1985巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.（伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司）
# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:（致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东）
You may remember the wildly upbeat message of last year’s report: nothing much was in the works but our experience had been that something big popped up occasionally. This carefully-crafted corporate strategy paid off in 1985. Later sections of this report discuss (a) our purchase of a major position in Capital Cities/ABC, (b) our acquisition of Scott & Fetzer, (c) our entry into a large, extended term participation in the insurance business of Fireman’s Fund, and (d) our sale of our stock in General Foods.
你或许还记得去年年报中充满乐观的表述：当时虽无太多重大进展，但根据我们的经验，偶尔会有大型机会出现。这一精心制定的公司战略在1985年收获了成效。本报告后续章节将讨论以下事项：（a）我们购入资本城/美国广播公司（Capital Cities/ABC）的大量股权；（b）我们收购斯科特-费策公司（Scott & Fetzer）；（c）我们大规模、长期参与消防员基金（Fireman’s Fund）的保险业务；（d）我们出售所持通用食品公司（General Foods）的股票。
Our gain in net worth during the year was $613.6 million, or 48.2%. It is fitting that the visit of Halley’s Comet coincided with this percentage gain: neither will be seen again in my lifetime. Our gain in per-share book value over the last twenty-one years (that is, since present management took over) has been from $19.46 to $1643.71, or 23.2% compounded annually, another percentage that will not be repeated.
本年度我们的净资产增长了6.136亿美元，增幅为48.2%。哈雷彗星的到访与这一增幅同时出现，可谓恰到好处——因为在我的有生之年，二者都不会再出现了。过去21年（即自现任管理层接手以来），我们的每股账面价值从19.46美元增长至1643.71美元，年复合增长率为23.2%，这一百分比同样难以重现。
Two factors make anything approaching this rate of gain unachievable in the future. One factor probably transitory - is a stock market that offers very little opportunity compared to the markets that prevailed throughout much of the 1964-1984 period. Today we cannot find significantly-undervalued equities to purchase for our insurance company portfolios. The current situation is 180 degrees removed from that existing about a decade ago, when the only question was which bargain to choose.
有两个因素导致未来无法实现接近这一水平的增长率。第一个因素或许是暂时的——当前股市的机会远少于1964-1984年大部分时间里的市场。如今，我们无法为保险公司的投资组合找到明显被低估的股票来买入。当前形势与大约十年前截然相反，那时唯一的问题是该选择哪一个廉价标的。
This change in the market also has negative implications for our present portfolio. In our 1974 annual report I could say: “We consider several of our major holdings to have great potential for significantly increased values in future years.” I can’t say that now. It’s true that our insurance companies currently hold major positions in companies with exceptional underlying economics and outstanding managements, just as they did in 1974. But current market prices generously appraise these attributes, whereas they were ignored in 1974. Today’s valuations mean that our insurance companies have no chance for future portfolio gains on the scale of those achieved in the past.
市场的这一变化也对我们当前的投资组合产生了负面影响。在1974年的年报中，我曾表示：“我们认为，我们持有的几只主要股票在未来几年具有大幅增值的巨大潜力。”如今我无法再这样说。诚然，我们的保险公司目前所持有的主要股权，其标的公司仍具备出色的内在经济价值和优秀的管理层，与1974年时一致。但当前的市场价格已充分反映了这些优势，而1974年时这些优势却被市场忽视。如今的估值水平意味着，我们的保险公司未来无法再实现过去那种规模的投资组合收益。
The second negative factor, far more telling, is our size. Our equity capital is more than twenty times what it was only ten years ago. And an iron law of business is that growth eventually dampens exceptional economics. just look at the records of high-return companies once they have amassed even $1 billion of equity capital. None that I know of has managed subsequently, over a ten-year period, to keep on earning 20% or more on equity while reinvesting all or substantially all of its earnings. Instead, to sustain their high returns, such companies have needed to shed a lot of capital by way of either dividends or repurchases of stock. Their shareholders would have been far better off if all earnings could have been reinvested at the fat returns earned by these exceptional businesses. But the companies simply couldn’t turn up enough high-return opportunities to make that possible.
第二个负面因素——也更为关键——是我们的规模。我们的权益资本仅在十年间就增长了二十多倍。而商业世界的一条铁律是：规模增长最终会削弱出色的经济效益。只需看看那些高回报率公司的记录——一旦它们的权益资本达到10亿美元，后续表现便会变化。据我所知，没有任何一家公司在权益资本达到这一规模后，还能在十年间持续实现20%或更高的净资产收益率，同时将全部或绝大部分盈利用于再投资。相反，为了维持高回报率，这些公司不得不通过分红或股票回购的方式大量返还资本。如果这些优秀企业的全部盈利都能以其自身实现的丰厚回报率进行再投资，股东们的收益本会高得多。但问题在于，这些公司根本找不到足够多的高回报机会来实现这一点。
Their problem is our problem. Last year I told you that we needed profits of $3.9 billion over the ten years then coming up to earn 15% annually. The comparable figure for the ten years now ahead is $5.7 billion, a 48% increase that corresponds - as it must mathematically - to the growth in our capital base during 1985. (Here’s a little perspective: leaving aside oil companies, only about 15 U.S. businesses have managed to earn over $5.7 billion during the past ten years.)
它们的问题也是我们的问题。去年我曾告诉大家，要在接下来的十年间实现15%的年回报率，我们需要创造39亿美元的利润。而对于当前即将开启的十年，这一数字已变为57亿美元——增幅达48%。从数学角度而言，这一增长必然与我们1985年资本基础的扩大相匹配。（不妨参考一个数据：不包括石油公司在内，过去十年间，仅有约15家美国企业的盈利超过了57亿美元。）
Charlie Munger, my partner in managing Berkshire, and I are reasonably optimistic about Berkshire’s ability to earn returns superior to those earned by corporate America generally, and you will benefit from the company’s retention of all earnings as long as those returns are forthcoming. We have several things going for us: (1) we don’t have to worry about quarterly or annual figures but, instead, can focus on whatever actions will maximize long-term value; (2) we can expand the business into any areas that make sense - our scope is not circumscribed by history, structure, or concept; and (3) we love our work. All of these help. Even so, we will also need a full measure of good fortune to average our hoped-for 15% - far more good fortune than was required for our past 23.2%.
我与管理伯克希尔的合伙人查理·芒格（Charlie Munger）对伯克希尔的盈利能力持审慎乐观态度，我们相信公司能够实现高于美国企业平均水平的回报率。只要能持续实现这一回报率，公司留存全部盈利的策略就会为你带来收益。我们拥有几项优势：（1）我们无需担忧季度或年度业绩数字，而是可以专注于采取能最大化长期价值的行动；（2）我们可以将业务拓展到任何合理的领域——我们的业务范围不受历史、结构或理念的限制；（3）我们热爱自己的工作。这些优势都有所助益。即便如此，要实现我们期望的15%年均回报率，仍需要足够的好运——所需的好运远多于我们过去实现23.2%回报率时。
We need to mention one further item in the investment equation that could affect recent purchasers of our stock. Historically, Berkshire shares have sold modestly below intrinsic business value. With the price there, purchasers could be certain (as long as they did not experience a widening of this discount) that their personal investment experience would at least equal the financial experience of the business. But recently the discount has disappeared, and occasionally a modest premium has prevailed.
在投资等式中，还有一个事项需要提及，它可能会影响近期买入我们股票的投资者。从历史上看，伯克希尔的股价一直略低于其内在业务价值。在这样的价格水平下，投资者可以确信（只要这一折价幅度没有扩大），他们个人的投资收益至少会与公司的财务业绩持平。但最近，这一折价已消失，有时股价甚至会略高于内在价值（即出现小幅溢价）。
The elimination of the discount means that Berkshire’s market value increased even faster than business value (which, itself, grew at a pleasing pace). That was good news for any owner holding while that move took place, but it is bad news for the new or prospective owner. If the financial experience of new owners of Berkshire is merely to match the future financial experience of the company, any premium of market value over intrinsic business value that they pay must be maintained.
折价的消失意味着，伯克希尔的市值增长速度甚至超过了其业务价值的增长速度（而业务价值本身的增长已相当可观）。对于在这一过程中持有股票的股东而言，这是好消息，但对于新投资者或潜在投资者来说，却是坏消息。如果伯克希尔新股东的投资收益仅能与公司未来的财务业绩持平，那么他们买入时所支付的、市值高于内在业务价值的那部分溢价必须持续存在（否则其收益将低于公司业绩）。
Management cannot determine market prices, although it can, by its disclosures and policies, encourage rational behavior by market participants. My own preference, as perhaps you’d guess, is for a market price that consistently approximates business value. Given that relationship, all owners prosper precisely as the business prospers during their period of ownership. Wild swings in market prices far above and below business value do not change the final gains for owners in aggregate; in the end, investor gains must equal business gains. But long periods of substantial undervaluation and/or overvaluation will cause the gains of the business to be inequitably distributed among various owners, with the investment result of any given owner largely depending upon how lucky, shrewd, or foolish he happens to be.
管理层无法决定股价，但可以通过信息披露和政策制定，鼓励市场参与者采取理性行为。或许你能猜到，我个人更倾向于股价始终接近公司的业务价值。在这种情况下，所有股东在其持股期间的收益，都将与公司的发展完全同步。股价大幅波动、远超或远低于业务价值，并不会改变全体股东的最终总收益；归根结底，投资者的总收益必然等于公司的总收益。但长期的大幅低估或高估，会导致公司的收益在不同股东之间分配不均，单个股东的投资结果在很大程度上取决于他的运气、判断力，或是是否做出了不明智的决策。
Over the long term there has been a more consistent relationship between Berkshire’s market value and business value than has existed for any other publicly-traded equity with which I am familiar. This is a tribute to you. Because you have been rational, interested, and investment-oriented, the market price for Berkshire stock has almost always been sensible. This unusual result has been achieved by a shareholder group with unusual demographics: virtually all of our shareholders are individuals, not institutions. No other public company our size can claim the same.
长期来看，伯克希尔的市值与业务价值之间的关联性，比我所了解的任何其他上市公司股票都更为稳定。这要归功于你们。正因为你们理性、关注公司且以投资为导向，伯克希尔的股价几乎始终处于合理水平。这一非凡成果由一个结构特殊的股东群体实现：我们几乎所有股东都是个人，而非机构。规模与我们相当的其他上市公司，均无法做到这一点。
You might think that institutions, with their large staffs of highly-paid and experienced investment professionals, would be a force for stability and reason in financial markets. They are not: stocks heavily owned and constantly monitored by institutions have often been among the most inappropriately valued.
你或许会认为，机构拥有大量高薪且经验丰富的投资专业人士，理应成为金融市场稳定与理性的推动力量。但事实并非如此：那些被机构大量持有且持续关注的股票，往往是估值最不合理的标的之一。
Ben Graham told a story 40 years ago that illustrates why investment professionals behave as they do: An oil prospector, moving to his heavenly reward, was met by St. Peter with bad news. “You’re qualified for residence”, said St. Peter, “but, as you can see, the compound reserved for oil men is packed. There’s no way to squeeze you in.” After thinking a moment, the prospector asked if he might say just four words to the present occupants. That seemed harmless to St. Peter, so the prospector cupped his hands and yelled, “Oil discovered in hell.” Immediately the gate to the compound opened and all of the oil men marched out to head for the nether regions. Impressed, St. Peter invited the prospector to move in and make himself comfortable. The prospector paused. “No,” he said, “I think I’ll go along with the rest of the boys. There might be some truth to that rumor after all.”
40年前，本杰明·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）曾讲过一个故事，用以解释投资专业人士为何会有这样的行为：一位石油勘探者升入天堂，却被圣彼得告知了一个坏消息。“你有资格在此居住，”圣彼得说，“但你也看到了，留给石油从业者的区域已经满了，实在挤不下你了。”勘探者思索片刻后，问能否对当前居住在那里的人说四个字。圣彼得觉得这并无不妥，于是勘探者双手拢在嘴边大喊：“地狱发现石油！”话音刚落，那片区域的大门便打开了，所有石油从业者都列队前往地狱。圣彼得对此印象深刻，邀请勘探者入住并安心生活。但勘探者却犹豫了。“不了，”他说，“我想我还是跟其他人一起去吧。毕竟那个传言说不定真有几分道理。”
# Sources of Reported Earnings（财报收益来源）
The table on the next page shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. These numbers, along with far more detailed sub-segment numbers, are the ones that Charlie and I focus upon. We do not find consolidated figures an aid in either managing or evaluating Berkshire and, in fact, never prepare them for internal use.
下一页的表格列出了伯克希尔财报收益的主要来源。我和查理关注的正是这些数据，以及更为详细的细分业务数据。我们认为合并数据对管理或评估伯克希尔并无帮助，事实上，我们从未为内部使用而编制合并数据。
Segment information is equally essential for investors wanting to know what is going on in a multi-line business. Corporate managers always have insisted upon such information before making acquisition decisions but, until a few years ago, seldom made it available to investors faced with acquisition and disposition decisions of their own. Instead, when owners wishing to understand the economic realities of their business asked for data, managers usually gave them a we-can’t-tell-you-what-is-going-on-because-it-would-hurt-the-company answer. Ultimately the SEC ordered disclosure of segment data and management began supplying real answers. The change in their behavior recalls an insight of Al Capone: “You can get much further with a kind word and a gun than you can with a kind word alone.”
对于希望了解多元化业务公司运营情况的投资者而言，细分业务信息同样至关重要。公司管理层在做出收购决策前，总会坚持要求获取这类信息，但在几年前，他们却很少向需要自主做出买入或卖出决策的投资者提供这些信息。相反，当股东希望了解公司的经济实际情况并要求提供数据时，管理层通常会以“我们不能告诉你具体情况，因为这会损害公司利益”为由拒绝。最终，美国证券交易委员会（SEC）下令要求披露细分业务数据，管理层才开始提供真实信息。他们这种行为的转变，让人想起阿尔·卡彭（Al Capone）的一句洞见：“一句好话再加上一把枪，远比只靠一句好话能走得更远。”
In the table, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix to my letter in the 1983 annual report, is aggregated as a separate item. (A compendium of the 1977-1984 letters is available upon request.) In the Business Segment Data and Management’s Discussion sections on pages 39-41 and 49-55, much additional information regarding our businesses is provided, including Goodwill and Goodwill Amortization figures for each of the segments. I urge you to read those sections as well as Charlie Munger’s letter to Wesco shareholders, which starts on page 56.
