2018巴菲特致股东的信

# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

(伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司)

Berkshire earned $4.0 billion in 2018 utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called “GAAP”). The components of that figure are $24.8 billion in operating earnings, a $3.0 billion non-cash loss from an impairment of intangible assets (arising almost entirely from our equity interest in Kraft Heinz), $2.8 billion in realized capital gains from the sale of investment securities and a $20.6 billion loss from a reduction in the amount of unrealized capital gains that existed in our investment holdings.

伯克希尔2018年依据通用会计准则（通常称为“GAAP”）实现了40亿美元盈利。这一数字的组成部分包括：248亿美元运营盈利，30亿美元因无形资产减值导致的非现金亏损（几乎全部源于我们对卡夫亨氏的股权投资），28亿美元来自已售投资证券的兑现资本利得，以及206亿美元因投资组合未兑现资本利得减少而产生的亏损。

A new GAAP rule requires us to include that last item in earnings. As I emphasized in the 2017 annual report, neither Berkshire’s Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, nor I believe that rule to be sensible. Rather, both of us have consistently thought that at Berkshire this mark-to-market change would produce what I described as “wild and capricious swings in our bottom line.”

一项新的GAAP规则要求我们将最后一项纳入盈利计算。正如我在2017年年报中强调的，无论是伯克希尔副董事长查理·芒格还是我都认为这一规则毫无意义。事实上，我们始终认为，这种逐日盯市的变动会导致我所说的“财报利润的狂野且反复无常的波动”。

The accuracy of that prediction can be suggested by our quarterly results during 2018. In the first and fourth quarters, we reported GAAP losses of $1.1 billion and $25.4 billion respectively. In the second and third quarters, we reported profits of $12 billion and $18.5 billion. In complete contrast to these gyrations, the many businesses that Berkshire owns delivered consistent and satisfactory operating earnings in all quarters. For the year, those earnings exceeded their 2016 high of $17.6 billion by 41%.

这一预测的准确性可通过2018年各季度结果得到验证。第一季度和第四季度，我们分别报告了11亿美元和254亿美元的GAAP亏损；第二季度和第三季度则分别实现了120亿美元和185亿美元的盈利。与这些剧烈波动形成鲜明对比的是，伯克希尔旗下所有业务全年各季度均贡献了稳定且令人满意的运营盈利。全年来看，运营盈利较2016年创下的176亿美元高点增长了41%。

Wide swings in our quarterly GAAP earnings will inevitably continue. That’s because our huge equity portfolio – valued at nearly $173 billion at the end of 2018 – will often experience one-day price fluctuations of $2 billion or more, all of which the new rule says must be dropped immediately to our bottom line. Indeed, in the fourth quarter, a period of high volatility in stock prices, we experienced several days with a “profit” or “loss” of more than $4 billion.

我们的季度GAAP盈利将不可避免地持续大幅波动。这是因为截至2018年底，我们庞大的股票投资组合价值近1730亿美元，单日市值波动超过20亿美元的情况时有发生。根据新规则，这些波动必须立即反映在财报利润中。事实上，在2018年第四季度这一股价剧烈波动期间，我们至少经历了多天“盈利”或“亏损”超过40亿美元的情况。

Our advice? Focus on operating earnings, paying little attention to gains or losses of any variety. My saying that in no way diminishes the importance of our investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect them to deliver substantial gains, albeit with highly irregular timing.

我们的建议？请专注于运营盈利，忽略任何形式的利得或亏损。强调这一点绝非贬低投资对伯克希尔的重要性。查理和我始终相信，长期来看这些投资将带来丰厚收益，尽管其时间分布可能极不规律。

Long-time readers of our annual reports will have spotted the different way in which I opened this letter. For nearly three decades, the initial paragraph featured the percentage change in Berkshire’s per-share book value. It’s now time to abandon that practice.

长期关注我们年报的读者可能已注意到今年信件开篇的不同之处。近三十年来，信件开篇通常以伯克希尔每股账面价值变动百分比为核心。但现在，是时候摒弃这一惯例了。

The fact is that the annual change in Berkshire’s book value – which makes its farewell appearance on page 2 – is a metric that has lost the relevance it once had. Three circumstances have made that so. First, Berkshire has gradually morphed from a company whose assets are concentrated in marketable stocks into one whose major value resides in operating businesses. Charlie and I expect that reshaping to continue in an irregular manner. Second, while our equity holdings are valued at market prices, accounting rules require our collection of operating companies to be included in book value at an amount far below their current value, a mismark that has grown in recent years. Third, it is likely that – over time – Berkshire will be a significant repurchaser of its shares, transactions that will take place at prices above book value but below our estimate of intrinsic value. The math of such purchases is simple: Each transaction makes per-share intrinsic value go up, while per-share book value goes down. That combination causes the book-value scorecard to become increasingly out of touch with economic reality.

事实上，伯克希尔账面价值的年度变化（本年度最后一次出现在第2页）已不再具备往昔的参考价值。这一变化由三种因素驱动：第一，伯克希尔已从一家资产集中于可交易股票的公司，逐渐转型为以运营型业务为主要价值来源的公司。查理和我认为这一重塑过程将以不规则的方式持续；第二，尽管我们的股票投资按市价计价，但会计规则要求旗下运营公司按远低于当前价值的账面价值入账，这一偏差近年来愈发严重；第三，长期来看，伯克希尔很可能会以高于账面价值、低于内在价值的价格回购股票。此类回购的逻辑简单明了：每笔交易都会推高每股内在价值，同时降低每股账面价值。两者的叠加效应使得账面价值指标日益脱离经济现实。

In future tabulations of our financial results, we expect to focus on Berkshire’s market price. Markets can be extremely capricious: Just look at the 54-year history laid out on page 2. Over time, however, Berkshire’s stock price will provide the best measure of business performance.

未来财务报告的呈现中，我们将聚焦伯克希尔的市场价格。市场情绪可能极度反复无常——参见第2页展示的54年历史数据即可直观感受。然而，从长期视角看，伯克希尔股价才是衡量企业表现的最佳标尺。

Before moving on, I want to give you some good news – really good news – that is not reflected in our financial statements. It concerns the management changes we made in early 2018, when Ajit Jain was put in charge of all insurance activities and Greg Abel was given authority over all other operations. These moves were overdue. Berkshire is now far better managed than when I alone was supervising operations. Ajit and Greg have rare talents, and Berkshire blood flows through their veins.

在进入下一部分前，请允许我分享一则未体现在财务报表中的好消息——真正的喜讯。这关乎我们在2018年初进行的管理层调整：贾因（Ajit Jain）被任命为保险业务总负责人，艾贝尔（Greg Abel）则接管除保险外的所有运营。这一调整早该发生。如今伯克希尔的管理质量已远超我独自掌舵之时。贾因和艾贝尔天赋异禀，伯克希尔的精神早已融入他们的血液。

Now let’s take a look at what you own.
(现在让我们看看你拥有什么。)

# Focus on the Forest – Forget the Trees

(放眼森林——忘记独木)

Investors who evaluate Berkshire sometimes obsess on the details of our many and diverse businesses – our economic "trees," so to speak. Analysis of that type can be mind-numbing, given that we own a vast array of specimens, ranging from twigs to redwoods. A few of our trees are diseased and unlikely to be around a decade from now. Many others, though, are destined to grow in size and beauty.

对伯克希尔进行评估的投资者有时会沉迷于我们众多且多样的业务细节——可以这么说，我们的经济“树木”。这种类型的分析可能会让人感到麻木，因为我们拥有的样本非常广泛，从灌木到红杉都有。我们的少数“树木”已经染病，可能在十年后就不复存在了。然而，还有许多其他“树木”注定会在规模和美丽上成长。

Fortunately, it’s not necessary to evaluate each tree individually to make a rough estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic business value. That’s because our forest contains five “groves” of major importance, each of which can be appraised, with reasonable accuracy, in its entirety. Four of those groves are differentiated clusters of businesses and financial assets that are easy to understand. The fifth – our huge and diverse insurance operation – delivers great value to Berkshire in a less obvious manner, one I will explain later in this letter.

幸运的是，要粗略估计伯克希尔的内在商业价值，并不需要单独评估每一棵“树”。这是因为我们的“森林”包含五个重要的“林区”，每个都可以整体进行相对准确的评估。其中四个“林区”是业务和金融资产的差异化集群，容易理解；第五个——我们庞大且多元化的保险业务——则以一种不那么显而易见的方式为伯克希尔创造巨大价值，我将在信的后半部分详细解释。

Before we look more closely at the first four groves, let me remind you of our prime goal in the deployment of your capital: to buy ably-managed businesses, in whole or part, that possess favorable and durable economic characteristics. We also need to make these purchases at sensible prices.

