2023巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.（伯克希尔哈撒韦致全体股东）
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing the savings of a great number of individuals. We are grateful for their enduring trust, a relationship that often spans much of their adult lifetime. It is those dedicated savers that are forefront in my mind as I write this letter.
伯克希尔哈撒韦致全体股东：
我和长期合作伙伴查理·芒格肩负着管理大量个人储蓄的职责。我们深感他们持久信任的珍贵，这种关系往往贯穿他们成年生活的大部分时间。在撰写此信时，我的脑海里始终浮现的是这些专注的储蓄者。
A common belief is that people choose to save when young, expecting thereby to maintain their living standards after retirement. Any assets that remain at death, this theory says, will usually be left to their families or, possibly, to friends and philanthropy.
一种普遍观点认为，人们年轻时选择储蓄是为了退休后维持生活水平。该理论指出，去世时剩余的资产通常会留给家人，或可能用于朋友和慈善事业。
Our experience has differed. We believe Berkshire’s individual holders largely to be of the once-a-saver, always-a-saver variety. Though these people live well, they eventually dispense most of their funds to philanthropic organizations. These, in turn, redistribute the funds by expenditures intended to improve the lives of a great many people who are unrelated to the original benefactor. Sometimes, the results have been spectacular.
我们的经验不同。我们认为伯克希尔的个人股东大多是“一旦开始储蓄，便终身坚持”的投资者。尽管他们生活富足，但最终会将大部分资金捐赠给慈善机构。这些机构通过支出资金改善大量与原始捐赠者无关联人群的生活质量，有时甚至取得了非凡成果。
The disposition of money unmasks humans. Charlie and I watch with pleasure the vast flow of Berkshire-generated funds to public needs and, alongside, the infrequency with which our shareholders opt for look-at-me assets and dynasty-building.
金钱的用途揭示了人性。查理和我欣慰地看到伯克希尔创造的资金大量流向公共需求，也注意到我们的股东很少选择炫耀型资产或家族财富积累。
Who wouldn’t enjoy working for shareholders like ours?
谁不愿为这样的股东效力呢？
# What We Do（我们的运作方式）
Charlie and I allocate your savings at Berkshire between two related forms of ownership. First, we invest in businesses that we control, usually buying 100% of each. Berkshire directs capital allocation at these subsidiaries and selects the CEOs who make day-by-day operating decisions. When large enterprises are being managed, both trust and rules are essential. Berkshire emphasizes the former to an unusual – some would say extreme – degree. Disappointments are inevitable. We are understanding about business mistakes; our tolerance for personal misconduct is zero.
我和查理将您的储蓄分配在两种相关所有权形式中：第一类是控股企业（通常全资拥有），伯克希尔主导资本配置并任命负责日常运营的CEO。管理大型企业时，“信任”与“规则”缺一不可。伯克希尔对信任的重视程度异乎寻常（有人会说是极致）。失望不可避免——我们对商业失误保持理解，但对个人行为失当零容忍。
In our second category of ownership, we buy publicly-traded stocks through which we passively own pieces of businesses. Holding these investments, we have no say in management.
第二类投资是公开交易的股票，通过它们我们被动持有企业权益。这类投资中，我们对管理层无决策权。
# The Power of Long-Term Investing（长期投资的力量）
American Express is much the same story. Berkshire’s purchases of Amex were essentially completed in 1995 and, coincidentally, also cost $1.3 billion. Annual dividends received from this investment have grown from $41 million to $302 million. Those checks, too, seem highly likely to increase.
美国运通的故事如出一辙。伯克希尔对运通的投资基本完成于1995年，巧合的是成本同样为13亿美元。该投资的年度分红从4,100万美元增长至3.02亿美元，且未来分红增长的可能性极高。
These dividend gains, though pleasing, are far from spectacular. But they bring with them important gains in stock prices. At yearend, our Coke investment was valued at $25 billion while Amex was recorded at $22 billion. Each holding now accounts for roughly 5% of Berkshire’s net worth, akin to its weighting long ago.