在该表格中，商誉摊销（Amortization of Goodwill）并未分摊至具体业务，而是根据我1983年年报信件附录中阐述的原因，汇总为一个单独项目列示。（1977-1984年信件汇编可应要求提供。）在第39-41页的“业务细分数据”（Business Segment Data）和第49-55页的“管理层讨论”（Management’s Discussion）部分，提供了更多关于我们业务的详细信息，包括各细分业务的商誉（Goodwill）及商誉摊销数据。我强烈建议你阅读这些部分，以及查理·芒格写给韦斯科（Wesco）股东的信件——该信件从第56页开始。
| （单位：千美元，省略末尾三个零） | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 税前收益（Pre-Tax Earnings） | 伯克希尔应占净收益（税后及扣除少数股东权益后）（Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests)） | |||
| 1985年 | 1984年 | 1985年 | 1984年 | |
| -------- | -------- | -------- | -------- | |
| 运营收益（Operating Earnings）： | ||||
| 保险集团（Insurance Group）： | ||||
| - 承保业务（Underwriting） | $(44,230) | $(48,060) | $(23,569) | $(25,955) |
| - 净投资收益（Net Investment Income） | 95,217 | 68,903 | 79,716 | 62,059 |
| 联合零售商店（Associated Retail Stores） | 270 | (1,072) | 134 | (579) |
| 蓝筹印花公司（Blue Chip Stamps） | 5,763 | (1,843) | 2,813 | (899) |
| 布法罗新闻报（Buffalo News） | 29,921 | 27,328 | 14,580 | 13,317 |
| 互助储蓄与贷款（Mutual Savings and Loan） | 2,622 | 1,456 | 4,016 | 3,151 |
| 内布拉斯加家具卖场（Nebraska Furniture Mart） | 12,686 | 14,511 | 5,181 | 5,917 |
| 精密钢铁公司（Precision Steel） | 3,896 | 4,092 | 1,477 | 1,696 |
| 喜诗糖果（See’s Candies） | 28,989 | 26,644 | 14,558 | 13,380 |
| 纺织业务（Textiles） | (2,395) | 418 | (1,324) | 226 |
| 韦斯科金融公司（Wesco Financial） | 9,500 | 9,777 | 4,191 | 4,828 |
| 商誉摊销（Amortization of Goodwill） | (1,475) | (1,434) | (1,475) | (1,434) |
| 债务利息（Interest on Debt） | (14,415) | (14,734) | (7,288) | (7,452) |
| 股东指定捐赠（Shareholder-Designated Contributions） | (4,006) | (3,179) | (2,164) | (1,716) |
| 其他（Other） | 3,106 | 4,932 | 2,102 | 3,475 |
| -------- | -------- | -------- | -------- | |
| 运营收益小计（Operating Earnings） | 125,449 | 87,739 | 92,948 | 70,014 |
| 通用食品特别分配收益（Special General Foods Distribution） | 4,127 | 8,111 | 3,779 | 7,294 |
| 华盛顿邮报特别分配收益（Special Washington Post Distribution） | 14,877 | --- | 13,851 | --- |
| 证券出售收益（Sales of Securities） | 468,903 | 104,699 | 325,237 | 71,587 |
| -------- | -------- | -------- | -------- | |
| 所有实体总收益（Total Earnings - all entities） | $613,356 | $200,549 | $435,815 | $148,895 |
| ======== | ======== | ======== | ======== |
Our 1985 results include unusually large earnings from the sale of securities. This fact, in itself, does not mean that we had a particularly good year (though, of course, we did). Security profits in a given year bear similarities to a college graduation ceremony in which the knowledge gained over four years is recognized on a day when nothing further is learned. We may hold a stock for a decade or more, and during that period it may grow quite consistently in both business and market value. In the year in which we finally sell it there may be no increase in value, or there may even be a decrease. But all growth in value since purchase will be reflected in the accounting earnings of the year of sale. (If the stock owned is in our insurance subsidiaries, however, any gain or loss in market value will be reflected in net worth annually.) Thus, reported capital gains or losses in any given year are meaningless as a measure of how well we have done in the current year.
我们1985年的业绩中，包含了异常丰厚的证券出售收益。但这一事实本身并不意味着我们这一年的表现特别出色（尽管我们确实表现不错）。某一年的证券收益，类似于大学毕业典礼——四年积累的知识在某一天得到认可，而当天本身并未学到新东西。我们可能持有一只股票十年甚至更久，在此期间，该股票的业务价值和市值可能会稳步增长。但在我们最终出售它的那一年，其价值可能没有增长，甚至可能下跌。然而，自买入以来的所有价值增长，都会反映在出售当年的会计收益中。（不过，如果所持股票由我们的保险子公司持有，其市值的任何增减都会每年反映在净资产中。）因此，某一年财报中披露的资本利得或损失，作为衡量我们当年表现的指标是毫无意义的。
A large portion of the realized gain in 1985 ($338 million pre-tax out of a total of $488 million) came about through the sale of our General Foods shares. We held most of these shares since 1980, when we had purchased them at a price far below what we felt was their per/share business value. Year by year, the managerial efforts of Jim Ferguson and Phil Smith substantially increased General Foods’ business value and, last fall, Philip Morris made an offer for the company that reflected the increase. We thus benefited from four factors: a bargain purchase price, a business with fine underlying economics, an able management concentrating on the interests of shareholders, and a buyer willing to pay full business value. While that last factor is the only one that produces reported earnings, we consider identification of the first three to be the key to building value for Berkshire shareholders. In selecting common stocks, we devote our attention to attractive purchases, not to the possibility of attractive sales.
1985年已实现收益中，很大一部分（总税前收益4.88亿美元中的3.38亿美元）来自出售通用食品公司的股票。我们自1980年起就持有大部分该股票，当时的买入价远低于我们认为的其每股业务价值。多年来，吉姆·弗格森（Jim Ferguson）和菲尔·史密斯（Phil Smith）的管理工作大幅提升了通用食品的业务价值。去年秋天，菲利普·莫里斯公司（Philip Morris）对通用食品提出了收购要约，该要约价格充分反映了这一价值增长。因此，我们的收益得益于四个因素：低廉的买入价、具备优良内在经济效益的业务、专注于股东利益的精干管理层，以及愿意支付全额业务价值的买家。尽管只有最后一个因素会在财报收益中体现，但我们认为，识别前三个因素才是为伯克希尔股东创造价值的关键。在选择普通股时，我们关注的是“有吸引力的买入机会”，而非“有吸引力的卖出可能性”。
We have again reported substantial income from special distributions, this year from Washington Post and General Foods. (The General Foods transactions obviously took place well before the Philip Morris offer.) Distributions of this kind occur when we sell a portion of our shares in a company back to it simultaneously with its purchase of shares from other shareholders. The number of shares we sell is contractually set so as to leave our percentage ownership in the company precisely the same after the sale as before. Such a transaction is quite properly regarded by the IRS as substantially equivalent to a dividend since we, as a shareholder, receive cash while maintaining an unchanged ownership interest. This tax treatment benefits us because corporate taxpayers, unlike individual taxpayers, incur much lower taxes on dividend income than on income from long-term capital gains. (This difference will be widened further if the House-passed tax bill becomes law: under its provisions, capital gains realized by corporations will be taxed at the same rate as ordinary income.) However, accounting rules are unclear as to proper treatment for shareholder reporting. To conform with last year’s treatment, we have shown these transactions as capital gains.
我们今年再次录得可观的特别分配收益，分别来自华盛顿邮报公司和通用食品公司（显然，通用食品的这笔交易发生在菲利普·莫里斯提出收购要约之前）。这类分配的产生方式是：当某公司向其他股东回购股票时，我们同时向该公司出售所持有的部分该公司股票。我们出售的股票数量会通过合同约定，确保交易后我们在该公司的持股比例与交易前完全一致。美国国税局（IRS）合理地将此类交易视为“实质上等同于股息”，因为作为股东，我们在获得现金的同时，持股权益并未发生变化。这种税务处理对我们有利，因为与个人纳税人不同，企业纳税人就股息收入缴纳的税款，远低于就长期资本利得缴纳的税款（如果众议院通过的税法草案生效，这一差异将进一步扩大：根据该草案，企业实现的资本利得将按与普通收入相同的税率征税）。然而，会计准则对于股东报告中如何恰当处理此类交易并无明确规定。为与去年的处理方式保持一致，我们将这些交易列为资本利得。
Though we have not sought out such transactions, we have agreed to them on several occasions when managements initiated the idea. In each case we have felt that non-selling shareholders (all of whom had an opportunity to sell at the same price we received) benefited because the companies made their repurchases at prices below intrinsic business value. The tax advantages we receive and our wish to cooperate with managements that are increasing values for all shareholders have sometimes led us to sell - but only to the extent that our proportional share of the business was undiminished.
尽管我们并未主动寻求此类交易，但当公司管理层提出相关想法时，我们曾多次同意参与。每一次我们都认为，未出售股票的股东（他们都有机会以与我们相同的价格出售股票）会从中受益，因为这些公司是以低于内在业务价值的价格进行股票回购的。我们获得的税务优势，以及与那些为所有股东提升价值的管理层合作的意愿，有时会促使我们出售股票——但前提是我们在该业务中的持股比例不会因此降低。
At this point we usually turn to a discussion of some of our major business units. Before doing so, however, we should first look at a failure at one of our smaller businesses. Our Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, has always emphasized the study of mistakes rather than successes, both in business and other aspects of life. He does so in the spirit of the man who said: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die so I’ll never go there.” You’ll immediately see why we make a good team: Charlie likes to study errors and I have generated ample material for him, particularly in our textile and insurance businesses.
通常在这一部分，我们会开始讨论旗下的一些主要业务部门。但在此之前，我们应先审视一项较小业务的失败案例。我们的副董事长查理·芒格（Charlie Munger）始终强调，无论是在商业领域还是生活的其他方面，都应注重研究失败而非成功。他秉持着这样一种理念：“我只想知道自己会死在何处，这样我就永远不会去那里。”你大概立刻就能明白我们为何是好搭档：查理喜欢研究错误，而我恰好为他提供了充足的素材，尤其是在我们的纺织和保险业务中。
# Shutdown of Textile Business（纺织业务的关闭）
In July we decided to close our textile operation, and by yearend this unpleasant job was largely completed. The history of this business is instructive.
今年7月，我们决定关闭纺织业务，到年底，这项令人不快的工作已基本完成。该业务的发展历程颇具借鉴意义。
When Buffett Partnership, Ltd., an investment partnership of which I was general partner, bought control of Berkshire Hathaway 21 years ago, it had an accounting net worth of $22 million, all devoted to the textile business. The company’s intrinsic business value, however, was considerably less because the textile assets were unable to earn returns commensurate with their accounting value. Indeed, during the previous nine years (the period in which Berkshire and Hathaway operated as a merged company) aggregate sales of $530 million had produced an aggregate loss of $10 million. Profits had been reported from time to time but the net effect was always one step forward, two steps back.
21年前，我担任普通合伙人的投资合伙企业——巴菲特合伙公司（Buffett Partnership, Ltd.）——收购了伯克希尔·哈撒韦的控制权。当时该公司的账面净资产为2200万美元，全部投入纺织业务。然而，公司的内在业务价值远低于这一数字，因为纺织资产无法赚取与其账面价值相符的回报。事实上，在之前的九年里（即伯克希尔与哈撒韦合并运营的时期），公司累计销售额达5.3亿美元，却累计亏损1000万美元。期间虽偶尔有盈利记录，但整体结果始终是“进一步，退两步”。
At the time we made our purchase, southern textile plants - largely non-union - were believed to have an important competitive advantage. Most northern textile operations had closed and many people thought we would liquidate our business as well.
我们收购时，人们普遍认为美国南部的纺织厂（大多是非工会企业）拥有重要的竞争优势。当时北部的大多数纺织厂已倒闭，许多人认为我们也会清算旗下的纺织业务。
We felt, however, that the business would be run much better by a long-time employee whom. we immediately selected to be president, Ken Chace. In this respect we were 100% correct: Ken and his recent successor, Garry Morrison, have been excellent managers, every bit the equal of managers at our more profitable businesses.
但我们认为，一位长期任职的员工能够更好地管理这项业务。我们随即任命他为总裁，他就是肯·蔡斯（Ken Chace）。在这一点上，我们的判断完全正确：肯及其继任者加里·莫里森（Garry Morrison）都是出色的管理者，其能力丝毫不逊色于我们那些盈利更高的业务部门的管理者。
In early 1967 cash generated by the textile operation was used to fund our entry into insurance via the purchase of National Indemnity Company. Some of the money came from earnings and some from reduced investment in textile inventories, receivables, and fixed assets. This pullback proved wise: although much improved by Ken’s management, the textile business never became a good earner, not even in cyclical upturns.
1967年初，纺织业务产生的现金被用于收购国民保险公司（National Indemnity Company），助力我们进军保险行业。这笔资金一部分来自纺织业务的盈利，另一部分则来自对纺织库存、应收账款及固定资产投资的缩减。事实证明，这一收缩决策十分明智：尽管在肯的管理下，纺织业务已有显著改善，但即便在行业周期性复苏阶段，它也从未成为盈利能力强劲的业务。
Further diversification for Berkshire followed, and gradually the textile operation’s depressing effect on our overall return diminished as the business became a progressively smaller portion of the corporation. We remained in the business for reasons that I stated in the 1978 annual report (and summarized at other times also): “(1) our textile businesses are very important employers in their communities, (2) management has been straightforward in reporting on problems and energetic in attacking them, (3) labor has been cooperative and understanding in facing our common problems, and (4) the business should average modest cash returns relative to investment.” I further said, “As long as these conditions prevail - and we expect that they will - we intend to continue to support our textile business despite more attractive alternative uses for capital.”
此后，伯克希尔进一步推进多元化发展。随着纺织业务在公司整体业务中的占比逐渐下降，其对公司整体回报率的拖累效应也逐步减弱。我们选择继续保留该业务，原因正如我在1978年年报中所阐述的（之后也多次总结）：“（1）我们的纺织业务是其所在社区的重要雇主；（2）管理层在汇报问题时坦诚直率，解决问题时积极主动；（3）员工在共同面对问题时表现出合作精神与理解态度；（4）该业务的投资应能带来适度的平均现金回报。”我还进一步表示：“只要这些条件持续存在——我们也预期会如此——即便有更具吸引力的资本替代用途，我们仍打算继续支持纺织业务。”
It turned out that I was very wrong about (4). Though 1979 was moderately profitable, the business thereafter consumed major amounts of cash. By mid-1985 it became clear, even to me, that this condition was almost sure to continue. Could we have found a buyer who would continue operations, I would have certainly preferred to sell the business rather than liquidate it, even if that meant somewhat lower proceeds for us. But the economics that were finally obvious to me were also obvious to others, and interest was nil.
事实证明，我对第（4）点的判断大错特错。尽管1979年纺织业务实现了一定盈利，但此后该业务开始大量消耗现金。到1985年年中，即便对我而言，也很清楚这种状况几乎必然会持续。如果当时能找到愿意继续运营该业务的买家，我肯定更倾向于出售而非清算，即便这意味着我们的收益会有所减少。但最终对我而言显而易见的经济现实，对其他人也同样明显，因此无人有收购意愿。
I won’t close down businesses of sub-normal profitability merely to add a fraction of a point to our corporate rate of return. However, I also feel it inappropriate for even an exceptionally profitable company to fund an operation once it appears to have unending losses in prospect. Adam Smith would disagree with my first proposition, and Karl Marx would disagree with my second; the middle ground is the only position that leaves me comfortable.
我不会仅仅为了将公司整体回报率提高零点几个百分点，就关闭盈利能力低于正常水平的业务。但另一方面，我也认为，即便对于盈利能力极强的公司，若某项业务已显现出持续亏损的前景，继续为其提供资金支持也是不合适的。亚当·斯密（Adam Smith）可能会反对我的前一个观点，卡尔·马克思（Karl Marx）可能会反对我的后一个观点；而中间立场是唯一让我感到安心的选择。
I should reemphasize that Ken and Garry have been resourceful, energetic and imaginative in attempting to make our textile operation a success. Trying to achieve sustainable profitability, they reworked product lines, machinery configurations and distribution arrangements. We also made a major acquisition, Waumbec Mills, with the expectation of important synergy (a term widely used in business to explain an acquisition that otherwise makes no sense). But in the end nothing worked and I should be faulted for not quitting sooner. A recent Business Week article stated that 250 textile mills have closed since 1980. Their owners were not privy to any information that was unknown to me; they simply processed it more objectively. I ignored Comte’s advice - “the intellect should be the servant of the heart, but not its slave” - and believed what I preferred to believe.
我需要再次强调，肯和加里为推动纺织业务取得成功，展现出了足智多谋、积极主动且富有创造力的特质。为实现可持续盈利，他们重新调整了产品线、设备配置及分销安排。我们还进行了一项重大收购——收购沃姆贝克纺织厂（Waumbec Mills），期望能产生显著的协同效应（“协同效应”是商界广泛使用的术语，常用于解释在其他情况下毫无意义的收购行为）。但最终一切努力都无济于事，而我应当为未能更早退出该业务承担责任。《商业周刊》（Business Week）近期的一篇文章指出，自1980年以来已有250家纺织厂倒闭。这些工厂的所有者并未掌握我所不知道的信息，他们只是更客观地分析了现有信息。我忽视了奥古斯特·孔德（Comte）的忠告——“理智应是情感的仆人，而非奴隶”——反而选择相信自己愿意相信的事情。
The domestic textile industry operates in a commodity business, competing in a world market in which substantial excess capacity exists. Much of the trouble we experienced was attributable, both directly and indirectly, to competition from foreign countries whose workers are paid a small fraction of the U.S. minimum wage. But that in no way means that our labor force deserves any blame for our closing. In fact, in comparison with employees of American industry generally, our workers were poorly paid, as has been the case throughout the textile business. In contract negotiations, union leaders and members were sensitive to our disadvantageous cost position and did not push for unrealistic wage increases or unproductive work practices. To the contrary, they tried just as hard as we did to keep us competitive. Even during our liquidation period they performed superbly. (Ironically, we would have been better off financially if our union had behaved unreasonably some years ago; we then would have recognized the impossible future that we faced, promptly closed down, and avoided significant future losses.)
