1998巴菲特致股东的信

# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

# 伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们：

Our gain in net worth during 1998 was $25.9 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 48.3%. Over the last 34 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $37,801, a rate of 24.7% compounded annually.*
1998年我们的净资产增加了259亿美元，使我们A类和B类股票的每股账面价值增长了48.3%。在过去34年中（即现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值从19美元增长到37,801美元，年复合增长率达到了24.7%。*

Normally, a gain of 48.3% would call for handsprings — but not this year. Remember Wagner, whose music has been described as better than it sounds? Well, Berkshire’s progress in 1998 — though more than satisfactory — was not as good as it looks. That’s because most of that 48.3% gain came from our issuing shares in acquisitions.
通常情况下，48.3%的增长会让人欣喜若狂——但今年并非如此。还记得瓦格纳吗？他的音乐曾被形容为“听起来比实际更好”。同样地，伯克希尔在1998年的进展虽然令人满意，但实际情况并没有看起来那么好。这是因为那48.3%的增长大部分来自于我们发行股票进行并购。

To explain: Our stock sells at a large premium over book value, which means that any issuing of shares we do — whether for cash or as consideration in a merger — instantly increases our per-share book-value figure, even though we’ve earned not a dime. What happens is that we get more per-share book value in such transactions than we give up. These transactions, however, do not deliver us any immediate gain in per-share intrinsic value, because in this respect what we give and what we get are roughly equal. And, as Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I can’t tell you too often (though you may feel that we try), it’s the per-share gain in intrinsic value that counts rather than the per-share gain in book value. Though Berkshire’s intrinsic value grew very substantially in 1998, the gain fell well short of the 48.3% recorded for book value. Nevertheless, intrinsic value still far exceeds book value. (For a more extensive discussion of these terms, and other investment and accounting concepts, please refer to our Owner’s Manual, on pages 56-64, in which we set forth our owner-related business principles. Intrinsic value is discussed on pages 61 and 62.)
解释如下：我们的股票以远高于账面价值的价格交易，这意味着我们无论以现金还是作为合并对价发行股票，都会立即提高每股账面价值，即使我们并未赚取任何利润。在这种交易中，我们获得的每股账面价值高于我们放弃的价值。然而，这些交易并不会带来每股内在价值的即时增长，因为在这一方面，我们付出与所得大致相等。正如伯克希尔副主席兼我的合伙人查理·芒格和我经常强调的那样（尽管你们可能觉得我们说太多了），真正重要的是每股内在价值的增长，而不是每股账面价值的增长。尽管伯克希尔的内在价值在1998年大幅增长，但其增幅远低于账面价值所记录的48.3%。不过，内在价值仍远高于账面价值。（有关这些术语及其他投资和会计概念的更详细讨论，请参阅第56至64页的《所有者手册》，其中列出了我们与所有者相关的企业原则。关于内在价值的讨论见第61和62页。）

We entered 1999 with the best collection of businesses and managers in our history. The two companies we acquired in 1998, General Re and Executive Jet, are first-class in every way — more about both later — and the performance of our operating businesses last year exceeded my hopes. GEICO, once again, simply shot the lights out. On the minus side, several of the public companies in which we have major investments experienced significant operating shortfalls that neither they nor I anticipated early in the year. Consequently, our equity portfolio did not perform nearly as well as did the S&P 500. The problems of these companies are almost certainly temporary, and Charlie and I believe that their long-term prospects are excellent.
进入1999年时，我们拥有公司历史上最优秀的业务组合和管理团队。我们在1998年收购的两家公司——通用再保险（General Re）和行政航空（Executive Jet）——各方面都堪称一流（后文将详细介绍）。去年我们的运营企业表现超出了我的预期。GEICO再次表现出色。不利的一面是，几家我们重仓投资的上市公司出现了重大经营亏损，无论是他们自己还是我年初都没有预料到这一点。因此，我们的股票投资组合表现远不如标普500指数。这些问题几乎可以肯定是暂时的，查理和我相信它们的长期前景依然非常乐观。

In our last three annual reports, we furnished you a table that we regard as central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key components of value, including General Re on a pro-forma basis as if we had owned it throughout the year. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents but excluding securities held in our financial products operation) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments (discussed on pages 62 and 63), but after all interest and corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs.
在过去的三份年度报告中，我们向您提供了一张我们认为对评估伯克希尔内在价值至关重要的表格。以下是更新后的版本，我们追踪了两个关键价值组成部分，并按模拟基准纳入了通用再保险，假设我们全年拥有它。第一列列出了我们每股的投资持有量（包括现金及等价物，但不包括金融产品部门持有的证券），第二列显示了扣除所有利息和公司费用后的伯克希尔运营企业在税前和购买会计调整前的每股收益（详见第62和63页）。第二列排除了我们从第一列列出的投资中实现的所有股息、利息和资本收益。实际上，这两列展示了如果伯克希尔分为两部分会是什么样子：一部分实体持有我们的投资，另一部分则运营我们所有的业务并承担所有公司成本。

*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.
*本报告中使用的所有数据均适用于伯克希尔A类股票，这是公司在1996年前唯一流通的股票。B类股票的经济权益相当于A类股票的1/30。

Year	Investments Per Share	Pre-tax Earnings Per Share With All Income from Investments Excluded
年度	投资每股金额（Investments Per Share）	扣除所有投资收入后的税前每股收益（Pre-tax Earnings Per Share With All Income from Investments Excluded）
1968 ...........................................	$ 53	$2.87
1978 ...........................................	465	12.85
1988 ...........................................	4,876	145.77
1998 ...........................................	47,647	474.45

Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:
以下是按十年划分的两个板块增长率：

Decade Ending	Investments Per Share	Pre-tax Earnings Per Share With All Income from Investments Excluded
十年截止	投资每股金额（Investments Per Share）	扣除所有投资收入后的税前每股收益（Pre-tax Earnings Per Share With All Income from Investments Excluded）
1978 ...........................................	24.2%	16.2%
1988 ...........................................	26.5%	27.5%
1998 ...........................................	25.6%	12.5%
Annual Growth Rate, 1968–1998 ......................	25.4%	18.6%

During 1998, our investments increased by $9,604 per share, or 25.2%, but per-share operating earnings fell by 33.9%. General Re (included, as noted, on a pro-forma basis) explains both facts. This company has very large investments, and these greatly increased our per-share investment figure. But General Re also had an underwriting loss in 1998, and that hurt operating earnings. Had we not acquired General Re, per-share operating earnings would have shown a modest gain.
1998年，我们的投资每股增长了9,604美元，或25.2%，但每股运营收益却下降了33.9%。这两个事实都可以用通用再保险（如前所述，按模拟基准纳入）来解释。这家公司拥有庞大的投资组合，这极大地提高了我们的每股投资金额。但通用再保险在1998年也出现了承保亏损，这影响了运营收益。如果我们没有收购通用再保险，每股运营收益本应小幅上升。

Though certain of our acquisitions and operating strategies may from time to time affect one column more than the other, we continually work to increase the figures in both. But one thing is certain: Our future rates of gain will fall far short of those achieved in the past. Berkshire’s capital base is now simply too large to allow us to earn truly outsized returns. If you believe otherwise, you should consider a career in sales but avoid one in mathematics (bearing in mind that there are really only three kinds of people in the world: those who can count and those who can’t).
尽管某些收购和运营策略有时会对其中一个板块的影响大于另一个，但我们始终致力于提升两个板块的数据。但有一件事是确定的：未来的增长速度将远不及过去。伯克希尔的资本基础现在已经太大，无法让我们获得真正超额的回报。如果你不这么认为，那你应该考虑从事销售工作，而不是数学领域（请记住世界上其实只有三种人：会数数的人和不会数数的人）。

Currently we are working to compound a net worth of $57.4 billion, the largest of any American corporation (though our figure will be eclipsed if the merger of Exxon and Mobil takes place). Of course, our lead in net worth does not mean that Berkshire outranks all other businesses in value: Market value is what counts for owners and General Electric and Microsoft, for example, have valuations more than three times Berkshire’s. Net worth, though, measures the capital that managers must deploy, and at Berkshire that figure has indeed become huge.
目前我们正在通过复利增长运作574亿美元的净资产，这是美国任何其他公司中最高的（尽管如果埃克森和美孚合并完成，这个数字将被超越）。当然，我们在净资产上的领先并不意味着伯克希尔在价值上超过所有其他企业：对股东而言重要的是市值，例如通用电气和微软的估值是伯克希尔的三倍多。不过，净资产衡量的是管理者必须部署的资本，在伯克希尔，这个数字确实已经变得巨大。

Nonetheless, Charlie and I will do our best to increase intrinsic value in the future at an average rate of 15%, a result we consider to be at the very peak of possible outcomes. We may have years when we exceed 15%, but we will most certainly have other years when we fall far short of that — including years showing negative returns — and those will bring our average down. In the meantime, you should understand just what an average gain of 15% over the next five years implies: It means we will need to increase net worth by $58 billion. Earning this daunting 15% will require us to come up with big ideas: Popcorn stands just won’t do. Today’s markets are not friendly to our search for “elephants,” but you can be sure that we will stay focused on the hunt.
尽管如此，查理和我将尽最大努力在未来以平均每年15%的速度提升内在价值，我们认为这是一个可能结果中的最高目标。我们可能会有几年超过15%，但也肯定会有一些年份远远达不到这一水平——甚至出现负回报——这将拉低我们的平均水平。同时，你应该清楚，未来五年平均增长15%意味着什么：这意味着我们需要增加580亿美元的净资产。要实现这个令人望而生畏的15%增长，我们需要提出宏大的想法：卖爆米花的小摊可不行。如今的市场对我们寻找“大象”并不友好，但你可以确信我们会继续专注于猎捕。

Whatever the future holds, I make you one promise: I’ll keep at least 99% of my net worth in Berkshire for as long as I am around. How long will that be? My model is the loyal Democrat in Fort Wayne who asked to be buried in Chicago so that he could stay active in the party. To that end, I’ve already selected a “power spot” at the office for my urn.
无论未来如何，我向你承诺一件事：只要我在世，至少会把99%的净资产投资于伯克希尔。我能活多久呢？我效仿的是福特韦恩那位忠诚的民主党人，他要求死后葬在芝加哥，以便继续参与政党活动。为此，我已经在办公室选好了放骨灰盒的“能量宝地”。

Our financial growth has been matched by employment growth: We now have 47,566 on our payroll, with the acquisitions of 1998 bringing 7,074 employees to us and internal growth adding another 2,500. To balance this gain
我们的员工数量也随着财务增长同步增加：我们现在共有47,566名员工，其中1998年的并购带来了7,074名员工，内部增长又新增了2,500人。为了平衡这一增长

of 9,500 in hands-on employees, we have enlarged the staff at world headquarters from 12 to 12.8. (The .8 doesn’t refer to me or Charlie: We have a new person in accounting, working four days a week.) Despite this alarming trend toward corporate bloat, our after-tax overhead last year was about $3.5 million, or well under one basis point (.01 of 1%) of the value of the assets we manage.
新增了9,500名一线员工，我们也将全球总部的员工人数从12人增加到了12.8人（0.8不是指我和查理：我们新招了一位会计人员，每周工作四天）。尽管这种看似“臃肿”的趋势令人担忧，但我们去年的税后管理费用仅为约350万美元，仅为我们所管理资产总值的不到一个基点（即0.01%）。

# Taxes (税收)

One beneficiary of our increased size has been the U.S. Treasury. The federal income taxes that Berkshire and General Re have paid, or will soon pay, in respect to 1998 earnings total $2.7 billion. That means we shouldered all of the U.S. Government’s expenses for more than a half-day.

我们规模的扩大也带来了一个受益者——美国财政部。伯克希尔和通用再保险为1998年盈利已经支付或将要支付的联邦所得税总额达到27亿美元。这意味着我们承担了美国政府超过半天的所有开支。

Follow that thought a little further: If only 625 other U.S. taxpayers had paid the Treasury as much as we and General Re did last year, no one else — neither corporations nor 270 million citizens — would have had to pay federal income taxes or any other kind of federal tax (for example, social security or estate taxes). Our shareholders can truly say that they “gave at the office.”

再进一步思考：如果另外仅625位美国纳税人缴纳给财政部的税款与我们和通用再保险去年所缴的一样多，那么其他所有人——无论是公司还是2.7亿公民——都不必再缴纳联邦所得税或其他任何联邦税（例如社会保障税或遗产税）。我们的股东们可以真正地说他们“在办公室就慷慨解囊”。

Writing checks to the IRS that include strings of zeros does not bother Charlie or me. Berkshire as a corporation, and we as individuals, have prospered in America as we would have in no other country. Indeed, if we lived in some other part of the world and completely escaped taxes, I’m sure we would be worse off financially (and in many other ways as well). Overall, we feel extraordinarily lucky to have been dealt a hand in life that enables us to write large checks to the government rather than one requiring the government to regularly write checks to us — say, because we are disabled or unemployed.

