归功于一项打破常规零售理念的政策：周日关门歇业。我当时怀疑这种做法在博伊西甚至犹他州以外任何地方都难以成功。毕竟，周日是很多消费者最愿意购物的日子。
Bill then insisted on something extraordinary: He would invest $11 million of his own money to build the Boise store and would sell it to Berkshire at cost (without interest!) if the venture succeeded. If it failed, Bill would keep the store and eat the loss on its disposal. As I told you in the 1999 annual report, the store immediately became a huge success ― and it has since grown.
比尔随后提出了一项非同寻常的做法：他自掏腰包1,100万美元用于建设博伊西门店，并承诺如果这次冒险成功，他将以成本价（甚至不计利息！）将门店卖给伯克希尔；若失败，则由他自己承担损失。正如我在1999年年度报告中所说，这家门店开业后立刻大获成功——而且此后还在持续成长。
Shortly after the Boise opening, Bill suggested we try Las Vegas, and this time I was even more skeptical. How could we do business in a metropolis of that size and be closed on Sundays, a day that all of our competitors would be exploiting? Buoyed by the Boise experience, however, we proceeded to locate in Henderson, a mushrooming city adjacent to Las Vegas.
博伊西门店开业不久后，比尔建议我们进军拉斯维加斯，这一次我的疑虑更重。在一个如此庞大的城市里，我们怎么能接受周日歇业，而所有竞争对手都在这一天积极营业呢？然而受博伊西成功的鼓舞，我们还是决定在拉斯维加斯附近的新兴城市亨德森（Henderson）开店。
The result: This store outsells all others in the R.C. Willey chain, doing a volume of business that far exceeds the volume of any competitor and that is twice what I had anticipated. I cut the ribbon at the grand opening in October — this was after a "soft" opening and a few weeks of exceptional sales — and, just as I did at Boise, I suggested to the crowd that the new store was my idea.
结果：这家门店的销售业绩超过了R.C. Willey旗下所有其他门店，销售额远远超过任何一家竞争对手，而且是我预期的两倍。我在10月亲自为门店剪彩（此前已试营业数周，并取得了异常好的销售成绩），就像当年在博伊西一样，我向现场观众开玩笑说，这家新店是我的主意。
It didn't work. Today, when I pontificate about retailing, Berkshire people just say, "What does Bill think?" (I'm going to draw the line, however, if he suggests that we also close on Saturdays.)
但这招没成功。如今每当我就零售发表高见时，伯克希尔的人都会笑着说：“比尔是怎么看的？”（不过如果他真建议我们也周日关门，那我是坚决不会同意的。）
# The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance
# 财产/意外险的经济学
Our main business — though we have others of great importance — is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.
尽管我们还有其他重要业务，但保险是我们核心的主营业务。因此，要理解伯克希尔，就必须了解如何评估一家保险公司。关键因素有三个：（1）业务产生的浮存金（float）数量；（2）其成本；（3）最为关键的是这两项因素的长期前景。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money.
首先，浮存金是指我们持有但并不属于我们的资金。在保险业务中，浮存金出现是因为保费先于赔付被收取，而这个时间差有时会长达数年。在这段时间内，保险公司可以将这笔钱用于投资。
This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.
当然，这种愉快的资金使用通常伴随着一个负面因素：保险公司收取的保费通常不足以覆盖最终必须支付的赔款和费用。这就造成了所谓的“承保亏损”，即浮存金的成本。如果一家保险公司的浮存金成本从长期来看低于公司获取资金所需的市场成本，那么这家公司就是有价值的。但如果浮存金成本高于市场资金利率，那这项业务就是一个烫手山芋。
# The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance (Continued)
# 财产/意外险的经济学（续）
Historically, Berkshire has obtained its float at a very low cost. Indeed, our cost has been less than zero in about half of the years in which we've operated; that is, we've actually been paid for holding other people's money. Over the last few years, however, our cost has been too high, and in 2001 it was terrible.
从历史上看，伯克希尔获得浮存金的成本一直非常低。事实上，在我们经营的年份中，大约有一半时间我们的成本甚至低于零；换句话说，我们实际上是因为持有别人的钱而获得了报酬。然而在过去的几年里，我们的成本过高，而在2001年更是糟糕透顶。
The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the various segments of Berkshire's insurance operations since we entered the business 35 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company (whose traditional lines are included in the segment "Other Primary"). For the table we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)
下表显示了自我们35年前通过收购National Indemnity公司进入保险业以来，伯克希尔各保险业务板块产生的浮存金情况（按时间间隔列出）。为制作此表，我们计算了浮存金——相对于保费规模而言，我们拥有大量浮存金——其计算方式为：将净损失准备金、理赔费用准备金、再保险承担下的资金、未赚取保费准备金相加，再减去与保险相关的应收款、预付获取成本、预付税款以及适用于再保险承担的递延费用。（明白了吗？）
| Year | GEICO | General Re | Other Reinsurance | Other Primary | Total Yearend Float (in $ millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1967 | — | — | — | 20 | 20 |
| 1977 | — | — | — | 701 | 701 |
| 1987 | — | — | 4,014 | 4,305 | 8,319 |
| 1997 | 2,917 | 14,909 | 6,285 | 15,525 | 39,636 |
| 1998 | 3,125 | 15,166 | 7,805 | 15,525 | 41,621 |
| 1999 | 3,444 | 22,754 | 11,262 | 19,310 | 56,770 |
| 2000 | 3,943 | 25,298 | — | 27,871 | 57,112 |
| 2001 | 4,251 | 35,508 | — | 685 | 40,444 |
Last year I told you that, barring a mega-catastrophe, our cost of float would probably drop from its 2000 level of 6%. I had in mind natural catastrophes when I said that, but instead we were hit by a man-made catastrophe on September 11th — an event that delivered the insurance industry its largest loss in history. Our float cost therefore came in at a staggering 12.8%. It was our worst year in float cost since 1984, and a result that to a significant degree, as I will explain in the next section, we brought upon ourselves.
去年我曾告诉各位，除非发生特大灾难，否则我们的浮存金成本可能会从2000年的6%水平下降。我当时想到的是自然灾害，但结果我们在9月11日遭遇了一场人为灾难——这一事件给保险行业带来了历史上最大的损失。因此，我们的浮存金成本高达惊人的12.8%。这是自1984年以来我们浮存金成本最糟糕的一年，而且正如我在下一节中将解释的那样，这个结果在很大程度上是我们自己造成的。
If no mega-catastrophe occurs, I — once again — expect the cost of our float to be low in the coming year. We will indeed need a low cost, as will all insurers. Some years back, float costing, say, 4% was tolerable because government bonds yielded twice as much, and stocks prospectively offered still loftier returns. Today, fat returns are nowhere to be found (at least we can't find them) and short-term funds earn less than 2%. Under these conditions, each of our insurance operations, save one, must deliver an underwriting profit if it is to be judged a good business. The exception is our retroactive reinsurance operation (a business we explained in last year's annual report), which has desirable economics even though it currently hits us with an annual underwriting loss of about $425 million.
如果没有特大灾难发生，我再次预计未来一年我们的浮存金成本会较低。我们确实需要低成本，所有保险公司都需要。几年前，浮存金成本为4%还是可以接受的，因为当时政府债券收益率是它的两倍，而股票市场的预期回报率更高。如今，丰厚的回报无处可寻（至少我们找不到），短期资金的收益率还不到2%。在这种情况下，除了一个例外之外，我们的每家保险公司如果要被视为优质业务，就必须实现承保利润。唯一的例外是我们从事的追溯性再保险业务（这项业务我们在去年年报中已作过说明），尽管它目前每年给我们带来约4.25亿美元的承保亏损，但从经济角度看仍是有吸引力的。
# Principles of Insurance Underwriting
# 保险承保原则
When property/casualty companies are judged by their cost of float, very few stack up as satisfactory businesses. And interestingly — unlike the situation prevailing in many other industries — neither size nor brand name determines an insurer's profitability. Indeed, many of the biggest and best-known companies regularly deliver mediocre results. What counts in this business is underwriting discipline. The winners are those that unfailingly stick to three key principles:
如果以浮存金成本来评判财产/意外险公司，能被认定为优质企业的寥寥无几。有趣的是——这与其他许多行业的情况不同——保险公司的盈利能力并不取决于其规模或品牌名称。事实上，许多最大、最知名的公司经常只能交出平庸的成绩。在这个行业中真正重要的是承保纪律。赢家始终遵循以下三项关键原则：
They accept only those risks that they are able to properly evaluate (staying within their circle of competence) and that, after they have evaluated all relevant factors including remote loss scenarios, carry the expectancy of profit. These insurers ignore market-share considerations and are sanguine about losing business to competitors that are offering foolish prices or policy conditions.
它们只承保那些它们有能力正确评估的风险（即坚守自己的能力圈），并在综合考虑所有相关因素（包括极端损失情景）后判断该风险具有盈利潜力。这些保险公司不看重市场份额，即使竞争对手以荒唐的价格或条款抢走生意，它们也能坦然面对。They limit the business they accept in a manner that guarantees they will suffer no aggregation of losses from a single event or from related events that will threaten their solvency. They ceaselessly search for possible correlation among seemingly-unrelated risks.
它们对所承保的业务进行限制，确保不会因单一事件或相关事件导致巨额损失集合，从而威胁自身偿付能力。它们不断寻找看似无关的风险之间可能存在的关联。They avoid business involving moral risk: No matter what the rate, trying to write good contracts with bad people doesn't work. While most policyholders and clients are honorable and ethical, doing business with the few exceptions is usually expensive, sometimes extraordinarily so.
它们避免涉及道德风险的业务：无论费率多高，与不良人士签订良好合同都行不通。虽然大多数投保人和客户都是诚实守信的，但与少数例外者打交道通常代价高昂，有时甚至是极其昂贵的。
The events of September 11th made it clear that our implementation of rules 1 and 2 at General Re had been dangerously weak. In setting prices and also in evaluating aggregation risk, we had either overlooked or dismissed the possibility of large-scale terrorism losses. That was a relevant underwriting factor, and we ignored it.
9月11日的事件清楚地表明，我们在General Re执行上述第1和第2条原则时存在严重漏洞。在定价和评估风险集中度方面，我们要么忽略了大规模恐怖袭击的可能性，要么轻视了这种可能性。这是一个重要的承保因素，但我们却忽视了它。
In pricing property coverages, for example, we had looked to the past and taken into account only costs we might expect to incur from windstorm, fire, explosion and earthquake. But what will be the largest insured property loss in history (after adding related business-interruption claims) originated from none of these forces. In short, all of us in the industry made a fundamental underwriting mistake by focusing on experience, rather than exposure, thereby assuming a huge terrorism risk for which we received no premium.
