1983巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.（伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司）
# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.（致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东）
This past year our registered shareholders increased from about 1900 to about 2900. Most of this growth resulted from our merger with Blue Chip Stamps, but there also was an acceleration in the pace of “natural” increase that has raised us from the 1000 level a few years ago.
过去一年，我们的登记股东人数从约1900人增至约2900人。股东人数增长主要源于我们与蓝筹印花公司（Blue Chip Stamps）的合并，但“自然增长”速度也有所加快——几年前我们的股东人数仅为1000人左右，正是这种自然增长推动人数持续上升。
With so many new shareholders, it’s appropriate to summarize the major business principles we follow that pertain to the manager-owner relationship:
鉴于新股东人数众多，有必要总结我们在管理层与股东关系方面遵循的主要经营原则：
Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because of the size of our shareholdings we also are, for better or worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business assets but, instead, view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.
尽管我们的组织形式是公司制，但我们秉持合伙制的理念。我和查理·芒格（Charlie Munger）将股东视为“所有者合伙人”，将我们自己视为“管理合伙人”。（由于我们持有的股份规模，无论结果好坏，我们同时也是“控股合伙人”。）我们不认为公司本身是业务资产的最终所有者，相反，我们将公司视为股东持有资产的“渠道”。
In line with this owner-orientation, our directors are all major shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway. In the case of at least four of the five, over 50% of family net worth is represented by holdings of Berkshire. We eat our own cooking.
与这种“股东导向”一致，我们的董事均为伯克希尔·哈撒韦的主要股东。在五名董事中，至少有四名的家庭净资产中，超过50%由伯克希尔的持股构成。我们“自己吃自己做的饭”（即与股东利益高度绑定）。
Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize the average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future - a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.
我们的长期经济目标（后续会提及一些限制条件）是最大化每股内在业务价值的年均增长率。我们不以公司规模衡量伯克希尔的经济意义或业绩，而是以每股业绩的增长为衡量标准。我们确信，未来每股增长速度将有所放缓——大幅扩大的资本基础必然会导致这一结果。但如果我们的增长速度未能超过美国大型企业的平均水平，我们会感到失望。
Our preference would be to reach this goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation.
为实现这一目标，我们的首选方式是直接拥有一组多元化的业务——这些业务能产生现金流，且持续获得高于平均水平的资本回报率。我们的次选方式是持有同类业务的部分股权，这主要通过我们的保险子公司购买可流通普通股来实现。某一特定年份的资本配置，取决于企业的收购价格、可获得性以及保险业务的资本需求。
Because of this two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them.
由于我们采用这种“双管齐下”的业务持有方式，再加上传统会计制度的局限性，合并报表中的净利润可能无法充分反映我们的真实经济业绩。我和查理无论是作为所有者还是管理者，几乎都会忽略这些合并数据。不过，我们也会向你们披露我们所控制的每一项主要业务的收益——这些数据在我们看来至关重要。这些数据，连同我们将提供的各业务相关补充信息，通常能帮助你们对这些业务做出判断。
Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.
会计结果不会影响我们的经营或资本配置决策。当收购成本相近时，我们更倾向于收购“按标准会计原则无法计入我们报表的2美元收益”，而非“可计入报表的1美元收益”。这正是我们经常面临的选择——因为整体收购一家企业（其收益可全额计入报表）的价格，往往是收购其小部分股权（其收益大部分无法计入报表）按比例计算价格的两倍。从长期和总体来看，我们预计这些未计入报表的收益将通过资本利得，充分反映在我们的内在业务价值中。
We rarely use much debt and, when we do, we attempt to structure it on a long-term fixed rate basis. We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders, depositors, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care.
我们很少使用大量债务，即便使用，也会尽量将其设计为长期固定利率结构。我们会放弃有吸引力的机会，也不愿让资产负债表过度杠杆化。这种保守主义可能会影响我们的业绩，但考虑到我们对投保人、储户、债权人以及众多股东的信托责任——这些股东将其净资产中相当大的部分托付给我们管理，这是唯一能让我们感到安心的经营方式。
A managerial “wish list” will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.
管理层的“愿望清单”不会以股东的代价来实现。我们不会为了多元化而以“忽略股东长期经济后果”的控股价格收购整个企业。我们只会用你们的资金做我们愿意用自己资金做的事，同时充分考虑你们通过在股市直接购买股票、自主分散投资组合所能获得的价值。
We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.
我们认为，高尚的意图应定期通过结果来检验。我们判断留存收益是否明智的标准是：随着时间推移，每留存1美元，能否为股东创造至少1美元的市值。迄今为止，我们通过了这一检验。我们将继续以五年滚动周期来应用这一检验标准。随着我们净资产的增长，明智地运用留存收益将变得愈发困难。
We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of issuance - not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as well. We will not sell small portions of your company - and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to - on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.
我们仅在“所获得的业务价值与所付出的价值相当”时，才会发行普通股。这一规则适用于所有发行形式——不仅包括并购或公开股票发行，还包括债转股、股票期权以及可转换证券。我们不会以“与企业整体价值不匹配”的方式出售公司的部分股权——而股票发行本质上就是出售股权。
You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns, and are very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling - the advocates will be sincere - but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in it.
你们应充分了解我和查理共同秉持的一种态度，这种态度可能会影响我们的财务业绩：无论价格如何，我们绝不打算出售伯克希尔旗下任何优质业务；对于业绩不佳的业务，只要我们预计其至少能产生一定现金流，且对其管理层和劳资关系感到满意，我们也极不情愿出售。我们希望不再重复过去的资本配置错误——正是这些错误让我们涉足了此类业绩不佳的业务。对于“通过大额资本支出可使业绩不佳的业务恢复至令人满意的盈利水平”的提议，我们会极为谨慎。（相关预测往往令人眼花缭乱，提议者也可能态度诚恳，但归根结底，在糟糕的行业中追加大额投资，通常如同在流沙中挣扎，难以获得回报。）然而，“金拉米牌式”的管理策略（即每次都舍弃前景最差的业务）并非我们的风格。我们宁愿整体业绩受到些许影响，也不愿采取这种做法。
We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less. Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: the CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.
我们向你们披露信息时将保持坦诚，着重说明评估业务价值时至关重要的优势与劣势。我们的准则是：若我们与你们的立场互换，我们希望了解哪些业务事实，就会向你们披露哪些事实。这是我们对你们应尽的责任。此外，作为一家拥有重要传媒业务的公司，若我们在自我披露时所遵循的准确性、平衡性和深刻性标准，低于我们要求新闻从业者报道他人时所遵循的标准，那将是不可原谅的。我们也相信，坦诚对我们管理者自身有益：在公开场合误导他人的首席执行官，最终可能在私下里误导自己。
Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas are. Therefore, we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say “no comment” on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.
尽管我们秉持坦诚的原则，但对于证券投资活动，我们仅会在法律要求的范围内进行讨论。优质的投资理念与优质的产品理念或并购理念一样，稀缺且珍贵，容易被竞争对手借鉴。因此，我们通常不会谈论我们的投资理念。这一限制甚至适用于我们已卖出的证券（因为我们可能再次买入），以及那些不实传言称我们正在买入的股票。若我们对某些传言予以否认，而对其他传言表示“无可奉告”，那么“无可奉告”本身就会被视为一种确认。
That completes the catechism, and we can now move on to the high point of 1983 - the acquisition of a majority interest in Nebraska Furniture Mart and our association with Rose Blumkin and her family.
以上便是我们的原则阐述。接下来，我们可以谈谈1983年的亮点事件——收购内布拉斯加家具卖场（Nebraska Furniture Mart）的多数股权，以及我们与罗斯·布卢姆金（Rose Blumkin）及其家族的合作。
# Nebraska Furniture Mart（内布拉斯加家具卖场）
Last year, in discussing how managers with bright, but adrenalin-soaked minds scramble after foolish acquisitions, I quoted Pascal: “It has struck me that all the misfortunes of men spring from the single cause that they are unable to stay quietly in one room.”
去年，在谈论那些头脑聪明却冲动的管理者如何盲目追逐糟糕的收购交易时，我引用了帕斯卡（Pascal）的一句话：“我突然意识到，人类所有的不幸都源于一个单一的原因——他们无法安静地待在一个房间里。”
Even Pascal would have left the room for Mrs. Blumkin.
即便帕斯卡本人，也会为布卢姆金夫人走出房间（意指为与她合作而采取行动）。
About 67 years ago Mrs. Blumkin, then 23, talked her way past a border guard to leave Russia for America. She had no formal education, not even at the grammar school level, and knew no English. After some years in this country, she learned the language when her older daughter taught her, every evening, the words she had learned in school during the day.
大约67年前，时年23岁的布卢姆金夫人说服边境警卫，离开俄罗斯前往美国。她没有接受过正规教育，甚至连小学教育都没有，而且不懂英语。在美国生活几年后，她的大女儿每天晚上都会把白天在学校学到的单词教给她，她就这样学会了英语。
In 1937, after many years of selling used clothing, Mrs. Blumkin had saved $500 with which to realize her dream of opening a furniture store. Upon seeing the American Furniture Mart in Chicago - then the center of the nation’s wholesale furniture activity - she decided to christen her dream Nebraska Furniture Mart.
1937年，在从事了多年二手服装销售后，布卢姆金夫人攒下了500美元，用这笔钱实现了自己开家具店的梦想。在参观了芝加哥的美国家具卖场（当时是美国家具批发业的中心）后，她决定将自己的店铺命名为“内布拉斯加家具卖场”。
She met every obstacle you would expect (and a few you wouldn’t) when a business endowed with only $500 and no locational or product advantage goes up against rich, long-entrenched competition. At one early point, when her tiny resources ran out, “Mrs. B” (a personal trademark now as well recognized in Greater Omaha as Coca-Cola or Sanka) coped in a way not taught at business schools: she simply sold the furniture and appliances from her home in order to pay creditors precisely as promised.
