2015巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司 致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2015 was $15.4 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%. Over the last 51 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from $19 to $155,501, a rate of 19.2% compounded annually.*
2015年，伯克希尔的净资产增长了154亿美元，使我们的A类和B类股票每股账面价值增长了6.4%。在过去51年里（即现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值以19.2%的年复合增长率从19美元增至155,501美元。*
During the first half of those years, Berkshire’s net worth was roughly equal to the number that really counts: the intrinsic value of the business. The similarity of the two figures existed then because most of our resources were deployed in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (less the tax that would be incurred if they were to be sold). In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very large part “marked to market.”
在那段时间的前半段，伯克希尔的净资产大致等于真正重要的数值：企业的内在价值。这两个数字的相似性存在是因为我们大部分资源都配置在有价证券上，这些证券会定期按市场报价重新估值（扣除出售时产生的税款）。用华尔街的话说，我们当时的资产负债表在很大程度上是“按市值计价的”。
By the early 1990s, however, our focus had changed to the outright ownership of businesses, a shift that diminished the relevance of balance-sheet figures. That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules that apply to controlled companies are materially different from those used in valuing marketable securities. The carrying value of the “losers” we own is written down, but “winners” are never revalued upwards.
然而到了1990年代初，我们的重点已转向对企业的完全所有权，这一转变削弱了资产负债表数据的相关性。这种脱节发生的原因是适用于控股公司的会计准则与用于评估有价证券的准则存在实质性差异。我们持有的“失败企业”的账面价值会被减记，但“成功企业”的价值却从未向上调整。
We’ve had experience with both outcomes: I’ve made some dumb purchases, and the amount I paid for the economic goodwill of those companies was later written off, a move that reduced Berkshire’s book value. We’ve also had some winners – a few of them very big – but have not written those up by a penny.
我们经历过这两种情况：我曾做出过一些愚蠢的投资，当时为收购这些公司经济商誉支付的金额后来被注销，此举降低了伯克希尔的账面价值。我们也有一些大赢家——其中少数非常成功——但从未为其增加过一分钱的账面价值。
Over time, this asymmetrical accounting treatment (with which we agree) necessarily widens the gap between intrinsic value and book value. Today, the large – and growing – unrecorded gains at our “winners” make it clear that Berkshire’s intrinsic value far exceeds its book value. That’s why we would be delighted to repurchase our shares should they sell as low as 120% of book value. At that level, purchases would instantly and meaningfully increase per-share intrinsic value for Berkshire’s continuing shareholders.
随着时间的推移，这种非对称的会计处理（我们对此表示认可）必然会导致内在价值与账面价值之间的差距扩大。如今，我们的“赢家”企业中大量且不断增长的未记录收益清楚地表明，伯克希尔的内在价值远高于其账面价值。这就是为什么如果股价跌至账面价值120%的水平，我们会非常乐意回购股票。在此价位回购将立即显著提升伯克希尔持续股东的每股内在价值。
The unrecorded increase in the value of our owned businesses explains why Berkshire’s aggregate market-value gain – tabulated on the facing page – materially exceeds our book-value gain. The two indicators vary erratically over short periods. Last year, for example, book-value performance was superior. Over time, however, market-value gains should continue their historical tendency to exceed gains in book value.
我们拥有的企业价值未记录的增长解释了为何伯克希尔的总市值增长（见下一页表格）明显超过账面价值增长。这两个指标在短期内波动剧烈。例如去年，账面价值增长表现更优。但从长期来看，市值增长应延续其历史趋势，持续超过账面价值增长。
- All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
- 本报告中所有每股数据均适用于伯克希尔A类股票（Class A）。B类股票（Class B）数据为A类股票的1/1500。
# The Year at Berkshire (2015)
伯克希尔年度回顾（2015年）
Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect Berkshire’s normalized earning power to increase every year. (Actual year-to-year earnings, of course, will sometimes decline because of weakness in the U.S. economy or, possibly, because of insurance mega-catastrophes.) In some years the normalized gains will be small; at other times they will be material. Last year was a good one. Here are the highlights:
伯克希尔副董事长兼我的合作伙伴查理·芒格（Charlie Munger）和我都预计伯克希尔的常态化盈利能力每年都会增长。（当然，由于美国经济疲软或保险业的巨灾事件，实际年度收益有时会下降。）在某些年份，常态化收益可能较小；而在另一些年份则可能显著。去年是丰收的一年。以下是亮点：
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The most important development at Berkshire during 2015 was not financial, though it led to better earnings. After a poor performance in 2014, our BNSF railroad dramatically improved its service to customers last year. To attain that result, we invested about $5.8 billion during the year in capital expenditures, a sum far and away the record for any American railroad and nearly three times our annual depreciation charge. It was money well spent.
2015年伯克希尔最重要的进展并非财务层面，尽管它带来了更好的收益。在2014年表现不佳后，我们的伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路公司（BNSF）去年大幅改善了客户服务。为了实现这一成果，我们在当年投入了约58亿美元的资本支出——这一金额创下美国铁路业纪录，且接近我们年度折旧费用的三倍。这笔钱花得非常值得。
BNSF moves about 17% of America’s intercity freight (measured by revenue ton-miles), whether transported by rail, truck, air, water or pipeline. In that respect, we are a strong number one among the seven large American railroads (two of which are Canadian-based), carrying 45% more ton-miles of freight than our closest competitor. Consequently, our maintaining first-class service is not only vital to our shippers’ welfare but also important to the smooth functioning of the U.S. economy.
BNSF承担了美国城际货运量的约17%（按收入吨英里计算），无论通过铁路、卡车、航空、水路或管道运输。在这方面，我们在美国七大铁路公司（其中两家总部位于加拿大）中稳居第一，货运吨英里量比最接近的竞争对手多出45%。因此，维持一流服务不仅对客户的利益至关重要，也对美国经济的顺畅运行举足轻重。
For most American railroads, 2015 was a disappointing year. Aggregate ton-miles fell, and earnings weakened as well. BNSF, however, maintained volume, and pre-tax income rose to a record $6.8 billion* (a gain of $606 million from 2014). Matt Rose and Carl Ice, the managers of BNSF, have my thanks and deserve yours.
对大多数美国铁路公司而言，2015年是令人失望的一年。总货运吨英里量下降，收益也走弱。然而，BNSF保持了货运量，税前收入增至创纪录的68亿美元*（较2014年增长6.06亿美元）。BNSF的管理者马特·罗斯（Matt Rose）和卡尔·艾斯（Carl Ice）值得我的感谢，也值得你们的感谢。
- Throughout this letter, all earnings are stated on a pre-tax basis unless otherwise designated.
- 本信中所有收益均以税前为基础陈述，除非另有说明。
BNSF is the largest of our “Powerhouse Five,” a group that also includes Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Marmon, Lubrizol and IMC. Combined, these companies – our five most profitable non-insurance businesses – earned $13.1 billion in 2015, an increase of $650 million over 2014.
BNSF是我们“五大核心企业”（Powerhouse Five）中规模最大的，其他成员包括伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（Berkshire Hathaway Energy）、马蒙集团（Marmon）、路博润（Lubrizol）和IMC。这五家非保险业务中最盈利的公司2015年合计收益为131亿美元，较2014年增长6.5亿美元。
Of the five, only Berkshire Hathaway Energy, then earning $393 million, was owned by us in 2003. Subsequently, we purchased three of the other four on an all-cash basis. In acquiring BNSF, however, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash and, for the remainder, issued Berkshire shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $12.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered by the five companies over the twelve-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply increasing earnings, but making sure we also increase per-share results.
其中，2003年时我们仅拥有伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（当时收益为3.93亿美元）。此后，我们以全现金方式收购了其余四家中的三家。然而在收购BNSF时，我们约70%的资金来自现金，剩余部分通过发行伯克希尔股票支付，导致流通股数量增加6.1%。换句话说，这五家公司过去十二年贡献的127亿美元年度收益增长，仅伴随了轻微的股权稀释。这符合我们的目标：不仅提升总收益，更要确保每股收益同步增长。
Next year, I will be discussing the “Powerhouse Six.” The newcomer will be Precision Castparts Corp. (“PCC”), a business that we purchased a month ago for more than $32 billion of cash. PCC fits perfectly into the Berkshire model and will substantially increase our normalized per-share earning power.
明年，我将讨论“六大核心企业”（Powerhouse Six）。新成员是精密铸件公司（Precision Castparts Corp., “PCC”），我们一个月前以超过320亿美元现金收购了它。PCC完美契合伯克希尔模式，将大幅增强我们的常态化每股盈利能力。
Under CEO Mark Donegan, PCC has become the world’s premier supplier of aerospace components (most of them destined to be original equipment, though spares are important to the company as well). Mark’s accomplishments remind me of the magic regularly performed by Jacob Harpaz at IMC, our remarkable Israeli manufacturer of cutting tools. The two men transform very ordinary raw materials into extraordinary products that are used by major manufacturers worldwide. Each is the da Vinci of his craft.
在CEO马克·多纳根（Mark Donegan）领导下，PCC已成为全球领先的航空航天部件供应商（大部分产品为原始设备配套，备件对公司同样重要）。马克的成就让我联想到IMC的传奇管理者雅各布·哈帕兹（Jacob Harpaz）——这位以色列著名刀具制造商定期创造奇迹。两人均能将普通原材料转化为供全球主要制造商使用的非凡产品。他们是各自领域的达·芬奇。
PCC’s products, often delivered under multi-year contracts, are key components in most large aircraft. Other industries are served as well by the company’s 30,466 employees, who work out of 162 plants in 13 countries. In building his business, Mark has made many acquisitions and will make more. We look forward to having him deploy Berkshire’s capital.
PCC的产品通常通过多年合同交付，是多数大型飞机的关键部件。公司的30,466名员工分布在13个国家的162家工厂中，为其他行业提供服务。马克在打造业务时进行了多次并购，并将继续如此。我们期待他运用伯克希尔的资本创造价值。
A personal thank-you: The PCC acquisition would not have happened without the input and assistance of our own Todd Combs, who brought the company to my attention a few years ago and went on to educate me about both the business and Mark. Though Todd and Ted Weschler are primarily investment managers – they each handle about $9 billion for us – both of them cheerfully and ably add major value to Berkshire in other ways as well. Hiring these two was one of my best moves.
个人致谢：若无托德·康布斯（Todd Combs）的建议与协助，PCC收购无法实现。几年前他向我推荐该公司，并持续帮助我了解其业务和马克。尽管托德与泰德·韦施勒（Ted Weschler）主要负责投资管理（每人管理约90亿美元），但他们还通过其他方式为伯克希尔创造重大价值。聘用他们是我最明智的决策之一。
With the PCC acquisition, Berkshire will own 10¹⁄₄ companies that would populate the Fortune 500 if they were stand-alone businesses. (Our 27% holding of Kraft Heinz is the ¹⁄₄.) That leaves just under 98% of America’s business giants that have yet to call us. Operators are standing by.
收购PCC后，伯克希尔将拥有10¼家若独立运营即可进入《财富》500强的公司（我们持有27%的卡夫亨氏（Kraft Heinz）占比¼）。这意味着美国商业巨头中仍有近98%尚未联系我们。我们的团队已整装待命。
Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $5.7 billion last year, up from $5.1 billion in 2014. Within this group, we have one company that last year earned more than $700 million, two that earned between $400 million and $700 million, seven that earned between $250 million and $400 million, six that earned between $100 million and $250 million, and eleven that earned between $50 million and $100 million. We love them all: This collection of businesses will expand both in number and earnings as the years go by.
我们的数十家小型非保险业务去年收益57亿美元，高于2014年的51亿美元。其中：1家公司收益超7亿美元，2家收益4-7亿美元，7家收益2.5-4亿美元，6家收益1-2.5亿美元，11家收益5000万-1亿美元。我们热爱所有这些企业：随着时间推移，它们的数量和收益都将增长。
When you hear talk about America’s crumbling infrastructure, rest assured that they’re not talking about Berkshire. We invested $16 billion in property, plant and equipment last year, a full 86% of it deployed in the United States.
当你听到关于美国基础设施衰败的讨论时，请放心：他们说的绝不是伯克希尔。我们去年在不动产、厂房和设备上投入160亿美元，其中86%（即137.6亿美元）用于美国本土。
I told you earlier about BNSF’s record capital expenditures in 2015. At the end of every year, our railroad’s physical facilities will be improved from those existing twelve months earlier.
我早前提到过BNSF 2015年的创纪录资本支出。每年年底，我们的铁路设施都将比前一年同期更先进。
Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) is a similar story. That company has invested $16 billion in renewables and now owns 7% of the country’s wind generation and 6% of its solar generation. Indeed, the 4,423 megawatts of wind generation owned and operated by our regulated utilities is six times the generation of the runner-up utility.
伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）也是如此。该公司在可再生能源领域已投资160亿美元，目前拥有美国7%的风力发电和6%的太阳能发电能力。事实上，我们受监管公用事业公司拥有并运营的4,423兆瓦风电产能，是第二名公用事业公司的六倍。
We’re not done. Last year, BHE made major commitments to the future development of renewables in support of the Paris Climate Change Conference. Our fulfilling those promises will make great sense, both for the environment and for Berkshire’s economics.
我们尚未止步。去年，BHE承诺大力支持未来可再生能源发展，以配合巴黎气候大会目标。履行这些承诺对环境和伯克希尔的经济效益都极具意义。
Berkshire’s huge and growing insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2015 – that makes 13 years in a row – and increased its float. During those years, our float – money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit – grew from $41 billion to $88 billion. Though neither that gain nor the size of our float is reflected in Berkshire’s earnings, float generates significant investment income because of the assets it allows us to hold.
伯克希尔庞大且不断增长的保险业务2015年再次实现承保利润——连续第13年盈利——并扩大了浮存金规模。在此期间，我们的浮存金（不属于我们但可为伯克希尔投资的资金）从410亿美元增至880亿美元。尽管这些增长和浮存金规模本身未反映在伯克希尔收益中，但其持有的资产带来了可观的投资收益。
Meanwhile, our underwriting profit totaled $26 billion during the 13-year period, including $1.8 billion earned in 2015. Without a doubt, Berkshire’s largest unrecorded wealth lies in its insurance business. We’ve spent 48 years building this multi-faceted operation, and it can’t be replicated.
同时，过去13年我们的承保利润总计260亿美元，其中2015年贡献18亿美元。毫无疑问，伯克希尔最大的未记录财富来自保险业务。我们用48年构建了这一多元化业务，其价值无法复制。
While Charlie and I search for new businesses to buy, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year we contracted for 29 bolt-ons, scheduled to cost $634 million in aggregate. The cost of these purchases ranged from $300,000 to $143 million.
查理和我寻找新收购标的的同时，旗下子公司也在频繁进行补充性并购。去年我们签署了29项此类交易，总成本预计6.34亿美元，单笔交易成本从30万美元至1.43亿美元不等。
Charlie and I encourage bolt-ons, if they are sensibly-priced. (Most deals offered us most definitely aren’t.) These purchases deploy capital in operations that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. That means no additional work for us, yet more earnings for Berkshire, a combination we find highly appealing. We will make many dozens of bolt-on deals in future years.
查理和我鼓励合理定价的补充性并购。（多数卖方提供的交易显然不符合这一标准。）这些收购将资金投入与现有业务协同的运营中，并由我们的专业经理团队管理。这意味着无需我们额外操心，却能为伯克希尔创造更多收益——这种组合令我们高度青睐。未来数年，我们将完成数十项此类交易。
# Our Heinz Partnership and Expansion
我们的亨氏合作与扩张
Our Heinz partnership with Jorge Paulo Lemann, Alex Behring and Bernardo Hees more than doubled its size last year by merging with Kraft. Before this transaction, we owned about 53% of Heinz at a cost of $4.25 billion. Now we own 325.4 million shares of Kraft Heinz (about 27%) that cost us $9.8 billion. The new company has annual sales of $27 billion and can supply you Heinz ketchup or mustard to go with your Oscar Mayer hot dogs that come from the Kraft side. Add a Coke, and you will be enjoying my favorite meal. (We will have the Oscar Mayer Wienermobile at the annual meeting – bring your kids.)