尽管分红增长可观，但更显著的收益来自股价上涨。年末，可口可乐持仓估值250亿美元，美国运通达220亿美元。两者目前合计占伯克希尔净资产约5%，与早期权重相似。
Assume, for a moment, I had made a similarly-sized investment mistake in the 1990s, one that flat-lined and simply retained its $1.3 billion value in 2022. (An example would be a high-grade 30-year bond.) That disappointing investment would now represent an insignificant 0.3% of Berkshire’s net worth and would be delivering to us an unchanged $80 million or so of annual income.
试想，若我在1990年代犯下同等规模的投资错误——例如购买一只30年期优质债券——该资产在2022年仅价值13亿美元且无增长（假设年收益固定为8,000万美元）。如今该资产仅占伯克希尔净资产0.3%，收益也未变化。
The lesson for investors: The weeds wither away in significance as the flowers bloom. Over time, it takes just a few winners to work wonders. And, yes, it helps to start early and live into your 90s as well.
投资者应吸取的教训：杂草终将枯萎，花朵终将绽放。长期来看，少数赢家足以创造奇迹。当然，越早开始投资、活得更久会进一步放大这一效应。
# The Past Year in Brief（2022年简要回顾）
Berkshire had a good year in 2022. The company’s operating earnings – our term for income calculated using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), exclusive of capital gains or losses from equity holdings – set a record at $30.8 billion. Charlie and I focus on this operational figure and urge you to do so as well. The GAAP figure, absent our adjustment, fluctuates wildly and capriciously at every reporting date. Note its acrobatic behavior in 2022, which is in no way unusual:
2022年伯克希尔表现良好。公司运营利润（我们定义为排除股权持仓损益的会计准则下的收益）创纪录达308亿美元。查理和我始终聚焦这一指标，并建议您同样如此。而未经调整的会计准则净利润则随市场波动剧烈且反复无常。请留意2022年数据的大幅波动（绝非例外）：
| Earnings in $ billions | 2022 Quarter | “Operating Earnings” | GAAP Earnings We are Required to Report |
|---|---|---|---|
| 收益（单位：十亿美元） | 2022年季度 | 运营利润 | 强制性GAAP净利润 |
| 1 | 7.0 | 5.5 | |
| 第一季度 | 70亿 | 55亿 | |
| 2 | 9.3 | (43.8) | |
| 第二季度 | 93亿 | 亏损438亿 | |
| 3 | 7.8 | (2.7) | |
| 第三季度 | 78亿 | 亏损27亿 | |
| 4 | 6.7 | 18.2 | |
| 第四季度 | 67亿 | 盈利182亿 |
The GAAP earnings are 100% misleading when viewed quarterly or even annually. Capital gains, to be sure, have been hugely important to Berkshire over past decades, and we expect them to be meaningfully positive in future decades. But their quarter-by-quarter gyrations, regularly and mindlessly headlined by media, totally misinform investors.
以季度或年度为单位的GAAP净利润具有完全误导性。尽管资本利得过去数十年对伯克希尔至关重要，且未来预计仍会贡献显著收益，但媒体反复炒作的季度波动完全扭曲了投资者认知。
# 2022年的第二大积极进展（A Second Positive Development for Berkshire in 2022）
A second positive development for Berkshire last year was our purchase of Alleghany Corporation, a property-casualty insurer captained by Joe Brandon. I’ve worked with Joe in the past, and he understands both Berkshire and insurance. Alleghany delivers special value to us because Berkshire’s unmatched financial strength allows its insurance subsidiaries to follow valuable and enduring investment strategies unavailable to virtually all competitors.
2022年伯克希尔的第二大积极进展是收购了由Joe Brandon领导的财险和意外险公司Alleghany Corporation。我曾与Joe合作过，他深谙伯克希尔和保险业务。Alleghany为我们带来独特价值，因为伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力使旗下保险公司能够采取竞争对手几乎无法效仿的长期投资策略。
Aided by Alleghany, our insurance float increased during 2022 from $147 billion to $164 billion. With disciplined underwriting, these funds have a decent chance of being cost-free over time. Since purchasing our first property-casualty insurer in 1967, Berkshire’s float has increased 8,000-fold through acquisitions, operations and innovations. Though not recognized in our financial statements, this float has been an extraordinary asset for Berkshire. New shareholders can get an understanding of its value by reading our annually updated explanation of float on page A-2.
