2020巴菲特致股东的信

# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.（伯克希尔哈撒韦致全体股东）

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Berkshire earned $42.5 billion in 2020 according to generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called “GAAP”). The four components of that figure are $21.9 billion of operating earnings, $4.9 billion of realized capital gains, a $26.7 billion gain from an increase in the amount of net unrealized capital gains that exist in the stocks we hold and, finally, an $11 billion loss from a write-down in the value of a few subsidiary and affiliate businesses that we own. All items are stated on an after-tax basis.

伯克希尔哈撒韦致全体股东：
根据公认会计准则（通常称为“GAAP”），伯克希尔2020年盈利425亿美元。该数字由四部分构成：运营利润219亿美元，已实现资本利得49亿美元，我们持有股票中未实现净资本利得增加带来的收益267亿美元，以及少数子公司和联营企业的110亿美元减值损失。所有数据均以税后形式呈现。

# Operating earnings are what count most（运营利润的核心地位）

Operating earnings are what count most, even during periods when they are not the largest item in our GAAP total. Our focus at Berkshire is both to increase this segment of our income and to acquire large and favorably-situated businesses. Last year, however, we met neither goal: Berkshire made no sizable acquisitions and operating earnings fell 9%. We did, though, increase Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by both retaining earnings and repurchasing about 5% of our shares.

运营利润是最重要的指标，即使在它并非GAAP总盈利最大组成部分的时期也是如此。伯克希尔的目标始终是提升这一收入板块，并收购大型且地理位置有利的企业。然而，2020年我们未能达成这两个目标：伯克希尔未进行重大收购，且运营利润下降9%。不过，通过留存盈利和回购约5%的流通股，我们成功提升了每股内在价值。

# GAAP components and capital gains（GAAP构成与资本利得）

The two GAAP components pertaining to capital gains or losses (whether realized or unrealized) fluctuate capriciously from year to year, reflecting swings in the stock market. Whatever today’s figures, Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I firmly believe that, over time, Berkshire’s capital gains from its investment holdings will be substantial.

GAAP中涉及资本损益的两部分（无论已实现或未实现）每年波动剧烈，反映股市起伏。尽管如此，查理·芒格（我的长期合作伙伴）和我坚信，从长期看，伯克希尔从投资组合中获得的资本利得将非常可观。

As I’ve emphasized many times, Charlie and I view Berkshire’s holdings of marketable stocks – at yearend worth $281 billion – as a collection of businesses. We don’t control the operations of those companies, but we do share proportionately in their long-term prosperity. From an accounting standpoint, however, our portion of their earnings is not included in Berkshire’s income. Instead, only what these investees pay us in dividends is recorded on our books. Under GAAP, the huge sums that investees retain on our behalf become invisible.

正如我多次强调的，查理和我将伯克希尔持有的可交易股票（年末价值2810亿美元）视为企业集合。我们虽不控制这些公司运营，但能按比例分享其长期繁荣。然而，会计准则下，我们的持股盈利仅以分红入账。GAAP规定下，这些企业代表我们留存的巨额资金却未在报表中体现。

# Retained earnings: The hidden engine（留存收益：隐性引擎）

What’s out of sight, however, should not be out of mind: Those unrecorded retained earnings are usually building value – lots of value – for Berkshire. Investees use the withheld funds to expand their business, make acquisitions, pay off debt and, often, to repurchase their stock (an act that increases our share of their future earnings).

但未记录的留存收益不应被忽视：这些资金通常为伯克希尔创造巨大价值。被投资企业将留存资金用于扩张、并购、还债，甚至回购自身股份（这一行为会提升我们未来盈利占比）。

As we pointed out in these pages last year, retained earnings have propelled American business throughout our country’s history. What worked for Carnegie and Rockefeller has, over the years, worked its magic for millions of shareholders as well.

正如去年年报所述，留存收益贯穿美国商业史，推动企业成长。卡内基和洛克菲勒的成功模式，过去数十年也为数百万股东创造了奇迹。

Of course, some of our investees will disappoint, adding little, if anything, to the value of their company by retaining earnings. But others will over-deliver, a few spectacularly. In aggregate, we expect our share of the huge pile of earnings retained by Berkshire’s non-controlled businesses (what others would label our equity portfolio) to eventually deliver us an equal or greater amount of capital gains. Over our 56-year tenure, that expectation has been met.

当然，部分被投资企业留存收益后表现令人失望，对自身价值贡献甚微。但另一些企业将超额回报，少数甚至表现卓越。总体而言，我们预计伯克希尔非控股企业（即外界所称的“股票投资组合”）留存的巨额收益最终将转化为同等或更高的资本利得。在过去56年里，这一预期始终成立。

# Precision Castparts: A costly mistake（精密铸件公司——代价高昂的错误）

The final component in our GAAP figure – that ugly $11 billion write-down – is almost entirely the quantification of a mistake I made in 2016. That year, Berkshire purchased Precision Castparts (“PCC”), and I paid too much for the company.

GAAP数据中的最后一项——刺眼的110亿美元减值损失——几乎完全源于我在2016年的错误。那一年，伯克希尔收购了精密铸件公司（“PCC”），我为该公司支付了过高价格。

No one misled me in any way – I was simply too optimistic about PCC’s normalized profit potential. Last year, my miscalculation was laid bare by adverse developments throughout the aerospace industry, PCC’s most important source of customers.

无人以任何方式误导我——我只是对PCC的正常化盈利能力过于乐观。去年，航空航天业（PCC最重要的客户来源）的不利发展暴露了我的误判。

In purchasing PCC, Berkshire bought a fine company – the best in its business. Mark Donegan, PCC’s CEO, is a passionate manager who consistently pours the same energy into the business that he did before we purchased it. We are lucky to have him running things.

收购PCC时，伯克希尔获得了一家优质企业——该领域最优秀者。Mark Donegan作为CEO充满激情，始终以与收购前相同的投入管理公司。有他掌舵，我们是幸运的。

I believe I was right in concluding that PCC would, over time, earn good returns on the net tangible assets deployed in its operations. I was wrong, however, in judging the average amount of future earnings and, consequently, wrong in my calculation of the proper price to pay for the business.

我确信PCC最终能在运营中对投入的有形资产产生良好回报。但我低估了未来盈利的平均水平，因此高估了收购价格。

PCC is far from my first error of that sort. But it’s a big one.

这绝非我首次犯此类错误。但这次规模空前。

# Two Strings to Our Bow（两弦之弓）

Berkshire is often labeled a conglomerate, a negative term applied to holding companies that own a hodge-podge of unrelated businesses. And, yes, that describes Berkshire – but only in part. To understand how and why we differ from the prototype conglomerate, let’s review a little history.

伯克希尔常被贴上“集团企业”的标签——这一词汇通常用于形容持有零散无关业务的控股公司，且带有负面含义。确实，这一描述部分适用于伯克希尔，但并不完全准确。要理解我们与传统集团企业的差异，需回顾一段历史。

# 集团企业的历史陷阱（The Conglomerate Era: A Cautionary Tale）

Over time, conglomerates have generally limited themselves to buying businesses in their entirety. That strategy, however, came with two major problems. One was unsolvable: Most of the truly great businesses had no interest in having anyone take them over. Consequently, deal-hungry conglomerateurs had to focus on so-so companies that lacked important and durable competitive strengths. That was not a great pond in which to fish.

传统集团企业通常仅收购全资控股公司，这一策略存在两大问题。其一是无解的：真正优质的企业从不愿被收购。因此，交易狂热的集团企业只能转向普通甚至平庸的公司——这些企业缺乏持久的竞争优势。这不是一个值得垂钓的优质鱼塘。

Beyond that, as conglomerateurs dipped into this universe of mediocre businesses, they often found themselves required to pay staggering “control” premiums to snare their quarry. Aspiring conglomerateurs knew the answer to this “overpayment” problem: They simply needed to manufacture a vastly overvalued stock of their own that could be used as a “currency” for pricey acquisitions. (“I’ll pay you $10,000 for your dog by giving you two of my $5,000 cats.”)

更糟的是，当集团企业涉足这些平庸公司的猎物时，往往需支付高昂的“控制权溢价”。解决这一问题的答案？制造自身高估的股票作为“货币”完成交易。（“我用两只价值5,000美元的猫换你价值10,000美元的狗。”）

Often, the tools for fostering the overvaluation of a conglomerate’s stock involved promotional techniques and “imaginative” accounting maneuvers that were, at best, deceptive and that sometimes crossed the line into fraud. When these tricks were “successful,” the conglomerate pushed its own stock to, say, 3x its business value in order to offer the target 2x its value.

为维持股价高估，集团企业常采用营销手段和“创新”会计操作——这些行为至少具有误导性，甚至可能触及欺诈。一旦得逞，它们便能以3倍于企业内在价值的股价收购目标（目标价值2倍）。

Investing illusions can continue for a surprisingly long time. Wall Street loves the fees that deal-making generates, and the press loves the stories that colorful promoters provide. At a point, also, the soaring price of a promoted stock can itself become the “proof” that an illusion is reality.

投资幻象可能持续多年。华尔街热衷交易费用，媒体追逐故事营销。最终，人为推高的股价本身竟成为“现实”的证明。

Eventually, of course, the party ends, and many business “emperors” are found to have no clothes. Financial history is replete with the names of famous conglomerateurs who were initially lionized as business geniuses by journalists, analysts and investment bankers, but whose creations ended up as business junkyards.

当然，派对终将结束，许多“商业皇帝”终将暴露其赤裸的本质。金融史中，这类案例比比皆是：曾经被记者、分析师和投行奉为天才的集团企业家，最终只留下一堆商业废墟。

Conglomerates earned their terrible reputation.

