1999巴菲特致股东的信

# BERKSHWICK HATHAWAY INC.

# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东)

Our gain in net worth during 1999 was $358 million, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 0.5%. Over the last 35 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $37,987, a rate of 24.0% compounded annually.*

1999年我们的净资产增长了3.58亿美元，使A类和B类股票的每股账面价值均提高了0.5%。在过去35年中（即现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值从19美元增长至37,987美元，年复合增长率达24.0%。*

The numbers on the facing page show just how poor our 1999 record was. We had the worst absolute performance of my tenure and, compared to the S&P, the worst relative performance as well. Relative results are what concern us: Over time, bad relative numbers will produce unsatisfactory absolute results.

对面页面上的数字清楚地显示了我们在1999年的表现有多糟糕。这是我任职期间绝对回报最差的一年，相对于标普指数的表现也是最差的一次。我们更关注相对结果：从长期来看，糟糕的相对回报将导致令人不满的绝对回报。

Even Inspector Clouseau could find last year’s guilty party: your Chairman. My performance reminds me of the quarterback whose report card showed four Fs and a D but who nonetheless had an understanding coach. “Son,” he drawled, “I think you’re spending too much time on that one subject.”

就连电影中的“督察克洛索”都能找出去年的罪魁祸首：你们的董事长。我的表现让我想起一个四分卫球员，他的成绩单上有四个F和一个D，但教练却很理解他。“孩子，”他慢悠悠地说，“我觉得你把太多时间花在那一门课上了。”

My “one subject” is capital allocation, and my grade for 1999 most assuredly is a D. What most hurt us during the year was the inferior performance of Berkshire’s equity portfolio — and responsibility for that portfolio, leaving aside the small piece of it run by Lou Simpson of GEICO, is entirely mine. Several of our largest investees badly lagged the market in 1999 because they’ve had disappointing operating results. We still like these businesses and are content to have major investments in them. But their stumbles damaged our performance last year, and it’s no sure thing that they will quickly regain their stride.

我所说的“那一门课”指的是资本配置，而我在1999年的成绩无疑是得了D。这一年对我们造成最大伤害的是伯克希尔股票投资组合表现不佳——除去GEICO的Lou Simpson管理的小部分之外，这部分的责任完全在我。我们几家最大被投资公司在1999年严重落后于市场，是因为它们的经营结果令人失望。我们仍然喜欢这些企业，并愿意对它们进行重大投资。但它们的失误损害了我们去年的表现，而且它们能否迅速恢复元气也并不确定。

The fallout from our weak results in 1999 was a more-than-commensurate drop in our stock price. In 1998, to go back a bit, the stock outperformed the business. Last year the business did much better than the stock, a divergence that has continued to the date of this letter. Over time, of course, the performance of the stock must roughly match the performance of the business.

1999年业绩疲软带来的后果是股价下跌幅度远超过实际基本面所应反映的程度。回顾一下，1998年股价表现优于公司本身业务表现。去年则是业务表现远好于股价表现，这种分歧一直持续到本信函撰写之日。当然，从长期来看，股价的表现必须大致与公司业务表现相匹配。

Despite our poor showing last year, Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect that the gain in Berkshire’s intrinsic value over the next decade will modestly exceed the gain from owning the S&P. We can’t guarantee that, of course. But we are willing to back our conviction with our own money. To repeat a fact you’ve heard before, well over 99% of my net worth resides in Berkshire. Neither my wife nor I have ever sold a share of Berkshire and — unless our checks stop clearing — we have no intention of doing so.

尽管去年我们表现不佳，但我和伯克希尔副董事长兼合伙人查理·芒格仍预计，在未来十年内，伯克希尔的内在价值增长将略微超过持有标普指数所能获得的收益。当然，我们无法保证这一点。但我们愿意用自己的资金来支持这一信念。重复一句你们以前听过的话：我的净资产中，有超过99%都投资于伯克希尔。我和我的妻子从未卖出过一股伯克希尔股票——除非我们的支票无法兑现——否则我们没有出售计划。

Please note that I spoke of hoping to beat the S&P “modestly.” For Berkshire, truly large superiorities over that index are a thing of the past. They existed then because we could buy both businesses and stocks at far more attractive prices than we can now, and also because we then had a much smaller capital base, a situation that allowed us to consider a much wider range of investment opportunities than are available to us today.

请注意我说的是“适度”超越标普指数。对于伯克希尔而言，大幅领先该指数的时代已经过去。当年之所以能做到，是因为我们当时能够以比现在更具吸引力的价格收购企业和股票，同时也因为我们当时的资本规模要小得多，这让我们可以考虑比今天广泛得多的投资机会。

Our optimism about Berkshire’s performance is also tempered by the expectation — indeed, in our minds, the virtual certainty — that the S&P will do far less well in the next decade or two than it has done since 1982. A recent article in Fortune expressed my views as to why this is inevitable, and I’m enclosing a copy with this report.

我们对伯克希尔未来表现的乐观情绪，也因另一个预期而有所克制——在我们看来几乎是确定无疑的：在未来一、二十年里，标普指数的表现将远逊于自1982年以来的表现。《财富》杂志最近刊登的一篇文章表达了我对这种必然性的看法，随此报告附上一份复印件。

Our goal is to run our present businesses well — a task made easy because of the outstanding managers we have in place — and to acquire additional businesses having economic characteristics and managers comparable to those we already own. We made important progress in this respect during 1999 by acquiring Jordan’s Furniture and contracting to buy a major portion of MidAmerican Energy. We will talk more about these companies later in the report but let me emphasize one point here: We bought both for cash, issuing no Berkshire shares. Deals of that kind aren’t always possible, but that is the method of acquisition that Charlie and I vastly prefer.

我们的目标是把现有的企业经营好——这项任务由于我们拥有一流的经理人而变得轻松，同时还要收购具有类似经济特征和优秀管理者的其他企业。1999年我们在这一方面取得了重要进展，成功收购了Jordan’s Furniture，并签约收购MidAmerican Energy的大部分股权。稍后我们会详细讨论这两家公司，但在此我想强调一点：我们是以现金完成收购，没有发行任何伯克希尔股票。这类交易并非总能实现，但却是查理和我最偏爱的并购方式。

*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.

*本报告中使用的所有数据均适用于伯克希尔A股，这是1996年前公司唯一流通的股票。B股的经济权益为A股的1/30。

# Guides to Intrinsic Value

# 内在价值指南

I often talk in these pages about intrinsic value, a key, though far from precise, measurement we utilize in our acquisitions of businesses and common stocks. (For an extensive discussion of this, and other investment and accounting terms and concepts, please refer to our Owner’s Manual on pages 55 - 62. Intrinsic value is discussed on page 60.)

在这封信中，我经常提到“内在价值”这一概念。这是我们用于企业及普通股收购的重要衡量标准之一，虽然它并不十分精确。（关于这个术语以及其它投资和会计术语的详细讨论，请参见第55至62页的《所有者手册》，内在价值的定义请见第60页。）

In our last four reports, we have furnished you a table that we regard as useful in estimating Berkshire’s intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace two key components of value. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents but excluding assets held in our financial products operation) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire’s operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments (discussed on page 61), but after all interest and corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs.

在过去的四年报告中，我们提供了我们认为有助于估算伯克希尔内在价值的表格。以下是更新版本，展示了两个关键的价值组成部分。第一列列出的是每股所持有的投资资产（包括现金及等价物，但不包括金融产品业务所持有的资产）；第二列则显示的是伯克希尔运营企业在扣除所有利息和公司费用后的每股税前盈利（不包括购买法会计调整的影响，相关内容请参见第61页）。第二列排除了从第一列投资中获得的所有股息、利息和资本利得。实际上，这两个栏目展示了如果将伯克希尔拆分为两个实体，一部分持有投资资产，另一部分运营所有业务并承担全部公司成本时的情形。

Year	Investments Per Share	Pre-tax Earnings (Loss) Per Share With All Income from Investments Excluded
年份	每股投资（Investments Per Share）	扣除所有投资收入后的每股税前盈利（Pre-tax Earnings (Loss) Per Share With All Income from Investments Excluded）
1969	$4.39	$(458.55)
1979	$13.07	$108.86
1989	$45	N.A.
1999	$7,200	$577

Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:

以下是按十年划分的两个部分的增长率：

Decade Ending	Investments Per Share	Pre-tax Earnings Per Share With All Income from Investments Excluded
结束十年	每股投资	扣除所有投资收入后的每股税前盈利
1979	29.0%	11.5%
1989	28.7%	23.6%
1999	20.7%	N.A.
Annual Growth Rate, 1969–1999	25.4%	N.A.

In 1999, our per-share investments changed very little, but our operating earnings, affected by negatives that overwhelmed some strong positives, fell apart. Most of our operating managers deserve a grade of A for delivering fine results and for having widened the difference between the intrinsic value of their businesses and the value at which these are carried on our balance sheet. But, offsetting this, we had a huge — and, I believe, aberrational — underwriting loss at General Re. Additionally, GEICO’s underwriting profit fell, as we had predicted it would. GEICO’s overall performance, though, was terrific, outstripping my ambitious goals.

1999年，我们每股投资变化不大，但受一些负面因素影响（这些因素压倒了一些积极成果），运营利润大幅下滑。我们的大多数运营经理人在绩效表现方面值得给予“A”的评价，他们不仅交出了出色的成绩，还扩大了其企业内在价值与其在我们资产负债表上的账面价值之间的差距。然而，另一方面，General Re出现了巨大的承保亏损——我认为这是异常情况所致。此外，正如我们预测的那样，GEICO的承保利润下降了。不过，GEICO的整体表现非常出色，甚至超过了我原本设定的高目标。

We do not expect our underwriting earnings to improve in any dramatic way this year. Though GEICO’s intrinsic value should grow by a highly satisfying amount, its underwriting performance is almost certain to weaken. That’s because auto insurers, as a group, will do worse in 2000, and because we will materially increase our marketing expenditures. At General Re, we are raising rates and, if there is no mega-catastrophe in 2000, the company’s underwriting loss should fall considerably. It takes some time, however, for the full effect of rate increases to kick in, and General Re is therefore likely to have another unsatisfactory underwriting year.

我们不期望今年的承保利润出现显著改善。尽管GEICO的内在价值预计将有非常令人满意的增长，但其承保业绩几乎肯定会减弱。这是因为汽车保险公司作为一个整体在2000年将面临更差的环境，而且我们将显著增加市场营销支出。在General Re方面，我们正在提高费率，如果2000年没有发生大型灾难事件，公司的承保亏损应该会明显减少。然而，费率上涨的全面效果需要一定时间才能显现出来，因此General Re很可能再经历一个令人失望的承保年度。

You should be aware that one item regularly working to widen the amount by which intrinsic value exceeds book value is the annual charge against income we take for amortization of goodwill — an amount now running about $500 million. This charge reduces the amount of goodwill we show as an asset and likewise the amount that is included in our book value. This is an accounting matter having nothing to do with true economic goodwill, which increases in most years. But even if economic goodwill were to remain constant, the annual amortization charge would persistently widen the gap between intrinsic value and book value.

你应该知道，有一项因素经常促使内在价值超过账面价值的差距扩大，那就是我们每年从盈利中扣除的商誉摊销费用——目前这一金额约为5亿美元。这项费用减少了我们在资产负债表上列示的商誉资产金额，也减少了计入账面价值的部分。这只是一个会计事项，与真正的经济商誉无关，而经济商誉在大多数年份是不断增长的。即使经济商誉保持不变，这种年度摊销费用也会持续扩大内在价值与账面价值之间的差距。

Though we can’t give you a precise figure for Berkshire’s intrinsic value, or even an approximation, Charlie and I can assure you that it far exceeds our $57.8 billion book value. Businesses such as See’s and Buffalo News are now worth fifteen to twenty times the value at which they are carried on our books. Our goal is to continually widen this spread at all subsidiaries.

尽管我们无法为你提供伯克希尔内在价值的确切数字，甚至也无法给出近似值，但查理和我可以向你保证，其内在价值远远超过了我们578亿美元的账面价值。例如See’s糖果公司和《布法罗新闻报》现在的价值是我们账面记录价值的15到20倍。我们的目标是在所有子公司中持续扩大这一差距。

# A Managerial Story You Will Never Read Elsewhere

# 一个你在别处读不到的管理故事

Berkshire’s collection of managers is unusual in several important ways. As one example, a very high percentage of these men and women are independently wealthy, having made fortunes in the businesses that they run. They work neither because they need the money nor because they are contractually obligated to — we have no contracts at Berkshire. Rather, they work long and hard because they love their businesses. And I use the word “their” advisedly, since these managers are truly in charge — there are no show-and-tell presentations in Omaha, no budgets to be approved by headquarters, no dictums issued about capital expenditures. We simply ask our managers to run their companies as if these are the sole asset of their families and will remain so for the next century.

伯克希尔所拥有的经理人们在多个方面都非常独特。其中一个显著特点是，他们中的很大一部分人已经凭借自己经营的企业积累了巨额财富。他们工作既不是因为需要钱，也不是因为受到合同约束——我们在伯克希尔没有任何合同条款来绑定这些经理人。他们之所以辛勤工作，是因为热爱自己的事业。我使用“他们的”这个词是有意为之的，因为这些经理人确实是真正的掌控者——他们不需要在奥马哈总部做汇报展示、也不需要总部批准预算，更不会收到关于资本支出的命令。我们只是要求他们像经营家族唯一资产一样经营公司，并且这种状态要持续百年。

Charlie and I try to behave with our managers just as we attempt to behave with Berkshire’s shareholders, treating both groups as we would wish to be treated if our positions were reversed. Though “working” means nothing to me financially, I love doing it at Berkshire for some simple reasons: It gives me a sense of achievement, a freedom to act as I see fit and an opportunity to interact daily with people I like and trust. Why should our managers — accomplished artists at what they do — see things differently?