我们与豪尔赫·保罗·莱曼（Jorge Paulo Lemann）、亚历克斯·贝林（Alex Behring）和贝尔纳多·希斯（Bernardo Hees）合作的亨氏业务去年通过与卡夫（Kraft）合并实现规模翻倍。合并前，我们以42.5亿美元成本持有亨氏约53%股权；合并后，我们以98亿美元成本持有卡夫亨氏3.254亿股（约27%）。新公司年销售额达270亿美元，无论您想搭配卡夫方的奥斯卡梅尔（Oscar Mayer）热狗享用亨氏番茄酱或芥末，再加一杯可乐，就能体验我的最爱餐食。（我们将在股东大会展示奥斯卡梅尔香肠车——带上孩子来吧。）
Though we sold no Kraft Heinz shares, “GAAP” (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) required us to record a $6.8 billion write-up of our investment upon completion of the merger. That leaves us with our Kraft Heinz holding carried on our balance sheet at a value many billions above our cost and many billions below its market value, an outcome only an accountant could love.
尽管我们未出售任何卡夫亨氏股份，但“公认会计准则（GAAP）”要求我们在合并完成后对投资进行68亿美元的账面增值。这使得我们的卡夫亨氏持股在资产负债表上的价值远高于成本价，却远低于市场价值——这种结果只有会计师才会喜欢。
Berkshire also owns Kraft Heinz preferred shares that pay us $720 million annually and are carried at $7.7 billion on our balance sheet. That holding will almost certainly be redeemed for $8.32 billion in June (the earliest date allowed under the preferred’s terms). That will be good news for Kraft Heinz and bad news for Berkshire.
伯克希尔还持有卡夫亨氏优先股，每年支付7.2亿美元股息，资产负债表价值77亿美元。该优先股几乎肯定将在6月以83.2亿美元赎回（条款允许的最早日期）。这对卡夫亨氏是好消息，对我们则是坏消息。
Jorge Paulo and his associates could not be better partners. We share with them a passion to buy, build and hold large businesses that satisfy basic needs and desires. We follow different paths, however, in pursuing this goal.
豪尔赫·保罗及其团队是无可挑剔的合作伙伴。我们与他们共同热衷于收购、打造并持有满足基本需求的大企业，但在实现这一目标的路径上有所不同。
Their method, at which they have been extraordinarily successful, is to buy companies that offer an opportunity for eliminating many unnecessary costs and then – very promptly – to make the moves that will get the job done. Their actions significantly boost productivity, the all-important factor in America’s economic growth over the past 240 years. Without more output of desired goods and services per working hour – that’s the measure of productivity gains – an economy inevitably stagnates. At much of corporate America, truly major gains in productivity are possible, a fact offering opportunities to Jorge Paulo and his associates.
他们的方法极其成功：收购存在大量非必要成本的企业，并迅速采取行动削减成本。他们的举措显著提升生产率——这是过去240年来美国经济增长的关键因素。若无法实现每工时产出更多理想商品和服务（即生产率提升），经济必然停滞。在多数美国企业中，生产率仍有巨大提升空间，这正是豪尔赫·保罗团队的机遇所在。
At Berkshire, we, too, crave efficiency and detest bureaucracy. To achieve our goals, however, we follow an approach emphasizing avoidance of bloat, buying businesses such as PCC that have long been run by cost-conscious and efficient managers. After the purchase, our role is simply to create an environment in which these CEOs – and their eventual successors, who typically are like-minded – can maximize both their managerial effectiveness and the pleasure they derive from their jobs. (With this hands-off style, I am heeding a well-known Mungerism: “If you want to guarantee yourself a lifetime of misery, be sure to marry someone with the intent of changing their behavior.”)
伯克希尔同样追求效率、厌恶官僚主义。但我们的策略是避免臃肿，收购像PCC这样长期由成本意识强且高效的管理者运营的企业。收购后，我们的角色仅是创造环境，让这些CEO及其通常志同道合的继任者最大限度发挥管理效能并享受工作乐趣。（这种放手风格遵循查理·芒格的名言：“若想确保一生痛苦，就娶一个试图改变其行为的人。”）
We will continue to operate with extreme – indeed, almost unheard of – decentralization at Berkshire. But we will also look for opportunities to partner with Jorge Paulo, either as a financing partner, as was the case when his group purchased Tim Horton’s, or as a combined equity-and-financing partner, as at Heinz. We also may occasionally partner with others, as we have successfully done at Berkadia.
伯克希尔将继续保持极端——甚至罕见的——去中心化运营。但我们也寻求与豪尔赫·保罗合作：既可作为融资伙伴（如其团队收购Tim Horton’s时），也可作为股权+融资联合伙伴（如亨氏案例）。我们也会与其他方合作，例如在Berkadia的成功实践。
Berkshire, however, will join only with partners making friendly acquisitions. To be sure, certain hostile offers are justified: Some CEOs forget that it is shareholders for whom they should be working, while other managers are woefully inept. In either case, directors may be blind to the problem or simply reluctant to make the change required. That’s when new faces are needed. We, though, will leave these “opportunities” for others. At Berkshire, we go only where we are welcome.
然而，伯克希尔仅参与友好并购。当然，某些敌意收购有其合理性：部分CEO忘记自己应为股东效力，另一些管理者则能力欠佳。此时董事会可能对问题视而不见或不愿推动变革，需要新面孔介入。但我们把这些“机会”留给他人。伯克希尔只会选择受欢迎的地方合作。
# Berkshire’s “Big Four” Investments
伯克希尔的“四大持仓”
Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of IBM (increasing our ownership to 8.4% versus 7.8% at yearend 2014) and Wells Fargo (going to 9.8% from 9.4%). At the other two companies, Coca-Cola and American Express, stock repurchases raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 9.2% to 9.3%, and our interest in American Express increased from 14.8% to 15.6%. In case you think these seemingly small changes aren’t important, consider this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one percentage point in our ownership raises Berkshire’s portion of their annual earnings by about $500 million.
去年，伯克希尔对“四大持仓”——美国运通（AmEx）、可口可乐（Coca-Cola）、IBM和富国银行（Wells Fargo）——的持股比例均有所提升。我们增持了IBM（持股从7.8%增至8.4%）和富国银行（从9.4%升至9.8%）。可口可乐和美国运通因回购股份，我们被动持股比例分别从9.2%升至9.3%、14.8%增至15.6%。若您认为这些微小变动无关紧要，请看数据：对这四家公司整体而言，我们持股每增加1个百分点，即可多享有约5亿美元年收益。
These four investees possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. Their returns on tangible equity range from excellent to staggering. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business. It’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
这四家被投企业拥有卓越业务，管理层兼具才华与股东导向。它们的有形权益回报率从优秀到惊人不等。伯克希尔更偏好持有优质公司虽非控股但可观的股份，而非全资拥有平庸企业。正如我们更愿持有希望钻石的一部分，而非拥有一整颗人造钻石。
If Berkshire’s yearend holdings are used as the marker, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2015 earnings amounted to $4.7 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends they pay us – about $1.8 billion last year. But make no mistake: The nearly $3 billion of these companies’ earnings we don’t report are every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.
若以伯克希尔年末持股为基准，我们在“四大持仓”2015年收益中应占47亿美元。但我们在报告中仅计入它们支付的股息——去年约18亿美元。请勿误解：我们未报告的近30亿美元收益，与伯克希尔账面记录的部分同样重要。
The earnings our investees retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock – a move that increases Berkshire’s share of future earnings without requiring us to lay out a dime. The retained earnings of these companies also fund business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees, in aggregate, will grow substantially over time. If gains do indeed materialize, dividends to Berkshire will increase and so, too, will our unrealized capital gains.
被投企业留存的收益常用于回购自身股票——此举无需我们追加投资，即可提升伯克希尔未来收益占比。这些留存收益也用于开拓通常有利可图的商业机会。因此我们预计，这四家企业的每股收益整体将长期大幅增长。若收益实现，伯克希尔将获得更多股息及未实现资本收益。
Our flexibility in capital allocation – our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses – gives us a significant edge over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they will operate. Woody Allen once explained that the advantage of being bi-sexual is that it doubles your chance of finding a date on Saturday night. In like manner – well, not exactly like manner – our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for Berkshire’s endless gusher of cash. Beyond that, having a huge portfolio of marketable securities gives us a stockpile of funds that can be tapped when an elephant-sized acquisition is offered to us.
我们在资本配置上的灵活性——愿意大规模被动投资非控股企业——相较于仅限于自营收购的公司，这是显著优势。伍迪·艾伦曾说，双性恋的优势在于周六晚上约会机会翻倍。同理（虽不完全相同），我们对自营企业和被动投资的双重偏好，让伯克希尔找到明智现金用途的机会翻倍。此外，庞大的可交易证券组合为我们储备了资金弹药，一旦出现大象级收购机会，我们即可动用。
# Economic Outlook and Berkshire’s Future
经济展望与伯克希尔未来
It’s an election year, and candidates can’t stop speaking about our country’s problems (which, of course, only they can solve). As a result of this negative drumbeat, many Americans now believe that their children will not live as well as they themselves do.
这是大选年，候选人不断谈论国家问题（当然，只有他们能解决）。受这种负面言论影响，许多美国人认为自己的孩子生活水平将不如自己。
That view is dead wrong: The babies being born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.
这种观点大错特错：如今在美国出生的婴儿是历史上最幸运的一代。
American GDP per capita is now about $56,000. As I mentioned last year that – in real terms – is a staggering six times the amount in 1930, the year I was born, a leap far beyond the wildest dreams of my parents or their contemporaries. U.S. citizens are not intrinsically more intelligent today, nor do they work harder than did Americans in 1930. Rather, they work far more efficiently and thereby produce far more. This all-powerful trend is certain to continue: America’s economic magic remains alive and well.
美国人均GDP现约56,000美元。正如我去年所提，按实际购买力计算，这一数字是1930年（我出生年份）的六倍，远超我父母及其同龄人最疯狂的想象。如今的美国人并非天生更聪明，工作也不比1930年更拼命。但效率大幅提升，从而产出更多。这一强大趋势必将延续：美国经济的魔力依然存在且充满活力。
Some commentators bemoan our current 2% per year growth in real GDP – and, yes, we would all like to see a higher rate. But let’s do some simple math using the much-lamented 2% figure. That rate, we will see, delivers astounding gains.
一些评论家哀叹美国实际GDP年增长仅2%——是的，我们都希望更高。但让我们用这个被频繁诟病的2%做简单计算。你会发现，这一增速仍能创造惊人成果。
America’s population is growing about .8% per year (.5% from births minus deaths and .3% from net migration). Thus 2% of overall growth produces about 1.2% of per capita growth. That may not sound impressive. But in a single generation of, say, 25 years, that rate of growth leads to a gain of 34.4% in real GDP per capita. (Compounding’s effects produce the excess over the percentage that would result by simply multiplying 25 x 1.2%.) In turn, that 34.4% gain will produce a staggering $19,000 increase in real GDP per capita for the next generation. Were that to be distributed equally, the gain would be $76,000 annually for a family of four. Today’s politicians need not shed tears for tomorrow’s children.
美国人口年增长率约0.8%（0.5%来自出生减死亡，0.3%来自净移民）。因此2%的总增长转化为人均增长约1.2%。这看似不高，但以一代人（假设25年）计算，人均实际GDP将增长34.4%。（复利效应使增幅超过25×1.2%的简单乘积。）这一增长将使下一代人均实际GDP增加19,000美元。若平均分配，四口之家年收入将增加76,000美元。今天的政客无需为明天的孩子流泪。
Indeed, most of today’s children are doing well. All families in my upper middle-class neighborhood regularly enjoy a living standard better than that achieved by John D. Rockefeller Sr. at the time of my birth. His unparalleled fortune couldn’t buy what we now take for granted, whether the field is – to name just a few – transportation, entertainment, communication or medical services. Rockefeller certainly had power and fame; he could not, however, live as well as my neighbors now do.
事实上，如今大多数孩子生活良好。我所在中产上层社区的所有家庭，生活水平都超过我出生时的约翰·D·洛克菲勒（John D. Rockefeller Sr.）。他无法用巨额财富买到我们如今习以为常的东西，例如交通、娱乐、通讯或医疗服务。洛克菲勒拥有权力和名声，但生活质量远不如我的邻居们。
Though the pie to be shared by the next generation will be far larger than today’s, how it will be divided will remain fiercely contentious. Just as is now the case, there will be struggles for the increased output of goods and services between those people in their productive years and retirees, between the healthy and the infirm, between the inheritors and the Horatio Algers, between investors and workers and, in particular, between those with talents that are valued highly by the marketplace and the equally decent hard-working Americans who lack the skills the market prizes. Clashes of that sort have forever been with us – and will forever continue. Congress will be the battlefield; money and votes will be the weapons. Lobbying will remain a growth industry.
尽管下一代可分蛋糕远大于今日，但分配方式仍将激烈争议。正如现在，生产力旺盛者与退休者、健康人与病患、继承者与白手起家者、投资者与劳动者之间将争夺更多产出。尤其是市场青睐的人才与同样正直勤劳却缺乏市场所需技能的美国人之间矛盾将持续存在。此类冲突伴随人类始终，也将永远延续。国会将是战场，金钱与选票是武器，游说行业将继续增长。
The good news, however, is that even members of the “losing” sides will almost certainly enjoy – as they should – far more goods and services in the future than they have in the past. The quality of their increased bounty will also dramatically improve. Nothing rivals the market system in producing what people want – nor, even more so, in delivering what people don’t yet know they want. My parents, when young, could not envision a television set, nor did I, in my 50s, think I needed a personal computer. Both products, once people saw what they could do, quickly revolutionized their lives. I now spend ten hours a week playing bridge online. And, as I write this letter, “search” is invaluable to me. (I’m not ready for Tinder, however.)
但好消息是，“失败方”成员未来几乎肯定能享受（且理应享受）远超以往的商品与服务，质量也将大幅提升。市场体系在满足需求（尤其是创造人们尚未意识到的需求）方面无可匹敌。我父母年轻时无法想象电视机，我50岁时也认为不需要个人电脑。一旦人们发现其功能，这两项产品迅速改变了生活。我现在每周花10小时在线打桥牌，撰写此信时，“搜索”对我至关重要。（不过，我还没准备好用Tinder。）
For 240 years it’s been a terrible mistake to bet against America, and now is no time to start. America’s golden goose of commerce and innovation will continue to lay more and larger eggs. America’s social security promises will be honored and perhaps made more generous. And, yes, America’s kids will live far better than their parents did.
过去240年，做空美国是可怕错误，现在更不该开始。美国商业与创新的金鹅将持续产下更多更大的蛋。社会保障承诺将兑现甚至更慷慨。是的，美国孩子的生活将远胜于父母。
# Berkshire’s Blueprint for Growth
伯克希尔的增长蓝图
Considering this favorable tailwind, Berkshire (and, to be sure, a great many other businesses) will almost certainly prosper. The managers who succeed Charlie and me will build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by following our simple blueprint of: (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. Management will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.
基于这一有利风向，伯克希尔（以及许多其他企业）几乎必然繁荣。查理和我的继任者将遵循我们的简单蓝图提升每股内在价值：（1）持续增强旗下众多子公司的基础盈利能力；（2）通过补充性并购进一步提升收益；（3）受益于被投企业的增长；（4）当股价大幅低于内在价值时回购股份；（5）偶尔进行大型收购。管理层还将通过极少（甚至不）增发股份来为您最大化收益。
# Insurance Business and Float
保险业务与浮存金
Let’s look first at insurance. The property-casualty (“P/C”) branch of that industry has been the engine that has propelled our expansion since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property-casualty company in the world, as measured by net worth. Moreover, its intrinsic value is far in excess of the value at which it is carried on our books.