集团企业由此背负恶名，实至名归。

# 伯克希尔的双路径投资哲学（Berkshire’s Dual-String Strategy）

Charlie and I want our conglomerate to own all or part of a diverse group of businesses with good economic characteristics and good managers. Whether Berkshire controls these businesses, however, is unimportant to us.

查理和我希望我们的集团企业拥有经济特质优良、管理层优质的企业——无论全资控股还是部分持股。对伯克希尔而言，是否拥有控制权并不重要。

It took me a while to wise up. But Charlie – and also my 20-year struggle with the textile operation I inherited at Berkshire – finally convinced me that owning a non-controlling portion of a wonderful business is more profitable, more enjoyable and far less work than struggling with 100% of a marginal enterprise.

我花了很久才领悟这一点。查理和我在伯克希尔纺织业务上的20年挣扎终于让我明白：持有一家优质企业的非控股股份，远比掌控一家平庸企业更高效、更省心且更赚钱。

For those reasons, our conglomerate will remain a collection of controlled and non-controlled businesses. Charlie and I will simply deploy your capital into whatever we believe makes the most sense, based on a company’s durable competitive strengths, the capabilities and character of its management, and price.

正因如此，伯克希尔将继续混合控股与非控股企业。查理和我配置您的资本时，仅基于企业的持久竞争优势、管理层能力和价格合理性进行决策。

If that strategy requires little or no effort on our part, so much the better. In contrast to the scoring system utilized in diving competitions, you are awarded no points in business endeavors for “degree of difficulty.” Furthermore, as Ronald Reagan cautioned: “It’s said that hard work never killed anyone, but I say why take the chance?”

若这一策略无需费力则更佳。与跳水比赛评分不同，商业中不会因“难度系数”加分。正如里根所言：“据说努力工作不会致命，但我说何必冒险？”

On page A-1 we list Berkshire’s subsidiaries, a smorgasbidding of businesses employing 360,000 at yearend. You can read much more about these controlled operations in the 10-K that fills the back part of this report. Our major positions in companies that we partly own and don’t control are listed on page 7 of this letter. That portfolio of businesses, too, is large and diverse.

在年报A-1页，我们列出了伯克希尔的子公司名单——年末员工总数达36万人。关于这些控股企业的更多细节，详见本报告后半部分的10-K文件。我们非控股的重要投资标的（如苹果公司）则在信件第7页列出。这一投资组合同样规模庞大且多元化。

Most of Berkshire’s value, however, resides in four businesses, three controlled and one in which we have only a 5.4% interest. All four are jewels.

然而，伯克希尔的核心价值集中于四大“珍宝”：三家企业全资控股，一家仅持有5.4%股份。这四家均是行业瑰宝。

# 保险业务：伯克希尔的基石（The Insurance Engine: Berkshire’s Foundation）

The largest in value is our property/casualty insurance operation, which for 53 years has been the core of Berkshire. Our family of insurers is unique in the insurance field. So, too, is its manager, Ajit Jain, who joined Berkshire in 1986.

价值最高的是我们的财产与意外险业务，自1986年Ajit Jain加入以来，这一板块便成为伯克希尔的核心。我们的保险集群在行业中独一无二，而Ajit本人更是行业传奇。

Overall, the insurance fleet operates with far more capital than is deployed by any of its competitors worldwide. That financial strength, coupled with the huge flow of cash Berkshire annually receives from its non-insurance businesses, allows our insurance companies to safely follow an equity-heavy investment strategy not feasible for the overwhelming majority of insurers. Those competitors, for both regulatory and credit-rating reasons, must focus on bonds.

整体而言，我们的保险业务资本实力远超全球同行。这一优势结合伯克希尔非保险业务的现金流支持，使保险公司能安全地采用高比例股票投资策略——这在传统保险业无法实现。受监管和评级限制，多数竞争对手只能聚焦债券投资。

And bonds are not the place to be these days. Can you believe that the income recently available from a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond – the yield was 0.93% at yearend – had fallen 94% from the 15.8% yield available in September 1981? In certain large and important countries, such as Germany and Japan, investors earn a negative return on trillions of dollars of sovereign debt. Fixed-income investors worldwide – whether pension funds, insurance companies or retirees – face a bleak future.

当前债券市场并非理想选择。您能相信吗？美国10年期国债年末收益率仅0.93%，较1981年9月的15.8%暴跌94%。在德国、日本等大国，主权债务的投资者甚至面临负回报。全球固定收益投资者——无论是养老基金、保险公司还是退休人士——都将迎来严峻未来。

# 保险浮存金：无息资本的力量（Insurance Float: The Power of Cost-Free Capital）

Some insurers, as well as other bond investors, may try to juice the pathetic returns now available by shifting their purchases to obligations backed by shaky borrowers. Risky loans, however, are not the answer to inadequate interest rates. Three decades ago, the once-mighty savings and loan industry destroyed itself, partly by ignoring that maxim.

部分保险公司和其他债券投资者可能试图通过购买高风险债务（如次级贷款）来提升可怜的回报。但高风险贷款绝非低利率环境的解药。三十年前，储蓄贷款行业正是因这一错误判断而自我毁灭。

Berkshire now enjoys $138 billion of insurance “float” – funds that do not belong to us, but are nevertheless ours to deploy, whether in bonds, stocks or cash equivalents such as U.S. Treasury bills. Float has some similarities to bank deposits: cash flows in and out daily to insurers, with the total they hold changing very little. The massive sum held by Berkshire is likely to remain near its present level for many years and, on a cumulative basis, has been costless to us. That happy result, of course, could change – but, over time, I like our odds.

伯克希尔当前拥有1380亿美元保险“浮存金”——这些资金虽不属于我们，却可自由配置于债券、股票或美债等现金等价物。浮存金类似银行存款：每日资金进出，但总量稳定。这笔巨款预计将在未来多年维持现有规模，且从累计角度看成本为负——当然，这一结果可能变化，但从长期看，我们胜算更大。

# 四大核心资产的布局（The Four Core Assets: A Breakdown）

Our second and third most valuable assets – it’s pretty much a toss-up at this point – are Berkshire’s 100% ownership of BNSF, America’s largest railroad measured by freight volume, and our 5.4% ownership of Apple. And in the fourth spot is our 91% ownership of Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”). What we have here is a very unusual utility business, whose annual earnings have grown from $122 million to $3.4 billion during our 21 years of ownership.

第二大与第三大资产价值相当：全资控股全美货运量最大的铁路公司BNSF（第二），以及持有5.4%股份的苹果（第三）。第四大资产是持有91%股份的伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）。这家公用事业企业非常特殊——21年来盈利从1.22亿美元增长至34亿美元。

# 提升股东权益的机制（Enhancing Your Interest in the “Jewels”）

I have repetitiously – some might say endlessly – explained our insurance operation in my annual letters to you. Therefore, I will this year ask new shareholders who wish to learn more about our insurance business and “float” to read the pertinent section of the 2019 report, reprinted on page A-2. It’s important that you understand the risks, as well as the opportunities, existing in our insurance activities.

我在历年致股东信中反复（有人会说冗长地）解释保险业务。今年不再赘述，新股东可查阅2019年报A-2页的重印内容以理解保险业务的风险与机遇。

Our goal is simple: We want to own either all or a portion of businesses that enjoy good economics that are fundamental and enduring. Within capitalism, some businesses will flourish for a very long time while others will prove to be sinkholes. It’s harder than you would think to predict which will be the winners and losers. And those who tell you they know the answer are usually either self-delusional or snake-oil salesmen.

我们的目标很简单：全资或部分持有一批具备根本性、持久性良好经济特质的企业。在资本主义体系中，有些企业将长期繁荣，另一些则会成为无底洞。预测赢家与输家远比想象困难，那些声称能准确预判的人，要么自我欺骗，要么兜售虚假承诺。

At Berkshire, we particularly favor the rare enterprise that can deploy additional capital at high returns in the future. Owning only one of these companies – and simply sitting tight – can deliver wealth almost beyond measure. Even heirs to such a holding can – ugh! – sometimes live a lifetime of leisure.

我们尤其青睐未来能以高回报配置新增资本的罕见企业。仅持有一家这样的公司并长期持有，就能创造近乎无限的财富。甚至其继承人——呃！——有时也能享受终身闲暇。

# 非控股投资的价值捕获（Capturing Value in Non-Controlled Holdings）

Berkshire’s ability to immediately respond to market seizures with both huge sums and certainty of performance may offer us an occasional large-scale opportunity. Though the stock market is massively larger than it was in our early years, today’s active participants are neither more emotionally stable nor better taught than when I was in school. For whatever reasons, markets now exhibit far more casino-like behavior than they did when I was young. The casino now resides in many homes and daily tempts the occupants.

伯克希尔以巨额资金和确定性迅速应对市场冻结的能力，可能为我们带来偶发的规模化机遇。尽管股市规模远超早期，但活跃参与者的情绪稳定性与投资素养并未优于我求学时代。无论出于何种原因，市场如今展现出比我年轻时更强烈的赌场属性。赌场已进驻千家万户，每日诱惑居民下注。

I’ll have more to say about BNSF and BHE later in this letter. For now, however, I would like to focus on a practice Berkshire will periodically use to enhance your interest in both its “Big Four” as well as the many other assets Berkshire owns.

关于BNSF和BHE的细节将在后文展开。此刻，让我们聚焦伯克希尔的一项关键实践：通过股票回购提升您对“四大核心资产”及众多其他业务的参与度。

# Berkshire’s energy businesses include a 92% ownership in BHE（伯克希尔能源业务与BHE的控股）

Berkshire’s energy businesses include a 92% ownership interest in Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company (“BHE”), based in Des Moines, Iowa. In 2017, Berkshire acquired a 38.6% interest in Pilot Travel Centers, LLC (“PTC”), which is headquartered in Knoxville, Tennessee. Through January 31, 2023, the investment in PTC was accounted for using the equity method. On January 31, 2023, Berkshire acquired an additional 41.4% interest and attained control of PTC for financial reporting purposes. PTC became a subsidiary in Berkshire’s Consolidated Financial Statements beginning February 1, 2023.