例如，在财产险定价方面，我们回顾了历史数据，并仅考虑了风灾、火灾、爆炸和地震可能导致的损失。然而，此次事件造成的财产损失将成为历史上最大的一次保险赔付（加上相关的营业中断索赔），但它并非由上述任何一种自然力造成。简言之，我们整个行业犯了一个根本性的承保错误：过于依赖经验数据，而忽略了实际暴露的风险，从而承担了巨大的恐怖主义风险，却没有为此收取任何额外保费。
Experience, of course, is a highly useful starting point in underwriting most coverages. For example, it's important for insurers writing California earthquake policies to know how many quakes in the state during the past century have registered 6.0 or greater on the Richter scale. This information will not tell you the exact probability of a big quake next year, or where in the state it might happen. But the statistic has utility, particularly if you are writing a huge statewide policy, as National Indemnity has done in recent years.
当然，经验数据通常是大多数保险产品定价的重要起点。例如，对于提供加州地震保险的公司来说，了解过去一个世纪中该州发生过多少次里氏6.0级以上的地震非常重要。这些信息无法告诉你明年是否会发生大地震，或者具体地点在哪里。但对于像National Indemnity近年来所承保的大范围全省政策来说，这些统计数据仍然具有实用价值。
At certain times, however, using experience as a guide to pricing is not only useless, but actually dangerous. Late in a bull market, for example, large losses from directors and officers liability insurance ("D&O") are likely to be relatively rare. When stocks are rising, there are a scarcity of targets to sue, and both questionable accounting and management chicanery often go undetected. At that juncture, experience on high-limit D&O may look great.
但在某些时候，以经验作为定价依据不仅无效，反而可能是危险的。例如，在牛市末期，董事及高管责任险（D&O）带来的重大损失相对较少。当股价上涨时，诉讼对象稀少，可疑的会计行为和管理层舞弊往往难以察觉。此时，高额D&O的历史数据看起来似乎非常理想。
But that's just when exposure is likely to be exploding, by way of ridiculous public offerings, earnings manipulation, chain-letter-like stock promotions and a potpourri of other unsavory activities. When stocks fall, these sins surface, hammering investors with losses that can run into the hundreds of billions. Juries deciding whether those losses should be borne by small investors or big insurance companies can be expected to hit insurers with verdicts that bear little relation to those delivered in bull-market days. Even one jumbo judgment, moreover, can cause settlement costs in later cases to mushroom. Consequently, the correct rate for D&O "excess" (meaning the insurer or reinsurer will pay losses above a high threshold) might well, if based on exposure, be five or more times the premium dictated by experience.
但这正是潜在风险急剧上升的时期，伴随着荒唐的首次公开发行、盈利操纵、类似传销式的股票推广以及其他各种不正当行为。一旦股市下跌，这些问题就会浮出水面，给投资者带来数百亿美元的损失。陪审团在裁定这些损失应由小投资者还是大保险公司承担时，往往会做出与牛市时期截然不同的判决。此外，哪怕出现一笔巨额判决，也可能引发后续案件赔偿金额的迅速膨胀。因此，基于实际暴露风险来定价的话，“超额”D&O（即保险公司或再保险公司仅在损失超过某一高额门槛时才赔付）的合理费率可能是根据历史经验定价的五倍以上。
Insurers have always found it costly to ignore new exposures. Doing that in the case of terrorism, however, could literally bankrupt the industry. No one knows the probability of a nuclear detonation in a major metropolis this year (or even multiple detonations, given that a terrorist organization able to construct one bomb might not stop there). Nor can anyone, with assurance, assess the probability in this year, or another, of deadly biological or chemical agents being introduced simultaneously (say, through ventilation systems) into multiple office buildings and manufacturing plants. An attack like that would produce astronomical workers' compensation claims.
保险公司历来发现忽略新型风险的代价巨大。但在恐怖主义问题上这样做，甚至可能让整个行业破产。没有人知道今年某主要大都市发生核爆炸的可能性有多大（更不用说多次爆炸的可能性，因为一旦恐怖组织制造出一枚炸弹，很可能不会就此罢手）。同样地，也没有人能够确切评估在今年或未来某年，致命生物或化学制剂同时（例如通过通风系统）释放到多个办公楼和工厂的概率。这样的攻击将引发天文数字般的工伤赔偿请求。
Here's what we do know:
但我们知道以下几点：
(a) The probability of such mind-boggling disasters, though likely very low at present, is not zero.
(a) 这类令人震惊的灾难发生的概率虽然目前看来极低，但并非为零。
(b) The probabilities are increasing, in an irregular and immeasurable manner, as knowledge and materials become available to those who wish us ill. Fear may recede with time, but the danger won't — the war against terrorism can never be won. The best the nation can achieve is a long succession of stalemates. There can be no checkmate against hydra-headed foes.
(b) 随着知识和技术手段逐渐落入对我们怀有恶意的人手中，这类事件发生的概率正以不规则且不可测量的方式上升。恐惧或许会随时间消退，但危险不会——反恐战争永远不可能彻底胜利。国家所能争取到的最佳结果，是一连串的僵局。面对如九头蛇般层出不穷的敌人，我们无法取得决定性胜利。
(c) Until now, insurers and reinsurers have blithely assumed the financial consequences from the incalculable risks I have described.
(c) 到目前为止，保险公司和再保险公司一直天真地承担了我所描述的那些无法估量的风险带来的财务后果。
(d) Under a "close-to-worst-case" scenario, which could conceivably involve $1 trillion of damage, the insurance industry would be destroyed unless it manages in some manner to dramatically limit its assumption of terrorism risks. Only the U.S. Government has the resources to absorb such a blow. If it is unwilling to do so on a prospective basis, the general citizenry must bear its own risks and count on the Government to come to its rescue after a disaster occurs.
(d) 在“接近最坏情况”的假设下，损失可能高达1万亿美元，若不设法大幅限制恐怖主义风险的承担，保险行业将面临灭顶之灾。只有美国政府才有能力吸收如此巨大的冲击。如果政府不愿事先提供保障，普通民众就必须自行承担风险，并指望灾难发生后政府出手相救。
Why, you might ask, didn't I recognize the above facts before September 11th? The answer, sadly, is that I did — but I didn't convert thought into action. I violated the Noah rule: Predicting rain doesn't count; building arks does. I consequently let Berkshire operate with a dangerous level of risk — at General Re in particular. I'm sorry to say that much risk for which we haven't been compensated remains on our books, but it is running off by the day.
你或许会问，为什么我在9月11日之前没有意识到上述事实？遗憾的是，其实我意识到了——但我没有将想法转化为行动。我违反了诺亚法则：预测下雨没用，真正重要的是建造方舟。因此，我让伯克希尔在相当危险的风险水平下运营，尤其是在General Re。令人遗憾的是，我们账面上仍有不少未获得相应补偿的风险敞口，但这些风险正随着时间逐步消退。
At Berkshire, it should be noted, we have for some years been willing to assume more risk than any other insurer has knowingly taken on. That's still the case. We are perfectly willing to lose $2 billion to $2½ billion in a single event (as we did on September 11th) if we have been paid properly for assuming the risk that caused the loss (which on that occasion we weren't).
需要指出的是，在伯克希尔，多年来我们一直愿意承担比其他任何保险公司都更主动接受的风险。这一点至今未变。只要我们因承担损失风险而获得了合理报酬，我们完全愿意在一次事件中承受高达20亿至25亿美元的损失（正如我们在9月11日所经历的那样），尽管那次我们并未得到相应的保费回报。
Indeed, we have a major competitive advantage because of our tolerance for huge losses. Berkshire has massive liquid resources, substantial non-insurance earnings, a favorable tax position and a knowledgeable shareholder constituency willing to accept volatility in earnings. This unique combination enables us to assume risks that far exceed the appetite of even our largest competitors. Over time, insuring these jumbo risks should be profitable, though periodically they will bring on a terrible year.
事实上，正是因为我们对巨大损失的容忍度，构成了我们的主要竞争优势。伯克希尔拥有充足的流动性资源、可观的非保险业务收益、有利的税务地位，以及一群理解并接受盈利波动的知识型股东。这种独特的组合使我们能够承担远超最大竞争对手所能接受的风险。从长期来看，承保这些巨灾风险应是盈利的，尽管偶尔也会带来灾难性的年度表现。
The bottom-line today is that we will write some coverage for terrorist-related losses, including a few non-correlated policies with very large limits. But we will not knowingly expose Berkshire to losses beyond what we can comfortably handle. We will control our total exposure, no matter what the competition does.
总结而言，我们现在仍然愿意承保某些与恐怖袭击相关的风险，包括少数不相关且限额极高的保单。但我们不会明知故犯地让伯克希尔暴露于超出我们承受能力的风险之下。无论竞争对手如何应对，我们将严格控制整体风险敞口。
# Insurance Operations in 2001
# 2001年保险业务回顾
Over the years, our insurance business has provided ever-growing, low-cost funds that have fueled much of Berkshire’s growth. Charlie and I believe this will continue to be the case. But we stumbled in a big way in 2001, largely because of underwriting losses at General Re.
多年来，我们的保险业务持续提供了不断增长且低成本的资金，为伯克希尔的发展注入了强大动力。查理和我都相信这一趋势将继续。但在2001年，我们遭遇了重大挫折，这主要归咎于General Re的承保亏损。
In the past I have assured you that General Re was underwriting with discipline — and I have been proven wrong. Though its managers' intentions were good, the company broke each of the three underwriting rules I set forth in the last section and has paid a huge price for doing so. One obvious cause for its failure is that it did not reserve correctly — more about this in the next section — and therefore severely miscalculated the cost of the product it was selling. Not knowing your costs will cause problems in any business. In long-tail reinsurance, where years of unawareness will promote and prolong severe underpricing, ignorance of true costs is dynamite.
过去我曾向你们保证General Re是以承保纪律进行运作的——事实证明我错了。虽然其管理层初衷良好，但公司违反了我在上一节所述的三项承保原则中的每一条，并为此付出了惨重代价。一个明显失败原因是它未能正确计提准备金——下一节将进一步说明——因此严重低估了其所售产品的成本。不了解成本将在任何行业中引发问题。而在长尾再保险领域，多年的无知会导致定价严重偏低，并使其影响长期存在，缺乏真实成本认知无异于引爆炸药。
Additionally, General Re was overly-competitive in going after, and retaining, business. While all concerned may intend to underwrite with care, it is nonetheless difficult for able, hard-driving professionals to curb their urge to prevail over competitors. If "winning," however, is equated with market share rather than profits, trouble awaits. "No" must be an important part of any underwriter's vocabulary.
此外，General Re在争取和保留业务方面过于激进。尽管相关人员可能有意谨慎承保，但对于能力强、进取心强的专业人士来说，要抑制击败对手的冲动并不容易。但如果“获胜”意味着市场份额而非利润，麻烦就会接踵而至。“不”必须成为每一位承保人的常用词之一。
At the risk of sounding Pollyannaish, I now assure you that underwriting discipline is being restored at General Re (and its Cologne Re subsidiary) with appropriate urgency. Joe Brandon was appointed General Re's CEO in September and, along with Tad Montross, its new president, is committed to producing underwriting profits. Last fall, Charlie and I read Jack Welch's terrific book, Jack, Straight from the Gut (get a copy!). In discussing it, we agreed that Joe has many of Jack's characteristics: He is smart, energetic, hands-on, and expects much of both himself and his organization.