一家仅靠500美元起步、既无区位优势也无产品优势的企业，要与资金雄厚、根基稳固的竞争对手抗衡，可想而知会面临诸多阻碍（有些阻碍甚至超乎想象），而布卢姆金夫人都一一克服了。在创业初期的某个阶段，当她的微薄资金耗尽时，“B夫人”（这一称呼如今已成为她的个人标志，在大奥马哈地区的知名度堪比可口可乐或桑卡咖啡）采取了一种商学院不会教授的应对方式：她直接卖掉自己家中的家具和电器，以如约向债权人还款。
Omaha retailers began to recognize that Mrs. B would offer customers far better deals than they had been giving, and they pressured furniture and carpet manufacturers not to sell to her. But by various strategies she obtained merchandise and cut prices sharply. Mrs. B was then hauled into court for violation of Fair Trade laws. She not only won all the cases, but received invaluable publicity. At the end of one case, after demonstrating to the court that she could profitably sell carpet at a huge discount from the prevailing price, she sold the judge $1400 worth of carpet.
奥马哈的零售商们开始意识到，B夫人能为客户提供比他们优惠得多的交易，于是他们向家具和地毯制造商施压，要求其不得向B夫人供货。但B夫人通过各种办法获得了商品，并大幅降价销售。随后，她因违反《公平贸易法》被告上法庭。她不仅赢了所有官司，还获得了宝贵的曝光机会。在其中一场官司结束时，她向法庭证明自己能以远低于市场价的折扣销售地毯且仍有利润后，还向法官卖出了价值1400美元的地毯。
Today Nebraska Furniture Mart generates over $100 million of sales annually out of one 200,000 square-foot store. No other home furnishings store in the country comes close to that volume. That single store also sells more furniture, carpets, and appliances than do all Omaha competitors combined.
如今，内布拉斯加家具卖场仅凭一家20万平方英尺的门店，年销售额就超过1亿美元。美国国内没有任何一家家居用品店的销售额能与之接近。这家单店的家具、地毯和家电销量，甚至超过了奥马哈所有竞争对手的销量总和。
One question I always ask myself in appraising a business is how I would like, assuming I had ample capital and skilled personnel, to compete with it. I’d rather wrestle grizzlies than compete with Mrs. B and her progeny. They buy brilliantly, they operate at expense ratios competitors don’t even dream about, and they then pass on to their customers much of the savings. It’s the ideal business - one built upon exceptional value to the customer that in turn translates into exceptional economics for its owners.
在评估一家企业时，我总会问自己一个问题：假设我拥有充足的资金和熟练的员工，我愿意与这家企业竞争吗？比起与B夫人及其后代竞争，我宁愿去和灰熊摔跤。他们采购眼光独到，运营费用率低到竞争对手连想都不敢想，还会将大部分成本节约让利给客户。这是一种理想的商业模式——以给客户提供超高价值为基础，进而为企业所有者带来超高的经济回报。
Mrs. B is wise as well as smart and, for far-sighted family reasons, was willing to sell the business last year. I had admired both the family and the business for decades, and a deal was quickly made. But Mrs. B, now 90, is not one to go home and risk, as she puts it, “losing her marbles”. She remains Chairman and is on the sales floor seven days a week. Carpet sales are her specialty. She personally sells quantities that would be a good departmental total for other carpet retailers.
B夫人不仅聪慧，而且极具远见。出于为家族长远考虑，她去年愿意出售这项业务。数十年来，我一直对这个家族和其业务心怀钦佩，因此交易很快就达成了。但现已90岁高龄的B夫人，并不愿意回家过退休生活——用她的话说，那样会有“变糊涂”的风险。她仍担任公司董事长，每周七天都在销售一线工作。地毯销售是她的专长，她个人的地毯销量，对其他地毯零售商而言，足以成为一个部门的出色业绩总额。
We purchased 90% of the business - leaving 10% with members of the family who are involved in management - and have optioned 10% to certain key young family managers.
我们收购了该公司90%的股权，将10%的股权留给了参与管理的家族成员，同时还向部分核心的年轻家族管理者授予了10%的股权认购期权。
And what managers they are. Geneticists should do handsprings over the Blumkin family. Louie Blumkin, Mrs. B’s son, has been President of Nebraska Furniture Mart for many years and is widely regarded as the shrewdest buyer of furniture and appliances in the country. Louie says he had the best teacher, and Mrs. B says she had the best student. They’re both right. Louie and his three sons all have the Blumkin business ability, work ethic, and, most important, character. On top of that, they are really nice people. We are delighted to be in partnership with them.
他们真是优秀的管理者。遗传学家或许会为布卢姆金家族的天赋惊叹不已。B夫人的儿子路易·布卢姆金（Louie Blumkin）担任内布拉斯加家具卖场总裁已有多年，被公认为美国最精明的家具和家电采购商。路易说自己有最好的老师，B夫人则说自己有最好的学生，两人的说法都没错。路易和他的三个儿子都继承了布卢姆金家族的商业才能、职业道德，更重要的是，还继承了家族的优良品格。除此之外，他们为人也十分友善。能与他们合作，我们感到非常荣幸。
# Corporate Performance（公司业绩）
During 1983 our book value increased from $737.43 per share to $975.83 per share, or by 32%. We never take the one-year figure very seriously. After all, why should the time required for a planet to circle the sun synchronize precisely with the time required for business actions to pay off? Instead, we recommend not less than a five-year test as a rough yardstick of economic performance. Red lights should start flashing if the five-year average annual gain falls much below the return on equity earned over the period by American industry in aggregate. (Watch out for our explanation if that occurs as Goethe observed, “When ideas fail, words come in very handy.”)
1983年，我们的每股账面价值从737.43美元增至975.83美元，增幅为32%。我们从不把单一年度的业绩数据看得过重。毕竟，行星绕太阳公转一周的时间，为何要与商业行为产生回报的时间精确同步呢？相反，我们建议以至少五年为周期，将其作为衡量经济业绩的大致标准。如果五年平均年增长率远低于同期美国工业整体的净资产收益率，就需要警惕了。（正如歌德所言：“当想法枯竭时，言语就派上用场了。”若真出现这种情况，还请留意我们的解释。）
During the 19-year tenure of present management, book value has grown from $19.46 per share to $975.83, or 22.6% compounded annually. Considering our present size, nothing close to this rate of return can be sustained. Those who believe otherwise should pursue a career in sales, but avoid one in mathematics.
在现任管理层任职的19年间，公司每股账面价值从19.46美元增长至975.83美元，年均复合增长率达22.6%。考虑到我们目前的规模，这样高的回报率已无法持续维持。那些认为我们仍能保持这一增速的人，或许适合从事销售工作，但不应涉足数学领域。
We report our progress in terms of book value because in our case (though not, by any means, in all cases) it is a conservative but reasonably adequate proxy for growth in intrinsic business value - the measurement that really counts. Book value’s virtue as a score-keeping measure is that it is easy to calculate and doesn’t involve the subjective (but important) judgments employed in calculation of intrinsic business value. It is important to understand, however, that the two terms - book value and intrinsic business value - have very different meanings.
我们选择以账面价值来衡量业绩进展，是因为就我们而言（尽管并非在所有情况下都如此），账面价值是衡量内在业务价值增长的保守且足够合理的替代指标——而内在业务价值才是真正重要的衡量标准。账面价值作为业绩衡量指标的优势在于，它计算简便，且不涉及计算内在业务价值时所需的主观判断（尽管这些判断很重要）。但必须明确的是，“账面价值”与“内在业务价值”这两个术语的含义截然不同。
Book value is an accounting concept, recording the accumulated financial input from both contributed capital and retained earnings. Intrinsic business value is an economic concept, estimating future cash output discounted to present value. Book value tells you what has been put in; intrinsic business value estimates what can be taken out.
账面价值是一个会计概念，记录了来自投入资本和留存收益的累计财务投入。内在业务价值则是一个经济概念，指对未来现金产出按现值折现后的估算值。账面价值反映的是“投入了什么”，而内在业务价值估算的是“能获得什么”。
An analogy will suggest the difference. Assume you spend identical amounts putting each of two children through college. The book value (measured by financial input) of each child’s education would be the same. But the present value of the future payoff (the intrinsic business value) might vary enormously - from zero to many times the cost of the education. So, also, do businesses having equal financial input end up with wide variations in value.
一个类比可以帮助理解两者的区别。假设你花费相同的金额供两个孩子读完大学，那么从财务投入角度衡量，每个孩子教育的“账面价值”是相同的。但未来回报的现值（即“内在业务价值”）可能存在巨大差异——从零到教育成本的数倍不等。企业也是如此，即便财务投入相同，最终的价值也可能相差悬殊。
At Berkshire, at the beginning of fiscal 1965 when the present management took over, the $19.46 per share book value considerably overstated intrinsic business value. All of that book value consisted of textile assets that could not earn, on average, anything close to an appropriate rate of return. In the terms of our analogy, the investment in textile assets resembled investment in a largely-wasted education.
1965财年初，现任管理层接管伯克希尔时，公司每股19.46美元的账面价值大幅高估了其内在业务价值。当时所有的账面价值都由纺织资产构成，而这些资产的平均回报率远未达到合理水平。用我们之前的类比来说，对纺织资产的投资，就如同投入了一场基本白费的教育。
Now, however, our intrinsic business value considerably exceeds book value. There are two major reasons:
(1) Standard accounting principles require that common stocks held by our insurance subsidiaries be stated on our books at market value, but that other stocks we own be carried at the lower of aggregate cost or market. At the end of 1983, the market value of this latter group exceeded carrying value by $70 million pre-tax, or about $50 million after tax. This excess belongs in our intrinsic business value, but is not included in the calculation of book value;
(2) More important, we own several businesses that possess economic Goodwill (which is properly includable in intrinsic business value) far larger than the accounting Goodwill that is carried on our balance sheet and reflected in book value.