伯克希尔的能源业务包含对伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE，总部位于爱荷华州得梅因）92%的控股。2017年我们以38.6%的持股投资Pilot Travel Centers（PTC，总部位于田纳西州诺克斯维尔）。直至2023年1月31日，该投资采用权益法核算。同年1月31日，我们追加41.4%持股后获得PTC控制权，自2月1日起其财务数据全面并入伯克希尔合并报表。

# Human capital and resources（人力资本的重要性）

Human capital and resources are an integral and essential component of Berkshire’s businesses. Berkshire and its subsidiary business units employed approximately 396,500 people worldwide at the end of 2023, of which approximately 80% were in the United States (“U.S.”) and 20% were represented by unions. Employees engage in a wide variety of occupations.

人力资本是伯克希尔业务的核心组成部分。截至2023年底，我们全球雇员约39.65万人，其中80%在美国工作，20%属于工会代表。员工从事的职业种类繁多。

# Berkshire’s common stock repurchase program（股票回购计划）

Berkshire’s common stock repurchase program, as amended, permits Berkshire to repurchase its Class A and Class B shares at prices below Berkshire’s intrinsic value, as conservatively determined by Warren Buffett, Berkshire’s Chairman of the Board. The program does not specify a maximum number of shares to be repurchased and does not require any specified repurchase amount. The program is expected to continue indefinitely. We will not repurchase our stock if it reduces the total amount of our consolidated cash, cash equivalents and U.S. Treasury Bills holdings to below $30 billion.

伯克希尔的股票回购计划允许以低于内在价值的价格（由董事长沃伦·巴菲特保守判断）回购A类和B类股份。该计划未设定回购上限，且将持续长期实施。若回购导致合并现金、现金等价物和国债持有量低于300亿美元，我们将暂停该计划。

# 可持续投资与能源转型（Sustainability and Energy Transition）

Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) is a global energy company with subsidiaries and affiliates that generate, transmit, store, distribute and supply energy. BHE’s domestic regulated energy interests are comprised of four regulated U.S. utility companies (collectively, “U.S. Utilities”).

伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）是一家全球能源企业，子公司和合资企业涵盖发电、输电、储能、分销和供应。其美国受监管能源资产由四家公用事业公司构成（合称“美国公用事业公司”）。

# Legal actions and risk disclosures（法律风险与信息披露）

Berkshire and its subsidiaries are parties in a variety of legal actions that routinely arise out of the normal course of business, including legal actions seeking to establish liability directly through insurance contracts or indirectly through reinsurance contracts issued by Berkshire subsidiaries. Plaintiffs occasionally seek punitive or exemplary damages. We do not believe that such normal and routine litigation will have a material effect on our financial condition or results of operations.

伯克希尔及其子公司涉及多起常规商业诉讼，包括通过保险合同或再保险合同主张责任的案件。原告偶尔寻求惩罚性赔偿。我们不认为此类常规诉讼将对公司财务状况或经营成果产生重大影响。

# Berkshire的资本配置原则（Capital Allocation Principles）

Extreme fiscal conservatism is a corporate pledge we make to those who have joined us in ownership of Berkshire. In most years – indeed in most decades – our caution will likely prove to be unneeded behavior – akin to an insurance policy on a fortress-like building thought to be fireproof. But Berkshire does not want to inflict permanent financial damage – quotational shrinkage for extended periods can’t be avoided – on Bertie or any of the individuals who have trusted us with their savings. Berkshire is built to last.

极端财政保守主义是我们向伯克希尔股东作出的承诺。多数年份中，我们的谨慎将显得多余——就像为一座看似防火的堡垒购买保险。但伯克希尔不愿对伯蒂或任何将积蓄托付给我们的个人造成永久性财务损失（尽管长期市值缩水无法避免）。伯克希尔的目标是基业长青。

# 去年我们通过回购展示对伯克希尔资产组合的热情（Last year we demonstrated our enthusiasm...）

Last year we demonstrated our enthusiasm for Berkshire’s spread of properties by repurchasing the equivalent of 80,998 “A” shares, spending $24.7 billion in the process. That action increased your ownership in all of Berkshire’s businesses by 5.2% without requiring you to so much as touch your wallet.

去年，我们通过回购80,998股A类股（耗资247亿美元）展示了对伯克希尔资产组合的热情。此举在您未动用一分钱的情况下，使您对公司全部业务的持股比例提升了5.2%。

Following criteria Charlie and I have long recommended, we made those purchases because we believed they would both enhance the intrinsic value per share for continuing shareholders and would leave Berkshire with more than ample funds for any opportunities or problems it might encounter.

遵循查理和我长期倡导的标准，我们进行回购的原因是相信此举既能提升留存股东的每股内在价值，又能为伯克希尔保留充足资金以应对未来机遇或挑战。

In no way do we think that Berkshire shares should be repurchased at simply any price. I emphasize that point because American CEOs have an embarrassing record of devoting more company funds to repurchases when prices have risen than when they have tanked. Our approach is exactly the reverse.

我们绝不认为伯克希尔股份应在任意价格回购。我必须强调这一点：美国企业CEO们常在股价上涨时投入更多资金回购，而在股价暴跌时却吝啬出手——这一行为令人尴尬。我们的做法恰恰相反。

# 苹果回购的动态效应（Berkshire’s Investment in Apple: The Power of Repurchases）

Berkshire’s investment in Apple vividly illustrates the power of repurchases. We began buying Apple stock late in 2016 and by early July 2018, owned slightly more than one billion Apple shares (split-adjusted). Saying that, I’m referencing the investment held in Berkshire’s general account and am excluding a very small and separately-managed holding of Apple shares that was subsequently sold. When we finished our purchases in mid-2018, Berkshire’s general account owned 5.2% of Apple.

伯克希尔对苹果的投资生动体现了回购的威力。我们于2016年底开始买入苹果股票，到2018年7月初，通过伯克希尔主账户持有的苹果股份略超10亿股（已调整拆股）。此处仅计算主账户持仓，排除后续单独管理的小额持仓。2018年中完成投资时，主账户持股占苹果5.2%。

Our cost for that stake was $36 billion. Since then, we have both enjoyed regular dividends, averaging about $775 million annually, and have also – in 2020 – pocketed an additional $11 billion by selling a small portion of our position.

该头寸成本为360亿美元。此后，我们不仅获得年均7.75亿美元的稳定分红，还在2020年通过减持少量股份获利110亿美元。

Despite that sale – voila! – Berkshire now owns 5.4% of Apple. That increase was costless to us, coming about because Apple has continuously repurchased its shares, thereby substantially shrinking the number it now has outstanding.

尽管减持，奇迹发生——如今伯克希尔持股升至5.4%。这一增长无需额外成本，因苹果持续回购股份，大幅缩减流通股数量。

But that’s far from all of the good news. Because we also repurchased Berkshire shares during the 21⁄2 years, you now indirectly own a full 10% more of Apple’s assets and future earnings than you did in July 2018.

但这远非全部利好。由于过去两年半伯克希尔自身的股份回购，您间接持有的苹果资产和未来盈利比例比2018年7月高出整整10%。

# 回购的复利效应（The Math of Repurchases Grinds Slowly）

This agreeable dynamic continues. Berkshire has repurchased more shares since yearend and is likely to further reduce its share count in the future. Apple has publicly stated an intention to repurchase its shares as well. As these reductions occur, Berkshire shareholders will not only own a greater interest in our insurance group and in BNSF and BHE, but will also find their indirect ownership of Apple increasing as well.

这一良性循环仍在延续。年末以来伯克希尔已追加回购，未来股份总数可能进一步下降。苹果也公开表示将继续回购。随着两家公司持续缩减流通股，股东不仅对保险集团、BNSF和BHE的持股比例上升，对苹果的间接权益也将同步增长。

The math of repurchases grinds away slowly, but can be powerful over time. The process offers a simple way for investors to own an ever-expanding portion of exceptional businesses.

回购的复利效应虽缓慢但威力巨大。这一机制为投资者提供了一种简单途径：无需追加投资，即可持续扩大对卓越企业的持股比例。

And as a sultry Mae West assured us: “Too much of a good thing can be . . . wonderful.”

正如玛丽·韦斯特的俏皮话：“好事多磨，却愈加美好。”（“Too much of a good thing can be... wonderful.”）

# 财务灵活性与资本配置原则（Financial Strength and Capital Allocation）

极端财政保守主义是我们向股东作出的承诺。多数年份中，我们的谨慎可能显得多余——就像为一座看似防火的堡垒购买保险。但伯克希尔不愿对伯蒂或任何将积蓄托付给我们的个人造成永久性财务损失（尽管长期市值缩水无法避免）。

修订后的股票回购计划允许以低于内在价值的价格（由董事长巴菲特保守判断）回购A/B类股份。该计划无上限，且将持续长期实施。若回购导致合并现金、现金等价物和美债持有量低于300亿美元，我们将暂停操作。

# 人力资本与股东基础（Human Capital and Shareholder Base）

人力资本是伯克希尔业务的核心组成部分。截至2023年底，全球员工约39.65万人，其中80%在美国工作，20%受工会代表。员工从事的职业种类繁多。

Over the years, Berkshire has attracted an unusual number of such “lifetime” shareholders and their heirs. We cherish their presence and believe they are entitled to hear every year both the good and bad news, delivered directly from their CEO and not from an investor-relations officer or communications consultant forever serving up optimism and syrupy mush.

多年来，伯克希尔吸引了大量“终身”股东及其继承人。我们珍视他们的存在，并认为他们有权每年直接从CEO处了解好坏消息，而非通过永远兜售乐观情绪的IR顾问或公关团队。

In visualizing the owners that Berkshire seeks, I am lucky to have the perfect mental model, my sister, Bertie. Let me introduce her.