美国国内纺织行业属于大宗商品业务，在全球市场中竞争，而该市场存在大量产能过剩。我们所遭遇的诸多困境，直接或间接都与来自外国的竞争有关——这些国家的工人薪资仅为美国最低工资的一小部分。但这绝不意味着我们的员工应对业务关闭承担任何责任。事实上，与美国工业界的普通员工相比，我们的工人薪资偏低，这在整个纺织行业都是普遍现象。在合同谈判中，工会领导人和成员充分理解我们不利的成本处境，没有要求不切实际的加薪，也没有坚持低效的工作方式。相反，他们和我们一样努力，力求维持公司的竞争力。即便在业务清算期间，他们的表现也十分出色。（颇具讽刺意味的是，若多年前工会采取不合理的态度，我们的财务状况反而会更好；那样我们就能更早认识到面临的无望前景，迅速关闭业务，从而避免后续的重大损失。）
Over the years, we had the option of making large capital expenditures in the textile operation that would have allowed us to somewhat reduce variable costs. Each proposal to do so looked like an immediate winner. Measured by standard return-on-investment tests, in fact, these proposals usually promised greater economic benefits than would have resulted from comparable expenditures in our highly-profitable candy and newspaper businesses.
多年来，我们一直有机会对纺织业务进行大规模资本投入，这本可以在一定程度上降低可变成本。每一项此类投入提案，乍看之下都像是能立刻见效的好方案。事实上，若用标准的投资回报率测试来衡量，这些提案所承诺的经济效益，通常高于在我们盈利丰厚的糖果和报纸业务中进行同等规模投入所能产生的效益。
But the promised benefits from these textile investments were illusory. Many of our competitors, both domestic and foreign, were stepping up to the same kind of expenditures and, once enough companies did so, their reduced costs became the baseline for reduced prices industrywide. Viewed individually, each company’s capital investment decision appeared cost-effective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions neutralized each other and were irrational (just as happens when each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better if he stands on tiptoes). After each round of investment, all the players had more money in the game and returns remained anemic.
但这些纺织业务投资所承诺的效益终究是虚幻的。我们的许多竞争对手，无论是国内还是国外的，都在进行类似的资本投入。一旦足够多的公司这样做，它们降低的成本就会成为全行业降价的基准。从单个公司的角度看，每一项资本投资决策似乎都具有成本效益且合理；但从整体行业角度看，这些决策相互抵消，变得不合理（就像观看游行时，每个人都认为踮起脚尖能看得更清楚，最终所有人都踮脚，结果与之前并无区别）。每一轮投资过后，所有参与者都投入了更多资金，但回报率依然低迷。
Thus, we faced a miserable choice: huge capital investment would have helped to keep our textile business alive, but would have left us with terrible returns on ever-growing amounts of capital. After the investment, moreover, the foreign competition would still have retained a major, continuing advantage in labor costs. A refusal to invest, however, would make us increasingly non-competitive, even measured against domestic textile manufacturers. I always thought myself in the position described by Woody Allen in one of his movies: “More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness, the other to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly.”
因此，我们面临着一个痛苦的抉择：大规模资本投入或许能让纺织业务维持运营，但会导致我们在不断增加的资本上获得极差的回报。此外，即便投入资本，外国竞争对手在劳动力成本上仍将保持持续的重大优势。而如果拒绝投入资本，即便与国内纺织制造商相比，我们的竞争力也会日益下降。我总觉得自己正处于伍迪·艾伦（Woody Allen）某部电影中描述的处境：“人类在历史上从未像现在这样面临十字路口。一条路通向绝望与彻底的无助，另一条路通向完全的毁灭。愿我们有智慧做出正确的选择。”
For an understanding of how the to-invest-or-not-to-invest dilemma plays out in a commodity business, it is instructive to look at Burlington Industries, by far the largest U.S. textile company both 21 years ago and now. In 1964 Burlington had sales of $1.2 billion against our $50 million. It had strengths in both distribution and production that we could never hope to match and also, of course, had an earnings record far superior to ours. Its stock sold at 60 at the end of 1964; ours was 13.
要理解“是否投资”的困境在大宗商品业务中如何演变，伯克希尔工业公司（Burlington Industries）的案例颇具借鉴意义。无论是21年前还是现在，它都是美国迄今为止最大的纺织公司。1964年，伯克希尔工业的销售额为12亿美元，而我们仅为5000万美元。它在分销和生产方面的优势，是我们永远无法企及的，其盈利记录自然也远优于我们。1964年底，它的股价为60美元，而我们的股价仅为13美元。
Burlington made a decision to stick to the textile business, and in 1985 had sales of about $2.8 billion. During the 1964-85 period, the company made capital expenditures of about $3 billion, far more than any other U.S. textile company and more than $200-per-share on that $60 stock. A very large part of the expenditures, I am sure, was devoted to cost improvement and expansion. Given Burlington’s basic commitment to stay in textiles, I would also surmise that the company’s capital decisions were quite rational.
伯克希尔工业决定坚守纺织业务，1985年其销售额约为28亿美元。在1964-1985年期间，该公司的资本支出约为30亿美元，远超美国其他任何纺织公司，按1964年60美元的股价计算，每股资本支出超过200美元。我确信，其中很大一部分支出用于成本优化和业务扩张。考虑到伯克希尔工业坚守纺织业务的基本承诺，我推测该公司的资本决策是相当理性的。
Nevertheless, Burlington has lost sales volume in real dollars and has far lower returns on sales and equity now than 20 years ago. Split 2-for-1 in 1965, the stock now sells at 34 -- on an adjusted basis, just a little over its $60 price in 1964. Meanwhile, the CPI has more than tripled. Therefore, each share commands about one-third the purchasing power it did at the end of 1964. Regular dividends have been paid but they, too, have shrunk significantly in purchasing power.
然而，以实际美元计算，伯克希尔工业的销售额有所下降，当前的销售回报率和净资产回报率也远低于20年前。该公司股票在1965年进行了1拆2，如今股价为34美元——经拆分调整后，仅略高于1964年的60美元。与此同时，消费者价格指数（CPI）已上涨逾两倍。因此，每股股票的购买力仅为1964年底的约三分之一。公司虽定期支付股息，但股息的购买力也大幅下降。
This devastating outcome for the shareholders indicates what can happen when much brain power and energy are applied to a faulty premise. The situation is suggestive of Samuel Johnson’s horse: “A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse - not a remarkable mathematician.” Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a remarkable textile company - but not a remarkable business.
这一对股东而言灾难性的结果表明，将大量智慧和精力投入错误的前提会导致何种后果。这种情况让人想起塞缪尔·约翰逊（Samuel Johnson）对马的评价：“一匹能数到十的马是一匹非凡的马——但绝非非凡的数学家。”同样，一家在行业内出色配置资本的纺织公司，是一家非凡的纺织公司——但绝非非凡的企业。
My conclusion from my own experiences and from much observation of other businesses is that a good managerial record (measured by economic returns) is far more a function of what business boat you get into than it is of how effectively you row (though intelligence and effort help considerably, of course, in any business, good or bad). Some years ago I wrote: “When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.” Nothing has since changed my point of view on that matter. Should you find yourself in a chronically-leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.
根据我自身的经历以及对众多企业的观察，我的结论是：良好的管理业绩（以经济回报衡量），更多取决于你登上了哪艘“业务之船”，而非你划船的效率有多高（当然，无论业务好坏，智慧和努力在任何企业中都大有帮助）。几年前我曾写道：“当一个以卓越闻名的管理团队接手一家以基础经济状况糟糕闻名的企业时，最终保持完好的，只会是企业的糟糕名声。”此后，我对此观点的看法从未改变。如果你发现自己身处一艘长期漏水的船，将精力用于换船，可能比用于修补漏洞更有成效。
There is an investment postscript in our textile saga. Some investors weight book value heavily in their stock-buying decisions (as I, in my early years, did myself). And some economists and academicians believe replacement values are of considerable importance in calculating an appropriate price level for the stock market as a whole. Those of both persuasions would have received an education at the auction we held in early 1986 to dispose of our textile machinery.
我们的纺织业务故事中，还有一段关于投资的后记。有些投资者在选股决策中非常看重账面价值（我早年也是如此）。一些经济学家和学者则认为，在计算整体股市的合理价格水平时，重置价值至关重要。而无论是持哪种观点的人，若参加了我们1986年初为处置纺织设备举办的拍卖会，想必都会得到一次深刻的“教训”。
The equipment sold (including some disposed of in the few months prior to the auction) took up about 750,000 square feet of factory space in New Bedford and was eminently usable. It originally cost us about $13 million, including $2 million spent in 1980-84, and had a current book value of $866,000 (after accelerated depreciation). Though no sane management would have made the investment, the equipment could have been replaced new for perhaps $30-$50 million.
此次出售的设备（包括拍卖前几个月处置的部分）占据了新贝德福德工厂约75万平方英尺的空间，且设备仍具备良好的使用性能。这些设备的原始成本约为1300万美元（其中1980-1984年投入了200万美元），经加速折旧后，当时的账面价值为86.6万美元。尽管理智的管理层不会再进行此类投资，但这些设备若全新重置，成本可能需要3000-5000万美元。
Gross proceeds from our sale of this equipment came to $163,122. Allowing for necessary pre- and post-sale costs, our net was less than zero. Relatively modern looms that we bought for $5,000 apiece in 1981 found no takers at $50. We finally sold them for scrap at $26 each, a sum less than removal costs.
我们出售这些设备的总收入仅为16.3122万美元。扣除必要的售前和售后成本后，净收入为负。我们1981年以每台5000美元购入的相对现代化的织布机，即便定价50美元也无人问津，最终只能作为废品以每台26美元的价格出售，这一价格甚至不足以覆盖拆除成本。
Ponder this: the economic goodwill attributable to two paper routes in Buffalo - or a single See’s candy store - considerably exceeds the proceeds we received from this massive collection of tangible assets that not too many years ago, under different competitive conditions, was able to employ over 1,000 people.
不妨思考一下：布法罗两条报纸配送路线所蕴含的经济商誉——或一家喜诗糖果店的经济商誉——远超过我们出售这批大量有形资产所获得的收入。而就在不久前，在不同的竞争环境下，这批资产还能雇佣超过1000名员工。
# Three Very Good Businesses (and a Few Thoughts About Incentive Compensation)（三项优质业务（及关于激励性薪酬的几点思考））
When I was 12, I lived with my grandfather for about four months. A grocer by trade, he was also working on a book and each night he dictated a few pages to me. The title - brace yourself - was “How to Run a Grocery Store and a Few Things I Have Learned About Fishing”. My grandfather was sure that interest in these two subjects was universal and that the world awaited his views. You may conclude from this section’s title and contents that I was overexposed to Grandpa’s literary style (and personality).
我12岁时，曾和祖父一起生活了大约四个月。他的本职是杂货店主，当时还在写一本书，每晚都会向我口述几页内容。这本书的书名——请做好心理准备——是《如何经营杂货店以及我在钓鱼方面学到的一些事》。祖父坚信，所有人都会对这两个主题感兴趣，全世界都在期待他的见解。从本节的标题和内容中，你或许能看出，我深受祖父这种写作风格（及性格）的影响。
I am merging the discussion of Nebraska Furniture Mart, See’s Candy Shops, and Buffalo Evening News here because the economic strengths, weaknesses, and prospects of these businesses have changed little since I reported to you a year ago. The shortness of this discussion, however, is in no way meant to minimize the importance of these businesses to us: in 1985 they earned an aggregate of $72 million pre-tax. Fifteen years ago, before we had acquired any of them, their aggregate earnings were about $8 million pre-tax.
我将内布拉斯加家具卖场（Nebraska Furniture Mart）、喜诗糖果店（See’s Candy Shops）和《布法罗晚报》（Buffalo Evening News）的讨论合并在此，是因为自去年向你们汇报以来，这些业务的经济优势、劣势及前景几乎没有变化。但讨论篇幅较短，绝不意味着这些业务对我们不重要：1985年，它们的税前总盈利达7200万美元。而15年前，在我们收购它们之前，这三家业务的税前总盈利仅约为800万美元。
While an increase in earnings from $8 million to $72 million sounds terrific - and usually is - you should not automatically assume that to be the case. You must first make sure that earnings were not severely depressed in the base year. If they were instead substantial in relation to capital employed, an even more important point must be examined: how much additional capital was required to produce the additional earnings?
尽管盈利从800万美元增长到7200万美元，听起来十分出色——通常情况也确实如此——但你不应想当然地认为这一定是卓越的成就。首先，你必须确认基准年的盈利是否处于严重低迷状态。如果基准年的盈利相对于投入资本已相当可观，那么就需要审视一个更重要的问题：实现额外盈利需要投入多少额外资本？
In both respects, our group of three scores well. First, earnings 15 years ago were excellent compared to capital then employed in the businesses. Second, although annual earnings are now $64 million greater, the businesses require only about $40 million more in invested capital to operate than was the case then.
在这两个方面，我们这三家业务的表现都很出色。首先，15年前，这些业务的盈利相对于当时的投入资本而言已十分优异。其次，尽管如今的年盈利比当时增加了6400万美元，但这些业务所需的运营投入资本仅比当时多了约4000万美元。
The dramatic growth in earning power of these three businesses, accompanied by their need for only minor amounts of capital, illustrates very well the power of economic goodwill during an inflationary period (a phenomenon explained in detail in the 1983 annual report). The financial characteristics of these businesses have allowed us to use a very large portion of the earnings they generate elsewhere. Corporate America, however, has had a different experience: in order to increase earnings significantly, most companies have needed to increase capital significantly also. The average American business has required about $5 of additional capital to generate an additional $1 of annual pre-tax earnings. That business, therefore, would have required over $300 million in additional capital from its owners in order to achieve an earnings performance equal to our group of three.
这三家业务的盈利能力大幅增长，同时仅需少量额外资本，这充分体现了通胀时期经济商誉的力量（这一现象在1983年年报中有详细解释）。这些业务的财务特征，使得我们能够将它们产生的绝大部分盈利用于其他领域。然而，美国企业界的情况则截然不同：大多数公司要实现盈利大幅增长，就必须大幅增加资本投入。美国企业的平均水平是，每增加1美元的年税前盈利，需要投入约5美元的额外资本。因此，若要实现与我们这三家业务相当的盈利增长，普通企业需要从股东那里获得超过3亿美元的额外资本。
When returns on capital are ordinary, an earn-more-by-putting-up-more record is no great managerial achievement. You can get the same result personally while operating from your rocking chair. just quadruple the capital you commit to a savings account and you will quadruple your earnings. You would hardly expect hosannas for that particular accomplishment. Yet, retirement announcements regularly sing the praises of CEOs who have, say, quadrupled earnings of their widget company during their reign - with no one examining whether this gain was attributable simply to many years of retained earnings and the workings of compound interest.
当资本回报率处于普通水平时，“通过增加投入实现盈利增长”的业绩并非什么了不起的管理成就。即便你坐在摇椅上，也能亲自实现这样的结果：只需将存入储蓄账户的资金增加三倍，你的利息收入也会增加三倍。你肯定不会因为这样的“成就”而期待掌声。然而，在CEO的退休公告中，人们却常常称赞他们在任期间将公司盈利提高了三倍（例如某家小部件公司）——却无人审视这种增长是否仅仅源于多年的留存收益和复利的作用。
If the widget company consistently earned a superior return on capital throughout the period, or if capital employed only doubled during the CEO’s reign, the praise for him may be well deserved. But if return on capital was lackluster and capital employed increased in pace with earnings, applause should be withheld. A savings account in which interest was reinvested would achieve the same year-by-year increase in earnings - and, at only 8% interest, would quadruple its annual earnings in 18 years.