查理和我都努力以对待股东的方式对待我们的经理人，希望我们能像我们期望被对待的那样对待他们。虽然从财务角度来说，“工作”对我个人意义不大，但我喜欢在伯克希尔工作，原因很简单：它给了我成就感、行动自由，以及每天与我喜欢并信任的人互动的机会。那么，我们的经理人——那些在各自领域堪称艺术家的人——为何会有不同的看法呢？

In their relations with Berkshire, our managers often appear to be hewing to President Kennedy’s charge, “Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country.” Here’s a remarkable story from last year: It’s about R. C. Willey, Utah’s dominant home furnishing business, which Berkshire purchased from Bill Child and his family in 1995. Bill and most of his managers are Mormons, and for this reason R. C. Willey’s stores have never operated on Sunday. This is a difficult way to do business: Sunday is the favorite shopping day for many customers. Bill, nonetheless, stuck to his principles — and while doing so built his business from $250,000 of annual sales in 1954, when he took over, to $342 million in 1999.

在与伯克希尔的关系中，我们的经理人常常体现出肯尼迪总统所说的那种精神：“不要问国家能为你做什么，而要问你能为国家做什么。”以下是去年的一个非凡故事：R. C. Willey是犹他州主导家庭用品市场的企业，伯克希尔于1995年从Bill Child及其家人手中收购了这家公司。Bill和他的大部分经理人都是摩门教徒，因此R. C. Willey的所有门店从不在周日营业。这是一种艰难的商业模式：周日是许多顾客最喜欢的购物日。然而，Bill始终坚持他的原则——正是在这种坚持下，他将公司年销售额从1954年接手时的25万美元增长到了1999年的3.42亿美元。

Bill felt that R. C. Willey could operate successfully in markets outside of Utah and in 1997 suggested that we open a store in Boise. I was highly skeptical about taking a no-Sunday policy into a new territory where we would be up against entrenched rivals open seven days a week. Nevertheless, this was Bill’s business to run. So, despite my reservations, I told him to follow both his business judgment and his religious convictions.

Bill认为R. C. Willey可以在犹他州以外的市场成功运营，并于1997年建议我们在博伊西（Boise）开设一家门店。我对在新地区实行“不营业于周日”的政策持高度怀疑态度，因为在当地我们将面对每周七天都营业的强大竞争对手。不过，这是Bill自己的企业，应该由他来决定。因此，尽管我有疑虑，我还是告诉他可以按照他的商业判断和宗教信仰行事。

Bill then insisted on a truly extraordinary proposition: He would personally buy the land and build the store — for about $9 million as it turned out — and would sell it to us at his cost if it proved to be successful. On the other hand, if sales fell short of his expectations, we could exit the business without paying Bill a cent. This outcome, of course, would leave him with a huge investment in an empty building. I told him that I appreciated his offer but felt that if Berkshire was going to get the upside it should also take the downside. Bill said nothing doing: If there was to be failure because of his religious beliefs, he wanted to take the blow personally.

随后，Bill提出了一个真正非同寻常的提议：他将亲自购买土地并建造这家门店——最终花费约900万美元——如果门店成功运营，他会以成本价卖给我们；但如果销售未达预期，我们可以完全退出业务而不支付他一分钱。当然，这种情况会让Bill独自承担一笔巨大的空置建筑投资。我告诉他，我很感激他的提议，但我认为如果伯克希尔要享受收益，也应该承担风险。Bill却一口回绝：如果失败是因为他的宗教信仰所致，他愿意亲自承受打击。

The store opened last August and immediately became a huge success. Bill thereupon turned the property over to us — including some extra land that had appreciated significantly — and we wrote him a check for his cost. And get this: Bill refused to take a dime of interest on the capital he had tied up over the two years.

这家店于去年八月开业后立刻大获成功。于是Bill将整个物业交给了我们——包括一块大幅升值的额外土地——我们按他的原始成本写了一张支票。更令人难以置信的是：Bill拒绝收取这两年他投入资金的一分利息。

If a manager has behaved similarly at some other public corporation, I haven’t heard about it. You can understand why the opportunity to partner with people like Bill Child causes me to tap dance to work every morning.

如果其他上市公司也有经理人表现出类似行为，我从未听说过。你现在应该明白，为什么能够与像Bill Child这样的人合作，让我每天都跳着舞去上班。

A footnote: After our “soft” opening in August, we had a grand opening of the Boise store about a month later. Naturally, I went there to cut the ribbon (your Chairman, I wish to emphasize, is good for something). In my talk I told the crowd how sales had far exceeded expectations, making us, by a considerable margin, the largest home furnishings store in Idaho. Then, as the speech progressed, my memory miraculously began to improve. By the end of my talk, it all had come back to me: Opening a store in Boise had been my idea.

注脚：在八月进行“软性开业”之后，大约一个月后我们举行了正式开幕。自然地，我亲临现场剪彩（我强调一下，你们的董事长还是有点用处的）。在演讲中，我告诉大家销售业绩远超预期，使我们成为爱达荷州最大的家居用品商店。随着演讲继续，我的记忆奇迹般开始恢复。到讲话结束时，我想起来了：在博伊西开一家店其实是我提出的主意。

# The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance

# 财产/意外险的经济学原理

Our main business — though we have others of great importance — is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.

我们主要的业务——尽管我们还有其他重要业务——是保险。因此，要理解伯克希尔，你必须了解如何评估一家保险公司。关键因素有三个：（1）公司产生的浮存金（float）数量；（2）其成本；（3）最重要的是，这两个因素的长期前景。

To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.

首先，浮存金是我们持有但并不属于我们的资金。在保险业务中，浮存金产生于保费先于赔付支付的时间差，这个时间差有时可能长达数年。在这段时间里，保险公司可以将这笔钱用于投资。这种“免费使用资金”的活动通常伴随着一个缺点：保险公司收取的保费往往不足以覆盖最终必须支付的损失和费用，这就导致了“承保亏损”，也就是浮存金的成本。如果一家保险公司的浮存金成本长期低于获取外部资金所需成本，则该公司具有价值。但如果其浮存金成本高于市场资金利率，那这家公司就变成了“柠檬”（Lemon，意指劣质品）。

A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. In 1999 a number of insurers announced reserve adjustments that made a mockery of the “earnings” that investors had relied on earlier when making their buy and sell decisions. At Berkshire, we strive to be conservative and consistent in our reserving. Even so, we warn you that an unpleasant surprise is always possible.

在此有必要提出警告：由于损失成本必须依赖估算，保险公司在计算承保结果时拥有极大的灵活性，这使得投资者很难准确判断公司的实际浮存金成本。这些估计误差通常是无心之失，但也可能是有意为之，而且误差规模可能非常巨大。这些错误直接影响财报盈余。经验丰富的观察者通常可以察觉大规模的准备金错误，但普通公众通常只能接受报表呈现的数据。有时，一些知名审计机构对某些数据的默许让我感到震惊。1999年，多家保险公司宣布调整准备金，这让投资者此前依据“盈利”做出买卖决策的基础变得荒谬可笑。在伯克希尔，我们力求在准备金计提方面保持保守和一贯性。即便如此，我们仍警告你，未来仍有出现意外负面消息的可能性。

Year	GEICO	General Re	Reinsurance Primary	Other Primary	Other	Total Yearend Float (in $ millions)
年份	GEICO	General Re	再保险原保业务 (Reinsurance Primary)	其他原保业务 (Other Primary)	其他	年末浮存金总额（单位：百万美元）
1967	—	—	—	20	—	20
1977	—	—	40	131	—	171
1987	—	—	701	807	—	1,508
1997	2,917	14,909	4,014	4,305	—	7,386
1998	3,125	15,166	455	6,285	—	22,754
1999	3,444	—	403	—	—	25,298

Growth of float is important — but its cost is what’s vital. Over the years we have usually recorded only a small underwriting loss — which means our cost of float was correspondingly low — or actually had an underwriting profit,

浮存金的增长固然重要——但其成本才是关键。多年来，我们通常只录得小额承保亏损——意味着我们的浮存金成本相应较低——或实际上实现了承保利润，

which means we were being paid for holding other people’s money. Indeed, our cumulative result through 1998 was an underwriting profit. In 1999, however, we incurred a $1.4 billion underwriting loss that left us with float cost of 5.8%. One mildly mitigating factor: We enthusiastically welcomed $400 million of the loss because it stems from business that will deliver us exceptional float over the next decade. The balance of the loss, however, was decidedly unwelcome, and our overall result must be judged extremely poor. Absent a mega-catastrophe, we expect float cost to fall in 2000, but any decline will be tempered by our aggressive plans for GEICO, which we will discuss later.

这意味着我们其实是“被付钱”来持有别人的钱。事实上，截至1998年，我们累计实现了承保利润。但在1999年，我们录得了14亿美元的承保亏损，导致浮存金成本达到5.8%。有一个略微缓解的因素：我们欣然接受了其中4亿美元的亏损，因为它来源于将在未来十年为我们带来优异浮存金的业务。但其余部分则完全是出乎意料且令人失望的，我们必须承认整体表现极差。除非发生大型灾难事件，否则我们预计2000年浮存金成本将下降，但任何降幅都会因我们对GEICO的积极扩张计划而有所抑制，这部分我们将在后文进一步讨论。

There are a number of people who deserve credit for manufacturing so much “no-cost” float over the years. Foremost is Ajit Jain. It’s simply impossible to overstate Ajit’s value to Berkshire: He has from scratch built an outstanding reinsurance business, which during his tenure has earned an underwriting profit and now holds $6.3 billion of float.

多年来，有许多人值得为制造大量“零成本”浮存金而受到表彰。首当其冲的是Ajit Jain。我们无法过分强调Ajit对伯克希尔的价值：他从零开始打造了一个卓越的再保险业务，在他的领导下实现了承保利润，并目前持有63亿美元的浮存金。

In Ajit, we have an underwriter equipped with the intelligence to properly rate most risks; the realism to forget about those he can’t evaluate; the courage to write huge policies when the premium is appropriate; and the discipline to reject even the smallest risk when the premium is inadequate. It is rare to find a person possessing any one of these talents. For one person to have them all is remarkable.

在Ajit身上，我们拥有一位具备以下特质的承保人：拥有正确评估大多数风险的智慧；有现实感，能忽略那些他无法判断的风险；有勇气在保费合适时承接巨额保单；以及有足够的纪律，在保费不足时拒绝哪怕是最小的风险。这些才能中任何一项都极为罕见，而一个人同时具备全部四项，则是极其难得的。

Since Ajit specializes in super-cat reinsurance, a line in which losses are infrequent but extremely large when they occur, his business is sure to be far more volatile than most insurance operations. To date, we have benefited from good luck on this volatile book. Even so, Ajit’s achievements are truly extraordinary.

由于Ajit专精于超级巨灾再保险（super-cat reinsurance），这类业务的特点是损失不常发生，但一旦发生则规模巨大，因此他的业务注定比大多数保险运营更具波动性。到目前为止，我们在这一高波动性的业务中受益于好运。即便如此，Ajit所取得的成就仍然非凡卓著。

In a smaller but nevertheless important way, our “other primary” insurance operation has also added to Berkshire’s intrinsic value. This collection of insurers has delivered a $192 million underwriting profit over the past five years while supplying us with the float shown in the table. In the insurance world, results like this are uncommon, and for their feat we thank Rod Eldred, Brad Kinstler, John Kizer, Don Towle and Don Wurster.

尽管规模较小但同样重要的是，我们的“其他原保”保险业务也为伯克希尔的内在价值做出了贡献。过去五年间，这些保险公司为我们带来了1.92亿美元的承保利润，同时提供了表格中所示的浮存金。在保险行业中，这样的成绩非常少见。为此，我们要感谢Rod Eldred、Brad Kinstler、John Kizer、Don Towle和Don Wurster。

As I mentioned earlier, the General Re operation had an exceptionally poor underwriting year in 1999 (though investment income left the company well in the black). Our business was extremely underpriced, both domestically and internationally, a condition that is improving but not yet corrected. Over time, however, the company should develop a growing amount of low-cost float. At both General Re and its Cologne subsidiary, incentive compensation plans are now directly tied to the variables of float growth and cost of float, the same variables that determine value for owners.

正如我之前提到的，General Re在1999年经历了异常糟糕的承保年度（尽管投资收入使公司整体盈利）。我们的业务在国内和国际市场上都被严重低估了，虽然这种情况正在改善，但尚未完全纠正。不过从长期来看，这家公司应能逐步积累越来越多低成本的浮存金。在General Re及其科隆子公司，激励薪酬计划现已直接与浮存金增长和浮存金成本这两个变量挂钩——而这正是决定股东价值的关键因素。

Even though a reinsurer may have a tightly focused and rational compensation system, it cannot count on every year coming up roses. Reinsurance is a highly volatile business, and neither General Re nor Ajit’s operation is immune to bad pricing behavior in the industry. But General Re has the distribution, the underwriting skills, the culture, and — with Berkshire’s backing — the financial clout to become the world’s most profitable reinsurance company. Getting there will take time, energy and discipline, but we have no doubt that Ron Ferguson and his crew can make it happen.