然而如今，我们的内在业务价值已大幅超过账面价值，主要原因有两点：
（1）按照标准会计原则，我们保险子公司持有的普通股需按市值在账簿上列示，但我们持有的其他股票需按总成本与总市值孰低的原则列示。1983年末，后一类股票的市值较其账面价值高出税前7000万美元，税后约5000万美元。这部分溢价应计入我们的内在业务价值，但未纳入账面价值的计算；
（2）更重要的是，我们旗下多家企业拥有的经济商誉（经济商誉应合理计入内在业务价值），远高于资产负债表上列示且反映在账面价值中的会计商誉。
Goodwill, both economic and accounting, is an arcane subject and requires more explanation than is appropriate here. The appendix that follows this letter - “Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities” - explains why economic and accounting Goodwill can, and usually do, differ enormously.
无论是经济商誉还是会计商誉，都是一个复杂的话题，需要更详尽的解释，而此处篇幅有限不便展开。本信件后的附录——《商誉及其摊销：规则与现实》（Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities）——将说明为何经济商誉与会计商誉可能（且通常确实）存在巨大差异。
You can live a full and rewarding life without ever thinking about Goodwill and its amortization. But students of investment and management should understand the nuances of the subject. My own thinking has changed drastically from 35 years ago when I was taught to favor tangible assets and to shun businesses whose value depended largely upon economic Goodwill. This bias caused me to make many important business mistakes of omission, although relatively few of commission.
即便从未思考过商誉及其摊销问题，你也能拥有充实且有意义的生活。但对于学习投资与管理的人而言，应当理解这一话题的细微差别。35年前，我所接受的教育是偏好有形资产，回避那些价值主要依赖经济商誉的企业，如今我的想法已发生了巨大转变。这种偏见曾让我在商业决策中犯下许多重大的“遗漏性错误”（即错失良机），尽管“执行性错误”（即决策失误）相对较少。
Keynes identified my problem: “The difficulty lies not in the new ideas but in escaping from the old ones.” My escape was long delayed, in part because most of what I had been taught by the same teacher had been (and continues to be) so extraordinarily valuable. Ultimately, business experience, direct and vicarious, produced my present strong preference for businesses that possess large amounts of enduring Goodwill and that utilize a minimum of tangible assets.
凯恩斯（Keynes）曾指出我的问题所在：“困难不在于接受新思想，而在于摆脱旧思想。”我花了很长时间才摆脱旧观念的束缚，部分原因是当初那位老师教授的大部分知识（至今仍）极具价值。最终，通过亲身及间接获取的商业经验，我如今强烈倾向于投资那些拥有大量持久经济商誉、且对有形资产需求极少的企业。
I recommend the Appendix to those who are comfortable with accounting terminology and who have an interest in understanding the business aspects of Goodwill. Whether or not you wish to tackle the Appendix, you should be aware that Charlie and I believe that Berkshire possesses very significant economic Goodwill value above that reflected in our book value.
对于熟悉会计术语且有兴趣理解商誉商业内涵的读者，我推荐阅读该附录。无论你是否打算阅读附录，都应知晓：我和查理认为，伯克希尔拥有的经济商誉价值远超其账面价值所反映的水平。
# Sources of Reported Earnings（财报收益来源）
The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. In 1982, Berkshire owned about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps whereas, in 1983, our ownership was 60% throughout the first six months and 100% thereafter. In turn, Berkshire’s net interest in Wesco was 48% during 1982 and the first six months of 1983, and 80% for the balance of 1983. Because of these changed ownership percentages, the first two columns of the table provide the best measure of underlying business performance.
下表列示了伯克希尔财报收益的来源。1982年，伯克希尔持有蓝筹印花公司（Blue Chip Stamps）约60%的股权；而1983年，我们在上半年持有其60%股权，下半年则持有100%股权。相应地，1982年及1983年上半年，伯克希尔在韦斯科金融公司（Wesco）的净持股比例为48%，1983年剩余时间则为80%。由于持股比例发生变化，下表前两列（税前总收益）最能反映各业务的实际经营业绩。
All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions on the line near the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings. (We regard any annual figure for realized capital gains or losses as meaningless, but we regard the aggregate realized and unrealized capital gains over a period of years as very important.) Furthermore, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix, is set forth as a separate item.
所有业务实体因非经常性资产出售产生的重大损益，均与证券交易损益汇总列于表格底部的对应项目中，未计入营业收益。（我们认为单一年度的已实现资本利得或损失并无意义，但多年度的已实现与未实现资本利得总和则至关重要。）此外，商誉摊销并未分摊至具体业务，而是基于附录中阐述的原因，作为单独项目列示。
| 项目 | 税前收益（Total） | 伯克希尔持股收益（Berkshire Share） | 伯克希尔税后收益（Berkshire Share） | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1983（千美元） | 1982（千美元） | 1983（千美元） | 1982（千美元） | 1983（千美元） | 1982（千美元） | |
| 营业收益 | ||||||
| 保险业务板块： | ||||||
| - 承保业务（Underwriting） | $(33,872) | $(21,558) | $(33,872) | $(21,558) | $(18,400) | $(11,345) |
| - 净投资收益（Net Investment Income） | 43,810 | 41,620 | 43,810 | 41,620 | 39,114 | 35,270 |
| 伯克希尔-沃姆贝克纺织（Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles） | (100) | (1,545) | (100) | (1,545) | (63) | (862) |
| 联合零售商店（Associated Retail Stores） | 697 | 914 | 697 | 914 | 355 | 446 |
| 内布拉斯加家具卖场(1)（Nebraska Furniture Mart(1)） | 3,812 | -- | 3,049 | -- | 1,521 | -- |
| 喜诗糖果（See’s Candies） | 27,411 | 23,884 | 24,526 | 14,235 | 12,212 | 6,914 |
| 布法罗晚报（Buffalo Evening News） | 19,352 | (1,215) | 16,547 | (724) | 8,832 | (226) |
| 蓝筹印花公司(2)（Blue Chip Stamps(2)） | (1,422) | 4,182 | (1,876) | 2,492 | (353) | 2,472 |
| 韦斯科金融-母公司（Wesco Financial - Parent） | 7,493 | 6,156 | 4,844 | 2,937 | 3,448 | 2,210 |
| 互助储蓄与贷款（Mutual Savings and Loan） | (798) | (6) | (467) | (2) | 1,917 | 1,524 |
| 精密钢铁（Precision Steel） | 3,241 | 1,035 | 2,102 | 493 | 1,136 | 265 |
| 债务利息（Interest on Debt） | (15,104) | (14,996) | (13,844) | (12,977) | (7,346) | (6,951) |
| GEICO特别分配（Special GEICO Distribution） | 21,000 | -- | 21,000 | -- | 19,551 | -- |
| 股东指定捐赠（Shareholder-Designated Contributions） | (3,066) | (891) | (3,066) | (891) | (1,656) | (481) |
| 商誉摊销（Amortization of Goodwill） | (532) | 151 | (563) | 90 | (563) | 90 |
| 其他（Other） | 10,121 | 3,371 | 9,623 | 2,658 | 8,490 | 2,171 |
| 营业收益小计（Operating Earnings） | 82,043 | 41,102 | 72,410 | 27,742 | 68,195 | 31,497 |
| 证券出售及非经常性资产出售（Sales of securities and unusual sales of assets） | 67,260 | 36,651 | 65,089 | 21,875 | 45,298 | 14,877 |
| 总收益（Total Earnings） | $149,303 | $77,753 | $137,499 | $49,617 | $113,493 | $46,374 |
（1）10月至12月（仅包含第四季度数据）
（2）1982年与1983年数据不具可比性；合并交易中发生了重大资产转移
For a discussion of the businesses owned by Wesco, please read Charlie Munger’s report on pages 46-51. Charlie replaced Louie Vincenti as Chairman of Wesco late in 1983 when health forced Louie’s retirement at age 77. In some instances, “health” is a euphemism, but in Louie’s case nothing but health would cause us to consider his retirement. Louie is a marvelous man and has been a marvelous manager.
关于韦斯科金融旗下业务的详情，敬请阅读第46-51页查理·芒格撰写的报告。1983年末，77岁的路易·文森蒂（Louie Vincenti）因健康原因退休，查理接任韦斯科金融董事长一职。在某些情况下，“健康原因”可能是一种委婉说法，但对路易而言，只有健康问题才会让我们考虑他退休。路易是一位出色的人，也是一位卓越的管理者。
The special GEICO distribution reported in the table arose when that company made a tender offer for a portion of its stock, buying both from us and other shareholders. At GEICO’s request, we tendered a quantity of shares that kept our ownership percentage the same after the transaction as before. The proportional nature of our sale permitted us to treat the proceeds as a dividend. Unlike individuals, corporations net considerably more when earnings are derived from dividends rather than from capital gains, since the effective Federal income tax rate on dividends is 6.9% versus 28% on capital gains.
表格中列示的GEICO特别分配，源于该公司对部分流通股发起的要约收购——GEICO同时从我们及其他股东手中回购股票。应GEICO的要求，我们出售的股票数量恰好使交易后我们的持股比例与交易前保持一致。由于此次出售属于“按比例减持”，我们可将出售所得视为股息收入。与个人投资者不同，企业从股息中获得的净收益远高于从资本利得中获得的净收益，因为股息对应的联邦有效所得税率为6.9%，而资本利得对应的税率为28%。
Even with this special item added in, our total dividends from GEICO in 1983 were considerably less than our share of GEICO’s earnings. Thus it is perfectly appropriate, from both an accounting and economic standpoint, to include the redemption proceeds in our reported earnings. It is because the item is large and unusual that we call your attention to it.