如果这家小部件公司在整个期间始终保持卓越的资本回报率，或者在CEO任内仅将投入资本增加了一倍，那么对他的赞扬或许是当之无愧的。但如果资本回报率平平，且投入资本的增长与盈利增长同步，那就不应给予掌声。一只复利再投资的储蓄账户，也能实现逐年的盈利增长——按8%的利率计算，18年内就能实现年收益增长三倍。
The power of this simple math is often ignored by companies to the detriment of their shareholders. Many corporate compensation plans reward managers handsomely for earnings increases produced solely, or in large part, by retained earnings - i.e., earnings withheld from owners. For example, ten-year, fixed-price stock options are granted routinely, often by companies whose dividends are only a small percentage of earnings.
这种简单的数学逻辑的力量，常常被企业忽视，进而损害股东利益。许多公司的薪酬计划会对管理层给予丰厚奖励，而奖励依据的盈利增长，完全或主要来自留存收益——即从股东手中留存的收益。例如，许多公司会常规授予十年期固定价格股票期权，而这些公司的股息通常仅占盈利的很小比例。
An example will illustrate the inequities possible under such circumstances. Let’s suppose that you had a $100,000 savings account earning 8% interest and “managed” by a trustee who could decide each year what portion of the interest you were to be paid in cash. Interest not paid out would be “retained earnings” added to the savings account to compound. And let’s suppose that your trustee, in his superior wisdom, set the “pay-out ratio” at one-quarter of the annual earnings.
举个例子可以说明在这种情况下可能出现的不公。假设你有一个10万美元的储蓄账户，年利率为8%，由一位受托人“管理”，他每年可以决定将多少比例的利息以现金形式支付给你。未支付的利息将作为“留存收益”计入储蓄账户，产生复利。再假设这位受托人凭借其“高超智慧”，将“派息率”设定为年收益的四分之一。
Under these assumptions, your account would be worth $179,084 at the end of ten years. Additionally, your annual earnings would have increased about 70% from $8,000 to $13,515 under this inspired management. And, finally, your “dividends” would have increased commensurately, rising regularly from $2,000 in the first year to $3,378 in the tenth year. Each year, when your manager’s public relations firm prepared his annual report to you, all of the charts would have had lines marching skyward.
在这些假设下，十年后你的账户价值将达到17.9084万美元。此外，在这位“英明”的管理者管理下，你的年收益将从8000美元增长到13515美元，增幅约70%。最终，你的“股息”也会相应增长，从第一年的2000美元稳步增加到第十年的3378美元。每年，当管理者的公关公司为你准备年度报告时，所有图表的曲线都会呈现“节节攀升”的趋势。
Now, just for fun, let’s push our scenario one notch further and give your trustee-manager a ten-year fixed-price option on part of your “business” (i.e., your savings account) based on its fair value in the first year. With such an option, your manager would reap a substantial profit at your expense - just from having held on to most of your earnings. If he were both Machiavellian and a bit of a mathematician, your manager might also have cut the pay-out ratio once he was firmly entrenched.
现在，纯粹为了说明问题，让我们将场景再推进一步：根据你“业务”（即储蓄账户）第一年的公允价值，授予这位受托人管理者一项为期十年的固定价格期权，允许他购买你“业务”的一部分。有了这样的期权，你的管理者只需留存你大部分的收益，就能以你的利益为代价赚取丰厚利润。如果他既工于心计又懂些数学，一旦地位稳固，甚至可能进一步降低派息率。
This scenario is not as farfetched as you might think. Many stock options in the corporate world have worked in exactly that fashion: they have gained in value simply because management retained earnings, not because it did well with the capital in its hands.
这种场景并非如你想象的那般牵强。企业界的许多股票期权，运作方式正是如此：期权价值的增长，仅仅是因为管理层留存了收益，而非因为他们妥善运用了手中的资本。
Managers actually apply a double standard to options. Leaving aside warrants (which deliver the issuing corporation immediate and substantial compensation), I believe it is fair to say that nowhere in the business world are ten-year fixed-price options on all or a portion of a business granted to outsiders. Ten months, in fact, would be regarded as extreme. It would be particularly unthinkable for managers to grant a long-term option on a business that was regularly adding to its capital. Any outsider wanting to secure such an option would be required to pay fully for capital added during the option period.
管理层在期权问题上实际上采用了双重标准。暂且不谈认股权证（认股权证能为发行公司带来即时且可观的补偿），公允地说，在商业世界中，从未有过向外部人士授予某家企业全部或部分股权的十年期固定价格期权的情况。事实上，十年期本身就已过长，十个月都可能被视为极端。对于一家持续增加资本投入的企业，管理层向外部人士授予长期期权，更是难以想象的事情。任何外部人士若想获得此类期权，都必须为期权有效期内企业新增的资本支付全额对价。
The unwillingness of managers to do-unto-outsiders, however, is not matched by an unwillingness to do-unto-themselves. (Negotiating with one’s self seldom produces a barroom brawl.) Managers regularly engineer ten-year, fixed-price options for themselves and associates that, first, totally ignore the fact that retained earnings automatically build value and, second, ignore the carrying cost of capital. As a result, these managers end up profiting much as they would have had they had an option on that savings account that was automatically building up in value.
然而，管理层不愿对外部人士做的事，却愿意对自己做（与自己谈判，很少会产生激烈冲突）。管理层常常为自己和同事设计十年期固定价格期权，这类期权存在两个问题：首先，完全忽视了留存收益会自动创造价值这一事实；其次，忽视了资本的持有成本。结果是，这些管理层最终获得的利润，与他们持有那个自动增值的储蓄账户的期权所获得的利润相差无几。
Of course, stock options often go to talented, value-adding managers and sometimes deliver them rewards that are perfectly appropriate. (Indeed, managers who are really exceptional almost always get far less than they should.) But when the result is equitable, it is accidental. Once granted, the option is blind to individual performance. Because it is irrevocable and unconditional (so long as a manager stays in the company), the sluggard receives rewards from his options precisely as does the star. A managerial Rip Van Winkle, ready to doze for ten years, could not wish for a better “incentive” system.
当然，股票期权有时会授予有才华、能为企业创造价值的管理层，有时也能为他们带来完全合理的回报（事实上，真正卓越的管理层所获得的回报，几乎总是远低于他们应得的）。但这种公平的结果往往是偶然的。期权一旦授予，就与个人业绩无关了。由于期权不可撤销且无条件（只要管理层留在公司），平庸的管理者通过期权获得的回报，与优秀的管理者完全相同。即便是一个打算昏睡十年的“里普·范·温克尔”式管理者，也找不到比这更好的“激励”制度了。
(I can’t resist commenting on one long-term option given an “outsider”: that granted the U.S. Government on Chrysler shares as partial consideration for the government’s guarantee of some lifesaving loans. When these options worked out well for the government, Chrysler sought to modify the payoff, arguing that the rewards to the government were both far greater than intended and outsize in relation to its contribution to Chrysler’s recovery. The company’s anguish over what it saw as an imbalance between payoff and performance made national news. That anguish may well be unique: to my knowledge, no managers - anywhere - have been similarly offended by unwarranted payoffs arising from options granted to themselves or their colleagues.)
（我忍不住要评论一个授予“外部人士”的长期期权案例：美国政府曾获得克莱斯勒公司（Chrysler）的股票期权，作为政府为克莱斯勒提供救命贷款担保的部分对价。当这些期权为政府带来丰厚收益时，克莱斯勒却试图修改期权收益条款，声称政府获得的回报远超预期，且与其对克莱斯勒复苏的贡献不成比例。公司对这种“收益与贡献失衡”的不满，成了全国性新闻。这种不满或许是独一无二的：据我所知，世界各地的管理层中，从未有人因为自己或同事获得的期权带来不当收益而感到不满。）
Ironically, the rhetoric about options frequently describes them as desirable because they put managers and owners in the same financial boat. In reality, the boats are far different. No owner has ever escaped the burden of capital costs, whereas a holder of a fixed-price option bears no capital costs at all. An owner must weigh upside potential against downside risk; an option holder has no downside. In fact, the business project in which you would wish to have an option frequently is a project in which you would reject ownership. (I’ll be happy to accept a lottery ticket as a gift - but I’ll never buy one.)
颇具讽刺意味的是，关于期权的说法常常宣称，期权之所以可取，是因为它能让管理层和股东处于同一条“财务之船”上。但事实上，两者的“船”截然不同。股东永远无法摆脱资本成本的负担，而固定价格期权的持有者则完全无需承担资本成本。股东必须权衡上行潜力与下行风险，而期权持有者则没有下行风险。事实上，你愿意持有期权的业务项目，往往是你不愿持有股权的项目。（我很乐意接受一张彩票作为礼物，但我绝不会自己去买。）
In dividend policy also, the option holders’ interests are best served by a policy that may ill serve the owner. Think back to the savings account example. The trustee, holding his option, would benefit from a no-dividend policy. Conversely, the owner of the account should lean to a total payout so that he can prevent the option-holding manager from sharing in the account’s retained earnings.
在股息政策上，最符合期权持有者利益的政策，也可能对股东不利。回想一下储蓄账户的例子：持有期权的受托人，会从“不分红”政策中获益。相反，账户的所有者则应倾向于“全额分红”，以防止持有期权的管理者分享账户的留存收益。
Despite their shortcomings, options can be appropriate under some circumstances. My criticism relates to their indiscriminate use and, in that connection, I would like to emphasize three points:
尽管期权存在缺陷，但在某些情况下，其使用仍是合理的。我的批评针对的是期权的滥用，在此我想强调三点：
First, stock options are inevitably tied to the overall performance of a corporation. Logically, therefore, they should be awarded only to those managers with overall responsibility. Managers with limited areas of responsibility should have incentives that pay off in relation to results under their control. The .350 hitter expects, and also deserves, a big payoff for his performance - even if he plays for a cellar-dwelling team. And the .150 hitter should get no reward - even if he plays for a pennant winner. Only those with overall responsibility for the team should have their rewards tied to its results.
- 股票期权必然与公司的整体业绩挂钩，因此从逻辑上讲，期权应仅授予对公司整体业绩负责的管理层。负责特定领域的管理者，其激励应与其可控范围内的业绩结果挂钩。一名击球率为0.350的棒球运动员，即便效力于垫底球队，也应因其表现获得丰厚回报，这是他应得的；而一名击球率为0.150的运动员，即便效力于冠军球队，也不应获得奖励。只有对球队整体负责的人，其奖励才应与球队的整体成绩挂钩。
Second, options should be structured carefully. Absent special factors, they should have built into them a retained-earnings or carrying-cost factor. Equally important, they should be priced realistically. When managers are faced with offers for their companies, they unfailingly point out how unrealistic market prices can be as an index of real value. But why, then, should these same depressed prices be the valuations at which managers sell portions of their businesses to themselves? (They may go further: officers and directors sometimes consult the Tax Code to determine the lowest prices at which they can, in effect, sell part of the business to insiders. While they’re at it, they often elect plans that produce the worst tax result for the company.) Except in highly unusual cases, owners are not well served by the sale of part of their business at a bargain price - whether the sale is to outsiders or to insiders. The obvious conclusion: options should be priced at true business value.
其次，期权的设计应谨慎。在无特殊情况下，期权条款中应纳入留存收益或资本持有成本因素。同样重要的是，期权的定价必须贴合实际。当管理层面临公司收购要约时，总会指出市场价格作为真实价值指标的不合理性。但既然如此，为何管理层要以这些被低估的价格，将公司部分股权“出售”给自己呢？（他们甚至可能做得更过分：高管和董事有时会查阅税法，以确定能将公司部分股权出售给内部人员的最低价格。在此过程中，他们往往会选择对公司税务最不利的方案。）除极特殊情况外，无论是向外部人士还是内部人员低价出售公司部分股权，都不利于股东利益。结论显而易见：期权应以公司真实业务价值定价。
Third, I want to emphasize that some managers whom I admire enormously - and whose operating records are far better than mine - disagree with me regarding fixed-price options. They have built corporate cultures that work, and fixed-price options have been a tool that helped them. By their leadership and example, and by the use of options as incentives, these managers have taught their colleagues to think like owners. Such a Culture is rare and when it exists should perhaps be left intact - despite inefficiencies and inequities that may infest the option program. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” is preferable to “purity at any price”.
第三，我想强调的是，一些我极为钦佩的管理层——他们的运营业绩远胜于我——在固定价格期权问题上与我的观点不同。他们打造了有效的企业文化，而固定价格期权正是助力他们实现这一目标的工具。通过自身的领导力与示范作用，以及将期权作为激励手段，这些管理层引导同事们以股东的思维方式思考。这种企业文化十分罕见，一旦形成，即便期权计划中存在低效或不公之处，或许也应保持其完整性。“未坏勿修”（If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it），比“为求完美不惜一切代价”（purity at any price）更可取。
At Berkshire, however, we use an incentive compensation system that rewards key managers for meeting targets in their own bailiwicks. If See’s does well, that does not produce incentive compensation at the News - nor vice versa. Neither do we look at the price of Berkshire stock when we write bonus checks. We believe good unit performance should be rewarded whether Berkshire stock rises, falls, or stays even. Similarly, we think average performance should earn no special rewards even if our stock should soar. “Performance”, furthermore, is defined in different ways depending upon the underlying economics of the business: in some our managers enjoy tailwinds not of their own making, in others they fight unavoidable headwinds.
然而，伯克希尔采用的激励薪酬制度，是根据核心管理层在其分管领域达成目标的情况进行奖励。若喜诗糖果业绩出色，并不会因此给《布法罗晚报》的管理层发放激励薪酬，反之亦然。我们在发放奖金时，也不会参考伯克希尔的股价。我们认为，无论伯克希尔股价上涨、下跌还是持平，业务单元的良好业绩都应得到奖励；同样，即便公司股价大幅上涨，平庸的业绩也不应获得特殊奖励。此外，“业绩”的定义会根据业务的内在经济特征有所不同：有些业务的管理层会受益于非自身创造的有利条件（顺风），有些则需应对不可避免的不利环境（逆风）。
The rewards that go with this system can be large. At our various business units, top managers sometimes receive incentive bonuses of five times their base salary, or more, and it would appear possible that one manager’s bonus could top $2 million in 1986. (I hope so.) We do not put a cap on bonuses, and the potential for rewards is not hierarchical. The manager of a relatively small unit can earn far more than the manager of a larger unit if results indicate he should. We believe, further, that such factors as seniority and age should not affect incentive compensation (though they sometimes influence basic compensation). A 20-year-old who can hit .300 is as valuable to us as a 40-year-old performing as well.
该制度下的奖励额度可能很高。在我们旗下各业务单元，高层管理者有时能获得相当于基本工资5倍甚至更高的激励奖金，且1986年有一位管理者的奖金似乎有望超过200万美元（我希望如此）。我们不对奖金设置上限，奖励潜力也不受层级限制。若业绩达标，规模相对较小的业务单元管理者，收入可能远高于规模较大业务单元的管理者。我们还认为，资历和年龄等因素不应影响激励薪酬（尽管这些因素有时会影响基础薪酬）。一位能打出0.300击球率的20岁球员，与一位表现相同的40岁球员，对我们而言价值相当。
Obviously, all Berkshire managers can use their bonus money (or other funds, including borrowed money) to buy our stock in the market. Many have done just that - and some now have large holdings. By accepting both the risks and the carrying costs that go with outright purchases, these managers truly walk in the shoes of owners.