即使一家再保险公司拥有高度聚焦且理性的薪酬体系，也不能指望每一年都能顺风顺水。再保险是一项高度波动的行业，无论是General Re还是Ajit的团队都无法避免整个行业的错误定价行为。然而，General Re拥有广泛的分销网络、出色的承保能力、良好的企业文化，以及——在伯克希尔的支持下——强大的财务实力，足以使其成为全球最盈利的再保险公司。实现这一目标需要时间、精力和纪律，但我们毫不怀疑Ron Ferguson和他的团队能够做到这一点。

# GEICO (1-800-847-7536 or GEICO.com)

# GEICO（电话：1-800-847-7536 或访问 GEICO.com）

GEICO made exceptional progress in 1999. The reasons are simple: We have a terrific business idea being implemented by an extraordinary manager, Tony Nicely. When Berkshire purchased GEICO at the beginning of 1996, we handed the keys to Tony and asked him to run the operation exactly as if he owned 100% of it. He has done the rest. Take a look at his scorecard:

GEICO在1999年取得了非凡的进步。原因很简单：我们有一个极佳的商业理念，由一位非凡的经理人Tony Nicely来执行。1996年初伯克希尔收购GEICO后，我们将管理权交给了Tony，要求他像经营100%属于自己的公司一样运营它。之后的成绩全靠他的努力。请看看他的成绩单：

New Auto Years	Policies (1)(2)	Auto Policies In-Force (1)
年份	新增汽车保单数（New Auto Policies）	在效汽车保单总数（Auto Policies In-Force）
1993	346,882	2,011,055
1994	384,217	2,147,549
1995	443,539	2,310,037
1996	592,300	2,543,699
1997	868,430	2,949,439
1998	1,249,875	3,562,644
1999	1,648,095	4,328,900

(1) “Voluntary” only; excludes assigned risks and the like.
（仅限“自愿投保”；排除指派风险等）
(2) Revised to exclude policies moved from one GEICO company to another.
（经修订，剔除了GEICO内部公司之间转移的保单）

In 1995, GEICO spent $33 million on marketing and had 652 telephone counselors. Last year the company spent $242 million, and the counselor count grew to 2,631. And we are just starting: The pace will step up materially in 2000. Indeed, we would happily commit $1 billion annually to marketing if we knew we could handle the business smoothly and if we expected the last dollar spent to produce new business at an attractive cost.

1995年，GEICO在市场营销上花费了3,300万美元，拥有652名电话顾问。去年，公司投入了2.42亿美元，顾问人数增至2,631人。但这只是开始：2000年的投入步伐将显著加快。事实上，如果我们确信自己能够顺利处理新增业务，并预计最后一美元的支出仍能带来具有吸引力的新业务，我们愿意每年投入高达10亿美元用于营销。

Currently two trends are affecting acquisition costs. The bad news is that it has become more expensive to develop inquiries. Media rates have risen, and we are also seeing diminishing returns — that is, as both we and our competitors step up advertising, inquiries per ad fall for all of us. These negatives are partly offset, however, by the fact that our closure ratio — the percentage of inquiries converted to sales — has steadily improved. Overall, we believe that our cost of new business, though definitely rising, is well below that of the industry. Of even greater importance, our operating costs for renewal business are the lowest among broad-based national auto insurers. Both of these major competitive advantages are sustainable. Others may copy our model, but they will be unable to replicate our economics.

目前有两个趋势正在影响获客成本。坏消息是，获取潜在客户的成本越来越高。媒体广告费用上涨，同时我们也看到了边际回报递减的现象——也就是说，当我们和竞争对手都在加大广告力度时，每次广告带来的咨询量却在下降。然而，这些负面因素部分被我们的转化率提升所抵消——即咨询客户转化为实际购买者的比例持续上升。总体而言，我们认为虽然新业务成本确实在上升，但仍远低于行业平均水平。更为重要的是，我们在续保业务上的运营成本是所有综合性全国汽车保险公司中最低的。这两大主要竞争优势都是可持续的。其他人可以模仿我们的模式，但他们无法复制我们的经济模型。

The table above makes it appear that GEICO’s retention of policyholders is falling, but for two reasons appearances are in this case deceiving. First, in the last few years our business mix has moved away from “preferred” policyholders, for whom industrywide retention rates are high, toward “standard” and “non-standard” policyholders for whom retention rates are much lower. (Despite the nomenclature, the three classes have similar profit prospects.) Second, retention rates for relatively new policyholders are always lower than those for long-time customers — and because of our accelerated growth, our policyholder ranks now include an increased proportion of new customers. Adjusted for these two factors, our retention rate has changed hardly at all.

上面的表格看似显示GEICO的客户留存率在下降，但实际上这是误导的，原因有两个。首先，近年来我们的客户结构已逐渐从“优质客户”（industrywide retention rates较高）转向“标准客户”和“非标准客户”（retention较低）。（尽管名称不同，这三类客户的盈利能力其实相近。）其次，新客户的留存率总是低于老客户——而由于我们的快速增长，现有客户中新增客户比例上升。若考虑这两个因素，我们的客户留存率几乎未发生变化。

We told you last year that underwriting margins for both GEICO and the industry would fall in 1999, and they did. We make a similar prediction for 2000. A few years ago margins got too wide, having enjoyed the effects of an unusual and unexpected decrease in the frequency and severity of accidents. The industry responded by reducing rates — but now is having to contend with an increase in loss costs. We would not be surprised to see the margins of auto insurers deteriorate by around three percentage points in 2000.

我们去年曾告诉过你，GEICO和整个行业的承保利润率将在1999年下降，结果确实如此。我们对2000年也做出类似预测。几年前，由于事故频率和严重程度出现了出乎意料的下降，导致利润率一度过高。行业随后降低了费率，但现在必须面对赔付成本上升的问题。我们不会对2000年汽车保险公司利润率下降约三个百分点感到惊讶。

Two negatives besides worsening frequency and severity will hurt the industry this year. First, rate increases go into effect only slowly, both because of regulatory delay and because insurance contracts must run their course before new rates can be put in. Second, reported earnings of many auto insurers have benefitted in the last few years from reserve releases, made possible because the companies overestimated their loss costs in still-earlier years. This reservoir of redundant reserves has now largely dried up, and future boosts to earnings from this source will be minor at best.

除了事故频率和严重程度恶化之外，今年还有两个负面因素将打击整个行业。第一，费率上调生效缓慢，既因为监管审批延迟，也因为现有保险合同必须到期后才能应用新费率。第二，过去几年许多汽车保险公司的财报盈利受益于释放前期超额计提的准备金（reserve release），这是因为它们早些年高估了赔付成本。这个超额准备金的“水库”现在已经基本枯竭，未来通过这种方式提升盈利的空间将非常有限。

In compensating its associates — from Tony on down — GEICO continues to use two variables, and only two, in determining what bonuses and profit-sharing contributions will be: 1) its percentage growth in policyholders and 2) the earnings of its “seasoned” business, meaning policies that have been with us for more than a year. We did outstandingly well on both fronts during 1999 and therefore made a profit-sharing payment of 28.4% of salary (in total, $113.3 million) to the great majority of our associates. Tony and I love writing those checks.

在对员工（包括Tony本人）进行薪酬激励时，GEICO继续只使用两个指标来决定奖金和利润分享金额：1）客户数量的增长百分比；2）“成熟业务”的盈利情况，即已持有一年以上的保单。我们在这两方面1999年表现优异，因此向绝大多数员工发放了相当于薪资28.4%的利润分享（总计1.133亿美元）。Tony和我都喜欢写这些支票。

At Berkshire, we want to have compensation policies that are both easy to understand and in sync with what we wish our associates to accomplish. Writing new business is expensive (and, as mentioned, getting more expensive). If we were to include those costs in our calculation of bonuses — as managements did before our arrival at GEICO — we would be penalizing our associates for garnering new policies, even though these are very much in Berkshire’s interest. So, in effect, we say to our associates that we will foot the bill for new business. Indeed, because percentage growth in policyholders is part of our compensation scheme, we reward our associates for producing this initially-unprofitable business. And then we reward them additionally for holding down costs on our seasoned business.

在伯克希尔，我们希望薪酬政策既易于理解，又能与我们希望员工达成的目标一致。拓展新业务的成本很高（而且如前所述，正变得越来越贵）。如果我们把这些成本纳入奖金计算——就像我们在GEICO接管前管理层的做法一样——我们会惩罚那些积极争取新客户的行为，而这些行为其实对伯克希尔大有裨益。因此实际上，我们是在告诉员工：我们来承担新业务的成本。事实上，正因为客户增长百分比是我们薪酬体系的一部分，我们奖励员工去开拓初期可能亏损的业务。此外，我们还进一步奖励他们在控制“成熟业务”成本方面的表现。

Despite the extensive advertising we do, our best source of new business is word-of-mouth recommendations from existing policyholders, who on the whole are pleased with our prices and service. An article published last year by Kiplinger’s Personal Finance Magazine gives a good picture of where we stand in customer satisfaction: The magazine’s survey of 20 state insurance departments showed that GEICO’s complaint ratio was well below the ratio for most of its major competitors.

尽管我们做了大量广告宣传，但我们最好的新客户来源仍是现有客户的口碑推荐，他们总体上对我们价格和服务感到满意。《基普林格个人理财杂志》去年发表的一篇文章很好地展示了我们的客户满意度状况：该杂志调查了20个州的保险监管部门，结果显示GEICO的投诉率远低于大多数主要竞争对手。

Our strong referral business means that we probably could maintain our policy count by spending as little as $50 million annually on advertising. That’s a guess, of course, and we will never know whether it is accurate because Tony’s foot is going to stay on the advertising pedal (and my foot will be on his). Nevertheless, I want to emphasize that a major percentage of the $300-$350 million we will spend in 2000 on advertising, as well as large additional costs we will incur for sales counselors, communications and facilities, are optional outlays we choose to make so that we can both achieve significant growth and extend and solidify the promise of the GEICO brand in the minds of Americans.

我们强大的转介绍业务意味着，理论上我们只需每年投入约5,000万美元广告费就可维持当前客户数量。当然这只是推测，我们永远也无法验证是否准确，因为Tony会继续踩着广告投入的油门（而我的脚也会踩在他的脚上）。但我仍要强调：我们在2000年预计将投入3亿至3.5亿美元用于广告，加上销售顾问、通信和设施等方面的额外开支，其中很大一部分是我们主动选择进行的支出，目的是实现显著增长，并在美国人心中进一步扩展和巩固GEICO品牌的承诺。

Personally, I think these expenditures are the best investment Berkshire can make. Through its advertising, GEICO is acquiring a direct relationship with a huge number of households that, on average, will send us $1,100 year after year. That makes us — among all companies, selling whatever kind of product — one of the country’s leading direct merchandisers. Also, as we build our long-term relationships with more and more families, cash is pouring in rather than going out (no Internet economics here). Last year, as GEICO increased its customer base by 766,256, it gained $590 million of cash from operating earnings and the increase in float.

我个人认为，这些支出是伯克希尔所能做出的最佳投资。通过广告宣传，GEICO正在建立与大量家庭用户的直接联系，平均每个家庭每年都会为我们带来1,100美元的收入。这使得我们——无论销售何种产品的企业——都成为美国领先的直销商之一。此外，随着我们与越来越多家庭建立长期关系，现金不断流入而非流出（这里不存在互联网经济那种烧钱模式）。去年，GEICO客户群增加了766,256户，从中获得了5.9亿美元的运营利润及浮存金增长。

In the past three years, we have increased our market share in personal auto insurance from 2.7% to 4.1%. But we rightfully belong in many more households — maybe even yours. Give us a call and find out. About 40% of those people checking our rates find that they can save money by doing business with us. The proportion is not 100% because insurers differ in their underwriting judgments, with some giving more credit than we do to drivers who live in certain geographic areas or work at certain occupations. Our closure rate indicates, however, that we more frequently offer the low price than does any other national carrier selling insurance to all comers. Furthermore, in 40 states we can offer a special discount — usually 8% — to our shareholders. Just be sure to identify yourself as a Berkshire owner so that our sales counselor can make the appropriate adjustment.

在过去三年中，我们在个人汽车保险市场的份额从2.7%提升至4.1%。但我们理应服务更多的家庭——也许包括你家。欢迎致电我们了解情况。约有40%查询我们费率的人发现通过我们投保可以节省开支。这一比例并非100%，是因为各家保险公司对风险的评估标准不同，有些公司会比我们更青睐某些特定地区或职业的驾驶人。但我们的成交率表明，在面向所有客户销售保险的全国性公司中，我们最常提供最低价格。此外，在40个州，我们还能向伯克希尔股东提供特别折扣——通常是8%。请务必在咨询时表明你是伯克希尔股东，以便我们的销售顾问做出相应调整。

It’s with sadness that I report to you that Lorimer Davidson, GEICO’s former Chairman, died last November, a few days after his 97th birthday. For GEICO, Davy was a business giant who moved the company up to the big leagues. For me, he was a friend, teacher and hero. I have told you of his lifelong kindnesses to me in past reports. Clearly, my life would have developed far differently had he not been a part of it. Tony, Lou Simpson and I visited Davy in August and marveled at his mental alertness — particularly in all matters regarding GEICO. He was the company’s number one supporter right up to the end, and we will forever miss him.

令人遗憾地告诉大家，洛里默·戴维森（Lorimer Davidson），GEICO前董事长，于去年11月去世，享年97岁。对于GEICO而言，戴维森是一位将公司带入顶级行列的企业巨人；对我而言，他是朋友、导师和英雄。我在以往报告中曾讲述过他一生对我的关照。很明显，如果没有他的影响，我的人生轨迹将会完全不同。去年八月，Tony、Lou Simpson和我曾探望过他，并惊叹于他头脑的敏锐程度——尤其是在谈到GEICO相关事务时。直至生命最后时刻，他始终是公司最坚定的支持者，我们将永远怀念他。

# Aviation Services

# 航空服务业务

Our two aviation services companies — FlightSafety International (“FSI”) and Executive Jet Aviation (“EJA”) — are both runaway leaders in their field. EJA, which sells and manages the fractional ownership of jet aircraft, through its NetJets® program, is larger than its next two competitors combined. FSI trains pilots (as well as other transportation professionals) and is five times or so the size of its nearest competitor.