即便计入这一特殊项目，我们1983年从GEICO获得的股息总额，仍远低于我们按持股比例应享有的GEICO收益份额。因此，无论从会计角度还是经济角度来看，将此次股票回购所得计入我们的财报收益都是完全合理的。我们特别提醒你关注这一项目，只因它金额较大且性质特殊。
The table showing you our sources of earnings includes dividends from those non-controlled companies whose marketable equity securities we own. But the table does not include earnings those companies have retained that are applicable to our ownership. In aggregate and over time we expect those undistributed earnings to be reflected in market prices and to increase our intrinsic business value on a dollar-for-dollar basis, just as if those earnings had been under our control and reported as part of our profits. That does not mean we expect all of our holdings to behave uniformly; some will disappoint us, others will deliver pleasant surprises. To date our experience has been better than we originally anticipated, In aggregate, we have received far more than a dollar of market value gain for every dollar of earnings retained.
展示我们收益来源的表格，已包含了我们持有的、非控股公司流通股权所产生的股息。但该表格未包含这些公司留存收益中归属于我们持股部分的金额。从长期和总体来看，我们预计这些未分配收益将反映在股价中，并会为我们的内在业务价值带来“一美元对一美元”的增长，就如同这些收益由我们掌控并计入利润报表一样。这并不意味着我们期望所有持股都能表现一致：有些可能会让我们失望，有些则可能带来惊喜。迄今为止，我们的实际体验比最初预期的更好——总体而言，每1美元的留存收益，为我们带来的市值增长远超过1美元。
The following table shows our 1983 yearend net holdings in marketable equities. All numbers represent 100% of Berkshire’s holdings, and 80% of Wesco’s holdings. The portion attributable to minority shareholders of Wesco has been excluded.
下表列示了我们1983年末持有的流通股权净值。所有数据均包含伯克希尔100%的持股，以及韦斯科金融80%的持股（已剔除韦斯科少数股东应享有的部分）。
| 持股数量（No. of Shares） | 公司名称（Company Name） | 成本（Cost）（千美元） | 市值（Market）（千美元） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 690,975 | Affiliated Publications, Inc.（附属出版公司） | $3,516 | $26,603 |
| 4,451,544 | General Foods Corporation(a)（通用食品公司(a)） | $163,786 | $228,698 |
| 6,850,000 | GEICO Corporation（GEICO公司） | $47,138 | $398,156 |
| 2,379,200 | Handy & Harman（汉迪-哈曼公司） | $27,318 | $42,231 |
| 636,310 | Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc.（英特帕布利克集团） | $4,056 | $33,088 |
| 197,200 | Media General（媒体通用公司） | $3,191 | $11,191 |
| 250,400 | Ogilvy & Mather International（奥美国际公司） | $2,580 | $12,833 |
| 5,618,661 | R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc.(a)（雷诺兹工业公司(a)） | $268,918 | $341,334 |
| 901,788 | Time, Inc.（时代公司） | $27,732 | $56,860 |
| 1,868,600 | The Washington Post Company（华盛顿邮报公司） | $10,628 | $136,875 |
| 小计（Subtotal） | $558,863 | $1,287,869 | |
| 其他普通股持股（All Other Common Stockholdings） | $7,485 | $18,044 | |
| 普通股持股总计（Total Common Stocks） | $566,348 | $1,305,913 |
（a）韦斯科金融（WESCO）持有这些公司的股份
Based upon present holdings and present dividend rates - excluding any special items such as the GEICO proportional redemption last year - we would expect reported dividends from this group to be approximately $39 million in 1984. We can also make a very rough guess about the earnings this group will retain that will be attributable to our ownership: these may total about $65 million for the year. These retained earnings could well have no immediate effect on market prices of the securities. Over time, however, we feel they will have real meaning.
基于当前持股规模和股息率（不包含去年GEICO按比例回购等特殊项目），我们预计2084年从这些持股中获得的财报股息约为3900万美元。我们还可大致估算，这些公司当年留存收益中归属于我们持股部分的金额：全年可能总计约6500万美元。这些留存收益或许不会对证券市值产生即时影响，但从长期来看，我们认为它们将具有实际价值。
In addition to the figures already supplied, information regarding the businesses we control appears in Management’s Discussion on pages 40-44. The most significant of these are Buffalo Evening News, See’s, and the Insurance Group, to which we will give some special attention here.
除已提供的数据外，关于我们所控制业务的更多信息，可参见第40-44页的“管理层讨论与分析”部分。其中最重要的业务包括《布法罗晚报》、喜诗糖果和保险业务板块，下文我们将对这些业务予以重点说明。
# Buffalo Evening News（《布法罗晚报》）
First, a clarification: our corporate name is Buffalo Evening News, Inc. but the name of the newspaper, since we began a morning edition a little over a year ago, is Buffalo News.
首先需要澄清：我们的公司名称是“布法罗晚报公司”（Buffalo Evening News, Inc.），但自一年多前推出早报版后，报纸的名称已改为《布法罗新闻》（Buffalo News）。
In 1983 the News somewhat exceeded its targeted profit margin of 10% after tax. Two factors were responsible: (1) a state income tax cost that was subnormal because of a large loss carry-forward, now fully utilized, and (2) a large drop in the per-ton cost of newsprint (an unanticipated fluke that will be reversed in 1984).
1983年，《布法罗新闻》的税后利润率略高于10%的目标。这主要得益于两个因素：（1）由于此前积累的大额亏损结转（现已全额使用），州所得税成本低于正常水平；（2）新闻纸的每吨成本大幅下降——这是一个意外情况，2084年该趋势将逆转。
Although our profit margins in 1983 were about average for newspapers such as the News, the paper’s performance, nevertheless, was a significant achievement considering the economic and retailing environment in Buffalo.
尽管1983年我们的利润率仅相当于同类报纸的平均水平，但考虑到布法罗当地的经济和零售业环境，这样的业绩已是一项重大成就。
Buffalo has a concentration of heavy industry, a segment of the economy that was hit particularly hard by the recent recession and that has lagged the recovery. As Buffalo consumers have suffered, so also have the paper’s retailing customers. Their numbers have shrunk over the past few years and many of those surviving have cut their linage.
布法罗是重工业集中地，该行业在近期经济衰退中受到的冲击尤为严重，且复苏步伐滞后。随着布法罗消费者收入受损，报纸的零售广告客户也受到影响。过去几年，零售广告客户数量不断减少，幸存的客户中也有许多缩减了广告版面投放量。
Within this environment the News has one exceptional strength: its acceptance by the public, a matter measured by the paper’s “penetration ratio” - the percentage of households within the community purchasing the paper each day. Our ratio is superb: for the six months ended September 30, 1983 the News stood number one in weekday penetration among the 100 largest papers in the United States (the ranking is based on “city zone” numbers compiled by the Audit Bureau of Circulations).
在这样的环境下，《布法罗新闻》拥有一项突出优势：公众对其的认可度。这一认可度通过报纸的“渗透率”来衡量，即社区内每日购买该报纸的家庭比例。我们的渗透率表现极佳：在截至1983年9月30日的六个月里，《布法罗新闻》的平日渗透率在美国100家最大报纸中排名第一（该排名基于发行量审计局编制的“城市区域”数据）。
In interpreting the standings, it is important to note that many large cities have two papers, and that in such cases the penetration of either paper is necessarily lower than if there were a single paper, as in Buffalo. Nevertheless, the list of the 100 largest papers includes many that have a city to themselves. Among these, the News is at the top nationally, far ahead of many of the country’s best-known dailies.
在解读这一排名时，有一点需要注意：许多大城市存在两家报纸竞争的情况，在这类城市中，任何一家报纸的渗透率都必然低于像布法罗这样只有一家报纸的城市。即便如此，美国100家最大报纸的名单中，仍包含许多在所在城市处于垄断地位的报纸。在这些垄断性报纸中，《布法罗新闻》的渗透率仍位居全国榜首，远超美国许多最知名的日报。
Among Sunday editions of these same large dailies, the News ranks number three in penetration - ten to twenty percentage points ahead of many well-known papers. It was not always this way in Buffalo. Below we show Sunday circulation in Buffalo in the years prior to 1977 compared with the present period. In that earlier period the Sunday paper was the Courier-Express (the News was not then publishing a Sunday paper). Now, of course, it is the News.
在上述大型日报的周日版中，《布法罗新闻》的渗透率排名第三，比许多知名报纸高出10至20个百分点。但布法罗的报纸市场并非一直如此。下方表格对比了1977年之前与当前时期布法罗的周日版报纸发行量。在1977年之前，当地的周日版报纸是《信使快报》（Courier-Express）——当时《布法罗新闻》尚未推出周日版。如今，当地的周日版报纸自然已变为《布法罗新闻》。
# Average Sunday Circulation（周日版平均发行量）
| Year（年份） | Circulation（发行量） |
|---|---|
| 1970 | 314,000 |
| 1971 | 306,000 |
| 1972 | 302,000 |
| 1973 | 290,000 |
| 1974 | 278,000 |
| 1975 | 269,000 |
| 1976 | 270,000 |
| 1984 (Current)（1984年当前） | 376,000 |
We believe a paper’s penetration ratio to be the best measure of the strength of its franchise. Papers with unusually high penetration in the geographical area that is of prime interest to major local retailers, and with relatively little circulation elsewhere, are exceptionally efficient buys for those retailers. Low-penetration papers have a far less compelling message to present to advertisers.
我们认为，报纸的渗透率是衡量其“特许经营权强度”的最佳指标。对于当地主要零售商而言，如果一份报纸在他们重点关注的地理区域内渗透率极高，而在其他区域发行量相对较少，那么对这些零售商来说，这份报纸的广告投放性价比极高。渗透率低的报纸，向广告商传递的价值吸引力则要弱得多。
In our opinion, three factors largely account for the unusual acceptance of the News in the community. Among these, points 2 and 3 also may explain the popularity of the Sunday News compared to that of the Sunday Courier-Express when it was the sole Sunday paper:
我们认为，有三个因素是《布法罗新闻》在当地获得极高认可度的主要原因。其中，第2点和第3点也能解释为何如今的《布法罗新闻》周日版，比过去《信使快报》作为当地唯一周日版报纸时更受欢迎：
The first point has nothing to do with merits of the News. Both emigration and immigration are relatively low in Buffalo. A stable population is more interested and involved in the activities of its community than is a shifting population - and, as a result, is more interested in the content of the local daily paper. Increase the movement in and out of a city and penetration ratios will fall.