得益于Alleghany，我们的保险浮存金在2022年从1,470亿美元增至1,640亿美元。通过严格的承保纪律，这些资金有望长期实现“零成本”甚至负成本。自1967年收购首家财险公司以来，伯克希尔的浮存金通过并购、运营和创新增长了8,000倍。尽管财务报表中未体现其价值，这一浮存金已成为伯克希尔的核心资产。新股东可通过阅读年报A-2页关于浮存金的年度更新解释理解其意义。
# 股票回购对每股内在价值的提升（Share Repurchases and Intrinsic Value）
A very minor gain in per-share intrinsic value took place in 2022 through Berkshire share repurchases as well as similar moves at Apple and American Express, both significant investees of ours. At Berkshire, we directly increased your interest in our unique collection of businesses by repurchasing 1.2% of the company’s outstanding shares. At Apple and Amex, repurchases increased Berkshire’s ownership a bit without any cost to us.
2022年，伯克希尔、苹果和美国运通的股票回购为每股内在价值带来了微小提升——这两家也是我们的重仓投资标的。通过回购1.2%的流通股，我们直接提升了您对伯克希尔独特企业组合的权益。在苹果和运通的回购中，我们的持股比例被动上升，且未新增成本。
The math isn’t complicated: When the share count goes down, your interest in our many businesses goes up. Every small bit helps if repurchases are made at value-accretive prices. Just as surely, when a company overpays for repurchases, the continuing shareholders lose. At such times, gains flow only to the selling shareholders and to the friendly, but expensive, investment banker who recommended the foolish purchases.
数学逻辑并不复杂：股份减少，您在我们众多业务中的权益比例就会上升。若以价值增厚的价格回购，每一点积累都带来帮助。反之，若公司高价回购，持续股东将受损，收益仅流向卖出方和推荐这一愚蠢操作的投行顾问——他们往往收费高昂却毫无价值。
# 回购的普惠性与误解（The Universality of Repurchase Benefits）
Gains from value-accretive repurchases, it should be emphasized, benefit all owners – in every respect. Imagine, if you will, three fully-informed shareholders of a local auto dealership, one of whom manages the business. Imagine, further, that one of the passive owners wishes to sell his interest back to the company at a price attractive to the two continuing shareholders. When completed, has this transaction harmed anyone? Is the manager somehow favored over the continuing passive owners? Has the public been hurt?
需强调的是，价值增厚型回购的收益惠及所有股东。试想一个本地汽车经销商有三位知情股东，其中一位参与管理。若一位被动股东以对两位留存股东有利的价格将股份回售给公司，交易完成后谁受损了？管理者是否获得了比留存股东更多的优势？公众利益是否受损？
When you are told that all repurchases are harmful to shareholders or to the country, or particularly beneficial to CEOs, you are listening to either an economic illiterate or a silver-tongued demagogue (characters that are not mutually exclusive).
若有人声称所有回购均损害股东或国家利益，或仅对CEO有益，您听到的不是经济学门外汉的言论，就是巧舌如簧的煽动者（两者身份可能重叠）的诡辩。
# Almost endless details of Berkshire’s 2022 operations...（伯克希尔2022年运营的详尽细节）
Almost endless details of Berkshire’s 2022 operations are laid out on pages K-33 – K-66. Charlie and I, along with many Berkshire shareholders, enjoy poring over the many facts and figures laid out in that section. These pages are not, however, required reading. There are many Berkshire centimillionaires and, yes, billionaires who have never studied our financial figures. They simply know that Charlie and I – along with our families and close friends – continue to have very significant investments in Berkshire, and they trust us to treat their money as we do our own. And that is a promise we can make.
伯克希尔2022年运营的几乎无穷无尽的细节详见K-33至K-66页。查理和我与许多股东一样，热衷于研究该部分列出的大量数据。但这些页面并非必读内容。许多持有伯克希尔百万美元（甚至十亿美元）资产的投资者从未研读过我们的财务数据。他们只需知道查理和我——以及我们的家人和密友——始终在伯克希尔拥有巨额投资，并相信我们会像管理自己的资金一样对待他们的财富。这一承诺，我们能够兑现。
# Finally, an important warning...（最后的重要警示）
Finally, an important warning: Even the operating earnings figure that we favor can easily be manipulated by managers who wish to do so. Such tampering is often thought of as sophisticated by CEOs, directors and their advisors. Reporters and analysts embrace its existence as well. Beating “expectations” is heralded as a managerial triumph. That activity is disgusting. It requires no talent to manipulate numbers: Only a deep desire to deceive is required. “Bold imaginative accounting,” as a CEO once described his deception to me, has become one of the shames of capitalism.