尽管听起来可能有些过于乐观，但我现在可以向各位保证，General Re（及其子公司Cologne Re）正在以应有的紧迫感恢复承保纪律。乔·布兰登（Joe Brandon）于9月被任命为General Re首席执行官，他与其新任总裁塔德·蒙罗斯（Tad Montross）致力于实现承保盈利。去年秋天，查理和我读了杰克·韦尔奇（Jack Welch）写的精彩著作《赢》（Jack, Straight from the Gut，强烈推荐！）。我们在讨论时一致认为，乔具备许多杰克的特质：聪明、精力充沛、注重实践，并对自己和组织都有极高要求。
When it was an independent company, General Re often shone, and now it also has the considerable strengths Berkshire brings to the table. With that added advantage and with underwriting discipline restored, General Re should be a huge asset for Berkshire. I predict that Joe and Tad will make it so.
作为一家独立公司时，General Re常常表现出色，如今它又获得了伯克希尔带来的诸多优势资源。在这一新增优势和恢复承保纪律的双重加持下，General Re将成为伯克希尔的巨大资产。我预测乔和塔德将实现这一目标。
At the National Indemnity reinsurance operation, Ajit Jain continues to add enormous value to Berkshire.
在National Indemnity的再保险业务中，阿吉特·杰恩（Ajit Jain）继续为伯克希尔创造巨大价值。
Working with only 18 associates, Ajit manages one of the world's largest reinsurance operations measured by assets, and the largest, based upon the size of individual risks assumed.
仅凭18名同事，阿吉特管理着全球按资产规模衡量最大的再保险业务之一，并且是按单一风险承保规模来看最大的再保险人。
I have known the details of almost every policy that Ajit has written since he came with us in 1986, and never on even a single occasion have I seen him break any of our three underwriting rules. His extraordinary discipline, of course, does not eliminate losses; it does, however, prevent foolish losses. And that's the key: Just as is the case in investing, insurers produce outstanding long-term results primarily by avoiding dumb decisions, rather than by making brilliant ones.
自1986年加入我们以来，我几乎了解阿吉特经手的每一项保单细节。在我记忆中，他从未违反过我们制定的三项承保原则中的任何一项。当然，他非凡的纪律并不能完全避免损失，但它能有效防止愚蠢的损失。而这正是关键所在：就像投资一样，保险公司产生卓越长期业绩的主要方式不是做出英明决策，而是避免做出愚蠢决策。
Since September 11th, Ajit has been particularly busy. Among the policies we have written and retained entirely for our own account are (1) $578 million of property coverage for a South American refinery once a loss there exceeds $1 billion; (2) $1 billion of non-cancelable third-party liability coverage for losses arising from acts of terrorism at several large international airlines; (3) £500 million of property coverage on a large North Sea oil platform, covering losses from terrorism and sabotage, above £600 million that the insured retained or reinsured elsewhere; and (4) significant coverage on the Sears Tower, including losses caused by terrorism, above a $500 million threshold. We have written many other jumbo risks as well, such as protection for the World Cup Soccer Tournament and the 2002 Winter Olympics. In all cases, however, we have attempted to avoid writing groups of policies from which losses might seriously aggregate. We will not, for example, write coverages on a large number of office and apartment towers in a single metropolis without excluding losses from both a nuclear explosion and the fires that would follow it.
自9月11日以来，阿吉特尤其忙碌。我们自主承保并保留的保单包括：（1）南美某炼油厂财产险，一旦损失超过10亿美元，我们承担5.78亿美元；（2）对几家大型国际航空公司提供总额10亿美元的不可撤销第三者责任险，保障由恐怖主义行为导致的损失；（3）针对北海一座大型石油平台提供的5亿英镑财产险，覆盖超过6亿英镑部分的恐怖袭击及破坏损失（该部分由投保人自行承担或另行再保）；（4）对西尔斯大厦（Sears Tower）提供重大保障，涵盖恐怖主义造成的损失，起赔点为5亿美元。此外，我们也承保了多项巨型风险项目，如世界杯足球赛和2002年冬季奥运会。但在所有案例中，我们都努力避免承保可能造成严重聚合损失的保单群组。例如，我们不会在未排除核爆及其引发火灾损失的情况下，为某大都市内的大量写字楼和公寓楼提供保障。
No one can match the speed with which Ajit can offer huge policies. After September 11th, his quickness to respond, always important, has become a major competitive advantage. So, too, has our unsurpassed financial strength. Some reinsurers — particularly those who, in turn, are accustomed to laying off much of their business on a second layer of reinsurers known as retrocessionaires — are in a weakened condition and would have difficulty surviving a second mega-cat. When a daisy chain of retrocessionaires exists, a single weak link can pose trouble for all. In assessing the soundness of their reinsurance protection, insurers must therefore apply a stress test to all participants in the chain, and must contemplate a catastrophe loss occurring during a very unfavorable economic environment. After all, you only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out. At Berkshire, we retain our risks and depend on no one. And whatever the world's problems, our checks will clear.
没有人能在快速出具巨额保单方面胜过阿吉特。9月11日后，他的迅速响应能力显得尤为重要，并已成为我们的核心竞争优势之一。同样具有优势的是我们无可匹敌的财务实力。一些再保险公司——特别是那些习惯于将大部分业务转嫁给第二层再保险商（即所谓的“回溯再保险商”）的公司——目前处于较弱状态，若再次发生重大灾难，它们将难以生存。当存在一个由多个回溯再保险商构成的链条时，其中任何一个薄弱环节都可能引发整个链条的问题。因此，保险公司在评估其再保险保障的稳健性时，必须对链中所有参与者进行压力测试，并设想灾难损失发生在极为不利的经济环境下的情形。毕竟，只有潮水退去后，你才知道谁在裸泳。在伯克希尔，我们自己承担风险，不依赖任何人。无论世界面临何种问题，我们的支票都将兑现。
Ajit's business will ebb and flow — but his underwriting principles won't waver. It's impossible to overstate his value to Berkshire.
阿吉特的业务会有起伏——但他的承保原则绝不会动摇。他对伯克希尔的价值无论如何强调都不为过。
# GEICO
# 盖可保险（GEICO）
GEICO, by far our largest primary insurer, made major progress in 2001, thanks to Tony Nicely, its CEO, and his associates. Quite simply, Tony is an owner's dream.
盖可保险（GEICO）是我们目前最大的直接保险公司，2001年取得了重大进展，这要归功于其CEO托尼·尼利（Tony Nicely）及其团队。简而言之，托尼就是股东梦寐以求的那种管理者。
GEICO's premium volume grew 6.6% last year, its float grew $308 million, and it achieved an underwriting profit of $221 million. This means we were actually paid that amount last year to hold the $4.25 billion in float, which of course doesn't belong to Berkshire but can be used by us for investment.
去年，GEICO的保费收入增长了6.6%，浮存金增加了3.08亿美元，并实现了2.21亿美元的承保利润。这意味着我们去年实际上因为持有42.5亿美元的浮存金而获得了2.21亿美元的报酬，当然这笔钱不属于伯克希尔，但我们可以将其用于投资。
The only disappointment at GEICO in 2001 — and it's an important one — was our inability to add policyholders. Our preferred customers (81% of our total) grew by 1.6% but our standard and non-standard policies fell by 10.1%. Overall, policies in force fell .8%.
2001年GEICO唯一令人失望的地方——而且是很重要的地方——是我们未能增加保单持有人数量。我们的优质客户（占总数的81%）增长了1.6%，但标准客户和非标准客户的保单减少了10.1%。总体来看，生效保单数量下降了0.8%。
New business has improved in recent months. Our closure rate from telephone inquiries has climbed, and our Internet business continues its steady growth. We, therefore, expect at least a modest gain in policy count during 2002. Tony and I are eager to commit much more to marketing than the $219 million we spent last year, but at the moment we cannot see how to do so effectively. In the meantime, our operating costs are low and far below those of our major competitors; our prices are attractive; and our float is cost-free and growing.
最近几个月来，新业务有所改善。电话咨询的成交率上升，互联网业务也继续保持稳定增长。因此，我们预计2002年保单数量至少会有小幅增长。托尼和我都希望在营销方面投入更多资金，远远超过去年的2.19亿美元，但目前我们还看不到有效的投放方式。与此同时，我们的运营成本很低，远低于主要竞争对手；我们的价格具有吸引力；我们的浮存金不仅免费，还在持续增长。
# Our Other Primary Insurers
# 其他直保公司
Our other primary insurers delivered their usual fine results last year. These operations, run by Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Tom Nerney, Michael Stearns, Don Towle and Don Wurster had combined premium volume of $579 million, up 40% over 2000. Their float increased 14.5% to $685 million, and they recorded an underwriting profit of $30 million. In aggregate, these companies are one of the finest insurance operations in the country, and their 2002 prospects look excellent.
我们的其他直保公司在去年继续交出了优异的成绩。由罗德·埃尔德雷德（Rod Eldred）、约翰·凯泽（John Kizer）、汤姆·纳尼（Tom Nerney）、迈克尔·斯特恩斯（Michael Stearns）、唐·陶尔（Don Towle）和唐·沃斯特（Don Wurster）领导的这些公司，合计保费收入达到5.79亿美元，比2000年增长了40%。他们的浮存金增长了14.5%，达到6.85亿美元，并实现了3,000万美元的承保利润。总体而言，这些公司是国内最优秀的保险业务群体之一，2002年的前景也非常光明。
# “Loss Development” and Insurance Accounting
# “损失发展”与保险会计
Bad terminology is the enemy of good thinking. When companies or investment professionals use terms such as "EBITDA" and "pro forma," they want you to unthinkingly accept concepts that are dangerously flawed. (In golf, my score is frequently below par on a pro forma basis: I have firm plans to "restructure" my putting stroke and therefore only count the swings I take before reaching the green.)
糟糕的术语是良好思维的大敌。当公司或投资专业人士使用诸如“EBITDA”和“pro forma”等术语时，他们希望你不加思考地接受一些存在严重缺陷的概念。（比如打高尔夫球时，我的成绩经常在“pro forma”基础上低于标准杆：我计划“重组”我的推杆动作，因此只计算到达果岭前的挥杆次数。）
# “Loss Development” and Insurance Accounting (Continued)
# “损失发展”与保险会计（续）
In insurance reporting, "loss development" is a widely used term — and one that is seriously misleading. First, a definition: Loss reserves at an insurer are not funds tucked away for a rainy day, but rather a liability account. If properly calculated, the liability states the amount that an insurer will have to pay for all losses (including associated costs) that have occurred prior to the reporting date but have not yet been paid. When calculating the reserve, the insurer will have been notified of many of the losses it is destined to pay, but others will not yet have been reported to it. These losses are called IBNR, for incurred but not reported. Indeed, in some cases (involving, say, product liability or embezzlement) the insured itself will not yet be aware that a loss has occurred.