- 第一点与《布法罗新闻》本身的优势无关。布法罗的人口迁入和迁出率都相对较低。与流动性强的人口相比，稳定的人口对社区活动更感兴趣、参与度更高，因此也更关注当地日报的内容。一座城市的人口流动性若增加，报纸的渗透率必然会下降。
The News has a reputation for editorial quality and integrity that was honed by our longtime editor, the legendary Alfred Kirchhofer, and that has been preserved and extended by Murray Light. This reputation was enormously important to our success in establishing a Sunday paper against entrenched competition. And without a Sunday edition, the News would not have survived in the long run. 2. 《布法罗新闻》在编辑质量和报道诚信方面享有良好声誉。这一声誉由我们的长期主编——传奇人物阿尔弗雷德·基尔霍夫（Alfred Kirchhofer）奠定，并由默里·莱特（Murray Light）传承和发扬。在面对已有稳固地位的竞争对手、推出周日版报纸的过程中，这一声誉对我们的成功至关重要。而且，若没有周日版，《布法罗新闻》长期来看难以立足。
The News lives up to its name - it delivers a very unusual amount of news. During 1983, our “news hole” (editorial material - not ads) amounted to 50% of the newspaper’s content (excluding preprinted inserts). Among papers that dominate their markets and that are of comparable or larger size, we know of only one whose news hole percentage exceeds that of the News. Comprehensive figures are not available, but a sampling indicates an average percentage in the high 30s. In other words, page for page, our mix gives readers over 25% more news than the typical paper. This news-rich mixture is by intent. Some publishers, pushing for higher profit margins, have cut their news holes during the past decade. We have maintained ours and will continue to do so. Properly written and edited, a full serving of news makes our paper more valuable to the reader and contributes to our unusual penetration ratio. 3. 《布法罗新闻》名副其实——它提供的新闻量远超常规。1983年，我们的“新闻版面占比”（即编辑内容，不含广告）占报纸总内容（不含预印插页）的50%。在那些占据市场主导地位、规模相当或更大的报纸中，我们所知仅有一家的新闻版面占比超过我们。目前尚无全面数据，但抽样调查显示，这类报纸的新闻版面占比平均约为35%至40%。换句话说，逐页对比，我们的报纸向读者提供的新闻量，比普通报纸多25%以上。这种“高新闻含量”的定位是我们刻意为之的。过去十年，一些出版商为追求更高利润率，缩减了新闻版面。而我们始终维持新闻版面占比，并将继续这样做。经过精心撰写和编辑的丰富新闻内容，能提升报纸对读者的价值，也正是这一点造就了我们极高的渗透率。
Despite the strength of the News’ franchise, gains in ROP linage (advertising printed within the newspaper pages as contrasted to preprinted inserts) are going to be very difficult to achieve. We had an enormous gain in preprints during 1983: lines rose from 9.3 million to 16.4 million, revenues from $3.6 million to $8.1 million. These gains are consistent with national trends, but exaggerated in our case by business we picked up when the Courier-Express closed.
尽管《布法罗新闻》的特许经营权实力强劲，但“报纸内页广告版面量”（ROP linage，即印刷在报纸内页的广告，与预印插页广告相对）的增长将极具挑战。1983年，我们的预印插页广告业务取得了大幅增长：广告行数从930万行增至1640万行，收入从360万美元增至810万美元。这一增长符合全国趋势，而由于我们承接了《信使快报》停刊后留下的业务，我们的增长幅度比行业平均水平更高。
On balance, the shift from ROP to preprints has negative economic implications for us. Profitability on preprints is less and the business is more subject to competition from alternative means of delivery. Furthermore, a reduction in ROP linage means less absolute space devoted to news (since the news hole percentage remains constant), thereby reducing the utility of the paper to the reader.
总体而言，广告从“报纸内页”向“预印插页”的转移，对我们具有负面经济影响。预印插页广告的盈利能力更低，且该业务面临来自其他广告投放渠道的竞争压力更大。此外，报纸内页广告版面量的减少，意味着报纸的绝对新闻版面空间也会减少（因为新闻版面占比保持不变），进而降低报纸对读者的实用价值。
Stan Lipsey became Publisher of the Buffalo News at midyear upon the retirement of Henry Urban. Henry never flinched during the dark days of litigation and losses following our introduction of the Sunday paper - an introduction whose wisdom was questioned by many in the newspaper business, including some within our own building. Henry is admired by the Buffalo business community, he’s admired by all who worked for him, and he is admired by Charlie and me. Stan worked with Henry for several years, and has worked for Berkshire Hathaway since 1969. He has been personally involved in all nuts-and-bolts aspects of the newspaper business from editorial to circulation. We couldn’t do better.
亨利·厄本（Henry Urban）退休后，斯坦·利普西（Stan Lipsey）于年中接任《布法罗新闻》出版商一职。在我们推出周日版报纸后，公司经历了诉讼缠身、亏损不断的艰难时期——当时许多报业人士（包括我们内部一些人）都质疑推出周日版的决策，但亨利始终坚定不移。布法罗商界钦佩亨利，所有曾为他工作的人钦佩他，我和查理也钦佩他。斯坦与亨利共事多年，且自1969年起就为伯克希尔·哈撒韦工作。他亲身参与过报业从编辑到发行的所有具体业务环节，由他接任是我们能找到的最佳选择。
# See’s Candy Shops（喜诗糖果店）
The financial results at See’s continue to be exceptional. The business possesses a valuable and solid consumer franchise and a manager equally valuable and solid.
喜诗糖果的财务业绩持续表现卓越。该业务拥有宝贵且稳固的消费者特许经营权，同时也拥有一位同样宝贵且可靠的管理者。
In recent years See’s has encountered two important problems, at least one of which is well on its way toward solution. That problem concerns costs, except those for raw materials. We have enjoyed a break on raw material costs in recent years though so, of course, have our competitors. One of these days we will get a nasty surprise in the opposite direction. In effect, raw material costs are largely beyond our control since we will, as a matter of course, buy the finest ingredients that we can, regardless of changes in their price levels. We regard product quality as sacred.
近年来，喜诗糖果面临两个重要问题，其中至少有一个问题的解决已取得显著进展。这个问题与成本相关，但不包括原材料成本。近年来，我们的原材料成本压力有所缓解，当然，我们的竞争对手也同样如此。未来某一天，我们很可能会面临原材料成本反向飙升的意外冲击。实际上，原材料成本在很大程度上超出我们的控制范围，因为我们始终坚持采购力所能及范围内最好的原料，无论其价格水平如何变化。我们将产品质量视为重中之重。
But other kinds of costs are more controllable, and it is in this area that we have had problems. On a per-pound basis, our costs (not including those for raw materials) have increased in the last few years at a rate significantly greater than the increase in the general price level. It is vital to our competitive position and profit potential that we reverse this trend.
但其他类型的成本更具可控性，而我们的问题恰恰出在这一领域。过去几年，按每磅产品计算，我们的非原材料成本增长率，显著高于整体物价水平的增长率。扭转这一趋势，对我们的竞争地位和盈利潜力至关重要。
In recent months much better control over costs has been attained and we feel certain that our rate of growth in these costs in 1984 will be below the rate of inflation. This confidence arises out of our long experience with the managerial talents of Chuck Huggins. We put Chuck in charge the day we took over, and his record has been simply extraordinary, as shown by the following table:
近几个月，我们对成本的控制已取得显著改善，且确信1984年这些成本的增长率将低于通货膨胀率。这种信心源于我们长期以来对查克·哈金斯（Chuck Huggins）管理才能的了解。自我们收购喜诗糖果之日起，就由查克负责管理，其业绩表现堪称卓越，具体如下表所示：
| 52-53周年度（截至12月31日左右） 52-53 Week Year Ended About December 31 | 销售收入（美元） Sales Revenues | 税后利润（美元） Operating Profits After Taxes | 糖果销量（磅） Number of Pounds of Candy Sold | 年末门店数量（家） Number of Stores Open at Year End |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1983年（53周）1983 (53 weeks) | $133,531,000 | $13,699,000 | 24,651,000 | 207 |
| 1982年 1982 | $123,662,000 | $11,875,000 | 24,216,000 | 202 |
| 1981年 1981 | $112,578,000 | $10,779,000 | 24,052,000 | 199 |
| 1980年 1980 | $97,715,000 | $7,547,000 | 24,065,000 | 191 |
| 1979年 1979 | $87,314,000 | $6,330,000 | 23,985,000 | 188 |
| 1978年 1978 | $73,653,000 | $6,178,000 | 22,407,000 | 182 |
| 1977年 1977 | $62,886,000 | $6,154,000 | 20,921,000 | 179 |
| 1976年（53周）1976 (53 weeks) | $56,333,000 | $5,569,000 | 20,553,000 | 173 |
| 1975年 1975 | $50,492,000 | $5,132,000 | 19,134,000 | 172 |
| 1974年 1974 | $41,248,000 | $3,021,000 | 17,883,000 | 170 |
| 1973年 1973 | $35,050,000 | $1,940,000 | 17,813,000 | 169 |
| 1972年 1972 | $31,337,000 | $2,083,000 | 16,954,000 | 167 |
The other problem we face, as the table suggests, is our recent inability to achieve meaningful gains in pounds sold. The industry has the same problem. But for many years we outperformed the industry in this respect and now we are not.