我们的两家航空服务公司——FlightSafety International（“FSI”）和Executive Jet Aviation（“EJA”）——在其领域都是遥遥领先的企业。EJA通过其NetJets®项目销售并管理喷气式飞机的“分时所有权”，其规模超过第二和第三大竞争对手之和。FSI则为飞行员（及其他交通运输专业人士）提供培训，其规模约为最大竞争对手的五倍。

Another common characteristic of the companies is that they are still managed by their founding entrepreneurs. Al Ueltschi started FSI in 1951 with $10,000, and Rich Santulli invented the fractional-ownership industry in 1986. These men are both remarkable managers who have no financial need to work but thrive on helping their companies grow and excel.

这两家公司还有一个共同特点：均由创始企业家亲自经营。Al Ueltschi于1951年用1万美元创立了FSI；Rich Santulli则于1986年开创了分时所有权行业。这两位都是非常杰出的管理者，他们并不需要靠工作谋生，但他们热衷于推动企业成长与卓越。

Though these two businesses have leadership positions that are similar, they differ in their economic characteristics. FSI must lay out huge amounts of capital. A single flight simulator can cost as much as $15 million — and we have 222. Only one person at a time, furthermore, can be trained in a simulator, which means that the capital investment per dollar of revenue at FSI is exceptionally high. Operating margins must therefore also be high, if we are to earn a reasonable return on capital. Last year we made capital expenditures of $215 million at FSI and FlightSafety Boeing, its 50%-owned affiliate.

尽管这两家企业都处于领导地位，但它们的经济特征有所不同。FSI必须投入巨额资本。一台飞行模拟器的成本可达1,500万美元——而我们拥有222台。此外，每次只能有一人使用模拟器进行训练，这意味着FSI每单位收入所需的资本投入非常高。因此，若要获得合理的资本回报率，运营利润率也必须很高。去年，我们在FSI及其50%持股的子公司FlightSafety Boeing共投入了2.15亿美元用于资本支出。

At EJA, in contrast, the customer owns the equipment, though we, of course, must invest in a core fleet of our own planes to ensure outstanding service. For example, the Sunday after Thanksgiving, EJA’s busiest day of the year, strains our resources since fractions of 169 planes are owned by 1,412 customers, many of whom are bent on flying home between 3 and 6 p.m. On that day, and certain others, we need a supply of company-owned aircraft to make sure all parties get where they want, when they want.

相比之下，在EJA，客户拥有设备的所有权，当然我们自身也需要投资一支核心机队以确保卓越服务。例如，感恩节后的周日是EJA一年中最繁忙的一天，由于169架飞机的“分时所有权”被1,412位客户持有，许多客户希望在下午3点到6点之间回家，这对我们资源调度构成挑战。在这一天及其他高峰时段，我们需要调配自有飞机，以确保每位客户都能在所需时间到达目的地。

Still, most of the planes we fly are owned by customers, which means that modest pre-tax margins in this business can produce good returns on equity. Currently, our customers own planes worth over $2 billion, and in addition we have $4.2 billion of planes on order. Indeed, the limiting factor in our business right now is the availability of planes. We now are taking delivery of about 8% of all business jets manufactured in the world, and we wish we could get a bigger share than that. Though EJA was supply-constrained in 1999, its recurring revenues — monthly management fees plus hourly flight fees — increased 46%.

然而，我们飞行的大多数飞机归客户所有，这意味着即使税前利润率不高，也能带来良好的股本回报率。目前，客户持有的飞机总价值超过20亿美元，此外还有42亿美元的订单尚未交付。事实上，目前我们业务的最大限制因素是飞机供应。我们现在接收全球制造商务喷气机中的约8%，但我们希望能获得更大的份额。尽管1999年EJA受到供应能力的限制，其经常性收入（每月管理费加上每小时飞行费用）仍增长了46%。

The fractional-ownership industry is still in its infancy. EJA is now building critical mass in Europe, and over time we will expand around the world. Doing that will be expensive — very expensive — but we will spend what it takes. Scale is vital to both us and our customers: The company with the most planes in the air worldwide will be able to offer its customers the best service. “Buy a fraction, get a fleet” has real meaning at EJA.

分时所有权行业仍处于早期发展阶段。EJA目前正在欧洲建立关键规模，未来将在全球范围内扩展。这一过程将是昂贵的——非常昂贵——但我们愿意投入必要资金。规模对我们和客户都至关重要：在全球拥有最多飞机的公司才能为客户提供最佳服务。“购买一个份额，享受整个机队”的理念在EJA具有实际意义。

EJA enjoys another important advantage in that its two largest competitors are both subsidiaries of aircraft manufacturers and sell only the aircraft their parents make. Though these are fine planes, these competitors are severely limited in the cabin styles and mission capabilities they can offer. EJA, in contrast, offers a wide array of planes from five suppliers. Consequently, we can give the customer whatever he needs to buy — rather than his getting what the competitor’s parent needs to sell.

EJA还拥有另一项重要优势：其两大竞争对手均为飞机制造商的子公司，仅销售母公司生产的飞机。虽然这些飞机质量不错，但它们在客舱风格和任务功能方面存在严重局限。相反，EJA提供来自五家供应商的多种机型。因此，我们可以根据客户需求提供合适的飞机，而不是让客户接受竞争对手母公司想要推销的产品。

Last year in this report, I described my family’s delight with the one-quarter (200 flight hours annually) of a Hawker 1000 that we had owned since 1995. I got so pumped up by my own prose that shortly thereafter I signed up for one-sixteenth of a Cessna V Ultra as well. Now my annual outlays at EJA and Borsheim’s, combined, total ten times my salary. Think of this as a rough guideline for your own expenditures with us.

去年的报告中，我描述了我们全家对我们自1995年以来拥有的Hawker 1000四分之一份额（每年200飞行小时）的喜爱之情。我写得如此热情洋溢，以至于不久之后我又购买了一架Cessna V Ultra十六分之一的份额。如今，我在EJA和Borsheim’s的年度支出合计是我薪资的十倍。你可以将此视为衡量你在我们身上花费金额的一个粗略参考。

During the past year, two of Berkshire’s outside directors have also signed on with EJA. (Maybe we’re paying them too much.) You should be aware that they and I are charged exactly the same price for planes and service as is any other customer: EJA follows a “most favored nations” policy, with no one getting a special deal.

过去一年，伯克希尔的两名外部董事也加入了EJA。（也许我们给他们的薪酬太高了。）你需要知道的是，我和他们所支付的飞机和服务费用与其他任何客户完全相同：EJA实行“最惠国”政策，无人享有特殊优惠。

And now, brace yourself. Last year, EJA passed the ultimate test: Charlie signed up. No other endorsement could speak more eloquently to the value of the EJA service. Give us a call at 1-800-848-6436 and ask for our “white paper” on fractional ownership.

现在，请做好心理准备。去年，EJA通过了一个终极考验：查理·芒格签约加入。没有任何推荐能比这更能体现EJA服务的价值。欢迎致电1-800-848-6436索取我们关于“飞机分时所有权”的白皮书。

# Acquisitions of 1999

# 1999年的并购交易

At both GEICO and Executive Jet, our best source of new customers is the happy ones we already have. Indeed, about 65% of our new owners of aircraft come as referrals from current owners who have fallen in love with the service.

无论是GEICO还是Executive Jet，我们获取新客户的最佳来源就是现有满意客户。事实上，我们新增的约65%飞机分时所有者都是由现有客户推荐而来，他们已深深爱上我们的服务。

Our acquisitions usually develop in the same way. At other companies, executives may devote themselves to pursuing acquisition possibilities with investment bankers, utilizing an auction process that has become standardized. In this exercise the bankers prepare a “book” that makes me think of the Superman comics of my youth. In the Wall Street version, a formerly mild-mannered company emerges from the investment banker’s phone booth able to leap over competitors in a single bound and with earnings moving faster than a speeding bullet. Titillated by the book’s description of the acquiree’s powers, acquisition-hungry CEOs — Lois Lanes all, beneath their cool exteriors — promptly swoon.

我们的并购通常以类似方式达成。其他公司可能依赖高管与投行合作，采用标准化的竞标流程来寻找收购机会。在这个过程中，银行家们会准备一份“推介材料”，让我想起年轻时看的超人漫画。华尔街版本中，一家原本平庸的公司仿佛从投行的电话亭中走出，瞬间跃过竞争者，盈利速度比子弹还快。看到这份材料对目标公司的夸张描述后，渴望并购的CEO们——外表冷静，内心却如Lois Lane般激动——立刻心动不已。

What’s particularly entertaining in these books is the precision with which earnings are projected for many years ahead. If you ask the author-banker, however, what his own firm will earn next month, he will go into a protective crouch and tell you that business and markets are far too uncertain for him to venture a forecast.

这些材料中最有趣的部分是对未来多年盈利的精确预测。但如果你问这位撰写材料的银行家他自己公司下个月的盈利，他会立刻摆出防御姿态，告诉你商业和市场太不确定，他无法做出预测。

Here’s one story I can’t resist relating: In 1985, a major investment banking house undertook to sell Scott Fetzer, offering it widely — but with no success. Upon reading of this strikeout, I wrote Ralph Schey, then and now Scott Fetzer’s CEO, expressing an interest in buying the business. I had never met Ralph, but within a week we had a deal. Unfortunately, Scott Fetzer’s letter of engagement with the banking firm provided it a $2.5 million fee upon sale, even if it had nothing to do with finding the buyer. I guess the lead banker felt he should do something for his payment, so he graciously offered us a copy of the book on Scott Fetzer his firm had prepared. With his customary tact, Charlie responded: “I’ll pay $2.5 million not to read it.”

有一个故事我忍不住要分享：1985年，一家大型投资银行试图出售Scott Fetzer公司，广泛推广却无果。读到这次失败后，我写信给当时的CEO Ralph Schey（至今仍是），表达我对收购该公司的兴趣。我们从未见过面，但一周之内就达成了交易。不幸的是，Scott Fetzer与该银行签订的协议规定，无论是否促成买家，只要公司售出，银行即可获得250万美元费用。我想那位主承销商觉得应该做点什么才对得起这笔报酬，于是大方地给我们寄了一份他们为Scott Fetzer准备的推介材料。查理一如既往地幽默回应：“我愿意付250万美元不看它。”

At Berkshire, our carefully-crafted acquisition strategy is simply to wait for the phone to ring. Happily, it sometimes does so, usually because a manager who sold to us earlier has recommended to a friend that he think about following suit.

在伯克希尔，我们精心制定的并购策略其实很简单：等待电话响起。幸运的是，有时电话真的会响，通常是因为某位之前将公司卖给我们的人向朋友推荐你也考虑这么做。

Which brings us to the furniture business. Two years ago I recounted how the acquisition of Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983 and my subsequent association with the Blumkin family led to follow-on transactions with R. C. Willey (1995) and Star Furniture (1997). For me, these relationships have all been terrific. Not only did Berkshire acquire three outstanding retailers; these deals also allowed me to become friends with some of the finest people you will ever meet.

这引出了我们进入家具行业的历程。两年前我曾回忆起1983年收购Nebraska Furniture Mart以及随后与Blumkin家族的合作如何带来了后续交易：R. C. Willey（1995年）和Star Furniture（1997年）。对我来说，这些关系都非常美好。不仅伯克希尔收购了三家出色的零售商，我也因此结识了一些你所能遇到的最优秀人物。

Naturally, I have persistently asked the Blumkins, Bill Child and Melvyn Wolff whether there are any more out there like you. Their invariable answer was the Tatelman brothers of New England and their remarkable furniture business, Jordan’s.

自然地，我不断询问Blumkin家族、Bill Child和Melvyn Wolff：你们之外，还有没有像你们这样的人？他们总是异口同声地提到新英格兰地区的Tatelman兄弟，以及他们出色的家具企业Jordan’s。

I met Barry and Eliot Tatelman last year and we soon signed an agreement for Berkshire to acquire the company. Like our three previous furniture acquisitions, this business had long been in the family — in this case since 1927, when Barry and Eliot’s grandfather began operations in a Boston suburb. Under the brothers’ management, Jordan’s has grown ever more dominant in its region, becoming the largest furniture retailer in New Hampshire as well as Massachusetts.

去年我结识了Barry和Eliot Tatelman兄弟，并很快与他们达成了伯克希尔收购Jordan’s的协议。与我们此前收购的三家家具企业一样，这家公司也是一家历史悠久的家族企业——自1927年Barry和Eliot的祖父在波士顿郊区创业以来，一直由Tatelman家族经营。在兄弟俩的管理下，Jordan’s在其所在地区不断扩张，如今已成为新罕布什尔州和马萨诸塞州最大的家具零售商。

The Tatelmans don’t just sell furniture or manage stores. They also present customers with a dazzling entertainment experience called “shoppertainment.” A family visiting a store can have a terrific time, while concurrently viewing an extraordinary selection of merchandise. The business results are also extraordinary: Jordan’s has the highest sales per square foot of any major furniture operation in the country. I urge you to visit one of their stores if you are in the Boston area — particularly the one at Natick, which is Jordan’s newest. Bring money.

Tatelman兄弟不仅销售家具或管理门店，他们还为顾客提供一种令人惊艳的“购物娱乐”体验（shoppertainment）。一家人可以在店内尽情享受欢乐时光的同时，浏览种类极为丰富的商品。其商业成果也同样卓越：Jordan’s每平方英尺销售额是全美大型家具零售商中最高的。如果你在波士顿地区，请务必参观他们的门店之一——尤其是最新的Natick店。记得带钱来。

Barry and Eliot are classy people — just like their counterparts at Berkshire’s three other furniture operations. When they sold to us, they elected to give each of their employees at least 50¢ for every hour that he or she had worked for Jordan’s. This payment added up to $9 million, which came from the Tatelmans’ own pockets, not from Berkshire’s. And Barry and Eliot were thrilled to write the checks.