最后，一个重要警示：即便我们偏好的运营利润数据，也可能被有意为之的管理者轻易操控。这种篡改行为常被CEO、董事及其顾问视为“高明操作”，记者和分析师也乐于传播此类现象。所谓“超越预期”被吹嘘为管理层的胜利。这种行为令人作呕。操纵数字无需任何能力，仅需强烈的欺骗意图。“大胆的想象会计”，一位CEO曾这样向我描述他的造假行为——已成为资本主义的耻辱之一。
# 58 Years – and a Few Figures（58年——以及一些数字）
In 1965, Berkshire was a one-trick pony, the owner of a venerable – but doomed – New England textile operation. With that business on a death march, Berkshire needed an immediate fresh start. Looking back, I was slow to recognize the severity of its problems.
1965年，伯克希尔还是一匹“单招马”，仅拥有一家历史悠久但注定失败的新英格兰纺织企业。当这项业务走向末路时，伯克希尔迫切需要全新的起点。回顾过去，我未能及时意识到其问题的严重性。
And then came a stroke of good luck: National Indemnity became available in 1967, and we shifted our resources toward insurance and other non-textile operations.
转机随之而来：1967年，我们收购了国家赔偿保险公司（National Indemnity），并将资源转向保险和其他非纺织业务。
Thus began our journey to 2023, a bumpy road involving a combination of continuous savings by our owners (that is, by their retaining earnings), the power of compounding, our avoidance of major mistakes and – most important of all – the American Tailwind. America would have done fine without Berkshire. The reverse is not true.
我们的旅程由此开启，通往2023年的道路充满波折，由股东持续储蓄（即留存收益）、复利威力、规避重大错误，以及最重要的——美国经济东风共同铺就。若没有伯克希尔，美国依然会繁荣；反之则未必成立。
Berkshire now enjoys major ownership in an unmatched collection of huge and diversified businesses. Let’s first look at the 5,000 or so publicly-held companies that trade daily on NASDAQ, the NYSE and related venues. Within this group is housed the members of the S&P 500 Index, an elite collection of large and well-known American companies.
如今，伯克希尔已控股一系列规模庞大、业务多元的企业。首先来看纳斯达克、纽约证券交易所及相关平台每日交易的约5,000家上市公司。标普500指数成员——美国大型知名企业中的精英群体——也包含其中。
In aggregate, the 500 earned $1.8 trillion in 2021. I don’t yet have the final results for 2022. Using, therefore, the 2021 figures, only 128 of the 500 (including Berkshire itself) earned $3 billion or more. Indeed, 23 lost money.
2021年，这500家公司合计盈利1.8万亿美元。2022年最终数据尚未出炉，基于2021年数据，仅有128家（含伯克希尔）盈利超过30亿美元，其中23家甚至出现亏损。
# 伯克希尔对大型企业的持股与税务贡献（At yearend 2022, Berkshire was the largest owner of eight of these giants...）
At yearend 2022, Berkshire was the largest owner of eight of these giants: American Express, Bank of America, Chevron, Coca-Cola, HP Inc., Moody’s, Occidental Petroleum and Paramount Global.
截至2022年底，伯克希尔是以下八家巨头的最大股东：美国运通、美国银行、雪佛龙、可口可乐、惠普公司、穆迪、西方石油公司和派拉蒙全球公司。
In addition to those eight investees, Berkshire owns 100% of BNSF and 92% of BH Energy, each with earnings that exceed the $3 billion mark noted above ($5.9 billion at BNSF and $4.3 billion at BHE). Were these companies publicly-owned, they would replace two present members of the 500. All told, our ten controlled and non-controlled behemoths leave Berkshire more broadly aligned with the country’s economic future than is the case at any other U.S. company. (This calculation leaves aside “fiduciary” operations such as pension funds and investment companies.) In addition, Berkshire’s insurance operation, though conducted through many individually-managed subsidiaries, has a value comparable to BNSF or BHE.