首先，让我们看看保险业务。自1967年以860万美元收购国家赔偿保险公司（National Indemnity）及其姊妹公司国家火灾与海事保险公司（National Fire & Marine）以来，财产险（P/C）业务一直是推动我们扩张的核心引擎。如今，国家赔偿保险公司按净资产计算是全球最大的财产险公司，且其内在价值远高于账面记录的价值。
One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
我们被财产险业务吸引的原因之一是其财务特性：保险公司先收取保费，之后支付理赔。在极端情况下（如某些工伤赔偿事故），支付可能持续数十年。这种“先收后付”模式使保险公司持有大量最终属于他人的资金——我们称之为“浮存金”。保险公司可利用这部分资金进行投资。尽管具体保单和理赔不断变化，但浮存金规模通常与保费收入保持稳定比例。因此，随着业务增长，我们的浮存金也随之增长。以下数据展示了我们的成长历程：
# Float Growth (in millions)
浮存金增长（百万美元）
| Year（年份） | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 | 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Float（浮存金） | $39 | $237 | $1,632 | $27,871 | $65,832 | $87,722 |
Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO and several of our specialized operations are almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do in time experience a decline in float, it will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. This structure is by design and is a key component in the strength of Berkshire’s economic fortress. It will never be compromised.
未来浮存金的增长将面临挑战。积极的一面是，GEICO和多个专业业务几乎必然以较快速度扩张。然而，国家赔偿保险公司的再保险部门参与了一些终止合同，其浮存金规模正在下降。即使未来出现浮存金减少，也将非常缓慢——每年最多不超过3%。我们的保险合同性质决定了永远不会面临即时或短期内的大额现金需求。这一结构是刻意设计的，正是伯克希尔经济堡垒的强度来源，且永远不会被破坏。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
若保费收入超过费用和最终损失总额，我们将实现承保利润，这会叠加到浮存金带来的投资收益中。当实现承保利润时，我们相当于免费使用资金——甚至还能因持有这些资金而获得报酬。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses. The prolonged period of low interest rates the world is now dealing with also virtually guarantees that earnings on float will steadily decrease for many years to come, thereby exacerbating the profit problems of insurers. It’s a good bet that industry results over the next ten years will fall short of those recorded in the past decade, particularly for those companies that specialize in reinsurance.
不幸的是，所有保险公司追求这一理想结果导致激烈竞争，激烈到有时使整个财产险行业出现显著承保亏损。这种亏损本质上是行业为持有浮存金支付的代价。竞争格局几乎注定保险行业将继续表现低迷：尽管享受浮存金收益，但其有形净资产回报率仍将低于美国其他企业。全球低利率环境持续多年，也几乎必然导致浮存金收益在未来多年稳步下降，进一步加剧保险公司盈利困境。可以肯定的是，未来十年行业整体表现将逊于过去十年，尤其对专注再保险的公司而言更是如此。
As noted early in this report, Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 13 consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $26.2 billion. That’s no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.
正如本报告开头所述，伯克希尔已连续13年实现承保利润，期间税前收益总计262亿美元。这不是偶然：所有保险经理每日的核心任务是严守风险评估原则。他们深知浮存金虽有价值，但糟糕的承保结果会吞噬其收益。其他保险公司对此仅口头承诺，而在伯克希尔，这是一条必须严格遵守的“戒律”。
So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect. It should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses – a huge $24.5 billion to more than six million claimants in 2015 – and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business that will soon generate its own claims, adding to float.
那么浮存金如何影响内在价值？计算伯克希尔账面价值时，浮存金全额作为负债扣除，仿佛我们必须立即支付且无法补充。但将浮存金视为纯粹负债是错误的，它应被看作循环基金。每天我们支付旧理赔及费用（2015年向超600万索赔人支付245亿美元），从而减少浮存金；同时每天也承保新业务，未来将产生新的理赔，增加浮存金。
If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing $1 that in effect will never leave the premises – because new business is almost certain to deliver a substitute – is worlds different from owing $1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities, however, are treated as equals under GAAP.
若我们的循环浮存金既无成本又长期存在（我深信如此），其真实负债价值将远低于会计负债。欠下1美元却因新业务几乎必然补充而不流出资金，与必须明天支付且无法替换的1美元负债截然不同。然而，根据通用会计准则（GAAP），这两类负债被同等对待。
A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that increases book value. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
对这一高估负债的部分抵消是我们收购保险公司时产生的155亿美元“商誉”资产，它增加了账面价值。很大程度上，这一商誉代表了我们为保险业务浮存金生成能力支付的价格。然而，商誉的成本与其真实价值无关。例如，若保险公司长期承受巨额承保亏损，无论原始成本如何，其账面商誉资产都应视为毫无价值。
Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Indeed, almost the entire $15.5 billion we carry for goodwill in our insurance business was already on our books in 2000. Yet we subsequently tripled our float. Its value today is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.
幸运的是，伯克希尔并非如此。查理和我认为，我们的保险商誉真实经济价值——若需购买具备类似浮存金质量的保险公司时我们愿支付的价格——远高于历史账面价值。事实上，我们保险业务当前记录的155亿美元商誉中，几乎全部已在2000年入账。此后我们的浮存金规模增长了三倍。今天，这一商誉价值正是（且是主要原因）我们坚信伯克希尔内在商业价值远超账面价值的关键所在。
# Berkshire’s Insurance Managers and Operations
伯克希尔的保险管理者与运营
Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.
伯克希尔保险业务的吸引力源于我们拥有一批卓越的管理者，他们以严明的纪律运营着难以复制的商业模式。请允许我介绍我们的主要保险单元。
First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.
**伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险集团（Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group）是按浮存金规模最大的单元，由阿吉特·杰恩（Ajit Jain）**管理。阿吉特承担的都是其他机构不愿或无力承担的风险。他的运营模式在保险业内独树一帜：兼具资本实力、决策速度、决断力以及最关键的智慧。但他从不让伯克希尔承担与其资源不匹配的风险。
Indeed, Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. We would also remain awash in cash and be looking for large opportunities to write business in an insurance market that might well be in disarray. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be swimming in red ink, if not facing insolvency.
事实上，伯克希尔在风险规避上的保守程度远超大多数大型保险公司。例如，若行业因超级巨灾遭遇2500亿美元损失（约为历史最高损失的三倍），伯克希尔整体仍可能实现可观盈利，因为我们有多元化的收益来源。我们还将保持充沛的现金储备，并在可能陷入混乱的保险市场中寻找大型承保机会。与此同时，其他大型保险公司和再保险公司可能陷入巨额亏损，甚至面临破产风险。
When Ajit entered Berkshire’s office on a Saturday in 1986, he did not have a day’s experience in the insurance business. Nevertheless, Mike Goldberg, then our manager of insurance, handed him the keys to our reinsurance business. With that move, Mike achieved sainthood: Since then, Ajit has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire shareholders.
1986年某个周六，阿吉特首次走进伯克希尔办公室时，对保险业毫无经验。然而，时任保险业务主管迈克·戈德伯格（Mike Goldberg）将再保险业务全权交予他管理。这一举动让迈克成为“圣人”：此后，阿吉特为伯克希尔股东创造了数千亿美元的价值。
We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
我们的另一大再保险力量是通用再保险（General Re），由**泰德·蒙特罗斯（Tad Montross）**管理。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
稳健的保险运营需遵循四大原则：必须（1）理解可能导致保单亏损的所有风险敞口；（2）保守评估任一风险实际引发亏损的概率及可能成本；（3）设定平均而言能在覆盖预期损失和运营成本后产生利润的保费；（4）若无法获得合理保费，必须愿意放弃业务。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.
许多保险公司能通过前三项考验，却在第四项上失败。他们无法拒绝竞争对手热衷的业务。“别人这么做，我们也得跟”这句老话在任何行业都危险，但在保险业尤为致命。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been considerably better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.
泰德严格遵守了这四大原则，其成果可见一斑。在他的领导下，通用再保险庞大的浮存金成本远低于零成本，且我们预计这一趋势将持续。我们尤其看好其国际人寿再保险业务——自1998年收购以来，该业务持续增长并盈利。
It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, it was beset by problems that caused commentators – and me as well, briefly – to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.
当然，收购通用再保险初期，它曾因问题频发导致评论家（甚至我也短暂地）认为我犯下重大错误。那段时期早已过去。如今通用再保险已成为一颗明珠。
Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 65 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 54 years of service in 2015. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony. In the 40 years that I’ve known him, his every action has made great sense.
最后是政府雇员保险公司（GEICO），这是我65年前初入保险业时接触的公司。GEICO由**托尼·尼利（Tony Nicely）**管理，他18岁加入公司，在2015年完成54年职业生涯。托尼自1993年担任CEO后，公司进入腾飞期。没有人比托尼更优秀。在过去40年中，他的每个决策都极具智慧。
When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed.
1951年1月首次接触GEICO时，我被其远低于行业巨头的成本优势震撼。我确信GEICO的成功是必然的，因为它理应成功。
No one likes to buy auto insurance. Almost everyone, though, likes to drive. The insurance consequently needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them – and only a low-cost operation can deliver these. Indeed, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading – right now! – and go to geico.com or call 800-368-2734.
没人喜欢购买汽车保险，但几乎人人都爱开车。因此所需的保险是多数家庭的重大支出。节省费用对他们至关重要——而这只有低成本运营才能实现。事实上，至少40%的读者可通过GEICO节省保费。所以，别再读了！立刻访问geico.com或致电800-368-2734。
GEICO’s cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. (We ended 2015 with 11.4% of the market compared to 2.5% in 1995, when Berkshire acquired control of GEICO.) The company’s low costs create a moat – an enduring one – that competitors are unable to cross.
GEICO的成本优势是其年复一年抢占市场份额的关键。（2015年底市场占有率为11.4%，相比之下，1995年伯克希尔控股时仅为2.5%。）公司的低成本构筑了持久护城河，竞争对手难以跨越。
All the while, our gecko never tires of telling Americans how GEICO can save them important money. I love hearing the little guy deliver his message: “15 minutes could save you 15% or more on car insurance.” (Of course, there’s always a grouch in the crowd. One of my friends says he is glad that only a few animals can talk, since the ones that do speak seem unable to discuss any subject but insurance.)
我们的壁虎形象始终不厌其烦地向美国人传递GEICO如何帮他们省钱。我喜欢听它说：“15分钟电话可为您节省15%以上的车险费用。”（当然总有人抱怨。一位朋友说庆幸只有少数动物会说话，因为那些会说话的动物似乎只会谈论保险。）
# Smaller Insurance Operations and BHSI
小型保险业务与伯克希尔哈撒韦专业保险（BHSI）
In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies that primarily write commercial coverages. In aggregate, these companies are a large, growing and valuable operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit, usually much better than that reported by their competitors. Indeed, over the past 13 years, this group has earned $4 billion from underwriting – about 13% of its premium volume – while increasing its float from $943 million to $9.9 billion.
除三大核心保险业务外，我们还拥有一组主要承保商业保险的小型公司。整体而言，这一组合是规模庞大、持续增长且盈利丰厚的业务，始终实现承保利润，且通常远超同行表现。事实上，过去13年该组通过承保累计获利40亿美元（约占保费收入的13%），浮存金规模则从9.43亿美元增至99亿美元。
Less than three years ago, we formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”), which we include in this group. Our first decision was to put Peter Eastwood in charge. That move was a home run: BHSI has already developed $1 billion of annual premium volume and, under Peter’s direction, is destined to become one of the world’s leading P/C insurers.
不到三年前，我们成立了伯克希尔哈撒韦专业保险（BHSI），并将其纳入该组。我们的首个决策是任命**彼得·伊斯伍德（Peter Eastwood）**负责。这一决定堪称本垒打：BHSI已实现年保费收入10亿美元，且在彼得领导下，注定成为全球领先的财产险公司之一。
# Underwriting Profit and Float by Division
分部门承保利润与浮存金
| Insurance Operations（保险业务） | Underwriting Profit (承保利润) 2015 | 2014 | Yearend Float (in millions) (年末浮存金，百万美元) 2015 | 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BH Reinsurance（伯克希尔再保险） | $421 | $277 | $44,108 | $42,454 |
| General Re（通用再保险） | $606 | $1,159 | $18,560 | $19,280 |
| GEICO | $132 | $626 | $15,148 | $13,569 |
| Other Primary（其他基础业务） | $460 | $824 | $9,906 | $8,618 |
| Total（总计） | $1,837 | $2,668 | $87,722 | $83,921 |
Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO and several of our specialized operations are almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do in time experience a decline in float, it will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year.
未来浮存金的增长将面临挑战。积极的一面是，GEICO和多个专业业务几乎必然以较快速度扩张。然而，国家赔偿保险公司的再保险部门参与了一些终止合同，其浮存金规模正在下降。即使未来出现浮存金减少，也将非常缓慢——每年最多不超过3%。
# Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受监管的重资本业务
We have two major operations, BNSF and BHE, that share important characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement. Together, they last year accounted for 37% of Berkshire’s after-tax operating earnings.
我们的两大核心业务——BNSF铁路和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）——具备与其他业务显著不同的特征。因此，我们在年报中为其单独设节，并在通用会计准则（GAAP）资产负债表和利润表中单独列示其合并财务数据。这两家公司去年贡献了伯克希尔税后营业利润的37%。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 8:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
两家公司的关键特征在于对长期受监管资产的巨额投资，部分资金来自无需伯克希尔担保的长期债务。实际上，我们的信用背书并不需要，因为每家公司的盈利能力即便在极端经济环境下也远超其利息需求。例如去年，尽管铁路行业整体低迷，BNSF的利息保障倍数仍超过8:1。（我们定义的保障倍数为息税前利润与利息之比，而非行业常用的EBITDA/利息，我们认为后者存在严重缺陷。）
At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service on an exclusive basis. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: a great and ever-widening diversity of earnings streams, which shield BHE from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. These many sources of profit, supplemented by the inherent advantage of being owned by a strong parent, have allowed BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This economic fact benefits both us and our customers.
BHE方面，两大因素确保其在任何情况下都能偿债。第一点为所有公用事业共有：因提供独家基础服务而具备抗衰退盈利能力。第二点则鲜有同行具备：盈利来源高度多样化且持续扩展，使BHE免受单一监管机构重大影响。这些多元利润来源叠加母公司强大背景，使BHE及其公用事业子公司大幅降低债务成本。这一经济现实对股东和客户均有益处。
# Key Financial Figures for BHE and BNSF
BHE与BNSF核心财务数据
# Berkshire Hathaway Energy (89.9% owned)
伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（持有89.9%）
| U.K. utilities（英国公用事业） | Iowa utility（爱荷华州公用事业） | Nevada utilities（内华达州公用事业） | PacifiCorp (primarily Oregon and Utah)（太平洋公司，主要覆盖俄勒冈与犹他州） | Gas pipelines (Northern Natural and Kern River)（天然气管道，北方天然与凯恩河） | Canadian transmission utility（加拿大输电公司） | Renewable projects（可再生能源项目） | Home Services（房屋服务） | Other (net)（其他净项） |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes（税息前运营利润）: $460 | $314 | $586 | $1,026 | $401 | $170 | $175 | $191 | $27 |
| Interest（利息）: $3,350 | Income taxes（所得税）: $499 | Net earnings（净利润）: $481 | Earnings applicable to Berkshire（归属伯克希尔收益）: $2,370 |
# BNSF
BNSF铁路公司
| Revenues（收入）: $21,967 | Operating expenses（运营费用）: $14,264 |
|---|---|
| Operating earnings before interest and taxes（税息前运营利润）: $7,703 | Interest (net)（净利息）: $928 |
All told, BHE and BNSF invested $11.6 billion in plant and equipment last year, a massive commitment to key components of America’s infrastructure. We relish making such investments as long as they promise reasonable returns – and, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.
总体而言，BHE与BNSF去年在工厂与设备上投入116亿美元，这是对美国基础设施关键领域的重大承诺。只要这类投资能带来合理回报，我们乐于继续投入——而在这方面，我们对未来的监管环境抱有充分信任。
# Environmental Commitments and Cost Advantages
环保承诺与成本优势
Low prices are a powerful way to keep these constituencies happy. In Iowa, BHE’s average retail rate is 6.8¢ per KWH. Alliant, the other major electric utility in the state, averages 9.5¢. Here are the comparable industry figures for adjacent states: Nebraska 9.0¢, Missouri 9.3¢, Illinois 9.3¢, Minnesota 9.7¢. The national average is 10.4¢. Our rock-bottom prices add up to real money for paycheck-strapped customers.