在深入探讨前四个“林区”之前，我想提醒各位我们的首要目标：用你们的资金投资于那些管理优秀、具备有利且持久经济特征的企业（无论是全资收购还是部分持股），同时以合理价格进行购买。

Sometimes we can buy control of companies that meet our tests. Far more often, we find the attributes we seek in publicly-traded businesses, in which we normally acquire a 5% to 10% interest. Our two-pronged approach to huge-scale capital allocation is rare in corporate America and, at times, gives us an important advantage.

有时我们能够控股符合标准的公司，但更多时候，我们在上市公司中发现我们追求的特质，并通常持有其5%-10%的股份。这种兼顾控股收购和证券投资的双轨策略在美国企业界较为罕见，却为我们带来重要的竞争优势。

In recent years, the sensible course for us to follow has been clear: Many stocks have offered far more for our money than we could obtain by purchasing businesses in their entirety. That disparity led us to buy about $43 billion of marketable equities last year, while selling only $19 billion. Charlie and I believe the companies in which we invested offered excellent value, far exceeding that available in takeover transactions.

近年来，对我们而言最理性的路径显而易见：许多股票能为我们的资金创造的价值远超直接收购企业。这种差异促使我们去年买入约430亿美元可交易股票，仅卖出190亿美元。查理和我认为，我们投资的公司提供了远超并购交易的优质价值。

Despite our recent additions to marketable equities, the most valuable grove in Berkshire’s forest remains the many dozens of non-insurance businesses that Berkshire controls (usually with 100% ownership and never with less than 80%). Those subsidiaries earned $16.8 billion last year. When we say “earned,” moreover, we are describing what remains after all income taxes, interest payments, managerial compensation (whether cash or stock-based), restructuring expenses, depreciation, amortization and home-office overhead.

尽管我们近期增加了可交易证券的投资，伯克希尔森林中最珍贵的“林区”仍然是我们控股的数十家非保险企业（通常持有100%股权，且持股比例从未低于80%）。这些子公司去年盈利168亿美元。需要强调的是，这里的“盈利”是指扣除所有所得税、利息支出、管理层薪酬（现金或股权形式）、重组费用、折旧摊销及总部管理费用后的实际留存收益。

That brand of earnings is a far cry from that frequently touted by Wall Street bankers and corporate CEOs. Too often, their presentations feature “adjusted EBITDA,” a measure that redefines “earnings” to exclude a variety of all-too-real costs.

这种盈利概念与华尔街银行家和企业CEO们常吹嘘的“调整后EBITDA”大相径庭。后者通过排除多种实际存在的成本（如重组费用、股权激励等）来重新定义“盈利”，往往掩盖了真实的财务状况。

For example, managements sometimes assert that their company’s stock-based compensation shouldn’t be counted as an expense. (What else could it be – a gift from shareholders?) And restructuring expenses? Well, maybe last year’s exact rearrangement won’t recur. But restructurings of one sort or another are common in business – Berkshire has gone down that road dozens of times, and our shareholders have always borne the costs of doing so.

例如，管理层有时声称股权激励不应计入费用。（否则它还能是什么？股东馈赠？）重组费用也是如此，或许去年的具体调整不会重演，但各类重组在企业中普遍存在——伯克希尔已经历过数十次重组，而所有成本始终由股东承担。

Abraham Lincoln once posed the question: “If you call a dog’s tail a leg, how many legs does it have?” and then answered his own query: “Four, because calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it one.” Abe would have felt lonely on Wall Street.

亚伯拉罕·林肯曾提出一个问题：“如果你把狗的尾巴称为腿，那它有多少条腿？”随后他自答：“四条，因为把尾巴叫成腿并不会让它变成腿。”如果林肯出现在华尔街，他一定会感到孤独。

Charlie and I do contend that our acquisition-related amortization expenses of $1.4 billion (detailed on page K-84) are not a true economic cost. We add back such amortization “costs” to GAAP earnings when we are evaluating both private businesses and marketable stocks.

查理和我坚持认为，与收购相关的14亿美元摊销费用（详见K-84页）并非真正的经济成本。在评估私营企业和可交易股票时，我们会将这类“摊销成本”加回到GAAP盈利中。

# In contrast, Berkshire’s $8.4 billion depreciation charge understates our true economic cost.

(相比之下，伯克希尔的84亿美元折旧费用低估了我们的真实经济成本)

In contrast, Berkshire’s $8.4 billion depreciation charge understates our true economic cost. In fact, we need to spend more than this sum annually to simply remain competitive in our many operations. Beyond those “maintenance” capital expenditures, we spend large sums in pursuit of growth. Overall, Berkshire invested a record $14.5 billion last year in plant, equipment and other fixed assets, with 89% of that spent in America.

相比之下，伯克希尔84亿美元的折旧费用低估了我们的实际经济成本。事实上，为了在众多业务中保持竞争力，我们每年必须投入超过这一金额的资金。除了这些“维护性”资本支出外，我们还投入巨资追求增长。总体而言，伯克希尔去年在工厂、设备和其他固定资产上的投资创下纪录达145亿美元，其中89%用于美国本土。

# Berkshire’s runner-up grove by value is its collection of equities...

(伯克希尔第二大价值“林区”是其持有的股权资产)

Berkshire’s runner-up grove by value is its collection of equities, typically involving a 5% to 10% ownership position in a very large company. As noted earlier, our equity investments were worth nearly $173 billion at yearend, an amount far above their cost. If the portfolio had been sold at its yearend valuation, federal income tax of about $14.7 billion would have been payable on the gain. In all likelihood, we will hold most of these stocks for a long time. Eventually, however, gains generate taxes at whatever rate prevails at the time of sale.

按价值排序，伯克希尔第二大“林区”是其持有的股票资产，通常在大型公司中拥有5%-10%的股权。如前所述，年末这些股权资产价值近1730亿美元，远超初始成本。若以年末估值出售，需缴纳约147亿美元联邦所得税。我们极有可能长期持有这些股票，但最终出售时仍需按当时税率缴税。

# Our investees paid us dividends of $3.8 billion last year...

(我们的被投企业去年支付38亿美元股息)

Our investees paid us dividends of $3.8 billion last year, a sum that will increase in 2019. Far more important than the dividends, though, are the huge earnings that are annually retained by these companies. Consider, as an indicator, these figures that cover only our five largest holdings.

我们的被投企业去年向我们支付了38亿美元股息，这一数字将在2019年增长。然而比股息更重要的是这些公司每年留存的巨额利润。以下仅以我们五大重仓股为例说明这一情况：

# Year-end Ownership & Earnings Breakdown

(年末持股与盈利明细)

Company	Berkshire’s Share in $ millions of	Dividends(1)	Retained Earnings(2)
American Express	17.9%	$237	$997
Apple	5.4%	$745	$2,502
Bank of America	9.5%	$551	$2,096
Coca-Cola	9.4%	$624	$(21)
Wells Fargo	9.8%	$809	$1,263
Total		$2,966	$6,837

(1) Based on current annual rate.
(2) Based on 2018 earnings minus common and preferred dividends paid.

GAAP – which dictates the earnings we report – does not allow us to include the retained earnings of investees in our financial accounts. But those earnings are of enormous value to us: Over the years, earnings retained by our investees (viewed as a group) have eventually delivered capital gains to Berkshire that totaled more than one dollar for each dollar these companies reinvested for us.

通用会计准则（GAAP）不允许我们将被投企业的留存收益计入财报。但这些收益对我们具有巨大价值：多年来，被投企业整体留存的利润最终为伯克希尔创造了超过1美元的资本利得——每1美元利润由他们为我们再投资时产生。

All of our major holdings enjoy excellent economics, and most use a portion of their retained earnings to repurchase their shares. We very much like that: If Charlie and I think an investee’s stock is underpriced, we rejoice when management employs some of its earnings to increase Berkshire’s ownership percentage.

我们所有重仓股都具备优异的经济特性，其中多数企业会用部分留存收益回购股票。我们对此非常欢迎：当查理和我认为某只股票被低估时，管理层用利润增持等于在变相提高我们的持股比例。

Here’s one example drawn from the table above: Berkshire’s holdings of American Express have remained unchanged over the past eight years. Meanwhile, our ownership increased from 12.6% to 17.9% because of repurchases made by the company. Last year, Berkshire’s portion of the $6.9 billion earned by American Express was $1.2 billion, about 96% of the $1.3 billion we paid for our stake in the company. When earnings increase and shares outstanding decrease, owners – over time – usually do well.