向国税局（IRS）开出一串零的支票并不会让查理和我感到困扰。作为一家公司，以及作为个人，我们在美国取得的成功是其他任何国家都无法比拟的。事实上，如果我们生活在世界其他地方并完全避税，我相信我们的财务状况会更差（在许多其他方面也是如此）。总体而言，我们深感幸运，命运让我们拥有能够向政府开具大额支票的人生机会，而不是需要政府定期给我们开支票的生活状态——比如说，因为我们残疾或失业。

Berkshire’s tax situation is sometimes misunderstood. First, capital gains have no special attraction for us: A corporation pays a 35% rate on taxable income, whether it comes from capital gains or from ordinary operations. This means that Berkshire’s tax on a long-term capital gain is fully 75% higher than what an individual would pay on an identical gain.

伯克希尔的税务状况有时被误解。首先，资本收益对我们并没有特别吸引力：无论收入来源于资本利得还是常规运营，企业都要按35%的税率纳税。这意味着伯克希尔对长期资本利得的税率比个人对相同收益所支付的税率高出整整75%。

Some people harbor another misconception, believing that we can exclude 70% of all dividends we receive from our taxable income. Indeed, the 70% rate applies to most corporations and also applies to Berkshire in cases where we hold stocks in non-insurance subsidiaries. However, almost all of our equity investments are owned by our insurance companies, and in that case the exclusion is 59.5%. That still means a dollar of dividends is considerably more valuable to us than a dollar of ordinary income, but not to the degree often assumed.

有些人还有另一个误解，认为我们可以将收到的所有股息中高达70%排除在应税收入之外。确实，70%的免税率适用于大多数公司，也适用于伯克希尔在非保险公司子公司持股的情况。然而，几乎我们所有的股权投资都是由我们的保险公司持有的，在这种情况下，股息的免税率为59.5%。这仍然意味着每一美元的股息对我们来说比每一美元的普通收入更有价值，但并不像人们通常想象的那么多。

Berkshire truly went all out for the Treasury last year. In connection with the General Re merger, we wrote a $30 million check to the government to pay an SEC fee tied to the new shares created by the deal. We understand that this payment set an SEC record. Charlie and I are enormous admirers of what the Commission has accomplished for American investors. We would rather, however, have found another way to show our admiration.

去年，伯克希尔为了财政部可谓倾尽全力。在通用再保险合并过程中，我们开出了3,000万美元的支票支付证券交易委员会（SEC）相关费用，这笔费用与交易中新发行的股份有关。据悉，这一付款创下了SEC的纪录。查理和我都非常钦佩该委员会为美国投资者所做的一切。不过，我们宁愿以别的方式表达我们的敬意。

# GEICO (1-800-847-7536)

# GEICO（电话：1-800-847-7536）

Combine a great idea with a great manager and you’re certain to obtain a great result. That mix is alive and well at GEICO. The idea is low-cost auto insurance, made possible by direct-to-customer marketing, and the manager is Tony Nicely. Quite simply, there is no one in the business world who could run GEICO better than Tony does. His instincts are unerring, his energy is boundless, and his execution is flawless. While maintaining underwriting discipline, Tony is building an organization that is gaining market share at an accelerating rate.

一个伟大的想法加上一位杰出的管理者，必然能带来卓越的结果。GEICO正是这种组合的典范。这个想法是通过直销模式实现低成本汽车保险，而这位管理者就是Tony Nicely。简单地说，在整个商业界，没有人能比Tony更好地经营GEICO。他的直觉准确无误，精力无限充沛，执行力也毫无瑕疵。在保持承保纪律的同时，Tony正在打造一个市场份额加速增长的组织。

This pace has been encouraged by our compensation policies. The direct writing of insurance — that is, without there being an agent or broker between the insurer and its policyholder — involves a substantial front-end investment. First-year business is therefore unprofitable in a major way. At GEICO, we do not wish this cost to deter our associates from the aggressive pursuit of new business — which, as it renews, will deliver significant profits — so we leave it out of our compensation formulas. What’s included then? We base 50% of our associates’ bonuses and profit sharing on

这一速度得到了我们薪酬政策的支持。直销保险——即保险公司与客户之间没有代理或经纪人——涉及大量前期投资。因此，第一年的业务利润非常有限。在GEICO，我们不希望这项成本阻碍员工积极开拓新业务——因为随着保单续保，这些业务将带来可观利润——所以我们将其排除在薪酬公式之外。那我们又基于什么呢？我们将员工奖金和利润分享的50%基于

the earnings of our “seasoned” book, meaning policies that have been with us for more than a year. The other 50% is tied to growth in policyholders — and here we have stepped on the gas.

我们“成熟”保单的收益，即那些已持续一年以上的保单。另外50%则与投保人数量的增长挂钩——在这方面我们全力以赴。

In 1995, the year prior to its acquisition by Berkshire, GEICO spent $33 million on marketing and had 652 telephone counselors. Last year the company spent $143 million, and the counselor count grew to 2,162. The effects that these efforts had at the company are shown by the new business and in-force figures below:

在1995年——也就是伯克希尔收购GEICO的前一年，公司在营销上花费了3,300万美元，拥有652名电话客服人员。去年，公司投入了1.43亿美元，客服人数增加到2,162人。以下是我们努力带来的成果，展示的是新增保单和有效保单的数据：

New Auto Years Policies*	Auto Policies In-Force*
新增汽车保单年度	有效汽车保单数
1993 ...........................................	1,354,882
1994 ...........................................	1,396,217
1995 ...........................................	1,461,608
1996 ...........................................	1,617,669
1997 ...........................................	1,913,176
1998 ...........................................	1,317,761

“Voluntary” only; excludes assigned risks and the like.
仅指“自愿投保”，不含指定风险等强制投保类型。

In 1999, we will again increase our marketing budget, spending at least $190 million. In fact, there is no limit to what Berkshire is willing to invest in GEICO’s new-business activity, as long as we can concurrently build the infrastructure the company needs to properly serve its policyholders.

1999年，我们将再次增加营销预算，至少投入1.9亿美元。事实上，只要我们能同时建设公司所需的基础架构以妥善服务投保人，伯克希尔愿意在GEICO的新业务上投入多少都没有上限。

Because of the first-year costs, companies that are concerned about quarterly or annual earnings would shy from similar investments, no matter how intelligent these might be in terms of building long-term value. Our calculus is different: We simply measure whether we are creating more than a dollar of value per dollar spent — and if that calculation is favorable, the more dollars we spend the happier I am.

由于第一年的成本较高，关注季度或年度利润的公司都会回避类似的投资，即使这些投资在构建长期价值方面非常明智。但我们考虑的方式不同：我们只衡量每花出去一美元是否创造了超过一美元的价值——如果计算结果有利，我们花的钱越多，我就越高兴。

There is far more to GEICO’s success, of course, than low prices and a torrent of advertising. The handling of claims must also be fair, fast and friendly — and ours is. Here’s an impartial scorecard on how we shape up: In New York, our largest-volume state, the Insurance Department recently reported that GEICO’s complaint ratio in 1997 was not only the lowest of the five largest auto insurers but was also less than half the average of the other four.

当然，GEICO的成功远不止于低价和大量的广告。理赔处理也必须公平、迅速且友好——我们正是如此。以下是一个客观评价标准：在我们业务量最大的纽约州，保险部门最近报告称，GEICO在1997年的投诉比例不仅低于五大汽车保险公司中的最低水平，而且不到其余四家公司平均值的一半。

GEICO’s 1998 profit margin of 6.7% was better than we had anticipated — and, indeed, better than we wished. Our results reflect an industry-wide phenomenon: In recent years, both the frequency of auto accidents and their severity have unexpectedly declined. We responded by reducing rates 3.3% in 1998, and we will reduce them still more in 1999. These moves will soon bring profit margins down — at the least to 4%, which is our target, and perhaps considerably lower. Whatever the case, we believe that our margins will continue to be much better than those of the industry.

GEICO在1998年的利润率达到了6.7%，超出了我们的预期——甚至也高于我们期望的水平。我们的结果反映了一个行业普遍现象：近年来，交通事故的发生频率及其严重程度都意外下降。对此，我们在1998年降低了3.3%的费率，并将在1999年进一步降低。这些举措将很快使利润率下降——至少降至我们目标的4%，甚至可能更低。无论如何，我们相信我们的利润率仍将远高于行业平均水平。

With GEICO’s growth and profitability both outstanding in 1998, so also were its profit-sharing and bonus payments. Indeed, the profit-sharing payment of $103 million or 32.3% of salary — which went to all 9,313 associates who had been with us for more than a year — may well have been the highest percentage payment at any large company in the country. (In addition, associates benefit from a company-funded pension plan.)

由于GEICO在1998年实现了快速增长和良好盈利，其利润分享和奖金发放也非常可观。事实上，向所有在公司工作超过一年的9,313名员工发放的1.03亿美元利润分享金额，相当于工资总额的32.3%——这可能是全国大型公司中利润分享比例最高的之一。（此外，员工还可享受公司资助的养老金计划。）

The 32.3% may turn out to be a high-water mark, given that the profitability component in our profit-sharing calculation is almost certain to come down in the future. The growth component, though, may well increase. Overall, we expect the two benchmarks together to dictate very significant profit-sharing payments for decades to come. For our associates, growth pays off in other ways as well: Last year we promoted 4,612 people.

考虑到我们在利润分享计算中用于衡量盈利能力的部分未来几乎肯定会下降，32.3%的比例可能会成为历史高点。但增长部分却有可能上升。总体而言，我们预计这两个指标共同作用下，未来几十年都将决定非常可观的利润分享支付。对我们的员工来说，增长也带来了其他方面的回报：去年我们提拔了4,612人。

Impressive as the GEICO figures are, we have far more to do. Our market share improved significantly in 1998 — but only from 3% to 31⁄2%. For every policyholder we now have, there are another ten who should be giving us their business.

尽管GEICO的各项数据令人印象深刻，但我们还有更多工作要做。我们的市场份额在1998年显著提升——但也只是从3%提高到了3.5%。我们现在每有一位客户，就有另外十位本应该选择我们的客户。

Some of you who are reading this may be in that category. About 40% of those who check our rates find that they can save money by doing business with us. The proportion is not 100% because insurers differ in their underwriting judgements, with some giving more credit than we do to drivers who live in certain geographical areas or work at certain occupations. We believe, however, that we more frequently offer the low price than does any other national carrier selling insurance to all comers. Furthermore, in 40 states we can offer a special discount — usually 8% — to our shareholders. So give us a call and check us out.

阅读这段文字的您中，也许有人正属于这类潜在客户。大约有40%的人在查询我们的费率后发现，与我们合作可以节省保费支出。这一比例不是100%，是因为各保险公司在承保判断上有所不同，有些公司会给居住在特定地区或从事特定职业的驾驶人更高的信用评分。然而，我们相信相比任何面向大众提供保险的全国性保险公司，我们更频繁地提供最低价格。此外，在40个州，我们还可以向我们的股东提供特别折扣——通常是8%。所以，请拨打电话联系我们，了解一下吧。

You may think that one commercial in this section is enough. But I have another to present, this one directed at managers of publicly-owned companies.
你可能会认为这一部分刊登一则广告就够了。但我还有另一个要介绍，这次是面向公众公司经理人的。

At Berkshire we feel that telling outstanding CEOs, such as Tony, how to run their companies would be the height of foolishness. Most of our managers wouldn’t work for us if they got a lot of backseat driving. (Generally, they don’t have to work for anyone, since 75% or so are independently wealthy.) Besides, they are the Mark McGwires of the business world and need no advice from us as to how to hold the bat or when to swing.
在伯克希尔，我们认为告诉像Tony这样出色的CEO如何经营他们的公司是一种极端愚蠢的行为。如果我们对他们的管理指手画脚，大多数经理人根本不会为我们工作。（通常来说，他们也不必为任何人工作，因为大约75%的经理人已经财务自由。）此外，他们是商业界的马克·麦奎尔（棒球传奇人物），不需要我们教他们怎么握球棒或什么时候挥棒。

Nevertheless, Berkshire’s ownership may make even the best of managers more effective. First, we eliminate all of the ritualistic and nonproductive activities that normally go with the job of CEO. Our managers are totally in charge of their personal schedules. Second, we give each a simple mission: Just run your business as if: 1) you own 100% of it; 2) it is the only asset in the world that you and your family have or will ever have; and 3) you can’t sell or merge it for at least a century. As a corollary, we tell them they should not let any of their decisions be affected even slightly by accounting considerations. We want our managers to think about what counts, not how it will be counted.
尽管如此，伯克希尔的所有权结构可以让即使是顶尖的经理人也变得更有效率。首先，我们消除了所有例行公事和低效无益的CEO常规活动。我们的经理人完全掌控自己的日程安排。其次，我们给他们一个简单的使命：像以下三种情况成立那样来经营你的公司：1）你拥有它100%；2）它是你和家人现在或将来的唯一资产；3）至少一个世纪内不能出售或合并。作为推论，我们告诉他们，任何决策都不应受到会计考量哪怕一丁点的影响。我们希望经理人关注真正重要的东西，而不是如何计量它。