Barry和Eliot都是品格高尚的人——这一点与我们在伯克希尔旗下其他三家家具公司的管理者如出一辙。当他们将公司出售给我们时，他们决定向每位员工支付每工作一小时不少于50美分的奖金。这笔总金额高达900万美元的支出完全来自Tatelman兄弟个人账户，而非伯克希尔。而他们写支票时的心情非常愉快。

Each of our furniture operations is number one in its territory. We now sell more furniture than anyone else in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Texas, Nebraska, Utah and Idaho. Last year Star’s Melvyn Wolff and his sister, Shirley Toomim, scored two major successes: a move into San Antonio and a significant enlargement of Star’s store in Austin.

我们每家家具公司在各自所在地区都排名第一。目前，我们在马萨诸塞州、新罕布什尔州、德克萨斯州、内布拉斯加州、犹他州和爱达荷州的家具销量均居全国首位。去年，Star Furniture的Melvyn Wolff及其妹妹Shirley Toomim取得了两项重大成功：进军圣安东尼奥市场，并大幅扩建了位于奥斯汀的门店。

There’s no operation in the furniture retailing business remotely like the one assembled by Berkshire. It’s fun for me and profitable for you. W. C. Fields once said, “It was a woman who drove me to drink, but unfortunately I never had the chance to thank her.” I don’t want to make that mistake. My thanks go to Louie, Ron and Irv Blumkin for getting me started in the furniture business and for unerringly guiding me as we have assembled the group we now have.

在家具零售行业中，没有任何一家公司能像伯克希尔所打造的体系那样独特。对我来说这很有趣，对你们而言则带来了可观利润。W. C. 菲尔兹曾说过：“是一个女人让我沉迷于饮酒，可惜我从未有机会感谢她。”我不想犯同样的错误。我要感谢Louie、Ron和Irv Blumkin，是你们带我进入了家具行业，并在我逐步建立这支团队的过程中始终给予我坚定指引。

Now, for our second acquisition deal: It came to us through my good friend, Walter Scott, Jr., chairman of Level 3 Communications and a director of Berkshire. Walter has many other business connections as well, and one of them is with MidAmerican Energy, a utility company in which he has substantial holdings and on whose board he sits. At a conference in California that we both attended last September, Walter casually asked me whether Berkshire might be interested in making a large investment in MidAmerican, and from the start the idea of being in partnership with Walter struck me as a good one. Upon returning to Omaha, I read some of MidAmerican’s public reports and had two short meetings with Walter and David Sokol, MidAmerican’s talented and entrepreneurial CEO. I then said that, at an appropriate price, we would indeed like to make a deal.

现在，讲第二笔并购交易：这次机会来自于我的好朋友Walter Scott Jr.，他是Level 3 Communications董事长，也是伯克希尔董事。Walter还有许多其他商业联系，其中之一就是MidAmerican Energy，一家公用事业公司，他在该公司持有大量股份并担任董事会成员。去年九月我们共同参加在加州举行的一次会议期间，Walter随意地问我，伯克希尔是否可能有兴趣对MidAmerican进行大额投资。从一开始，我就觉得与Walter合作的想法非常好。回到奥马哈后，我阅读了一些MidAmerican的公开报告，并与Walter及MidAmerican才华横溢、具有企业家精神的CEO David Sokol进行了两次简短会面。随后我表示，在合适的价格下，我们确实愿意达成这笔交易。

Acquisitions in the electric utility industry are complicated by a variety of regulations including the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Therefore, we had to structure a transaction that would avoid Berkshire gaining voting control. Instead we are purchasing an 11% fixed-income security, along with a combination of common stock and exchangeable preferred that will give Berkshire just under 10% of the voting power of MidAmerican but about 76% of the equity interest. All told, our investment will be about $2 billion.

电力公用事业行业的并购受到多种法规的限制，其中包括1935年的《公用事业控股公司法案》。因此，我们必须设计一项交易结构，以避免伯克希尔获得投票控制权。我们购买的是一项11%的固定收益证券，同时搭配普通股和可交换优先股，使伯克希尔拥有MidAmerican不到10%的投票权，却拥有约76%的股权权益。总体而言，我们的投资约为20亿美元。

Walter characteristically backed up his convictions with real money: He and his family will buy more MidAmerican stock for cash when the transaction closes, bringing their total investment to about $280 million. Walter will also be the controlling shareholder of the company, and I can’t think of a better person to hold that post.

Walter一如既往地用真金白银支持自己的判断：交易完成后，他和他的家人将以现金方式继续增持MidAmerican股票，使其总投资额达到约2.8亿美元。Walter也将成为该公司的控股股东，我想不到比他更合适的人选来担任这一职位。

Though there are many regulatory constraints in the utility industry, it’s possible that we will make additional commitments in the field. If we do, the amounts involved could be large.

尽管公用事业行业存在诸多监管限制，但我们仍有可能在该领域追加投资。如果发生这种情况，涉及的资金规模可能会非常庞大。

# Acquisition Accounting

# 并购会计处理

Once again, I would like to make some comments about accounting, in this case about its application to acquisitions. This is currently a very contentious topic and, before the dust settles, Congress may even intervene (a truly terrible idea).

我想再次谈谈会计问题，这次聚焦于并购相关的会计处理。这是一个极具争议的话题，在尘埃落定之前，国会甚至可能介入（一个非常糟糕的想法）。

When a company is acquired, generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) currently condone two very different ways of recording the transaction: “purchase” and “pooling.” In a pooling, stock must be the currency; in a purchase, payment can be made in either cash or stock. Whatever the currency, managements usually detest purchase accounting because it almost always requires that a “goodwill” account be established and subsequently written off — a process that saddles earnings with a large annual charge that normally persists for decades. In contrast, pooling avoids a goodwill account, which is why managements love it.

当一家公司被收购时，现行的公认会计准则（GAAP）允许两种截然不同的记录方式：“购买法”（purchase）和“权益合并法”（pooling）。采用权益合并法时，必须使用股票作为支付手段；而在购买法下，可以使用现金或股票。无论使用哪种支付方式，管理层通常都厌恶购买法会计处理，因为它几乎总是要求设立“商誉”账户并随后逐年摊销——这一过程会在未来数十年间持续对公司盈利造成一笔巨大的年度负担。相比之下，权益合并法不产生商誉账户，这也是管理层偏爱它的重要原因。

Now, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) has proposed an end to pooling, and many CEOs are girding for battle. It will be an important fight, so we’ll venture some opinions. To begin with, we agree with the many managers who argue that goodwill amortization charges are usually spurious. You’ll find my thinking about this in the appendix to our 1983 annual report, which is available on our website, and in the Owner’s Manual on pages 55 - 62.

目前，财务会计准则委员会（FASB）已提议取消权益合并法，许多首席执行官正准备奋起抗争。这将是一场重要的争论，我也想表达一些观点。首先，我们认同许多经理人的看法：商誉摊销费用往往并不真实。关于这一问题的思考，你可以参见我们网站上1983年年报附录以及第55至62页的《所有者手册》。

For accounting rules to mandate amortization that will, in the usual case, conflict with reality is deeply troublesome: Most accounting charges relate to what’s going on, even if they don’t precisely measure it. As an example, depreciation charges can’t with precision calibrate the decline in value that physical assets suffer, but these charges do at least describe something that is truly occurring: Physical assets invariably deteriorate. Correspondingly, obsolescence charges for inventories, bad debt charges for receivables and accruals for warranties are among the charges that reflect true costs. The annual charges for these expenses can’t be exactly measured, but the necessity for estimating them is obvious.

若会计规则强制要求进行与现实不符的摊销，则这种做法令人深感不安：大多数会计费用虽不能精确计量，但至少反映了正在发生的事实。例如，折旧费用无法精准衡量实物资产价值的下降，但它至少描述了一种真实存在的现象：实物资产必然随时间推移而损耗。同样，存货减值准备、应收账款坏账计提和保修费用预提等，也都反映的是真实的成本。这些费用的年度计提虽无法做到绝对准确，但估算的必要性显而易见。

In contrast, economic goodwill does not, in many cases, diminish. Indeed, in a great many instances — perhaps most — it actually grows in value over time. In character, economic goodwill is much like land: The value of both assets is sure to fluctuate, but the direction in which value is going to go is in no way ordained. At See’s, for example, economic goodwill has grown, in an irregular but very substantial manner, for 78 years. And, if we run the business right, growth of that kind will probably continue for at least another 78 years.

相比之下，在很多情况下，经济意义上的商誉并不会减少。事实上，在许多甚至可能是大多数案例中，它的价值随着时间推移反而增长。从本质上看，经济商誉类似于土地：两者的价值都会波动，但它们的走势方向无法事先确定。例如，在See’s糖果公司，经济商誉在过去78年间虽然波动不定，但价值显著增长。如果我们继续正确经营这家企业，这种增长很可能在未来再持续至少78年。

To escape from the fiction of goodwill charges, managers embrace the fiction of pooling. This accounting convention is grounded in the poetic notion that when two rivers merge their streams become indistinguishable. Under this concept, a company that has been merged into a larger enterprise has not been “purchased” (even though it will often have received a large “sell-out” premium). Consequently, no goodwill is created, and those pesky subsequent charges to earnings are eliminated. Instead, the accounting for the ongoing entity is handled as if the businesses had forever been one unit.

为了摆脱商誉摊销费用带来的虚假压力，管理层选择了另一种虚构方式——权益合并法。这种会计惯例基于一种诗意的设想：两条河流汇合后便难分彼此。按照这种理念，被并入更大企业的公司并未真正“被收购”（即使它经常获得了很高的“溢价退出”回报）。因此，不产生任何商誉，也就避免了那些烦人的后续费用对盈利的影响。取而代之的是，合并后的实体被视为自始至终就是一个整体单位。

So much for poetry. The reality of merging is usually far different: There is indisputably an acquirer and an acquiree, and the latter has been “purchased,” no matter how the deal has been structured. If you think otherwise, just ask employees severed from their jobs which company was the conqueror and which was the conquered. You will find no confusion. So on this point the FASB is correct: In most mergers, a purchase has been made. Yes, there are some true “mergers of equals,” but they are few and far between.

诗意归诗意，现实中的并购往往并非如此。通常来说，显然有收购方和被收购方之分，后者确实被“买下”，无论交易结构如何安排。如果你持不同意见，只需问问那些被裁员的员工：哪家公司是征服者，哪家又是被征服者？你不会看到任何困惑。因此在这方面，FASB的观点是正确的：在大多数并购中，实际上发生了“购买”。当然，确实存在一些真正的“平等合并”，但它们极为罕见。

Charlie and I believe there’s a reality-based approach that should both satisfy the FASB, which correctly wishes to record a purchase, and meet the objections of managements to nonsensical charges for diminution of goodwill. We would first have the acquiring company record its purchase price — whether paid in stock or cash — at fair value. In most cases, this procedure would create a large asset representing economic goodwill. We would then leave this asset on the books, not requiring its amortization. Later, if the economic goodwill became impaired, as it sometimes would, it would be written down just as would any other asset judged to be impaired.

查理和我认为，有一种基于现实的做法既可以满足FASB希望如实记录“购买”的合理诉求，也能回应管理层对无意义商誉减值费用的反对。我们建议首先让收购方按公允价值记录其收购价格——无论是通过股票还是现金支付。在多数情况下，这会产生一项代表经济商誉的大额资产。我们随后应将其保留在账面上，不再强制进行摊销。只有在经济商誉确实发生减值的情况下（有时会发生），才像其他认定为减值的资产一样进行减记。

If our proposed rule were to be adopted, it should be applied retroactively so that acquisition accounting would be consistent throughout America — a far cry from what exists today. One prediction: If this plan were to take effect, managements would structure acquisitions more sensibly, deciding whether to use cash or stock based on the real consequences for their shareholders rather than on the unreal consequences for their reported earnings.

如果我们提出的规则被采纳，它应当适用于过去交易，以确保美国境内的并购会计标准保持一致——而这正是当前所缺乏的。我可以做一个预测：一旦这一计划实施，管理层在并购决策中将更加理性，他们会根据对股东的实际影响，而不是基于对报表盈利的虚幻影响来决定使用现金还是股票完成交易。

In our purchase of Jordan’s, we followed a procedure that will maximize the cash produced for our shareholders but minimize the earnings we report to you. Berkshire purchased assets for cash, an approach that on our tax returns permits us to amortize the resulting goodwill over a 15-year period. Obviously, this tax deduction materially increases the amount of cash delivered by the business. In contrast, when stock, rather than assets, is purchased for cash, the resulting write-offs of goodwill are not tax-deductible. The economic difference between these two approaches is substantial.

在收购Jordan’s时，我们采取了一种方式：最大化为股东创造的现金收益，同时最小化我们向你报告的盈利。伯克希尔以现金购买了资产，这种方法在我们的税务申报中允许我们将由此产生的商誉在15年内进行摊销。显然，这种税收抵扣显著增加了企业带来的现金流。相比之下，如果是以现金购买股票而非资产，则由此产生的商誉摊销将无法享受税前扣除。这两种方法在经济后果上的差异是巨大的。

From the economic standpoint of the acquiring company, the worst deal of all is a stock-for-stock acquisition. Here, a huge price is often paid without there being any step-up in the tax basis of either the stock of the acquiree or its assets. If the acquired entity is subsequently sold, its owner may owe a large capital gains tax (at a 35% or greater rate), even though the sale may truly be producing a major economic loss.