除上述八家投资外，伯克希尔全资控股BNSF铁路公司并持有BH能源公司92%的股份，两者的盈利均超过前述30亿美元门槛（BNSF盈利59亿美元，BHE盈利43亿美元）。若这两家公司被列入标普500指数，它们将取代现有两家企业。总体而言，伯克希尔通过控股或非控股的十家巨型企业，比任何其他美国公司更广泛地与国家经济未来保持一致。（此计算未包含养老基金或投资公司的“受托”业务。）此外，尽管保险业务通过多家独立管理的子公司运营，但其价值可与BNSF或BHE媲美。
As for the future, Berkshire will always hold a boatload of cash and U.S. Treasury bills along with a wide array of businesses. We will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs at inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses. Our CEO will always be the Chief Risk Officer – a task it is irresponsible to delegate. Additionally, our future CEOs will have a significant part of their net worth in Berkshire shares, bought with their own money. And yes, our shareholders will continue to save and prosper by retaining earnings.
展望未来，伯克希尔将始终持有大量现金和美国国债，以及多元化的业务组合。我们将避免任何可能导致突发资金压力的行为，包括金融恐慌或前所未有的保险损失。我们的CEO必须始终担任首席风险官——这一职责不可委托他人。此外，未来的CEO个人财富中将有大量伯克希尔股份，且由其自有资金购入。当然，我们的股东将继续通过留存收益实现储蓄与繁荣。
# 一些关于联邦税收的惊人事实（Some Surprising Facts About Federal Taxes）
During the decade ending in 2021, the United States Treasury received about $32.3 trillion in taxes while it spent $43.9 trillion.
截至2021年的十年间，美国财政部税收收入约32.3万亿美元，支出却达43.9万亿美元。
Though economists, politicians and many of the public have opinions about the consequences of that huge imbalance, Charlie and I plead ignorance and firmly believe that near-term economic and market forecasts are worse than useless. Our job is to manage Berkshire’s operations and finances in a manner that will achieve an acceptable result over time and that will preserve the company’s unmatched staying power when financial panics or severe worldwide recessions occur. Berkshire also offers some modest protection from runaway inflation, but this attribute is far from perfect. Huge and entrenched fiscal deficits have consequences.
尽管经济学家、政治家和公众对这一巨大失衡的影响众说纷纭，查理和我坦承无知，并坚信短期经济与市场预测比毫无用处更糟。我们的职责是管理伯克希尔的运营与财务，以在长期实现可接受的结果，并在金融恐慌或全球严重衰退时维持公司无与伦比的持久力。伯克希尔对恶性通胀提供了一定保护，但这一特性远非完美。巨额且根深蒂固的财政赤字必然带来后果。
The $32 trillion of revenue was garnered by the Treasury through individual income taxes (48%), social security and related receipts (34 1⁄2%), corporate income tax payments (8 1⁄2%) and a wide variety of lesser levies. Berkshire’s contribution via the corporate income tax was $32 billion during the decade, almost exactly a tenth of 1% of all money that the Treasury collected.
财政部的32万亿美元收入中，个人所得税占比48%，社会保障及相关收入34.5%，企业所得税8.5%，其余为各类小额税种。伯克希尔在此期间缴纳的企业所得税为320亿美元，约占财政部总税收收入的0.1%。
# And that means – brace yourself – had there been roughly 1,000 taxpayers in the U.S. matching Berkshire’s payments...（这意味着——做好心理准备——如果美国约有1,000名纳税人缴纳的税费与伯克希尔相当）
And that means – brace yourself – had there been roughly 1,000 taxpayers in the U.S. matching Berkshire’s payments, no other businesses nor any of the country’s 131 million households would have needed to pay any taxes to the federal government. Not a dime.
这意味着——做好心理准备——如果美国约有1,000名纳税人缴纳的税费与伯克希尔相当，那么其他所有企业及全国1.31亿家庭均无需向联邦政府缴税。一分钱都不需要再交。
Millions, billions, trillions – we all know the words, but the sums involved are almost impossible to comprehend. Let’s put physical dimensions to the numbers:
• If you convert $1 million into newly-printed $100 bills, you will have a stack that reaches your chest.