以上表为例：过去八年伯克希尔持有的美国运通股份未变，但因公司回购，我们的持股比例从12.6%升至17.9%。去年运通赚取69亿美元利润，属于伯克希尔的份额为12亿美元，接近我们初始投资成本13亿美元的96%。当盈利增长而流通股减少时，长期股东通常会获益。

# A third category of Berkshire’s business ownership...

(伯克希尔业务所有权的第三类)

A third category of Berkshire’s business ownership is a quartet of companies in which we share control with other parties. Our portion of the after-tax operating earnings of these businesses – 26.7% of Kraft Heinz, 50% of Berkadia and Electric Transmission Texas, and 38.6% of Pilot Flying J – totaled about $1.3 billion in 2018.

伯克希尔业务所有权的第三类是四家共同控股的企业。我们在这类企业的税后运营利润占比分别为：卡夫亨氏26.7%、Berkadia和Electric Transmission Texas各50%、Pilot Flying J 38.6%。2018年这部分利润合计约13亿美元。

# In our fourth grove, Berkshire held $112 billion...

(第四大“林区”：现金及固定收益资产)

In our fourth grove, Berkshire held $112 billion at yearend in U.S. Treasury bills and other cash equivalents, and another $20 billion in miscellaneous fixed-income instruments. We consider a portion of that stash to be untouchable, having pledged to always hold at least $20 billion in cash equivalents to guard against external calamities. We have also promised to avoid any activities that could threaten our maintaining that buffer.

第四大“林区”是年末持有的1120亿美元美国国债及其他现金等价物，以及200亿美元各类固定收益工具。我们承诺保留至少200亿美元现金等价物以应对极端危机，这部分资金不可动用。同时承诺不会进行威胁这一缓冲的活动。

Berkshire will forever remain a financial fortress. In managing, I will make expensive mistakes of commission and will also miss many opportunities, some of which should have been obvious to me. At times, our stock will tumble as investors flee from equities. But I will never risk getting caught short of cash.

伯克希尔将永远是金融堡垒。管理中我会犯代价高昂的错误，也会错过许多机会（有些本应显而易见）。有时股价会因投资者逃离股市而暴跌，但我绝不会冒现金短缺的风险。

# In the years ahead, we hope to move much of our excess liquidity...

(未来计划：将流动性投入永久性资产)

In the years ahead, we hope to move much of our excess liquidity into businesses that Berkshire will permanently own. The immediate prospects for that, however, are not good: Prices are sky-high for businesses possessing decent long-term prospects.

未来我们希望将大部分超额流动性资金投入伯克希尔将永久持有的业务。但近期前景并不乐观：具备合理长期前景的企业估值已高企。

That disappointing reality means that 2019 will likely see us again expanding our holdings of marketable equities. We continue, nevertheless, to hope for an elephant-sized acquisition. Even at our ages of 88 and 95 – I’m the young one – that prospect is what causes my heart and Charlie’s to beat faster. (Just writing about the possibility of a huge purchase has caused my pulse rate to soar.)

这一令人失望的现实意味着2019年我们可能再次扩大可交易股票持仓。但我们仍渴望达成一笔“大象级”收购。即使我88岁、查理95岁（我可是年轻人），这一前景仍让我们的脉搏加速。（仅仅是写下“大额收购”的可能性，我的心率已飙升。）

# My expectation of more stock purchases is not a market call...

(股票增持不代表市场预测)

My expectation of more stock purchases is not a market call. Charlie and I have no idea as to how stocks will behave next week or next year. Predictions of that sort have never been a part of our activities. Our thinking, rather, is focused on calculating whether a portion of an attractive business is worth more than its market price.

我对增持股票的预期不代表对市场的预测。查理和我完全不知道股票下周或明年将如何表现。这类预测从未出现在我们的活动中。我们的思考重点始终是计算一家优质企业的部分股权是否价值高于其市场价格。

# I believe Berkshire’s intrinsic value can be approximated by summing the values of our four asset-laden groves...

(我认为伯克希尔的内在价值可通过四大“林区”估值加总得出)

I believe Berkshire’s intrinsic value can be approximated by summing the values of our four asset-laden groves and then subtracting an appropriate amount for taxes eventually payable on the sale of marketable securities.

我认为伯克希尔的内在价值可以通过加总四大高资产“林区”的估值，再扣除可交易证券出售时需缴纳的适当税款来近似计算。

You may ask whether an allowance should not also be made for the major tax costs Berkshire would incur if we were to sell certain of our wholly-owned businesses. Forget that thought: It would be foolish for us to sell any of our wonderful companies even if no tax would be payable on its sale. Truly good businesses are exceptionally hard to find. Selling any you are lucky enough to own makes no sense at all.

你或许会问：若伯克希尔出售全资控股企业，是否也需预留大额税款？请抛开这种想法：即使无需缴税，出售我们任何一家优质企业都是愚蠢的。真正优秀的企业极其难寻，对自己有幸拥有的企业更应珍惜。

The interest cost on all of our debt has been deducted as an expense in calculating the earnings at Berkshire’s non-insurance businesses. Beyond that, much of our ownership of the first four groves is financed by funds generated from Berkshire’s fifth grove – a collection of exceptional insurance companies. We call those funds “float,” a source of financing that we expect to be cost-free – or maybe even better than that – over time. We will explain the characteristics of float later in this letter.

所有债务利息成本均已从伯克希尔非保险业务的盈利计算中扣除。此外，前四大“林区”的部分资金来源于第五大“林区”——一组卓越的保险公司。我们称这类资金为“浮存金”，长期来看，它是一种预计无成本甚至可能带来净收益的融资来源。本信后文将详细解释浮存金的特性。

Finally, a point of key and lasting importance: Berkshire’s value is maximized by our having assembled the five groves into a single entity. This arrangement allows us to seamlessly and objectively allocate major amounts of capital, eliminate enterprise risk, avoid insularity, fund assets at exceptionally low cost, occasionally take advantage of tax efficiencies, and minimize overhead.

最后强调一个关键且持久重要的观点：将五大“林区”整合为一个实体，使伯克希尔价值最大化。这种架构让我们能无缝且客观地配置巨额资本，消除企业风险，避免封闭性，以极低成本融资，间或利用税务效率，并将管理成本降至最低。

At Berkshire, the whole is greater – considerably greater – than the sum of the parts.

在伯克希尔，整体远大于部分之和。

# Repurchases and Reporting

(股票回购与报告)

Earlier I mentioned that Berkshire will from time to time be repurchasing its own stock. Assuming that we buy at a discount to Berkshire’s intrinsic value – which certainly will be our intention – repurchases will benefit both those shareholders leaving the company and those who stay.

此前我提到伯克希尔会适时回购自家股票。假设我们以低于内在价值的价格回购（这当然是我们的意图），回购将对退出股东和留存股东均有益处。

True, the upside from repurchases is very slight for those who are leaving. That’s because careful buying by us will minimize any impact on Berkshire’s stock price. Nevertheless, there is some benefit to sellers in having an extra buyer in the market.

诚然，回购对离场股东的收益提升有限。这是因我们谨慎买入会尽量减少对股价的影响。不过，市场多一个买家仍会对卖家带来些许好处。

For continuing shareholders, the advantage is obvious: If the market prices a departing partner’s interest at, say, 90¢ on the dollar, continuing shareholders reap an increase in per-share intrinsic value with every repurchase by the company. Obviously, repurchases should be price-sensitive: Blindly buying an overpriced stock is value-destructive, a fact lost on many promotional or ever-optimistic CEOs.

对留存股东而言，优势显而易见：若市场对离场股东权益的定价仅为实际价值的90%，公司每回购一股，留存股东的每股内在价值即提升一次。显然，回购必须重视价格：盲目买入高估股票会摧毁价值，但许多热衷宣传或盲目乐观的CEO却忽略了这一点。

When a company says that it contemplates repurchases, it’s vital that all shareholder-partners be given the information they need to make an intelligent estimate of value. Providing that information is what Charlie and I try to do in this report. We do not want a partner to sell shares back to the company because he or she has been misled or inadequately informed.

当公司宣布计划回购时，关键在于向所有股东提供其评估价值所需的充分信息。这也是查理和我在本报告中努力实现的目标。我们不希望任何股东因误导或信息不足而将股份回售给公司。

Some sellers, however, may disagree with our calculation of value and others may have found investments that they consider more attractive than Berkshire shares. Some of that second group will be right: There are unquestionably many stocks that will deliver far greater gains than ours.

然而，部分卖家可能不同意我们的估值计算，另一些人可能找到了自认为比伯克希尔股票更具吸引力的投资标的。后者中的一部分人是对的：毫无疑问，许多股票的回报将远超我们的表现。

In addition, certain shareholders will simply decide it’s time for them or their families to become net consumers rather than continuing to build capital. Charlie and I have no current interest in joining that group. Perhaps we will become big spenders in our old age.