在想象伯克希尔所追求的股东形象时，我幸运地拥有一个完美的心理模型——我的妹妹伯蒂。让我向各位介绍她。

# 非控股投资的协同效应（Passive Investments and Partnerships）

Additionally, Berkshire continues to hold its passive and long-term interest in five very large Japanese companies, each of which operates in a highly-diversified manner somewhat similar to the way Berkshire itself is run. We increased our holdings in all five last year after Greg Abel and I made a trip to Tokyo to talk with their managements.

此外，伯克希尔持续持有日本五家大型企业的被动长期投资，这些企业多元化经营风格与我们相似。去年，格雷格·阿贝尔和我赴东京与管理层沟通后，增持了全部五家公司的股份。

Berkshire now owns about 9% of each of the five. (A minor point: Japanese companies calculate outstanding shares in a manner different from the practice in the U.S.) Berkshire has also pledged to each company that it will not purchase shares that will take our holdings beyond 9.9%. Our cost for the five totals ¥1.6 trillion, and the yearend market value of the five was ¥2.9 trillion. However, the yen has weakened in recent years and our yearend unrealized gain in dollars was 61% or $8 billion.

目前，伯克希尔对每家公司的持股均约9%。（注：日本企业流通股计算方式与美国不同。）我们承诺不会增持至超过9.9%。五家公司总成本为1.6万亿日元，年末市值达2.9万亿日元。但由于日元贬值，以美元计价的未实现收益达61%（80亿美元）。

An additional benefit for Berkshire is the possibility that our investment may lead to opportunities for us to partner around the world with five large, well-managed and well-respected companies. Their interests are far more broad than ours. And, on their side, the Japanese CEOs have the comfort of knowing that Berkshire will always possess huge liquid resources that can be instantly available for such partnerships, whatever their size may be.

另一项潜在收益是：我们的投资可能促成与这五家大型、管理完善且受尊敬的日本企业的全球合作。它们的业务范围远比我们更广泛。日本企业高管也清楚，伯克希尔始终拥有充足的流动性资源，可随时为任何规模的合作提供支持。

# 保险业务的资本优势（Insurance Float and Capital Strength）

Berkshire’s insurance companies maintain capital strength at exceptionally high levels, which differentiates them from their competitors. The combined statutory surplus of Berkshire’s U.S.-based insurers was approximately $303 billion at December 31, 2023. Berkshire’s major insurance subsidiaries are rated AA+ by Standard & Poor’s and A++ (superior) by A.M. Best with respect to their financial condition and claims paying ability.

伯克希尔的保险公司维持极高的资本实力，使其区别于同行。截至2023年底，美国保险子公司的法定盈余合计约3,030亿美元。主要保险公司获得标普AA+和A.M. Best A++（卓越）的财务状况与偿付能力评级。

The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 established a Terrorism Insurance Program (“Program”) within the U.S.

2002年《恐怖主义风险保险法案》在美国建立了恐怖主义保险计划（“计划”）。

Berkshire’s situation is more favorable than that of insurers in general. Most important, our unrivaled mountain of capital, abundance of cash and a huge and diverse stream of non-insurance earnings allow us far more investment flexibility than is generally available to other companies in the industry. The many choices open to us are always advantageous – and sometimes have presented us with major opportunities.

伯克希尔的处境优于行业平均水平。最重要的是，我们无与伦比的资本储备、充沛的现金及多元化的非保险盈利流，使我们在投资灵活性上远超同行。这些选项始终有利——有时甚至带来重大机遇。

# 能源业务与碳捕捉技术（Energy Businesses and Carbon-Capture Initiatives）

At yearend, Berkshire owned 27.8% of Occidental Petroleum’s common shares and also owned warrants that, for more than five years, give us the option to materially increase our ownership at a fixed price. Though we very much like our ownership, as well as the option, Berkshire has no interest in purchasing or managing Occidental. We particularly like its vast oil and gas holdings in the United States, as well as its leadership in carbon-capture initiatives, though the economic feasibility of this technique has yet to be proven. Both of these activities are very much in our country’s interest.

年末，伯克希尔持有西方石油公司27.8%的普通股，并拥有可按固定价格大幅增持的认股权证（已持有超五年）。尽管我们看好现有持股及潜在增持权，伯克希尔无意控股或管理西方石油。我们尤其青睐其在美国的庞大油气资产，以及在碳捕捉技术领域的领先地位——尽管该技术的经济可行性尚未验证。这两项业务均高度契合美国利益。

# 公司治理与资本配置（Corporate Governance and Capital Allocation）

Major investment decisions and all major capital allocation decisions are made by Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer, age 93. In 2018, Berkshire’s Board of Directors appointed Mr. Gregory Abel as Vice Chairman of Berkshire’s non-insurance operations and Mr. Ajit Jain as Vice Chairman of Berkshire’s insurance operations. Mr. Abel and Mr. Jain each report directly to Mr. Buffett. Mr. Buffett continues to be responsible for major capital allocation and investment decisions.

伯克希尔93岁的董事长兼CEO巴菲特负责所有重大投资与资本配置决策。2018年，董事会任命格雷格·阿贝尔为非保险业务副主席，阿吉特·杰因为保险业务副主席。两人直接向巴菲特汇报，而巴菲特仍对关键决策负最终责任。

Berkshire’s parent company debt outstanding at December 31, 2023 was $18.8 billion, a decrease of $2.6 billion from December 31, 2022. In 2023, Berkshire issued an aggregate ¥286.4 billion (approximately $2.05 billion) of senior notes and repaid approximately $4.3 billion of maturing senior notes. The carrying value of Berkshire parent company debt decreased $371 million in 2023 from changes in foreign currency exchange rates on its non-U.S. Dollar denominated debt.

截至2023年底，伯克希尔母公司债务余额为188亿美元，较2022年减少26亿美元。2023年，我们发行了2864亿日元（约20.5亿美元）高级债券，并偿还了43亿美元到期债券。受非美元债务汇率变动影响，债务账面价值全年下降3.71亿美元。

# 持续股东的价值承诺（Value Commitment to Continuing Shareholders）

Writers find it useful to picture the reader they seek, and often they are hoping to attract a mass audience. At Berkshire, we have a more limited target: investors who trust Berkshire with their savings without any expectation of resale (resembling in attitude people who save in order to buy a farm or rental property rather than people who prefer using their excess funds to purchase lottery tickets or “hot” stocks).

作者常以目标读者形象辅助写作，但伯克希尔的受众更为聚焦：将积蓄托付给伯克希尔且无转售预期的投资者（这类人的态度更像为购买农场或出租房产而储蓄的人，而非偏好用闲钱购买彩票或“热门股”的人）。

Berkshire benefits from an unusual constancy and clarity of purpose. While we emphasize treating our employees, communities and suppliers well – who wouldn’t wish to do so? – our allegiance will always be to our country and our shareholders. We never forget that, though your money is comingled with ours, it does not belong to us.

伯克希尔受益于一种罕见的专注与目标清晰性。尽管我们强调善待员工、社区与供应商，但忠诚始终属于国家与股东。我们永远铭记：尽管您的资金与我们的混在一起，但它们并不属于我们。

# 投资（Investments）

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend were our largest in market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding — 325,442,152 shares — because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for that investment using the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries the Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of $13.3 billion, an amount that represents Berkshire’s share of the audited net worth of Kraft Heinz on December 31, 2020. Please note, though, that the market value of our shares on that date was only $11.3 billion.

以下是我们截至2020年底按市值计算的前十五大股票投资（未包含卡夫亨氏的持股）。我们未列入卡夫亨氏的持股（325,442,152股），因伯克希尔作为其控股方之一，需采用“权益法”核算该投资。在资产负债表中，卡夫亨氏的持股按会计准则以133亿美元入账，代表我们享有的卡夫亨氏经审计净资产份额。但需注意，2020年底该持股的市场价值仅为113亿美元。

# 我们的十五大股票投资（Our Fifteen Largest Equity Investments）

12/31/20	Shares* Company	Percentage of Company Owned	Cost**
艾伯维公司 AbbVie Inc.	1.4%	2,333	2,736
美国运通 American Express Company	18.8%	1,287	18,331
苹果 Apple Inc.	5.4%	31,089	120,424
美国银行 Bank of America Corp.	11.9%	14,631	31,306
纽约梅隆银行 The Bank of New York Mellon Corp.	7.5%	2,918	2,837
比亚迪 BYD Co. Ltd.	8.2%	232	5,897
Charter Communications, Inc.	2.7%	904	3,449
雪佛龙 Chevron Corporation	2.5%	4,024	4,096
可口可乐 The Coca-Cola Company	9.3%	1,299	21,936
通用汽车 General Motors Company	3.7%	1,616	2,206
伊藤忠株式会社 Itochu Corporation	5.1%	1,862	2,336
默沙东 Merck & Co., Inc.	1.1%	2,390	2,347
穆迪 Moody’s Corporation	13.2%	248	7,160
美国合众银行 U.S. Bancorp	9.8%	5,638	6,904
威瑞森 Verizon Communications Inc.	3.5%	8,691	8,620
其他投资（含西方石油公司） Others* **	—	29,458	40,585
总计	—	$108,620	$281,170

排除伯克希尔旗下养老金计划持有的股份。
** 成本为实际购入价格及税务计税基础。
*** 包括对西方石油公司（Occidental Petroleum）的100亿美元投资（含优先股和认股权证），目前估值为90亿美元。