低廉电价是维系利益相关方满意度的有力工具。在爱荷华州，BHE平均零售电价为每千瓦时6.8美分，而另一大电力公司Alliant为9.5美分。邻近州电价分别为：内布拉斯加9.0美分，密苏里9.3美分，伊利诺伊9.3美分，明尼苏达9.7美分，全国均价10.4美分。我们的超低电价为收入拮据的客户节省了真金白银。
At BNSF, price comparisons between major railroads are far more difficult to make because of significant differences in both their mix of cargo and the average distance it is carried. To supply a very crude measure, however, our revenue per ton-mile was just under 3¢ last year, while shipping costs for customers of the other four major U.S.-based railroads were at least 40% higher, ranging from 4.2¢ to 5.3¢.
由于各家铁路公司货物类型和平均运输距离差异显著，BNSF与其他铁路公司的价格对比更为复杂。但粗略衡量，我们去年每吨英里运费不足3美分，而其他四家美国主要铁路公司的运费至少高出40%，介于4.2至5.3美分之间。
Both BHE and BNSF have been leaders in pursuing planet-friendly technology. In wind generation, no state comes close to Iowa, where last year megawatt-hours we generated from wind equaled 47% of all megawatt-hours sold to our retail customers. (Additional wind projects to which we are committed will take that figure to 58% in 2017.)
BHE与BNSF均在推动环保技术方面处于领先地位。在风电领域，爱荷华州遥遥领先，去年我们风电发电量占零售客户总用电量的47%。（我们承诺的新增风电项目将在2017年将这一比例提升至58%。）
BNSF, like other Class I railroads, uses only a single gallon of diesel fuel to move a ton of freight almost 500 miles. That makes the railroads four times as fuel-efficient as trucks! Furthermore, railroads alleviate highway congestion – and the taxpayer-funded maintenance expenditures that come with heavier traffic – in a major way.
BNSF与其他一级铁路一样，仅需1加仑柴油即可将1吨货物运送近500英里，铁路运输的燃油效率是卡车的四倍！此外，铁路大幅缓解了公路拥堵及由此带来的纳税人资助的高额维护成本。
# Financial Performance of BHE and BNSF
BHE与BNSF财务表现
# Key Financial Figures for BHE and BNSF
BHE与BNSF核心财务数据
# Berkshire Hathaway Energy (89.9% owned)
伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（持有89.9%）
| U.K. utilities（英国公用事业） | Iowa utility（爱荷华州公用事业） | Nevada utilities（内华达州公用事业） | PacifiCorp (primarily Oregon and Utah)（太平洋公司，主要覆盖俄勒冈与犹他州） | Gas pipelines (Northern Natural and Kern River)（天然气管道，北方天然与凯恩河） | Canadian transmission utility（加拿大输电公司） | Renewable projects（可再生能源项目） | Home Services（房屋服务） | Other (net)（其他净项） |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes（税息前运营利润）: $460 | $314 | $586 | $1,026 | $401 | $170 | $175 | $191 | $27 |
| Interest（利息）: $3,350 | Income taxes（所得税）: $499 | Net earnings（净利润）: $481 | Earnings applicable to Berkshire（归属伯克希尔收益）: $2,370 |
# BNSF
BNSF铁路公司
| Revenues（收入）: $21,967 | Operating expenses（运营费用）: $14,264 |
|---|---|
| Operating earnings before interest and taxes（税息前运营利润）: $7,703 | Interest (net)（净利息）: $928 |
I currently expect increased after-tax earnings at BHE in 2016, but lower earnings at BNSF.
预计2016年BHE税后收益将增长，而BNSF收益将下降。
# Financial Statements and Accounting Adjustments
财务报表与会计调整
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
伯克希尔这一板块的业务覆盖范围广泛。以下是对该集团合并资产负债表和利润表的摘要：
# Balance Sheet 12/31/15 (in millions)
资产负债表（百万美元）
| Assets（资产） | 2015年12月31日 |
|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents (现金及等价物) | $6,807 |
| Accounts and notes receivable (应收账款和票据) | $8,886 |
| Inventory (存货) | $11,916 |
| Other current assets (其他流动资产) | $970 |
| Total current assets（流动资产合计） | $28,579 |
| Goodwill and other intangibles (商誉及其他无形资产) | $30,289 |
| Fixed assets (固定资产) | $15,161 |
| Other assets (其他资产) | $4,445 |
| Total assets（资产总计） | $78,474 |
| Liabilities and Equity（负债及权益） | 2015年12月31日 |
|---|---|
| Notes payable (应付票据) | $93,472 |
| Other current liabilities (其他流动负债) | $87,208 |
| Total current liabilities（流动负债合计） | $104 |
| Deferred taxes (递延税项) | $6,160 |
| Term debt and other liabilities (长期债务及其他负债) | $2,283 |
| Non-controlling interests (非控股权益) | $3,877 |
| Berkshire equity (伯克希尔权益) | $10,565 |
| Total liabilities and equity（负债及权益总计） | $78,474 |
# Earnings Statement (in millions)
利润表（百万美元）
| 项目（英文｜中文） | 2015 | 2014 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues（收入） | $107,825 | $97,689 | $93,472 |
| Operating expenses（运营费用） | $100,607 | $90,788 | $87,208 |
| Interest expense（利息支出） | $103 | $109 | $104 |
| Pre-tax earnings（税前收益） | $7,115 | $6,792 | $6,160 |
| Income taxes and non-controlling interests（所得税及非控股权益） | $2,432 | $2,324 | $2,283 |
| Net earnings（净利润） | $4,683 | $4,468 | $3,877 |
- Earnings for 2013 have been restated to exclude Marmon’s leasing operations, which are now included in the Finance and Financial Products results.
- 2013年收益已重述，排除了马蒙集团的租赁业务（现归入金融及金融产品板块）。
Our income and expense data conforming to GAAP is on page 38. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP because they exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.
我们的GAAP合规财务数据见第38页。上述运营费用为非GAAP口径，排除了部分并购会计项目（主要是特定无形资产的摊销）。我们采用此方式呈现，因查理和我认为调整后的数据更能准确反映表中聚合企业的实际经济成本和利润，相比GAAP准则更合理。
I won’t explain all of the adjustments – some are tiny and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets. Some truly deplete in value over time, while others in no way lose value. For software, as a big example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Conversely, the concept of recording charges against other intangibles, such as customer relationships, arises from purchase-accounting rules and clearly does not reflect economic reality. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated – even though, from an investor’s viewpoint, they could not differ more.
无需详述所有调整（部分调整金额微小且复杂），但严肃投资者应理解无形资产的差异性：某些资产价值随时间消耗（如软件摊销为真实成本），而另一些（如客户关系）的价值损耗则不符合经济现实。GAAP准则未区分二者，均计入费用——但从投资者视角，二者本质截然不同。
In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 38, amortization charges of $1.1 billion have been deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. The “non-real” charges, once non-existent at Berkshire, have become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. Non-real amortization charges are likely to climb further as we acquire more companies.
在第38页的GAAP合规数据中，摊销费用11亿美元已被扣除。其中约20%为“真实费用”，其余为“非真实费用”。过去伯克希尔无此类费用，但因频繁并购，非真实摊销费用显著增长。未来收购更多企业时，这类费用可能进一步增加。
The table on page 55 gives you the current status of our intangible assets as calculated by GAAP. We now have $6.8 billion left of amortizable intangibles, of which $4.1 billion will be expensed over the next five years. Eventually, of course, every dollar of these “assets” will be charged off. When that happens, reported earnings increase even if true earnings are flat. (My gift to my successor.)
第55页的表格展示了按GAAP计算的无形资产现状。目前尚余68亿美元可摊销无形资产，其中41亿美元将在未来五年内摊销。最终，这些“资产”的每一美元都将被冲销。当冲销发生时，即使实际盈利停滞，报告收益也会增长。（这是留给继任者的“礼物”。）
# Critique of GAAP and Management Practices
对GAAP准则与管理实践的批评
I suggest that you ignore a portion of GAAP amortization costs. But it is with some trepidation that I do that, knowing that it has become common for managers to tell their owners to ignore certain expense items that are all too real. “Stock-based compensation” is the most egregious example. The very name says it all: “compensation.” If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it? And, if real and recurring expenses don’t belong in the calculation of earnings, where in the world do they belong?
建议您忽略部分GAAP摊销成本，但此举需谨慎——因管理层常引导股东忽视某些真实存在的费用项。“股票期权薪酬”是最典型的例子。其名称已说明一切：“薪酬”。若薪酬不是成本，什么才是？若真实且持续的费用不计入盈利计算，它们又该归属何处？
Wall Street analysts often play their part in this charade, too, parroting the phony, compensation-ignoring “earnings” figures fed them by managements. Maybe the offending analysts don’t know any better. Or maybe they fear losing “access” to management. Or maybe they are cynical, telling themselves that since everyone else is playing the game, why shouldn’t they go along with it. Whatever their reasoning, these analysts are guilty of propagating misleading numbers that can deceive investors.
华尔街分析师也常参与这场闹剧，机械复述管理层提供的忽略薪酬的“盈利”数据。或许他们并非有意误导，而是惧怕失去与管理层的沟通渠道；亦或犬儒地认为既然他人如此操作，自己不妨从众。无论动机如何，这些分析师传播的数据具有误导性，可能欺骗投资者。
Depreciation charges are a more complicated subject but are almost always true costs. Certainly they are at Berkshire. I wish we could keep our businesses competitive while spending less than our depreciation charge, but in 51 years I’ve yet to figure out how to do so. Indeed, the depreciation charge we record in our railroad business falls far short of the capital outlays needed to merely keep the railroad running properly, a mismatch that leads to GAAP earnings that are higher than true economic earnings. (This overstatement of earnings exists at all railroads.) When CEOs or investment bankers tout pre-depreciation figures such as EBITDA as a valuation guide, watch their noses lengthen while they speak.
折旧费用更为复杂，但几乎总是真实成本。伯克希尔即是如此。我曾希望仅投入低于折旧费用即可保持竞争力，但51年来始终未找到方法。事实上，铁路业务的折旧费用远低于维持正常运营所需资本支出，导致GAAP收益高于真实经济收益（全行业均存在此高估）。当CEO或投行家以EBITDA等税息折旧及摊销前利润作为估值指引时，请注意他们说话时的“匹诺曹效应”。
Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, you should remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report. You should also subtract something to reflect BNSF’s inadequate depreciation charge.
我们的公开盈利报告当然将继续符合GAAP准则。但为贴近真实，建议您加回大部分我们报告的摊销费用，并减去BNSF不足的折旧费用。
# Manufacturing, Service, and Retailing Operations
制造、服务与零售业务
Let’s get back to our many manufacturing, service, and retailing operations, which sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of this sector’s businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%.
让我们回到覆盖从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机的制造、服务及零售业务。该板块部分企业的资产收益率极佳：基于无杠杆有形净资产，税后利润率为25%至100%以上；另一些企业的回报率在12%-20%之间。
A few, however – these are serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation – have very poor returns. In most of these cases, I was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operates, and we are now paying the price for my misjudgments. At other times, I stumbled in evaluating either the fidelity or the ability of incumbent managers or ones I later appointed. I will commit more errors; you can count on that. If we luck out, they will occur at our smaller operations.
少数业务（资本配置的重大失误）回报率极低。多数案例中，我对企业或行业的经济特性判断错误，现正为此付出代价；另有部分错误源于对现任或任命的管理者忠诚度或能力评估失误。未来必然还会犯错，但愿集中在小型业务中。
Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $25.6 billion of net tangible assets during 2015 and, despite holding large cash reserves and using minimal leverage, earned 18.4% after-tax on that capital.
整体而言，该板块企业表现优异。2015年平均使用256亿美元有形净资产，尽管持有大量现金且杠杆极低，仍实现18.4%的税后回报率。
Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if bought at too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost reflected in the large goodwill figure. Overall, we are getting a decent return on this sector’s capital. Earnings should grow substantially in 2016 as Duracell and Precision Castparts join the fold.
当然，若收购价格过高，即便优质企业也可能成为糟糕投资。我们为多数业务支付了大幅溢价（体现为巨额商誉），但整体回报率仍合理。2016年随着金霸王（Duracell）和精密铸件公司（PCC）并表，板块盈利将大幅增长。
# Finance and Financial Products
金融及金融产品板块
Our three leasing and rental operations are conducted by CORT (furniture), XTRA (semi-trailers), and Marmon (primarily tank cars but also freight cars, intermodal tank containers and cranes). These companies are industry leaders and have substantially increased their earnings as the American economy has gained strength. At each of the three, we have invested more money in new equipment than have many of our competitors, and that’s paid off. Dealing from strength is one of Berkshire’s enduring advantages.
我们的三项租赁业务由 CORT（家具租赁）、XTRA（半挂车租赁） 和 马蒙集团（以罐车为主，也涉及货车、联运罐箱和起重机） 运营。这些公司是行业领军者，随着美国经济复苏，盈利显著增长。我们在这三个业务上投入的设备资金远超多数竞争对手，这一策略已见成效。以强势地位开展业务是伯克希尔的长期优势之一。
Kevin Clayton has again delivered an industry-leading performance at Clayton Homes, the second-largest home builder in America. Last year, the company sold 34,397 homes, about 45% of the manufactured homes bought by Americans. In contrast, the company was number three in the field, with a 14% share, when Berkshire purchased it in 2003.
凯文·克莱顿（Kevin Clayton） 再次带领 克莱顿房屋公司（Clayton Homes） 取得行业领先地位。作为美国第二大住宅建筑商，该公司去年销售了34,397套预制房屋，占全美同类房屋销量的45%。相比之下，2003年伯克希尔收购时，其市场份额仅为14%，排名第三。
Manufactured homes allow the American dream of home ownership to be achieved by lower-income citizens: Around 70% of new homes costing $150,000 or less come from our industry. About 46% of Clayton’s homes are sold through the 331 stores we ourselves own and operate. Most of Clayton’s remaining sales are made to 1,395 independent retailers.
预制房屋让低收入群体实现美国梦：约70%售价在15万美元以下的新房来自该行业。克莱顿约46%的房屋通过我们自营的331家门店销售，其余主要销往1,395家独立零售商。
Key to Clayton’s operation is its $12.8 billion mortgage portfolio. We originate about 35% of all mortgages on manufactured homes. About 37% of our mortgage portfolio emanates from our retail operation, with the balance primarily originated by independent retailers, some of which sell our homes while others market only the homes of our competitors.
克莱顿的核心是其 128亿美元的抵押贷款组合。我们发放了约35%的预制房屋抵押贷款。其中约37%来自自营零售业务，其余主要由独立零售商发起——部分销售我们的房屋，另一些仅销售竞争对手的产品。
Lenders other than Clayton have come and gone. With Berkshire’s backing, however, Clayton steadfastly financed home buyers throughout the panic days of 2008-2009. Indeed, during that period, Clayton used precious capital to finance dealers who did not sell our homes. The funds we supplied to Goldman Sachs and General Electric at that time produced headlines; the funds Berkshire quietly delivered to Clayton both made home ownership possible for thousands of families and kept many non-Clayton dealers alive.
除克莱顿外，其他贷款机构纷纷退出市场。但凭借伯克希尔支持，克莱顿在2008-2009年金融危机期间持续提供住房融资。彼时，我们甚至动用宝贵资本为非克莱顿经销商提供融资。当时向高盛和通用电气注资的新闻引发关注，而伯克希尔对克莱顿的默默支持既帮助数万家庭圆了住房梦，也维持了非克莱顿经销商的生存。
# Mortgage Origination and Risk Management
抵押贷款发放与风险管理
Mortgage-origination practices are of great importance to both the borrower and to society. There is no question that reckless practices in home lending played a major role in bringing on the financial panic of 2008, which in turn led to the Great Recession. In the years preceding the meltdown, a destructive and often corrupt pattern of mortgage creation flourished whereby (1) an originator in, say, California would make loans and (2) promptly sell them to an investment or commercial bank in, say, New York, which would package many mortgages to serve as collateral for a dizzyingly complicated array of mortgage-backed securities to be (3) sold to unwitting institutions around the world.