此外，某些股东可能单纯认为自己或家人已到该成为净消费者而非继续积累资本的阶段。查理和我目前对此毫无兴趣，或许等我们年老时才会成为挥霍者。

# For 54 years our managerial decisions at Berkshire have been made from the viewpoint of the shareholders who are staying...

(54年来，我们的管理决策始终从留存股东视角出发)

For 54 years our managerial decisions at Berkshire have been made from the viewpoint of the shareholders who are staying, not those who are leaving. Consequently, Charlie and I have never focused on current-quarter results. Berkshire, in fact, may be the only company in the Fortune 500 that does not prepare monthly earnings reports or balance sheets. I, of course, regularly view the monthly financial reports of most subsidiaries. But Charlie and I learn of Berkshire’s overall earnings and financial position only on a quarterly basis.

54年来，伯克希尔的所有管理决策都是从留存股东而非离场股东的视角制定的。因此，查理和我从未关注过当季财报。事实上，伯克希尔可能是《财富》500强中唯一一家不编制月度盈利报告或资产负债表的公司。当然，我会定期查看大部分子公司的月度财务报告，但查理和我仅在季度层面了解伯克希尔的整体盈利和财务状况。

Furthermore, Berkshire has no company-wide budget (though many of our subsidiaries find one useful). Our lack of such an instrument means that the parent company has never had a quarterly “number” to hit. Shunning the use of this bogey sends an important message to our many managers, reinforcing the culture we prize.

此外，伯克希尔没有全公司范围的预算（尽管许多子公司认为预算有用）。这种缺失意味着母公司从未设定季度“目标数字”。拒绝使用这种虚设指标向我们的众多经理人传递了一个重要信号，强化了我们珍视的文化。

Over the years, Charlie and I have seen all sorts of bad corporate behavior, both accounting and operational, induced by the desire of management to meet Wall Street expectations. What starts as an “innocent” fudge in order to not disappoint “the Street” – say, trade-loading at quarter-end, turning a blind eye to rising insurance losses, or drawing down a “cookie-jar” reserve – can become the first step toward full-fledged fraud. Playing with the numbers “just this once” may well be the CEO’s intent; it’s seldom the end result. And if it’s okay for the boss to cheat a little, it’s easy for subordinates to rationalize similar behavior.

多年来，查理和我目睹过无数因迎合华尔街预期而引发的糟糕企业行为，涵盖会计和运营。最初看似“无害”的粉饰——例如季度末突击交易、对保险损失上升视而不见，或动用“秘密储备金”——往往成为全面欺诈的第一步。“只玩一次数字游戏”的初衷可能是CEO的本意，但结果往往事与愿违。如果老板可以轻微作弊，下属很容易为类似行为找到合理借口。

At Berkshire, our audience is neither analysts nor commentators: Charlie and I are working for our shareholder-partners. The numbers that flow up to us will be the ones we send on to you.

在伯克希尔，我们的受众既不是分析师也不是评论员：查理和我只为股东合伙人工作。我们向上汇总的数字，也是我们发送给各位的数字。

# Non-Insurance Operations – From Lollipops to Locomotives

(非保险业务——从小糖果到大火车)

Let’s now look further at Berkshire’s most valuable grove – our collection of non-insurance businesses – keeping in mind that we do not wish to unnecessarily hand our competitors information that might be useful to them. Additional details about individual operations can be found on pages K-5 – K-22 and pages K-40 – K-51.

现在我们进一步探讨伯克希尔最有价值的“林区”——非保险业务集群。请注意，我们无意将可能对竞争对手有用的细节信息公之于众。各单项业务的详细信息请参阅K-5至K-22页及K-40至K-51页。

Viewed as a group, these businesses earned pre-tax income in 2018 of $20.8 billion, a 24% increase over 2017. Acquisitions we made in 2018 delivered only a trivial amount of that gain.

整体来看，这些业务2018年实现税前收入208亿美元，较2017年增长24%。其中2018年的并购贡献微乎其微。

I will stick with pre-tax figures in this discussion. But our after-tax gain in 2018 from these businesses was far greater – 47% – thanks in large part to the cut in the corporate tax rate that became effective at the beginning of that year. Let’s look at why the impact was so dramatic.

本讨论中我将沿用税前数据。但2018年这些业务的税后利润增长更为显著——达47%，这主要得益于当年初生效的企业税率下调。让我们分析这一影响为何如此剧烈。

Begin with an economic reality: Like it or not, the U.S. Government “owns” an interest in Berkshire’s earnings of a size determined by Congress. In effect, our country’s Treasury Department holds a special class of our stock – call this holding the AA shares – that receives large “dividends” (that is, tax payments) from Berkshire. In 2017, as in many years before, the corporate tax rate was 35%, which meant that the Treasury was doing very well with its AA shares. Indeed, the Treasury’s “stock,” which was paying nothing when we took over in 1965, had evolved into a holding that delivered billions of dollars annually to the federal government.

从一个经济现实开始：无论是否喜欢，美国政府通过国会决定的比例“持有”伯克希尔的部分盈利。实际上，财政部持有一类特殊股票——可称为AA股——从伯克希尔获得巨额“股息”（即税款）。2017年及此前多年，企业税率为35%，这意味着财政部的AA股表现优异。事实上，1965年我们接手时无需支付任何税款的“股票”，已演变为每年为联邦政府贡献数十亿美元的资产。

Last year, however, 40% of the government’s “ownership” (14/35ths) was returned to Berkshire – free of charge – when the corporate tax rate was reduced to 21%. Consequently, our “A” and “B” shareholders received a major boost in the earnings attributable to their shares.

然而去年，当企业税率降至21%时，政府“所有权”的40%（14/35）被无偿返还给伯克希尔。因此，我们的“A股”和“B股”股东所享有的每股盈利大幅增加。

This happening materially increased the intrinsic value of the Berkshire shares you and I own. The same dynamic, moreover, enhanced the intrinsic value of almost all of the stocks Berkshire holds.

这一变化显著提升了你我持有的伯克希尔股票的内在价值。同样逻辑也增强了伯克希尔所持几乎所有股票的内在价值。

Those are the headlines. But there are other factors to consider that tempered our gain. For example, the tax benefits garnered by our large utility operation get passed along to its customers. Meanwhile, the tax rate applicable to the substantial dividends we receive from domestic corporations is little changed at about 13%. (This lower rate has long been logical because our investees have already paid tax on the earnings that they pay to us.) Overall, however, the new law made our businesses and the stocks we own considerably more valuable.

以上是关键要点。但还有其他因素削弱了我们的收益提升。例如，公用事业巨头的税收优惠会传导给客户；同时，我们从国内企业获得的巨额股息适用税率基本维持13%不变（这一低税率长期合理，因被投企业已就这些盈利缴税）。然而总体而言，新税法使我们的业务和持股显著增值。

Which suggests that we return to the performance of our non-insurance businesses. Our two towering redwoods in this grove are BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (90.9% owned). Combined, they earned $9.3 billion before tax last year, up 6% from 2017. You can read more about these businesses on pages K-5 – K-10 and pages K-40 – K-45.

这引出我们对非保险业务表现的回顾。该“林区”两棵参天红杉是BNSF（伯灵顿北方圣太菲铁路公司）和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源（持股90.9%）。二者合计2018年税前盈利93亿美元，同比增长6%。更多详情请参阅K-5至K-10页及K-40至K-45页。

Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts, had aggregate pre-tax income in 2018 of $6.4 billion, up from the $5.5 billion these companies earned in 2017.

按盈利排序的下五大非保险子公司（此处按字母顺序排列）：Clayton Homes、International Metalworking、Lubrizol、Marmon和Precision Castparts。2018年合计税前收入64亿美元，高于2017年的55亿美元。

The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Forest River, Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and TTI) earned $2.4 billion pre-tax last year, up from $2.1 billion in 2017.

再下一级的五大子公司（同样按盈利排序并列出）：Forest River、Johns Manville、MiTek、Shaw和TTI。2018年税前盈利24亿美元，高于2017年的21亿美元。

The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – had pre-tax income of $3.6 billion in 2018 vs. $3.3 billion in 2017.

其余众多非保险业务2018年税前盈利36亿美元，高于2017年的33亿美元。

# Insurance, “Float,” and Berkshire’s Holdings of Cash and Bonds

(保险、“浮存金”以及伯克希尔的现金与债券持有)

Berkshire’s fifth and final grove consists of a collection of superb property/casualty (P/C) insurance businesses. Over the 52 years that Berkshire has owned this industry, our float – funds that are held but not owned by us – has grown from $16 million to about $122 billion.

伯克希尔的第五大“林区”是由一组卓越的财产/意外险（P/C）保险公司构成。在过去52年中，我们持有的这一行业浮存金——即我们持有但不属于我们的资金——从1600万美元增长至约1220亿美元。

Float is usable by us because insurance operations usually receive cash upfront – in the form of premiums – and pay out later, sometimes decades later, as claims are settled. This model allows us to hold large sums of money for investment purposes.