显然，所有伯克希尔的管理层都可以用奖金（或其他资金，包括借款）在市场上购买公司股票。许多人确实这样做了，部分人如今已持有大量股份。通过全额购买股票，承担相应的风险与资本持有成本，这些管理者真正做到了与股东利益一致。
Now let’s get back - at long last - to our three businesses:
现在，终于让我们回到对这三项业务的讨论：
At Nebraska Furniture Mart our basic strength is an exceptionally low-cost operation that allows the business to regularly offer customers the best values available in home furnishings. NFM is the largest store of its kind in the country. Although the already-depressed farm economy worsened considerably in 1985, the store easily set a new sales record. I also am happy to report that NFM’s Chairman, Rose Blumkin (the legendary “Mrs. B”), continues at age 92 to set a pace at the store that none of us can keep up with. She’s there wheeling and dealing seven days a week, and I hope that any of you who visit Omaha will go out to the Mart and see her in action. It will inspire you, as it does me.
内布拉斯加家具卖场（NFM）的核心优势在于其极低的运营成本，这使其能够持续为客户提供家居用品领域最具性价比的选择。NFM是美国同类卖场中规模最大的一家。尽管1985年本已低迷的农业经济进一步恶化，该卖场仍轻松创下新的销售纪录。我还很高兴地告诉大家，NFM董事长罗斯·布鲁姆金（Rose Blumkin）——传奇的“B夫人”——在92岁高龄时，依然在卖场保持着我们无人能及的工作节奏。她每周七天都在卖场洽谈业务，我希望所有到访奥马哈的股东都能去卖场看看她的工作状态，这会像激励我一样激励你们。
At See’s we continue to get store volumes that are far beyond those achieved by any competitor we know of. Despite the unmatched consumer acceptance we enjoy, industry trends are not good, and we continue to experience slippage in poundage sales on a same-store basis. This puts pressure on per-pound costs. We now are willing to increase prices only modestly and, unless we can stabilize per-shop poundage, profit margins will narrow.
喜诗糖果的单店销售额仍远超我们所知的所有竞争对手。尽管我们拥有无可比拟的消费者认可度，但行业趋势并不乐观，同店糖果销量（按磅计算）持续下滑，这对单位重量成本构成了压力。目前我们仅愿意小幅提价，除非能稳定单店销量，否则利润率将面临收窄。
At the News volume gains are also difficult to achieve. Though linage increased during 1985, the gain was more than accounted for by preprints. ROP linage (advertising printed on our own pages) declined. Preprints are far less profitable than ROP ads, and also more vulnerable to competition. In 1985, the News again controlled costs well and our household penetration continues to be exceptional.
《布法罗晚报》的发行量增长同样面临挑战。尽管1985年广告篇幅有所增加，但增长几乎完全来自预印广告（preprints），本报版面广告（ROP linage，即印刷在报纸自身版面上的广告）则出现下滑。预印广告的盈利能力远低于本报版面广告，且更易受到竞争冲击。1985年，《布法罗晚报》再次实现了良好的成本控制，家庭覆盖率也依然保持在极高水平。
One problem these three operations do not have is management. At See’s we have Chuck Huggins, the man we put in charge the day we bought the business. Selecting him remains one of our best business decisions. At the News we have Stan Lipsey, a manager of equal caliber. Stan has been with us 17 years, and his unusual business talents have become more evident with every additional level of responsibility he has tackled. And, at the Mart, we have the amazing Blumkins - Mrs. B, Louie, Ron, Irv, and Steve - a three-generation miracle of management.
这三项业务均不存在管理层方面的问题。喜诗糖果由查克·哈金斯（Chuck Huggins）负责，我们在收购该业务当天就任命他为负责人，选择他仍是我们最成功的商业决策之一。《布法罗晚报》由斯坦·利普西（Stan Lipsey）管理，他是一位能力相当的管理者。斯坦已与我们共事17年，随着他承担的职责层级不断提升，其卓越的商业才能愈发凸显。而内布拉斯加家具卖场则拥有出色的布鲁姆金家族——B夫人、路易（Louie）、罗恩（Ron）、欧文（Irv）和史蒂夫（Steve）——这是一个跨越三代的管理奇迹。
I consider myself extraordinarily lucky to be able to work with managers such as these. I like them personally as much as I admire them professionally.
# 能与这样的管理层共事，我认为自己格外幸运。无论是个人层面，还是专业能力层面，我对他们的喜爱与钦佩同样深厚。
# Insurance Operations（保险业务）
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table, listing two key figures for the insurance industry:
以下是我们常用表格的更新版本，列出了保险行业的两项关键数据：
| 年份 | 承保保费年增长率（%）（Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%)） | 扣除保单持有人股息后的综合赔付率（Combined Ratio after Policyholder Dividends） |
|---|---|---|
| 1972 | 10.2 | 96.2 |
| 1973 | 8.0 | 99.2 |
| 1974 | 6.2 | 105.4 |
| 1975 | 11.0 | 107.9 |
| 1976 | 21.9 | 102.4 |
| 1977 | 19.8 | 97.2 |
| 1978 | 12.8 | 97.5 |
| 1979 | 10.3 | 100.6 |
| 1980 | 6.0 | 103.1 |
| 1981 | 3.9 | 106.0 |
| 1982 | 4.4 | 109.7 |
| 1983 | 4.5 | 111.9 |
| 1984（修订后） | 9.2 | 117.9 |
| 1985（预估） | 20.9 | 118.0 |
来源（Source）：贝斯特综合与平均报告（Best’s Aggregates and Averages）
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.
综合赔付率是指保险总成本（已发生赔款加上费用）与保费收入的比值：该比率低于100意味着承保盈利，高于100则意味着承保亏损。
The industry’s 1985 results were highly unusual. The revenue gain was exceptional, and had insured losses grown at their normal rate of most recent years - that is, a few points above the inflation rate - a significant drop in the combined ratio would have occurred. But losses in 1985 didn’t cooperate, as they did not in 1984. Though inflation slowed considerably in these years, insured losses perversely accelerated, growing by 16% in 1984 and by an even more startling 17% in 1985. The year’s growth in losses therefore exceeds the inflation rate by over 13 percentage points, a modern record.
1985年保险行业的业绩极为特殊。保费收入增长异常强劲，若承保损失能按近年正常速度（即略高于通胀率几个百分点）增长，综合赔付率本应大幅下降。但与1984年一样，1985年的损失并未按预期发展。尽管这两年通胀大幅放缓，承保损失却反常加速增长：1984年增长16%，1985年增幅更达惊人的17%。1985年损失增长率较通胀率高出逾13个百分点，创下现代行业纪录。
Catastrophes were not the culprit in this explosion of loss cost. True, there were an unusual number of hurricanes in 1985, but the aggregate damage caused by all catastrophes in 1984 and 1985 was about 2% of premium volume, a not unusual proportion. Nor was there any burst in the number of insured autos, houses, employers, or other kinds of “exposure units”.
巨灾并非此次损失成本激增的原因。诚然，1985年飓风数量异常多，但1984年和1985年所有巨灾造成的总损失仅占保费总额的约2%，这一比例并不算异常。此外，投保车辆、房屋、雇主数量及其他各类“风险暴露单位”也未出现激增。
A partial explanation for the surge in the loss figures is all the additions to reserves that the industry made in 1985. As results for the year were reported, the scene resembled a revival meeting: shouting “I’ve sinned, I’ve sinned”, insurance managers rushed forward to confess they had under reserved in earlier years. Their corrections significantly affected 1985 loss numbers.
损失数据激增的部分原因，是行业在1985年大幅补提准备金。在披露年度业绩时，整个行业的场景如同一场宗教复兴集会：保险经理人纷纷站出来忏悔“我犯了错，我犯了错”，承认前些年准备金计提不足。这些补提行为对1985年的损失数据产生了显著影响。
A more disturbing ingredient in the loss surge is the acceleration in “social” or “judicial” inflation. The insurer’s ability to pay has assumed overwhelming importance with juries and judges in the assessment of both liability and damages. More and more, “the deep pocket” is being sought and found, no matter what the policy wording, the facts, or the precedents.
损失激增中更令人担忧的因素，是“社会通胀”或“司法通胀”的加速。在陪审团和法官评估责任与损害赔偿时，保险公司的支付能力已变得至关重要。无论保单条款、事实依据或过往判例如何，越来越多的案件中，人们开始寻找并锁定“财大气粗”的赔付方。
This judicial inflation represents a wild card in the industry’s future, and makes forecasting difficult. Nevertheless, the short-term outlook is good. Premium growth improved as 1985 went along (quarterly gains were an estimated 15%, 19%, 24%, and 22%) and, barring a supercatastrophe, the industry’s combined ratio should fall sharply in 1986.
这种司法通胀为行业未来带来了不确定性，也使得预测变得困难。尽管如此，短期前景依然乐观。1985年保费增长逐季改善（预估季度增幅分别为15%、19%、24%和22%），且若不发生超级巨灾，1986年行业综合赔付率应会大幅下降。
The profit improvement, however, is likely to be of short duration. Two economic principles will see to that. First, commodity businesses achieve good levels of profitability only when prices are fixed in some manner or when capacity is short. Second, managers quickly add to capacity when prospects start to improve and capital is available.
然而，这种盈利改善可能难以持久，两条经济原则将决定这一点。第一，大宗商品类业务只有在价格以某种方式固定，或产能短缺时，才能实现较高盈利水平；第二，当前景开始改善且有资本可用时，管理者会迅速扩大产能。
In my 1982 report to you, I discussed the commodity nature of the insurance industry extensively. The typical policyholder does not differentiate between products but concentrates instead on price. For many decades a cartel-like procedure kept prices up, but this arrangement has disappeared for good. The insurance product now is priced as any other commodity for which a free market exists: when capacity is tight, prices will be set remuneratively; otherwise, they will not be.
在1982年的年报中，我曾详细讨论过保险行业的大宗商品属性。普通投保人不会区分不同保险公司的产品，而是只关注价格。数十年来，类似卡特尔的机制曾维持着较高保费，但这种机制已永久消失。如今，保险产品的定价与其他存在自由市场的大宗商品无异：产能紧张时，定价会带来可观利润；反之，则无法实现盈利定价。
Capacity currently is tight in many lines of insurance - though in this industry, unlike most, capacity is an attitudinal concept, not a physical fact. Insurance managers can write whatever amount of business they feel comfortable writing, subject only to pressures applied by regulators and Best’s, the industry’s authoritative rating service. The comfort level of both managers and regulators is tied to capital. More capital means more comfort, which in turn means more capacity. In the typical commodity business, furthermore, such as aluminum or steel, a long gestation precedes the birth of additional capacity. In the insurance industry, capital can be secured instantly. Thus, any capacity shortage can be eliminated in short order.
目前，许多保险业务线都存在产能紧张的情况——但与大多数行业不同，保险行业的“产能”是一个与态度相关的概念，而非实物事实。保险经理人可根据自身风险承受能力承接业务，仅需受监管机构和行业权威评级机构贝斯特（Best’s）的压力约束。经理人和监管机构的风险承受能力均与资本挂钩：资本越多，风险承受能力越强，进而意味着产能越高。此外，在铝、钢等典型大宗商品行业，新增产能的落地需要较长周期；而在保险行业，资本可即时到位，因此任何产能短缺都能在短期内得到缓解。
That’s exactly what’s going on right now. In 1985, about 15 insurers raised well over $3 billion, piling up capital so that they can write all the business possible at the better prices now available. The capital-raising trend has accelerated dramatically so far in 1986.
目前行业正处于这样的状态。1985年，约15家保险公司募集了远超30亿美元的资金，通过积累资本，以便在当前较好的定价环境下承接尽可能多的业务。1986年至今，这种募资趋势已大幅加速。
If capacity additions continue at this rate, it won’t be long before serious price-cutting appears and next a fall in profitability. When the fall comes, it will be the fault of the capital-raisers of 1985 and 1986, not the price-cutters of 198X. (Critics should be understanding, however: as was the case in our textile example, the dynamics of capitalism cause each insurer to make decisions that for itself appear sensible, but that collectively slash profitability.)
若产能继续以当前速度扩张，不久后便会出现大幅降价，进而导致盈利能力下降。当这一情况发生时，责任在于1985年和1986年的募资者，而非未来某一年（198X年）的降价者。（但批评者应保持理解：正如我们纺织业务的案例所示，资本主义的运行规律使得每家保险公司的个体决策看似合理，但集体决策却会导致整体盈利能力大幅下滑。）
In past reports, I have told you that Berkshire’s strong capital position - the best in the industry - should one day allow us to claim a distinct competitive advantage in the insurance market. With the tightening of the market, that day arrived. Our premium volume more than tripled last year, following a long period of stagnation. Berkshire’s financial strength (and our record of maintaining unusual strength through thick and thin) is now a major asset for us in securing good business.
在以往的年报中，我曾告诉大家，伯克希尔强劲的资本实力——行业内最佳水平——终有一天会让我们在保险市场获得显著竞争优势。随着市场收紧，这一天已然到来。在经历长期停滞之后，我们去年的保费规模增长了两倍多。伯克希尔的财务实力（以及我们无论顺境逆境都能维持卓越实力的记录），如今已成为我们获取优质业务的重要资产。
We correctly foresaw a flight to quality by many large buyers of insurance and reinsurance who belatedly recognized that a policy is only an IOU - and who, in 1985, could not collect on many of their IOUs. These buyers today are attracted to Berkshire because of its strong capital position. But, in a development we did not foresee, we also are finding buyers drawn to us because our ability to insure substantial risks sets us apart from the crowd.
我们准确预判到，许多大型保险和再保险买家会转向追求“优质主体”。这些买家迟迟才意识到，保单本质上只是一张借据（IOU）——而1985年，他们中有许多人无法兑现手中的借据。如今，这些买家被伯克希尔吸引，正是因为我们强劲的资本实力。但超出我们预期的是，还有部分买家被我们吸引，是因为我们承接大额风险的能力让我们在行业中脱颖而出。
To understand this point, you need a few background facts about large risks. Traditionally, many insurers have wanted to write this kind of business. However, their willingness to do so has been almost always based upon reinsurance arrangements that allow the insurer to keep just a small portion of the risk itself while passing on (“laying off”) most of the risk to its reinsurers. Imagine, for example, a directors and officers (“D & O”) liability policy providing $25 million of coverage. By various “excess-of-loss” reinsurance contracts, the company issuing that policy might keep the liability for only the first $1 million of any loss that occurs. The liability for any loss above that amount up to $24 million would be borne by the reinsurers of the issuing insurer. In trade parlance, a company that issues large policies but retains relatively little of the risk for its own account writes a large gross line but a small net line.
要理解这一点，需要了解关于大额风险的一些背景知识。传统上，许多保险公司都希望承接这类业务，但他们的承接意愿几乎都基于再保险安排——通过再保险，保险公司仅自留小部分风险，而将大部分风险转移（“分保”）给再保险公司。例如，假设有一份保额2500万美元的董事及高级管理人员责任险（D&O责任险），通过各类“超额赔款”再保险合同，签发该保单的公司可能仅自留首笔100万美元的损失责任，超出100万美元、最高2400万美元的损失责任则由其再保险公司承担。用行业术语来说，这类签发大额保单但自留风险较少的公司，其“毛承保能力”（gross line）高，但“净承保能力”（net line）低。
In any reinsurance arrangement, a key question is how the premiums paid for the policy should be divided among the various “layers” of risk. In our D & O policy, for example. what part of the premium received should be kept by the issuing company to compensate it fairly for taking the first $1 million of risk and how much should be passed on to the reinsurers to compensate them fairly for taking the risk between $1 million and $25 million?
在任何再保险安排中，核心问题是保费应如何在不同“风险层级”间分配。以我们上述D&O保单为例：签发公司应留存多少保费，以公平补偿其承担的首笔100万美元风险？又应将多少保费转移给再保险公司，以公平补偿其承担的100万至2500万美元风险？
One way to solve this problem might be deemed the Patrick Henry approach: “I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience.” In other words, how much of the total premium would reinsurers have needed in the past to compensate them fairly for the losses they actually had to bear?
解决这一问题的一种方法可称为“帕特里克·亨利法”：“我只有一盏灯指引我的脚步，那就是经验之灯。”换句话说，回顾历史，再保险公司为补偿其实际承担的损失，过去需要获得总保费中的多大比例？
Unfortunately, the lamp of experience has always provided imperfect illumination for reinsurers because so much of their business is “long-tail”, meaning it takes many years before they know what their losses are. Lately, however, the light has not only been dim but also grossly misleading in the images it has revealed. That is, the courts’ tendency to grant awards that are both huge and lacking in precedent makes reinsurers’ usual extrapolations or inferences from past data a formula for disaster. Out with Patrick Henry and in with Pogo: “The future ain’t what it used to be.”