Very few CEOs of public companies operate under a similar mandate, mainly because they have owners who focus on short-term prospects and reported earnings. Berkshire, however, has a shareholder base — which it will have for decades to come — that has the longest investment horizon to be found in the public-company universe. Indeed, a majority of our shares are held by investors who expect to die still holding them. We can therefore ask our CEOs to manage for maximum long-term value, rather than for next quarter’s earnings. We certainly don’t ignore the current results of our businesses — in most cases, they are of great importance — but we never want them to be achieved at the expense of our building ever-greater competitive strengths.
很少有公众公司的CEO能在类似的授权下运作，这主要是因为他们背后的股东往往关注短期前景和报告利润。然而，伯克希尔拥有一批在未来几十年仍将保持长期投资视野的股东群体——这是整个公众公司世界中最长远的投资视野。事实上，我们多数股份由那些预计会一直持有到去世的投资者所持有。因此，我们可以要求我们的CEO们追求最大化的长期价值，而非下一个季度的盈利。我们当然不会忽视当前业务的表现——在大多数情况下它们非常重要——但我们绝不希望这些业绩是以削弱我们不断增强的竞争优势为代价换来的。

I believe the GEICO story demonstrates the benefits of Berkshire’s approach. Charlie and I haven’t taught Tony a thing — and never will — but we have created an environment that allows him to apply all of his talents to what’s important. He does not have to devote his time or energy to board meetings, press interviews, presentations by investment bankers or talks with financial analysts. Furthermore, he need never spend a moment thinking about financing, credit ratings or “Street” expectations for earnings per share. Because of our ownership structure, he also knows that this operational framework will endure for decades to come. In this environment of freedom, both Tony and his company can convert their almost limitless potential into matching achievements.
我相信GEICO的故事就体现了伯克希尔方法的优势。查理和我从未教过Tony任何东西——将来也不会——但我们创造了一个环境，让他可以将全部才能投入到真正重要的事务上。他不必把时间和精力花在董事会会议、媒体采访、投行展示或与分析师的会谈上。此外，他也无需花费哪怕一分钟去思考融资、信用评级或华尔街对每股收益的预期。由于我们的所有权结构，他知道这种运营框架将在未来几十年持续不变。在这种高度自由的环境中，Tony和他的公司能够将几乎无限的潜力转化为相应的卓越成就。

If you are running a large, profitable business that will thrive in a GEICO-like environment, check our acquisition criteria on page 21 and give me a call. I promise a fast answer and will mention your inquiry to no one except Charlie.
如果你正在经营一家大型、盈利且适合GEICO式环境的企业，请查阅第21页上的收购标准并给我打电话。我承诺快速答复，并且只会向查理提及你的询问。

# Executive Jet Aviation (1-800-848-6436)

# 行政航空（电话：1-800-848-6436）

To understand the huge potential at Executive Jet Aviation (EJA), you need some understanding of its business, which is selling fractional shares of jets and operating the fleet for its many owners. Rich Santulli, CEO of EJA, created the fractional ownership industry in 1986, by visualizing an important new way of using planes. Then he combined guts and talent to turn his idea into a major business.
要理解行政航空（EJA）的巨大潜力，你需要先了解它的业务模式：销售喷气机的部分产权，并为其众多业主运营整个机队。EJA的CEO瑞奇·桑图利（Rich Santulli）于1986年首创了飞机分时共享这一行业，他凭借对新型飞行方式的远见卓识，再结合非凡的勇气和才华，将自己的想法发展成了一个规模庞大的企业。

In a fractional ownership plan, you purchase a portion — say 1/8th — of any of a wide variety of jets that EJA offers. That purchase entitles you to 100 hours of flying time annually. (“Dead-head” hours don’t count against your allotment, and you are also allowed to average your hours over five years.) In addition, you pay both a monthly management fee and a fee for hours actually flown.
在分时共享计划中，你可以购买EJA提供的任意型号喷气机的一部分产权——例如1/8——该购买赋予你每年100小时的飞行时间。（“空返”飞行时间不计入配额，你还可以在五年内平均使用你的飞行小时数。）此外，你还需支付每月的管理费以及实际飞行小时的费用。

Then, on a few hours notice, EJA makes your plane, or another at least as good, available to you at your choice of the 5500 airports in the U.S. In effect, calling up your plane is like phoning for a taxi.
只需提前几小时通知，EJA就会为你准备好你的飞机，或者另一架性能相当甚至更好的飞机，供你在美国5500个机场中任意选择起飞地点。实际上，叫飞机就像打电话叫出租车一样方便。

I first heard about the NetJets® program, as it is called, about four years ago from Frank Rooney, our manager at H.H. Brown. Frank had used and been delighted with the service and suggested that I meet Rich to investigate signing up for my family’s use. It took Rich about 15 minutes to sell me a quarter (200 hours annually) of a Hawker 1000. Since then, my family has learned firsthand — through flying 900 hours on 300 trips — what a friendly, efficient, and safe operation EJA runs. Quite simply, they love this service. In fact, they quickly grew so enthusiastic that I did a testimonial ad for EJA long before I knew there was any possibility of our purchasing the business. I did, however, ask Rich to give me a call if he ever got interested in selling. Luckily, he phoned me last May, and we quickly made a $725 million deal, paying equal amounts of cash and stock.
我第一次听说这个被称为NetJets®的项目是在大约四年前，当时H.H. Brown的经理Frank Rooney告诉我。他亲自体验过这项服务并非常满意，于是建议我去见瑞奇，看看是否适合我家使用。瑞奇用了大约15分钟就说服我买下了一架霍克1000的四分之一产权（每年200小时）。从那以后，我的家人通过300次飞行累计900小时的亲身经历，切实体验到了EJA运营的友好、高效与安全。简而言之，他们非常喜欢这项服务。事实上，他们很快变得非常热衷，以至于在我甚至还未考虑收购这家公司的可能性之前，我就为EJA拍了一个推荐广告。不过我也请瑞奇，如果他哪天想出售公司，一定要打个电话给我。幸运的是，他去年五月真的打了电话，我们很快就以7.25亿美元成交，一半用现金，一半用股票支付。

EJA, which is by far the largest operator in its industry, has more than 1,000 customers and 163 aircraft (including 23 “core” aircraft that are owned or leased by EJA itself, so that it can make sure that service is first-class even during the times when demand is heaviest). Safety, of course, is the paramount issue in any flight operation, and Rich’s pilots — now numbering about 650 — receive extensive training at least twice a year from FlightSafety International, another Berkshire subsidiary and the world leader in pilot training. The bottom line on our pilots: I’ve sold the Berkshire plane and will now do all of my business flying, as well as my personal flying, with NetJets’ crews.
EJA目前是该行业中最大的运营商，拥有超过1,000名客户和163架飞机（其中包括23架“核心”飞机，由EJA自己拥有或租赁，以确保即使在需求最旺盛的时候也能提供顶级服务）。当然，飞行运营中最重要的是安全，而瑞奇旗下的飞行员——目前约有650人——每年至少两次接受伯克希尔旗下另一家公司FlightSafety International的全面培训，这家公司是全球飞行员培训领域的领导者。关于飞行员的结论是：我已经卖掉了伯克希尔的自有飞机，今后无论是商务还是私人飞行，我都会使用NetJets的机组人员。

Being the leader in this industry is a major advantage for all concerned. Our customers gain because we have an armada of planes positioned throughout the country at all times, a blanketing that allows us to provide unmatched service. Meanwhile, we gain from the blanketing because it reduces dead-head costs. Another compelling attraction for our clients is that we offer products from Boeing, Gulfstream, Falcon, Cessna, and Raytheon, whereas our two competitors are owned by manufacturers that offer only their own planes. In effect, NetJets is like a physician who can recommend whatever medicine best fits the needs of each patient; our competitors, in contrast, are producers of a “house” brand that they must prescribe for one and all.
成为该行业的领军者对我们和客户都具有重大优势。我们的客户受益于我们始终在全国各地部署的庞大机群，这种覆盖使我们能提供无可匹敌的服务。与此同时，我们也因这种布局而受益，因为它降低了空返成本。另一个吸引客户的重要因素是我们提供波音、湾流、猎鹰、塞斯纳和雷神等多种品牌机型的产品，而我们的两家竞争对手则分别隶属于飞机制造商，只能销售自家品牌的飞机。换句话说，NetJets就像是可以根据每位病人需求开出最适合药物的医生；而我们的竞争对手更像是只生产“自有品牌”药品，必须对所有人都开同样的处方。

In many cases our clients, both corporate and individual, own fractions of several different planes and can therefore match specific planes to specific missions. For example, a client might own 1/16th of three different jets (each giving it 50 hours of flying time), which in total give it a virtual fleet, obtained for a small fraction of the cost of a single plane.
在许多情况下，我们的客户——无论是公司还是个人——都拥有多种不同飞机的部分产权，从而可以根据不同的任务选择最合适的机型。例如，一位客户可能拥有三架不同喷气机各1/16的产权（每架提供50小时飞行时间），总共获得相当于一支虚拟机队的使用权，而成本只是购买一架整机的一小部分。

Significantly, it is not only small businesses that can benefit from fractional ownership. Already, some of America’s largest companies use NetJets as a supplement to their own fleet. This saves them big money in both meeting peak requirements and in flying missions that would require their wholly-owned planes to log a disproportionate amount of dead-head hours.
值得注意的是，受益于分时共享模式的不只是中小企业。一些美国最大的公司已经开始将NetJets作为自有机队的补充。这不仅帮助他们在满足高峰时段需求时节省大量开支，还能避免自有飞机执行某些任务时产生过多的空返飞行小时数。

When a plane is slated for personal use, the clinching argument is that either the client signs up now or his children likely will later. That’s an equation I explained to my wonderful Aunt Alice 40 years ago when she asked me whether she could afford a fur coat. My reply settled the issue: “Alice, you aren’t buying it; your heirs are.”
当飞机用于个人用途时，最有力的说服理由是：要么你现在加入，否则很可能你的孩子将来也会这么做。40年前，我亲爱的艾丽丝姑妈曾问我她是否负担得起一件皮草大衣，我当时就用同样的逻辑解释给她听。我的回答解决了问题：“艾丽丝，你不是在为自己买，而是在为你的继承人买。”

EJA’s growth has been explosive: In 1997, it accounted for 31% of all corporate jets ordered in the world. Nonetheless, Rich and I believe that the potential of fractional ownership has barely been scratched. If many thousands of owners find it sensible to own 100% of a plane — which must be used 350-400 hours annually if it’s to make economic sense — there must be a large multiple of that number for whom fractional ownership works.
EJA的增长势头迅猛：1997年，它占全球订购公务机总量的31%。尽管如此，瑞奇和我们都相信，分时共享的潜力才刚刚开始被挖掘。如果成千上万的业主都认为拥有整架飞机是合理的——前提是每年至少使用350至400小时以达到经济合理性——那么一定存在数量远超这一数字的用户更适合采用分时共享模式。

In addition to being a terrific executive, Rich is fun. Like most of our managers, he has no economic need whatsoever to work. Rich spends his time at EJA because it’s his baby — and he wants to see how far he can take it. We both already know the answer, both literally and figuratively: to the ends of the earth.
除了是一位出色的管理者外，瑞奇也很有趣。像我们大多数经理人一样，他完全没有经济压力去工作。他之所以花时间在EJA，是因为那是他的“孩子”，他想看看自己能把这份事业带到多远。其实我们俩心里早就有了答案，无论字面上还是比喻上都是：走到世界的尽头。

And now a small hint to Berkshire directors: Last year I spent more than nine times my salary at Borsheim’s and EJA. Just think how Berkshire’s business would boom if you’d only spring for a raise.
最后给伯克希尔董事们一个小提示：去年我在Borsheim和EJA的消费超过了我年薪的九倍。想想看，如果你们愿意给我加薪，伯克希尔的业务会有多大的增长！

# General Re（通用再保险）

On December 21, we completed our $22 billion acquisition of General Re Corp. In addition to owning 100% of General Reinsurance Corporation, the largest U.S. property-casualty reinsurer, the company also owns (including stock it has an arrangement to buy) 82% of the oldest reinsurance company in the world, Cologne Re. The two companies together reinsure all lines of insurance and operate in 124 countries.
12月21日，我们完成了对通用再保险公司（General Re Corp）价值220亿美元的收购。除了拥有美国最大的财产与意外险再保险公司——通用再保险（General Reinsurance Corporation）100%的股权外，该公司还拥有（包括已达成购买协议的股份）全球最古老再保险公司科隆再保险（Cologne Re）82%的股权。这两家公司共同承保各类保险业务，并在124个国家开展运营。

For many decades, General Re’s name has stood for quality, integrity and professionalism in reinsurance — and under Ron Ferguson’s leadership, this reputation has been burnished still more. Berkshire can add absolutely nothing to the skills of General Re’s and Cologne Re’s managers. On the contrary, there is a lot that they can teach us.
几十年来，通用再保险的名字一直是再保险行业品质、诚信和专业精神的代名词——在Ron Ferguson的领导下，这一声誉进一步提升。伯克希尔无法为通用再保险和科隆再保险的管理团队增添任何技能方面的价值。相反，他们有许多值得我们学习的地方。