浮存金对我们可用的原因在于保险业务通常先收取现金（即保费），在理赔解决后才支付出去，有时这一过程可能长达数十年。这种模式使我们能够持有大量资金用于投资。

The cost of float is critical. If premiums exceed the total of eventual losses and expenses, the cost is negative – in effect, we are paid to use the money. When such “float” is available at a low or negative cost, it becomes a powerful financial tool.

浮存金的成本至关重要。若保费超过最终损失和费用总和，其成本即为负值——实际上，我们因使用这笔资金而获得报酬。当浮存金以低成本或负成本获得时，它便成为一种强大的金融工具。

Over the past 16 years, Berkshire has achieved underwriting profits in 15 of them. This record is exceptional in the insurance industry. In 2018, we earned $2 billion in pre-tax underwriting gains, further enhancing our float’s value.

过去16年中，伯克希尔在15年中实现了承保盈利。这在保险行业极为罕见。2018年，我们实现了20亿美元的税前承保利润，进一步提升了浮存金的价值。

Our insurance operations are structured to ensure liquidity. Even in extreme scenarios, such as catastrophic events, we maintain sufficient cash reserves to meet obligations. This discipline is a cornerstone of Berkshire’s financial strength.

我们的保险业务结构旨在确保流动性。即使在极端情况下（如灾难性事件），我们仍持有充足现金以履行偿付义务。这种纪律性是伯克希尔财务实力的基石。

While many insurers struggle with underwriting discipline, Berkshire’s managers adhere strictly to risk assessment principles. They avoid overpricing competition and focus on long-term value creation.

尽管许多保险公司难以保持承保纪律，伯克希尔的管理者始终严格遵循风险评估原则。他们避免恶性价格竞争，专注于长期价值创造。

The combination of float and disciplined underwriting gives Berkshire a unique advantage. Unlike other companies that rely solely on debt or equity financing, we benefit from a stable, low-cost funding source that grows with our insurance operations.

浮存金与严苛承保纪律的结合赋予伯克希尔独特优势。与其他依赖债务或股权融资的公司不同，我们受益于一种稳定的低成本资金来源，其规模随保险业务增长而扩大。

In summary, our insurance businesses are not just profit centers; they are engines of capital allocation. Through float, we gain access to funds that fuel investments across Berkshire’s diverse operations, compounding value for shareholders over time.

总之，我们的保险业务不仅是利润中心，更是资本配置的引擎。通过浮存金，我们获得资金用于投资伯克希尔多元化的业务，长期为股东创造复利价值。

# For 54 years our managerial decisions at Berkshire have been made from the viewpoint of the shareholders who are staying...

(54年来，我们的管理决策始终从留存股东视角出发)

At Berkshire, our audience is neither analysts nor commentators: Charlie and I are working for our shareholder-partners. The numbers that flow up to us will be the ones we send on to you.

在伯克希尔，我们的受众既不是分析师也不是评论员：查理和我只为股东合伙人工作。我们向上汇总的数字，也是我们发送给各位的数字。

# Insurance, “Float,” and the Funding of Berkshire

(保险、“浮存金”与伯克希尔的融资)

Our property/casualty (“P/C”) insurance business – our fifth grove – has been the engine propelling Berkshire’s growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property/casualty company in the world as measured by net worth.

我们的财产/意外险（P/C）业务——第五大“林区”——自1967年以来一直是推动伯克希尔增长的核心引擎。当年我们以860万美元收购了国家赔偿公司及其姊妹公司国家火灾与海上保险公司。如今，按净资产衡量，国家赔偿公司已成为全球最大的财产/意外险公司。

One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was the industry’s business model: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, or severe workplace accidents, payments can stretch over many decades.

我们最初被P/C业务吸引的原因之一是其商业模式：保险公司先收取保费，后支付理赔。在极端情况下（如石棉暴露或严重工伤事故引发的索赔），支付周期可能持续数十年。

This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:

这种“先收后付”的模式使保险公司持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——最终将支付给他人。与此同时，保险公司可将浮存金用于自身投资。尽管单个保单和理赔会动态变化，但浮存金规模通常与保费规模保持稳定比例。因此，随着业务增长，浮存金也随之增长。以下数据展示了其增长轨迹：

Year | Float (in millions)*
1970 | $39
1980 | $237
1990 | $1,632
2000 | $27,871
2010 | $65,832
2018 | $122,732

Includes float arising from life, annuity and health insurance businesses.

年份 | 浮存金（百万美元）*
1970 | 39
1980 | 237
1990 | 1,632
2000 | 27,871
2010 | 65,832
2018 | 122,732

包含寿险、年金险和健康险业务产生的浮存金。

We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. That structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. That strength will never be compromised.

未来浮存金可能出现下降，但降幅将极其缓慢——每年最多不超过3%。我们保险合同的性质决定了不会面临即期或短期大额资金兑付压力。这一结构是刻意设计的，也是我们保险公司无与伦比财务实力的关键组成部分，这种实力绝不会被削弱。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

若保费收入超过费用和最终理赔损失总和，我们的保险业务即可实现承保利润，叠加浮存金投资收益。当实现承保利润时，我们便拥有“免费资金”可供使用——更理想的是，持有这些资金还能获得报酬。

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. That loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses.

然而，所有保险公司对这一理想结果的追求导致激烈竞争，甚至使整个P/C行业时常出现承保亏损。这种亏损实质上是行业为持有浮存金所付出的代价。竞争格局几乎注定保险行业将继续表现低迷——尽管所有公司都享受浮存金收益，但其有形净资产回报率仍低于美国其他行业平均水平。

Nevertheless, I like our own prospects. Berkshire’s unrivaled financial strength allows us far more flexibility in investing our float than that generally available to P/C companies. The many alternatives available to us are always an advantage and occasionally offer major opportunities. When other insurers are constrained, our choices expand.

尽管如此，我对伯克希尔的前景充满信心。我们无与伦比的财务实力使浮存金投资具备远超同行的灵活性。我们拥有的多元选择始终是优势所在，有时甚至能创造重大机遇。当其他保险公司受限时，我们的选择空间反而扩大。

Moreover, our P/C companies have an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 15 of the past 16 years, the exception being 2017, when our pre-tax loss was $3.2 billion. For the entire 16-year span, our pre-tax gain totaled $27 billion, of which $2 billion was recorded in 2018.

此外，我们的P/C公司拥有卓越的承保记录。过去16年中，伯克希尔有15年实现承保利润，唯一例外是2017年，当年税前亏损32亿美元。16年间整体税前盈利达270亿美元，其中2018年贡献20亿美元。

That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of our insurance managers, who know that the benefits of float can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.

这一成绩绝非偶然：严苛的风险评估是保险业务管理者每日的核心任务。他们深知，糟糕的承保结果足以吞噬浮存金的所有好处。其他保险公司可能口头宣称这一理念，但在伯克希尔，它被奉为“宗教戒律”，旧约式的严格遵守。

# In most cases, the funding of a business comes from two sources – debt and equity.

(企业融资的两大常规来源：债务与股权)

In most cases, the funding of a business comes from two sources – debt and equity. At Berkshire, we have two additional arrows in the quiver to talk about, but let’s first address the conventional components.

企业的融资通常来源于两个渠道——债务和股权。伯克希尔还有两项额外的融资工具需要探讨，但让我们先回顾常规构成部分。

We use debt sparingly. Many managers, it should be noted, will disagree with this policy, arguing that significant debt juices the returns for equity owners. And these more venturesome CEOs will be right most of the time.

我们对债务的使用极为审慎。值得注意的是，许多管理者会对此政策持不同意见，认为高杠杆能提升股东回报。这类更激进的CEO在多数情况下确实是对的。

At rare and unpredictable intervals, however, credit vanishes and debt becomes financially fatal. A Russian-roulette equation – usually win, occasionally die – may make financial sense for someone who gets a piece of a company’s upside but does not share in its downside. But that strategy would be madness for Berkshire. Rational people don’t risk what they have and need for what they don’t have and don’t need.

然而，在罕见且不可预测的时刻，信贷会突然枯竭，债务可能成为致命威胁。对于只参与收益分配而不承担亏损的人来说，“俄罗斯轮盘赌式策略”——大概率盈利，小概率死亡——可能有其财务逻辑。但这种策略对伯克希尔而言无异于疯狂。理性的人不会为了不需要的东西，去冒险失去已拥有且必需的资源。

Most of the debt you see on our consolidated balance sheet – see page K-65 – resides at our railroad and energy subsidiaries, both of them asset-heavy companies. During recessions, the cash generation of these businesses remains bountiful. The debt they use is both appropriate for their operations and not guaranteed by Berkshire.