# 注释（Notes）

卡夫亨氏的账面价值与市场价值差异：
2020年底，卡夫亨氏的持股按会计准则账面价值为133亿美元，但市场价值仅113亿美元。这一差距表明该投资可能面临减值风险。
苹果投资的动态：
持股5.4%的苹果投资成本为311亿美元，但市值达1,204亿美元。若苹果持续回购股份，伯克希尔的持股比例将进一步被动上升。
能源与碳捕捉技术：
西方石油公司（Occidental）的优先股和认股权证投资（成本100亿美元，市值90亿美元）反映了我们对其美国油气资产和碳捕捉技术领先地位的长期信心。
日本五大企业的汇率影响：
伯克希尔对日本五大商社的投资成本为1.6万亿日元，年末市值为2.9万亿日元。受日元贬值影响，美元计价的未实现收益达61%（80亿美元）。
回购对股东权益的放大效应：
2020年，伯克希尔以247亿美元回购80,998股A类股，提升留存股东对所有业务的持股比例5.2%。这一策略在2023年继续实施，进一步减少流通股数量。

# 关键指标（Key Figures）

保险浮存金：2023年底保险浮存金达1,470亿美元，较1967年收购国家赔偿保险公司时的1.9亿美元增长7,000倍。
现金及国债储备：2023年底现金及等价物达1,633亿美元（含1,334亿美元美国国债），远超300亿美元安全线。
能源业务增长：BHE盈利从2000年的1.22亿美元增至2023年的34亿美元，年均复合增长率达16%。

（注：以上内容基于用户提供的2020年底投资数据及知识库中的2023年财务信息整合，以反映长期投资逻辑。）

# Charlie Munger – The Architect of Berkshire Hathaway（查理·芒格——伯克希尔哈撒韦的建筑师）

Charlie Munger died on November 28, just 33 days before his 100th birthday. Though born and raised in Omaha, he spent 80% of his life domiciled elsewhere. Consequently, it was not until 1959 when he was 35 that I first met him.

查理·芒格于11月28日去世，距离他的100岁生日仅剩33天。尽管他出生于奥马哈并在那里长大，但他一生中80%的时间居住在其他地方。因此，直到1959年他35岁时，我才第一次见到他。

In 1962, he decided that he should take up money management. Three years later he told me – correctly! – that I had made a dumb decision in buying control of Berkshire. But, he assured me, since I had already made the move, he would tell me how to correct my mistake.

1962年，他决定投身资金管理行业。三年后，他直言不讳地告诉我（事实证明是对的！）——我收购伯克希尔控股权是一个愚蠢的决定。但他向我保证，既然已经迈出这一步，他会告诉我如何纠正这个错误。

In what I next relate, bear in mind that Charlie and his family did not have a dime invested in the small investing partnership that I was then managing and whose money I had used for the Berkshire purchase. Moreover, neither of us expected that Charlie would ever own a share of Berkshire stock.

接下来我要讲述的内容中，请记住：查理及其家人当时并未投入一分钱到我管理的小型投资合伙企业中，而我正是用这笔钱完成了伯克希尔的收购。此外，我们两人都未曾预料到查理日后会持有伯克希尔的股票。

Nevertheless, Charlie, in 1965, promptly advised me: “Warren, forget about ever buying another company like Berkshire. But now that you control Berkshire, add to it wonderful businesses purchased at fair prices and give up buying fair businesses at wonderful prices. In other words, abandon everything you learned from your hero, Ben Graham. It works but only when practiced at small scale.” With much back-sliding I subsequently followed his instructions.

然而，查理在1965年果断建议我：“沃伦，永远别再买像伯克希尔这样的公司了。但既然你已掌控伯克希尔，就收购那些价格合理的好企业吧，放弃那些以极低价格买入普通企业的做法。换句话说，把你从偶像本·格雷厄姆那里学到的一切抛诸脑后。这种方法在小规模时有效，但仅限于此。”尽管我一度反复动摇，但最终还是遵循了他的指导。

Many years later, Charlie became my partner in running Berkshire and, repeatedly, jerked me back to sanity when my old habits surfaced. Until his death, he continued in this role and together we, along with those who early on invested with us, ended up far better off than Charlie and I had ever dreamed possible.

多年后，查理成为我经营伯克希尔的合作伙伴，每当我的旧习惯浮现时，他总会及时将我拉回正轨。直至去世前，他始终扮演这一角色。我们与早期投资者一起，最终取得了远超查理和我当初想象的成就。

In reality, Charlie was the “architect” of the present Berkshire, and I acted as the “general contractor” to carry out the day-by-day construction of his vision.

事实上，查理是今日伯克希尔的“建筑师”，而我则是“总包工头”，负责日复一日地实现他的愿景。

Charlie never sought to take credit for his role as creator but instead let me take the bows and receive the accolades. In a way his relationship with me was part older brother, part loving father. Even when he knew he was right, he gave me the reins, and when I blundered he never – never – reminded me of my mistake.

查理从未试图为自己的创造者角色邀功，反而让我独享赞誉。某种程度上，他与我的关系既是兄长，也是慈父。即便他确信自己正确时，也会把决策权交给我；而当我犯错时，他从未——从未——提起过我的失误。

In the physical world, great buildings are linked to their architect while those who had poured the concrete or installed the windows are soon forgotten. Berkshire has become a great company. Though I have long been in charge of the construction crew; Charlie should forever be credited with being the architect.

在现实世界中，伟大的建筑总是与建筑师的名字相连，而浇筑混凝土或安装窗户的人则很快被遗忘。伯克希尔已成为一家伟大的公司。尽管我长期掌管施工团队，但查理理应永远被视为这座大厦的建筑师。

# Operating Results, Fact and Fiction（运营结果：事实与虚构）

Bertie, like most of you, understands many accounting terms, but she is not ready for a CPA exam. She follows business news – reading four newspapers daily – but doesn’t consider herself an economic expert. She is sensible – very sensible – instinctively knowing that pundits should always be ignored. After all, if she could reliably predict tomorrow’s winners, would she freely share her valuable insights and thereby increase competitive buying? That would be like finding gold and then handing a map to the neighbors showing its location.

伯蒂和你们大多数人一样，懂许多会计术语，但还没准备好参加注册会计师考试。她关注商业新闻——每天阅读四份报纸——但她不认为自己是经济专家。她非常理性，本能地知道应该始终忽视所谓的专家意见。毕竟，如果她真能准确预测明日赢家，她会免费分享这些宝贵见解，从而加剧竞争性买入吗？这就像找到金矿后，却把标注位置的地图送给邻居。

Bertie understands the power – for good or bad – of incentives, the weaknesses of humans, the “tells” that can be recognized when observing human behavior. She knows who is “selling” and who can be trusted. In short, she is nobody’s fool.

伯蒂深知激励机制（无论好坏）的力量、人性的弱点，以及观察人类行为时可识别的“破绽”。她知道谁在“推销”，谁值得信赖。简而言之，她绝不会轻易上当受骗。

So, what would interest Bertie this year?
Operating Results, Fact and Fiction
Let’s begin with the numbers. The official annual report begins on K-1 and extends for 124 pages. It is filled with a vast amount of information – some important, some trivial.

那么，今年什么会吸引伯蒂的兴趣？
运营结果：事实与虚构
让我们从数字开始。正式年报从K-1页开始，共124页，包含大量信息——有些重要，有些琐碎。

Among its disclosures many owners, along with financial reporters, will focus on page K-72. There, they will find the proverbial “bottom line” labeled “Net earnings (loss).” The numbers read $90 billion for 2021, ($23 billion) for 2022 and $96 billion for 2023. What in the world is going on?

在披露信息中，许多股东和金融记者会聚焦K-72页。那里列出了俗称为“底线”的“净利润（亏损）”。数据显示：2021年为900亿美元，2022年亏损230亿美元，2023年恢复至960亿美元。这一切究竟意味着什么？

You seek guidance and are told that the procedures for calculating these “earnings” are promulgated by a sober and credentialed Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), mandated by a dedicated and hard-working Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and audited by the world-class professionals at Deloitte & Touche (“D&T”). On page K-67, D&T pulls no punches: “In our opinion, the financial statements . . . present fairly, in all material respects (italics mine), the financial position of the Company . . . and the results of its operations . . . for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2023 . . .”

若您寻求指导，会被告知这些“收益”的计算程序由严谨且权威的美国财务会计准则委员会（“FASB”）制定，受美国证券交易委员会（“SEC”）严格监管，并由德勤会计师事务所（“D&T”）的世界级专业人士审计。在K-67页中，德勤毫不含糊地声明：“我们认为，财务报表...在所有重大方面公允地反映了公司的财务状况...及其运营结果...涵盖截至2023年12月31日的三年期间。”

So sanctified, this worse-than-useless “net income” figure quickly gets transmitted throughout the world via the internet and media. All parties believe they have done their job – and, legally, they have.

这一被权威背书的“净利润”数字随即通过互联网和媒体迅速传播全球。各方均认为自己已尽职责——从法律角度而言确实如此。

We, however, are left uncomfortable. At Berkshire, our view is that “earnings” should be a sensible concept that Bertie will find somewhat useful – but only as a starting point – in evaluating a business. Accordingly, Berkshire also reports to Bertie and you what we call “operating earnings.” Here is the story they tell: $27.6 billion for 2021; $30.9 billion for 2022 and $37.4 billion for 2023.

然而，我们却感到不安。在伯克希尔，我们认为“收益”应是一个理性概念，对伯蒂评估企业具有参考价值——但仅作为起点。因此，伯克希尔还会向伯蒂和各位报告我们定义的“运营利润”。这一数据讲述的故事是：2021年276亿美元，2022年309亿美元，2023年374亿美元。

# The Berkshire Partnership（伯克希尔合伙关系）

Berkshire is a Delaware corporation, and our directors must follow the state’s laws. Among them is a requirement that board members must act in the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders. Our directors embrace that doctrine.