Nevertheless, we believe that Berkshire’s ownership will benefit General Re in important ways and that its earnings a decade from now will materially exceed those that would have been attainable absent the merger. We base this optimism on the fact that we can offer General Re’s management a freedom to operate in whatever manner will best allow the company to exploit its strengths.
尽管如此，我们相信伯克希尔的所有权将在多个重要方面使通用再保险受益，并且我们预计十年后的收益将显著超过未合并情况下的预期水平。我们之所以持这种乐观态度，是因为我们可以给予通用再保险管理层充分的自由，以最有利于发挥公司优势的方式进行运作。

Let’s look for a moment at the reinsurance business to understand why General Re could not on its own do what it can under Berkshire. Most of the demand for reinsurance comes from primary insurers who want to escape the wide swings in earnings that result from large and unusual losses. In effect, a reinsurer gets paid for absorbing the volatility that the client insurer wants to shed.
让我们花点时间了解一下再保险业务，从而理解为什么通用再保险在没有伯克希尔的情况下无法做到现在所能实现的一切。大多数再保险需求来自希望规避因重大异常损失而导致盈利剧烈波动的原保险人。实际上，再保险商通过承担客户想要摆脱的波动性而获得报酬。

Ironically, though, a publicly-held reinsurer gets graded by both its owners and those who evaluate its credit on the smoothness of its own results. Wide swings in earnings hurt both credit ratings and p/e ratios, even when the business that produces such swings has an expectancy of satisfactory profits over time. This market reality sometimes causes a reinsurer to make costly moves, among them laying off a significant portion of the business it writes (in transactions that are called “retrocessions”) or rejecting good business simply because it threatens to bring on too much volatility.
讽刺的是，一家上市再保险公司的业绩表现不仅受到股东评估，也受到信用评级机构的关注，它们更看重其结果的稳定性。即使这些波动背后代表的是长期来看利润可期的业务，盈利的大幅波动仍会损害其信用评级和市盈率。这种市场现实有时迫使再保险公司做出代价高昂的决策，例如将大量业务转手给其他再保险公司（称为“再再保险”），或仅仅因为某项业务可能带来较大波动而拒绝接受优质业务。

Berkshire, in contrast, happily accepts volatility, just as long as it carries with it the expectation of increased profits over time. Furthermore, we are a Fort Knox of capital, and that means volatile earnings can’t impair our premier credit ratings. Thus we have the perfect structure for writing — and retaining — reinsurance in virtually any amount. In fact, we’ve used this strength over the past decade to build a powerful super-cat business.
相比之下，只要波动伴随着未来利润增长的预期，伯克希尔就乐于接受它。此外，我们的资本实力堪比诺克斯堡金库（Fort Knox），这意味着盈利的波动不会影响我们顶尖的信用评级。因此，我们拥有几乎可以承接并保留任意规模再保险业务的理想结构。事实上，过去十年中我们正是利用这一优势建立了一个强大的超级巨灾保险业务。

What General Re gives us, however, is the distribution force, technical facilities and management that will allow us to employ our structural strength in every facet of the industry. In particular, General Re and Cologne Re can now accelerate their push into international markets, where the preponderance of industry growth will almost certainly occur. As the merger proxy statement spelled out, Berkshire also brings tax and investment benefits to General Re. But the most compelling reason for the merger is simply that General Re’s outstanding management can now do what it does best, unfettered by the constraints that have limited its growth.
但通用再保险带给我们的，则是能够让我们在整个行业中充分发挥自身结构性优势的销售力量、技术设施和管理能力。特别是通用再保险和科隆再保险现在可以加速进军国际市场，而那里将是未来行业增长的主要来源。正如并购代理声明所指出的，伯克希尔也为通用再保险带来了税务和投资方面的优势。但促成这次合并最关键的原因在于：通用再保险卓越的管理团队如今可以突破限制，放手做他们最擅长的事。

Berkshire is assuming responsibility for General Re’s investment portfolio, though not for Cologne Re’s. We will not, however, be involved in General Re’s underwriting. We will simply ask the company to exercise the discipline of the past while increasing the proportion of its business that is retained, expanding its product line, and widening its geographical coverage — making these moves in recognition of Berkshire’s financial strength and tolerance for wide swings in earnings. As we’ve long said, we prefer a lumpy 15% return to a smooth 12%.
伯克希尔将接管通用再保险的投资组合（不包括科隆再保险）。但我们不会参与通用再保险的承保工作。我们将仅要求公司在保持以往纪律的同时，提高自留业务比例，拓展产品线，并扩大地理覆盖范围——所有这些举措都基于伯克希尔雄厚的财务实力以及对盈利波动的高度容忍度。正如我们长期以来所说：我们宁愿选择一个波动但年均15%的回报率，而不是平稳但只有12%的回报率。

Over time, Ron and his team will maximize General Re’s new potential. He and I have known each other for many years, and each of our companies has initiated significant business that it has reinsured with the other. Indeed, General Re played a key role in the resuscitation of GEICO from its near-death status in 1976.
随着时间推移，Ron和他的团队将充分释放通用再保险的新潜力。我们相识多年，两家公司之间也曾多次互相承保重大业务。事实上，通用再保险曾在1976年GEICO濒临破产时发挥了关键作用，帮助其起死回生。

Both Ron and Rich Santulli plan to be at the annual meeting, and I hope you get a chance to say hello to them.
Ron和Rich Santulli都计划出席今年的股东大会，我希望大家有机会向他们打个招呼。

# The Economics of Property-Casualty Insurance（财产与意外险经济学）

With the acquisition of General Re — and with GEICO’s business mushrooming — it becomes more important than ever that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most important of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.
随着通用再保险的收购完成，以及GEICO业务的迅猛发展，理解如何评估一家保险公司变得比以往任何时候都更加重要。关键决定因素有三个：(1) 公司产生的浮存金金额；(2) 浮存金的成本；(3) 最重要的是，这两项因素的长期前景。

To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. Typically, this pleasant activity carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.
首先，“浮存金”是我们持有但不属于我们的资金。在保险业务中，浮存金来源于保费先于赔付收入而产生，这个时间差有时可达数年。在此期间，保险公司可以将这笔钱用于投资。通常情况下，这种令人愉快的操作伴随一个负面事实：收取的保费往往不足以覆盖最终必须支付的赔款和费用，这导致公司出现“承保亏损”，也就是浮存金的成本。如果一家保险公司的浮存金成本低于公司通过其他方式融资所需成本，那么这项业务是有价值的。但如果浮存金成本高于市场资金利率，那这项业务就成了烫手山芋。

A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. As for Berkshire, Charlie and I attempt to be conservative in presenting its underwriting results to you, because we have found that virtually all surprises in insurance are unpleasant ones.
这里有必要提出警示：由于赔款成本需要估算，保险公司对承保结果的计算具有相当大的弹性空间，这让投资者很难判断公司真实的浮存金成本。估算错误有时可能是无意的，但后果也可能非常严重。这些错误直接反映在盈利数据中。经验丰富的观察者通常能发现大规模的准备金错误，但公众通常只能被动接受报表上的数字。有时，一些知名审计师默许的数据甚至让我感到震惊。至于伯克希尔，查理和我在呈现承保结果时一直力求保守，因为我们发现，保险业中的意外几乎总是坏消息。

The table that follows shows the float generated by Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered the business 32 years ago. The data are for every fifth year and also the last, which includes General Re’s huge float. For the table we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)
下表显示了我们进入保险业务32年以来所产生的浮存金情况。数据涵盖每五年一次的时间点，以及最新年度（包含通用再保险带来的巨额浮存金）。为了编制这张表格，我们按以下公式计算浮存金：将净损失准备金、理赔调整准备金、再保险合同下的应付资金和未赚取保费准备金相加，再减去代理人账户余额、预付获取成本、预付税款以及适用于再保险合同的递延费用。（明白了吗？）

Year	Average Float (in $ millions)
年份	平均浮存金（百万美元）
1967 ...........................................	17
1972 ...........................................	70
1977 ...........................................	139
1982 ...........................................	221
1987 ...........................................	1,267
1992 ...........................................	2,290
1997 ...........................................	7,093
1998 ...........................................	22,762 (year-end)

Impressive as the growth in our float has been — 25.4% compounded annually — what really counts is the cost of this item. If that becomes too high, growth in float becomes a curse rather than a blessing.
虽然我们的浮存金年复合增长率高达25.4%，增速令人印象深刻，但真正重要的是它的成本。如果成本过高，浮存金的增长反而会成为诅咒而非祝福。

At Berkshire, the news is all good: Our average cost over the 32 years has been well under zero. In aggregate, we have posted a substantial underwriting profit, which means that we have been paid for holding a large and growing amount of money. This is the best of all worlds. Indeed, though our net float is recorded on our balance sheet as a liability, it has had more economic value to us than an equal amount of net worth would have had. As long as we can continue to achieve an underwriting profit, float will continue to outrank net worth in value.
在伯克希尔，好消息是：过去32年我们的平均浮存金成本远低于零。总体而言，我们实现了可观的承保利润，这意味着我们不仅持有大量且不断增长的资金，还因此获得了报酬。这是最理想的状态。确实，尽管我们的净浮存金在资产负债表上列为负债，但它对我们来说的经济价值远胜于同等数额的净资产。只要我们继续实现承保利润，浮存金的价值将继续超越净资产。

During the next few years, Berkshire’s growth in float may well be modest. The reinsurance market is soft, and in this business, relationships change slowly. Therefore, General Re’s float — 2/3rds of our total — is unlikely to increase significantly in the near term. We do expect, however, that our cost of float will remain very attractive compared to that of other insurers.
在未来几年，伯克希尔浮存金的增长可能较为温和。再保险市场目前处于低迷期，而在这个行业中关系变化缓慢。因此，占我们总浮存金三分之二的通用再保险浮存金短期内不太可能大幅增长。但我们预计，与其他保险公司相比，我们的浮存金成本仍将极具吸引力。

# Sources of Reported Earnings (报告收益来源)

The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on pages 62 and 63, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally-accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表展示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在本展示中，**购买会计调整（purchase-accounting adjustments）**并未按具体适用业务分配，而是统一汇总并单独列示。这种方式让我们可以像这些企业未被收购时那样看待其盈利表现。正如第62和63页所讨论的，我们认为这种呈现方式比遵循一般公认会计准则（GAAP）——即要求逐项摊销购买溢价——对投资者和管理者更有参考价值。当然，我们在表格中显示的总收益与经审计财务报表中的GAAP总收益完全一致。

# Pre-Tax Earnings (税前收益)

Year	Insurance Group: Underwriting—Super-Cat (巨灾承保收益)	Underwriting—Other Reinsurance (其他再保险承保收益)	Underwriting—GEICO (GEICO承保收益)	Underwriting—Other Primary (其他直保承保收益)	Net Investment Income (净投资收益)	Buffalo News (布法罗新闻)	Finance and Financial Products Businesses (金融及金融产品业务)	Flight Services (飞行服务)	Home Furnishings (家居装饰)	International Dairy Queen (国际Dairy Queen)	Jewelry (珠宝)	Scott Fetzer (excluding finance operation) (斯科特·费策公司，不含金融业务)	See’s Candies (喜诗糖果)	Shoe Group (鞋业集团)	General Re (通用再保险)	Purchase-Accounting Adjustments (购买会计调整)	Interest Expense (4) (利息支出)	Shareholder-Designated Contributions (股东指定捐赠)	Other (其他)	Operating Earnings (运营收益)	Capital Gains from Investments (投资资本利得)	Total Earnings - All Entities (所有实体总收益)
1998	$154	$(175)	$269	$17	$974	$53	$704	$39	$58	$85	$33	$137	$41	$72	$2,415	$(123)	$(101)	$34	$29	$1,899	—	$4,314
1997	$283	$(155)	$281	$53	$882	$56	$62	$32	$57	$77	$26	$119	$35	$58	$1,721	$(100)	$(118)	$60	$37	$1,106	—	$2,827

# After Taxes and Minority Interests (扣除税款和少数权益后收益)

Year	Insurance Group: Underwriting—Super-Cat (巨灾承保收益)	Underwriting—Other Reinsurance (其他再保险承保收益)	Underwriting—GEICO (GEICO承保收益)	Underwriting—Other Primary (其他直保承保收益)	Net Investment Income (净投资收益)	Buffalo News (布法罗新闻)	Finance and Financial Products Businesses (金融及金融产品业务)	Flight Services (飞行服务)	Home Furnishings (家居装饰)	International Dairy Queen (国际Dairy Queen)	Jewelry (珠宝)	Scott Fetzer (excluding finance operation) (斯科特·费策公司，不含金融业务)	See’s Candies (喜诗糖果)	Shoe Group (鞋业集团)	General Re (通用再保险)	Purchase-Accounting Adjustments (购买会计调整)	Interest Expense (4) (利息支出)	Shareholder-Designated Contributions (股东指定捐赠)	Other (其他)	Operating Earnings (运营收益)	Capital Gains from Investments (投资资本利得)	Total Earnings - All Entities (所有实体总收益)
1998	$100	$(114)	$175	$10	$731	$32	$463	$23	$33	$56	$16	$94	$22	$48	$1,553	$(94)	$(63)	$13	$11	$1,277	—	$2,830
1997	$183	$(100)	$181	$34	$704	$33	$40	$18	$32	$59	$10	$84	$16	$35	$1,197	$(107)	$(67)	$—	$—	$704	—	$1,901

You can be proud of our operating managers. They almost invariably deliver earnings that are at the very top of what conditions in their industries allow, meanwhile fortifying their businesses’ long-term competitive strengths. In aggregate, they have created many billions of dollars of value for you.