从收购方的经济角度来看，最糟糕的交易是换股并购（stock-for-stock）。在这种交易中，通常支付了高昂的价格，但被收购公司的股票或其资产的计税基础并没有任何提升。如果随后出售该实体，其所有者可能需要缴纳高额资本利得税（税率高达35%以上），即使这次出售实际上带来了重大的经济损失。

We have made some deals at Berkshire that used far-from-optimal tax structures. These deals occurred because the sellers insisted on a given structure and because, overall, we still felt the acquisition made sense. We have never done an inefficiently-structured deal, however, in order to make our figures look better.

我们在伯克希尔完成的一些交易采用了并非最优的税务结构。这是因为卖方坚持某种特定结构，而我们认为整体上这笔收购仍有意义。然而，我们从未为了美化财务数据而进行过结构低效的交易。

# Sources of Reported Earnings

# 报告盈利的来源

The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on page 61, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表展示了伯克希尔报告盈利的主要来源。在本表中，我们未将购买法会计调整分摊到具体业务单元，而是将其汇总并单独列出。这种方式让你能够看到：假如我们未曾进行这些收购，各业务的盈利会是什么样子。如第61页所述，我们认为这种呈现方式对投资者和管理者更有参考价值，优于采用通用会计准则（GAAP）的做法——后者要求将收购溢价逐项计入各个业务。当然，我们在表中展示的总盈利与经审计财务报表中的GAAP总额完全一致。

Pre-Tax Earnings	1999	1998
Insurance Group:
Underwriting—Reinsurance	$(1,440)	$(21)
Underwriting—GEICO	24	269
Underwriting—Other Primary	22	17
Net Investment Income	2,482	974
Buffalo News	55	53
Finance and Financial Products Businesses	125	205
Flight Services	225	(2)
Home Furnishings	181	79
International Dairy Queen	72	56
Jewelry	58	51
Scott Fetzer (excluding finance operation)	147	137
See’s Candies	74	62
Shoe Group	17	33
Purchase-Accounting Adjustments	(739)	(123)
Interest Expense (3)	(109)	(100)
Shareholder-Designated Contributions	(118)	(63)
Other	(17)	(11)
Operating Earnings	$(927)	$16
Capital Gains from Investments	1,764	974
Total Earnings - All Entities	$886	$1,085

(1) Includes Executive Jet from August 7, 1998.
（包括自1998年8月7日起纳入的Executive Jet）
(2) Includes Jordan’s Furniture from November 13, 1999.
（包括自1999年11月13日起纳入的Jordan’s家具）
(3) Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.
（不含金融业务利息支出）
(4) Includes General Re operations for ten days in 1998.
（含1998年General Re运营的10天数据）

Almost all of our manufacturing, retailing and service businesses had excellent results in 1999. The exception was Dexter Shoe, and there the shortfall did not occur because of managerial problems: In skills, energy and devotion to their work, the Dexter executives are every bit the equal of our other managers. But we manufacture shoes primarily in the U.S., and it has become extremely difficult for domestic producers to compete effectively. In 1999, approximately 93% of the 1.3 billion pairs of shoes purchased in this country came from abroad, where extremely low-cost labor is the rule.

我们几乎所有制造、零售和服务类企业在1999年的表现都非常出色。唯一的例外是Dexter鞋业，但它的业绩不佳并非管理层的问题：在技能、工作热情和敬业精神方面，Dexter的管理层与其他经理人不相上下。但我们主要在美国生产鞋子，而国内生产商如今已极难有效竞争。1999年，美国市场所购13亿双鞋中约有93%来自海外，那里的劳动力成本极其低廉。

Counting both Dexter and H. H. Brown, we are currently the leading domestic manufacturer of shoes, and we are likely to continue to be. We have loyal, highly-skilled workers in our U.S. plants, and we want to retain every job here that we can. Nevertheless, in order to remain viable, we are sourcing more of our output internationally. In doing that, we have incurred significant severance and relocation costs that are included in the earnings we show in the table.

合并Dexter和H. H. Brown后，我们目前是美国最大的本土制鞋厂商，并有望继续保持这一地位。我们在美国工厂拥有忠诚且技术娴熟的员工，我们希望尽可能保留每一个岗位。然而，为了保持企业的可持续性，我们必须越来越多地将生产外包至海外市场。这一过程中，我们承担了大量遣散和搬迁费用，这些成本已被计入表中所示的盈利数据。

A few years back, Helzberg’s, our 200-store jewelry operation, needed to make operating adjustments to restore margins to appropriate levels. Under Jeff Comment’s leadership, the job was done and profits have dramatically rebounded. In the shoe business, where we have Harold Alfond, Peter Lunder, Frank Rooney and Jim Issler in charge, I believe we will see a similar improvement over the next few years.

几年前，我们旗下拥有200家门店的珠宝连锁Helzberg’s曾需进行运营调整以恢复合理利润率。在Jeff Comment的领导下，这项任务顺利完成，利润大幅回升。在鞋业领域，Harold Alfond、Peter Lunder、Frank Rooney和Jim Issler正掌舵管理，我相信未来几年我们会看到类似的好转。

See’s Candies deserves a special comment, given that it achieved a record operating margin of 24% last year. Since we bought See’s for $25 million in 1972, it has earned $857 million pre-tax. And, despite its growth, the business has required very little additional capital. Give the credit for this performance to Chuck Huggins. Charlie and I put him in charge the day of our purchase, and his fanatical insistence on both product quality and friendly service has rewarded customers, employees and owners.

必须特别提到See’s糖果公司，因为去年它实现了创纪录的24%营业利润率。自从我们于1972年以2,500万美元收购该公司以来，它累计创造了8.57亿美元的税前利润。尽管业务不断增长，它所需追加的资本却非常少。这份成绩应归功于Chuck Huggins。查理和我在收购当天就任命他负责这家公司，他对产品质量和服务态度的极致追求，使客户、员工和股东都受益匪浅。

Chuck gets better every year. When he took charge of See’s at age 46, the company’s pre-tax profit, expressed in millions, was about 10% of his age. Today he’s 74, and the ratio has increased to 100%. Having discovered this mathematical relationship — let’s call it Huggins’ Law — Charlie and I now become giddy at the mere thought of Chuck’s birthday.

Chuck一年比一年更出色。他在46岁时接管See’s时，公司当年的税前利润（单位为百万美元）大约是他年龄的10%。如今他74岁，这个比例已升至100%。发现这一数学关系后——我们称之为“哈金斯定律”——现在一想到Chuck的生日，我和查理就忍不住兴奋不已。

Additional information about our various businesses is given on pages 39 - 54, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 63 - 69, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company.

更多关于我们各项业务的信息请参见第39至54页，在那里你可以看到我们按GAAP标准报告的分部盈利。此外，在第63至69页，我们还以非GAAP方式将伯克希尔的财务数据重新划分为四个板块，这种呈现方式反映了查理和我对公司结构的看法。

# Look-Through Earnings

# “穿透式”盈利

Reported earnings are an inadequate measure of economic progress at Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table presented earlier include only the dividends we receive from investees — though these dividends typically represent only a small fraction of the earnings attributable to our ownership. Not that we mind this division of money, since on balance we regard the undistributed earnings of investees as more valuable to us than the portion paid out. The reason for our thinking is simple: Our investees often have the opportunity to reinvest earnings at high rates of return. So why should we want them paid out?

仅看报告中的盈利数字，并不能充分衡量伯克希尔的经济进展，部分原因是前面表格中所列的数据仅包含我们从投资对象收到的股息收入——而这些股息通常只是我们所持股份对应盈利的一小部分。我们并不介意这种分配方式，因为我们总体认为，投资对象未分配给我们的利润对我们来说比已分配的部分更具价值。原因很简单：这些投资对象往往有机会以高回报率再投资这些利润。既然如此，我们为何还要它们分红呢？

To depict something closer to economic reality at Berkshire than reported earnings, though, we employ the concept of "look-through" earnings. As we calculate these, they consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) our share of the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating "operating earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting adjustments as well as capital gains and other major non-recurring items.

为了更贴近伯克希尔的真实经济状况，我们引入了“穿透式盈利”（Look-Through Earnings）这一概念。按照我们的计算方法，它由以下三部分组成：（1）上一部分报告的经营盈利；加上（2）我们应享有的主要投资对象留存盈余的份额（这部分在GAAP会计下并未体现在我们的利润中）；减去（3）若这些留存盈余被实际分配给我们，伯克希尔需缴纳的预估税费。在统计此处的“经营盈利”时，我们剔除了购买法会计调整、资本利得及其他重大非经常性项目。

The following table sets forth our 1999 look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures can be no more than approximate, since they are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 13, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")

下表列示了我们1999年的“穿透式盈利”（look-through earnings），不过我必须提醒你，这些数据只能是近似值，因为它们基于许多主观判断。（我们从被投资公司获得的股息收入已包含在第13页列出的经营利润中，主要归类于“保险集团：净投资收益”。）

Berkshire's Major Investees	Berkshire's Approximate Ownership at Year-end (1)	Berkshire's Share of Undistributed Operating Earnings (in millions) (2)
American Express Company	11.3%	$228
The Coca-Cola Company	8.1%	$144
Freddie Mac	8.6%	$127
The Gillette Company	9.0%	$53
M&T Bank	6.5%	$17
The Washington Post Company	18.3%	$30
Wells Fargo & Company	3.6%	$108
Total		$707

Berkshire’s share of undistributed earnings of major investees
我们应享有的主要被投资公司未分配营业利润份额

Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings (3)
（若这些未分配利润实际分配，伯克希尔需缴纳的预估税费） | $(99)$

Reported operating earnings of Berkshire
伯克希尔报告的营业利润 | $1,318$

Total look-through earnings of Berkshire
伯克希尔整体穿透式盈利 | $1,926 million |

(1) Does not include shares allocable to minority interests
（不含少数股东权益所占股份）

(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
（按全年平均持股比例计算）

(3) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays on the dividends it receives
（采用的税率是14%，即伯克希尔收到股息时适用的实际税率）

# Investments

# 投资组合

Below we present our common stock investments. Those that had a market value at the end of 1999 are itemized.

以下是我们持有的普通股投资。仅列出截至1999年底具有市场价值的投资。

# 截至1999年12月31日市值超过7.5亿美元的股票投资：

Shares	Company	Cost*	Market (12/31/99)
50,536,900	American Express Company	$1,470	$8,402
200,000,000	The Coca-Cola Company	$1,299	$11,650
59,559,300	Freddie Mac	$294	$2,803
96,000,000	The Gillette Company	$600	$3,954
1,727,765	The Washington Post Company	$11	$960
59,136,680	Wells Fargo & Company	$349	$2,391
—	Others	$4,180	$6,848
—	Total Common Stocks	$8,203	$37,008

（单位：百万美元）
* Represents tax-basis cost which, in aggregate, is $691 million less than GAAP cost.
（代表税法基础成本，总计比GAAP会计成本低6.91亿美元。）

We made few portfolio changes in 1999. As I mentioned earlier, several of the companies in which we have large investments had disappointing business results last year. Nevertheless, we believe these companies have important competitive advantages that will endure over time. This attribute, which makes for good long-term investment results, is one Charlie and I occasionally believe we can identify. More often, however, we can’t — not at least with a high degree of conviction. This explains, by the way, why we don’t own stocks of tech companies, even though we share the general view that our society will be transformed by their products and services. Our problem — which we can’t solve by studying up — is that we have no insights into which participants in the tech field possess a truly durable competitive advantage.

我们在1999年几乎没有对投资组合做出重大调整。正如我之前所说，我们持有大量股份的一些公司在去年交出了令人失望的业绩。但我们相信，这些公司拥有重要的竞争优势，并将在未来持续发挥作用。这种属性通常能带来良好的长期投资回报，而查理和我都认为自己偶尔能够识别出这类企业。但更多时候，我们并不能做到这一点——至少没有十足把握。这也解释了为什么我们不投资科技公司的股票，尽管我们也认同一个普遍观点：我们的社会将因科技产品和服务发生深刻变革。我们的问题是——无法通过研究来解决的问题——是我们缺乏对科技领域哪家公司真正具备持久竞争优势的洞察力。

Our lack of tech insights, we should add, does not distress us. After all, there are a great many business areas in which Charlie and I have no special capital-allocation expertise. For instance, we bring nothing to the table when it comes to evaluating patents, manufacturing processes or geological prospects. So we simply don’t get into judgments in those fields.

需要补充的是，我们在科技领域的知识缺失并未让我们感到困扰。毕竟，查理和我在许多商业领域都并不具备资本配置方面的专长。例如，在评估专利、制造流程或地质前景方面，我们几乎毫无建树。因此，我们干脆不去涉足这些领域的判断。

If we have a strength, it is in recognizing when we are operating well within our circle of competence and when we are approaching the perimeter. Predicting the long-term economics of companies that operate in fast-changing industries is simply far beyond our perimeter. If others claim predictive skill in those industries — and seem to have their claims validated by the behavior of the stock market — we neither envy nor emulate them. Instead, we just stick with what we understand. If we stray, we will have done so inadvertently, not because we got restless and substituted hope for rationality. Fortunately, it’s almost certain there will be opportunities from time to time for Berkshire to do well within the circle we’ve staked out.

如果说我们有什么优势的话，那就是我们懂得何时我们正处于能力圈之内，以及何时接近能力圈边缘。预测快速变化行业中企业的长期经济状况远远超出了我们的能力范围。如果其他人声称他们在这些行业具备预测能力——并且似乎得到了股市行为的验证——我们既不会羡慕也不会效仿他们。相反，我们坚持我们理解的东西。如果我们偏离了这个原则，那一定是无心之失，而非因为我们浮躁不安、用希望替代理性。幸运的是，可以肯定的是，伯克希尔总会有机会在我们划定的能力圈内做出出色的投资决策。

Right now, the prices of the fine businesses we already own are just not that attractive. In other words, we feel much better about the businesses than their stocks. That’s why we haven’t added to our present holdings. Nevertheless, we haven’t yet scaled back our portfolio in a major way: If the choice is between a questionable business at a comfortable price or a comfortable business at a questionable price, we much prefer the latter. What really gets our attention, however, is a comfortable business at a comfortable price.