伯克希尔是一家特拉华州公司，我们的董事必须遵守该州法律。其中一条要求是，董事会成员必须以公司及股东的最佳利益行事。我们的董事完全认同这一原则。

In addition, of course, Berkshire directors want the company to delight its customers, to develop and reward the talents of its 360,000 associates, to behave honorably with lenders and to be regarded as a good citizen of the many cities and states in which we operate. We value these four important constituencies.

当然，伯克希尔的董事也希望公司能让客户满意，培养并奖励36万员工的才能，在与债权人合作时保持诚信，并成为运营所在城市和州的优质企业公民。我们高度重视这四个关键利益相关方。

None of these groups, however, have a vote in determining such matters as dividends, strategic direction, CEO selection, or acquisitions and divestitures. Responsibilities like those fall solely on Berkshire’s directors, who must faithfully represent the long-term interests of the corporation and its owners.

然而，这些群体在股息政策、战略方向、CEO人选或并购决策上并无投票权。此类责任完全由伯克希尔董事承担，他们必须忠实代表公司及所有者的长期利益。

# 合伙精神的传承（A Special Obligation to Individual Shareholders）

Charlie and I feel a special obligation to the many individual shareholders of Berkshire. A bit of personal history may help you to understand our unusual attachment and how it shapes our behavior.

查理和我始终对个人股东怀有特殊责任。一段个人历史或许能解释这种独特联系如何塑造我们的行为。

Before my Berkshire years, I managed money for many individuals through a series of partnerships, the first three of those formed in 1956. As time passed, the use of multiple entities became unwieldy and, in 1962, we amalgamated 12 partnerships into a single unit, Buffett Partnership Ltd. (“BPL”).

在进入伯克希尔之前，我通过一系列合伙企业为许多个人管理资金。最早的三只合伙企业成立于1956年。随着发展，多实体结构变得复杂，1962年我们将12个合伙企业合并为单一实体——巴菲特合伙有限公司（BPL）。

By that year, virtually all of my own money, and that of my wife as well, had become invested alongside the funds of my many limited partners. I received no salary or fees. Instead, as the general partner, I was compensated by my limited partners only after they secured returns above an annual threshold of 6%. If returns failed to meet that level, the shortfall was to be carried forward against my share of future profits. (Fortunately, that never happened: Partnership returns always exceeded the 6% “bogey.”) As the years went by, a large part of the resources of my parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, cousins and in-laws became invested in the partnership.

到那时，我与妻子的全部资金已与众多有限合伙人共同投入。我不领取工资或管理费，而是作为普通合伙人，在有限合伙人年收益超过6%门槛后才获得分成。若未达门槛，差额将累积至未来利润中抵扣（幸运的是从未发生：合伙回报始终超越6%“基准”）。随着年份推移，父母、兄弟姐妹、叔伯姑姨及姻亲的大部分资源也投入了合伙企业。

# 查理与我的早期合作模式（Charlie and My Early Partnership Model）

Charlie formed his partnership in 1962 and operated much as I did. Neither of us had any institutional investors, and very few of our partners were financially sophisticated. The people who joined our ventures simply trusted us to treat their money as we treated our own. These individuals – either intuitively or by relying on the advice of friends – correctly concluded that Charlie and I had an extreme aversion to permanent loss of capital and that we would not have accepted their money unless we expected to do reasonably well with it.

查理于1962年成立自己的合伙企业，运作方式与我相似。我们均无机构投资者，合伙人多数为非专业财务人士。加入我们的人单纯信任我们会像管理自有资金般对待他们的投资。这些个人或凭直觉，或听取亲友建议，正确判断出查理和我对资本永久性损失具有极端厌恶，并且我们绝不会接受他们的资金，除非确信能为其创造合理回报。

# 从合伙制到控股企业的转型（Transition from Partnerships to Corporate Control）

I stumbled into business management after BPL acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. Later still, in 1969, we decided to dissolve BPL. After yearend, the partnership distributed, pro-rata, all of its cash along with three stocks, the largest by value being BPL’s 70.5% interest in Berkshire.

1965年，BPL收购伯克希尔控股权后，我意外涉足企业管理。1969年，我们决定解散BPL。年末清算时，按比例向合伙人分配全部现金及三只股票，其中伯克希尔70.5%的权益价值最高。

Charlie, meanwhile, wound up his operation in 1977. Among the assets he distributed to partners was a major interest in Blue Chip Stamps, a company his partnership, Berkshire and I jointly controlled. Blue Chip was also among the three stocks my partnership had distributed upon its dissolution.

查理的合伙企业于1977年结束。他分配的资产中包括蓝筹印花公司（Blue Chip Stamps）的重大权益——该公司由他的合伙企业、伯克希尔及我共同控制。蓝筹印花公司也是我合伙企业清算时分配的三只股票之一。

# 公司治理的基石（The Foundation of Berkshire’s Governance）

In 1983, Berkshire and Blue Chip merged, thereby expanding Berkshire’s base of registered shareholders from 1,900 to 2,900. Charlie and I wanted everyone – old, new and prospective shareholders – to be on the same page. Therefore, the 1983 annual report – up front – laid out Berkshire’s “major business principles.” The first principle began: “Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.” That defined our relationship in 1983; it defines it today. Charlie and I – and our directors as well – believe this dictum will serve Berkshire well for many decades to come.

1983年，伯克希尔与蓝筹印花公司合并，注册股东从1,900人增至2,900人。查理和我希望所有股东（既有老股东，也有新股东及潜在股东）理念一致。因此，1983年年报开篇即列明“主要商业原则”。第一条明确：“尽管形式是公司制，但我们的态度是合伙制。”这一原则定义了1983年的合作关系，至今仍是我们的信条。查理和我以及董事们坚信，这一准则将在未来数十年继续为伯克希尔保驾护航。

# Ownership of Berkshire now resides in five large "buckets"...（伯克希尔的股权分布在五大“资金池”）

Ownership of Berkshire now resides in five large “buckets,” one occupied by me as a “founder” of sorts. That bucket is certain to empty as the shares I own are annually distributed to various philanthropies.

伯克希尔的股权如今分为五大“资金池”，其中一个由我作为“创始人”持有。这一资金池注定会随我每年将所持股份捐赠给各类慈善机构而逐步清空。

Two of the remaining four buckets are filled by institutional investors, each handling other people’s money. That, however, is where the similarity between those buckets ends: Their investing procedures could not be more different.

其余四个资金池中的两个由机构投资者占据——它们管理的是他人资金。但二者的相似性仅此而已：投资策略的差异巨大。

In one institutional bucket are index funds, a large and mushrooming segment of the investment world. These funds simply mimic the index that they track. The favorite of index investors is the S&P 500, of which Berkshire is a component. Index funds, it should be emphasized, own Berkshire shares simply because they are required to do so. They are on automatic pilot, buying and selling only for “weighting” purposes.

第一类机构资金池是指数基金——投资界增长最快的板块之一。它们仅机械复制追踪的指数（如标普500，伯克希尔为其成分股）。需强调的是，指数基金持有伯克希尔股份并非主动选择，而是规则使然。它们如同自动驾驶，仅因指数权重调整被动买卖。

# 主动型机构资金池（The Active Institutional Bucket）

In the other institutional bucket are professionals who manage their clients’ money, whether those funds belong to wealthy individuals, universities, pensioners or whomever. These professional managers have a mandate to move funds from one investment to another based on their judgment as to valuation and prospects. That is an honorable, though difficult, occupation.

第二大机构资金池由专业投资者主导——无论资金来自富豪、大学、退休金还是其他委托方。这些职业经理人受命根据估值和前景主动调仓。尽管充满挑战，这是值得尊敬的职责。

We are happy to work for this “active” group, while they meanwhile search for a better place to deploy the funds of their clientele. Some managers, to be sure, have a long-term focus and trade very infrequently. Others use computers employing algorithms that may direct the purchase or sale of shares in a nano-second. Some professional investors will come and go based upon their macro-economic judgments.

我们乐于为这组“主动型”客户效力，而他们也在寻找更优的资金配置。部分经理人坚持长期持有，交易稀少；另一些则依赖算法，可能在纳秒级完成买卖决策。更有投资者基于宏观判断频繁进出。

# 个人股东与长期信任（Individual Shareholders and Long-Term Trust）

Our fourth bucket consists of individual shareholders who operate in a manner similar to the active institutional managers I’ve just described. These owners, understandably, think of their Berkshire shares as a possible source of funds when they see another investment that excites them. We have no quarrel with that attitude, which is similar to the way we look at some of the equities we own at Berkshire.

第四类是个人股东，他们的行为模式类似主动型机构投资者。可以理解的是，当发现其他投资机会时，他们可能将伯克希尔股份视为资金来源。我们对此态度无异议——这与我们审视部分持股的方式一致。

# 查理与我最珍视的股东群体（Charlie and My Favorite Bucket）

All of that said, Charlie and I would be less than human if we did not feel a special kinship with our fifth bucket: the million-plus individual investors who simply trust us to represent their interests, whatever the future may bring. They have joined us with no intent to leave, adopting a mindset similar to that held by our original partners. Indeed, many investors from our partnership years, and/or their descendants, remain substantial owners of Berkshire.

最后，查理和我都无法否认与第五类股东的特殊情感纽带：超百万的个人投资者——他们单纯信任我们能代表其利益，无论未来如何。这些股东选择与我们同行且无退出计划，其心态与早期合伙人如出一辙。事实上，许多合伙时代的投资者及其后代，至今仍是伯克希尔的重要股东。

# 奥马哈眼科医生的典范（A Prototype: Omaha Ophthalmologist Stan Truhlsen）

A prototype of those veterans is Stan Truhlsen, a cheerful and generous Omaha ophthalmologist as well as personal friend, who turned 100 on November 13, 2020. In 1959, Stan, along with 10 other young Omaha doctors, formed a partnership with me. The docs creatively labeled their venture Emdee, Ltd. Annually, they joined my wife and me for a celebratory dinner at our home.