我们的运营经理人值得你感到骄傲。他们几乎总是能在各自行业条件下实现行业顶尖的业绩，同时巩固企业的长期竞争优势。总体而言，他们已为你创造了数千亿美元的价值。

An example: In my 1994 letter, I reported on Ralph Schey’s extraordinary performance at Scott Fetzer. Little did I realize that he was just warming up. Last year Scott Fetzer, operating with no leverage (except for a conservative level of debt in its finance subsidiary), earned a record $96.5 million after-tax on its $112 million net worth.

一个例子：我在1994年的信中曾提到Ralph Schey在Scott Fetzer的非凡表现。当时我没想到他才刚刚热身。去年，Scott Fetzer在几乎不使用杠杆的情况下（仅在其金融子公司保持保守负债水平），实现了创纪录的税后净利润9,650万美元，净资产为1.12亿美元。

Today, Berkshire has an unusually large number of individuals, such as Ralph, who are truly legends in their industries. Many of these joined us when we purchased their companies, but in recent years we have also identified a number of strong managers internally. We further expanded our corps of all-stars in an important way when we acquired General Re and EJA.

如今，伯克希尔拥有大量如Ralph般真正成为行业传奇的个人。许多人是在我们收购他们公司时加入的，但近年来我们也从内部培养了一批出色的管理者。随着通用再保险和EJA的收购，我们的明星团队得到了进一步扩充。

Charlie and I have the easy jobs at Berkshire: We do very little except allocate capital. And, even then, we are not all that energetic. We have one excuse, though: In allocating capital, activity does not correlate with achievement. Indeed, in the fields of investments and acquisitions, frenetic behavior is often counterproductive. Therefore, Charlie and I mainly just wait for the phone to ring.

查理和我在伯克希尔的工作是最轻松的：我们几乎只做一件事——配置资本，而且甚至在这方面也并不频繁出手。我们有一个理由：在资本配置中，行动频率与成果并无直接关系。事实上，在投资和并购领域，过度活跃往往适得其反。因此，查理和我大部分时间只是等待电话响起。

Our managers, however, work very hard — and it shows. Naturally, they want to be paid fairly for their efforts, but pay alone can’t explain their extraordinary accomplishments. Instead, each is primarily motivated by a vision of just how far his or her business can go — and by a desire to be the one who gets it there. Charlie and I thank them on your behalf and ours.

然而，我们的经理人们非常努力——并且他们的成绩也体现了这一点。他们自然希望获得公平的报酬，但薪酬本身无法解释他们为何能取得如此卓越的成就。真正驱动他们的，是对企业能走多远的愿景，以及由自己亲手实现这一目标的愿望。代表你们和我们自己，查理和我对他们表示感谢。

Additional information about our various businesses is given on pages 39-53, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 65-71, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company.

有关我们各项业务的更多信息请参见第39至53页，其中也以GAAP标准报告了分部收益。此外，在第65至71页，我们将伯克希尔的财务数据重新划分为四个非GAAP板块进行展示，这正是查理和我看公司的方式。

Normally, we follow this section with one on “Look-Through” Earnings. Because the General Re acquisition occurred near year-end, though, neither a historical nor a pro-forma calculation of a 1998 number seems relevant. We will resume the look-through calculation in next year’s report.

通常情况下，我们会紧接“透视收益”（Look-Through Earnings）部分。但由于通用再保险的收购发生在年底附近，无论是历史数据还是模拟计算都无法准确反映1998年情况。我们将在明年年报中恢复透视收益的计算。

# Investments (投资组合)

Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a market value of more than $750 million are itemized.

以下是我们持有的普通股投资组合。市值超过7.5亿美元的投资项目已单独列出。

# Common Stock Holdings (常见股票持仓)

Company (公司名称)	Shares (持股数量)	Cost* (成本，单位：百万美元)	12/31/98 Market Value (1998年底市场价值，单位：百万美元)
American Express Company (美国运通公司)	50,536,900	$1,470	$5,180
The Coca-Cola Company (可口可乐公司)	200,000,000	$1,299	$13,400
The Walt Disney Company (华特迪士尼公司)	51,202,242	$281	$1,536
Freddie Mac (房地美)	60,298,000	$308	$3,885
The Gillette Company (吉列公司)	96,000,000	$600	$4,590
The Washington Post Company (华盛顿邮报公司)	1,727,765	$11	$999
Wells Fargo & Company (富国银行)	63,595,180	$392	$2,540
Others (其他)	—	$2,683	$5,135
Total Common Stocks (合计普通股)	—	$7,044	$37,265

Represents tax-basis cost which, in aggregate, is $1.5 billion less than GAAP cost.
表示税务基础成本，总计比GAAP成本低15亿美元。

During the year, we slightly increased our holdings in American Express, one of our three largest commitments, and left the other two unchanged. However, we trimmed or substantially cut many of our smaller positions. Here, I need to make a confession (ugh): The portfolio actions I took in 1998 actually decreased our gain for the year. In particular, my decision to sell McDonald’s was a very big mistake. Overall, you would have been better off last year if I had regularly snuck off to the movies during market hours.

这一年，我们略微增加了三大重仓股之一的美国运通公司的持股，其余两家则保持不变。但我们削减或大幅减持了许多小仓位。在此我要坦白（唉）：我在1998年所作的投资操作实际上降低了当年的整体收益。特别是卖出麦当劳的决定是一个非常大的错误。总的来说，如果我在交易时段经常溜去看电影，你们去年的表现可能会更好。

At yearend, we held more than $15 billion in cash equivalents (including high-grade securities due in less than one year). Cash never makes us happy. But it’s better to have the money burning a hole in Berkshire’s pocket than resting comfortably in someone else’s. Charlie and I will continue our search for large equity investments or, better yet, a really major business acquisition that would absorb our liquid assets. Currently, however, we see nothing on the horizon.

年终时，我们持有超过150亿美元的现金等价物（包括一年内到期的高评级证券）。现金从来不会让我们感到高兴。但与其让钱安稳地躺在别人的口袋里，不如让它在伯克希尔的口袋里“烧出一个洞”。查理和我将继续寻找大规模股权投资，或者更理想地，收购一家真正意义上的大企业来吸收我们的流动性资产。不过目前来看，未来似乎没有任何合适的目标出现。

Once we knew that the General Re merger would definitely take place, we asked the company to dispose of the equities that it held. (As mentioned earlier, we do not manage the Cologne Re portfolio, which includes many equities.) General Re subsequently eliminated its positions in about 250 common stocks, incurring $935 million of taxes in the process. This “clean sweep” approach reflects a basic principle that Charlie and I employ in business and investing: We don’t back into decisions.

一旦确认通用再保险的合并必将发生，我们就要求其出售所持有的股票。（如前所述，科隆再保险的投资组合包含大量股票，但我们并不参与管理。）随后，通用再保险清仓了约250只普通股，在此过程中承担了9.35亿美元的税负。这种“彻底清理”的做法体现了查理和我在商业与投资中坚持的一个基本原则：我们从不事后补救式地做决策。

Last year I deviated from my standard practice of not disclosing our investments (other than those we are legally required to report) and told you about three unconventional investments we had made. There were several reasons behind that disclosure. First, questions about our silver position that we had received from regulatory authorities led us to believe that they wished us to publicly acknowledge this investment. Second, our holdings of zero-coupon bonds were so large that we wanted our owners to know of this investment’s potential impact on Berkshire’s net worth. Third, we simply wanted to alert you to the fact that we sometimes do make unconventional commitments.

去年，我打破了以往不披露非法定报告义务之外投资的做法，向你们透露了三项非传统的投资。这一披露背后有几个原因：第一，监管机构对我们白银持仓提出了质询，使我们认为他们希望我们公开承认这项投资；第二，我们的零息债券持仓规模巨大，我们希望股东们了解其对伯克希尔净资产可能产生的影响；第三，我们只是想提醒大家，我们有时也会做出一些非常规的投资承诺。

Normally, however, as discussed in the Owner’s Manual on page 61, we see no advantage in talking about specific investment actions. Therefore — unless we again take a position that is particularly large — we will not post you as to what we are doing in respect to any specific holding of an unconventional sort. We can report, however, that we have eliminated certain of the positions discussed last year and added certain others.

然而通常情况下，正如第61页《所有者手册》所述，我们并不认为谈论具体的投资行为有任何优势。因此——除非我们再次建立特别大的头寸——我们将不再就任何非传统类别的特定持仓进行更新。我们可以报告的是，我们已清除了部分去年提到的持仓，并新增了一些其他投资。

Our never-comment-even-if-untrue policy in regard to investments may disappoint “piggybackers” but will benefit owners: Your Berkshire shares would be worth less if we discussed what we are doing. Incidentally, we should warn you that media speculation about our investment moves continues in most cases to be incorrect. People who rely on such commentary do so at their own peril.

我们在投资上“即使被误解也绝不评论”的政策可能会令某些“跟风投资者”失望，但却有利于股东利益：如果我们公开正在做的投资操作，伯克希尔的股份价值反而会更低。顺便提醒一句，媒体对我们投资动向的猜测大多数仍是错误的。依赖这些评论的人，是在自担风险。

# Accounting — Part 1 (会计准则 — 第一部分)

Our General Re acquisition put a spotlight on an egregious flaw in accounting procedure. Sharp-eyed shareholders reading our proxy statement probably noticed an unusual item on page 60. In the pro-forma statement of income — which detailed how the combined 1997 earnings of the two entities would have been affected by the merger — there was an item stating that compensation expense would have been increased by $63 million.

通用再保险的收购突显了现行会计程序中的一个严重缺陷。眼光敏锐的股东在阅读我们的委托书声明时，可能已经注意到了第60页上的一个异常项目。在模拟合并后的损益表中——该表详细说明了两家公司1997年合并后盈利将如何受到合并影响——其中有一项指出，薪酬费用将增加6,300万美元。

This item, we hasten to add, does not signal that either Charlie or I have experienced a major personality change. (He still travels coach and quotes Ben Franklin.) Nor does it indicate any shortcoming in General Re’s accounting practices, which have followed GAAP to the letter. Instead, the pro-forma adjustment came about because we are replacing General Re’s longstanding stock option plan with a cash plan that ties the incentive compensation of General Re managers to their operating achievements. Formerly what counted for these managers was General Re’s stock price; now their payoff will come from the business performance they deliver.

需要强调的是，这个项目并不意味着查理或我发生了性格上的重大转变。（他仍然坐经济舱，引用本杰明·富兰克林的话。）也不表示通用再保险的会计实践存在任何问题，他们的做法完全符合公认会计准则（GAAP）。这项模拟调整的出现，是因为我们正用一种基于运营成果的现金激励计划取代通用再保险长期存在的股票期权计划。过去，这些经理人看重的是通用再保险的股价；现在，他们的报酬将取决于他们实际带来的业务绩效。

The new plan and the terminated option arrangement have matching economics, which means that the rewards they deliver to employees should, for a given level of performance, be the same. But what these people could have formerly anticipated earning from new option grants will now be paid in cash. (Options granted in past years remain outstanding.)

新计划与终止的期权安排在经济效果上是匹配的，这意味着在相同业绩水平下，员工获得的回报应当一致。但原本通过新授予期权预期获得的报酬，现在将以现金支付。（此前授予的期权仍有效。）

Though the two plans are an economic wash, the cash plan we are putting in will produce a vastly different accounting result. This Alice-in-Wonderland outcome occurs because existing accounting principles ignore the cost of stock options when earnings are being calculated, even though options are a huge and increasing expense at a great many corporations. In effect, accounting principles offer management a choice: Pay employees in one form and count the cost, or pay them in another form and ignore the cost. Small wonder then that the use of options has mushroomed.

尽管两种计划在经济实质上是一样的，但我们推行的新现金计划将在会计报表上产生截然不同的结果。这种“爱丽丝梦游仙境”般的结果，源于现行会计原则在计算收益时忽略了股票期权的成本，尽管它在许多公司已成为日益庞大且不断增长的一项支出。实际上，会计规则给管理层提供了一个选择：以某种形式支付员工并计入成本，或换另一种方式支付却无需计入成本。难怪期权的使用迅速膨胀。

This lop-sided choice has a big downside for owners, however: Though options, if properly structured, can be an appropriate, and even ideal, way to compensate and motivate top managers, they are more often wildly capricious in their distribution of rewards, inefficient as motivators, and inordinately expensive for shareholders.