目前，我们已经拥有的优秀企业的股价吸引力不大。换句话说，我们对企业本身的信心远高于对其股价的信心。这就是我们没有增持现有持仓的原因。然而，我们也没有大幅减持投资组合中的头寸：如果要在“以低价买入可疑企业”与“以高价买入优质企业”之间做选择，我们更倾向于后者。真正引起我们兴趣的是：以合理价格买入优质企业。

Our reservations about the prices of securities we own apply also to the general level of equity prices. We have never attempted to forecast what the stock market is going to do in the next month or the next year, and we are not trying to do that now. But, as I point out in the enclosed article, equity investors currently seem wildly optimistic in their expectations about future returns.

我们对我们所持证券价格的保留意见也适用于整个股市的一般水平。我们从未试图预测下个月或下一年股市会如何走，现在也不打算这么做。但是，正如我在附带文章中指出的那样，当前投资者对未来回报的预期显得异常乐观。

We see the growth in corporate profits as being largely tied to the business done in the country (GDP), and we see GDP growing at a real rate of about 3%. In addition, we have hypothesized 2% inflation. Charlie and I have no particular conviction about the accuracy of 2%. However, it’s the market’s view: Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) yield about two percentage points less than the standard treasury bond, and if you believe inflation rates are going to be higher than that, you can profit by simply buying TIPS and shorting Governments.

我们认为企业利润的增长大致与国家整体经济活动（GDP）挂钩，而我们预计GDP将以每年约3%的真实增长率发展。此外，我们假设通胀率为2%。查理和我对这一通胀率的准确性并无特别信心。但这是市场的看法：通胀保值国债（TIPS）收益率比标准国债低约两个百分点，如果你相信通胀率将高于该水平，只需购买TIPS并做空国债即可获利。

If profits do indeed grow along with GDP, at about a 5% rate, the valuation placed on American business is unlikely to climb by much more than that. Add in something for dividends, and you emerge with returns from equities that are dramatically less than most investors have either experienced in the past or expect in the future. If investor expectations become more realistic — and they almost certainly will — the market adjustment is apt to be severe, particularly in sectors in which speculation has been concentrated.

如果企业利润真的随着GDP以约5%的速度增长，那么美国企业的估值不太可能显著超过这一增速。再加上股息因素，我们最终得到的股票回报率将远低于大多数投资者过去经历过的水平，也低于他们对未来回报的预期。如果投资者的预期变得更为现实——几乎可以肯定会发生这种情况——市场将出现剧烈调整，尤其是在投机气氛浓厚的板块中。

Berkshire will someday have opportunities to deploy major amounts of cash in equity markets — we are confident of that. But, as the song goes, “Who knows where or when?” Meanwhile, if anyone starts explaining to you what is going on in the truly-manic portions of this “enchanted” market, you might remember still another line of song: “Fools give you reasons, wise men never try.”

伯克希尔终将有机会向股市部署大笔现金——我们对此充满信心。但正如一首歌中唱到的那样：“谁知道在哪里、也不知道什么时候？”与此同时，如果有人开始向你解释这个“魔法市场”中最疯狂部分到底发生了什么，请记住另一句歌词：“蠢人给你理由，智者从不开口。”

# 股票回购

Recently, a number of shareholders have suggested to us that Berkshire repurchase its shares. Usually the requests were rationally based, but a few leaned on spurious logic.

最近，不少股东建议伯克希尔回购自己的股票。大多数建议是有理有据的，但也有一些逻辑站不住脚。

There is only one combination of facts that makes it advisable for a company to repurchase its shares: First, the company has available funds — cash plus sensible borrowing capacity — beyond the near-term needs of the business and, second, finds its stock selling in the market below its intrinsic value, conservatively-calculated. To this we add a caveat: Shareholders should have been supplied all the information they need for estimating that value. Otherwise, insiders could take advantage of their uninformed partners and buy out their interests at a fraction of true worth. We have, on rare occasions, seen that happen. Usually, of course, chicanery is employed to drive stock prices up, not down.

只有当两个条件同时满足时，公司回购股票才是明智之举：第一，公司拥有超出短期业务需求的可用资金（包括现金和合理的借贷能力）；第二，公司股票的市场价格低于其保守估算的内在价值。我们再加一条警告：股东们应能获取所有必要的信息以便准确估算公司价值。否则，内部人士可能会利用信息不对称的优势，以极低价格买断外部股东的股份。我们确实见过类似情况发生，尽管极为罕见。当然，更多的时候，操纵手法是用来推高股价，而不是压低它。

The business “needs” that I speak of are of two kinds: First, expenditures that a company must make to maintain its competitive position (e.g., the remodeling of stores at Helzberg’s) and, second, optional outlays, aimed at business growth, that management expects will produce more than a dollar of value for each dollar spent (R. C. Willey’s expansion into Idaho).

我所说的“业务需求”分为两类：第一类是为维持公司竞争地位所必须进行的支出（例如Helzberg’s门店的翻新）；第二类是管理层预期每投入一美元能创造超过一美元价值的可选支出（如R. C. Willey进入爱达荷州市场的扩张）。

When available funds exceed needs of those kinds, a company with a growth-oriented shareholder population can buy new businesses or repurchase shares. If a company’s stock is selling well below intrinsic value, repurchases usually make the most sense. In the mid-1970s, the wisdom of making these was virtually screaming at managements, but few responded. In most cases, those that did made their owners much wealthier than if alternative courses of action had been pursued.

当可用资金超过上述业务需求时，一家面向增长的股东群体的公司可以选择收购新企业或回购股票。如果公司股价远低于其内在价值，通常回购是最明智的选择。在上世纪70年代中期，这种做法的智慧几乎“呼之欲出”，但很少有管理层做出回应。而在那些确实进行了回购的公司中，它们的股东比采取其他替代策略获得了更多的财富。

Indeed, during the 1970s (and, spasmodically, for some years thereafter) we searched for companies that were large repurchasers of their shares. This often was a tipoff that the company was both undervalued and run by a shareholder-oriented management.

事实上，在整个70年代（以及之后几年偶尔也如此），我们一直在寻找那些大量回购股票的公司。这往往是一个信号：这家公司被低估，并且由以股东利益为导向的管理层运营。

That day is past. Now, repurchases are all the rage, but are all too often made for an unstated and, in our view, ignoble reason: to pump or support the stock price. The shareholder who chooses to sell today, of course, is benefitted by any buyer, whatever his origin or motives. But the continuing shareholder is penalized by repurchases above intrinsic value. Buying dollar bills for $1.10 is not good business for those who stick around.

那个时代已经过去了。如今，回购风靡一时，但往往是出于一种未明说、但我们认为不光彩的原因：人为推高或支撑股价。当然，选择今天卖出的股东无论买家是谁、动机为何，都会因此受益。但对于继续持有股份的股东而言，以高于内在价值的价格进行回购则是一种惩罚。用1.1美元买1美元纸币对长期投资者来说并不是一笔好买卖。

Charlie and I admit that we feel confident in estimating intrinsic value for only a portion of traded equities and then only when we employ a range of values, rather than some pseudo-precise figure. Nevertheless, it appears to us that many companies now making repurchases are overpaying departing shareholders at the expense of those who stay.

查理和我都承认，我们只对部分上市公司的内在价值有信心进行估算，而且即便如此，我们也只能给出一个估值区间，而不是某种看似精确实则虚假的数字。然而，在我们看来，目前许多正在回购股票的公司，实际上是在牺牲留下的股东利益，向退出股东支付过高的价格。

In defense of those companies, I would say that it is natural for CEOs to be optimistic about their own businesses. They also know a whole lot more about them than I do. However, I can’t help but feel that too often today’s repurchases are dictated by management’s desire to “show confidence” or be in fashion rather than by a desire to enhance per-share value.

为这些公司辩护一下，我认为CEO们对自己企业的乐观是自然的事。他们对企业了解得比我多得多。不过，我仍忍不住觉得，如今许多回购行为更多是出于管理层想“展示信心”或赶时髦，而非真正出于提升每股价值的目的。

Sometimes, too, companies say they are repurchasing shares to offset the shares issued when stock options granted at much lower prices are exercised. This “buy high, sell low” strategy is one many unfortunate investors have employed — but never intentionally! Managements, however, seem to follow this perverse activity very cheerfully.

有时，公司声称回购股票是为了抵消员工行使低价授予的期权所发行的新股。这种“高价买入、低价卖出”的策略，是许多不幸的投资者曾经采用过的——但从来不是有意为之！然而，管理层似乎乐此不疲地从事这种反常的行为。

Of course, both option grants and repurchases may make sense — but if that’s the case, it’s not because the two activities are logically related. Rationally, a company’s decision to repurchase shares or to issue them should stand on its own feet. Just because stock has been issued to satisfy options — or for any other reason — does not mean that stock should be repurchased at a price above intrinsic value. Correspondingly, a stock that sells well below intrinsic value should be repurchased whether or not stock has previously been issued (or may be because of outstanding options).

当然，授予期权和回购都可能是合理的——但如果合理，并非因为两者之间存在逻辑关联。理性地说，公司是否回购或发行股票应各自独立判断。仅仅因为股票曾用于满足期权行权（或任何其他原因）并不意味着就应在高于内在价值的价格回购；同样地，只要股价远低于内在价值，不管之前是否发行过股票（或是否有尚未行权的期权），都应该进行回购。

You should be aware that, at certain times in the past, I have erred in not making repurchases. My appraisal of Berkshire’s value was then too conservative or I was too enthused about some alternative use of funds. We have therefore missed some opportunities — though Berkshire’s trading volume at these points was too light for us to have done much buying, which means that the gain in our per-share value would have been minimal. (A repurchase of, say, 2% of a company’s shares at a 25% discount from per-share intrinsic value produces only a ½% gain in that value at most — and even less if the funds could alternatively have been deployed in value-building moves.)

你应当清楚，过去我也曾因未进行回购而犯下错误。当时我对伯克希尔价值的评估过于保守，或者我对资金的其他用途过于热衷。因此，我们错失了一些机会——虽然那时伯克希尔的交易量太低，使我们难以大举买入，这意味着每股价值的提升会非常有限。（例如，以低于每股内在价值25%的价格回购2%的流通股，最多只会带来0.5%的价值提升——如果资金本可用于创造更高价值的投资，则实际收益可能更低。）

Some of the letters we’ve received clearly imply that the writer is unconcerned about intrinsic value considerations but instead wants us to trumpet an intention to repurchase so that the stock will rise (or quit going down). If the writer wants to sell tomorrow, his thinking makes sense — for him! — but if he intends to hold, he should instead hope the stock falls and trades in enough volume for us to buy a lot of it. That’s the only way a repurchase program can have any real benefit for a continuing shareholder.

我们收到的一些信件显然表明，写信人并不关心内在价值的问题，而是希望我们公开宣布回购意图，从而推动股价上涨（或停止下跌）。如果这位股东明天就想卖出，他的想法对他自己而言是对的！但如果他打算长期持有，那么他应该希望股价下跌，并有足够的成交量让我们能大量买入。这才是回购计划对长期股东真正有益的方式。

We will not repurchase shares unless we believe Berkshire stock is selling well below intrinsic value, conservatively calculated. Nor will we attempt to talk the stock up or down. (Neither publicly or privately have I ever told anyone to buy or sell Berkshire shares.) Instead we will give all shareholders — and potential shareholders — the same valuation-related information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed.

除非我们认为伯克希尔的股价远低于其保守估算的内在价值，否则我们不会回购股票。我们也不会试图通过言论影响股价涨跌。（无论是公开还是私下场合，我从未告诉任何人该买或卖伯克希尔的股票。）相反，我们会向所有股东——以及潜在股东——提供我们在互换位置时也希望拥有的关于估值的信息。

Recently, when the A shares fell below $45,000, we considered making repurchases. We decided, however, to delay buying, if indeed we elect to do any, until shareholders have had the chance to review this report. If we do find that repurchases make sense, we will only rarely place bids on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”). Instead, we will respond to offers made directly to us at or below the NYSE bid. If you wish to offer stock, have your broker call Mark Millard at 402-346-1400. When a trade occurs, the broker can either record it in the “third market” or on the NYSE. We will favor purchase of the B shares if they are selling at more than a 2% discount to the A. We will not engage in transactions involving fewer than 10 shares of A or 50 shares of B.

最近，当A类股票跌破45,000美元时，我们考虑过回购。但我们决定暂缓购买行动，直到股东有机会阅读这份报告。如果我们最终确认回购是有意义的，我们也很少会在纽约证券交易所（NYSE）挂单。我们更倾向于接受直接发来的报价，且报价不得高于或等于NYSE的买方出价。如果你愿意出售，请让你的经纪人拨打Mark Millard电话：402-346-1400。成交后，你的经纪人可以在“第三市场”记录交易，也可以在NYSE完成交割。如果B类股票的折价超过A类股票2%，我们将优先购买B类股票。我们不会处理少于10股A类或50股B类的小额交易。

Please be clear about one point: We will never make purchases with the intention of stemming a decline in Berkshire’s price. Rather we will make them if and when we believe that they represent an attractive use of the Company’s money. At best, repurchases are likely to have only a very minor effect on the future rate of gain in our stock’s intrinsic value.

请明确一点：我们绝不会为了阻止伯克希尔股价下跌而进行回购。只有当我们相信回购是资金的最佳用途之一时，我们才会进行回购。即使回购发生，它对我们未来股价内在价值的增长所能产生的正面影响也是极其微小的。

# Shareholder-Designated Contributions

# 股东指定捐赠计划

About 97.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1999 shareholder-designated contributions program, with contributions totaling $17.2 million. A full description of the program appears on pages 70 - 71.