在保险报告中，“loss development（损失发展）”是一个被广泛使用但极具误导性的术语。首先，我们来明确其定义：保险公司的损失准备金并不是为“雨天”而预留的资金，而是一项负债账户。如果计算得当，这项负债代表了保险公司需支付的、截至报告日已发生但尚未赔付的所有损失（包括相关费用）的金额。在计算准备金时，保险公司可能已经获悉许多它最终需要赔付的损失，但也有一些损失尚未上报。这些损失被称为IBNR（已发生但未报告）。事实上，在某些情况下（例如产品责任或挪用公款），被保险人本身甚至尚未意识到损失已经发生。
It's clearly difficult for an insurer to put a figure on the ultimate cost of all such reported and unreported events. But the ability to do so with reasonable accuracy is vital. Otherwise the insurer's managers won't know what its actual loss costs are and how these compare to the premiums being charged. GEICO got into huge trouble in the early 1970s because for several years it severely underreserved, and therefore believed its product (insurance protection) was costing considerably less than was truly the case. Consequently, the company sailed blissfully along, underpricing its product and selling more and more policies at ever-larger losses.
对于一家保险公司来说，要准确估算所有已报告和未报告事件的最终成本显然非常困难。但具备这种合理准确的估算能力至关重要。否则，管理层将无法了解真实的损失成本，并判断这些成本是否与所收取的保费匹配。GEICO在上世纪70年代初陷入巨大困境，原因就是多年来严重低估了准备金，从而误以为其产品（保险保障）的成本远低于实际水平。结果公司盲目乐观地继续低价销售保单，导致亏损不断加剧。
When it becomes evident that reserves at past reporting dates understated the liability that truly existed at the time, companies speak of "loss development." In the year discovered, these shortfalls penalize reported earnings because the "catch-up" costs from prior years must be added to current-year costs when results are calculated. This is what happened at General Re in 2001: a staggering $800 million of loss costs that actually occurred in earlier years, but that were not then recorded, were belatedly recognized last year and charged against current earnings. The mistake was an honest one, I can assure you of that. Nevertheless, for several years, this underreserving caused us to believe that our costs were much lower than they truly were, an error that contributed to woefully inadequate pricing. Additionally, the overstated profit figures led us to pay substantial incentive compensation that we should not have and to incur income taxes far earlier than was necessary.
当发现过去报告日的准备金低估了当时实际存在的负债时，公司就会称其为“损失发展”。在问题暴露的当年，这些不足额准备金会直接影响当期盈利，因为计算结果时必须将前几年的“补提”成本计入当期成本。这就是General Re在2001年所经历的情况：高达8亿美元的损失成本其实早在前几年就已发生，却未能及时入账，直到去年才被确认并计入当期利润。我可以向你保证，这个错误是诚实的失误。然而，这一低估准备金的行为让我们多年来误判了自己的成本水平，从而导致定价严重偏低。此外，虚高的利润数字还使我们发放了不应有的高额奖金，并提前缴纳了不必要的所得税。
We recommend scrapping the term "loss development" and its equally ugly twin, "reserve strengthening." (Can you imagine an insurer, upon finding its reserves excessive, describing the reduction that follows as "reserve weakening"?) "Loss development" suggests to investors that some natural, uncontrollable event has occurred in the current year, and "reserve strengthening" implies that adequate amounts have been further buttressed. The truth, however, is that management made an error in estimation that in turn produced an error in the earnings previously reported. The losses didn't "develop" — they were there all along. What developed was management's understanding of the losses (or, in the instances of chicanery, management's willingness to finally fess up).
我们建议彻底弃用“loss development”这一术语，以及同样令人反感的双胞胎词“reserve strengthening（准备金加强）”。（你能想象一家保险公司发现自己的准备金过高后，把调减称为“reserve weakening（准备金削弱）”吗？）“损失发展”这个词让投资者误以为今年发生了某种自然、不可控的事件；“准备金加强”则暗示原本充足的准备金又被进一步夯实。但实际上，这是管理层在估计上的失误，进而导致了前期财务报告中的错误。损失并没有“发展”——它们一直都在那里。真正发生变化的是管理层对损失的认知（或者在某些舞弊案例中，是管理层终于愿意承认错误）。
A more forthright label for the phenomenon at issue would be "loss costs we failed to recognize when they occurred" (or maybe just "oops"). Underreserving, it should be noted, is a common — and serious — problem throughout the property/casualty insurance industry. At Berkshire we told you of our own problems with underestimation in 1984 and 1986. Generally, however, our reserving has been conservative.
更直白的说法应该是：“我们在损失发生时未能识别的成本”（或者干脆叫“哎呀”）。需要注意的是，低估准备金是整个财产/意外险行业普遍且严重的问题。伯克希尔曾在1984年和1986年坦承过我们在这方面的失误。不过总体而言，我们的准备金计提一向较为保守。
Major underreserving is common in cases of companies struggling for survival. In effect, insurance accounting is a self-graded exam, in that the insurer gives some figures to its auditing firm and generally doesn't get an argument. (What the auditor gets, however, is a letter from management that is designed to take his firm off the hook if the numbers later look silly.) A company experiencing financial difficulties — of a kind that, if truly faced, could put it out of business — seldom proves to be a tough grader. Who, after all, wants to prepare his own execution papers?
对于那些处于生存边缘的公司来说，严重低估准备金是常见的现象。实际上，保险行业的会计就像一场自我评分的考试：保险公司给审计机构提供一些数据，通常不会遭到质疑。（但审计师通常会收到一份管理层出具的免责函，以防日后这些数字看起来荒谬。）一家正面临财务危机的公司（一旦如实反映，可能会倒闭），很少会在准备金评估上严格把关。毕竟谁愿意亲手给自己写判决书呢？
Even when companies have the best of intentions, it's not easy to reserve properly. I've told the story in the past about the fellow traveling abroad whose sister called to tell him that their dad had died. The brother replied that it was impossible for him to get home for the funeral; he volunteered, however, to shoulder its cost. Upon returning, the brother received a bill from the mortuary for $4,500, which he promptly paid. A month later, and a month after that also, he paid $10 pursuant to an add-on invoice. When a third $10 invoice came, he called his sister for an explanation. "Oh," she replied, "I forgot to tell you. We buried dad in a rented suit."
即使公司有良好的意图，正确计提准备金也并不容易。我曾讲过一个故事：一位在国外旅行的男子接到姐姐电话，说父亲去世了。弟弟表示赶不回来参加葬礼，但主动承担费用。回家后他支付了殡仪馆开据的4,500美元账单。一个月后，又收到两张各10美元的附加发票，他也照付了。当第三张10美元发票寄来时，他打电话问姐姐怎么回事。她回答说：“哦，我忘了告诉你，我们是租了一套西装埋了爸爸。”
There are a lot of "rented suits" buried in the past operations of insurance companies. Sometimes the problems they signify lie dormant for decades, as was the case with asbestos liability, before virulently manifesting themselves. Difficult as the job may be, it's management's responsibility to adequately account for all possibilities. Conservatism is essential. When a claims manager walks into the CEO's office and says "Guess what just happened," his boss, if a veteran, does not expect to hear it's good news. Surprises in the insurance world have been far from symmetrical in their effect on earnings.
保险公司的历史运营中埋藏着大量类似“租来的西装”的隐患。有时这些问题潜伏数十年才会爆发，比如石棉责任案便是如此。尽管这项工作难度极大，但管理层有责任对所有可能性做出充分考量。保守性原则至关重要。当理赔主管走进CEO办公室说“猜猜刚刚发生了什么”，他的老板如果是经验丰富的管理者，绝不会期待听到好消息。在保险业中，所谓“惊喜”对盈亏的影响从来都不是对称的。
Because of this one-sided experience, it is folly to suggest, as some are doing, that all property/casualty insurance reserves be discounted, an approach reflecting the fact that they will be paid in the future and that therefore their present value is less than the stated liability for them. Discounting might be acceptable if reserves could be precisely established. They can't, however, because a myriad of forces — judicial broadening of policy language and medical inflation, to name just two chronic problems — are constantly working to make reserves inadequate. Discounting would exacerbate this already-serious situation and, additionally, would provide a new tool for the companies that are inclined to fudge.
正因为这种单边风险的存在，有人提议对所有财产/意外险准备金进行折现处理，这种做法实属愚蠢。该方法基于这样一个事实：这些负债将在未来支付，因此其现值应低于账面金额。如果准备金可以精确确定，折现或许是可以接受的。但现实并非如此，因为各种因素——例如司法对保单条款的扩大解释和医疗通胀——持续导致准备金不足。折现将进一步恶化本已严重的问题，并为那些倾向于操纵数据的公司提供新的工具。
I'd say that the effects from telling a profit-challenged insurance CEO to lower reserves through discounting would be comparable to those that would ensue if a father told his 16-year-old son to have a normal sex life. Neither party needs that kind of push.
我认为，要求一家盈利困难的保险公司CEO通过折现方式降低准备金所产生的后果，类似于一位父亲告诉自己16岁的儿子要过正常性生活一样。双方都不需要这样的推动。
# Sources of Reported Earnings
# 盈利来源分析
The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments (primarily relating to "goodwill") are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. In recent years, our "expense" for goodwill amortization has been large. Going forward, generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") will no longer require amortization of goodwill. This change will increase our reported earnings (though not our true economic earnings) and simplify this section of the report.
下表显示了伯克希尔报告盈利的主要来源。在此展示方式中，购买会计调整（主要涉及“商誉”）并未分配至具体适用的业务，而是统一汇总单独列示。这种方法可以让您看到，如果我们没有收购这些企业，这些业务本来会呈现怎样的盈利情况。近年来，我们的商誉摊销“费用”相当庞大。未来，按照美国通用会计准则（GAAP）的要求，商誉将不再需要摊销。这一变化将提升我们的报告盈利（尽管不影响我们真正的经济收益），也将简化本节内容。
| Operating Earnings: | 2001 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|
| Insurance Group: | ||
| Underwriting – Reinsurance | $(2,824) | $(911) |
| Underwriting – GEICO | 144 | (146) |
| Underwriting – Other Primary | 18 | 16 |
| Net Investment Income | 1,968 | 1,946 |
| Building Products(1) | 287 | 21 |
| Finance and Financial Products Business | 336 | 343 |
| Flight Services | 105 | 126 |
| MidAmerican Energy (76% owned) | 230 | 109 |
| Retail Operations | 101 | 104 |
| Scott Fetzer (excluding finance operation) | 83 | 80 |
| Shaw Industries(2) | 156 | -- |
| Other Businesses | 103 | 133 |
| Purchase-Accounting Adjustments | (699) | (843) |
| Corporate Interest Expense | (60) | (61) |
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions | (11) | (11) |
| Other | 30 | 25 |
| Operating Earnings | $936 | $1,320 |
| Capital Gains from Investments | $2,392 | $1,699 |
| Total Earnings – All Entities | $3,328 | $2,919 |
(1) Includes Acme Brick from August 1, 2000; Benjamin Moore from December 18, 2000; Johns Manville from February 27, 2001; and MiTek from July 31, 2001.