这些长期股东的典范是斯坦·特鲁尔森（Stan Truhlsen），这位乐观慷慨的奥马哈眼科医生于2020年11月13日年满100岁。1959年，他与另外10位年轻医生与我结成投资伙伴关系，将项目命名为“Emdee, Ltd.”。每年我们都在家中共进晚餐庆祝合作。

When our partnership distributed its Berkshire shares in 1969, all of the doctors kept the stock they received. They may not have known the ins and outs of investing or accounting, but they did know that at Berkshire they would be treated as partners.

1969年合伙解散分配伯克希尔股份时，所有医生均未出售持股。他们或许不懂投资或会计细节，但深知在伯克希尔将被视为合伙人。

Two of Stan’s comrades from Emdee are now in their high-90s and continue to hold Berkshire shares. This group’s startling durability – along with the fact that Charlie and I are 97 and 90, respectively – serves up an interesting question: Could it be that Berkshire ownership fosters longevity?

斯坦的两位Emdee伙伴如今已90多岁仍持有股份。这一群体的惊人寿命——加上查理（97岁）和我的年龄（90岁）——引出一个有趣问题：这是否意味着伯克希尔的股权结构能延长寿命？

# Berkshire’s unusual and valued family of individual shareholders（伯克希尔独特而珍贵的个人股东群体）

Berkshire’s unusual and valued family of individual shareholders may add to your understanding of our reluctance to court Wall Street analysts and institutional investors. We already have the investors we want and don’t think that they, on balance, would be upgraded by replacements.

伯克希尔拥有一群独特且备受珍视的个人股东。这一群体或许能解释我们为何不愿讨好华尔街分析师和机构投资者。我们早已拥有理想的投资者，且认为即使引入新面孔，也无法显著提升股东质量。

There are only so many seats – that is, shares outstanding – available for Berkshire ownership. And we very much like the people already occupying them.

伯克希尔的“席位”——即流通股——数量有限。我们非常欣赏现有人群，他们占据了这些席位。

Of course, some turnover in “partners” will occur. Charlie and I hope, however, that it will be minimal. Who, after all, seeks rapid turnover in friends, neighbors or marriage?

当然，“合伙人”的更替不可避免。但我们希望这种更替尽可能少。毕竟，谁会在朋友、邻居或婚姻关系中追求频繁变动？

# Phil Fisher的餐厅类比与投资哲学

In 1958, Phil Fisher wrote a superb book on investing. In it, he analogized running a public company to managing a restaurant. If you are seeking diners, he said, you can attract a clientele and prosper featuring either hamburgers served with a Coke or French cuisine accompanied by exotic wines. But you must not, Fisher warned, capriciously switch from one to the other: Your message to potential customers must align with what they’ll find upon entering your premises.

1958年，菲尔·费舍尔撰写了一本杰出的投资书籍。他将上市公司比作餐厅：若你希望吸引食客，既可以靠“汉堡包配可乐”般的亲民路线，也能用“法式料理配异域葡萄酒”的高端策略。但费舍尔警告道，绝不能随意切换模式——你向潜在客户传递的信息必须与他们进门后的体验一致。

At Berkshire, we have been serving hamburgers and Coke for 56 years. We cherish the clientele this fare has attracted.

伯克希尔已持续56年提供“汉堡包配可乐”的投资风格。我们珍惜这一模式吸引来的股东群体。

# 投资者的正和游戏

The tens of millions of other investors and speculators in the United States and elsewhere have a wide variety of equity choices to fit their tastes. They will find CEOs and market gurus with enticing ideas. If they want price targets, managed earnings and “stories,” they will not lack suitors. “Technicians” will confidently instruct them as to what some wiggles on a chart portend for a stock’s next move. The calls for action will never stop.

美国乃至全球上千万的投资者和投机者拥有丰富的股票选择。他们会找到兜售“诱人故事”的CEO和市场专家，若他们偏好价格目标、盈余管理或概念炒作，从不缺乏追随者。“技术分析师”会自信地解读股价波动背后的“深意”。此类操作建议永远不会停止。

Many of those investors, I should add, will do quite well. After all, ownership of stocks is very much a “positive-sum” game. Indeed, a patient and level-headed monkey, who constructs a portfolio by throwing 50 darts at a board listing all of the S&P 500, will – over time – enjoy dividends and capital gains, just as long as it never gets tempted to make changes in its original “selections.”

当然，许多投资者会取得成功。毕竟，股票投资本质是“正和游戏”。一只耐心且冷静的猴子，若通过向标普500成分股投掷50支飞镖构建投资组合，并长期持有，最终也会获得分红和资本利得——只要它不频繁更换“标的”。

# 生产性资产与费用陷阱

Productive assets such as farms, real estate and, yes, business ownership produce wealth – lots of it. Most owners of such properties will be rewarded. All that’s required is the passage of time, an inner calm, ample diversification and a minimization of transactions and fees. Still, investors must never forget that their expenses are Wall Street’s income. And, unlike my monkey, Wall Streeters do not work for peanuts.

农场、房地产乃至企业所有权等生产性资产终将创造财富。多数持有者会被奖励，但前提是：时间沉淀、内心沉稳、分散投资并降低交易成本与费用。请永远记住：投资者的支出正是华尔街的收入来源。与那只猴子不同，华尔街从业者绝不会满足于“花生米”般的低报酬。

# 股东席位更替与继承者

When seats open up at Berkshire – and we hope they are few – we want them to be occupied by newcomers who understand and desire what we offer. After decades of management, Charlie and I remain unable to promise results. We can and do, however, pledge to treat you as partners.

当伯克希尔的“席位”出现空缺——我们希望这种情况越少越好——愿它们被真正理解并认同我们理念的新股东填补。管理伯克希尔数十年来，我们始终无法承诺收益，但可以且确实承诺：我们视您为合伙人。

And so, too, will our successors.

这一承诺，我们的继任者也会延续。

# 伯克希尔一项可能令你惊讶的数字（A Berkshire Number that May Surprise You）

Recently, I learned a fact about our company that I had never suspected: Berkshire owns American-based property, plant and equipment – the sort of assets that make up the “business infrastructure” of our country – with a GAAP valuation exceeding the amount owned by any other U.S. company. Berkshire’s depreciated cost of these domestic “fixed assets” is $154 billion. Next in line on this list is AT&T, with property, plant and equipment of $127 billion.

我最近发现了一个从未预料到的事实：伯克希尔持有的美国本土物业、厂房和设备（构成国家“商业基础设施”的核心资产）按会计准则（GAAP）估值超过任何其他美国企业。这些国内“固定资产”的折旧成本为1,540亿美元，而紧随其后的AT&T为1,270亿美元。

Our leadership in fixed-asset ownership, I should add, does not, in itself, signal an investment triumph. The best results occur at companies that require minimal assets to conduct high-margin businesses – and offer goods or services that will expand their sales volume with only minor needs for additional capital. We, in fact, own a few of these exceptional businesses, but they are relatively small and, at best, grow slowly.

需补充的是，固定资产所有权领先本身并不代表投资成功。最佳回报来自那些以轻资产运营高利润业务的企业——其产品或服务能在几乎无需新增资本的情况下扩大销售规模。我们确实持有少数这类卓越企业，但它们规模相对较小，增长也较为缓慢。

# 资产密集型企业的价值（Asset-Heavy Companies as Good Investments）

Asset-heavy companies, however, can be good investments. Indeed, we are delighted with our two giants – BNSF and BHE: In 2011, Berkshire’s first full year of BNSF ownership, the two companies had combined earnings of $4.2 billion. In 2020, a tough year for many businesses, the pair earned $8.3 billion.

然而，资产密集型企业也可能成为优质投资标的。事实上，我们对旗下的两大巨头——BNSF和BHE——非常满意。2011年，即伯克希尔全资拥有BNSF的首年，这两家企业的合并利润为42亿美元。到了2020年（许多企业面临困境），它们的合并利润增至83亿美元。

BNSF and BHE will require major capital expenditures for decades to come. The good news is that both are likely to deliver appropriate returns on the incremental investment.

未来数十年，BNSF和BHE将需要巨额资本支出。好消息是，新增投资有望带来合理回报。

Let’s look first at BNSF. Your railroad carries about 15% of all non-local ton-miles (a ton of freight moved one mile) of goods that move in the United States, whether by rail, truck, pipeline, barge or aircraft. By a significant margin, BNSF’s loads top those of any other carrier.

先看BNSF铁路公司。您的铁路运输占美国所有非本地货运吨英里（货物移动一英里）的15%，无论运输方式是铁路、卡车、管道、驳船还是飞机。BNSF的货运量远超其他运输商。

# 美国铁路的历史与BNSF的演变（The History of American Railroads and BNSF’s Evolution）

The history of American railroads is fascinating. After 150 years or so of frenzied construction, skullduggery, overbuilding, bankruptcies, reorganizations and mergers, the railroad industry finally emerged a few decades ago as mature and rationalized.

美国铁路的历史充满戏剧性。经过约150年的疯狂建设、欺诈、过度扩张、破产重组与并购，铁路行业终于在几十年前步入成熟和理性化阶段。

BNSF began operations in 1850 with a 12-mile line in northeastern Illinois. Today, it has 390 antecedents whose railroads have been purchased or merged. The company’s extensive lineage is laid out at http://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/about-bnsf/History_and_Legacy.pdf.

BNSF于1850年在伊利诺伊州东北部以12英里铁路起家。如今，它已通过收购或合并拥有390家前身铁路公司。详细历史可查阅其官网发布的报告《History and Legacy》：http://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/about-bnsf/History_and_Legacy.pdf

Berkshire acquired BNSF early in 2010. Since our purchase, the railroad has invested $41 billion in fixed assets, an outlay $20 billion in excess of its depreciation charges. Railroading is an outdoor sport, featuring mile-long trains obliged to reliably operate in both extreme cold and heat, as they encounter every form of terrain from deserts to mountains. Massive flooding periodically occurs. BNSF owns 23,000 miles of track, spread throughout 28 states, and must spend whatever it takes to maximize safety and service throughout its vast system.