如表所示，我们面临的另一个问题是，近期糖果销量（以磅计）未能实现实质性增长。整个糖果行业也存在同样问题，但过去多年我们在销量增长上一直优于行业水平，如今却未能保持这一优势。
The poundage volume in our retail stores has been virtually unchanged each year for the past four, despite small increases every year in the number of shops (and in distribution expense as well). Of course, dollar volume has increased because we have raised prices significantly. But we regard the most important measure of retail trends to be units sold per store rather than dollar volume. On a same-store basis (counting only shops open throughout both years) with all figures adjusted to a 52-week year, poundage was down .8 of 1% during 1983. This small decline was our best same-store performance since 1979; the cumulative decline since then has been about 8%. Quantity-order volume, about 25% of our total, has plateaued in recent years following very large poundage gains throughout the 1970s.
过去四年，尽管我们的门店数量（以及分销费用）每年都有小幅增加，但零售门店的糖果销量（以磅计）几乎没有变化。当然，由于我们大幅提价，销售收入（以美元计）有所增长。但我们认为，衡量零售业务趋势的最重要指标是“单店销量”，而非“销售收入”。按“同店可比”口径（仅统计连续两年均营业的门店），并将所有数据调整为52周口径后，1983年的糖果销量下降了0.8%。这一小幅降幅是我们自1979年以来最佳的同店表现；自1979年以来，同店销量累计降幅约为8%。批量订单销量占总销量的25%左右，在20世纪70年代实现大幅增长后，近年来已进入平台期。
We are not sure to what extent this flat volume - both in the retail shop area and the quantity order area - is due to our pricing policies and to what extent it is due to static industry volume, the recession, and the extraordinary share of market we already enjoy in our primary marketing area. Our price increase for 1984 is much more modest than has been the case in the past few years, and we hope that next year we can report better volume figures to you. But we have no basis to forecast these.
我们尚不确定，零售和批量订单领域的销量停滞，在多大程度上源于我们的定价政策，又在多大程度上源于行业整体销量停滞、经济衰退，以及我们在核心市场已占据极高市场份额。1984年我们的提价幅度远低于过去几年，我们希望明年能向大家报告更理想的销量数据，但目前尚无依据对此进行预测。
Despite the volume problem, See’s strengths are many and important. In our primary marketing area, the West, our candy is preferred by an enormous margin to that of any competitor. In fact, we believe most lovers of chocolate prefer it to candy costing two or three times as much. (In candy, as in stocks, price and value can differ; price is what you give, value is what you get.) The quality of customer service in our shops - operated throughout the country by us and not by franchisees is every bit as good as the product. Cheerful, helpful personnel are as much a trademark of See’s as is the logo on the box. That’s no small achievement in a business that requires us to hire about 2000 seasonal workers. We know of no comparably-sized organization that betters the quality of customer service delivered by Chuck Huggins and his associates.
尽管存在销量问题，喜诗糖果仍拥有众多重要优势。在我们的核心市场——美国西部地区，消费者对我们糖果的偏好度远超任何竞争对手。事实上，我们认为大多数巧克力爱好者更青睐我们的产品，即便其他竞品价格是我们的两到三倍（与股票类似，糖果的价格和价值也可能存在差异：价格是你付出的成本，价值是你获得的回报）。我们在全美各地的门店均由公司直接运营（非特许经营），门店的客户服务质量与产品质量一样出色。热情、乐于助人的员工，与包装盒上的品牌标识一样，都是喜诗糖果的标志性特征。对于一个每年需要雇佣约2000名季节性员工的企业而言，这一成就实属不易。在同等规模的企业中，我们尚未发现有哪家能在客户服务质量上超越查克·哈金斯及其团队。
Because we have raised prices so modestly in 1984, we expect See’s profits this year to be about the same as in 1983.
由于1984年提价幅度较小，我们预计喜诗糖果今年的利润将与1983年基本持平。
# Insurance - Controlled Operations（保险业务——控股运营部分）
We both operate insurance companies and have a large economic interest in an insurance business we don’t operate, GEICO. The results for all can be summed up easily: in aggregate, the companies we operate and whose underwriting results reflect the consequences of decisions that were my responsibility a few years ago, had absolutely terrible results. Fortunately, GEICO, whose policies I do not influence, simply shot the lights out. The inference you draw from this summary is the correct one. I made some serious mistakes a few years ago that came home to roost.
我们既直接运营保险公司，也在一家非我们运营的保险公司——GEICO中拥有重大经济利益。所有相关业务的业绩可简单概括如下：总体而言，我们运营的保险公司，其承保业绩反映了几年前由我负责的决策所产生的后果，这些业绩表现极其糟糕。幸运的是，GEICO的业绩表现极为出色，而我并不影响GEICO的经营决策。你从这一概括中得出的结论是正确的：几年前我犯下的一些严重错误，如今已显现出负面影响。
The industry had its worst underwriting year in a long time, as indicated by the table below:
如下表所示，保险业迎来了长期以来承保业绩最差的一年：
| 年份 Year | 承保保费年变化率（%） Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%) | 扣除保单持有人股息后的综合成本率 Combined Ratio after Policyholder Dividends |
|---|---|---|
| 1972年 1972 | 10.2 | 96.2 |
| 1973年 1973 | 8.0 | 99.2 |
| 1974年 1974 | 6.2 | 105.4 |
| 1975年 1975 | 11.0 | 107.9 |
| 1976年 1976 | 21.9 | 102.4 |
| 1977年 1977 | 19.8 | 97.2 |
| 1978年 1978 | 12.8 | 97.5 |
| 1979年 1979 | 10.3 | 100.6 |
| 1980年 1980 | 6.0 | 103.1 |
| 1981年 1981 | 3.9 | 106.0 |
| 1982年（修订后）1982 (Revised) | 4.4 | 109.7 |
| 1983年（预估）1983 (Estimated) | 4.6 | 111.0 |
来源：贝斯特综合报告（Best’s Aggregates and Averages）
Source: Best’s Aggregates and Averages.
Best’s data reflect the experience of practically the entire industry, including stock, mutual, and reciprocal companies. The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit and one above 100 indicates a loss.
贝斯特的数据几乎涵盖了整个保险业的业绩情况，包括股份制保险公司、互助保险公司和交互保险公司。综合成本率是指保险总成本（已发生赔款加上费用）与保费收入的比值：该比率低于100意味着承保盈利，高于100则意味着承保亏损。
For the reasons outlined in last year’s report, we expect the poor industry experience of 1983 to be more or less typical for a good many years to come. (As Yogi Berra put it: “It will be deja vu all over again.”) That doesn’t mean we think the figures won’t bounce around a bit; they are certain to. But we believe it highly unlikely that the combined ratio during the balance of the decade will average significantly below the 1981-1983 level. Based on our expectations regarding inflation - and we are as pessimistic as ever on that front - industry premium volume must grow about 10% annually merely to stabilize loss ratios at present levels.
基于去年报告中阐述的原因，我们预计1983年保险业的糟糕业绩，在未来多年内将或多或少成为常态（正如尤吉·贝拉（Yogi Berra）所言：“历史会重演”）。这并不意味着我们认为相关数据不会有小幅波动——波动必然存在。但我们认为，在本十年剩余时间里，行业综合成本率的平均值远低于1981-1983年水平的可能性极低。基于我们对通货膨胀的预期（在这一问题上，我们仍持悲观态度），保险业保费收入需每年增长约10%，才能使赔付率维持在当前水平。
Our own combined ratio in 1983 was 121. Since Mike Goldberg recently took over most of the responsibility for the insurance operation, it would be nice for me if our shortcomings could be placed at his doorstep rather than mine. But unfortunately, as we have often pointed out, the insurance business has a long lead-time. Though business policies may be changed and personnel improved, a significant period must pass before the effects are seen. (This characteristic of the business enabled us to make a great deal of money in GEICO; we could picture what was likely to happen well before it actually occurred.) So the roots of the 1983 results are operating and personnel decisions made two or more years back when I had direct managerial responsibility for the insurance group.
1983年，我们自身的综合成本率为121。由于迈克·戈德堡（Mike Goldberg）最近接手了保险业务的大部分管理职责，若能将业绩不佳的责任归咎于他而非我，对我而言自然是好事。但不幸的是，正如我们常指出的，保险业务具有“长周期”特性：即便调整经营策略、优化人员配置，也需经过较长时间才能看到效果（正是这一特性让我们在GEICO上赚了大钱——我们能在实际情况发生前，就预判到可能出现的结果）。因此，1983年业绩不佳的根源，在于两三年前我直接负责保险业务板块时所做的运营和人员决策。
Despite our poor results overall, several of our managers did truly outstanding jobs. Roland Miller guided the auto and general liability business of National Indemnity Company and National Fire and Marine Insurance Company to improved results, while those of competitors deteriorated. In addition, Tom Rowley at Continental Divide Insurance - our fledgling Colorado homestate company - seems certain to be a winner. Mike found him a little over a year ago, and he was an important acquisition.
尽管整体业绩不佳，我们的几位经理仍展现出卓越的工作能力。罗兰·米勒（Roland Miller）带领国民保险公司（National Indemnity Company）和国家火灾与海上保险公司（National Fire and Marine Insurance Company）的汽车保险及一般责任险业务实现业绩改善，而同期竞争对手的业绩却在恶化。此外，我们位于科罗拉多州的新成立的本土保险公司——大陆分水岭保险公司（Continental Divide Insurance）的汤姆·罗利（Tom Rowley），似乎必定会成为一名成功的管理者。迈克在一年多前发掘了他，这是一次重要的人才招募。
We have become active recently - and hope to become much more active - in reinsurance transactions where the buyer’s overriding concern should be the seller’s long-term creditworthiness. In such transactions our premier financial strength should make us the number one choice of both claimants and insurers who must rely on the reinsurer’s promises for a great many years to come.
近期，我们开始积极参与再保险交易（并希望未来进一步扩大参与度）。在这类交易中，买方最关心的应当是卖方的长期信用资质。凭借我们卓越的财务实力，在这类交易中，我们理应成为索赔人和保险公司的首选合作伙伴——因为他们在未来多年里都必须依赖再保险公司的承诺。
A major source of such business is structured settlements - a procedure for settling losses under which claimants receive periodic payments (almost always monthly, for life) rather than a single lump sum settlement. This form of settlement has important tax advantages for the claimant and also prevents his squandering a large lump-sum payment. Frequently, some inflation protection is built into the settlement. Usually the claimant has been seriously injured, and thus the periodic payments must be unquestionably secure for decades to come. We believe we offer unparalleled security. No other insurer we know of - even those with much larger gross assets - has our financial strength.