遗憾的是，“经验之灯”对再保险公司的指引始终不够完善，因为其大量业务属于“长尾业务”——即需要多年时间才能确定最终损失金额。而近来，这盏灯不仅昏暗，所呈现的信息还极具误导性。具体而言，法院越来越倾向于做出金额巨大且无先例可循的判决，这使得再保险公司通过历史数据进行常规推断的做法，沦为灾难的导火索。此时，帕特里克·亨利的理念已不再适用，取而代之的是波戈（Pogo）的名言：“未来已非昔日模样。”
The burgeoning uncertainties of the business, coupled with the entry into reinsurance of many unsophisticated participants, worked in recent years in favor of issuing companies writing a small net line: they were able to keep a far greater percentage of the premiums than the risk. By doing so, the issuing companies sometimes made money on business that was distinctly unprofitable for the issuing and reinsuring companies combined. (This result was not necessarily by intent: issuing companies generally knew no more than reinsurers did about the ultimate costs that would be experienced at higher layers of risk.) Inequities of this sort have been particularly pronounced in lines of insurance in which much change was occurring and losses were soaring; e.g., professional malpractice, D & 0, products liability, etc. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that issuing companies remained enthusiastic about writing business long after premiums became woefully inadequate on a gross basis.
业务不确定性日益加剧，加之许多缺乏经验的参与者进入再保险领域，近年来这些因素对“净承保能力低”的签发公司有利：他们留存的保费占比远高于其承担的风险占比。通过这种方式，即便某笔业务对签发公司与再保险公司的整体而言明显亏损，签发公司仍可能从中盈利。（这种结果并非必然出于故意：签发公司通常与再保险公司一样，无法预知较高风险层级的最终成本。）这类不公平现象在变革剧烈、损失飙升的保险业务线中尤为突出，例如职业责任险、D&O责任险、产品责任险等。在这种情况下，即便整体保费已严重不足，签发公司仍对承接业务保持热情，也就不足为奇了。
An example of just how disparate results have been for issuing companies versus their reinsurers is provided by the 1984 financials of one of the leaders in large and unusual risks. In that year the company wrote about $6 billion of business and kept around $2 1/2 billion of the premiums, or about 40%. It gave the remaining $3 1/2 billion to reinsurers. On the part of the business kept, the company’s underwriting loss was less than $200 million - an excellent result in that year. Meanwhile, the part laid off produced a loss of over $1.5 billion for the reinsurers. Thus, the issuing company wrote at a combined ratio of well under 110 while its reinsurers, participating in precisely the same policies, came in considerably over 140. This result was not attributable to natural catastrophes; it came from run-of-the-mill insurance losses (occurring, however, in surprising frequency and size). The issuing company’s 1985 report is not yet available, but I would predict it will show that dramatically unbalanced results continued.
某家在大额及特殊风险领域处于领先地位的公司，其1984年财务数据可说明签发公司与再保险公司的业绩差异有多大。该年，该公司承接了约60亿美元业务，留存保费约25亿美元（占比40%），将剩余35亿美元保费分给再保险公司。在自留业务部分，该公司承保亏损不足2亿美元——在当年属于出色业绩；而分保部分给再保险公司带来了超过15亿美元的亏损。因此，该签发公司的综合赔付率远低于110，而参与同一批保单的再保险公司，综合赔付率却远高于140。这一结果并非由自然灾害导致，而是源于常规保险损失（但损失发生的频率和金额均超出预期）。该签发公司1985年的报告尚未披露，但我预计其业绩将继续呈现这种显著的不平衡。
A few years such as this, and even slow-witted reinsurers can lose interest, particularly in explosive lines where the proper split in premium between issuer and reinsurer remains impossible to even roughly estimate. The behavior of reinsurers finally becomes like that of Mark Twain’s cat: having once sat on a hot stove, it never did so again - but it never again sat on a cold stove, either. Reinsurers have had so many unpleasant surprises in long-tail casualty lines that many have decided (probably correctly) to give up the game entirely, regardless of price inducements. Consequently, there has been a dramatic pull-back of reinsurance capacity in certain important lines.
经历几年这样的情况后，即便是反应迟钝的再保险公司也会失去兴趣，尤其是在那些无法大致估算“签发公司与再保险公司保费分配比例”的高风险业务线中。再保险公司的行为最终会变得像马克·吐温笔下的猫：一旦坐在热炉子上，就再也不会坐上去——但也再也不会坐在冷炉子上了。再保险公司在长尾责任险业务中遭遇了太多意外亏损，许多公司已决定（或许是正确的）完全退出这一领域，无论价格多么诱人。因此，在某些重要业务线中，再保险产能已大幅收缩。
This development has left many issuing companies under pressure. They can no longer commit their reinsurers, time after time, for tens of millions per policy as they so easily could do only a year or two ago, and they do not have the capital and/or appetite to take on large risks for their own account. For many issuing companies, gross capacity has shrunk much closer to net capacity - and that is often small, indeed.
这一变化使许多签发公司面临压力。他们无法再像一两年前那样轻松地让再保险公司为每份保单承担数千万美元的风险，同时自身也没有足够的资本和（或）意愿自留大额风险。对许多签发公司而言，其毛承保能力已大幅收缩，接近净承保能力——而净承保能力往往很低。
At Berkshire we have never played the lay-it-off-at-a-profit game and, until recently, that put us at a severe disadvantage in certain lines. Now the tables are turned: we have the underwriting capability whereas others do not. If we believe the price to be right, we are willing to write a net line larger than that of any but the largest insurers. For instance, we are perfectly willing to risk losing $10 million of our own money on a single event, as long as we believe that the price is right and that the risk of loss is not significantly correlated with other risks we are insuring. Very few insurers are willing to risk half that much on single events - although, just a short while ago, many were willing to lose five or ten times that amount as long as virtually all of the loss was for the account of their reinsurers.
伯克希尔从未参与过“通过分保盈利”的游戏，直到最近，这一点还让我们在某些业务线中处于严重劣势。如今形势逆转：我们拥有承保能力，而其他公司却没有。若我们认为定价合理，我们愿意承接的净风险规模，除了最大型保险公司外，无人能及。例如，只要我们认为定价合理，且该风险与我们承保的其他风险无显著相关性，我们完全愿意为单一事件自留1000万美元的风险损失。极少有保险公司愿意为单一事件承担一半的风险——尽管就在不久前，许多公司愿意承担五倍或十倍于这一金额的风险，只要几乎所有损失都由再保险公司承担。
In mid-1985 our largest insurance company, National Indemnity Company, broadcast its willingness to underwrite large risks by running an ad in three issues of an insurance weekly. The ad solicited policies of only large size: those with a minimum premium of $1 million. This ad drew a remarkable 600 replies and ultimately produced premiums totaling about $50 million. (Hold the applause: it’s all long-tail business and it will be at least five years before we know whether this marketing success was also an underwriting success.) Today, our insurance subsidiaries continue to be sought out by brokers searching for large net capacity.
1985年中期，我们旗下最大的保险公司——国民保险公司（National Indemnity Company）——在某保险周刊的三期杂志上刊登广告，表明其承接大额风险的意愿。该广告仅面向大额保单：最低保费要求为100万美元。这则广告收到了多达600份回复，最终带来的保费总额约为5000万美元。（先别急着鼓掌：这些业务均为长尾业务，至少需要五年时间，我们才能判断这次营销成功是否同时也是承保成功。）如今，仍有许多经纪人为寻找大额净承保能力，主动与我们的保险子公司接洽。
As I have said, this period of tightness will pass; insurers and reinsurers will return to underpricing. But for a year or two we should do well in several segments of our insurance business. Mike Goldberg has made many important improvements in the operation (prior mismanagement by your Chairman having provided him ample opportunity to do so). He has been particularly successful recently in hiring young managers with excellent potential. They will have a chance to show their stuff in 1986.
正如我此前所说，当前的市场紧俏期终将过去，保险公司和再保险公司终将重回低价承保的状态。但未来一两年，我们保险业务的多个板块仍有望取得良好业绩。迈克·戈德堡（Mike Goldberg）已对业务运营做出多项重要改进（此前董事长的管理失误，为他提供了充足的改进空间）。近期，他在招募具备卓越潜力的年轻管理者方面尤为成功，这些人将在1986年有机会展现自己的能力。
Our combined ratio has improved - from 134 in 1984 to 111 in 1985 - but continues to reflect past misdeeds. Last year I told you of the major mistakes I had made in loss-reserving, and promised I would update you annually on loss-development figures. Naturally, I made this promise thinking my future record would be much improved. So far this has not been the case. Details on last year’s loss development are on pages 50-52. They reveal significant underreserving at the end of 1984, as they did in the several years preceding.
我们的综合赔付率有所改善——从1984年的134降至1985年的111——但仍受过去失误的影响。去年我曾向大家提及，我在损失准备金计提方面犯下了重大错误，并承诺会每年向大家更新损失发展数据。做出这一承诺时，我自然认为未来的表现会有大幅改善，但目前来看并非如此。去年损失发展的详细数据见第50-52页，数据显示，1984年末仍存在大幅准备金计提不足的情况，与前几年的状况一致。
The only bright spot in this picture is that virtually all of the underreserving revealed in 1984 occurred in the reinsurance area - and there, in very large part, in a few contracts that were discontinued several years ago. This explanation, however, recalls all too well a story told me many years ago by the then Chairman of General Reinsurance Company. He said that every year his managers told him that “except for the Florida hurricane” or “except for Midwestern tornadoes”, they would have had a terrific year. Finally he called the group together and suggested that they form a new operation - the Except-For Insurance Company - in which they would henceforth place all of the business that they later wouldn’t want to count.
这一局面中唯一的亮点是，1984年暴露的准备金不足问题几乎全部集中在再保险领域——且很大程度上源于几份多年前就已终止的合同。然而，这一解释让我不禁想起多年前通用再保险公司（General Reinsurance Company）时任董事长给我讲的一个故事。他说，每年他的管理层都会告诉他，“若不是佛罗里达飓风”或“若不是中西部龙卷风”，公司本会取得出色的年度业绩。最终，他召集管理层提议，成立一家新公司——“除外责任保险公司”（Except-For Insurance Company），今后所有他们不愿计入业绩的业务，都可归入这家公司。
In any business, insurance or otherwise, “except for” should be excised from the lexicon. If you are going to play the game, you must count the runs scored against you in all nine innings. Any manager who consistently says “except for” and then reports on the lessons he has learned from his mistakes may be missing the only important lesson - namely, that the real mistake is not the act, but the actor.
无论在保险行业还是其他行业，“若不是”都应从业务术语中剔除。既然要参与游戏，就必须正视九局比赛中对手得到的每一分。若某位管理者总是说“若不是”，然后大谈从错误中吸取的教训，他可能遗漏了唯一重要的教训——即真正的问题不在于错误本身，而在于犯错的人。
Inevitably, of course, business errors will occur and the wise manager will try to find the proper lessons in them. But the trick is to learn most lessons from the experiences of others. Managers who have learned much from personal experience in the past usually are destined to learn much from personal experience in the future.
当然，商业失误在所难免，明智的管理者会努力从中吸取正确的教训。但关键在于，要尽可能从他人的经验中学习，而非仅依赖自身经历。过去常从自身经历中吸取教训的管理者，未来往往仍需通过自身经历不断学习（意即未能从他人经验中规避错误）。
GEICO, 38%-owned by Berkshire, reported an excellent year in 1985 in premium growth and investment results, but a poor year - by its lofty standards - in underwriting. Private passenger auto and homeowners insurance were the only important lines in the industry whose results deteriorated significantly during the year. GEICO did not escape the trend, although its record was far better than that of virtually all its major competitors.
伯克希尔持有38%股权的GEICO公司，1985年在保费增长和投资业绩方面表现出色，但以其自身高标准衡量，承保业绩欠佳。个人乘用车保险和房主保险是年内行业中仅有的两项业绩显著恶化的重要业务线。GEICO虽未能摆脱这一趋势，但其业绩仍远优于几乎所有主要竞争对手。
Jack Byrne left GEICO at mid-year to head Fireman’s Fund, leaving behind Bill Snyder as Chairman and Lou Simpson as Vice Chairman. Jack’s performance in reviving GEICO from near-bankruptcy was truly extraordinary, and his work resulted in enormous gains for Berkshire. We owe him a great deal for that.
杰克·伯恩（Jack Byrne）于年中离开GEICO，出任消防员基金（Fireman’s Fund）负责人，由比尔·斯奈德（Bill Snyder）接任董事长，卢·辛普森（Lou Simpson）担任副董事长。杰克带领GEICO从濒临破产的境地中复苏，业绩堪称非凡，他的工作为伯克希尔带来了巨额收益，我们对此感激不尽。
We are equally indebted to Jack for an achievement that eludes most outstanding leaders: he found managers to succeed him who have talents as valuable as his own. By his skill in identifying, attracting and developing Bill and Lou, Jack extended the benefits of his managerial stewardship well beyond his tenure.
杰克还有一项大多数杰出领导者都难以企及的成就，同样值得我们感谢：他为自己找到了能力与他不相上下的继任管理者。通过发掘、吸引并培养比尔和卢，杰克将其管理成果的价值延续到了任期之外。
# Fireman’s Fund Quota-Share Contract（消防员基金配额分保合同）
Never one to let go of a meal ticket, we have followed Jack Byrne to Fireman’s Fund (“FFIC”) where he is Chairman and CEO of the holding company.
我们从不会轻易放弃有利机会，因此也跟随杰克·伯恩将业务拓展至消防员基金（Fireman’s Fund，简称FFIC）——他目前担任该控股公司的董事长兼首席执行官。
On September 1, 1985 we became a 7% participant in all of the business in force of the FFIC group, with the exception of reinsurance they write for unaffiliated companies. Our contract runs for four years, and provides that our losses and costs will be proportionate to theirs throughout the contract period. If there is no extension, we will thereafter have no participation in any ongoing business. However, for a great many years in the future, we will be reimbursing FFIC for our 7% of the losses that occurred in the September 1, 1985 - August 31, 1989 period.
1985年9月1日起，我们成为FFIC集团所有在保业务（不包括其为非关联公司承保的再保险业务）的7%参与方。合同期限为四年，约定在整个合同期内，我们承担的损失和成本将与FFIC按比例分摊。若合同未延期，此后我们将不再参与其任何新增业务。但未来许多年内，对于1985年9月1日至1989年8月31日期间发生的损失，我们仍需向FFIC支付7%的赔偿款。
Under the contract FFIC remits premiums to us promptly and we reimburse FFIC promptly for expenses and losses it has paid. Thus, funds generated by our share of the business are held by us for investment. As part of the deal, I’m available to FFIC for consultation about general investment strategy. I’m not involved, however, in specific investment decisions of FFIC, nor is Berkshire involved in any aspect of the company’s underwriting activities.
根据合同，FFIC会及时将保费的7%汇给我们，而我们也会及时向FFIC偿付其已垫付的费用和损失。因此，我们可持有该业务份额产生的资金用于投资。作为协议的一部分，我会为FFIC提供总体投资策略咨询，但不会参与其具体投资决策，伯克希尔也不会参与该公司承保业务的任何环节。
Currently FFIC is doing about $3 billion of business, and it will probably do more as rates rise. The company’s September 1, 1985 unearned premium reserve was $1.324 billion, and it therefore transferred 7% of this, or $92.7 million, to us at initiation of the contract. We concurrently paid them $29.4 million representing the underwriting expenses that they had incurred on the transferred premium. All of the FFIC business is written by National Indemnity Company, but two-sevenths of it is passed along to Wesco-Financial Insurance Company (“Wes-FIC”), a new company organized by our 80%-owned subsidiary, Wesco Financial Corporation. Charlie Munger has some interesting comments about Wes-FIC and the reinsurance business on pages 60-62.