然而，这种失衡的选择对股东来说代价不小：虽然如果设计得当，股票期权可以成为适当甚至理想的高管激励方式，但在现实中，它们往往在奖励分配上极其随意、激励效率低下，并且对股东而言成本过高。

Whatever the merits of options may be, their accounting treatment is outrageous. Think for a moment of that $190 million we are going to spend for advertising at GEICO this year. Suppose that instead of paying cash for our ads, we paid the media in ten-year, at-the-market Berkshire options. Would anyone then care to argue that Berkshire had not borne a cost for advertising, or should not be charged this cost on its books?

无论期权本身有何优点，其会计处理方式都是荒谬的。试想一下，今年GEICO将花费1.9亿美元用于广告。如果我们不是用现金支付广告费，而是用十年期、市价的伯克希尔期权来支付，是否还有人会认为伯克希尔没有承担广告成本，或者不应将其计入账面？

Perhaps Bishop Berkeley — you may remember him as the philosopher who mused about trees falling in a forest when no one was around — would believe that an expense unseen by an accountant does not exist. Charlie and I, however, have trouble being philosophical about unrecorded costs. When we consider investing in an option-issuing company, we make an appropriate downward adjustment to reported earnings, simply subtracting an amount equal to what the company could have realized by publicly selling options of like quantity and structure. Similarly, if we contemplate an acquisition, we include in our evaluation the cost of replacing any option plan. Then, if we make a deal, we promptly take that cost out of hiding.

或许贝克莱主教——那位曾思考森林中无人听见时树倒下是否发出声音的哲学家——会相信会计师看不见的费用就不存在。但查理和我无法对未记录的成本保持哲学态度。当我们考虑投资一家发行期权的公司时，我们会对报告收益做出相应的向下调整，简单地扣除相当于该公司若公开出售同数量、同结构期权所能获得金额的费用。同样，如果我们考虑一项收购，我们会在评估中纳入替代现有期权计划的成本。一旦达成交易，我们就会立即将这笔成本从隐藏中剥离出来。

Readers who disagree with me about options will by this time be mentally quarreling with my equating the cost of options issued to employees with those that might theoretically be sold and traded publicly. It is true, to state one of these arguments, that employee options are sometimes forfeited — that lessens the damage done to shareholders — whereas publicly-offered options would not be. It is true, also, that companies receive a tax deduction when employee options are exercised; publicly-traded options deliver no such benefit. But there’s an offset to these points: Options issued to employees are often repriced, a transformation that makes them much more costly than the public variety.

对于我关于期权的观点持不同意见的读者，此刻也许已经在心里反驳我把员工期权成本等同于理论上可上市交易期权的做法。确实，有人会说员工期权有时会被放弃行权——这减轻了对股东的损害——而公开市场期权则不会。此外，员工行权时公司还可享受税收抵扣，而公开市场期权则不具备这一好处。但也有反面观点：员工期权经常会被重新定价，这种调整使其比公开市场期权昂贵得多。

It’s sometimes argued that a non-transferable option given to an employee is less valuable to him than would be a publicly-traded option that he could freely sell. That fact, however, does not reduce the cost of the non-transferable option: Giving an employee a company car that can only be used for certain purposes diminishes its value to the employee, but does not in the least diminish its cost to the employer.

有人辩称，员工获得的不可转让期权对其个人的价值低于可自由交易的公开市场期权。但这一事实并不会降低不可转让期权的成本：就像公司提供一辆只能用于特定用途的公务车，虽然对员工价值打了折扣，但对企业来说成本一分不少。

The earning revisions that Charlie and I have made for options in recent years have frequently cut the reported per-share figures by 5%, with 10% not all that uncommon. On occasion, the downward adjustment has been so great that it has affected our portfolio decisions, causing us either to make a sale or to pass on a stock purchase we might otherwise have made.

近年来，查理和我对期权成本所做的利润修正，常常使每股报告数据下降5%，有时甚至高达10%。在某些情况下，这种下调幅度之大直接影响了我们的投资组合决策，导致我们不得不卖出股票，或放弃原本可能买入的机会。

A few years ago we asked three questions in these pages to which we have not yet received an answer:
“If options aren’t a form of compensation, what are they?
If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it?
And, if expenses shouldn’t go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world should they go?”

几年前，我们也在这几页中提出过三个至今无人回答的问题：
“如果期权不是一种报酬形式，那它是什么？
如果报酬不算支出，那什么才算？
如果支出不该计入盈利计算，那它又该去哪儿呢？”

# Accounting — Part 2 (会计准则 — 第二部分)

The role that managements have played in stock-option accounting has hardly been benign: A distressing number of both CEOs and auditors have in recent years bitterly fought FASB’s attempts to replace option fiction with truth and virtually none have spoken out in support of FASB. Its opponents even enlisted Congress in the fight, pushing the case that inflated figures were in the national interest.

管理层在股票期权会计处理方面扮演的角色远非无害：近年来，有相当多的CEO和审计师激烈反对FASB（美国财务会计准则委员会）试图用真实数据取代期权谎言的努力，几乎没有人公开支持FASB。反对者甚至动员国会加入战斗，声称虚增的数据才符合国家利益。

Still, I believe that the behavior of managements has been even worse when it comes to restructurings and merger accounting. Here, many managements purposefully work at manipulating numbers and deceiving investors. And, as Michael Kinsley has said about Washington: “The scandal isn’t in what’s done that’s illegal but rather in what’s legal.”

然而，我认为管理层在重组与并购会计方面的行为更为恶劣：在这些领域，许多管理层有意操纵数字、误导投资者。正如Michael Kinsley谈及华盛顿政坛时所说：“丑闻不在于做了什么非法的事，而在于那些合法做的事。”

It was once relatively easy to tell the good guys in accounting from the bad: The late 1960's, for example, brought on an orgy of what one charlatan dubbed “bold, imaginative accounting” (the practice of which, incidentally, made him loved for a time by Wall Street because he never missed expectations). But most investors of that period knew who was playing games. And, to their credit, virtually all of America’s most-admired companies then shunned deception.

过去，区分会计领域的“好人”与“坏人”相对容易：例如上世纪60年代后期，市场上掀起了一场被称为“大胆创新会计”的狂潮（顺便说一句，这种手法曾一度让他深受华尔街喜爱，因为他从未错过市场预期）。但当时大多数投资者都知道谁在玩把戏。值得肯定的是，那时几乎所有最受尊敬的美国公司都拒绝这种欺骗行为。

In recent years, probity has eroded. Many major corporations still play things straight, but a significant and growing number of otherwise high-grade managers — CEOs you would be happy to have as spouses for your children or as trustees under your will — have come to the view that it’s okay to manipulate earnings to satisfy what they believe are Wall Street’s desires. Indeed, many CEOs think this kind of manipulation is not only okay, but actually their duty.

近年来，诚信正在被侵蚀。许多大公司仍然保持正直经营，但越来越多原本素质很高的管理者——那些你愿意让他们成为你子女的配偶或遗嘱执行人的CEO们——开始认为，为了迎合他们所理解的华尔街期望而操纵盈利是可以接受的行为。事实上，许多CEO不仅认为这种行为可以接受，甚至视其为一种职责。

These managers start with the assumption, all too common, that their job at all times is to encourage the highest stock price possible (a premise with which we adamantly disagree). To pump the price, they strive, admirably, for operational excellence. But when operations don’t produce the result hoped for, these CEOs resort to unadmirable accounting stratagems. These either manufacture the desired “earnings” or set the stage for them in the future.

这些管理者普遍抱有一个错误前提：他们的职责始终是推动股价达到最高可能水平（我们对此坚决反对）。为了推高股价，他们在运营上努力追求卓越表现，这是值得称赞的。但当实际运营未能实现预期结果时，这些CEO就会转向不光彩的会计手段。这些做法要么人为制造出理想的“盈利”，要么为未来制造类似结果铺路。

Rationalizing this behavior, these managers often say that their shareholders will be hurt if their currency for doing deals — that is, their stock — is not fully-priced, and they also argue that in using accounting shenanigans to get the figures they want, they are only doing what everybody else does. Once such an everybody’s-doing-it attitude takes hold, ethical misgivings vanish. Call this behavior Son of Gresham: Bad accounting drives out good.

为这种行为辩解时，这些经理人常常说，如果他们的交易货币——即股票——未被充分估值，股东将受损；他们还辩称，使用会计手法来达成目标只是“大家都在做的事”。一旦形成“别人都这么做”的心态，道德上的不安感也随之消失。我们将这种现象称为“格雷欣法则二代”：劣币驱逐良币，在这里是坏会计驱逐好会计。

The distortion du jour is the “restructuring charge,” an accounting entry that can, of course, be legitimate but that too often is a device for manipulating earnings. In this bit of legerdemain, a large chunk of costs that should properly be attributed to a number of years is dumped into a single quarter, typically one already fated to disappoint investors. In some cases, the purpose of the charge is to clean up earnings misrepresentations of the past, and in others it is to prepare the ground for future misrepresentations. In either case, the size and timing of these charges is dictated by the cynical proposition that Wall Street will not mind if earnings fall short by $5 per share in a given quarter, just as long as this deficiency ensures that quarterly earnings in the future will consistently exceed expectations by five cents per share.

当前最流行的扭曲手段是所谓的“重组费用”（Restructuring Charge），虽然在某些情况下它是合法的，但它更常被用作操纵利润的工具。在这种财务魔术中，本应分摊到多个年度的成本被一次性计入一个季度，通常是一个已经注定让投资者失望的季度。有些时候，这项费用的目的是清理过去虚报的盈利；而在其他时候，则是为了给未来的虚报打基础。无论是哪种情况，这些费用的规模和时机选择都基于一种冷嘲热讽的逻辑：只要这一季度的亏损能让未来每季每股多出五美分的盈利，华尔街就不会介意当季每股亏损五美元。

This dump-everything-into-one-quarter behavior suggests a corresponding “bold, imaginative” approach to — golf scores. In his first round of the season, a golfer should ignore his actual performance and simply fill his card with atrocious numbers — double, triple, quadruple bogeys — and then turn in a score of, say, 140. Having established this “reserve,” he should go to the golf shop and tell his pro that he wishes to “restructure” his imperfect swing. Next, as he takes his new swing onto the course, he should count his good holes, but not the bad ones. These remnants from his old swing should be charged instead to the reserve established earlier. At the end of five rounds, then, his record will be 140, 80, 80, 80, 80 rather than 91, 94, 89, 94, 92. On Wall Street, they will ignore the 140 — which, after all, came from a “discontinued” swing — and will classify our hero as an 80 shooter (and one who never disappoints).

这种“把所有损失塞进一个季度”的做法，就像高尔夫球手采取的一种“大胆创新”的记分策略。赛季第一轮，他无视真实成绩，在记分卡上随意填入双柏忌、三柏忌甚至四柏忌，最后交出140杆的成绩作为“储备”。然后他去俱乐部告诉教练自己要“重构挥杆动作”。接下来几轮比赛中，他只记录好的成绩，而不记录差的。旧挥杆方式导致的差成绩则从之前的“储备”里扣除。于是最终他的成绩单是140、80、80、80、80，而不是真实的91、94、89、94、92。在华尔街看来，那个140分来自“已终止”的挥杆方式，可以忽略不计；于是我们的英雄就被定义为“稳定发挥型选手”（而且从不让人失望）。

For those who prefer to cheat up front, there would be a variant of this strategy. The golfer, playing alone with a cooperative caddy-auditor, should defer the recording of bad holes, take four 80s, accept the plaudits he gets for such athleticism and consistency, and then turn in a fifth card carrying a 140 score. After rectifying his earlier scorekeeping sins with this “big bath,” he may mumble a few apologies but will refrain from returning the sums he has previously collected from comparing scorecards in the clubhouse. (The caddy, need we add, will have acquired a loyal patron.)

对于偏好提前作弊的人来说，也有类似的策略变体。这位球员在与“友好”的球童兼审计员一起打球时，故意延迟记录差成绩，前四轮打出四个80杆以博得赞誉，最后一轮才交出140杆。通过这个“一次亏到底”的洗牌，他可能会低声道歉几句，却不会归还之前因虚假成绩获得的奖金。（当然，那位球童也成了忠实客户。）

Unfortunately, CEOs who use variations of these scoring schemes in real life tend to become addicted to the games they’re playing — after all, it’s easier to fiddle with the scorecard than to spend hours on the practice tee — and never muster the will to give them up. Their behavior brings to mind Voltaire’s comment on sexual experimentation: “Once a philosopher, twice a pervert.”

不幸的是，在现实中采用这类“记分策略”的CEO往往会沉迷其中——毕竟，修改报表比花时间练习挥杆容易得多。他们从此再难自拔。他们的行为让人想起伏尔泰对性实验的一句评论：“第一次叫哲学家，第二次就成了变态。”

In the acquisition arena, restructuring has been raised to an art form: Managements now frequently use mergers to dishonestly rearrange the value of assets and liabilities in ways that will allow them to both smooth and swell future earnings. Indeed, at deal time, major auditing firms sometimes point out the possibilities for a little accounting magic (or for a lot). Getting this push from the pulpit, first-class people will frequently stoop to third-class tactics. CEOs understandably do not find it easy to reject auditor-blessed strategies that lead to increased future “earnings.”