抵押贷款发放实践对借款人和全社会均至关重要。毫无疑问，2008年金融危机及随后的大萧条，正是由住房贷款中不负责任的操作引发。危机前数年，一种破坏性且常涉腐败的模式盛行：（1）加州等地的贷款方发放贷款后，（2）迅速将其卖给纽约等地的投行或商业银行，后者将大量抵押贷款打包为复杂的抵押贷款支持证券（MBS），（3）最终出售给全球不明真相的机构投资者。
As if these sins weren’t sufficient to create an unholy mess, imaginative investment bankers sometimes concocted a second layer of sliced-up financing whose value depended on the junkier portions of primary offerings. (When Wall Street gets “innovative,” watch out!) While that was going on, I described this “doubling-up” practice as requiring an investor to read tens of thousands of pages of mind-numbing prose to evaluate a single security being offered.
更糟的是，华尔街银行家还创造了第二层融资结构，其价值依赖于原始发行中的垃圾级资产。（当华尔街“创新”时，要当心！）我曾形容这种“叠加操作”需投资者阅读数万页晦涩文件才能评估单个证券价值。
Both the originator and the packager of these financings had no skin in the game and were driven by volume and mark-ups. Many housing borrowers joined the party as well, blatantly lying on their loan applications while mortgage originators looked the other way. Naturally, the gamiest credits generated the most profits. Smooth Wall Street salesmen garnered millions annually by manufacturing products that their customers were unable to understand. (It’s also questionable as to whether the major rating agencies were capable of evaluating the more complex structures. But rate them they did.)
这些融资的发起方和打包方均无自身利益绑定，唯交易量和价差驱动。许多购房者也参与其中，在申请贷款时公然造假，而放贷方却视而不见。自然，风险最高的信贷产生最高利润。华尔街销售精英通过制造客户无法理解的产品，每年轻松赚取数百万美元。（值得怀疑的是，评级机构是否真能评估复杂结构——但他们仍给出了评级。）
Barney Frank, perhaps the most financially-savvy member of Congress during the panic, recently assessed the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, saying, “The one major weakness that I’ve seen in the implementation was this decision by the regulators not to impose risk retention on all residential mortgages.” Today, some legislators and commentators continue to advocate a 1%-to-5% retention by the originator as a way to align its interests with that of the ultimate lender or mortgage guarantor.
危机期间国会中金融知识最丰富的议员巴尼·弗兰克（Barney Frank）近期评价《2010年多德-弗兰克法案》时指出：“监管者未强制所有住宅抵押贷款实施风险留存，这是我看到的最大漏洞。”如今，一些立法者和评论家仍主张发起方留存1%-5%风险，以使其利益与最终放贷方或抵押担保方一致。
At Clayton, our risk retention was, and is, 100%. When we originate a mortgage we keep it (leaving aside the few that qualify for a government guarantee). When we make mistakes in granting credit, we therefore pay a price – a hefty price that dwarfs any profit we realized upon the original sale of the home. Last year we had to foreclose on 8,444 manufactured-housing mortgages at a cost to us of $157 million.
克莱顿的风险留存率始终为 100%。我们发放的抵押贷款自行持有（少数符合政府担保资格的除外）。若信用评估失误，我们承担全部代价——这一代价远超房屋初始销售利润。去年，我们因8,444笔预制房屋贷款违约损失1.57亿美元。
The average loan we made in 2015 was only $59,942, small potatoes for traditional mortgage lenders, but a daunting commitment for our many lower-income borrowers. Our buyer acquires a decent home – take a look at the home we will have on display at our annual meeting – requiring monthly principal-and-interest payments that average $522.
2015年我们发放的平均贷款仅59,942美元，传统房贷机构眼中微不足道，但对众多低收入借款人而言却意义重大。我们的买家可获得体面住房（股东大会将展示样屋），月供本金加利息平均522美元。
Some borrowers, of course, will lose their jobs, and there will be divorces and deaths. Others will get over-extended on credit cards and mishandle their finances. We will lose money then, and our borrower will lose his down payment (though his mortgage payments during his time of occupancy may have been well under rental rates for comparable quarters). Nevertheless, despite the low FICO scores and income of our borrowers, their payment behavior during the Great Recession was far better than that prevailing in many mortgage pools populated by people earning multiples of our typical borrower’s income.
当然，部分借款人会失业、离婚或去世，另一些人可能信用卡过度借贷并误判财务。届时我们会亏损，借款人将损失首付（但居住期间月供可能低于同等租房成本）。然而，尽管我们的借款人信用评分（FICO）和收入较低，大萧条期间其还款表现远超收入数倍于他们的群体所构成的房贷池。
The strong desire of our borrowers to have a home of their own is one reason we’ve done well with our mortgage portfolio. Equally important, we have financed much of the portfolio with floating-rate debt or with short-term fixed-rate debt. Consequently, the incredibly low short-term rates of recent years have provided us a constantly-widening spread between our interest costs and the income we derive from our mortgage portfolio, which bears fixed rates.
借款人对自有住房的强烈渴望是抵押贷款组合表现优异的原因之一。同样重要的是，我们主要通过浮动利率债务或短期固定利率债务为贷款组合融资。因此，近年极低的短期利率使我们的融资成本与固定利率抵押贷款收益之间的利差不断扩大。
Normally, it is risky business to lend long at fixed rates and borrow short as we have been doing at Clayton. Over the years, some important financial institutions have gone broke doing that. At Berkshire, however, we possess a natural offset in that our businesses always maintain at least $20 billion in cash-equivalents that earn short-term rates. More often, our short-term investments are in the $40 billion to $60 billion range. If we have, say, $60 billion invested at 1⁄4% or less, a sharp move to higher short-term rates would bring benefits to us far exceeding the higher financing costs we would incur in funding Clayton’s $13 billion mortgage portfolio. In banking terms, Berkshire is – and always will be – heavily asset-sensitive and will consequently benefit from rising interest rates.
以固定利率长期放贷、以短期利率融资（如克莱顿模式）通常风险极高。历史上，多家金融机构因此破产。但伯克希尔拥有天然对冲：我们的业务始终持有至少200亿美元现金等价物（年化利率随短期利率变动），通常规模在400亿至600亿美元之间。若600亿美元投资于0.25%或更低利率的资产，短期利率上涨将带来的收益远超为克莱顿130亿美元贷款组合融资的额外成本。用银行业的术语来说，伯克希尔始终是“资产敏感型”企业，将从加息中显著受益。
# Regulatory Scrutiny and Performance
监管审查与表现
Let me talk about one subject of which I am particularly proud, that having to do with regulation. The Great Recession caused mortgage originators, servicers and packagers to come under intense scrutiny and to be assessed many billions of dollars in fines and penalties.
我要谈一个特别引以为豪的领域——监管应对。大萧条后，抵押贷款发起方、服务商和打包方面临严格审查，并被处以巨额罚款。
The scrutiny has certainly extended to Clayton, whose mortgage practices have been continuously reviewed and examined in respect to such items as originations, servicing, collections, advertising, compliance, and internal controls. At the federal level, we answer to the Federal Trade Commission（联邦贸易委员会）, the Department of Housing and Urban Development（住房和城市发展部） and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau（消费者金融保护局）. Dozens of states regulate us as well. During the past two years, indeed, various federal and state authorities (from 25 states) examined and reviewed Clayton and its mortgages on 65 occasions. The result? Our total fines during this period were $38,200 and our refunds to customers $704,678. Furthermore, though we had to foreclose on 2.64% of our manufactured-home mortgages last year, 95.4% of our borrowers were current on their payments at yearend, as they moved toward owning a debt-free home.
克莱顿的抵押贷款实践持续接受审查，涵盖发放、服务、催收、广告、合规性和内部控制等环节。联邦层面，我们需向 联邦贸易委员会、住房和城市发展部 和 消费者金融保护局 负责，数十个州政府亦有监管。过去两年，来自25个州的联邦及州监管机构共审查克莱顿及其贷款业务 65次，结果仅被罚款 38,200美元，向客户退还 704,678美元。尽管去年我们对2.64%的预制房屋贷款执行止赎，但年终 95.4%的借款人仍正常还款，逐步实现无债务住房的目标。
# Railcar Fleet and Investment Summary
铁路车辆与投资概览
Marmon’s rail fleet expanded to 133,220 units by yearend, a number significantly increased by the company’s purchase of 25,085 cars from General Electric on September 30. If our fleet was connected to form a single train, the engine would be in Omaha and the caboose in Portland, Maine.
马蒙集团（Marmon）的铁路车辆数量截至年底增至133,220辆，其中9月30日从通用电气收购的25,085辆罐车大幅推动了增长。若将我们的车辆首尾相连组成一列火车，车头将在内布拉斯加州奥马哈，车尾则延伸至缅因州波特兰。
At yearend, 97% of our railcars were leased, with about 15-17% of the fleet coming up for renewal each year. Though “tank cars” sound like vessels carrying crude oil, only about 7% of our fleet carries that product; chemicals and refined petroleum products are the lead items we transport. When trains roll by, look for the UTLX or Procor markings that identify our tank cars. When you spot the brand, puff out your chest; you own a portion of that car.
截至年底，97%的铁路车辆已出租，每年约15%-17%的租赁合同需续约。尽管“罐车”听起来像运输原油，但实际仅7%用于此，主要运输化工产品和精炼石油。当列车驶过时，请留意标有UTLX或Procor的罐车——看到它们请挺起胸膛，因为您拥有这些车辆的部分权益。
# Earnings Recap for Finance and Financial Products Sector
金融及金融产品板块收益概览
| 项目（英文｜中文） | 2015年（百万美元） | 2014年（百万美元） | 2013年（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|---|
| Berkadia (our 50% share)（伯克迪亚（50%权益）） | $74 | $80 | $122 |
| Clayton（克莱顿房屋公司） | $706 | $416 | $558 |
| CORT（家具租赁） | $55 | $42 | $49 |
| Marmon–Containers and Cranes（马蒙集团–集装箱与起重机） | $192 | $226 | $238 |
| Marmon–Railcars（马蒙集团–铁路车辆） | $546 | $353 | $442 |
| XTRA（半挂车租赁） | $172 | $125 | $147 |
| Net financial income*（净金融收入*） | $341 | $322 | $283 |
| 总计 | $2,086 | $1,564 | $1,839 |
- Excludes capital gains or losses（* 排除资本损益）
# Investments: Top 15 Common Stock Holdings
投资：前15大普通股持仓
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding because we are part of a control group and account for it on the “equity” method.
以下列出我们截至年底市值最大的15项普通股投资（不含卡夫亨氏，因其为控股企业，按权益法核算）。
# Berkshire’s Top Equity Investments
伯克希尔前十大股票投资
| Shares（持股数） | Percentage of Company Owned（持股比例） | Company（公司） | Cost（成本，百万美元） | Market (12/31/15)（市值，百万美元） |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | 15.6% | American Express Company（美国运通） | $1,287 | $10,276 |
| 46,577,138 | 0.8% | AT&T（美国电话电报公司） | $1,283 | $16,450 |
| 7,463,157 | 6.6% | Charter Communications, Inc.（宪章通信公司） | $1,202 | $11,152 |
| 400,000,000 | 9.3% | The Coca-Cola Company（可口可乐） | $1,299 | $17,184 |
| 18,513,482 | 8.8% | DaVita HealthCare Partners Inc.（达维塔医疗） | $843 | $2,475 |
| 22,164,450 | 7.0% | Deere & Company（约翰迪尔） | $1,773 | $4,530 |
| 11,390,582 | 2.7% | The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.（高盛集团） | $654 | $4,683 |
| 81,033,450 | 8.4% | International Business Machines Corp.（IBM） | $13,791 | $11,800 |
| 24,669,778 | 12.6% | Moody’s Corporation（穆迪公司） | $248 | $3,893 |
| 55,384,926 | 10.5% | Phillips 66（菲利普斯66能源） | $1,701 | $4,346 |
| 52,477,678 | 1.9% | The Procter & Gamble Company（宝洁公司） | $3,239 | $5,800 |
| 22,169,930 | 1.7% | Sanofi（赛诺菲制药） | $5,530 | $8,612 |
| 101,859,335 | 5.8% | U.S. Bancorp（美国合众银行） | $3,593 | $7,000 |
| 63,507,544 | 2.0% | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.（沃尔玛） | $12,730 | $15,000 |
| 500,000,000 | 9.8% | Wells Fargo & Company（富国银行） | $10,276 | $27,180 |
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market（按市值计价的普通股总值） | $58,612 | $112,338 |
- This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.
- 成本为我们实际购买价格及税务基础；少数情况下，GAAP准则下的“成本”因需按规则调整而不同。
** Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
** 排除伯克希尔子公司养老金持有的股份。
*** Held under contract of sale for this amount.
*** 按销售合同持有该金额。
# Bank of America Warrants: A Hidden Gem
美国银行认股权证：隐藏的瑰宝
Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At yearend these shares were worth $11.8 billion. We are likely to purchase them just before expiration of our option and, if we wish, we can use our $5 billion of Bank of America 6% preferred to fund the purchase. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fourth largest equity investment – and one we value highly.
伯克希尔有一项重大权益投资未列入上表：我们有权在2021年9月前以50亿美元购买美国银行7亿股普通股。截至年底，这些股份价值118亿美元。我们可能在认股权证到期前行使权利，也可选择用持有的50亿美元美国银行6%优先股支付。在此提醒您：美国银行实质上是伯克希尔第四大股票投资，且我们高度看重其价值。
# Productivity and Prosperity
生产力与繁荣
Earlier, I told you how our partners at Kraft Heinz root out inefficiencies, thereby increasing output per hour of employment. That kind of improvement has been the secret sauce of America’s remarkable gains in living standards since the nation’s founding in 1776. Unfortunately, the label of “secret” is appropriate: Too few Americans fully grasp the linkage between productivity and prosperity. To see that connection, let’s look first at the country’s most dramatic example – farming – and later examine three Berkshire-specific areas.
早前我提到，卡夫亨氏的合作伙伴如何消除低效，从而提升每小时劳动产出。这种改进正是自1776年建国以来美国生活水平显著提升的关键。遗憾的是，“秘密”一词恰如其分：太少美国人真正理解生产力与繁荣之间的联系。为了看清这种联系，我们先从最戏剧化的例子——农业——出发，再探讨伯克希尔内部的三个案例。
# Agricultural Revolution: A Century of Gains
农业革命：百年的增长
In 1900, America’s civilian work force numbered 28 million. Of these, 11 million, a staggering 40% of the total, worked in farming. The leading crop then, as now, was corn. About 90 million acres were devoted to its production and the yield per acre was 30 bushels, for a total output of 2.7 billion bushels annually.
1900年，美国非军事劳动力总数为2800万人，其中1100万（占40%）从事农业。当时与现在一样，玉米是主要作物，种植面积9000万英亩，每英亩产量30蒲式耳，年总产量27亿蒲式耳。
Then came the tractor and one innovation after another that revolutionized such keys to farm productivity as planting, harvesting, irrigation, fertilization and seed quality. Today, we devote about 85 million acres to corn. Productivity, however, has improved yields to more than 150 bushels per acre, for an annual output of 13-14 billion bushels. Farmers have made similar gains with other products.
随后拖拉机问世，接着一系列创新彻底改变了播种、收获、灌溉、施肥和种子质量等农业生产力关键环节。如今，玉米种植面积约8500万英亩，单产提升至每英亩150蒲式耳以上，年产量达130-140亿蒲式耳。农民在其他农产品上也实现了类似突破。
Increased yields, though, are only half the story: The huge increases in physical output have been accompanied by a dramatic reduction in the number of farm laborers (“human input”). Today about three million people work on farms, a tiny 2% of our 158-million-person work force. Thus, improved farming methods have allowed tens of millions of present-day workers to utilize their time and talents in other endeavors, a reallocation of human resources that enables Americans of today to enjoy huge quantities of non-farm goods and services they would otherwise lack.