(2) From date of acquisition, January 8, 2001.
Here are some highlights (and lowlights) from 2001 relating to our non-insurance activities:
以下是我们2001年非保险业务中的一些亮点（和低点）回顾：
Our shoe operations (included in "other businesses") lost $46.2 million pre-tax, with profits at H.H. Brown and Justin swamped by losses at Dexter.
我们的鞋类业务（包含在“其他业务”中）税前亏损了4,620万美元，H.H. Brown和Justin的盈利完全被Dexter的亏损所吞噬。
I've made three decisions relating to Dexter that have hurt you in a major way: (1) buying it in the first place; (2) paying for it with stock and (3) procrastinating when the need for changes in its operations was obvious. I would like to lay these mistakes on Charlie (or anyone else, for that matter) but they were mine. Dexter, prior to our purchase — and indeed for a few years after — prospered despite low-cost foreign competition that was brutal. I concluded that Dexter could continue to cope with that problem, and I was wrong.
我在关于Dexter上的三项决策严重伤害了你们的利益：（1）最初收购它；（2）用股票支付对价；（3）在运营明显需要改革时却拖延不决。我真想把这些错误推给查理（或者任何人），但它们确实是我自己的错。在我们收购之前——甚至收购后的几年里——尽管面临残酷的低成本外国竞争，Dexter仍然蓬勃发展。我原以为它能继续应对这一问题，但我错了。
We have now placed the Dexter operation — which is still substantial in size — under the management of Frank Rooney and Jim Issler at H.H. Brown. These men have performed outstandingly for Berkshire, skillfully contending with the extraordinary changes that have bedeviled the footwear industry. During part of 2002, Dexter will be hurt by unprofitable sales commitments it made last year. After that, we believe our shoe business will be reasonably profitable.
目前我们将Dexter（其规模依然可观）交由H.H. Brown的Frank Rooney和Jim Issler管理。他们在伯克希尔的表现非常出色，成功地应对了困扰制鞋行业的剧烈变化。在2002年的一部分时间里，Dexter将因去年做出的一些亏损销售承诺而受到影响。但在此之后，我们相信我们的鞋类业务将恢复合理的盈利能力。
• MidAmerican Energy, of which we own 76% on a fully-diluted basis, had a good year in 2001. Its reported earnings should also increase considerably in 2002 given that the company has been shouldering a large charge for the amortization of goodwill and that this "cost" will disappear under the new GAAP rules.
我们全资拥有76%权益的MidAmerican Energy在2001年表现良好。考虑到公司此前承担了大额商誉摊销费用，而根据新的GAAP规则这项“成本”将不再计入，因此我们预计2002年的报告盈利也将显著上升。
Last year MidAmerican swapped some properties in England, adding Yorkshire Electric, with its 2.1 million customers. We are now serving 3.6 million customers in the U.K. and are its 2nd largest electric utility. We have an equally important operation in Iowa as well as major generating facilities in California and the Philippines.
去年，MidAmerican在英国进行了部分资产置换，并获得了拥有210万用户的Yorkshire电力公司。我们现在是英国第二大电力供应商，服务客户达360万人。我们在爱荷华州也有同等重要的业务，并在加州和菲律宾拥有大型发电设施。
At MidAmerican — this may surprise you — we also own the second-largest residential real estate brokerage business in the country. We are market-share leaders in a number of large cities, primarily in the Midwest, and have recently acquired important firms in Atlanta and Southern California. Last year, operating under various names that are locally familiar, we handled about 106,000 transactions involving properties worth nearly $20 billion. Ron Peltier has built this business for us, and it's likely he will make more acquisitions in 2002 and the years to come.
在MidAmerican——这可能会让你惊讶——我们还拥有美国第二大住宅房地产经纪公司。我们在多个大城市（主要位于中西部地区）占据市场主导地位，并最近在亚特兰大和南加州收购了重要企业。去年，我们以多个本地熟知的品牌名义完成了约106,000笔交易，涉及房产价值近200亿美元。罗恩·佩尔蒂埃（Ron Peltier）为我们打造了这项业务，未来几年他很可能还会进行更多收购。
• Considering the recessionary environment plaguing them, our retailing operations did well in 2001. In jewelry, same-store sales fell 7.6% and pre-tax margins were 8.9% versus 10.7% in 2000. Return on invested capital remains high.
尽管面临经济衰退的大环境，我们的零售业务在2001年仍表现不错。珠宝业务的同店销售额下降了7.6%，税前利润率从2000年的10.7%降至8.9%。但投入资本回报率仍维持高位。
Same-store sales at our home-furnishings retailers were unchanged and so was the margin — 9.1% pre-tax — these operations earned. Here, too, return on invested capital is excellent.
我们家居用品零售商的同店销售额保持稳定，税前利润率也维持在9.1%。同样，这些业务的投入资本回报率也非常优异。
We continue to expand in both jewelry and home-furnishings. Of particular note, Nebraska Furniture Mart is constructing a mammoth 450,000 square foot store that will serve the greater Kansas City area beginning in the fall of 2003. Despite Bill Child's counter-successes, we will keep this store open on Sundays.
我们继续在珠宝和家居用品领域扩张。特别值得注意的是，Nebraska Furniture Mart正在建造一家占地45万平方英尺的巨型门店，计划于2003年秋季开始服务于堪萨斯城大都会区。尽管比尔·奇尔德（Bill Child）坚持反对，我们仍将坚持该门店周日营业。
• The large acquisitions we initiated in late 2000 — Shaw, Johns Manville and Benjamin Moore — all came through their first year with us in great fashion. Charlie and I knew at the time of our purchases that we were in good hands with Bob Shaw, Jerry Henry and Yvan Dupuy, respectively — and we admire their work even more now. Together these businesses earned about $659 million pre-tax.
我们在2000年底完成的三起重大收购——Shaw、Johns Manville和Benjamin Moore——都与我们顺利度过了第一个完整财年。当时我们就知道，Bob Shaw、Jerry Henry和Yvan Dupuy都是值得信赖的管理者，如今我们更加敬佩他们的工作能力。这三家公司合计创造了约6.59亿美元的税前利润。
Shortly after yearend we exchanged 4,740 Berkshire A shares (or their equivalent in B shares) for the 12.7% minority interest in Shaw, which means we now own 100% of the company. Shaw is our largest non-insurance operation and will play a big part in Berkshire's future.
年终后不久，我们以4,740股伯克希尔A股（或等值B股）换取了Shaw剩余12.7%的少数股权，这意味着我们现在已100%控股该公司。Shaw是我们最大的非保险业务板块，将在伯克希尔的未来发展中扮演重要角色。
• All of the income shown for Flight Services in 2001 — and a bit more — came from FlightSafety, our pilot-training subsidiary. Its earnings increased 2.5%, though return on invested capital fell slightly because of the $258 million investment we made last year in simulators and other fixed assets. My 84-year-old friend, Al Ueltschi, continues to run FlightSafety with the same enthusiasm and competitive spirit that he has exhibited since 1951, when he invested $10,000 to start the company. If I line Al up with a bunch of 60-year-olds at the annual meeting, you will not be able to pick him out.
2001年Flight Services的所有收入（甚至更多）均来自我们的飞行员培训子公司FlightSafety。其盈利增长了2.5%，但由于我们去年投资2.58亿美元用于购买模拟器和其他固定资产，投入资本回报率略有下降。我84岁的朋友Al Ueltschi仍然以1951年创业时投入1万美元以来一贯的热情和进取精神经营着这家公司。如果我在股东大会上让他和一群60岁的人站在一起，你根本分不清谁是谁。
After September 11th, training for commercial airlines fell, and today it remains depressed. However, training for business and general aviation, our main activity, is at near-normal levels and should continue to grow. In 2002, we expect to spend $162 million for 27 simulators, a sum far in excess of our annual depreciation charge of $95 million. Those who believe that EBITDA is in any way equivalent to true earnings are welcome to pick up the tab.
9月11日后，商业航空公司培训需求大幅下滑，至今仍未恢复。不过，我们主要业务——私人和通用航空培训——已接近正常水平，并有望持续增长。2002年，我们预计将花费1.62亿美元购置27台飞行模拟器，远高于我们每年9,500万美元的折旧支出。那些认为EBITDA在任何意义上都等同于真实收益的人，欢迎他们来为这笔账单买单。
Our NetJets® fractional ownership program sold a record number of planes last year and also showed a gain of 21.9% in service income from management fees and hourly charges. Nevertheless, it operated at a small loss, versus a small profit in 2000. We made a little money in the U.S., but these earnings were more than offset by European losses. Measured by the value of our customers' planes, NetJets accounts for about half of the industry. We believe the other participants, in aggregate, lost significant money.
我们的NetJets®飞机共享项目去年售出创纪录数量的飞机，服务收入（包括管理费和按小时计费）同比增长21.9%。然而整体业务仍录得小幅亏损，相较2000年的小幅盈利有所下降。我们在美国略有盈利，但欧洲的亏损完全抵消了这部分利润。按客户飞机总价值计算，NetJets约占整个行业的一半。我们认为其余参与者总体而言损失惨重。
Maintaining a premier level of safety, security and service was always expensive, and the cost of sticking to those standards was exacerbated by September 11th. No matter how much the cost, we will continue to be the industry leader in all three respects. An uncompromising insistence on delivering only the best to his customers is embedded in the DNA of Rich Santulli, CEO of the company and the inventor of fractional ownership. I'm delighted with his fanaticism on these matters for both the company's sake and my family's: I believe the Buffetts fly more fractional-ownership hours — we log in excess of 800 annually — than does any other family. In case you're wondering, we use exactly the same planes and crews that serve NetJet's other customers.
始终保持顶尖水平的安全、安保和服务一向代价高昂，而9月11日后维持这些标准的成本进一步上升。无论成本多高，我们都将继续在这三个方面引领行业。公司CEO兼飞机共享模式发明者Rich Santulli对客户服务的极致追求深植于他的性格之中。我对他在这些方面的执着感到欣慰，无论是对公司还是对我家庭而言：我相信巴菲特家族每年使用飞机共享的时间超过世界上任何其他家庭（我们年使用时长超过800小时）。顺便说一句，我们使用的飞机和机组人员与其他客户完全一样。
NetJets experienced a spurt in new orders shortly after September 11th, but its sales pace has since returned to normal. Per-customer usage declined somewhat during the year, probably because of the recession.