• Perform the same exercise with $1 billion – this is getting exciting! – and the stack reaches about 3⁄4 of a mile into the sky.
• Finally, imagine piling up $32 billion, the total of Berkshire’s 2012-21 federal income tax payments. Now the stack grows to more than 21 miles in height, about three times the level at which commercial airplanes usually cruise.
百万、十亿、万亿——我们都会念出这些词，但数字本身几乎难以想象。让我们用实物尺寸来感受：
• 将100万美元换成全新百元钞票，堆叠起来的高度可达到你的胸部。
• 用10亿美元重复这个实验——开始令人兴奋了！——钞票堆叠高度可达四分之三英里（约1.2公里）。
• 最后，想象将320亿美元（2012-2021年伯克希尔联邦所得税总额）堆叠起来。此时高度超过21英里（约34公里），是民航客机巡航高度的三倍。
When it comes to federal taxes, individuals who own Berkshire can unequivocally state “I gave at the office.”
在联邦税收问题上，持有伯克希尔的股东可以毫不含糊地说：“我在办公室就已慷慨解囊。”
# At Berkshire we hope and expect to pay much more in taxes during the next decade...（伯克希尔希望并预期未来十年缴纳更多税收）
At Berkshire we hope and expect to pay much more in taxes during the next decade. We owe the country no less: America’s dynamism has made a huge contribution to whatever success Berkshire has achieved – a contribution Berkshire will always need. We count on the American Tailwind and, though it has been becalmed from time to time, its propelling force has always returned.
伯克希尔希望并预期未来十年缴纳更多税收。这是我们的责任：美国经济活力对伯克希尔取得的任何成功都功不可没，而这种贡献始终不可或缺。我们坚信“美国东风”的力量，尽管偶尔会遭遇逆风，但其推动力终将回归。
I have been investing for 80 years – more than one-third of our country’s lifetime. Despite our citizens’ penchant – almost enthusiasm – for self-criticism and self-doubt, I have yet to see a time when it made sense to make a long-term bet against America. And I doubt very much that any reader of this letter will have a different experience in the future.
我投资已80年——超过美国国龄的三分之一。尽管美国民众热衷自我批评与怀疑，但我从未见过一个适合长期做空美国的时代。我坚信，未来任何阅读此信的读者都不会有不同体验。
# Nothing Beats Having a Great Partner（没有比拥有伟大伙伴更好的事）
Charlie and I think pretty much alike. But what it takes me a page to explain, he sums up in a sentence. His version, moreover, is always more clearly reasoned and also more artfully – some might add bluntly – stated.
查理和我思维方式高度一致。但需要我写满一页才能解释清楚的道理，他总能用一句话精准概括。他的表述不仅逻辑更清晰，而且语言更犀利——有人或许会说更直白。
Here are a few of his thoughts, many lifted from a very recent podcast:
• The world is full of foolish gamblers, and they will not do as well as the patient investor.
• If you don’t see the world the way it is, it’s like judging something through a distorted lens.
• All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there. And a related thought: Early on, write your desired obituary – and then behave accordingly.
• If you don’t care whether you are rational or not, you won’t work on it. Then you will stay irrational and get lousy results.
• Patience can be learned. Having a long attention span and the ability to concentrate on one thing for a long time is a huge advantage.
• You can learn a lot from dead people. Read of the deceased you admire and detest.
• Don’t bail away in a sinking boat if you can swim to one that is seaworthy.
• A great company keeps working after you are not; a mediocre company won’t do that.
• Warren and I don’t focus on the froth of the market. We seek out good long-term investments and stubbornly hold them for a long time.
• Ben Graham said, “Day to day, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term it’s a weighing machine.” If you keep making something more valuable, then some wise person is going to notice it and start buying.
• There is no such thing as a 100% sure thing when investing. Thus, the use of leverage is dangerous. A string of wonderful numbers times zero will always equal zero. Don’t count on getting rich twice.
• You don’t, however, need to own a lot of things in order to get rich.
• You have to keep learning if you want to become a great investor. When the world changes, you must change.
• Warren and I hated railroad stocks for decades, but the world changed and finally the country had four huge railroads of vital importance to the American economy. We were slow to recognize the change, but better late than never.