但增产只是故事的一半：实物产出激增的同时，农业劳动力（“人力投入”）数量大幅下降。如今仅300万人从事农业，占1.58亿劳动力的2%。这意味着改进后的农业方法释放了数千万劳动力，使他们转向其他领域，这种人力资源的再分配让现代美国人能享受大量原本无法获得的非农业商品和服务。
It’s easy to look back over the 115-year span and realize how extraordinarily beneficial agricultural innovations have been – not just for farmers but, more broadly, for our entire society. We would not have anything close to the America we now know had we stifled those improvements in productivity. (It was fortunate that horses couldn’t vote.) On a day-to-day basis, however, talk of the “greater good” must have rung hollow to farm hands who lost their jobs to machines that performed routine tasks far more efficiently than humans ever could. We will examine this flip-side to productivity gains later in this section.
回顾这115年，不难发现农业创新带来的巨大利益——不仅惠及农民，更造福整个社会。若当年扼杀这些生产力进步，今天的美国将大不相同。（幸运的是马匹没有投票权。）然而对失去工作机会的农场工人而言，“共同利益”的说辞显得苍白无力——机器以人类无法企及的效率完成常规任务。稍后我们将深入探讨生产力增长的另一面。
# Railroad Efficiency: BNSF’s Transformation
铁路效率：BNSF的转型
In 1947, shortly after the end of World War II, the American workforce totaled 44 million. About 1.35 million workers were employed in the railroad industry. The revenue ton-miles of freight moved by Class I railroads that year totaled 655 billion.
二战刚结束的1947年，美国劳动力总数4400万人，其中135万（占3%）在铁路行业工作。当年一级铁路公司运输收入吨英里达6550亿。
By 2014, Class I railroads carried 1.85 trillion ton-miles, an increase of 182%, while employing only 187,000 workers, a reduction of 86% since 1947. (Some of this change involved passenger-related employees, but most of the workforce reduction came on the freight side.) As a result of this staggering improvement in productivity, the inflation-adjusted price for moving a ton-mile of freight has fallen by 55% since 1947, a drop saving shippers about $90 billion annually in current dollars.
到2014年，一级铁路运输收入吨英里增至1.85万亿（增长182%），而员工仅18.7万人（较1947年减少86%）。（部分裁员涉及客运相关岗位，但多数来自货运部门。）这种惊人的生产力提升使经通胀调整后的每吨英里运输成本下降55%，按当前美元计算，每年为货主节省约900亿美元。
Another startling statistic: If it took as many people now to move freight as it did in 1947, we would need well over three million railroad workers to handle present volumes. (Of course, that level of employment would raise freight charges by a lot; consequently, nothing close to today’s volume would actually move.)
另一个惊人数据：若以1947年的人力密度运输现有货运量，需超300万铁路工人。（当然，如此高的人力成本将推高运费，实际运输量将远低于今日。）
Our own BNSF was formed in 1995 by a merger between Burlington Northern and Santa Fe. In 1996, the merged company’s first full year of operation, 411 million ton-miles of freight were transported by 45,000 employees. Last year the comparable figures were 702 million ton-miles (plus 71%) and 47,000 employees (plus only 4%). That dramatic gain in productivity benefits both owners and shippers. Safety at BNSF has improved as well: Reportable injuries were 2.04 per 200,000 man-hours in 1996 and have since fallen more than 50% to 0.95.
我们旗下的BNSF由伯灵顿北方与南太平洋铁路于1995年合并而成。1996年合并后首年，4.5万人运输了4.11亿吨英里货物。去年，货运量增至7.02亿吨英里（+71%），员工仅4.7万人（+4%）。这种生产力飞跃使股东和货主均受益。BNSF安全记录也同步改善：1996年每20万工时报告工伤2.04起，现已降至0.95起（降幅超50%）。
# Insurance Industry Innovation: From Agency to Direct Distribution
保险业创新：从代理制到直销模式
A bit more than a century ago, the auto was invented, and around it formed an industry that insures cars and their drivers. Initially, this business was written through traditional insurance agencies – the kind dealing in fire insurance. This agency-centric approach included high commissions and other underwriting expenses that consumed about 40¢ of the premium dollar. Strong local agencies were then in the driver’s seat because they represented multiple insurers and could play one company off against another when commissions were being negotiated. Cartel-like pricing prevailed, and all involved were doing fine – except for the consumer.
一个多世纪前，汽车诞生后催生了为其司机提供保障的保险行业。初期，这类业务通过传统火灾险代理销售，代理佣金及其他承保成本占保费的40美分。强势地方代理因代表多家保险公司，可在谈判佣金时左右逢源，形成卡特尔式定价，各方皆大欢喜——除了消费者。
And then some American ingenuity came into play: G. J. Mecherle, a farmer from Merna, Illinois, came up with the idea of a captive sales force that would sell the insurance products of only a single company. His baby was christened State Farm Mutual. The company cut commissions and expenses – moves that permitted lower prices – and soon became a powerhouse. For many decades, State Farm has been the runaway volume leader in both auto and homeowner’s insurance. Allstate, which also operated with a direct distribution model, was long the runner-up. Both State Farm and Allstate have had underwriting expenses of about 25%.
美国式的创新改变了一切：伊利诺伊州梅纳镇的农民G.J.梅彻尔（G. J. Mecherle）提出由专属销售团队销售单一公司产品的模式。他创立的州农场互助保险公司（State Farm Mutual）通过降低佣金和费用实现低价策略，迅速成为行业巨头。过去数十年，州农场在汽车和房屋保险市场稳居销量榜首，全美保险（Allstate）以直销模式长期位居第二。两者承保成本均维持在25%左右。
In the early 1930s, another contender, United Services Auto Association (“USAA”), a mutual-like company, was writing auto insurance for military officers on a direct-to-the-customer basis. This marketing innovation arose from a need that military personnel had to buy insurance that would stay with them as they moved from base to base. That was business of little interest to local insurance agencies, which wanted the steady renewals that came from permanent residents.
1930年代初，另一竞争者——类似互惠公司的美国军人汽车协会（USAA）——开始直接向军官销售汽车保险。这一营销创新源于军职人员的需求：他们需要保险随迁，而非绑定特定驻地。此类业务对依赖本地居民续保的地方代理毫无吸引力。
The direct distribution method of USAA incurred lower costs than State Farm and Allstate, delivering an even greater bargain to customers. That made Leo and Lillian Goodwin, employees of USAA, dream of broadening the target market for its direct distribution model beyond military officers. In 1936, starting with $100,000 of capital, they incorporated Government Employees Insurance Co. (later compressing this mouthful to GEICO).
USAA的直销模式成本低于州农场和全美保险，为客户提供更大实惠。USAA员工利奥和莉莲·古德温（Leo and Lillian Goodwin）由此萌生将直销模式扩展至非军人客户的想法。1936年，他们以10万美元资本成立政府雇员保险公司（后简称GEICO）。
Their fledgling did $238,000 of auto insurance business in 1937, its first full year. Last year GEICO did $22.6 billion, more than double the volume of USAA. (Though the early bird gets the worm, the second mouse gets the cheese.) GEICO’s underwriting expenses in 2015 were 14.7% of premiums, with USAA being the only large company to achieve a lower percentage. (GEICO is fully as efficient as USAA but spends considerably more on advertising aimed at promoting growth.)
1937年开业首年，GEICO汽车险业务规模23.8万美元。去年业务量达226亿美元，是USAA的两倍多。（早起的鸟儿有虫吃，但第二只老鼠也能吃到奶酪。）2015年GEICO承保成本占保费的14.7%，仅略高于USAA，后者是唯一更低的大公司。（GEICO效率与USAA相当，但广告投入更多以促进增长。）
With the price advantage GEICO’s low costs allow, it’s no surprise that several years ago the company seized the number two spot in auto insurance from Allstate. GEICO is also gaining ground on State Farm, though it is still far ahead of us in volume. On August 30, 2030 – my 100th birthday – I plan to announce that GEICO has taken over the top spot. Mark your calendar.
凭借低成本带来的价格优势，GEICO几年前超越全美保险成为行业老二不足为奇。它正逐步追赶州农场，尽管后者体量仍远超我们。2030年8月30日——我100岁生日——我计划宣布GEICO登顶。请标记日历。
GEICO employs about 34,000 people to serve its 14 million policyholders. I can only guess at the workforce it would require to serve a similar number of policyholders under the agency system. I believe, however, that the number would be at least 60,000, a combination of what the insurer would need in direct employment and the personnel required at supporting agencies.
GEICO用约3.4万名员工服务1400万保单持有人。若采用代理制，服务同样数量客户所需的员工数我只能预估：至少需6万人——保险公司直接雇佣人数加上代理机构所需人员的总和。
# The Human Cost of Progress
进步的人力代价
The direct distribution method of USAA and GEICO demonstrates how efficiency gains reshape industries. Yet, as seen in farming and railroads, these advancements often displace workers. While society as a whole benefits from lower costs and higher output, displaced workers face real hardship. This duality – progress for many, pain for some – defines the complexity of productivity growth.
USAA和GEICO的直销模式展现了效率提升如何重塑行业。然而，正如农业和铁路的历史所示，这些进步常以部分岗位流失为代价。尽管社会整体因低成本高产出受益，但失业者面临现实困境。这种二元性——多数人进步，少数人阵痛——正是生产力增长的复杂之处。
# Productivity and Prosperity
生产力与繁荣
In its electric utility business, our Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) operates within a changing economic model. Historically, the survival of a local electric company did not depend on its efficiency. In fact, a “sloppy” operation could do just fine financially.
在电力公用事业领域，我们的**伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）**正面临经济模式的转变。过去，地方电力公司的生存并不依赖效率。事实上，“低效运营”也能在财务上表现良好。
That’s because utilities were usually the sole supplier of a needed product and were allowed to price at a level that gave them a prescribed return upon the capital they employed. The joke in the industry was that a utility was the only business that would automatically earn more money by redecorating the boss’s office. And some CEOs ran things accordingly.
因为公用事业通常是唯一供应商，政府允许其定价达到预设的资本回报率。业内有句玩笑：“装修老板办公室就能自动赚更多钱的企业只有公用事业。”一些CEO据此行事。
That’s all changing. Today, society has decided that federally-subsidized wind and solar generation is in our country’s long-term interest. Federal tax credits are used to implement this policy, support that makes renewables price-competitive in certain geographies. Those tax credits, or other government-mandated help for renewables, may eventually erode the economics of the incumbent utility, particularly if it is a high-cost operator.
这一模式正在改变。如今社会认定联邦补贴的风电和太阳能符合国家长期利益。联邦税收抵免政策推动可再生能源在特定地区具备价格竞争力。这些补贴或政府强制扶持可能侵蚀传统电力公司（尤其是高成本运营商）的经济基础。
BHE’s long-established emphasis on efficiency – even when the company didn’t need it to attain authorized earnings – leaves us particularly competitive in today’s market (and, more important, in tomorrow’s as well).
BHE长期以来对效率的重视——即使过去无需此来实现授权收益——使我们在当前及未来市场均具备竞争力。
# BHE Efficiency Gains: Case Studies
BHE效率提升：案例研究
BHE acquired its Iowa utility in 1999. In the year before, that utility employed 3,700 people and produced 19 million megawatt-hours of electricity. Now we employ 3,500 people and produce 29 million megawatt-hours. That major increase in efficiency allowed us to operate without a rate increase for 16 years, a period during which industry rates increased 44%.
BHE于1999年收购爱荷华州公用事业公司。收购前一年，3,700名员工生产1,900万兆瓦时电力；如今3,500名员工生产2,900万兆瓦时。效率提升使我们在行业电价上涨44%的16年间未提价。
The safety record of our Iowa utility is also outstanding. It had 0.79 injuries per 100 employees in 2015 compared to the rate of 7.0 experienced by the previous owner in the year before we bought the operation.
爱荷华州公用事业的安全记录同样优异：2015年每百名员工工伤率0.79，而我们收购前一年原所有者的工伤率为7.0。
In 2006 BHE purchased PacifiCorp, which operated primarily in Oregon and Utah. The year before our purchase PacifiCorp employed 6,750 people and produced 52.6 million megawatt-hours. Last year the numbers were 5,700 employees and 56.3 million megawatt-hours. Here, too, safety improved dramatically, with the accident rate per 100 employees falling from 3.4 in 2005 to 0.85 in 2015. In safety, BHE now ranks in the industry’s top decile.
2006年BHE收购太平洋公司（PacifiCorp，主要覆盖俄勒冈与犹他州）。收购前一年，6,750名员工生产5,260万兆瓦时；去年员工5,700人，产量5,630万兆瓦时。安全记录同样显著改善：每百名员工事故率从2005年的3.4降至2015年的0.85，现居行业安全前十。
Those outstanding performances explain why BHE is welcomed by regulators when it proposes to buy a utility in their jurisdiction. The regulators know the company will run an efficient, safe and reliable operation and also arrive with unlimited capital to fund whatever projects make sense. (BHE has never paid a dividend to Berkshire since we assumed ownership. No investor-owned utility in America comes close to matching BHE’s enthusiasm for reinvestment.)
这些卓越表现解释了为何BHE在提出收购公用事业时总受监管机构欢迎：他们知道我们将提供高效、安全、可靠的运营，并能以无限资本支持合理项目。（自收购以来BHE从未向伯克希尔分红，美国无一家投资者拥有的公用事业公司能匹配BHE的再投资热情。）
# The Dual Edges of Productivity
生产力的双刃剑
The productivity gains that I’ve just spelled out – and countless others that have been achieved in America – have delivered awesome benefits to society. That’s the reason our citizens, as a whole, have enjoyed – and will continue to enjoy – major gains in the goods and services they receive.
我刚阐述的生产力提升——以及美国实现的无数其他进步——为社会带来巨大福祉。这正是美国民众整体上享受（并将持续享受）商品与服务供给大幅增长的原因。
To this thought there are offsets. First, the productivity gains achieved in recent years have largely benefitted the wealthy. Second, productivity gains frequently cause upheaval: Both capital and labor can pay a terrible price when innovation or new efficiencies upend their worlds.
但存在抵消因素：首先，近年生产力提升主要惠及富裕阶层；其次，效率提升常引发动荡——当创新或新效率颠覆原有生态时，资本与劳动力均可能付出惨痛代价。
We need shed no tears for the capitalists (whether they be private owners or an army of public shareholders). It’s their job to take care of themselves. When large rewards can flow to investors from good decisions, these parties should not be spared the losses produced by wrong choices. Moreover, investors who diversify widely and simply sit tight with their holdings are certain to prosper: In America, gains from winning investments have always far more than offset the losses from clunkers. (During the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrial Average – an index fund of sorts – soared from 66 to 11,497, with its component companies all the while paying ever-increasing dividends.)
对资本家（无论私人所有者还是公众股东）无需同情——这是他们的职责所在。若正确决策带来巨额收益，错误选择的损失也应由其承担。此外，广泛分散并长期持股的投资者必将繁荣：美国历史上，赢家投资的收益始终远超失败投资的损失。（20世纪道琼斯工业平均指数——某种指数基金——从66点升至11,497点，成分股持续支付递增股息。）
A long-employed worker faces a different equation. When innovation and the market system interact to produce efficiencies, many workers may be rendered unnecessary, their talents obsolete. Some can find decent employment elsewhere; for others, that is not an option.
长期就业的工人则面临不同处境。当创新与市场机制共同推动效率提升时，许多工人可能被取代，技能被淘汰。部分人可在别处找到工作，另一些人却无路可走。
When low-cost competition drove shoe production to Asia, our once-prosperous Dexter operation folded, putting 1,600 employees in a small Maine town out of work. Many were past the point in life at which they could learn another trade. We lost our entire investment, which we could afford, but many workers lost a livelihood they could not replace. The same scenario unfolded in slow-motion at our original New England textile operation, which struggled for 20 years before expiring. Many older workers at our New Bedford plant, as a poignant example, spoke Portuguese and knew little, if any, English. They had no Plan B.