合并资产负债表（见K-65页）上的大部分债务集中在铁路和能源子公司——两者均为重资产企业。经济衰退期间，这些业务仍能持续产生充沛现金流。它们使用的债务规模与其运营需求匹配，且无需伯克希尔提供担保。

Our level of equity capital is a different story: Berkshire’s $349 billion is unmatched in corporate America. By retaining all earnings for a very long time, and allowing compound interest to work its magic, we have amassed funds that have enabled us to purchase and develop the valuable groves earlier described. Had we instead followed a 100% payout policy, we would still be working with the $22 million with which we began fiscal 1965.

我们的权益资本规模则截然不同：伯克希尔3490亿美元的权益资本在美国企业界无人能及。通过长期留存全部盈利，借助复利效应，我们积累的资金使我们得以收购并培育前述五大核心资产。若当年选择将全部利润派发给股东，今天的可用资金仍将是1965财年起步时的2200万美元。

Beyond using debt and equity, Berkshire has benefitted in a major way from two less-common sources of corporate funding. The larger is the float I have described. So far, those funds, though they are recorded as a huge net liability on our balance sheet, have been of more utility to us than an equivalent amount of equity. That’s because they have usually been accompanied by underwriting earnings. In effect, we have been paid in most years for holding and using other people’s money.

除债务和股权外，伯克希尔还从两项非常规融资来源中获益。其中规模更大的是前述“浮存金”。尽管这些资金在资产负债表上体现为巨额净负债，但其效用远超同等规模的股权融资。原因在于浮存金通常伴随承保利润——实质上，我们多年间因持有并运用他人的资金而获得报酬。

As I have often done before, I will emphasize that this happy outcome is far from a sure thing: Mistakes in assessing insurance risks can be huge and can take many years to surface. (Think asbestos.) A major catastrophe that will dwarf hurricanes Katrina and Michael will occur – perhaps tomorrow, perhaps many decades from now. “The Big One” may come from a traditional source, such as a hurricane or earthquake, or it may be a total surprise involving, say, a cyber attack having disastrous consequences beyond anything insurers now contemplate. When such a mega-catastrophe strikes, we will get our share of the losses and they will be big – very big. Unlike many other insurers, however, we will be looking to add business the next day.

我必须再次强调，这一理想结果远非必然：保险风险评估的失误可能极其巨大，且潜伏多年才会显现（参考石棉索赔案例）。未来必将出现规模远超卡特里娜飓风和迈克尔飓风的灾难——可能明天发生，也可能几十年后降临。“百年一遇的巨灾”可能源于传统灾害（如飓风或地震），也可能由网络攻击等全新威胁引发，其后果将远超保险业当前的预估范围。当这类超级灾难来临时，伯克希尔将承担属于我们的巨额损失。但与许多同行不同的是，次日我们将依然具备拓展业务的实力。

The final funding source – which again Berkshire possesses to an unusual degree – is deferred income taxes. These are liabilities that we will eventually pay but that are meanwhile interest-free.

最后一项融资来源——伯克希尔同样拥有独特优势——是递延所得税。这些是我们未来需支付的负债，但在此期间无需支付利息。

As I indicated earlier, about $14.7 billion of our $50.5 billion of deferred taxes arises from the unrealized gains in our equity holdings. These liabilities are accrued in our financial statements at the current 21% corporate tax rate but will be paid at the rates prevailing when our investments are sold. Between now and then, we in effect have an interest-free “loan” that allows us to have more money working for us in equities than would otherwise be the case.

如前所述，505亿美元递延税中约147亿美元源自未实现股权投资收益。这些负债按当前21%的企业税率计提，但实际出售时将按届时税率支付。在此期间，我们实质上获得了免息“贷款”，使更多资金能持续在股市中运作。

A further $28.3 billion of deferred tax results from our being able to accelerate the depreciation of assets such as plant and equipment in calculating the tax we must currently pay. The front-ended savings in taxes that we record gradually reverse in future years. We regularly purchase additional assets, however. As long as the present tax law prevails, this source of funding should trend upward.

另有283亿美元递延税源于我们通过加速折旧（如厂房和设备）减少当期税负。此类税收优惠将在未来年度逐步回转，但由于我们持续购置新资产，只要现行税法持续有效，这一融资来源将呈增长趋势。

Over time, Berkshire’s funding base – that’s the right-hand side of our balance sheet – should grow, primarily through the earnings we retain. Our job is to put the money retained to good use on the left-hand side, by adding attractive assets.

长期来看，伯克希尔的资金基础——即资产负债表右侧——将主要通过留存收益持续增长。我们的职责是将这些资金有效配置于资产负债表左侧，用于收购优质资产。

# GEICO and Tony Nicely

(GEICO与托尼·尼塞利)

GEICO and Tony Nicely
That title says it all: The company and the man are inseparable.

GEICO与托尼·尼塞利
这一标题已说明一切：公司与这个人密不可分。

Tony joined GEICO in 1961 at the age of 18; I met him in the mid-1970s. At that time, GEICO, after a four-decade record of both rapid growth and outstanding underwriting results, suddenly found itself near bankruptcy. A recently-installed management had grossly underestimated GEICO’s loss costs and consequently underpriced its product. It would take many months until those loss-generating policies on GEICO’s books – there were no less than 2.3 million of them – would expire and could then be repriced. The company’s net worth in the meantime was rapidly approaching zero.

托尼18岁时于1961年加入GEICO；我于1970年代中期认识他。彼时，GEICO在经历了四十年的快速增长和卓越承保记录后，突然陷入濒临破产的境地。新任管理层严重低估了公司的损失成本，导致产品定价过低。那些导致亏损的保单（至少有230万份）需耗时数月才能到期并重新定价。在此期间，公司净资产迅速趋近于零。

In 1976, Jack Byrne was brought in as CEO to rescue GEICO. Soon after his arrival, I met him, concluded that he was the perfect man for the job, and began to aggressively buy GEICO shares. Within a few months, Berkshire bought about 1⁄3 of the company, a portion that later grew to roughly 1⁄2 without our spending a dime. That stunning accretion occurred because GEICO, after recovering its health, consistently repurchased its shares. All told, this half-interest in GEICO cost Berkshire $47 million, about what you might pay today for a trophy apartment in New York.

1976年，杰克·伯恩被任命为CEO以挽救GEICO。他上任后不久，我与他见面并认定他是最佳人选，随即开始大量买入GEICO股票。短短数月，伯克希尔购入约三分之一的股份，后因公司持续回购股票，持股比例自然增至约50%。这一惊人的增值源于GEICO恢复健康后不断回购股份。总计这笔半数股权仅花费伯克希尔4700万美元，相当于如今购买一套纽约“奖杯公寓”的价格。

Let’s now fast-forward 17 years to 1993, when Tony Nicely was promoted to CEO. At that point, GEICO’s reputation and profitability had been restored – but not its growth. Indeed, at yearend 1992 the company had only 1.9 million auto policies on its books, far less than its pre-crisis high. In sales volume among U.S. auto insurers, GEICO then ranked an undistinguished seventh.

让我们快进17年到1993年，托尼·尼塞利升任CEO。此时，GEICO的声誉和盈利能力已恢复——但增长尚未实现。事实上，1992年底公司账面仅有190万份汽车保单，远低于危机前的峰值。在美国汽车保险公司保费规模排名中，GEICO仅位列第七，毫无亮点。

Late in 1995, after Tony had re-energized GEICO, Berkshire made an offer to buy the remaining 50% of the company for $2.3 billion, about 50 times what we had paid for the first half (and people say I never pay up!). Our offer was successful and brought Berkshire a wonderful, but underdeveloped, company and an equally wonderful CEO, who would move GEICO forward beyond my dreams.

1995年底，托尼重振GEICO后，伯克希尔提出以23亿美元收购剩余50%股权，约为我们最初支付费用的50倍（人们总说我不肯溢价！）。收购成功为伯克希尔带来了一家潜力未被充分挖掘的卓越公司，以及一位同样卓越的CEO。托尼将带领GEICO走向超越我想象的未来。

GEICO is now America’s Number Two auto insurer, with sales 1,200% greater than it recorded in 1995. Underwriting profits have totaled $15.5 billion (pre-tax) since our purchase, and float available for investment has grown from $2.5 billion to $22.1 billion.

如今，GEICO已成为美国第二大汽车保险公司，销售额较1995年增长1200%。自收购以来，其承保利润累计达155亿美元（税前），可用于投资的浮存金规模也从25亿美元增至221亿美元。

By my estimate, Tony’s management of GEICO has increased Berkshire’s intrinsic value by more than $50 billion. On top of that, he is a model for everything a manager should be, helping his 40,000 associates to identify and polish abilities they didn’t realize they possessed.