• Finally, I will add two short sentences by Charlie that have been his decision-clinchers for decades: “Warren, think more about it. You’re smart and I’m right.”
以下是查理的部分箴言，多数摘自最近一次播客访谈：
• 世界充斥着愚蠢的赌徒，他们的收益远不如耐心的投资者。
• 若你不能如实看待世界，就像透过扭曲的镜头观察事物。
• 我唯一想确定的“死亡地点”是：找到它后永远避开。延伸思考：尽早写下你希望的讣告内容，并据此行动。
• 若你不在乎自己是否理性，便不会去修炼理性。最终你会保持非理性，并收获糟糕的结果。
• 耐心是可以习得的。长期专注同一件事的能力是巨大优势。
• 向逝者学习——阅读你钦佩或厌恶之人的传记。
• 若能游向一艘可靠的船，就别浪费力气从沉船中舀水。
• 伟大的公司会在你离开后持续运转，平庸的公司则不然。
• 沃伦和我从不追逐市场泡沫。我们寻找优质长期投资标的，并顽固持有。
• 本·格雷厄姆说过：“短期来看，股市是投票机；长期来看，它是称重机。” 若你持续创造价值，终将有人发现并买入。
• 投资中没有100%确定的事。因此使用杠杆是危险的。一连串辉煌数字乘以零仍等于零。别指望暴富两次。
• 想致富，无需拥有很多资产。
• 想成为伟大投资者，必须持续学习。世界变化时，你也必须改变。
• 沃伦和我曾几十年厌恶铁路股，但世界变了——如今美国已有四家对经济至关重要的巨型铁路公司。我们察觉变化较晚，但迟到总比不到好。
• 最后，分享查理几十年来的决策信条：“沃伦，再仔细想想。你聪明，但我正确。”
# A Family Gathering in Omaha（奥马哈的家庭聚会）
I will add to Charlie’s list a rule of my own: Find a very smart high-grade partner – preferably slightly older than you – and then listen very carefully to what he says.
在此基础上，我补充一条自己的规则：寻找一位非常聪明且资历深厚的合作伙伴——最好比你年长些——并认真倾听他的建议。
Charlie and I are shameless. Last year, at our first shareholder get-together in three years, we greeted you with our usual commercial hustle. From the opening bell, we went straight for your wallet. In short order, our See’s kiosk sold you eleven tons of nourishing peanut brittle and chocolates. In our P.T. Barnum pitch, we promised you longevity. After all, what else but candy from See’s could account for Charlie and me making it to 99 and 92?
查理和我厚脸皮。去年是疫情后首次股东聚会，我们一如既往地向各位的钱包发起冲锋。开张即售出11吨See’s花生糖和巧克力。我们甚至打出P.T.巴纳姆式的口号：长寿秘诀？除了See’s糖果，还有什么能让查理活到99岁、我活到92岁？
I know you can’t wait to hear the specifics of last year’s hustle. On Friday, the doors were open from noon until 5 p.m., and our candy counters rang up 2,690 individual sales. On Saturday, See’s registered an additional 3,931 transactions between 7 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., despite the fact that 6 1⁄2 of the 9 1⁄2 operating hours occurred while our movie and the question-and-answer session were limiting commercial traffic.
我知道你们迫不及待想了解去年的销售数据。周五中午至下午5点，我们完成了2,690笔交易。周六清晨7点至下午4:30，尽管6.5小时与电影放映和问答环节重叠（商业流量受限），See’s仍完成3,931笔交易。
Do the math: See’s rang up about 10 sales per minute during its prime operating time (racking up $400,309 of volume during the two days), with all the goods purchased at a single location selling products that haven’t been materially altered in 101 years. What worked for See’s in the days of Henry Ford’s Model T works now.
算笔账：高峰时段See’s每分钟售出约10单（两天总销售额达400,309美元）。所有产品在单一地点生产，101年来配方几乎未变。亨利·福特T型车时代的成功模式，如今依然有效。
Charlie, I, and the entire Berkshire bunch look forward to seeing you in Omaha on May 5-6. We will have a good time and so will you.
查理、我和整个伯克希尔团队期待5月5-6日在奥马哈与各位重逢。我们将共度美好时光——您也会。
February 25, 2023
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
2023年2月25日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席