当低成本竞争将制鞋业推向亚洲，我们曾繁荣的Dexter业务关闭，缅因州小镇1,600人失业。许多人已无力学习新技能。我们损失了全部投资（尚可承受），但许多工人失去了无法替代的生计。类似场景缓慢发生于新英格兰纺织业务，它挣扎20年后倒闭。以纽贝德福德工厂为例，许多年长工人只会葡萄牙语，英语几乎不会，他们没有“备选方案”。
# The Path Forward: Balancing Progress and Compassion
前进之路：平衡进步与关怀
The answer in such disruptions is not the restraining or outlawing of actions that increase productivity. Americans would not be living nearly as well as we do if we had mandated that 11 million people should forever be employed in farming.
应对这类冲击，答案不是限制或禁止提升生产力的行为。若当年强制1,100万人永久务农，美国生活水平绝非今日景象。
The solution, rather, is a variety of safety nets aimed at providing a decent life for those who are willing to work but find their specific talents judged of small value because of market forces. (I personally favor a reformed and expanded Earned Income Tax Credit that would try to make sure America works for those willing to work.) The price of achieving ever-increasing prosperity for the great majority of Americans should not be penury for the unfortunate.
更优解是建立多元安全网，保障愿意工作但因市场力量失去价值的人群体面生活。（我支持改革并扩大劳动所得税收抵免（EITC），确保美国体系惠及勤劳者。）追求大多数美国人持续繁荣的代价，不应让少数人陷入贫困。
# Important Risks
重要风险
We, like all public companies, are required by the SEC to annually catalog “risk factors” in our 10-K. I can’t remember, however, an instance when reading a 10-K’s “risk” section has helped me in evaluating a business. That’s not because the identified risks aren’t real. The truly important risks, however, are usually well known. Beyond that, a 10-K’s catalog of risks is seldom of aid in assessing: (1) the probability of the threatening event actually occurring; (2) the range of costs if it does occur; and (3) the timing of the possible loss. A threat that will only surface 50 years from now may be a problem for society, but it is not a financial problem for today’s investor.
作为上市公司，我们需按美国证券交易委员会（SEC）要求在10-K文件中列明“风险因素”。但我不记得曾通过阅读10-K的“风险”章节真正帮助评估过一家企业。这并非因为所列风险不真实。但真正重要的风险通常早已众所周知。此外，10-K文件的风险清单对以下三点帮助有限：（1）威胁事件发生的概率；（2）若发生，其成本范围；（3）潜在损失的时间节点。一个50年后才显现的威胁可能是社会问题，但对今日投资者而言并非财务问题。
Berkshire operates in more industries than any company I know of. Each of our pursuits has its own array of possible problems and opportunities. Those are easy to list but hard to evaluate: Charlie, I and our various CEOs often differ in a very major way in our calculation of the likelihood, the timing and the cost (or benefit) that may result from these possibilities.
伯克希尔涉足的行业比任何我所知的公司都多。每个业务领域都有其独特的问题与机遇。这些风险易于列举却难以评估：查理、我及旗下CEO们对可能性、时间点及潜在成本（或收益）的判断常有重大分歧。
Let me mention just a few examples. To begin with an obvious threat, BNSF, along with other railroads, is certain to lose significant coal volume over the next decade. At some point in the future – though not, in my view, for a long time – GEICO’s premium volume may shrink because of driverless cars. This development could hurt our auto dealerships as well. Circulation of our print newspapers will continue to fall, a certainty we allowed for when purchasing them. To date, renewables have helped our utility operation but that could change, particularly if storage capabilities for electricity materially improve. Online retailing threatens the business model of our retailers and certain of our consumer brands. These potentialities are just a few of the negative possibilities facing us – but even the most casual follower of business news has long been aware of them.
仅举几个例子：显而易见的威胁包括BNSF及其他铁路公司未来十年煤炭运输量的显著下降。GEICO的保费规模可能因自动驾驶汽车而缩减（尽管我认为这一变化短期内不会发生），此趋势也可能冲击我们的汽车经销商。印刷报纸发行量将持续下滑，这一点我们在收购时已充分考虑。目前可再生能源利好公用事业运营，但若电力储能技术取得重大突破，这种优势可能逆转。在线零售威胁我们的零售商及部分消费品品牌。这些只是部分负面可能性——即使最不关注商业新闻的人也早已知晓。
None of these problems, however, is crucial to Berkshire’s long-term well-being. When we took over the company in 1965, its risks could have been encapsulated in a single sentence: “The northern textile business in which all of our capital resides is destined for recurring losses and will eventually disappear.” That development, however, was no death knell. We simply adapted. And we will continue to do so.
然而，这些问题对伯克希尔长期健康无实质威胁。1965年接管公司时，风险可用一句话概括：“我们全部资本所在的北方纺织业注定持续亏损并最终消亡。”但这一发展并非绝境。我们只是适应变化，并将继续如此。
Every day Berkshire managers are thinking about how they can better compete in an always-changing world. Just as vigorously, Charlie and I focus on where a steady stream of funds should be deployed. In that respect, we possess a major advantage over one-industry companies, whose options are far more limited. I firmly believe that Berkshire has the money, talent and culture to plow through the sort of adversities I’ve itemized above – and many more – and to emerge with ever-greater earning power.
伯克希尔的管理者每日思考如何在不断变化的世界中更好竞争。查理和我也同样积极寻找资金配置方向。相比之下，单一产业公司的选择远受限制。我坚信伯克希尔拥有足够的资金、人才和文化韧性，能克服上述及更多挑战，并最终实现更强的盈利能力。
# Existential Threats Beyond Control
不可控的生存威胁
There is, however, one clear, present and enduring danger to Berkshire against which Charlie and I are powerless. That threat to Berkshire is also the major threat our citizenry faces: a “successful” (as defined by the aggressor) cyber, biological, nuclear or chemical attack on the United States. That is a risk Berkshire shares with all of American business.
然而，有一项明确、当前存在且持久的威胁让查理和无能为力：针对美国的网络、生物、核或化学攻击（以攻击者定义的“成功”为标准）。这是伯克希尔与全美企业共同面临的威胁。
The probability of such mass destruction in any given year is likely very small. It’s been more than 70 years since I delivered a Washington Post newspaper headlining the fact that the United States had dropped the first atomic bomb. Subsequently, we’ve had a few close calls but avoided catastrophic destruction. We can thank our government – and luck! – for this result.
此类大规模毁灭每年发生的概率极低。自1945年我在《华盛顿邮报》头版报道美国投下首颗原子弹以来，已逾70年。此后虽有过几次危机，但均未引发灾难性后果。我们必须感谢政府——以及运气！——才得以幸免。
Nevertheless, what’s a small probability in a short period approaches certainty in the longer run. (If there is only one chance in thirty of an event occurring in a given year, the likelihood of it occurring at least once in a century is 96.6%.) The added bad news is that there will forever be people and organizations and perhaps even nations that would like to inflict maximum damage on our country. Their means of doing so have increased exponentially during my lifetime. “Innovation” has its dark side.
然而，短期内的小概率事件在长期内几乎必然发生。（若某年仅有1/30的概率，百年内至少发生一次的概率为96.6%。）更糟的是，永远有人、组织甚至国家企图对我国造成最大破坏。我的一生中，此类手段呈指数级增长。“创新”也有其黑暗面。
There is no way for American corporations or their investors to shed this risk. If an event occurs in the U.S. that leads to mass devastation, the value of all equity investments will almost certainly be decimated.
美国企业及其投资者无法规避此风险。若美国发生大规模灾难，所有股票投资价值几乎必然崩溃。
No one knows what “the day after” will look like. I think, however, that Einstein’s 1949 appraisal remains apt: “I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.”
无人知晓“灾难次日”的景象。但我认为爱因斯坦1949年的预言仍适用：“我不知道第三次世界大战将使用何种武器，但第四次世界大战必将回归木棍和石块。”
# Proxy Proposal on Climate Change
气候变化代理提案
I am writing this section because we have a proxy proposal regarding climate change to consider at this year’s annual meeting. The sponsor would like us to provide a report on the dangers that this change might present to our insurance operation and explain how we are responding to these threats.
撰写本节是因为今年股东大会有一项关于气候变化的代理提案。提案方要求我们报告气候变化可能对保险业务造成的风险，并说明应对措施。
It seems highly likely to me that climate change poses a major problem for the planet. I say “highly likely” rather than “certain” because I have no scientific aptitude and remember well the dire predictions of most “experts” about Y2K. It would be foolish, however, for me or anyone to demand 100% proof of huge forthcoming damage to the world if that outcome seemed at all possible and if prompt action had even a small chance of thwarting the danger.
气候变化对地球构成重大问题的可能性极高。我用“极高”而非“确定”，因我非科学专家，且记得当年Y2000问题被“专家”过度渲染的教训。但若全球性灾难看似可能，即使行动仅有微小成功机会，要求100%证据才是愚蠢的。
This issue bears a similarity to Pascal’s Wager on the Existence of God. Pascal, it may be recalled, argued that if there were only a tiny probability that God truly existed, it made sense to behave as if He did because the rewards could be infinite whereas the lack of belief risked eternal misery. Likewise, if there is only a 1% chance the planet is heading toward a truly major disaster and delay means passing a point of no return, inaction now is foolhardy. Call this Noah’s Law: If an ark may be essential for survival, begin building it today, no matter how cloudless the skies appear.
此问题类似帕斯卡关于上帝存在的赌注理论。帕斯卡认为，即使上帝存在概率极低，信仰祂仍是理性选择——因信仰可能带来无限回报，而否定则面临永恒痛苦。同理，若地球面临重大灾难的概率仅1%，且延迟行动将错过最后窗口，此时无所作为才是愚蠢的。不妨称其为诺亚法则：若方舟是生存必需品，无论天空多么晴朗，今天就该开始建造。
It’s understandable that the sponsor of the proxy proposal believes Berkshire is especially threatened by climate change because we are a huge insurer, covering all sorts of risks. The sponsor may worry that property losses will skyrocket because of weather changes. And such worries might, in fact, be warranted if we wrote ten- or twenty-year policies at fixed prices. But insurance policies are customarily written for one year and repriced annually to reflect changing exposures. Increased possibilities of loss translate promptly into increased premiums.
提案方认为气候变化对伯克希尔构成特殊威胁可以理解，因我们是全球大型保险公司，覆盖各类风险。他们可能担忧极端天气导致财产损失激增。但若我们出售的是十年或二十年固定价格保单，此类担忧才合理。实际上，保险合同通常一年一签，保费会根据风险变化年度调整。损失风险上升会立即反映为保费上涨。
Think back to 1951 when I first became enthused about GEICO. The company’s average loss-per-policy was then about $30 annually. Imagine your reaction if I had predicted then that in 2015 the loss costs would increase to about $1,000 per policy. Wouldn’t such skyrocketing losses prove disastrous, you might ask? Well, no.
回顾1951年我首次投资GEICO时，每份保单年均赔付约30美元。若当时我预言2015年赔付成本将升至1000美元，您或许会认为灾难降临？但事实并非如此。
Over the years, inflation has caused a huge increase in the cost of repairing both the cars and the humans involved in accidents. But these increased costs have been promptly matched by increased premiums. So, paradoxically, the upward march in loss costs has made insurance companies far more valuable. If costs had remained unchanged, Berkshire would now own an auto insurer doing $600 million of business annually rather than one doing $23 billion.
多年通胀推高了事故车辆维修和伤者赔偿成本。但保费同步上涨抵消了这一压力。矛盾的是，损失成本攀升反而提升了保险公司的价值。若成本不变，伯克希尔如今拥有的汽车保险公司年保费仅6亿美元，而非230亿美元。
Up to now, climate change has not produced more frequent nor more costly hurricanes nor other weather-related events covered by insurance. As a consequence, U.S. super-cat rates have fallen steadily in recent years, which is why we have backed away from that business. If super-cats become costlier and more frequent, the likely – though far from certain – effect on Berkshire’s insurance business would be to make it larger and more profitable.
迄今为止，气候变化未导致飓风或其他天气事件频率或成本上升。因此，美国超级巨灾保险费率近年持续下降，这也是我们退出该业务的原因。若超级巨灾频发且损失加剧，伯克希尔保险业务可能反而因保费上涨而壮大获利（尽管结果远非确定）。
As a citizen, you may understandably find climate change keeping you up at night. As a homeowner in a low-lying area, you may wish to consider moving. But when you are thinking only as a shareholder of a major insurer, climate change should not be on your list of worries.
作为公民，您可能因气候变化彻夜难眠；作为低洼地区房主，您或许该考虑搬家。但若您仅以大型保险公司股东身份思考，气候变化不应列入担忧清单。
# The Annual Meeting
股东大会
Charlie and I have finally decided to enter the 21st Century. Our annual meeting this year will be webcast worldwide in its entirety. To view the meeting, simply go to Yahoo Finance Livestream (opens new window) at 9 a.m. Central Daylight Time on Saturday, April 30th. The Yahoo! webcast will begin with a half hour of interviews with managers, directors and shareholders. Then, at 9:30, Charlie and I will commence answering questions.
查理和我终于决定拥抱21世纪。今年股东大会将首次通过雅虎财经平台全球直播。请于4月30日（周六）美国中部夏令时上午9点访问直播链接 (opens new window)观看。直播将以30分钟的管理层、董事及股东访谈开场，随后于9:30开始问答环节。
# Rationale for Webcasting
直播股东大会的原因
This new arrangement will serve two purposes. First, it may level off or modestly decrease attendance at the meeting. Last year’s record of more than 40,000 attendees strained our capacity. In addition to quickly filling the CenturyLink Center’s main arena, we packed its overflow rooms and then spilled into two large meeting rooms at the adjoining Omaha Hilton. All major hotels were sold out notwithstanding Airbnb’s stepped-up presence. Airbnb was especially helpful for those visitors on limited budgets.
这一安排出于两个目的：第一，控制参会人数。去年超40,000人参会已超出场地负荷。除主会场CenturyLink中心迅速满员外，溢出会场和毗邻的奥马哈希尔顿酒店的两个大会议室也座无虚席。尽管Airbnb房源增加，主要酒店仍一房难求，后者为预算有限的访客提供了便利。
Our second reason for initiating a webcast is more important. Charlie is 92, and I am 85. If we were partners with you in a small business, and were charged with running the place, you would want to look in occasionally to make sure we hadn’t drifted off into la-la land. Shareholders, in contrast, should not need to come to Omaha to monitor how we look and sound. (In making your evaluation, be kind: Allow for the fact that we didn’t look that impressive when we were at our best.)
第二，适应年龄现实。查理92岁，我85岁。若我们是合伙经营的小企业，您或许会定期到访确保我们未脱离正轨。但股东无需亲临奥马哈监督我们的状态（评估时请宽容：我们最佳状态时也不算惊艳）。
# Berkshire’s Culinary Traditions
饮食传统
Viewers can also observe our life-prolonging diet. During the meeting, Charlie and I will each consume enough Coke, See’s fudge and See’s peanut brittle to satisfy the weekly caloric needs of an NFL lineman. Long ago we discovered a fundamental truth: There’s nothing like eating carrots and broccoli when you’re really hungry – and want to stay that way.
观众还可“观摩”我们的长寿饮食。会议期间，查理和我将消耗足够多的可乐、See’s软糖和花生脆糖——足以满足NFL前锋一周的热量需求。我们早已领悟真理：当你真饿了且想保持饥饿感时，胡萝卜和西蓝花无可替代。
# Meeting Logistics and Activities
会议安排与活动
Shareholders planning to attend the meeting should come at 7 a.m. when the doors open at CenturyLink Center and start shopping. Carrie Sova will again be in charge of the festivities. She had her second child late last month, but that did not slow her down. Carrie is unflappable, ingenious and expert at bringing out the best in those who work with her. She is aided by hundreds of Berkshire employees from around the country and by our entire home office crew as well, all of them pitching in to make the weekend fun and informative for our owners.
计划参会的股东请于7:00 a.m抵达CenturyLink中心，届时商场同步开放。卡莉·索瓦（Carrie Sova）将继续主持活动策划。她上月刚诞下二胎，但工作节奏未受影响。卡莉冷静睿智，善于激发团队潜能，并得到数百名来自各地员工及总部团队的全力支持，共同打造股东们的欢乐周末。
Last year we increased the number of hours available for shopping at the CenturyLink. Sales skyrocketed – so, naturally, we will stay with the new schedule. On Friday, April 29th you can shop between noon and 5 p.m., and on Saturday exhibits and stores will be open from 7 a.m. until 4:30 p.m.