1999年，伯克希尔的股东指定捐赠计划共有约97.3%的符合条件股份参与，总捐款金额达1,720万美元。该计划的完整说明见第70至71页。

Cumulatively, over the 19 years of the program, Berkshire has made contributions of $147 million pursuant to the instructions of our shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries, which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $13.8 million in 1999, including in-kind donations of $2.5 million.

自该计划实施以来的19年间，根据股东指示，伯克希尔已累计捐款1.47亿美元。其余的慈善支出由各子公司自行安排，延续其被收购前的慈善模式（唯一的不同是原股东现在自行承担个人慈善责任）。1999年，我们的子公司共捐赠了1,380万美元，其中包括250万美元的实物捐赠。

To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 2000, will be ineligible for the 2000 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten. Designations received after the due date will not be honored.

如欲参与今后的项目，你必须拥有登记在你自己名下的A类股票，而非登记在经纪人、银行或托管机构名义下的股份。截至2000年8月31日仍未登记在股东本人名下的股份将不具备参与2000年度计划的资格。当你收到我们的捐赠表格后，请尽快填写并寄回，以免被遗忘或耽误。逾期提交的捐赠意向将不予受理。

# The Annual Meeting

# 年度股东大会

This year’s Woodstock Weekend for Capitalists will follow a format slightly different from that of recent years. We need to make a change because the Aksarben Coliseum, which served us well the past three years, is gradually being closed down. Therefore, we are relocating to the Civic Auditorium (which is on Capitol Avenue between 18th and 19th, behind the Doubletree Hotel), the only other facility in Omaha offering the space we require.

今年的“资本家伍德斯托克周末”将略有变化。我们需要更换场地，是因为过去三年服务我们的Aksarben展览馆正逐步关闭。因此，我们迁至Civic礼堂举行大会（位于Capitol大道18街与19街之间，Doubletree酒店后面），这是奥马哈唯一具备足够空间可以容纳我们的场所。

The Civic, however, is located in downtown Omaha, and we would create a parking and traffic nightmare if we were to meet there on a weekday. We will, therefore, convene on Saturday, April 29, with the doors opening at 7 a.m., the movie beginning at 8:30 and the meeting itself commencing at 9:30. As in the past, we will run until 3:30 p.m. with a short break at noon for food, which will be available at the Civic’s concession stands.

不过，Civic礼堂位于奥马哈市中心，若在工作日召开会议，将造成停车和交通的巨大混乱。因此，我们定于4月29日（星期六）召开会议，当天早上7点开放入场，8:30播放电影短片，9:30正式开会。正如以往，会议将持续到下午3:30，中午会有短暂休息时间用餐，食品将在Civic礼堂内的摊位供应。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. In our normal fashion, we will run buses from the larger hotels to the meeting. After the meeting, the buses will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim’s and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.

随附委托书材料中的附件详细说明了你需要如何获取参加大会及其他活动所需的凭证。至于机票、酒店和租车预订，我们再次邀请美国运通（800-799-6634）为你提供特别协助。和往常一样，我们会安排从主要酒店开往会场的大巴车。会议结束后，大巴车也将送大家返回酒店、前往Nebraska家具商场、Borsheim珠宝店及机场。尽管如此，我们建议你最好租一辆车以便自由出行。

We have scheduled the meeting in 2002 and 2003 on the customary first Saturday in May. In 2001, however, the Civic is already booked on that Saturday, so we will meet on April 29. The Civic should fit our needs well on any weekend, since there will then be more than ample parking in nearby lots and garages as well as on streets. We will also be able to greatly enlarge the space we give exhibitors. So, overcoming my normal commercial reticence, I will see that you have a wide display of Berkshire products at the Civic that you can purchase. As a benchmark, in 1999 shareholders bought 3,059 pounds of See’s candy, $16,155 of World Book Products, 1,928 pairs of Dexter shoes, 895 sets of Quikut knives, 1,752 golf balls with the Berkshire Hathaway logo and 3,446 items of Berkshire apparel. I know you can do better.

我们已将2002年和2003年的年会安排在每年五月的第一个星期六。但2001年5月的第一个周六已被他人预订，所以我们改在4月29日召开。由于周末期间附近停车场、车库和街道都会有充足的空间，这一地点非常适合我们。同时，我们还能为参展商提供更大的展位。因此，打破我一贯的商业低调风格，我会安排在会场陈列各种伯克希尔产品供你选购。作为参考，1999年股东们购买了See’s糖果3,059磅、World Book图书产品16,155美元、Dexter鞋1,928双、Quikut刀具895套、印有伯克希尔标志的高尔夫球1,752个，以及伯克希尔纪念服饰等商品共计3,446件。我知道你们能做得更好。

Last year, we also initiated the sale of at least eight fractions of Executive Jet aircraft. We will again have an array of models at the Omaha airport for your inspection on Saturday and Sunday. Ask an EJA representative at the Civic about viewing any of these planes.

去年，我们还首次推出至少八分之一架Executive Jet飞机的销售。今年的周六和周日，我们仍将有多款机型在奥马哈机场展出供你参观。你也可以在Civic礼堂向EJA代表咨询看机事宜。

Dairy Queen will also be on hand at the Civic and again will donate all proceeds to the Children’s Miracle Network. Last year we sold 4,586 Dilly® bars, fudge bars and vanilla/orange bars. Additionally, GEICO will have a booth that will be staffed by a number of our top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to offer you a special shareholder’s discount. Bring the details of your existing insurance, and check out whether we can save you some money.

Dairy Queen也将在Civic礼堂设摊，所有销售收入将全数捐赠给“儿童奇迹网络”（Children's Miracle Network）。去年我们共售出了4,586支Dilly®棒冰、巧克力软糖和香草/橙味冰棒。此外，GEICO也将设立展位，并由来自全国各地的多位顶级顾问现场为你提供汽车保险报价服务。在大多数情况下，你可以享受股东专属折扣。请带上你现有的保单资料，来看看我们是否能帮你节省保费。

Finally, Ajit Jain and his associates will be on hand to offer both no-commission annuities and a liability policy with jumbo limits of a size rarely available elsewhere. Talk to Ajit and learn how to protect yourself and your family against a $10 million judgment.

最后，Ajit Jain及其团队也将到场，提供无佣金年金产品以及罕见的高额责任险保单，保障额度之高，在其他地方几乎难以获得。与Ajit聊聊，了解如何为你的家庭提供高达1,000万美元赔偿风险的保障。

NFM’s newly remodeled complex, located on a 75-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays. This operation offers an unrivaled breadth of merchandise — furniture, electronics, appliances, carpets and computers — all at can’t-be-beat prices. In 1999 NFM did more than $300 million of business at its 72nd Street location, which in a metropolitan area of 675,000 is an absolute miracle. During the Thursday, April 27 to Monday, May 1 period, any shareholder presenting his or her meeting credential will receive a discount that is customarily given only to employees. We have offered this break to shareholders the last couple of years, and sales have been amazing. In last year’s five-day “Berkshire Weekend,” NFM’s volume was $7.98 million, an increase of 26% from 1998 and 51% from 1997.

位于Dodge大道与Pacific大道之间72街占地75英亩的新装修Nebraska Furniture Mart（NFM）商场营业时间为：平日早上10点至晚上9点，周末早上10点至下午6点。这家商场提供种类最齐全的商品——家具、电子产品、家电、地毯和电脑，价格极具竞争力。1999年，该店仅在这条街就实现了超过3亿美元的销售额，在一个总人口仅67.5万的大都会区，这简直是个奇迹。4月27日（星期四）至5月1日（星期一）期间，任何出示股东大会入场凭证的股东都将享有通常只对员工开放的特别折扣。过去几年我们向股东提供这一优惠，销售成绩令人惊叹。去年五天“伯克希尔周末”期间，NFM的销售额达到798万美元，较1998年增长26%，较1997年增长51%。

Borsheim’s — the largest jewelry store in the country except for Tiffany’s Manhattan store — will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a champagne and dessert party from 6 p.m.-10 p.m. on Friday, April 28. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 30. On that day, Charlie and I will be on hand to sign sales tickets. Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid the largest crowds, which will form on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a shareholder. On Saturday, we will be open until 7 p.m. Borsheim’s operates on a gross margin that is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals, so be prepared to be blown away by both our prices and selection.

Borsheim’s珠宝店是全美最大的珠宝商之一（仅次于蒂芙尼在曼哈顿的旗舰店），今年将为股东举办两场专属活动。第一场是4月28日（星期五）下午6点到10点的香槟甜点招待会；第二场是4月30日（星期日）上午9点至下午6点的大型庆典活动。当天我和查理将亲自到场签名签购单。股东专属优惠价将从4月27日持续到5月1日。如果你希望避开周五晚及周日的人潮，请选择其他时间前来并表明你是伯克希尔股东身份。周六我们将营业至晚上7点。Borsheim’s的毛利率比主要竞争对手低整整二十个百分点，因此我们的价格和商品种类会让你大吃一惊。

In the mall outside of Borsheim’s, we will again have Bob Hamman — the best bridge player the game has ever seen — available to play with our shareholders on Sunday. We will also have a few other experts playing at additional tables. In 1999, we had more demand than tables, but we will cure that problem this year.

在Borsheim’s外的商场区域，我们再次邀请世界桥牌大师Bob Hamman于周日与股东们对弈。同时还有几位桥牌专家将在其他桌参与。1999年时，报名人数超过了桌子数量，今年我们会解决这个问题。

Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will again be in the mall playing blindfolded against all comers. He tells me that he has never tried to play more than four games simultaneously while handicapped this way but might try to bump that limit to five or six this year. If you’re a chess fan, take Patrick on — but be sure to check his blindfold before your first move.

两度美国国际象棋冠军Patrick Wolff也将再度登场，在商场进行蒙眼挑战赛。他告诉我，以往他最多同时下过四盘盲棋，但今年可能会尝试增加到五盘或六盘。如果你是象棋爱好者，欢迎来挑战Patrick——不过别忘了在他走第一步前检查他的眼罩是否戴好。

Gorat’s — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, April 30, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until about midnight. Please remember that you can’t come to Gorat’s on Sunday without a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 3 (but not before). If Sunday is sold out, try Gorat’s on one of the other evenings you will be in town. I make a “quality check” of Gorat’s about once a week and can report that their rare T-bone (with a double order of hash browns) is still unequaled throughout the country.

Gorat’s是我最喜欢的牛排馆，它将在4月30日（星期日）专为伯克希尔股东开放，营业时间为下午4点至午夜左右。请注意，周日前往Gorat’s必须提前订位。订位请于4月3日拨打402-551-3733（且不要早于当日）。如果周日已满座，欢迎你在逗留奥马哈的其他晚间前往。我每周大约光顾一次Gorat’s做“品质抽检”，我可以负责任地说，他们那半熟T骨牛排配双份土豆饼的组合，至今仍在全国无人能敌。

The usual baseball game will be held at Rosenblatt Stadium at 7 p.m. on Saturday night. This year the Omaha Golden Spikes will play the Iowa Cubs. Come early, because that’s when the real action takes place. Those who attended last year saw your Chairman pitch to Ernie Banks.

周六晚7点，Rosenblatt体育场将照例举行棒球比赛。今年对阵双方是Omaha Golden Spikes和Iowa Cubs。建议早点到场，因为真正的精彩往往发生在正式开赛后之前。去年出席的朋友都看到了你们的董事长与Ernie Banks对决投球的一幕。

This encounter proved to be the titanic duel that the sports world had long awaited. After the first few pitches — which were not my best, but when have I ever thrown my best? — I fired a brushback at Ernie just to let him know who was in command. Ernie charged the mound, and I charged the plate. But a clash was avoided because we became exhausted before reaching each other.

这场对决果然不负众望，成为体育界期待已久的巅峰之战。头几颗投球并非我的最佳表现——毕竟我什么时候发挥过最佳水平呢？——但我还是朝Ernie投了一记近身球，提醒他谁才是主导者。Ernie冲上投手丘，我也冲向本垒板。幸运的是，我们在接近对方前都累瘫了，避免了一场正面冲突。

Ernie was dissatisfied with his performance last year and has been studying the game films all winter. As you may know, Ernie had 512 home runs in his career as a Cub. Now that he has spotted telltale weaknesses in my delivery, he expects to get #513 on April 29. I, however, have learned new ways to disguise my “flutterball.” Come and watch this matchup.

Ernie去年对自己的表现不满意，整个冬天都在研究比赛录像。大家都知道他在小熊队的职业生涯中共击出512支本垒打。现在他发现了我在投球动作中的破绽，打算在4月29日拿下第513支本垒打。不过，我也学会了新的方式来掩饰我的“飘球”。欢迎来现场观看这场较量。

I should add that I have extracted a promise from Ernie that he will not hit a “come-backer” at me since I would never be able to duck in time to avoid it. My reflexes are like Woody Allen’s, who said his were so slow that he was once hit by a car being pushed by two guys.

顺便说一句，我已经让Ernie承诺不会对我打出回击球，因为我根本来不及躲闪。我的反应速度就像伍迪·艾伦形容自己的那样：“慢得要命，有一次甚至被两个推着车的人撞上了。”

Our proxy statement contains instructions about obtaining tickets to the game and also a large quantity of other information that should help you enjoy your visit in Omaha. Join us at the Capitalist Caper on Capitol Avenue.

我们的委托书文件中包含获取比赛门票的方法，以及其他大量实用信息，帮助你更好地享受在奥马哈的旅程。欢迎来到Capitol大道上的“资本家狂欢节”。

# WARREN E. BUFFETT

Chairman of the Board
March 1, 2000

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
2000年3月1日

编辑

上次更新: 2025/07/14, 21:42:27

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