在并购领域，“重组”已被提升为一门艺术形式：管理层如今频繁利用并购机会，以不诚实的方式重新安排资产与负债价值，从而在未来既平滑又夸大盈利。实际上，在交易过程中，一些大型会计师事务所还会主动建议如何施展一点“会计魔法”（有时甚至是大规模操作）。有了专业人士的背书，原本一流的人物也常常堕落到使用三流战术。面对能带来“更高未来收益”的审计师支持策略，CEO们自然难以拒绝。

An example from the property-casualty insurance industry will illuminate the possibilities. When a p-c company is acquired, the buyer sometimes simultaneously increases its loss reserves, often substantially. This boost may merely reflect the previous inadequacy of reserves — though it is uncanny how often an actuarial “revelation” of this kind coincides with the inking of a deal. In any case, the move sets up the possibility of ‘earnings” flowing into income at some later date, as reserves are released.

财产与意外险行业的例子足以说明问题。当一家p-c保险公司被收购后，买家有时会立即大幅提高它的损失准备金。这种调整可能是出于原准备金不足的原因——不过奇怪的是，这种“精算发现”往往总是在交易签署的同时出现。无论如何，这种调整为未来释放准备金、从而产生“利润”创造了空间。

Berkshire has kept entirely clear of these practices: If we are to disappoint you, we would rather it be with our earnings than with our accounting. In all of our acquisitions, we have left the loss reserve figures exactly as we found them. After all, we have consistently joined with insurance managers knowledgeable about their business and honest in their financial reporting. When deals occur in which liabilities are increased immediately and substantially, simple logic says that at least one of those virtues must have been lacking — or, alternatively, that the acquirer is laying the groundwork for future infusions of “earnings.”

伯克希尔始终远离这些做法：如果我们让你失望，我们宁愿是因为业绩不佳，而不是因为账目造假。在我们所有的收购中，我们都完全保留原有公司的损失准备金数字不变。毕竟，我们一直合作的保险经理人都是精通业务且财务报告诚实可靠的人。当一笔交易中突然大幅增加负债时，简单的逻辑告诉我们：至少有一方缺乏上述美德——或者换言之，买方正在为未来“注入盈利”打基础。

Here’s a true story that illustrates an all-too-common view in corporate America. The CEOs of two large banks, one of them a man who’d made many acquisitions, were involved not long ago in a friendly merger discussion (which in the end didn’t produce a deal). The veteran acquirer was expounding on the merits of the possible combination, only to be skeptically interrupted by the other CEO: “But won’t that mean a huge charge,” he asked, “perhaps as much as $1 billion?” The “sophisticate” wasted no words: “We’ll make it bigger than that — that’s why we’re doing the deal.”

下面这则真实故事生动地揭示了美国企业界的普遍心态。两家大银行的CEO曾进行过一次友好的合并讨论（最终未成交）。其中一位是经验丰富的并购老手，滔滔不绝地讲述这笔交易的好处。另一位CEO半信半疑地打断他说：“但这不是意味着要计提一大笔费用吗？或许高达10亿美元？”这位“精明人士”毫不迟疑地回答：“我们会让它更大些——这才是我们做这笔交易的目的。”

A preliminary tally by R.G. Associates, of Baltimore, of special charges taken or announced during 1998 — that is, charges for restructuring, in-process R&D, merger-related items, and write-downs — identified no less than 1,369 of these, totaling $72.1 billion. That is a staggering amount as evidenced by this bit of perspective: The 1997 earnings of the 500 companies in Fortune’s famous list totaled $324 billion.

巴尔的摩的R.G.协会初步统计显示，仅1998年一年，就有不少于1,369项特别支出被计提或宣布，总额达721亿美元。其中包括重组费用、在研项目注销、并购相关支出以及资产减记等。这一金额令人震惊。相比之下，财富杂志500强公司在1997年的总盈利也不过3,240亿美元。

Clearly the attitude of disrespect that many executives have today for accurate reporting is a business disgrace. And auditors, as we have already suggested, have done little on the positive side. Though auditors should regard the investing public as their client, they tend to kowtow instead to the managers who choose them and dole out their pay. (“Whose bread I eat, his song I sing.”)

显然，今天许多高管对准确财务报告的轻蔑态度，是对商业伦理的羞辱。正如我们已经指出的那样，审计师在这方面也几乎没有做出积极贡献。尽管审计师理应将公众投资者视为他们的客户，但他们往往屈从于任命并支付报酬的管理层。“吃谁的饭，唱谁的歌。”

A big piece of news, however, is that the SEC, led by its chairman, Arthur Levitt, seems determined to get corporate America to clean up its act. In a landmark speech last September, Levitt called for an end to “earnings management.” He correctly observed, “Too many corporate managers, auditors and analysts are participants in a game of nods and winks.” And then he laid on a real indictment: “Managing may be giving way to manipulating; integrity may be losing out to illusion.”

然而，一个重大新闻是：在美国证券交易委员会主席阿瑟·利维特的领导下，SEC似乎决心让美国企业界“改邪归正”。去年九月，他在一场具有里程碑意义的演讲中呼吁结束“盈余管理”。他正确指出：“太多企业管理者、审计师和分析师都在玩‘眉来眼去’的游戏。”他还进一步提出严厉批评：“管理正在被操纵取代，诚信正在输给幻象。”

I urge you to read the Chairman’s speech (you can find it on the Internet at www.sec.gov) and to support him in his efforts to get corporate America to deliver a straight story to its owners. Levitt’s job will be Herculean, but it is hard to think of another more important for him to take on.

我强烈建议大家阅读主席的这篇演讲（可在www.sec.gov网站查阅），并支持他推动美国企业向所有者提供真实信息的努力。利维特的任务艰巨如赫拉克勒斯，但很难想象还有比这更重要的工作等着他去做。

# Reports to Shareholders (致股东的报告)

Berkshire’s Internet site, www.berkshirehathaway.com, has become a prime source for information about the company. While we continue to send an annual report to all shareholders, we now send quarterlies only to those who request them, letting others read these at our site. In this report, we again enclose a card that can be returned by those wanting to get printed quarterlies in 1999.

伯克希尔的官方网站 www.berkshirehathaway.com 已经成为了解公司的重要信息来源。虽然我们仍会寄送年报给所有股东，但季报我们只发给主动索取者，其他人可以在网站上自行查阅。今年我们再次附上回执卡，供希望收到纸质季报的股东返回给我们。

Charlie and I have two simple goals in reporting:

We want to give you the information that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed; and
We want to make Berkshire’s information accessible to all of you simultaneously. Our ability to reach that second goal is greatly helped by the Internet.

查理和我在信息披露方面有两个简单的目标：
1）我们想提供给你我们认为如果你我是互换身份时你也应该提供给我的信息；
2）我们希望你们所有人能同时获取伯克希尔的信息。互联网大大帮助我们实现了第二个目标。

In another portion of his September speech, Arthur Levitt deplored what he called “selective disclosure.” His remarks were timely: Today, many companies matter-of-factly favor Wall Street analysts and institutional investors in a variety of ways that often skirt or cross the line of unfairness. These practices leave the great bulk of shareholders at a distinct disadvantage to a favored class.

在同一篇九月讲话中，阿瑟·利维特还痛心疾首地批评了他称之为“选择性披露”的做法。他的发言恰逢其时：如今，许多公司理所应当地以各种方式偏袒华尔街分析师和机构投资者，而这些做法往往触及甚至逾越了公平性的边界。这种行为使广大普通股东处于明显劣势，少数特权阶层却从中获益。

At Berkshire, we regard the holder of one share of B stock as the equal of our large institutional investors. We, of course, warmly welcome institutions as owners and have gained a number of them through the General Re merger. We hope also that these new holders find that our owner’s manual and annual reports offer them more insights and information about Berkshire than they garner about other companies from the investor relations departments that these corporations typically maintain. But if it is “earnings guidance” or the like that shareholders or analysts seek, we will simply guide them to our public documents.

在伯克希尔，我们认为每一位持有B股的股东与大型机构投资者享有完全平等的地位。我们当然热烈欢迎机构作为股东加入，并通过通用再保险的并购新增了不少机构股东。我们也希望这些新股东能发现我们的《所有者手册》和年报所提供的关于伯克希尔的见解和信息，远胜于他们从其他公司通常设立的投资者关系部门所获得的内容。但如果股东或分析师寻求类似“盈利指引”之类的信息，我们会直接引导他们查阅我们的公开文件。

This year we plan to post our quarterly reports on the Internet after the close of the market on May 14, August 13, and November 12. We also expect to put the 1999 annual report on our website on Saturday, March 11, 2000, and to mail the print version at roughly the same time.

今年我们计划在5月14日、8月13日和11月12日市场收盘后，在互联网上发布我们的季度报告。我们预计将在2000年3月11日（星期六）将1999年度年报上传至网站，并在同一时间左右寄出纸质版年报。

We promptly post press releases on our website. This means that you do not need to rely on the versions of these reported by the media but can instead read the full text on your computer.

我们会在官网第一时间发布新闻稿。这意味着你无需依赖媒体对内容的转述，而是可以直接在电脑上阅读完整原文。

Despite the pathetic technical skills of your Chairman, I’m delighted to report that GEICO, Borsheim’s, See’s, and The Buffalo News are now doing substantial business via the Internet. We’ve also recently begun to offer annuity products on our website. This business was developed by Ajit Jain, who over the last decade has personally accounted for a significant portion of Berkshire’s operating earnings. While Charlie and I sleep, Ajit keeps thinking of new ways to add value to Berkshire.

尽管你们的董事长技术能力堪忧，但我很高兴地报告：GEICO、Borsheim珠宝店、See’s糖果和布法罗新闻现在都已经通过互联网开展大量业务。我们最近还开始在网站上提供年金产品。这项业务由Ajit Jain开发，过去十年中，他个人为伯克希尔贡献了可观的运营利润。查理和我睡觉时，Ajit仍在不断思考如何为伯克希尔创造新的价值。

# Shareholder-Designated Contributions (股东指定捐赠)

About 97.5% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1998 shareholder-designated contributions program, with contributions totaling $16.9 million. A full description of the program appears on pages 54–55.

在1998年的股东指定捐赠项目中，约97.5%的符合条件股份参与其中，总捐款金额达到1,690万美元。该项目的详细说明请见第54–55页。

Cumulatively, over the 18 years of the program, Berkshire has made contributions of $130 million pursuant to the instructions of our shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries, which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $12.5 million in 1998, including in-kind donations of $2.0 million.

截至该计划实施18年为止，伯克希尔已根据股东指示累计捐款1.3亿美元。其余慈善支出由我们的子公司完成，它们延续了被收购前的公益模式（只是原股东需自行负责其私人慈善事业）。总计来看，1998年我们的子公司共捐赠了1,250万美元，其中包括价值200万美元的实物捐赠。

To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1999, will be ineligible for the 1999 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten. Designations received after the due date will not be honored.

如欲参加未来项目的股东，必须持有以实际所有人名义登记的A类股票，而非托管人（券商、银行或托管机构）名义登记的股份。凡未在1999年8月31日前以真实姓名登记的股份，均不具备1999年项目的资格。当你收到我们的捐赠表格后，请尽快返回，以免被搁置或遗忘。逾期收到的指定捐赠将不予受理。

# The Annual Meeting (年度股东大会)

This year’s Woodstock for Capitalists will be held May 1–3, and we may face a problem. Last year more than 10,000 people attended our annual meeting, and our shareholders list has since doubled. So we don’t quite know what attendance to expect this year. To be safe, we have booked both Aksarben Coliseum, which holds about 14,000 and the Holiday Convention Centre, which can seat an additional 5,000. Because we know that our Omaha shareholders will want to be good hosts to the out-of-towners (many of them come from outside the U.S), we plan to give those visitors first crack at the Aksarben tickets and to subsequently allocate these to greater Omaha residents on a first-come, first-served basis. If we exhaust the Aksarben tickets, we will begin distributing Holiday tickets to Omaha shareholders.

今年的“资本主义者的伍德斯托克音乐节”将于5月1日至3日举行，但我们可能面临一个问题。去年有超过1万人参加了我们的股东大会，而如今股东人数已经翻倍。因此，我们无法准确预测今年到场人数。为了稳妥起见，我们预订了两个会场：Aksarben体育馆（可容纳14,000人）以及Holiday会议中心（可额外容纳5,000人）。我们知道奥马哈本地股东希望能热情招待外地股东（许多人来自美国以外地区），所以我们计划先让外地股东优先领取Aksarben门票，之后剩余门票按奥马哈居民先到先得的方式发放。如果Aksarben门票用完，我们将开始向奥马哈股东发放Holiday中心的门票。

If we end up using both locations, Charlie and I will split our pre-meeting time between the two. Additionally, we will have exhibits and also the Berkshire movie, large television screens and microphones at both sites. When we break for lunch, many attendees will leave Aksarben, which means that those at Holiday can, if they wish, make the five-minute trip to Aksarben and finish out the day there. Buses will be available to transport people who don’t have cars.