9月11日后不久，NetJets的新订单一度激增，但此后销售节奏已恢复正常。每位客户的平均使用量略有下降，可能与经济衰退有关。
Both we and our customers derive significant operational benefits from our being the runaway leader in the fractional ownership business. We have more than 300 planes constantly on the go in the U.S. and can therefore be wherever a customer needs us on very short notice. The ubiquity of our fleet also reduces our "positioning" costs below those incurred by operators with smaller fleets.
作为飞机共享领域的绝对领导者，我们和客户都能从中获得显著的运营优势。我们在美国拥有300多架随时待命的飞机，能在极短时间内抵达客户所需地点。庞大的机队也让我们调度成本低于机队规模较小的运营商。
These advantages of scale, and others we have, give NetJets a significant economic edge over competition. Under the competitive conditions likely to prevail for a few years, however, our advantage will at best produce modest profits.
这些规模优势及其他资源使NetJets在行业中具备明显的经济护城河。但在未来几年可能持续存在的激烈竞争环境下，我们的优势最多只能带来适度的盈利。
• Our finance and financial products line of business now includes XTRA, General Re Securities (which is in a run-off mode that will continue for an extended period) and a few other relatively small operations. The bulk of the assets and liabilities in this segment, however, arise from a few fixed-income strategies, involving highly-liquid AAA securities, that I manage. This activity, which only makes sense when certain market relationships exist, has produced good returns in the past and has reasonable prospects for continuing to do so over the next year or two.
我们的金融及金融产品业务线目前包括XTRA、General Re Securities（处于长期清算阶段）以及其他几个相对较小的业务单元。但本板块大部分资产负债来自于我亲自管理的几种固定收益策略，主要涉及高度流动性、AAA评级证券。这种策略只有在特定市场关系存在时才具有意义，过去它带来了不错的回报，预计在未来一两年内仍有合理前景。
# Investments
# 投资情况
Below we present our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $500 million at the end of 2001 are itemized.
以下列示了我们持有的普通股投资组合。其中市值在2001年底超过5亿美元的投资明细如下：
| Shares | Company | Cost ($ millions) | Market ($ millions) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | $1,470 | $5,726 |
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | $1,299 | $10,000 |
| 96,000,000 | The Gillette Company | $600 | $5,410 |
| 15,999,200 | H&R Block, Inc. | $255 | $916 |
| 24,000,000 | Moody's Corporation | $499 | $2,315 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company | $11 | $715 |
| 53,265,080 | Wells Fargo & Company | $306 | $957 |
| Others | — | $4,103 | $3,206 |
| Total Common Stocks | $8,543 | $28,675 |
We made few changes in our portfolio during 2001. As a group, our larger holdings have performed poorly in the last few years, some because of disappointing operating results. Charlie and I still like the basic businesses of all the companies we own. But we do not believe Berkshire’s equity holdings as a group are undervalued.
2001年我们基本未对投资组合做出重大调整。过去几年，我们的主要持仓表现不佳，有些是因为经营业绩令人失望。查理和我仍然看好我们所持有公司的基本面。但我们并不认为伯克希尔的整体股票投资组合目前被低估。
Our restrained enthusiasm for these securities is matched by decidedly lukewarm feelings about the prospects for stocks in general over the next decade or so. I expressed my views about equity returns in a speech I gave at an Allen and Company meeting in July (which was a follow-up to a similar presentation I had made two years earlier) and an edited version of my comments appeared in a December 10th Fortune article. I'm enclosing a copy of that article. You can also view the Fortune version of my 1999 talk at our website www.berkshirehathaway.com (opens new window).
我们对这些证券的谨慎态度，与我们对未来十年左右股市整体前景的冷淡预期是一致的。我在7月于Allen & Company会议上发表的一次演讲中表达了我对股权回报的看法（这是两年前类似演讲的后续），而该演讲内容的精简版后来刊登在12月10日的《财富》杂志上。我随信附上这篇文章的副本。你也可以通过我们的网站 www.berkshirehathaway.com (opens new window) 查看我1999年讲话的《财富》版本。
Charlie and I believe that American business will do fine over time but think that today's equity prices presage only moderate returns for investors. The market outperformed business for a very long period, and that phenomenon had to end. A market that no more than parallels business progress, however, is likely to leave many investors disappointed, particularly those relatively new to the game.
查理和我都相信美国企业从长期来看会表现良好，但我们认为当前的股价预示着投资者未来只能获得中等回报。市场曾长期跑赢实体经济，这种现象终究会结束。然而，一个仅仅与经济进步同步的市场很可能会让许多投资者失望，尤其是那些刚入市不久的新手。
Here's one for those who enjoy an odd coincidence: The Great Bubble ended on March 10, 2000 (though we didn't realize that fact until some months later). On that day, the NASDAQ (recently 1,731) hit its all-time high of 5,132. That same day, Berkshire shares traded at $40,800, their lowest price since mid-1997.
对于喜欢巧合的人来说，这里有个有趣的例子：大泡沫终结于2000年3月10日（尽管我们是在几个月后才意识到这一点）。就在那天，纳斯达克指数（最近仅为1,731点）触及了历史高点5,132点。同一天，伯克希尔的股价跌至40,800美元，是自1997年中以来的最低点。
During 2001, we were somewhat more active than usual in "junk" bonds. These are not, we should emphasize, suitable investments for the general public, because too often these securities live up to their name. We have never purchased a newly-issued junk bond, which is the only kind most investors are urged to buy. When losses occur in this field, furthermore, they are often disastrous: Many issues end up at a small fraction of their original offering price and some become entirely worthless.
2001年我们在“垃圾债券”领域比往常更活跃了一些。但我们要强调的是，这类投资并不适合普通公众参与，因为它们经常名副其实地带来亏损。我们从未购买过新发行的垃圾债券——而这类债券恰恰是大多数投资者被鼓励买入的品种。此外，当这个领域出现损失时，往往是非常严重的：很多债券的价格最终只剩下原始发行价的很小一部分，有些甚至变得一文不值。
Despite these dangers, we periodically find a few — a very few — junk securities that are interesting to us. And, so far, our 50-year experience in distressed debt has proven rewarding. In our 1984 annual report, we described our purchases of Washington Public Power System bonds when that issuer fell into disrepute. We've also, over the years, stepped into other apparent calamities such as Chrysler Financial, Texaco and RJR Nabisco — all of which returned to grace. Still, if we stay active in junk bonds, you can expect us to have losses from time to time.
尽管存在这些风险，我们还是会偶尔发现一些对我们来说有吸引力的垃圾债券——当然数量非常有限。迄今为止，我们在困境债务领域长达50年的经验已被证明是值得的。在1984年的年报中，我们曾描述过当时收购华盛顿公共电力系统（Washington Public Power System）债券的情况，那时该发行人正陷入声誉危机。多年来我们也介入过其他看似灾难性的案例，比如Chrysler Financial、Texaco和RJR Nabisco——这些公司最终都恢复了元气。不过，如果我们继续活跃于垃圾债市场，你可以预计我们会时不时遭遇亏损。
Occasionally, a purchase of distressed bonds leads us into something bigger. Early in the Fruit of the Loom bankruptcy, we purchased the company's public and bank debt at about 50% of face value. This was an unusual bankruptcy in that interest payments on senior debt were continued without interruption, which meant we earned about a 15% current return. Our holdings grew to 10% of Fruit's senior debt, which will probably end up returning us about 70% of face value. Through this investment, we indirectly reduced our purchase price for the whole company by a small amount.
有时，购买困境债券会引导我们进入更大的交易。在Fruit of the Loom破产初期，我们以票面价值约50%的价格购入了其公开市场债券和银行债务。这起破产案颇为特殊，高级债务利息支付并未中断，这意味着我们获得了约15%的当期回报。我们的持仓最终占到了Fruit高级债务的10%，预计将收回票面价值的70%左右。通过这项投资，我们间接降低了整体收购价格。
In late 2000, we began purchasing the obligations of FINOVA Group, a troubled finance company, and that, too, led to our making a major transaction. FINOVA then had about $11 billion of debt outstanding, of which we purchased 13% at about two-thirds of face value. We expected the company to go into bankruptcy, but believed that liquidation of its assets would produce a payoff for creditors that would be well above our cost. As default loomed in early 2001, we joined forces with Leucadia National Corporation to present the company with a prepackaged plan for bankruptcy.
2000年底，我们开始购买一家陷入困境的金融公司FINOVA集团的债务，这一举动也促使我们完成了一项重大交易。当时FINOVA未偿债务约为110亿美元，我们以大约票面价值的三分之二价格买入其中13%。我们预计公司即将破产，但我们判断通过资产清算所能回收的价值将远高于我们的买入成本。2001年初违约临近之际，我们与Leucadia National公司联手，向公司提出了一份预先打包好的破产重组方案。
The plan as subsequently modified (and I'm simplifying here) provided that creditors would be paid 70% of face value (along with full interest) and that they would receive a newly-issued 7½% note for the 30% of their claims not satisfied by cash. To fund FINOVA’s 70% distribution, Leucadia and Berkshire formed a jointly-owned entity — mellifluently christened Berkadia — that borrowed $5.6 billion through FleetBoston and, in turn, re-lent this sum to FINOVA, concurrently obtaining a priority claim on its assets. Berkshire guaranteed 90% of the Berkadia borrowing and also has a secondary guarantee on the 10% for which Leucadia has primary responsibility. (Did I mention that I am simplifying?)
经过修改后的计划（此处我做了简化）规定，债权人将以现金方式获得其债权面值的70%（连同全部利息），剩余30%部分则将以一张新的7.5%票据来补偿。为了提供上述70%的现金分配，Leucadia和伯克希尔联合成立了一家名为Berkadia的合资实体，并通过FleetBoston融资56亿美元，再将这笔资金转贷给FINOVA，同时取得了对其资产的优先求偿权。伯克希尔承担了Berkadia借款总额的90%担保责任，另外还为Leucadia主要负责的10%提供了次级担保。（我说过了，这里我做了一些简化。）
There is a spread of about two percentage points between what Berkadia pays on its borrowing and what it receives from FINOVA, with this spread flowing 90% to Berkshire and 10% to Leucadia. As I write this, each loan has been paid down to $3.9 billion.
Berkadia为其借贷所支付的利率与其从FINOVA所获得的利率之间约有2个百分点的利差，其中90%归伯克希尔，10%归Leucadia。截至我写此信时，贷款余额已降至39亿美元。
As part of the bankruptcy plan, which was approved on August 10, 2001, Berkshire also agreed to offer 70% of face value for up to $500 million principal amount of the $3.25 billion of new 7½% bonds that were issued by FINOVA. (Of these, we had already received $426.8 million in principal amount because of our 13% ownership of the original debt.) Our offer, which was to run until September 26, 2001, could be withdrawn under a variety of conditions, one of which became operative if the New York Stock Exchange closed during the offering period. When that indeed occurred in the week of September 11th, we promptly terminated the offer.