据我估计，托尼对GEICO的管理为伯克希尔内在价值贡献超过500亿美元。更重要的是，他堪称管理者典范，帮助4万名员工发现并打磨他们未曾意识到的能力。

Last year, Tony decided to retire as CEO, and on June 30th he turned that position over to Bill Roberts, his long-time partner. I’ve known and watched Bill operate for several decades, and once again Tony made the right move. Tony remains Chairman and will be helpful to GEICO for the rest of his life. He’s incapable of doing less.

去年，托尼决定卸任CEO职务，并于6月30日将职位交予长期搭档比尔·罗伯茨。我观察比尔的工作数十年，再次证明托尼做出了正确选择。托尼将继续担任董事长，并终身为GEICO提供支持——这是他的本能使然。

All Berkshire shareholders owe Tony their thanks. I head the list.

所有伯克希尔股东都应向托尼致谢。我排在首位。

# Investments

(投资)

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding – 325,442,152 shares – because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries its Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of $13.8 billion, an amount reduced by our share of the large write-off of intangible assets taken by Kraft Heinz in 2018. At yearend, our Kraft Heinz holding had a market value of $14 billion and a cost basis of $9.8 billion.

以下是我们年末市值最大的十五项普通股投资列表。我们未将卡夫亨氏的持股（325,442,152股）列入此表，因伯克希尔属于控股方，需按“权益法”核算该投资。合并资产负债表中，伯克希尔卡夫亨氏持股的GAAP账面价值为138亿美元，该金额已扣除我们按比例分摊的2018年卡夫亨氏无形资产大幅减值损失。年末该持股市值为140亿美元，成本基础为98亿美元。

12/31/18
Shares* Company
Percentage of Company Owned
Cost** Market (in millions)

151,610,700 American Express Company ................. 17.9% $ 1,287 $ 14,452
255,300,329 Apple Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4% $ 36,044 $ 40,271
918,919,000 Bank of America Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5% $ 11,650 $ 22,642
84,488,751 The Bank of New York Mellon Corp. . . . . . . . . . . 8.8% $ 3,860 $ 3,977
6,789,054 Charter Communications, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0% $ 1,210 $ 1,935
400,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4% $ 1,299 $ 18,940
65,535,000 Delta Air Lines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.6% $ 2,860 $ 3,270
18,784,698 The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9% $ 2,380 $ 3,138
50,661,394 JPMorgan Chase & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5% $ 5,605 $ 4,946
24,669,778 Moody’s Corporation ....................... 12.9% $ 248 $ 3,455
47,890,899 Southwest Airlines Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7% $ 2,005 $ 2,226
21,938,642 United Continental Holdings Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1% $ 1,195 $ 1,837
146,346,999 U.S. Bancorp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1% $ 5,548 $ 6,688
43,387,980 USG Corporation .......................... 31.0% $ 836 $ 1,851
449,349,102 Wells Fargo & Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.8% $ 10,639 $ 20,706
Others ................................... $ 16,201 $ 22,423
Total Common Stocks Carried at Market ........ $ 102,867 $ 172,757

* Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.

12/31/18
持股数* 公司
持股比例
成本** 市值（百万美元）

151,610,700 美国运通公司 ................. 17.9% $ 1,287 $ 14,452
255,300,329 苹果公司 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4% $ 36,044 $ 40,271
918,919,000 美国银行 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5% $ 11,650 $ 22,642
84,488,751 纽约梅隆银行 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.8% $ 3,860 $ 3,977
6,789,054 Charter通信公司 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0% $ 1,210 $ 1,935
400,000,000 可口可乐公司 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4% $ 1,299 $ 18,940
65,535,000 达美航空 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.6% $ 2,860 $ 3,270
18,784,698 高盛集团 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9% $ 2,380 $ 3,138
50,661,394 摩根大通 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5% $ 5,605 $ 4,946
24,669,778 穆迪公司 ....................... 12.9% $ 248 $ 3,455
47,890,899 西南航空 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7% $ 2,005 $ 2,226
21,938,642 联合大陆航空 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1% $ 1,195 $ 1,837
146,346,999 美国合众银行 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1% $ 5,548 $ 6,688
43,387,980 USG公司 .......................... 31.0% $ 836 $ 1,851
449,349,102 富国银行 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.8% $ 10,639 $ 20,706
其他 ................................... $ 16,201 $ 22,423
按市值计价的普通股总额 ........ $ 102,867 $ 172,757

* 未包含伯克希尔子公司养老金持有的股份。
** 为实际购入成本及税务基础。

Charlie and I do not view the $172.8 billion detailed above as a collection of ticker symbols – a financial dalliance to be terminated because of downgrades by “the Street,” expected Federal Reserve actions, possible political developments, forecasts by economists or whatever else might be the subject du jour.

查理和我并不将上述1728亿美元视为一堆交易代码——不会因华尔街评级下调、“美联储动作预期”、“政治局势变化”或经济学家的预测等短期因素而仓促抛售。

What we see in our holdings, rather, is an assembly of companies that we partly own and that, on a weighted basis, are earning about 20% on the net tangible equity capital required to run their businesses. These companies, also, earn their profits without employing excessive levels of debt.

我们眼中的持仓，是一群我们部分拥有的企业。按加权计算，这些公司为其运营所需的有形净资产创造了约20%的回报，且其盈利实现并未依赖过高的债务杠杆。

Returns of that order by large, established and understandable businesses are remarkable under any circumstances. They are truly mind-blowing when compared against the return that many investors have accepted on bonds over the last decade – 3% or less on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds, for example.

对于规模大、根基稳且业务清晰的企业而言，此类回报率在任何情况下都堪称卓越。若对比过去十年投资者接受的债券收益率（例如30年期美债仅3%或更低），这一表现更令人惊叹。

On occasion, a ridiculously-high purchase price for a given stock will cause a splendid business to become a poor investment – if not permanently, at least for a painfully long period. Over time, however, investment performance converges with business performance. And, as I will next spell out, the record of American business has been extraordinary.

然而，若以过高的价格买入某只股票，即使是一家卓越的企业也可能成为糟糕的投资（至少在漫长时期内如此）。但长期来看，投资回报终将与企业经营绩效趋同。正如我将阐述的，美国企业的历史表现堪称非凡。

# The American Tailwind (美国顺风)

On March 11th, it will be 77 years since I first invested in an American business. The year was 1942, I was 11, and I went all in, investing $114.75 I had begun accumulating at age six. What I bought was three shares of Cities Service preferred stock. I had become a capitalist, and it felt good.

3月11日将是我首次投资美国企业77周年。那是1942年，我11岁，投入了我从六岁开始积累的114.75美元。我买了三股Cities Service优先股。我成为了一个资本家，感觉很好。

Let’s now travel back through the two 77-year periods that preceded my purchase. That leaves us starting in 1788, a year prior to George Washington’s installation as our first president. Could anyone then have imagined what their new country would accomplish in only three 77-year lifetimes?

现在让我们回顾在我购买前的两个77年时期。这让我们回到1788年，乔治·华盛顿就任美国第一任总统的前一年。当时有人能想象这个新生国家在仅仅三个77年的时间内会取得怎样的成就吗？

During the two 77-year periods prior to 1942, the United States had grown from four million people – about 1⁄2 of 1% of the world’s population – into the most powerful country on earth. In that spring of 1942, though, it faced a crisis: The U.S. and its allies were suffering heavy losses in a war that we had entered only three months earlier. Bad news arrived daily.

在1942年之前的两个77年期间，美国从400万人口——约占世界人口的0.5%——成长为地球上最强大的国家。然而，在1942年的春天，它面临着危机：美国及其盟友在一场仅三个月前加入的战争中遭受重大损失。坏消息每天传来。

Despite the alarming headlines, almost all Americans believed on that March 11th that the war would be won. Nor was their optimism limited to that victory. Leaving aside congenital pessimists, Americans believed that their children and generations beyond would live far better lives than they themselves had led.

尽管头条新闻令人担忧，但几乎所有美国人在3月11日那天都相信战争会胜利。他们的乐观不仅限于这场胜利。除了天生的悲观主义者，美国人相信他们的孩子及后代会过上比他们自己更好的生活。

The nation’s citizens understood, of course, that the road ahead would not be a smooth ride. It never had been. Early in its history our country was tested by a Civil War that killed 4% of all American males and led President Lincoln to openly ponder whether “a nation so conceived and so dedicated could long endure.” In the 1930s, America suffered through the Great Depression, a punishing period of massive unemployment.