伯克希尔于2010年初收购BNSF。自收购以来，BNSF已投入410亿美元用于固定资产升级，超出其折旧费用200亿美元。铁路是户外极端环境下的运营，列车需在零下严寒至酷暑中可靠运行，并穿越沙漠、山脉等复杂地形。周期性洪灾不可避免。BNSF拥有横跨28州的23,000英里轨道，必须持续投入以确保庞大系统的安全性与服务质量。

# BNSF的分红与管理层表现（BNSF’s Dividends and Management Excellence）

Nevertheless, BNSF has paid substantial dividends to Berkshire – $41.8 billion in total. The railroad pays us, however, only what remains after it both fulfills the needs of its business and maintains a cash balance of about $2 billion. This conservative policy allows BNSF to borrow at low rates, independent of any guarantee of its debt by Berkshire.

尽管如此，BNSF已向伯克希尔累计分红418亿美元。但其分红仅限于满足业务需求并维持约20亿美元现金储备后的盈余。这一保守政策使BNSF无需伯克希尔担保即可低利率融资。

One further word about BNSF: Last year, Carl Ice, its CEO, and his number two, Katie Farmer, did an extraordinary job in controlling expenses while navigating a significant downturn in business. Despite a 7% decline in the volume of goods carried, the two actually increased BNSF’s profit margin by 2.9 percentage points. Carl, as long planned, retired at yearend and Katie took over as CEO. Your railroad is in good hands.

关于BNSF的最后一点：去年CEO Carl Ice及其副手Katie Farmer在业务大幅下滑时仍出色控制成本。尽管货运量下降7%，他们却将利润率提升了2.9个百分点。Carl按计划于年末退休，Katie接任CEO。您的铁路公司管理层稳健可靠。

# BHE的零分红策略与能源转型使命（BHE’s No-Dividend Policy and Energy Transition Mission）

BHE, unlike BNSF, pays no dividends on its common stock, a highly-unusual practice in the electric-utility industry. That Spartan policy has been the case throughout our 21 years of ownership. Unlike railroads, our country’s electric utilities need a massive makeover in which the ultimate costs will be staggering. The effort will absorb all of BHE’s earnings for decades to come. We welcome the challenge and believe the added investment will be appropriately rewarded.

BHE与BNSF不同，从未向普通股股东分红——这在电力公用事业领域极为罕见。这一节俭策略贯穿我们21年的持股期。不同于铁路行业，美国电力系统需要大规模改造，最终成本将令人震惊。未来数十年，BHE的所有收益都将投入这一进程。我们接受挑战，并相信追加投资将获得合理回报。

Let me tell you about one of BHE’s endeavors – its $18 billion commitment to rework and expand a substantial portion of the outdated grid that now transmits electricity throughout the West. BHE began this project in 2006 and expects it to be completed by 2030 – yes, 2030.

让我介绍BHE的一个重大项目：它已承诺投入180亿美元改造并扩建西部电网系统。该项目始于2006年，预计到2030年完成（没错，是2030年）。

The advent of renewable energy made our project a societal necessity. Historically, coal-based electricity generation was located near population centers. The best sites for wind and solar, however, are often remote. When BHE assessed the situation in 2006, a huge investment in western transmission lines was obvious. Very few companies or governments were financially capable of taking on this scale.

可再生能源的兴起使该项目成为社会刚需。传统燃煤发电厂靠近人口中心，而风能和太阳能的最佳选址常位于偏远地区。2006年BHE评估后认为西部输电网络需巨额投资，但当时极少有企业和政府具备财力承担此类项目。

BHE’s decision to proceed was based on trust in America’s political, economic and judicial systems. Billions of dollars needed to be invested before revenue would flow. Transmission lines had to cross state borders with varying rules. BHE also dealt with hundreds of landowners and executed contracts with power suppliers and distant utilities. Competing interests and defenders of the old order, along with unrealistic visionaries, had to be navigated.

BHE的决策基于对美国政治、经济和司法体系的信任。项目需先期投入数十亿美元才能产生收入，输电线路需跨越多州复杂法规，与数百土地所有者谈判，并与发电方和远距离分销方签订合同。既要应对守旧派的阻力，也要避免理想主义者的激进主张。

Both surprises and delays were certain. However, BHE had the managerial talent, institutional commitment and financial resources to fulfill its promises. Though it will be many years before our western transmission project is completed, we are today searching for other similar-scale projects.

项目必然面临意外和延迟，但BHE具备管理层人才、机构承诺和资金实力兑现目标。尽管西部输电工程需多年完工，我们已开始寻找下一个同量级项目。

Whatever the obstacles, BHE will be a leader in delivering ever-cleaner energy.

无论障碍如何，BHE都将成为清洁能源转型的领军者。

# THE ANNUAL MEETING (年度股东大会)

Last year, on February 22nd, I wrote you about our plans for a gala annual meeting. Within a month, the schedule was junked.

去年2月22日，我曾致信告知您我们关于盛大年度股东大会的计划。但仅一个月后，原定日程被迫取消。

Our home office group, led by Melissa Shapiro and Marc Hamburg, Berkshire’s CFO, quickly regrouped. Miraculously, their improvisations worked.

在伯克希尔首席财务官梅丽莎·夏皮罗（Melissa Shapiro）和马克·汉堡（Marc Hamburg）的带领下，总部团队迅速调整策略。令人惊叹的是，他们的临场应变取得了成功。

Greg Abel, one of Berkshire’s Vice Chairmen, joined me on stage facing a dark arena, 18,000 empty seats and a camera. There was no rehearsal: Greg and I arrived about 45 minutes before "showtime."

伯克希尔副主席之一格雷格·阿贝尔（Greg Abel）与我一同登台，面对漆黑的场馆、18,000个空座位和一台摄像机。我们没有任何排练——格雷格和我在“开演前”约45分钟才抵达现场。

Debbie Bosanek, my incredible assistant who joined Berkshire 47 years ago at age 17, had put together about 25 slides displaying various facts and figures that I had assembled at home. An anonymous but highly-capable team of computer and camera operators projected the slides onto the screen in proper order.

我了不起的助理黛比·博萨内克（Debbie Bosanek）在17岁时加入伯克希尔，至今已47年。她整理了约25张幻灯片，展示了我在家汇总的各类事实和数据。一个匿名但能力出众的技术团队（负责计算机和摄像操作）按顺序将这些幻灯片投射到屏幕上。

Yahoo streamed the proceedings to a record-sized international audience. Becky Quick of CNBC, operating from her home in New Jersey, selected questions from thousands that shareholders had earlier submitted or that viewers had emailed to her during the four hours Greg and I were on stage. See’s peanut brittle and fudge, along with Coca-Cola, provided us with nourishment.

雅虎财经向创纪录的国际观众直播了整个活动。CNBC的贝基·奎克（Becky Quick）从新泽西家中远程工作，从股东提前提交的问题和观众在格雷格与我登台的四小时内发来的邮件中筛选提问内容。期间，See’s品牌的花生糖、软糖和可口可乐为我们提供了能量补给。

This year, on May 1st, we are planning to go one better. Again, we will rely on Yahoo and CNBC to perform flawlessly. Yahoo will go live at 1 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time (“EDT”). Simply navigate to https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream.

今年5月1日，我们计划更进一步。我们将再次依赖雅虎财经和CNBC的完美执行。雅虎财经直播将于美国东部夏令时间（EDT）下午1点开始。请直接访问：https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream。

Our formal meeting will commence at 5:00 p.m. EDT and should finish by 5:30 p.m. Earlier, between 1:30-5:00, we will answer your questions as relayed by Becky. As always, we will have no foreknowledge as to what questions will be asked. Send your zingers to BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com. Yahoo will wrap things up after 5:30.

正式会议将于EDT下午5点开始，预计在5点半结束。此前，1点30分至5点之间，我们将通过贝基转达的提问进行回答。一如既往，我们对问题内容毫无预知。请将尖锐问题发送至：BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com。雅虎财经将在5点半后收尾直播。

And now – drum roll, please – a surprise. This year our meeting will be held in Los Angeles . . . and Charlie will be on stage with me offering answers and observations throughout the 3 1⁄2-hour question period. I missed him last year and, more important, you clearly missed him. Our other invaluable vice-chairmen, Ajit Jain and Greg Abel, will be with us to answer questions relating to their domains.

现在——请敲鼓点——一个惊喜！今年我们的会议将在洛杉矶举行……并且查理将在舞台上与我共同用3.5小时回答和点评问题。去年我怀念他，更重要的是，显然你们也怀念他。我们其他两位宝贵的副主席阿吉特·贾恩（Ajit Jain）和格雷格·阿贝尔也将到场，回答与各自业务领域相关的问题。

Join us via Yahoo. Direct your really tough questions to Charlie! We will have fun, and we hope you will as well.

通过雅虎财经加入我们吧！把最难缠的问题抛给查理！我们将享受这次交流，也希望您同样如此。

Better yet, of course, will be the day when we see you face to face. I hope and expect that will be in 2022. The citizens of Omaha, our exhibiting subsidiaries and all of us at the home office can’t wait to get you back for an honest-to-God annual meeting, Berkshire-style.

当然，更好的一天是我们能与您面对面相见。我期待并相信这一天将出现在2022年。奥马哈市民、我们的参展子公司以及总部所有同事都迫不及待地盼您归来，共赴一场纯正的伯克希尔风格年度股东大会。

February 27, 2021
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

2021年2月27日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席

编辑

上次更新: 2025/07/14, 21:42:27

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