这类业务的一个主要来源是“结构化和解”——一种损失赔付方式，即索赔人获得定期付款（几乎都是按月支付，终身有效），而非一次性总额赔付。这种赔付方式对索赔人而言具有重要的税收优势，还能防止其挥霍大额一次性赔付资金。通常，结构化和解协议中还会包含一定的通胀保护条款。此类索赔人通常遭受了严重伤害，因此未来数十年的定期付款必须具备无可置疑的安全性。我们认为，我们能提供无与伦比的安全性。据我们所知，没有其他保险公司——即便那些总资产规模大得多的公司——拥有我们这样的财务实力。
We also think our financial strength should recommend us to companies wishing to transfer loss reserves. In such transactions, other insurance companies pay us lump sums to assume all (or a specified portion of) future loss payments applicable to large blocks of expired business. Here also, the company transferring such claims needs to be certain of the transferee’s financial strength for many years to come. Again, most of our competitors soliciting such business appear to us to have a financial condition that is materially inferior to ours.
我们还认为，我们的财务实力应能吸引那些希望转移损失准备金的保险公司。在这类交易中，其他保险公司向我们支付一笔总额款项，由我们承担其“已到期大量业务”对应的全部（或特定比例的）未来赔付责任。同样，转移这类索赔责任的保险公司，需要确保受让方在未来多年内具备充足的财务实力。在我们看来，大多数参与此类业务竞争的对手，其财务状况都远不如我们。
Potentially, structured settlements and the assumption of loss reserves could become very significant to us. Because of their potential size and because these operations generate large amounts of investment income compared to premium volume, we will show underwriting results from those businesses on a separate line in our insurance segment data. We also will exclude their effect in reporting our combined ratio to you. We “front end” no profit on structured settlement or loss reserve transactions, and all attributable overhead is expensed currently. Both businesses are run by Don Wurster at National Indemnity Company.
结构化和解与损失准备金承接业务，有望成为我们的重要业务板块。由于这两项业务潜在规模较大，且相较于保费规模能产生高额投资收益，我们将在保险板块数据中，单独列示这两项业务的承保业绩。在向你们披露综合成本率时，也将剔除这两项业务的影响。我们在结构化和解与损失准备金承接交易中不追求“前端利润”，所有相关间接费用均在当期列支。这两项业务均由国民保险公司（National Indemnity Company）的唐·沃斯特（Don Wurster）负责管理。
# Insurance - GEICO（保险业务——GEICO）
Geico’s performance during 1983 was as good as our own insurance performance was poor. Compared to the industry’s combined ratio of 111, GEICO wrote at 96 after a large voluntary accrual for policyholder dividends. A few years ago I would not have thought GEICO could so greatly outperform the industry. Its superiority reflects the combination of a truly exceptional business idea and an exceptional management.
1983年，GEICO的业绩表现极为出色，与我们自身保险业务的糟糕表现形成鲜明对比。保险业综合成本率为111，而GEICO在主动计提大额保单持有人股息后，综合成本率仍仅为96。几年前，我从未想过GEICO能如此大幅超越行业水平。它的领先地位，源于“卓越的业务模式”与“卓越的管理团队”的完美结合。
Jack Byrne and Bill Snyder have maintained extraordinary discipline in the underwriting area (including, crucially, provision for full and proper loss reserves), and their efforts are now being further rewarded by significant gains in new business. Equally important, Lou Simpson is the class of the field among insurance investment managers. The three of them are some team.
杰克·伯恩（Jack Byrne）和比尔·斯奈德（Bill Snyder）在承保领域始终保持极高的纪律性（其中关键包括足额计提恰当的损失准备金），如今他们的努力进一步获得回报——新业务实现大幅增长。同样重要的是，卢·辛普森（Lou Simpson）在保险投资经理中堪称行业顶尖。他们三人组成了一支极具实力的团队。
We have approximately a one-third interest in GEICO. That gives us a $270 million share in the company’s premium volume, an amount some 80% larger than our own volume. Thus, the major portion of our total insurance business comes from the best insurance book in the country. This fact does not moderate by an iota the need for us to improve our own operation.
我们持有GEICO约三分之一的股权。这意味着，我们在GEICO保费收入中对应的份额约为2.7亿美元，比我们自身保险业务的保费规模高出约80%。因此，我们保险业务总额的主要部分，来自全美最优质的保险业务组合。但这一事实丝毫没有降低我们改善自身保险业务运营的必要性。
# Stock Splits and Stock Activity（股票拆分与股票相关事项）
We often are asked why Berkshire does not split its stock. The assumption behind this question usually appears to be that a split would be a pro-shareholder action. We disagree. Let me tell you why.
我们经常被问及伯克希尔为何不进行股票拆分。这个问题背后的潜台词通常是“股票拆分是对股东有利的举措”，但我们并不认同这一观点。以下是具体原因。
One of our goals is to have Berkshire Hathaway stock sell at a price rationally related to its intrinsic business value. (But note “rationally related”, not “identical”: if well-regarded companies are generally selling in the market at large discounts from value, Berkshire might well be priced similarly.) The key to a rational stock price is rational shareholders, both current and prospective.
我们的目标之一，是让伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股价与其内在业务价值保持合理关联（请注意是“合理关联”，而非“完全一致”：如果市场上知名公司的股价普遍大幅低于其价值，伯克希尔的股价也可能出现类似情况）。而合理股价的关键，在于现有及潜在股东均具备理性判断能力。
If the holders of a company’s stock and/or the prospective buyers attracted to it are prone to make irrational or emotion-based decisions, some pretty silly stock prices are going to appear periodically. Manic-depressive personalities produce manic-depressive valuations. Such aberrations may help us in buying and selling the stocks of other companies. But we think it is in both your interest and ours to minimize their occurrence in the market for Berkshire.
如果一家公司的现有股东，或被其吸引的潜在买家，倾向于做出非理性或情绪化决策，那么公司股价就可能周期性出现离谱的波动。具有“躁郁症”特质的投资者，会催生“躁郁症”式的估值。这种估值异常或许能帮助我们买卖其他公司的股票，但我们认为，尽可能减少伯克希尔股价出现此类异常，对我们和你们而言都是有利的。
To obtain only high quality shareholders is no cinch. Mrs. Astor could select her 400, but anyone can buy any stock. Entering members of a shareholder “club” cannot be screened for intellectual capacity, emotional stability, moral sensitivity or acceptable dress. Shareholder eugenics, therefore, might appear to be a hopeless undertaking.
要吸引到的全是优质股东并非易事。阿斯特夫人（Mrs. Astor）可以挑选她的400位精英社交圈成员，但股票市场中任何人都能购买任意股票。我们无法对加入“股东俱乐部”的成员进行筛选——无法评估其认知能力、情绪稳定性、道德敏感度，甚至无法要求其着装得体。因此，“股东优化”似乎是一项不可能完成的任务。
In large part, however, we feel that high quality ownership can be attracted and maintained if we consistently communicate our business and ownership philosophy - along with no other conflicting messages - and then let self selection follow its course. For example, self selection will draw a far different crowd to a musical event advertised as an opera than one advertised as a rock concert even though anyone can buy a ticket to either.
但我们认为，只要我们始终如一地传递我们的经营理念与股东理念——不传递任何相互矛盾的信息——然后让投资者“自我筛选”，就能吸引并留住优质股东。举例来说，一场标注为“歌剧”的音乐活动，与一场标注为“摇滚音乐会”的活动，即便任何人都能购买门票，吸引到的人群也会截然不同。
Through our policies and communications - our “advertisements” - we try to attract investors who will understand our operations, attitudes and expectations. (And, fully as important, we try to dissuade those who won’t.) We want those who think of themselves as business owners and invest in companies with the intention of staying a long time. And, we want those who keep their eyes focused on business results, not market prices.
通过我们的政策与信息披露——即我们的“宣传内容”——我们努力吸引那些能理解我们业务、态度与预期的投资者（同样重要的是，我们也努力劝退那些无法理解的投资者）。我们希望吸引的是“将自己视为企业所有者”、打算长期持有公司股票的投资者，是“关注企业业绩而非股价波动”的投资者。
Investors possessing those characteristics are in a small minority, but we have an exceptional collection of them. I believe well over 90% - probably over 95% - of our shares are held by those who were shareholders of Berkshire or Blue Chip five years ago. And I would guess that over 95% of our shares are held by investors for whom the holding is at least double the size of their next largest. Among companies with at least several thousand public shareholders and more than $1 billion of market value, we are almost certainly the leader in the degree to which our shareholders think and act like owners. Upgrading a shareholder group that possesses these characteristics is not easy.
具备上述特质的投资者占比极少，但我们恰好拥有一批这样的优秀股东。我认为，目前伯克希尔超过90%（甚至可能超过95%）的股份，由五年前就是伯克希尔或蓝筹印花公司股东的投资者持有。而且我推测，超过95%的股份由这样的投资者持有：伯克希尔股票在其投资组合中的占比，至少是第二大持仓的两倍。在拥有至少数千名公众股东且市值超过10亿美元的公司中，我们的股东“以所有者思维和方式行事”的程度，几乎肯定是最高的。要进一步优化这样一支优质股东群体，难度极大。
Were we to split the stock or take other actions focusing on stock price rather than business value, we would attract an entering class of buyers inferior to the exiting class of sellers. At $1300, there are very few investors who can’t afford a Berkshire share. Would a potential one-share purchaser be better off if we split 100 for 1 so he could buy 100 shares? Those who think so and who would buy the stock because of the split or in anticipation of one would definitely downgrade the quality of our present shareholder group. (Could we really improve our shareholder group by trading some of our present clear-thinking members for impressionable new ones who, preferring paper to value, feel wealthier with nine $10 bills than with one $100 bill?) People who buy for non-value reasons are likely to sell for non-value reasons. Their presence in the picture will accentuate erratic price swings unrelated to underlying business developments.