当然，国民明白，前方的道路不会一帆风顺。从来都不是。在美国历史早期，内战考验了国家，造成4%的美国男性死亡，林肯总统公开思考“如此构想和奉献的国家能否长久存在”。在1930年代，美国经历了导致大规模失业的大萧条。

Nevertheless, in 1942, when I made my purchase, the nation expected post-war growth, a belief that proved to be well-founded. In fact, the nation’s achievements can best be described as breathtaking.

尽管如此，在1942年我购买时，国家期待战后增长，这一信念被证明是正确的。事实上，国家的成就最好用惊叹来形容。

Let’s put numbers to that claim: If my $114.75 had been invested in a no-fee S&P 500 index fund, and all dividends had been reinvested, my stake would have grown to be worth (pre-taxes) $606,811 on January 31, 2019 (the latest data available before the printing of this letter). That is a gain of 5,288 for 1. Meanwhile, a $1 million investment by a tax-free institution of that time – say, a pension fund or college endowment – would have grown to about $5.3 billion.

让我们用数字来证明这一说法：如果我的114.75美元投资于无费用的标普500指数基金，且所有股息都再投资，到2019年1月31日（本信印发前的最新数据），我的投资将增长到（税前）606,811美元。这是5288倍的回报。同时，当时一个免税机构（如养老基金或大学基金会）投资100万美元，将增长到约53亿美元。

Let me add one additional calculation that I believe will shock you: If that hypothetical institution had paid only 1% of assets annually to various “helpers,” such as investment managers and consultants, its gain would have been cut in half, to $2.65 billion. That’s what happens over 77 years when the 11.8% annual return actually achieved by the S&P 500 is recalculated at a 10.8% rate.

让我再补充一个可能让你震惊的计算：如果那个假设的机构每年支付1%的资产给各种“帮手”，如投资经理和顾问，其收益将减半至26.5亿美元。这就是当标普500实际实现的11.8%年回报率按10.8%重新计算时，77年后的结果。

Those who regularly preach doom because of government budget deficits (as I regularly did myself for many years) might note that our country’s national debt has increased roughly 400-fold during the last of my 77-year periods. That’s 40,000%! Suppose you had foreseen this increase and panicked at the prospect of runaway deficits and a worthless currency. To “protect” yourself, you might have eschewed stocks and opted instead to buy 31⁄4 ounces of gold with your $114.75.

那些因政府预算赤字而经常预言末日的人（我自己多年来也常如此）可能注意到，在我最近的77年期间，国家的债务增长了大约400倍。那是40,000%！假设你预见了这种增长，并因失控的赤字和货币贬值而恐慌。为了“保护”自己，你可能避开了股票，选择用114.75美元购买31⁄4盎司黄金。

And what would that supposed protection have delivered? You would now have an asset worth about $4,200, less than 1% of what would have been realized from a simple unmanaged investment in American business. The magical metal was no match for the American mettle.

而这种所谓的保护带来了什么？你的资产现在价值约4200美元，不到简单投资美国企业所获回报的1%。神奇的金属无法与美国的韧性相比。

Our country’s almost unbelievable prosperity has been gained in a bipartisan manner. Since 1942, we have had seven Republican presidents and seven Democrats. In the years they served, the country contended at various times with a long period of viral inflation, a 21% prime rate, several controversial and costly wars, the resignation of a president, a pervasive collapse in home values, a paralyzing financial panic and a host of other problems. All engendered scary headlines; all are now history.

我们国家几乎难以置信的繁荣是以两党合作的方式获得的。自1942年以来，我们有七位共和党总统和七位民主党总统。在他们执政的岁月里，国家不时应对病毒式通货膨胀、21%的最高利率、几次有争议且代价高昂的战争、一位总统的辞职、房价的普遍崩溃、瘫痪性的金融恐慌以及诸多其他问题。所有这些都引发了可怕的头条新闻；现在都已成为历史。

Christopher Wren, architect of St. Paul’s Cathedral, lies buried within that London church. Near his tomb are posted these words of description (translated from Latin): “If you would seek my monument, look around you.” Those skeptical of America’s economic playbook should heed his message.

圣保罗大教堂的建筑师克里斯托弗·雷恩葬于伦敦那座教堂内。他的墓旁贴着这样的描述（从拉丁文翻译而来）：“如果你想寻找我的纪念碑，环顾四周。”那些怀疑美国经济蓝图的人应该留意他的信息。

In 1788 – to go back to our starting point – there really wasn’t much here except for a small band of ambitious people and an embryonic governing framework aimed at turning their dreams into reality. Today, the Federal Reserve estimates our household wealth at $108 trillion, an amount almost impossible to comprehend.

在1788年——回到我们的起点——这里几乎一无所有，除了一小群有雄心的人和一个旨在将他们的梦想变为现实的雏形治理框架。今天，美联储估计我们的家庭财富达到108万亿美元，这个数字几乎令人难以想象。

Remember, earlier in this letter, how I described retained earnings as having been the key to Berkshire’s prosperity? So it has been with America. In the nation’s accounting, the comparable item is labeled “savings.” And save we have. If our forefathers had instead consumed all they produced, there would have been no investment, no productivity gains and no leap in living standards.

还记得我在信中早些时候如何描述留存收益是伯克希尔繁荣的关键吗？美国也是如此。在国家的会计中，类似的项目被称为“储蓄”。我们确实储蓄了。如果我们的祖先消耗了他们生产的所有东西，就不会有投资、没有生产力提升，也不会有人均生活水平的飞跃。

markdown Charlie and I happily acknowledge that much of Berkshire’s success has simply been a product of what I think should be called The American Tailwind. It is beyond arrogance for American businesses or individuals to boast that they have “done it alone.” The tidy rows of simple white crosses at Normandy should shame those who make such claims.

查理和我欣然承认，伯克希尔的许多成功仅仅是源于我认为应称为“美国顺风”的力量。美国企业或个人若夸口说他们“独自完成”，那是极其傲慢的。诺曼底整齐排列的简单白色十字架应该让那些做出此类声明的人感到羞耻。

There are also many other countries around the world that have bright futures. About that, we should rejoice: Americans will be both more prosperous and safer if all nations thrive. At Berkshire, we hope to invest significant sums across borders.

世界上还有许多其他国家拥有光明的未来。对此，我们应该感到高兴：如果所有国家都繁荣，美国人将更加富裕和安全。在伯克希尔，我们希望在跨境投资中投入大量资金。

Over the next 77 years, however, the major source of our gains will almost certainly be provided by The American Tailwind. We are lucky – gloriously lucky – to have that force at our back.

然而，在接下来的77年里，我们的收益主要来源几乎肯定仍将是美国顺风。我们很幸运——非常幸运——有这股力量在背后支持我们。

# The Annual Meeting (年度股东大会)

Berkshire’s 2019 annual meeting will take place on Saturday, May 4th. If you are thinking about attending – and Charlie and I hope you come – check out the details on pages A-2 – A-3. They describe the same schedule we’ve followed for some years.

伯克希尔2019年的年度股东大会将于5月4日星期六举行。如果您考虑参加——查理和我希望您能来——请查看A-2至A-3页的细节。它们描述了我们多年来遵循的相同日程安排。

If you can’t join us in Omaha, attend via Yahoo’s webcast. Andy Serwer and his Yahoo associates do an outstanding job, both in covering the entire meeting and interviewing many Berkshire managers, celebrities, financial experts and shareholders from the U.S. and abroad. The world’s knowledge of what goes on in Omaha the first Saturday of every May has grown dramatically since Yahoo came on board. Its coverage begins at 8:45 a.m. CDT and provides Mandarin translation.

如果您无法亲临奥马哈，可以通过雅虎的网络直播参加。安迪·塞尔沃和他的雅虎团队表现出色，不仅全程报道会议，还采访了许多伯克希尔的管理者、名人、财务专家以及来自美国和海外的股东。自从雅虎加入以来，全球对每年五月第一个星期六在奥马哈发生的事情的了解显著增加。其报道从美国中部时间上午8:45开始，并提供中文翻译。

For 54 years, Charlie and I have loved our jobs. Daily, we do what we find interesting, working with people we like and trust. And now our new management structure has made our lives even more enjoyable.

54年来，查理和我一直热爱我们的工作。每天，我们做我们觉得有趣的事情，与我们喜欢和信任的人共事。现在，我们的新管理结构让我们的生活更加愉快。

With the whole ensemble – that is, with Ajit and Greg running operations, a great collection of businesses, a Niagara of cash-generation, a cadre of talented managers and a rock-solid culture – your company is in good shape for whatever the future brings.

有了整个团队——也就是说，有阿吉特和格雷格负责运营，一系列优秀的企业，现金流的尼亚加拉瀑布，一群才华横溢的经理人以及坚如磐石的文化——您的公司已经为未来的一切做好了准备。

February 23, 2019
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

2019年2月23日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席

编辑

上次更新: 2025/07/14, 21:42:27

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