如果我们最终使用两个会场，查理和我会分别在两地进行会前活动。此外，两个地点都将设有展览区、伯克希尔影片放映、大屏幕电视和麦克风。午休期间许多参会者会离开Aksarben，届时Holiday会场的听众可以选择乘车五分钟前往Aksarben继续全天活动。我们也将安排巴士接送无车人士。

The doors will open at both locations at 7 a.m. on Monday, and at 8:30 we will premier the 1999 Berkshire movie epic, produced by Marc Hamburg, our CFO. The meeting will last from 9:30 until 3:30, interrupted only by the short lunch break.

两大会场将在周一早上7点开放入场，8:30分我们将首映由我们的CFO马克·汉堡制作的1999年伯克希尔纪录片。正式会议时间为9:30至15:30，仅短暂午休中断。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the badge you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. In our normal fashion, we will run buses from the larger hotels to the meeting. After the meeting, these will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim’s and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.

随本报告附上的委托材料中有一份附件，说明如何获取参加股东大会及其他活动所需的证件。至于机票、酒店及租车预订，我们再次与美国运通合作（电话：800-799-6634），为您提供特别协助。一如往年，我们将安排从主要酒店出发的大巴接送至会场。会议结束后，大巴也会送回酒店，并前往Nebraska家具城、Borsheim珠宝店和机场。即便如此，建议您自备车辆以便灵活出行。

The full line of Berkshire products will be available at Aksarben, and the more popular items will also be at Holiday. Last year we set sales records across-the-board, moving 3,700 pounds of See’s candy, 1,635 pairs of Dexter shoes, 1,150 sets of Quikut knives and 3,104 Berkshire shirts and hats. Additionally, $26,944 of World Book products were purchased as well as more than 2,000 golf balls with the Berkshire Hathaway logo. Charlie and I are pleased but not satisfied with these numbers and confidently predict new records in all categories this year. Our 1999 apparel line will be unveiled at the meeting, so please defer your designer purchases until you view our collection.

所有伯克希尔旗下品牌商品都将在Aksarben展出，部分热销商品也将在Holiday会场展示。去年我们创下了多项销售纪录：卖出3,700磅喜诗糖果、1,635双Dexter鞋、1,150套Quikut刀具、3,104件印有伯克希尔标志的T恤和帽子，还有价值26,944美元的世界图书产品，以及超过2,000颗印有伯克希尔logo的高尔夫球。查理和我对这个成绩感到高兴但仍不满足，并有信心今年各项纪录都会被刷新。我们1999年的服饰系列将在大会上首次亮相，敬请在参观后再决定是否购买设计师服装。

Dairy Queen will also be on hand and will again donate all proceeds to the Children’s Miracle Network. Last year we sold about 4,000 Dilly® bars, fudge bars and vanilla/orange bars. Additionally, GEICO will have a booth that will be manned by a number of our top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In almost all cases, GEICO will be able to offer you a special shareholder’s discount. Check out whether we can save you some money.

国际Dairy Queen也将现场设摊，全部销售收入将捐给儿童奇迹网络基金会。去年我们卖出了大约4,000支Dilly®甜筒、巧克力软糖棒和香草/橙味冰棍。此外，GEICO将在展会设立展位，由全国多位顶尖顾问驻守，为您提供汽车保险报价服务。几乎在所有情况下，GEICO都能为您带来专属股东折扣。欢迎您前来咨询，看看我们能否为您节省开支。

The pièce de résistance of our one-company trade show will be a 79-foot-long, nearly 12-foot-wide, fully-outfitted cabin of a 737 Boeing Business Jet (“BBJ”), which is NetJets’ newest product. This plane has a 14-hour range; is designed to carry 19 passengers; and offers a bedroom, an office, and two showers. Deliveries to fractional owners will begin in the first quarter of 2000.

本次单一家公司的展会上最引人注目的将是NetJets最新推出的波音737公务喷气机（简称“BBJ”）客舱展区。这架飞机全长79英尺，宽近12英尺，内部配置齐全，拥有卧室、办公室和两个淋浴间，航程可达14小时，最多可搭载19名乘客。面向分时产权客户的交付预计将在2000年第一季度开始。

The BBJ will be available for your inspection on May 1–3 near the entrance to the Aksarben hall. You should be able to minimize your wait by making your visit on Saturday or Sunday. Bring along your checkbook in case you decide to make an impulse purchase.

这架BBJ将在5月1日至3日出现在Aksarben大厅入口附近供您参观。为避免排队，建议您选择周六或周日前来。如果您当场决定购买，别忘了带上支票簿。

NFM's multi-stored complex, located on a 75-acre site about a mile from Aksarben, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays. This operation did $300 million in business during 1998 and offers an unrivaled breadth of merchandise — furniture, electronics, appliances, carpets and computers — all at can’t-be-beat prices. During the April 30th to May 4th period, shareholders presenting their meeting badge will receive a discount that is customarily given only to its employees.

位于Aksarben一英里外、占地75英亩的Nebraska Furniture Mart（NFM）多层卖场，平日营业时间为上午10点至晚上9点，周末为上午10点至下午6点。1998年该商场销售额达3亿美元，提供种类齐全的家具、电子产品、家电、地毯和电脑，价格极具竞争力。在4月30日至5月4日期间，持股东会议证件的股东可享受员工专属折扣。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 2nd. On annual meeting weekend last year, the store did an incredible amount of business. Sales were double those of the previous year, and the store’s volume on Sunday greatly exceeded volume for any day in Borsheim’s history. Charlie attributes this record to the fact that he autographed sales tickets that day and, while I have my doubts about this proposition, we are not about to mess with a winning formula. Please give him writer’s cramp. On last year’s Sunday, Borsheim’s wrote 2,501 tickets during the eight hours it was open. For those of you who are mathematically challenged, that is one ticket every 11½ seconds.

Borsheim珠宝店通常周日闭店，但今年5月2日（周日）将特许为股东开放，营业时间为上午10点至下午6点。去年股东大会周末当天的销售业绩令人惊叹：销售额是前一年的两倍，周日销量更打破了Borsheim成立多年来的单日销售记录。查理认为这是因为他在当天亲自为每张销售小票签名所致——虽然我个人对此存疑，但我们不会轻易改变这一成功模式。请大家让他签到手抽筋吧。去年周日，Borsheim在八小时内售出2,501笔订单，换算下来，平均每11.5秒就卖出一件商品。

Shareholders who wish to avoid Sunday’s crowd can visit Borsheim’s on Saturday (10 a.m.–5:30 p.m.) or on Monday (10 a.m.–8 p.m.). Be sure to identify yourself as a Berkshire owner so that Susan Jacques, Borsheim’s CEO, can quote you a “shareholder-weekend” price. Susan joined us in 1983 as a $4-per-hour salesperson and was made CEO in 1994. This move ranks as one of my best managerial decisions.

如想避开周日人流高峰，股东也可选择周六（上午10点–下午5:30）或周一（上午10点–晚上8点）前往Borsheim。请务必出示伯克希尔股东身份，以便Susan Jacques（Borsheim CEO）为您报上“股东周末特价”。Susan于1983年以每小时4美元的销售员身份加入我们，1994年升任CEO。这是我做出的最佳管理决策之一。

Bridge players can look forward to a thrill on Sunday, when Bob Hamman — the best the game has ever seen — will turn up to play with our shareholders in the mall outside of Borsheim’s. Bob plays without sorting his cards — hey, maybe that’s what’s wrong with my game. We will also have a couple of other tables at which another expert or two will be playing.

桥牌爱好者们也别错过周日的精彩时刻。全球公认的桥牌大师Bob Hamman将现身Borsheim商场外的桥牌区，与我们的股东同台竞技。据说Bob打牌时从不整理手中的牌——也许这就是我的桥牌水平难以提高的原因？届时还将有几位桥牌专家在其他桌上参与互动。

Gorat’s — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open especially for Berkshire shareholders on the Sunday night before the meeting. Though Gorat’s served from 4 p.m. until about 1 a.m. last year, its crew was swamped, and some of our shareholders had an uncomfortable wait. This year fewer reservations will be accepted, and we ask that you don’t come on Sunday without a reservation. In other years, many of our shareholders have chosen to visit Gorat’s on Friday, Saturday or Monday. You can make reservations beginning on April 1 (but not before) by calling 402-551-3733. The cognoscenti will continue to order rare T-bones with double orders of hash browns.

我最喜欢的牛排馆Gorat’s将在股东大会前的周日晚间再次专为伯克希尔股东开放。去年Gorat’s从下午4点一直营业到凌晨1点左右，但员工们被大量顾客淹没，一些股东不得不长时间排队等候。今年我们将减少预约名额，并请求您：没有预约请勿在周日前往。往年也有许多股东选择在周五、周六或周一前往Gorat’s用餐。您可自4月1日起（不早于此日期）拨打402-551-3733进行预订。内行人都知道该怎么点餐：要一份三分熟的T骨牛排，外加双份薯饼。

The Omaha Golden Spikes (neé the Omaha Royals) will meet the Iowa Cubs on Saturday evening, May 1st, at Rosenblatt Stadium. Your Chairman, whose breaking ball had the crowd buzzing last year, will again take the mound. This year I plan to introduce my “flutterball.” It’s a real source of irritation to me that many view our annual meeting as a financial event rather than the sports classic I consider it to be. Once the world sees my flutterball, that misperception will be erased.

5月1日（星期六）晚上，Omaha Golden Spikes队（原Omaha Royals队）将在Rosenblatt体育场迎战Iowa Cubs队。去年我的曲线球曾引起全场轰动，今年我将再度登板投球。这次我计划祭出我的“飘球”绝技。让我有点不满的是，很多人把我们的年度股东大会当作一个金融事件，而忽视了它其实是一场体育盛会。等世界见识了我的飘球后，这种误解自然会被打破。

Our proxy statement includes instructions about obtaining tickets to the game and also a large quantity of other information that should help you to enjoy your visit. I particularly urge the 60,000 shareholders that we gained through the Gen Re merger to join us. Come and meet your fellow capitalists.

我们的委托书文件中包含获取比赛门票的说明，以及大量其他信息，帮助您更好地安排此次行程。我特别邀请通过Gen Re并购新增的6万名股东加入我们。来吧，与您的资本家同僚面对面交流！

* * * * * * * * *

It wouldn’t be right to close without a word about the 11.8 people who work with me in Berkshire’s corporate office. In addition to handling the myriad of tax, regulatory and administrative matters that come with owning dozens of businesses, this group efficiently and cheerfully manages various special projects, some of which generate hundreds of inquiries. Here’s a sample of what went on in 1998:

在结束之前，我想提一提与我在伯克希尔总部共事的11.8位同事。（别问为什么是小数——他们工作太高效了！）除了处理数十家企业带来的各种税务、监管和行政事务，这个团队还以极高的效率和热情管理着各类特殊项目，其中有些项目会引发数百个咨询电话。以下是他们在1998年完成的部分工作摘要：

6,106 shareholders designated 3,880 charities to receive contributions.
6,106位股东指定了3,880家慈善机构接受捐赠。
Kelly Muchemore processed about 17,500 admission tickets for the annual meeting, along with orders and checks for 3,200 baseball tickets.
Kelly Muchemore处理了约17,500张股东大会入场券，并处理了3,200张棒球赛票的订单及支票。
Kelly and Marc Hamburg produced and directed the Aksarben extravaganza, a job that required them to arrange the presentations made by our subsidiaries, prepare our movie, and sometimes lend people a hand with travel and lodging.
Kelly和Marc Hamburg策划并导演了Aksarben大会的整个流程，包括协调各子公司展示内容、制作公司影片，有时还要协助参会者安排交通和住宿。
Debbie Bosanek satisfied the varying needs of the 46 media organizations (13 of them non-U.S.) that covered the meeting, and meanwhile, as always, skillfully assisted me in every aspect of my job.
Debbie Bosanek应对了来自46家媒体组织（其中13家来自海外）的各种需求，一如既往地在各个方面给予我极大的支持。
Debbie and Marc assembled the data for our annual report and oversaw the production and distribution of 165,000 copies. (This year the number will be 325,000.)
Debbie和Marc整理了年报数据，并监督印刷和发放了165,000份年报。（今年这一数字将达到325,000份。）
Marc handled 95% of the details — and much of the substance — connected with our completing two major mergers.
Marc负责了我们完成两起重大并购交易中的95%细节工作，甚至也参与了实质性的决策过程。
Kelly, Debbie and Deb Ray dealt efficiently with tens of thousands of requests for annual reports and financial information that came through the office.
Kelly、Debbie和Deb Ray高效处理了成千上万份经由办公室转来的年报和财务资料申请。

You and I are paying for only 11.8 people, but we are getting what would at most places be the output of 100. To all of the 11.8, my thanks.

你和我只为11.8个人支付薪水，但我们获得的产出却相当于大多数公司百人团队的工作量。向这11.8位同仁致谢——你们真的太棒了！

Warren E. Buffett
March 1, 1999
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
1999年3月1日
董事会主席

编辑

上次更新: 2025/07/14, 21:42:27

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