目前FFIC的年保费规模约为30亿美元，随着费率上涨，这一规模可能进一步扩大。1985年9月1日，该公司的未到期保费准备金为13.24亿美元，因此在合同生效时，向我们转移了其中的7%（即9270万美元）。同时，我们向其支付了2940万美元，用于补偿其就该部分转移保费已发生的承保费用。FFIC的所有业务均由国民保险公司承接，但其中七分之二会分保给韦斯科金融保险公司（Wesco-Financial Insurance Company，简称Wes-FIC）——这是我们持股80%的子公司韦斯科金融公司（Wesco Financial Corporation）新成立的公司。查理·芒格在第60-62页就Wes-FIC及再保险业务发表了一些有趣的观点。
To the Insurance Segment tables on page 41, we have added a new line, labeled Major Quota Share Contracts. The 1985 results of the FFIC contract are reported there, though the newness of the arrangement makes these results only very rough approximations.
我们在第41页的“保险业务板块”表格中新增了“主要配额分保合同”一栏，其中列报了FFIC合同1985年的业绩。但由于该合同刚生效不久，这些业绩数据仅为粗略估算值。
After the end of the year, we secured another quota-share contract, whose 1986 volume should be over $50 million. We hope to develop more of this business, and industry conditions suggest that we could: a significant number of companies are generating more business than they themselves can prudently handle. Our financial strength makes us an attractive partner for such companies.
年末之后，我们又达成了另一项配额分保合同，其1986年保费规模预计将超过5000万美元。我们希望拓展更多此类业务，而行业环境也为我们提供了可能性：目前有相当多的公司承接的业务量超出了其审慎承接能力，我们的财务实力使我们成为这些公司极具吸引力的合作伙伴。
# Marketable Securities（有价证券）
We show below our 1985 yearend net holdings in marketable equities. All positions with a market value over $25 million are listed, and the interests attributable to minority shareholders of Wesco and Nebraska Furniture Mart are excluded.
以下是我们1985年末持有的有价股票净额。表中仅列出市值超过2500万美元的持仓，且剔除了韦斯科和内布拉斯加家具卖场少数股东应享有的权益。
| 持股数量（No. of Shares） | 公司名称（Company Name） | 成本（Cost）（千美元，省略末尾三个零） | 市值（Market）（千美元，省略末尾三个零） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1,036,461 | Affiliated Publications, Inc.（联合出版公司） | $ 3,516 | $ 55,710 |
| 900,800 | American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.（美国广播公司） | 54,435 | 108,997 |
| 2,350,922 | Beatrice Companies, Inc.（比阿特丽斯公司） | 106,811 | 108,142 |
| 6,850,000 | GEICO Corporation（GEICO公司） | 45,713 | 595,950 |
| 2,379,200 | Handy & Harman（汉迪-哈曼公司） | 27,318 | 43,718 |
| 847,788 | Time, Inc.（时代公司） | 20,385 | 52,669 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company（华盛顿邮报公司） | 9,731 | 205,172 |
| 小计（Subtotal） | $ 267,909 | $ 1,170,358 | |
| 其他所有普通股持仓（All Other Common Stockholdings） | 7,201 | 27,963 | |
| 普通股合计（Total Common Stocks） | $ 275,110 | $ 1,198,321 |
We mentioned earlier that in the past decade the investment environment has changed from one in which great businesses were totally unappreciated to one in which they are appropriately recognized. The Washington Post Company (“WPC”) provides an excellent example.
我们此前曾提及，过去十年间，投资环境已从“优质企业完全被低估”转变为“优质企业获得合理认可”。华盛顿邮报公司（The Washington Post Company，简称WPC）就是一个绝佳案例。
We bought all of our WPC holdings in mid-1973 at a price of not more than one-fourth of the then per-share business value of the enterprise. Calculating the price/value ratio required no unusual insights. Most security analysts, media brokers, and media executives would have estimated WPC’s intrinsic business value at $400 to $500 million just as we did. And its $100 million stock market valuation was published daily for all to see. Our advantage, rather, was attitude: we had learned from Ben Graham that the key to successful investing was the purchase of shares in good businesses when market prices were at a large discount from underlying business values.
我们所有的华盛顿邮报公司股票均在1973年中期买入，买入价不超过当时该公司每股业务价值的四分之一。计算这一价 值比并不需要特殊的洞察力——当时大多数证券分析师、媒体经纪人和媒体高管，都会像我们一样，估算出华盛顿邮报公司的内在业务价值在4亿至5亿美元之间，而其1亿美元的市值每天都公之于众，人人可见。我们的优势在于态度：我们从本杰明·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）那里学到，成功投资的关键在于，当优质企业的股价远低于其内在业务价值时买入其股票。
Most institutional investors in the early 1970s, on the other hand, regarded business value as of only minor relevance when they were deciding the prices at which they would buy or sell. This now seems hard to believe. However, these institutions were then under the spell of academics at prestigious business schools who were preaching a newly-fashioned theory: the stock market was totally efficient, and therefore calculations of business value - and even thought, itself - were of no importance in investment activities. (We are enormously indebted to those academics: what could be more advantageous in an intellectual contest - whether it be bridge, chess, or stock selection than to have opponents who have been taught that thinking is a waste of energy?)
另一方面，20世纪70年代初的大多数机构投资者在决定买卖价格时，认为业务价值仅具有次要相关性。如今看来这似乎难以置信，但当时这些机构正受到知名商学院学者的影响，这些学者宣扬一种新理论：股市是完全有效的，因此业务价值计算——甚至思考本身——在投资活动中都无关紧要。（我们非常感谢这些学者：在智力竞赛中——无论是桥牌、国际象棋还是选股——还有什么比对手被灌输“思考是浪费精力”的理念更有利的呢？）
Through 1973 and 1974, WPC continued to do fine as a business, and intrinsic value grew. Nevertheless, by yearend 1974 our WPC holding showed a loss of about 25%, with market value at $8 million against our cost of $10.6 million. What we had thought ridiculously cheap a year earlier had become a good bit cheaper as the market, in its infinite wisdom, marked WPC stock down to well below 20 cents on the dollar of intrinsic value.
1973年至1974年期间，华盛顿邮报公司的业务持续表现良好，内在价值不断增长。然而，到1974年末，我们持有的该公司股票却出现了约25%的浮亏——市值仅为800万美元，而我们的买入成本为1060万美元。一年前我们认为已便宜得离谱的股价，在市场“无穷的智慧”推动下，变得更加便宜，当时股价已跌至内在价值的20%以下。
You know the happy outcome. Kay Graham, CEO of WPC, had the brains and courage to repurchase large quantities of stock for the company at those bargain prices, as well as the managerial skills necessary to dramatically increase business values. Meanwhile, investors began to recognize the exceptional economics of the business and the stock price moved closer to underlying value. Thus, we experienced a triple dip: the company’s business value soared upward, per-share business value increased considerably faster because of stock repurchases and, with a narrowing of the discount, the stock price outpaced the gain in per-share business value.
结局是圆满的，这一点你们也已知晓。华盛顿邮报公司首席执行官凯·格雷厄姆（Kay Graham）既有智慧和勇气，以低廉价格为公司大量回购股票，也具备显著提升业务价值所需的管理能力。与此同时，投资者开始认识到该公司卓越的经济特质，股价逐渐向内在价值靠拢。因此，我们获得了三重收益：公司整体业务价值大幅增长；股票回购使每股业务价值增速显著加快；股价与每股业务价值之间的折价收窄，推动股价涨幅超过每股业务价值涨幅。
We hold all of the WPC shares we bought in 1973, except for those sold back to the company in 1985’s proportionate redemption. Proceeds from the redemption plus yearend market value of our holdings total $221 million.
我们仍持有1973年买入的全部华盛顿邮报公司股票，仅除外1985年按比例赎回并售回给公司的部分。赎回所得款项加上年末持仓市值，总计达2.21亿美元。
If we had invested our $10.6 million in any of a half-dozen media companies that were investment favorites in mid-1973, the value of our holdings at yearend would have been in the area of $40 - $60 million. Our gain would have far exceeded the gain in the general market, an outcome reflecting the exceptional economics of the media business. The extra $160 million or so we gained through ownership of WPC came, in very large part, from the superior nature of the managerial decisions made by Kay as compared to those made by managers of most media companies. Her stunning business success has in large part gone unreported but among Berkshire shareholders it should not go unappreciated.
若我们当年将1060万美元投资于1973年中期六家热门传媒公司中的任意一家，到年末时持仓价值可能在4000万至6000万美元之间。即便如此，收益也会远超大盘涨幅，这体现了传媒行业非凡的经济特性。而通过持有华盛顿邮报公司股票多获得的约1.6亿美元收益，很大程度上源于凯（Kay）的管理决策优于大多数传媒公司管理者。她卓越的商业成就虽未被广泛报道，但伯克希尔的股东们理应予以认可。
Our Capital Cities purchase, described in the next section, required me to leave the WPC Board early in 1986. But we intend to hold indefinitely whatever WPC stock FCC rules allow us to. We expect WPC’s business values to grow at a reasonable rate, and we know that management is both able and shareholder-oriented. However, the market now values the company at over $1.8 billion, and there is no way that the value can progress from that level at a rate anywhere close to the rate possible when the company’s valuation was only $100 million. Because market prices have also been bid up for our other holdings, we face the same vastly-reduced potential throughout our portfolio.
下一部分将提及我们对资本城公司（Capital Cities）的收购，该交易要求我于1986年初退出华盛顿邮报公司董事会。但我们计划在联邦通信委员会（FCC）规则允许的范围内，无限期持有华盛顿邮报公司股票。我们预计其业务价值将以合理速度增长，且深知其管理层能力出众、以股东利益为导向。然而，目前该公司市值已超过18亿美元，从这一规模再实现高增长，难度远大于市值仅为1亿美元时。由于我们其他持仓的股价也已被推高，整个投资组合的增长潜力都大幅下降。
You will notice that we had a significant holding in Beatrice Companies at yearend. This is a short-term arbitrage holding - in effect, a parking place for money (though not a totally safe one, since deals sometimes fall through and create substantial losses). We sometimes enter the arbitrage field when we have more money than ideas, but only to participate in announced mergers and sales. We would be a lot happier if the funds currently employed on this short-term basis found a long-term home. At the moment, however, prospects are bleak.
你会注意到，年末我们持有大量比阿特丽斯公司（Beatrice Companies）股票。这是一项短期套利持仓，本质上是资金的“临时存放地”（并非绝对安全，因交易有时会失败并造成重大损失）。当我们资金充裕却缺乏长期投资标的时，会进入套利领域，但仅参与已公告的并购或出售交易。若目前用于短期套利的资金能找到长期投资方向，我们会更满意，但目前来看前景黯淡。
At yearend our insurance subsidiaries had about $400 million in tax-exempt bonds, of which $194 million at amortized cost were issues of Washington Public Power Supply System (“WPPSS”) Projects 1, 2, and 3. 1 discussed this position fully last year, and explained why we would not disclose further purchases or sales until well after the fact (adhering to the policy we follow on stocks). Our unrealized gain on the WPPSS bonds at yearend was $62 million, perhaps one-third arising from the upward movement of bonds generally, and the remainder from a more positive investor view toward WPPSS 1, 2, and 3s. Annual tax-exempt income from our WPPSS issues is about $30 million.
年末，我们保险子公司持有约4亿美元免税债券，其中摊余成本1.94亿美元为华盛顿公共电力供应系统（WPPSS）1、2、3号项目债券。去年我已详细讨论过这一持仓，并解释为何我们不会实时披露该债券的买卖情况（遵循与股票相同的披露政策）。年末该债券的未实现收益为6200万美元，其中约三分之一源于整体债券市场上涨，其余则因投资者对WPPSS 1、2、3号项目债券的看法转好。该债券为我们带来的年度免税收入约为3000万美元。
# Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.（资本城/美国广播公司）
Right after yearend, Berkshire purchased 3 million shares of Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (“Cap Cities”) at $172.50 per share, the market price of such shares at the time the commitment was made early in March, 1985. I’ve been on record for many years about the management of Cap Cities: I think it is the best of any publicly-owned company in the country. And Tom Murphy and Dan Burke are not only great managers, they are precisely the sort of fellows that you would want your daughter to marry. It is a privilege to be associated with them - and also a lot of fun, as any of you who know them will understand.
年末刚过，伯克希尔以每股172.50美元的价格购入300万股资本城/美国广播公司（Cap Cities）股票。这一价格是1985年3月初我们做出投资承诺时的市价。多年来我一直公开表示，资本城公司的管理层是美国所有上市公司中最优秀的。汤姆·墨菲（Tom Murphy）和丹·伯克（Dan Burke）不仅是杰出的管理者，更是你愿意将女儿托付的那种人。能与他们合作是一种荣幸，也充满乐趣，认识他们的人都会理解这一点。
Our purchase of stock helped Cap Cities finance the $3.5 billion acquisition of American Broadcasting Companies. For Cap Cities, ABC is a major undertaking whose economics are likely to be unexciting over the next few years. This bothers us not an iota; we can be very patient. (No matter how great the talent or effort, some things just take time: you can’t produce a baby in one month by getting nine women pregnant.)
我们的股票认购为资本城公司提供了资金支持，助力其以35亿美元收购美国广播公司（ABC）。对资本城公司而言，ABC是一项重大投资，未来几年其经济效益可能并不突出。但我们对此毫不在意，因为我们极具耐心。（无论能力多强、努力多少，有些事情终究需要时间：让九个女人同时怀孕，也无法在一个月内生出孩子。）
As evidence of our confidence, we have executed an unusual agreement: for an extended period Tom, as CEO (or Dan, should he be CEO) votes our stock. This arrangement was initiated by Charlie and me, not by Tom. We also have restricted ourselves in various ways regarding sale of our shares. The object of these restrictions is to make sure that our block does not get sold to anyone who is a large holder (or intends to become a large holder) without the approval of management, an arrangement similar to ones we initiated some years ago at GEICO and Washington Post.
为体现我们的信心，我们签订了一项特殊协议：在较长时期内，由汤姆（作为首席执行官）或丹（若其担任首席执行官）代为行使我们所持股票的投票权。该安排由查理和我主动提出，而非汤姆。我们还对股票出售施加了多项限制，目的是确保在未获管理层批准的情况下，我们的持股不会出售给任何大股东（或有意成为大股东的人）。这一安排与我们多年前在GEICO和华盛顿邮报公司采取的措施类似。
Since large blocks frequently command premium prices, some might think we have injured Berkshire financially by creating such restrictions. Our view is just the opposite. We feel the long-term economic prospects for these businesses - and, thus, for ourselves as owners - are enhanced by the arrangements. With them in place, the first-class managers with whom we have aligned ourselves can focus their efforts entirely upon running the businesses and maximizing long-term values for owners. Certainly this is much better than having those managers distracted by “revolving-door capitalists” hoping to put the company “in play”. (Of course, some managers place their own interests above those of the company and its owners and deserve to be shaken up - but, in making investments, we try to steer clear of this type.)
由于大宗持股通常能以溢价出售，有人可能认为这些限制会损害伯克希尔的财务利益。但我们持相反观点：我们认为这些安排将提升企业的长期经济前景，进而提升我们作为股东的利益。有了这些安排，与我们合作的一流管理者便能全身心投入业务运营，为股东实现长期价值最大化，而不必被那些希望“炒作公司”的“投机资本家”干扰。（当然，有些管理者将个人利益置于公司和股东利益之上，理应被替换，但我们在投资时会尽量避开这类管理者。）
Today, corporate instability is an inevitable consequence of widely-diffused ownership of voting stock. At any time a major holder can surface, usually mouthing reassuring rhetoric but frequently harboring uncivil intentions. By circumscribing our blocks of stock as we often do, we intend to promote stability where it otherwise might be lacking. That kind of certainty, combined with a good manager and a good business, provides excellent soil for a rich financial harvest. That’s the economic case for our arrangements.