去年我们延长了CenturyLink中心的购物时间，销售额激增。今年延续此安排：4月29日（周五）12:00-17:00开放，周六7:00-16:30开放。
On Saturday morning, we will have our fifth International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will again be a Clayton Home porch, located precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. When I was a teenager – in my one brief flirtation with honest labor – I delivered about 500,000 papers. So I think I’m pretty good at this game. Challenge me! Humiliate me! Knock me down a peg! The papers will run 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed).
周六上午将举行第五届国际报纸投掷挑战赛。目标仍是距投掷线35英尺的Clayton房屋门廊。青少年时期短暂送报经历（约50万份）让我自信擅长此游戏。挑战我吧！击败我！让股神低头！参赛报纸需自行折叠（禁用橡皮筋），每份36-42页。
The competition begins at 7:15, when contestants will make preliminary tosses. The eight throws judged most accurate – four made by contestants 12 or under, and four made by the older set – will compete against me at 7:45. The young challengers will each receive a prize. But the older ones will have to beat me to take anything home.
比赛流程：7:15预赛，8名优胜者（4名12岁以下儿童+4名成人）将于7:45挑战我本人。儿童组人人有奖，成人组需战胜我方可获奖。
And be sure to check out the Clayton home itself. It can be purchased for $78,900, fully installed on land you provide. In past years, we’ve made many sales on the meeting day. Kevin Clayton will be on hand with his order book.
别错过Clayton房屋本尊。该房屋可购买（78,900美元，不含土地），往年会议日销量可观。凯文·克莱顿（Kevin Clayton）将携订单簿现场坐镇。
At 8:30 a.m., a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (including a break for lunch at CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30 p.m. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45 p.m. This business session typically lasts only a half hour or so and can safely be skipped by those craving a little last-minute shopping.
8:30 a.m.播放伯克希尔新宣传片，9:30 a.m.开始问答环节（含午餐时段），持续至15:30。短暂休会后，15:45召开正式股东大会，约半小时即可结束，购物爱好者可安心血拼。
# Exhibits and Special Events
展览与特别活动
Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries will be for sale. Say hello to the many Berkshire managers who will be captaining their exhibits. And be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad layout that salutes all of our subsidiaries. Your children (and you!) will be enchanted with it.
购物区占地194,300平方英尺，数十家子公司参展。欢迎向驻守展位的管理者们问好，并务必参观BNSF铁路模型展台——它将致敬伯克希尔所有子公司，孩子（和您自己）定会着迷。
We will have a new and very special exhibit in the hall this year: a full-size model of the world’s largest aircraft engine, for which Precision Castparts makes many key components. The real engines weigh about 20,000 pounds and are ten feet in diameter and 22 feet in length. The bisected model at the meeting will give you a good look at many PCC components that help power your flights.
今年新增全球最大航空发动机全尺寸模型，展示精密铸件公司（PCC）制造的关键部件。真实发动机重20,000磅，直径10英尺，长22英尺。现场剖面模型将让您一窥PCC如何助力飞行。
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them on Sunday at our fourth annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide sent with your meeting credentials. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in; the fudge and peanut brittle take their toll.) Participation in the 5K grows every year. Help us set another record.
旗下跑鞋品牌Brooks将推出纪念款。购买后可参加周日清晨8:00在CenturyLink起跑的第四届“伯克希尔5公里跑”。完整参赛信息见随入场凭证发送的《游客指南》，您将与众多伯克希尔管理者、董事及合伙人同跑。（查理和我将缺席——软糖和花生糖已耗尽精力。）5公里跑参与人数年年破纪录，期待您再创新高。
A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money. Spend the savings on our other products.
GEICO展位将由全国顶尖顾问驻场提供报价服务。多数情况下，股东可享8%专属折扣（44个司法辖区允许此优惠）。若您符合其他折扣条件（如特定团体），此折扣不可叠加。（请携带现有保单详情对比价格，省下的钱可用于购买伯克希尔其他产品。）
# Book Exhibits and Special Offers
书籍展览与特别优惠
Be sure to visit the Bookworm（书虫展台）. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. Andy Kilpatrick will introduce (and be glad to sign) the latest edition of his all-encompassing coverage of Berkshire. It’s 1,304 pages and weighs 9.8 pounds. (My blurb for the book: “Ridiculously skimpy.”) Check out Peter Bevelin’s new book as well. Peter has long been a keen observer of Berkshire.
务必参观书虫展台（Bookworm），将展售约35本书籍及DVD，包括数本新书。安迪·基尔帕特里克（Andy Kilpatrick）将携其全面记录伯克希尔的新版著作亮相（含签名版）。该书厚达1,304页，重达9.8磅。（我的推荐语：“内容过于精简。”）彼得·贝维林（Peter Bevelin）的新书也值得关注，他长期密切观察伯克希尔动态。
We will also have a new, 20-page-longer edition of Berkshire’s 50-year commemorative book that at last year’s meeting sold 12,000 copies. Since then, Carrie and I have uncovered additional material that we find fascinating, such as some very personal letters sent by Grover Cleveland to Edward Butler, his friend and the then-publisher of The Buffalo News. Nothing from the original edition has been changed or eliminated, and the price remains $20. Charlie and I will jointly sign 100 copies that will be randomly placed among the 5,000 available for sale at the meeting.
我们还将推出伯克希尔50周年纪念书的新增20页版本，去年售出12,000本。新增内容包含格罗弗·克利夫兰（Grover Cleveland）致其好友兼《布法罗新闻报》前出版人爱德华·巴特勒（Edward Butler）的私人信件等珍贵资料。原版内容未作任何修改，价格仍为20美元。查理和我将联合签署100本，随机混入5,000本销售中。
# Special Guest Authors and Events
特邀作者与活动
My friend, Phil Beuth, has written Limping on Water, an autobiography that chronicles his life at Capital Cities Communications and tells you a lot about its leaders, Tom Murphy and Dan Burke. These two were the best managerial duo – both in what they accomplished and how they did it – that Charlie and I ever witnessed. Much of what you become in life depends on whom you choose to admire and copy. Start with Tom Murphy, and you’ll never need a second exemplar.
好友菲尔·贝斯（Phil Beuth）撰写的自传《如履薄冰》（Limping on Water）回顾了他在资本城通讯公司（Capital Cities Communications）的经历，并深度剖析其领导者汤姆·墨菲（Tom Murphy）与丹·伯克（Dan Burke）的管理哲学。查理和我见证过无数管理者，但无人能超越这对搭档的成就与方法。人生高度取决于你选择效仿的榜样——从汤姆·墨菲开始，您无需再找第二位楷模。
Finally, Jeremy Miller has written Warren Buffett’s Ground Rules, a book that will debut at the annual meeting. Mr. Miller has done a superb job of researching and dissecting the operation of Buffett Partnership Ltd. and of explaining how Berkshire’s culture has evolved from its BPL origin. If you are fascinated by investment theory and practice, you will enjoy this book.
最后，杰里米·米勒（Jeremy Miller）的新书《沃伦·巴菲特的投资原则》将在股东大会首发。该书深入解析巴菲特合伙公司（Buffett Partnership Ltd.）的运作，并阐明伯克希尔文化如何从BPL起源演变至今。若您对投资理论与实践感兴趣，这本书不容错过。
# Travel and Accommodation Tips
差旅与住宿建议
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2¹⁄₂ hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.
随代理材料附上的附件将说明如何获取参会及参与其他活动的凭证。航空公司常在伯克希尔周末提高票价。若您远道而来，建议比较飞往堪萨斯城与奥马哈的成本。两城车程约2.5小时，堪萨斯城可能为您节省数百至千美元费用（尤其计划在奥马哈租车者）。省下的钱，请用于支持伯克希尔。
# Nebraska Furniture Mart: Berkshire Weekend Discount
内布拉斯加家具商城：股东周折扣
At Nebraska Furniture Mart（内布拉斯加家具商城）, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year in the week encompassing the meeting, the store did a record $44,239,493 of business. If you repeat that figure to a retailer, he is not going to believe you. (An average week for NFM’s Omaha store – the highest-volume home furnishings store in the United States except for our new Dallas store – is about $9 million.)
位于多奇与太平洋街之间72街占地77英亩的**内布拉斯加家具商城（Nebraska Furniture Mart）**将推出“股东周”专属折扣。去年会议周期间销售额创纪录达44,239,493美元，若告诉其他零售商这一数字，他们一定不信。（商城奥马哈店平日周销售额约900万美元，仅低于新落成的达拉斯店。）
To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 26th and Monday, May 2nd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. During “Berkshire Weekend” NFM will be open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Saturday and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is hosting a picnic to which you are all invited.
享受NFM折扣需在4月26日至5月2日期间购物并出示股东凭证。折扣覆盖多个通常禁止打折的高端品牌，感谢合作方特例支持。股东周期间商城营业时间为：周一至周五10:00-21:00，周六10:00-21:30，周日10:00-20:00。周六17:30-20:00将举办股东专属野餐会，诚邀您参与。
# Borsheims: Shareholder-Only Events
博舍姆珠宝：股东专场活动
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, April 29th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 1st, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. During last year’s Friday-Sunday stretch, the store wrote a sales ticket every 15 seconds that it was open.
博舍姆珠宝（Borsheims）将为股东举办两场专场活动：4月29日（周五）18:00-21:00鸡尾酒会，5月1日（周日）09:00-16:00主庆典。周六营业延长至18:00。去年股东周三天期间，商城每开放15秒即售出一张销售单。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 25th through Saturday, May 7th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing you own our stock.
周末博舍姆将人流如潮，为此**股东优惠提前至4月25日（周一）至5月7日（周六）**有效。请出示股东凭证或券商持股证明以享优惠。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. On the upper level, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. I will join them and hope to have Ajit and Charlie there also.
周日，博舍姆外商场将有达拉斯魔术师诺曼·贝克（Norman Beck）表演。二楼平台将有桥牌大师鲍勃·哈曼（Bob Hamman）与莎伦·奥斯伯格（Sharon Osberg）与股东对弈。我将参与其中，并希望阿吉特与查理也能到场。
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she’s a junior at Princeton, having already represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.
周日，好友艾瑞尔·邢（Ariel Hsing）将在商场挑战乒乓球爱好者。我九岁时结识她，当时已无法击败她。如今她是普林斯顿大学学生，曾代表美国参加2012年奥运会。若您不介意被碾压，下午1点起可挑战她。比尔·盖茨和我将率先出场，试图消耗她的体力。
# Dining and Meeting Logistics
餐饮与会议安排
Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 1st, serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before). As for my other favorite restaurant, Piccolo’s, I’m sad to report it closed.
戈拉特牛排馆（Gorat’s）将在5月1日（周日）13:00-22:00专为股东开放。请于4月1日拨打402-551-3733预约（不可提前）。遗憾的是，我的另一家最爱餐厅Piccolo’s已关闭。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are:
Carol Loomis（卡罗尔·卢米斯）, the preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be e-mailed at loomisbrk@gmail.com;
Becky Quick（贝基·奎克）, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com;
Andrew Ross Sorkin（安德鲁·罗斯·索金）, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
我们将延续传统，由以下三位金融记者主持问答环节，转达股东通过邮件提交的问题：
- 卡罗尔·卢米斯（Carol Loomis）：loomisbrk@gmail.com（时代顶尖财经记者）；
- 贝基·奎克（Becky Quick）：BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com（CNBC）；
- 安德鲁·罗斯·索金（Andrew Ross Sorkin）：arsorkin@nytimes.com（《纽约时报》）。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)
每位记者将从提交问题中精选6个最有趣且重要者。记者们建议：问题简洁、提前提交、聚焦伯克希尔、每封邮件限提2个问题，并注明若问题被选中是否希望提及您的姓名。
An accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Cliff Gallant of Nomura Securities. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.
此外，三位分析师将提出问题：保险领域由野村证券克里夫·加兰特（Cliff Gallant）负责，非保险业务由鲁安·卡尼夫与高富（Jonathan Brandt）及晨星公司格雷格·沃伦（Gregg Warren）提问。我们希望他们的问题能深化股东对投资的理解。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. Multi-part questions aren’t allowed; we want to give as many questioners as possible a shot at us.
查理和我将提前获知任何问题。提问者可提出尖锐问题，我们乐于接受挑战。但禁止复合问题，以让更多股东有机会提问。
All told we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. (Last year we had 64 in total.) The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host a drawing.
总计预计至少回答54个问题（分析师与记者各6个，观众18个；去年共64个）。现场观众提问者通过11场抽奖选出，抽奖将于股东大会当日上午8:15举行，主会场及溢出会场的11个麦克风区各抽取1人。
# Transparency in Information Release
信息披露透明度
While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and, if possible, should also have adequate time to digest and analyze it before any trading takes place. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday. We do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders. There is no one more important to us than the shareholder of limited means who trusts us with a substantial portion of his savings.
最后重申信息披露原则：查理和我坚信所有股东应同步获取伯克希尔发布的信息，且在交易前有充足时间消化分析。因此财务数据总在周五晚或周六早发布，股东大会定于周六举行。我们从不单独与机构投资者或分析师私下沟通，视所有股东平等。对我们而言，最重要的股东是那些将毕生积蓄托付给我们的普通人。
# Management Philosophy and Corporate Culture
管理层理念与企业文化
their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I also believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
他们管理业务如同经营家族唯一资产。我深信伯克希尔的管理层比任何大型上市公司都更以股东利益为重。多数管理者无需为生计工作，“打出商业全垒打”的成就感对他们而言与薪酬同样重要。
# The Unsung Heroes: Corporate Office Team
幕后英雄：总部团队
Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 30,400-page Federal income tax return – that’s up 6,000 pages from the prior year! – oversees the filing of 3,530 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities, fact-checks this letter – and the list goes on and on.
同样重要的是与我共事的24名总部员工。他们高效处理SEC监管要求、提交30,400页联邦税申报（比去年多6,000页！）、监督3,530份州税申报、回应无数股东与媒体咨询、发布年报、筹备全美最大规模股东大会、协调董事会活动，并核查本信内容——工作清单长到难以穷尽。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year, for example, they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and french fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day. In fact, my job becomes more fun every year.
他们以无比高效与乐观完成所有任务，让我的工作轻松愉快。他们的付出甚至超出伯克希尔本职：去年协助安排40所高校（从200所申请中甄选）学生来奥马哈与我交流，处理各类请求、安排行程，甚至为我准备午餐汉堡与薯条（当然淋上亨氏番茄酱）。没有CEO的工作能比这更优越；我真觉得每天上班都像跳踢踏舞般开心。事实上，这份工作每年都更有趣。
# Employee Stability: A Unique Trait
员工稳定性：独特优势
In 2015, Berkshire’s revenues increased by $16 billion. Look carefully, however, at the two pictures on the facing page. The top one is from last year’s report and shows the entire Berkshire home-office crew at our Christmas lunch. Below that photo is this year’s Christmas photo portraying the same 25 people identically positioned. In 2015, no one joined us, no one left. And the odds are good that you will see a photo of the same 25 next year.
2015年伯克希尔收入增长160亿美元。但请细看下一页的两张照片：上方是去年圣诞聚餐的总部团队合影，下方是今年完全相同的25人位置合影。2015年无人加入，无人离职。明年您很可能再次看到这25人的面孔。
Can you imagine another very large company – we employ 361,270 people worldwide – enjoying that kind of employment stability at headquarters? At Berkshire we have hired some wonderful people – and they have stayed with us. Moreover, no one is hired unless he or she is truly needed. That’s why you’ve never read about “restructuring” charges at Berkshire.
您能想象另一家拥有361,270名全球员工的大型企业，总部团队如此稳定吗？我们在总部招聘了优秀人才，他们选择留下。更关键的是，我们绝不因非必要需求而增员。这正是伯克希尔从未有过“重组费用”的原因。
# Invitation to the Annual Meeting
股东大会邀约
On April 30th, come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – and meet my gang. They are the best.
4月30日，请亲临资本主义发源地——奥马哈，与我的团队见面。他们是全美最顶尖的团队。
February 27, 2016
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
2016年2月27日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席