作为破产重组计划的一部分，伯克希尔还同意以面值70%的价格，最多回购5亿美元由FINOVA新发行的32.5亿美元7.5%债券（其中我们原本持有的旧债占13%，因此已自动获得4.268亿美元的新债）。我们的回购要约原定持续到2001年9月26日，在多种情况下我们有权撤回要约，其中包括纽交所在要约期内暂停交易这一条。果然在9·11事件发生那一周交易所关闭，我们随即终止了要约。
Many of FINOVA’s loans involve aircraft assets whose values were significantly diminished by the events of September 11th. Other receivables held by the company also were imperiled by the economic consequences of the attack that day. FINOVA’s prospects, therefore, are not as good as when we made our proposal to the bankruptcy court. Nevertheless we feel that overall the transaction will prove satisfactory for Berkshire. Leucadia has day-to-day operating responsibility for FINOVA, and we have long been impressed with the business acumen and managerial talent of its key executives.
FINOVA的许多贷款涉及飞机资产，而9月11日事件严重削弱了这些资产的价值。当天袭击引发的经济后果也危及公司的其他应收账款。因此，FINOVA的前景已不如我们最初向破产法院提交提案时那么乐观。不过总体而言，我们认为这项交易对伯克希尔仍是令人满意的。Leucadia负责FINOVA的日常运营，我们长期以来一直钦佩该公司高管们的商业洞察力和管理才能。
It's déjà vu time again: In early 1965, when the investment partnership I ran took control of Berkshire, that company had its main banking relationships with First National Bank of Boston and a large New York City bank. Previously, I had done no business with either.
又到了重温旧事的时候：1965年初，我所经营的投资合伙公司接管伯克希尔时，伯克希尔的主要银行关系是波士顿第一国民银行和一家大型纽约银行。此前我与这两家银行并无往来。
Fast forward to 1969, when I wanted Berkshire to buy the Illinois National Bank and Trust of Rockford. We needed $10 million, and I contacted both banks. There was no response from New York. However, two representatives of the Boston bank immediately came to Omaha. They told me they would supply the money for our purchase and that we would work out the details later.
到了1969年，我想让伯克希尔收购Rockford伊利诺伊国家银行信托公司，需要1,000万美元资金，于是我联系了两家银行。纽约方面毫无回应，但波士顿那家银行立刻派来两位代表来到奥马哈。他们告诉我，他们会为我们提供所需资金，细节以后再谈。
For the next three decades, we borrowed almost nothing from banks. (Debt is a four-letter word around Berkshire.) Then, in February, when we were structuring the FINOVA transaction, I again called Boston, where First National had morphed into FleetBoston. Chad Gifford, the company's president, responded just as Bill Brown and Ira Stepanian had back in 1969 — “you've got the money and we'll work out the details later.”
接下来的三十年里，我们几乎很少从银行借款。（在伯克希尔，“负债”是个禁忌词。）直到今年2月，在安排FINOVA交易时，我再次拨通了波士顿的电话，此时原来的First National已经变成FleetBoston。公司总裁查德·吉福德（Chad Gifford）的反应与1969年比尔·布朗（Bill Brown）和艾拉·史蒂潘尼安（Ira Stepanian）当年的反应如出一辙：“钱没问题，细节之后再说。”
And that's just what happened. FleetBoston syndicated a loan for $6 billion (as it turned out, we didn't need $400 million of it), and it was quickly oversubscribed by 17 banks throughout the world. Sooooo ... if you ever need $6 billion, just give Chad a call — assuming, that is, your credit is AAA.
事实也正是如此。FleetBoston牵头组织了60亿美元的银团贷款（实际上我们只用了其中的56亿美元），全球17家银行迅速超额认购。所以嘛……如果你哪天也需要60亿美元，就打电话找查德吧——前提是你得有AAA信用评级。
One more point about our investments: The media often report that "Buffett is buying" this or that security, having picked up the "fact" from reports that Berkshire files. These accounts are sometimes correct, but at other times the transactions Berkshire reports are actually being made by Lou Simpson, who runs a $2 billion portfolio for GEICO that is quite independent of me. Normally, Lou does not tell me what he is buying or selling, and I learn of his activities only when I look at a GEICO portfolio summary that I receive a few days after the end of each month. Lou's thinking, of course, is quite similar to mine, but we usually end up in different securities. That's largely because he's working with less money and can therefore invest in smaller companies than I. Oh, yes, there's also another minor difference between us: In recent years, Lou's performance has been far better than mine.
关于我们的投资，还有一个需要说明的问题：媒体经常报道“巴菲特正在买入某只股票”，而这通常只是基于伯克希尔定期提交的披露文件。这些报道有时是对的，但也有不少交易其实是Lou Simpson做的。他在GEICO独立管理着20亿美元的组合。一般来说，他不会告诉我他的买卖动向，我也只有在月底几天收到GEICO投资组合摘要时才知道。当然，Lou的投资理念与我很接近，但我们的持仓常常不同。这主要是因为他管理的资金规模较小，可以投资市值更小的公司。哦，对了，我们之间还有一个小小的不同：近年来，Lou的表现明显优于我本人。
# Charitable Contributions
# 慈善捐赠
Berkshire follows a highly unusual policy in respect to charitable contributions — but it's one that Charlie and I believe is both rational and fair to owners.
伯克希尔在慈善捐赠方面的做法非常独特——但查理和我都认为，这是一种既理性又对股东公平的方式。
First, we let our operating subsidiaries make their own charitable decisions, requesting only that the owners/managers who once ran these as independent companies make all donations to their personal charities from their own funds, instead of using company money. When our managers are using company funds, we trust them to make gifts in a manner that delivers commensurate tangible or intangible benefits to the operations they manage. Last year contributions from Berkshire subsidiaries totaled $19.2 million.
首先，我们允许旗下运营子公司自行决定其慈善捐赠事宜，仅要求那些曾作为独立公司运营的企业的所有者/管理者，从个人资金中支付他们对私人慈善机构的捐款，而非使用公司资金。当管理者动用公司资金进行捐赠时，我们相信他们会以能够为所管理业务带来相应有形或无形利益的方式进行。去年，伯克希尔各子公司共捐赠了1,920万美元。
At the parent company level, we make no contributions except those designated by shareholders. We do not match contributions made by directors or employees, nor do we give to the favorite charities of the Buffetts or the Mungers. However, prior to our purchasing them, a few of our subsidiaries had employee-match programs and we feel fine about their continuing them: It's not our style to tamper with successful business cultures.
在母公司层面，我们不主动做出任何捐赠，除非这些捐赠是由股东指定的。我们不会匹配董事或员工的捐款，也不会向巴菲特家族或芒格家族偏爱的慈善机构捐赠。不过，在我们收购之前，一些子公司已有员工配捐计划，我们对此持支持态度并允许其继续执行：我们从不干涉成功的商业文化。
To implement our owners’ charitable desires, each year we notify registered holders of A shares (A’s represent 86.6% of our equity capital) of a per-share amount that they can instruct us to contribute to as many as three charities. Shareholders name the charity; Berkshire writes the check. Any organization that qualifies under the Internal Revenue Code can be designated by shareholders. Last year Berkshire made contributions of $16.7 million at the direction of 5,700 shareholders, who named 3,550 charities as recipients. Since we started this program, our shareholders’ gifts have totaled $181 million.
为了实现股东们的慈善意愿，每年我们都会通知A股登记持有人（A股占我们股权资本的86.6%），每持有一股可指定一定金额用于捐赠至最多三家慈善机构。由股东指定受赠机构，伯克希尔负责开出支票。只要符合美国国税局法规的组织，均可被股东指定。去年，我们根据5,700位股东的指示，向3,550家慈善机构捐赠了总计1,670万美元。自该计划实施以来，股东们通过伯克希尔累计捐赠达1.81亿美元。
Most public corporations eschew gifts to religious institutions. These, however, are favorite charities of our shareholders, who last year named 437 churches and synagogues to receive gifts. Additionally, 790 schools were recipients. A few of our larger shareholders, including Charlie and me, designate their personal foundations to get gifts, so that those entities can, in turn, disburse their funds widely.
大多数上市公司避免向宗教机构捐赠。然而，我们的股东却特别青睐此类机构，去年就有437家教堂和犹太会堂被列入捐赠名单。此外，还有790所学校接受了捐赠。包括我和查理在内的一些大股东选择将资金捐赠给自己的私人基金会，以便这些机构再广泛分配资金。
I get a few letters every week criticizing Berkshire for contributing to Planned Parenthood. These letters are usually prompted by an organization that wishes to see boycotts of Berkshire products. The letters are invariably polite and sincere, but their writers are unaware of a key point: It's not Berkshire, but rather its owners who are making charitable decisions — and these owners are about as diverse in their opinions as you can imagine. For example, they are probably on both sides of the abortion issue in roughly the same proportion as the American population. We'll follow their instructions, whether they designate Planned Parenthood or Metro Right to Life, just as long as the charity possesses 501(c)(3) status. It's as if we paid a dividend, which the shareholder then donated. Our form of disbursement, however, is more tax-efficient.
我每周都会收到几封批评伯克希尔向Planned Parenthood捐赠的信件。这些信通常来自希望抵制伯克希尔产品的组织。来信虽礼貌且真诚，但写信人往往不了解一个关键事实：做出慈善决策的是我们的股东，而不是伯克希尔本身——而我们的股东观点之多样，远超想象。例如，他们在堕胎问题上的立场与美国公众大致相当，正反两方都有。只要慈善机构具备501(c)(3)资质，无论是Planned Parenthood还是Metro Right to Life，我们都会照章执行。这就像我们发放了一笔股息，然后由股东自行捐赠一样。只不过这种方式更具税务效率。
In neither the purchase of goods nor the hiring of personnel, do we ever consider the religious views, the gender, the race or the sexual orientation of the persons we are dealing with. It would not only be wrong to do so, it would be idiotic. We need all of the talent we can find, and we have learned that able and trustworthy managers, employees and suppliers come from a very wide spectrum of humanity.
我们在采购商品或招聘人员时，从不考虑对方的宗教信仰、性别、种族或性取向。这样做不仅是错误的，更是愚蠢的。我们需要尽可能多的人才，而我们深知，有能力且值得信赖的管理者、员工和供应商来自社会各个阶层。
# Participation Instructions for Future Programs
# 参与未来慈善项目的说明
To participate in our future charitable contribution programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 2002 will be ineligible for the 2002 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly. Designations received after the due date will not be honored.