如今，表决权股份的广泛分散导致公司不稳定成为必然。任何时候都可能出现大股东，他们通常言辞动听，却往往心怀不轨。通过对我们的大宗持股施加限制，我们希望在可能缺乏稳定性的地方营造稳定环境。这种确定性，再加上优秀的管理者和优质的业务，将为丰厚的财务回报提供绝佳土壤——这是我们做出此类安排的经济考量。
The human side is just as important. We don’t want managers we like and admire - and who have welcomed a major financial commitment by us - to ever lose any sleep wondering whether surprises might occur because of our large ownership. I have told them there will be no surprises, and these agreements put Berkshire’s signature where my mouth is. That signature also means the managers have a corporate commitment and therefore need not worry if my personal participation in Berkshire’s affairs ends prematurely (a term I define as any age short of three digits).
人文层面的考量同样重要。我们不希望那些我们欣赏、且欢迎我们大额投资的管理者，因我们持有大量股份而担心出现意外。我已向他们承诺不会有意外，这些协议则让伯克希尔以书面形式兑现了我的承诺。这一承诺也意味着，即便我个人参与伯克希尔事务的时间提前结束（我将“提前”定义为未活到100岁），管理者也无需担忧，因为他们拥有的是公司层面的承诺。
Our Cap Cities purchase was made at a full price, reflecting the very considerable enthusiasm for both media stocks and media properties that has developed in recent years (and that, in the case of some property purchases, has approached a mania). it’s no field for bargains. However, our Cap Cities investment allies us with an exceptional combination of properties and people - and we like the opportunity to participate in size.
我们收购资本城公司的价格是公允的，反映了近年来市场对传媒股票和传媒资产的高度热情（部分资产收购甚至近乎狂热），目前该领域已无低价标的。然而，对资本城公司的投资让我们与优质资产和优秀人才结合，我们也乐于获得这样的大额投资机会。
Of course, some of you probably wonder why we are now buying Cap Cities at $172.50 per share given that your Chairman, in a characteristic burst of brilliance, sold Berkshire’s holdings in the same company at $43 per share in 1978-80. Anticipating your question, I spent much of 1985 working on a snappy answer that would reconcile these acts.
A little more time, please.
当然，你们中有些人可能会疑惑：为何我在1978-1980年以每股43美元的价格出售了伯克希尔持有的资本城公司股票，如今却以每股172.50美元的价格重新买入？我早已预料到这个问题，1985年大部分时间都在思考如何巧妙解释这一矛盾行为。
请再给我一点时间。
# Acquisition of Scott & Fetzer（收购斯科特-费策公司）
Right after yearend we acquired The Scott & Fetzer Company (“Scott Fetzer”) of Cleveland for about $320 million. (In addition, about $90 million of pre-existing Scott Fetzer debt remains in place.) In the next section of this report I describe the sort of businesses that we wish to buy for Berkshire. Scott Fetzer is a prototype - understandable, large, well-managed, a good earner.
年末刚过，我们以约3.2亿美元收购了位于克利夫兰的斯科特-费策公司（Scott Fetzer）。（此外，该公司原有的约9000万美元债务仍将保留。）本报告下一部分将阐述我们希望为伯克希尔收购的业务类型，而斯科特-费策公司正是此类业务的典范——业务易懂、规模可观、管理优秀、盈利能力良好。
The company has sales of about $700 million derived from 17 businesses, many leaders in their fields. Return on invested capital is good to excellent for most of these businesses. Some well-known products are Kirby home-care systems, Campbell Hausfeld air compressors, and Wayne burners and water pumps.
该公司旗下17项业务的总销售额约为7亿美元，其中多项业务在各自领域处于领先地位。大部分业务的投资回报率良好甚至卓越，知名产品包括柯比（Kirby）家庭清洁系统、坎贝尔·豪斯菲尔德（Campbell Hausfeld）空气压缩机，以及韦恩（Wayne）燃烧器和水泵。
World Book, Inc. - accounting for about 40% of Scott Fetzer’s sales and a bit more of its income - is by far the company’s largest operation. It also is by far the leader in its industry, selling more than twice as many encyclopedia sets annually as its nearest competitor. In fact, it sells more sets in the U.S. than its four biggest competitors combined.
世界图书公司（World Book, Inc.）是斯科特-费策公司最大的业务板块，贡献了约40%的销售额和略高比例的利润。该公司也是其行业内的绝对领导者，每年百科全书的销量是最接近竞争对手的两倍多，在美国市场的销量甚至超过四大竞争对手的总和。
Charlie and I have a particular interest in the World Book operation because we regard its encyclopedia as something special. I’ve been a fan (and user) for 25 years, and now have grandchildren consulting the sets just as my children did. World Book is regularly rated the most useful encyclopedia by teachers, librarians and consumer buying guides. Yet it sells for less than any of its major competitors. Childcraft, another World Book, Inc. product, offers similar value. This combination of exceptional products and modest prices at World Book, Inc. helped make us willing to pay the price demanded for Scott Fetzer, despite declining results for many companies in the direct-selling industry.
查理和我对世界图书公司的业务尤为关注，因为我们认为其百科全书独具价值。25年来，我一直是它的粉丝和用户，如今我的孙辈也像我的孩子当年一样查阅这套百科全书。世界图书经常被教师、图书馆员和消费者购买指南评为最实用的百科全书，但其售价却低于所有主要竞争对手。世界图书公司的另一产品“儿童工艺”（Childcraft）也具有类似的高性价比。尽管许多直销行业公司业绩下滑，但世界图书公司“优质产品+合理价格”的组合，仍让我们愿意为收购斯科特-费策公司支付相应价格。
An equal attraction at Scott Fetzer is Ralph Schey, its CEO for nine years. When Ralph took charge, the company had 31 businesses, the result of an acquisition spree in the 1960s. He disposed of many that did not fit or had limited profit potential, but his focus on rationalizing the original potpourri was not so intense that he passed by World Book when it became available for purchase in 1978. Ralph’s operating and capital-allocation record is superb, and we are delighted to be associated with him.
斯科特-费策公司的另一大吸引力在于其首席执行官拉尔夫·谢伊（Ralph Schey）——他已任职九年。拉尔夫接手时，公司因20世纪60年代的收购热潮拥有31项业务。他剥离了许多不匹配或盈利潜力有限的业务，但在整合业务的同时，并未错过1978年收购世界图书公司的机会。拉尔夫在运营和资本配置方面的记录堪称卓越，我们很高兴能与他合作。
The history of the Scott Fetzer acquisition is interesting, marked by some zigs and zags before we became involved. The company had been an announced candidate for purchase since early 1984. A major investment banking firm spent many months canvassing scores of prospects, evoking interest from several. Finally, in mid-1985 a plan of sale, featuring heavy participation by an ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan), was approved by shareholders. However, as difficulty in closing followed, the plan was scuttled.
斯科特-费策公司的收购历程颇具波折，在我们介入前经历了不少起伏。自1984年初起，该公司就公开寻求收购方。一家大型投资银行耗时数月接洽了数十家潜在买家，也引发了部分兴趣。最终在1985年中期，一项以员工持股计划（ESOP）为主导的出售方案获得股东批准，但后续因交易完成遇阻，该方案被迫搁置。
I had followed this corporate odyssey through the newspapers. On October 10, well after the ESOP deal had fallen through, I wrote a short letter to Ralph, whom I did not know. I said we admired the company’s record and asked if he might like to talk. Charlie and I met Ralph for dinner in Chicago on October 22 and signed an acquisition contract the following week.
我通过报纸关注着这家公司的动态。10月10日，在ESOP方案失败后，我给素未谋面的拉尔夫写了一封短信，表达了我们对该公司业绩的认可，并询问是否愿意洽谈。10月22日，查理和我与拉尔夫在芝加哥共进晚餐，第二周便签署了收购合同。
The Scott Fetzer acquisition, plus major growth in our insurance business, should push revenues above $2 billion in 1986, more than double those of 1985.
收购斯科特-费策公司，再加上保险业务的大幅增长，预计将使1986年伯克希尔的营收突破20亿美元，较1985年增长一倍以上。
# Miscellaneous（其他事项）
The Scott Fetzer purchase illustrates our somewhat haphazard approach to acquisitions. We have no master strategy, no corporate planners delivering us insights about socioeconomic trends, and no staff to investigate a multitude of ideas presented by promoters and intermediaries. Instead, we simply hope that something sensible comes along - and, when it does, we act.
对斯科特-费策公司的收购，体现了我们略显随机的收购方式。我们没有总体战略，没有企业规划师为我们分析社会经济趋势，也没有团队去调研推广方和中介提供的大量想法。我们只是期待合适的标的出现，一旦出现便采取行动。
To give fate a helping hand, we again repeat our regular “business wanted” ad. The only change from last year’s copy is in (1): because we continue to want any acquisition we make to have a measurable impact on Berkshire’s financial results, we have raised our minimum profit requirement.
为增加机会，我们再次发布常规的“收购意向”公告。与去年相比，唯一的变化在第（1）条：由于我们仍希望收购能对伯克希尔的财务业绩产生显著影响，我们提高了最低利润要求。
Here’s what we’re looking for: (1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings), (2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turn-around” situations), (3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt, (4) management in place (we can’t supply it), (5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it), (6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
我们寻求的标的需满足以下条件： （1）规模较大（税后利润至少1000万美元）； （2）具备持续盈利能力（我们对未来预测不感兴趣，也不关注“扭亏为盈”类标的）； （3）权益回报率良好，且负债少或无负债； （4）管理层稳定（我们无法提供管理层）； （5）业务简单（若涉及大量技术，我们无法理解）； （6）有明确报价（若价格未知，即便初步洽谈也会浪费双方时间，我们不愿为此投入）。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuance of stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. Indeed, following recent advances in the price of Berkshire stock, transactions involving stock issuance may be quite feasible. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.
我们不参与恶意收购。我们承诺对洽谈内容完全保密，并会迅速反馈是否感兴趣——通常在五分钟内。我们更倾向于现金收购，但如果能以同等内在业务价值进行股票交换，也会考虑发行股票。事实上，随着近期伯克希尔股价上涨，股票置换类交易可能更具可行性。我们邀请潜在出售方通过联系我们过往的合作伙伴了解我们，对于合适的业务和团队，我们能提供良好的发展平台。
On the other hand, we frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: new ventures, turnarounds, auction-like sales, and the ever-popular (among brokers) “I’m-sure-something-will-work-out-if-you-people-get-to-know-each-other”. None of these attracts us in the least.
另一方面，我们经常收到不符合上述条件的收购提议：新项目、扭亏标的、拍卖式出售，以及经纪人常说的“只要你们多接触，肯定能达成合作”。这些提议均无法引起我们的兴趣。
Besides being interested in the purchases of entire businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock, as in our Cap Cities purchase. Such purchases appeal to us only when we are very comfortable with both the economics of the business and the ability and integrity of the people running the operation. We prefer large transactions: in the unusual case we might do something as small as $50 million (or even smaller), but our preference is for commitments many times that size.
除了上述对整体业务的收购，我们也有意通过协商收购大额但非控股的股票，如对资本城公司的投资。此类投资需满足两个条件：我们对业务的经济特性有充分信心，且信任运营团队的能力与诚信。我们更倾向于大额交易：特殊情况下可能考虑5000万美元（甚至更低）的投资，但更偏好规模远超于此的交易。
About 96.8% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1985 shareholder-designated contributions program. Total contributions made through the program were $4 million, and 1,724 charities were recipients. We conducted a plebiscite last year in order to get your views about this program, as well as about our dividend policy. (Recognizing that it’s possible to influence the answers to a question by the framing of it, we attempted to make the wording of ours as neutral as possible.) We present the ballot and the results in the Appendix on page 69. I think it’s fair to summarize your response as highly supportive of present policies and your group preference - allowing for the tendency of people to vote for the status quo - to be for increasing the annual charitable commitment as our asset values build.
1985年伯克希尔股东指定捐赠计划的参与率约为96.8%，通过该计划的总捐赠额达400万美元，惠及1724家慈善机构。去年我们就该计划及股息政策进行了投票调查（我们意识到问题表述可能影响结果，因此尽量保持措辞中立）。投票内容及结果详见第69页附录。总体而言，你们对现有政策高度支持，且尽管人们通常倾向于维持现状，但仍希望随着公司资产增值，增加年度慈善捐赠额度。
We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 66 and 67. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure that your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in “street” name or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1986 will be ineligible for the 1986 program.
我们建议新股东阅读第66-67页关于股东指定捐赠计划的说明。若你希望参与未来的计划，请立即确认你的股票以实际持有人名义登记，而非以券商名义（street name）或代理人名义（nominee name）登记。1986年9月30日前未完成此类登记的股票，将无资格参与1986年的捐赠计划。
Five years ago we were required by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1969 to dispose of our holdings in The Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois. Our method of doing so was unusual: we announced an exchange ratio between stock of Rockford Bancorp Inc. (the Illinois National’s holding company) and stock of Berkshire, and then let each of our shareholders - except me - make the decision as to whether to exchange all, part, or none of his Berkshire shares for Rockford shares. I took the Rockford stock that was left over and thus my own holding in Rockford was determined by your decisions. At the time I said, “This technique embodies the world’s oldest and most elementary system of fairly dividing an object. Just as when you were a child and one person cut the cake and the other got first choice, I have tried to cut the company fairly, but you get first choice as to which piece you want.”
五年前，根据1969年《银行控股公司法》，我们需出售所持有的伊利诺伊州罗克福德市伊利诺伊国民银行信托公司的股份。我们采用了特殊的处置方式：公布罗克福德银行集团（该银行的控股公司）股票与伯克希尔股票的兑换比例，然后让除我之外的所有股东自主决定是否将伯克希尔股票全部、部分或零兑换为罗克福德银行股票。我则持有剩余的罗克福德银行股票，因此我在该银行的持股比例由你们的决定而定。当时我表示：“这种方式体现了世界上最古老、最基本的公平分配原则。就像小时候分蛋糕，一人切蛋糕，另一人先选；我尽力公平地‘分割’公司，而你们有权先选择想要的‘部分’。”
Last fall Illinois National was sold. When Rockford’s liquidation is completed, its shareholders will have received per-share proceeds about equal to Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value at the time of the bank’s sale. I’m pleased that this five-year result indicates that the division of the cake was reasonably equitable.
去年秋天，伊利诺伊国民银行被出售。罗克福德银行集团清算完成后，其股东获得的每股收益将与银行出售时伯克希尔的每股内在价值大致相当。五年后的这一结果表明，当初的“蛋糕分割”相当公平，我对此感到满意。
Last year I put in a plug for our annual meeting, and you took me up on the invitation. Over 250 of our more than 3,000 registered shareholders showed up. Those attending behaved just as those present in previous years, asking the sort of questions you would expect from intelligent and interested owners. You can attend a great many annual meetings without running into a crowd like ours. (Lester Maddox, when Governor of Georgia, was criticized regarding the state’s abysmal prison system. “The solution”, he said, “is simple. All we need is a better class of prisoners.” Upgrading annual meetings works the same way.)
去年我邀请大家参加年度股东大会，你们积极响应。在3000多名登记股东中，有250多人出席。与会者和往年一样，提出了明智且关注公司的问题，这样的股东群体并不常见。（佐治亚州前州长莱斯特·马多克斯曾因该州糟糕的监狱系统受到批评，他回应道：“解决方案很简单，我们只需要更优质的囚犯。”提升股东大会质量的道理与此相同。）
I hope you come to this year’s meeting, which will be held on May 20 in Omaha. There will be only one change: after 48 years of allegiance to another soft drink, your Chairman, in an unprecedented display of behavioral flexibility, has converted to the new Cherry Coke. Henceforth, it will be the Official Drink of the Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting.
And bring money: Mrs. B promises to have bargains galore if you will pay her a visit at The Nebraska Furniture Mart after the meeting.
我希望你们能参加今年5月20日在奥马哈举行的年度股东大会。今年唯一的变化是：担任董事长48年来，我一直偏爱某款软饮，如今我将打破常规，改喝新款樱桃可乐。今后，樱桃可乐将成为伯克希尔·哈撒韦年度股东大会的“官方饮品”。
记得带上钱：B夫人承诺，若你们会后前往内布拉斯加家具卖场，会有大量优惠商品等着你们。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 4, 1986