如欲参与未来的慈善捐赠项目，请确保您持有的是登记在您本人名下的A类股票，而非证券商、银行或托管机构名义持有。若您所持股份未于2002年8月31日前以实名登记，则无法参与本年度计划。收到我们的捐赠表格后，请尽快回寄。逾期提交的捐赠意向将不予受理。
# The Annual Meeting
# 年度股东大会
This year’s annual meeting will be on Saturday, May 4, and we will again be at the Civic Auditorium. The doors will open at 7 a.m., the movie will begin at 8:30, and the meeting itself will commence at 9:30. There will be a short break at noon for food. (Sandwiches can be bought at the Civic’s concession stands.) Except for that interlude, Charlie and I will answer questions until 3:30. Give us your best shot.
今年的年度股东大会将在**5月4日（星期六）**举行，地点仍为市政礼堂（Civic Auditorium）。大门将于早上7点开放，8:30播放影片，会议正式开始时间为9:30。中午我们将安排短暂休息时间用餐（现场设有小卖部提供三明治等食品）。除午休外，查理和我会一直回答问题直到下午3:30。请各位踊跃提问。
For at least the next year, the Civic, located downtown, is the only site available to us. We must therefore hold the meeting on either Saturday or Sunday to avoid the traffic and parking nightmare sure to occur on a weekday. Shortly, however, Omaha will have a new Convention Center with plenty of parking facilities. Assuming that we then head for the Center, I will poll shareholders to see whether you wish to return to the Monday meeting that was standard until 2000. We will decide that vote based on a count of shareholders, not shares. (This is not a system, however, we will ever institute to decide who should be CEO.)
至少在明年以前，市中心的市政礼堂仍然是我们唯一可用场地。因此我们必须选在周末召开大会，以避免工作日带来的交通与停车难题。不过，奥马哈即将建成拥有充足停车位的新会展中心。届时，我会征求股东意见是否恢复以往惯例，即在周一召开会议（这也是2000年前的标准安排）。此次投票将以股东人数计票，而非股份数量。（当然，这种机制绝不会用于CEO人选的决策。）
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. They do a terrific job for us each year, and I thank them for it.
随附年报一起寄出的代理材料中包含了一份关于如何获取入场凭证的说明。至于飞机、酒店和租车预订，我们再次委托美国运通公司（电话：800-799-6634）为您提供专属协助。他们每年为我们提供卓越服务，我在此表示感谢。
In our usual fashion, we will run buses from the larger hotels to the meeting. Afterwards, the buses will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim’s and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.
我们会像往年一样，安排从主要酒店到会场的穿梭巴士。散会后，巴士也将送大家返回酒店，并前往Nebraska Furniture Mart、宝狮珠宝店（Borsheim’s）及机场。即便如此，建议您租一辆车会更方便。
We have added so many new companies to Berkshire this year that I’m not going to detail all of the products that we will be selling at the meeting. But come prepared to carry home everything from bricks to candy. And underwear, of course. Assuming our Fruit of the Loom purchase has closed by May 4, we will be selling Fruit’s latest styles, which will make you your neighborhood’s fashion leader. Buy a lifetime supply.
今年我们新增了许多子公司，因此我不打算一一列举大会上将展出的产品。但请您做好准备，从砖块到糖果，甚至内衣，应有尽有。特别是如果Fruit of the Loom收购案在5月4日前完成交割，我们将销售其最新款式的服装，让您成为社区时尚先锋。建议一次买足终身所需。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 41 of the 49 jurisdictions in which we operate. Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money.
GEICO将在会上设立展位，多位全国顶尖保险顾问将亲临现场，为您计算汽车保险报价。大部分地区（49个州中有41个）都允许我们提供股东专属折扣（通常是8%）。请带上您的现有保单信息，看看我们能否为您节省开支。
At the Omaha airport on Saturday, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets® available for your inspection. Just ask a representative at the Civic about viewing any of these planes. If you buy what we consider an appropriate number of items during the weekend, you may well need your own plane to take them home. And, if you buy a fraction of a plane, we might even throw in a three-pack of briefs or boxers.
周六当天，奥马哈机场将展示NetJets®的飞机供参观。您只需向会场代表提出申请即可预约看机。如果您在周末购买足够多的商品，也许真得买架飞机才能装回家。而且，如果您购买部分飞机产权，我们甚至可能赠送三条Fruit of the Loom内裤。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 75-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” pricing, which means we will be offering our shareholders a discount that is customarily given only to employees. We initiated this special pricing at NFM five years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $11.5 million in 2001.
位于Dodge街与Pacific街之间的72号大道占地75英亩的Nebraska Furniture Mart（NFM）将继续推出“伯克希尔周末”特价活动，这意味着我们给予股东相当于员工级别的折扣。五年前我们首次推出这项优惠时，1997年销售额为530万美元，到2001年已增长至1,150万美元。
To get the discount, you must make your purchases on Thursday, May 2 through Monday, May 6 and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but that, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays.
要享受折扣，您必须于5月2日至6日之间购物，并出示大会入场凭证。许多平时绝不打折的知名品牌也破例参与本次活动。我们衷心感谢他们的合作。NFM营业时间为：平日10:00–21:00；周末10:00–18:00。
Borsheim’s — the largest jewelry store in the country except for Tiffany’s Manhattan store — will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 3. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Sunday, May 5. Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid the large crowds that will assemble on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a shareholder. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. Borsheim’s operates on a gross margin that is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals, so the more you buy, the more you save (or at least that’s what my wife and daughter tell me). Come by and let us perform a walletectomy on you.
宝狮珠宝（Borsheim’s）——除了蒂芙尼纽约旗舰店之外全美最大的珠宝店——将举办两场仅限股东参加的活动。第一场是5月3日（周五）晚上6点至10点的鸡尾酒会；第二场则是5月5日（周日）上午9点至下午5点的大型庆典。股东专属价格适用于5月2日至6日期间，如您希望避开周五晚与周日高峰人流，也可选择其他时间凭股东证件购物。周六营业至18:00。宝狮的毛利率比同行低整整20个百分点，所以买得越多越划算（这是我妻子和女儿告诉我的）。欢迎前来体验“钱包大出血”。
In the mall outside of Borsheim’s, we will have some of the world’s top bridge experts available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. We expect Bob and Petra Hamman along with Sharon Osberg to host tables. Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will also be in the mall, taking on all comers — blindfolded!
在宝狮商场外的广场上，周日下午将邀请世界顶级桥牌专家与股东互动。Bob Hamman夫妇和Sharon Osberg将亲自设桌陪打。两次获得美国国际象棋冠军的Patrick Wolff也将蒙眼迎战挑战者！
Last year, Patrick played as many as six games simultaneously — with his blindfold securely in place — and this year will try for seven. Finally, Bill Robertie, one of only two players who have twice won the backgammon world championship, will be on hand to test your skill at that game. Come to the mall on Sunday for the Mensa Olympics.
去年，帕特里克·沃尔夫（Patrick Wolff）戴着遮眼布同时对阵六盘棋，今年他将挑战七盘。另外，Bill Robertie这位仅有的两位双料世界西洋双陆棋冠军之一，也会到场与大家切磋技艺。周日下午来广场，参加“门萨级智力奥运会”，尽情较量吧！
Gorat's — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 5, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that to come to Gorat's on Sunday, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1 (but not before). If Sunday is sold out, try Gorat's on one of the other evenings you will be in town. Show your sophistication by ordering a rare T-bone with a double order of hash browns.
Gorat’s——我最喜欢的牛排馆——将于5月5日（周日）下午4点至10点专为伯克希尔股东开放。请记住，如欲在周日前去用餐，必须提前预约。您可在4月1日当天拨打电话402-551-3733进行预订（请勿提前拨打）。若周日晚位已满，也可在您逗留奥马哈的其他晚上前往Gorat's用餐。点餐时不妨展现您的品位：来一份三分熟T骨牛排配双份薯饼。
The usual baseball game will be held at Rosenblatt Stadium at 7 p.m. on Saturday night. This year the Omaha Royals will play the Oklahoma RedHawks. Last year, in an attempt to emulate the career switch of Babe Ruth, I gave up pitching and tried batting. Bob Gibson, an Omaha native, was on the mound and I was terrified, fearing Bob's famous brush-back pitch. Instead, he delivered a fast ball in the strike zone, and with a Mark McGwire-like swing, I managed to connect for a hard grounder, which inexplicably died in the infield. I didn't run it out: At my age, I get winded playing a hand of bridge.
周六晚七点，我们照例会在Rosenblatt体育场观看棒球比赛。今年将由奥马哈皇家队迎战俄克拉荷马红鹰队。去年我效仿贝比·鲁斯的职业生涯转型，从投手改当打者。来自奥马哈的传奇投手鲍勃·吉布森（Bob Gibson）站上投手丘时，我还真有点紧张，生怕他那标志性的近身球飞过来。没想到他却投了一颗好球区内的快速直球，我以马克·麦奎尔（Mark McGwire）式的挥棒击出一记强劲的地滚球，但不知为何球竟然停在了内野。我没跑完垒：我这个年纪，连打个桥牌都会喘。
I'm not sure what will take place at the ballpark this year, but come out and be surprised. Our proxy statement contains instructions for obtaining tickets to the game. Those people ordering tickets to the annual meeting will receive a booklet containing all manner of information that should help you enjoy your visit in Omaha. There will be plenty of action in town. So come for Woodstock Weekend and join our Celebration of Capitalism at the Civic.
今年球场会安排什么活动我不确定，但欢迎你亲自前来体验惊喜。我们的委托书文件中包含了获取球赛门票的方法。凡订购股东大会入场券者，都将收到一本信息详尽的手册，助您畅游奥马哈。届时全城活动丰富、精彩不断。所以，请把这周末当作“伍德斯托克式”聚会，加入我们在市政礼堂举行的“资本主义庆典”。
Finally, I would like to thank the wonderful and incredibly productive crew at World Headquarters (all 5,246.5 square feet of it) who make my job so easy. Berkshire added about 40,000 employees last year, bringing our workforce to 110,000. At headquarters we added one employee and now have 14.8. (I've tried in vain to get JoEllen Rieck to change her workweek from four days to five; I think she likes the national recognition she gains by being .8.)
最后，我想感谢总部世界办公室（总共才5,246.5平方英尺）这支杰出且高效运作的团队，是你们让我的工作如此轻松。去年伯克希尔新增员工约4万人，目前全球员工总数达11万。而总部只加了一名员工，现共有14.8人。（我曾多次试图说服JoEllen Rieck将每周工作日从四天改为五天，但始终未果；我觉得她挺喜欢这种“0.8”的全国性知名度。）
The smooth handling of the array of duties that come with our current size and scope – as well as some additional activities almost unique to Berkshire, such as our shareholder gala and designated-gifts program – takes a very special group of people. And that we most definitely have.
面对伯克希尔如今的规模和职责范围，以及一些几乎只有我们才会开展的独特事务——例如股东晚宴和指定捐赠项目——需要一支极其特别的团队才能顺利运转。而我们确实拥有这样一群人。
Warren E. Buffett
February 28, 2002
Chairman of the Board