如果我们进行股票拆分，或采取其他“关注股价而非业务价值”的举措，那么吸引来的新买家，其素质将不如卖出股票的现有股东。在股价为1300美元时，几乎没有投资者买不起一股伯克希尔股票。若我们进行1拆100的拆分，让潜在投资者能买100股而非1股，这对他而言真的更有利吗？那些认同这一观点、并因拆分或预期拆分而买入股票的投资者，必然会降低我们现有股东群体的质量。（我们岂能通过“用部分思路清晰的现有股东，换取易受影响的新股东”来优化股东群体？这些新股东重形式轻价值，认为持有9张10美元钞票比1张100美元钞票更富有。）因非价值因素买入股票的人，也可能因非价值因素卖出。他们的存在，会加剧股价与业务基本面无关的非理性波动。
We will try to avoid policies that attract buyers with a short-term focus on our stock price and try to follow policies that attract informed long-term investors focusing on business values. just as you purchased your Berkshire shares in a market populated by rational informed investors, you deserve a chance to sell - should you ever want to - in the same kind of market. We will work to keep it in existence.
我们会尽量避免采取“吸引短期关注股价的买家”的政策，而是努力推行“吸引了解业务、关注长期价值的投资者”的政策。正如你们当初是在“由理性且知情的投资者构成的市场”中买入伯克希尔股票，若未来你们想卖出，也理应在同样的市场环境中进行交易。我们会努力维持这样的市场环境。
One of the ironies of the stock market is the emphasis on activity. Brokers, using terms such as “marketability” and “liquidity”, sing the praises of companies with high share turnover (those who cannot fill your pocket will confidently fill your ear). But investors should understand that what is good for the croupier is not good for the customer. A hyperactive stock market is the pickpocket of enterprise.
股票市场的讽刺之处之一，在于对“交易活跃度”的推崇。经纪人用“市场流通性”“流动性”等术语，夸赞股价换手率高的公司（那些无法让你赚钱的人，总能让你听得心花怒放）。但投资者应明白，对“庄家”有利的事，未必对“客户”有利。过度活跃的股票市场，是企业的“扒手”。
For example, consider a typical company earning, say, 12% on equity. Assume a very high turnover rate in its shares of 100% per year. If a purchase and sale of the stock each extract commissions of 1% (the rate may be much higher on low-priced stocks) and if the stock trades at book value, the owners of our hypothetical company will pay, in aggregate, 2% of the company’s net worth annually for the privilege of transferring ownership. This activity does nothing for the earnings of the business, and means that 1/6 of them are lost to the owners through the “frictional” cost of transfer. (And this calculation does not count option trading, which would increase frictional costs still further.)
举例来说，假设一家典型公司的净资产收益率为12%，其股票换手率高达每年100%。若每次买卖股票的佣金率为1%（低价股的佣金率可能更高），且股价按账面价值交易，那么这家假设公司的全体股东，每年需支付相当于公司净资产2%的费用，仅为获得“所有权转移”的权利。这类交易对企业盈利毫无贡献，却意味着股东要因“交易摩擦成本”损失1/6的盈利（这一计算还未包含期权交易，期权交易会进一步增加摩擦成本）。
All that makes for a rather expensive game of musical chairs. Can you imagine the agonized cry that would arise if a governmental unit were to impose a new 16 2/3% tax on earnings of corporations or investors? By market activity, investors can impose upon themselves the equivalent of such a tax.
这本质上是一场成本极高的“抢椅子游戏”。试想一下，若政府对企业或投资者的盈利征收16又2/3%的新税，会引发何等强烈的反对？而通过市场交易活动，投资者正在向自己征收相当于这一比例的“税”。
Days when the market trades 100 million shares (and that kind of volume, when over-the-counter trading is included, is today abnormally low) are a curse for owners, not a blessing - for they mean that owners are paying twice as much to change chairs as they are on a 50-million-share day. If 100 million-share days persist for a year and the average cost on each purchase and sale is 15 cents a share, the chair-changing tax for investors in aggregate would total about $7.5 billion - an amount roughly equal to the combined 1982 profits of Exxon, General Motors, Mobil and Texaco, the four largest companies in the Fortune 500.
市场单日成交量达1亿股的日子（若包含场外交易，如今这样的成交量其实异常低迷），对股东而言是诅咒而非福音——这意味着股东为“换椅子”支付的成本，是成交量5000万股日子的两倍。若1亿股成交量的日子持续一年，且每次买卖的平均成本为每股15美分，那么投资者支付的“换椅税”总额约为75亿美元——这一金额大致相当于1982年《财富》500强中四家最大公司（埃克森、通用汽车、美孚、德士古）的利润总和。
These companies had a combined net worth of $75 billion at yearend 1982 and accounted for over 12% of both net worth and net income of the entire Fortune 500 list. Under our assumption investors, in aggregate, every year forfeit all earnings from this staggering sum of capital merely to satisfy their penchant for “financial flip-flopping”. In addition, investment management fees of over $2 billion annually - sums paid for chair-changing advice - require the forfeiture by investors of all earnings of the five largest banking organizations (Citicorp, Bank America, Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover and J. P. Morgan). These expensive activities may decide who eats the pie, but they don’t enlarge it.
1982年末，这四家公司的净资产合计达750亿美元，占《财富》500强整体净资产和净利润的比例均超过12%。根据我们的假设，投资者每年要放弃这笔巨额资本产生的全部收益，仅仅是为了满足自己“频繁交易”的偏好。此外，每年超过20亿美元的投资管理费（为“换椅建议”支付的费用），意味着投资者要放弃美国五大银行（花旗集团、美国银行、大通曼哈顿银行、汉华实业银行、摩根大通）的全部盈利。这些高成本的交易活动，或许能决定“谁分走蛋糕”，但无法“让蛋糕变大”。
(We are aware of the pie-expanding argument that says that such activities improve the rationality of the capital allocation process. We think that this argument is specious and that, on balance, hyperactive equity markets subvert rational capital allocation and act as pie shrinkers. Adam Smith felt that all noncollusive acts in a free market were guided by an invisible hand that led an economy to maximum progress; our view is that casino-type markets and hair-trigger investment management act as an invisible foot that trips up and slows down a forward-moving economy.)
（我们知道有一种“蛋糕扩大论”认为，此类交易活动能提升资本配置的合理性。但我们认为这一观点站不住脚，总体而言，过度活跃的股票市场会破坏理性资本配置，反而成为“蛋糕缩小器”。亚当·斯密认为，自由市场中所有非串通行为，都会在“看不见的手”引导下推动经济实现最大发展；而我们认为，赌场式的市场与“一触即发”的投资管理模式，就像“看不见的脚”，会绊倒并拖慢向前发展的经济。）
Contrast the hyperactive stock with Berkshire. The bid-and-ask spread in our stock currently is about 30 points, or a little over 2%. Depending on the size of the transaction, the difference between proceeds received by the seller of Berkshire and cost to the buyer may range downward from 4% (in trading involving only a few shares) to perhaps 1 1/2% (in large trades where negotiation can reduce both the market-maker’s spread and the broker’s commission). Because most Berkshire shares are traded in fairly large transactions, the spread on all trading probably does not average more than 2%.
将过度活跃的股票与伯克希尔对比来看：目前我们股票的买卖价差约为30点，即略高于2%。根据交易规模不同，伯克希尔股票卖方获得的收益与买方支付的成本之间的差额，最高可能达4%（仅涉及少数几股的交易），最低则可能降至1.5%（大宗交易中，通过协商可降低做市商价差与经纪佣金）。由于伯克希尔股票的交易大多为大宗交易，所有交易的平均价差可能不超过2%。
Meanwhile, true turnover in Berkshire stock (excluding inter-dealer transactions, gifts and bequests) probably runs 3% per year. Thus our owners, in aggregate, are paying perhaps 6/100 of 1% of Berkshire’s market value annually for transfer privileges. By this very rough estimate, that’s $900,000 - not a small cost, but far less than average. Splitting the stock would increase that cost, downgrade the quality of our shareholder population, and encourage a market price less consistently related to intrinsic business value. We see no offsetting advantages.
与此同时，伯克希尔股票的实际换手率（剔除交易商间交易、赠予及遗产转让）可能仅为每年3%。因此，我们的全体股东每年为“所有权转移”支付的成本，约为伯克希尔市值的0.06%。根据这一粗略估算，金额约为90万美元——这并非小数目，但远低于市场平均水平。股票拆分会增加这一成本、降低股东群体质量，并导致股价与内在业务价值的关联度下降。我们看不到任何能抵消这些负面影响的好处。
# Miscellaneous（其他事项）
Last year in this section I ran a small ad to encourage acquisition candidates. In our communications businesses we tell our advertisers that repetition is a key to results (which it is), so we will again repeat our acquisition criteria.
去年，我在本节中发布了一则小型广告，旨在寻找潜在的收购标的。在我们的传媒业务中，我们会告诉广告客户“重复宣传是取得效果的关键”（事实确实如此），因此我们将再次重申我们的收购标准。
We prefer: (1) large purchases (at least $5 million of after-tax earnings), (2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turn-around” situations), (3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt, (4) management in place (we can’t supply it), (5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it), (6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
我们偏好的收购标的需满足以下条件：
- 规模较大（税后收益至少500万美元）；
- 具有经证实的持续盈利能力（我们对未来盈利预测兴趣不大，对“扭亏为盈”类标的也不感兴趣）；
- 净资产收益率良好，且几乎不负债或负债极少；
- 管理层稳定在位（我们无法提供管理层）；
- 业务简单（若涉及大量技术含量，我们无法理解）；
- 有明确的报价（若价格未知，即便只是初步洽谈，我们也不愿浪费自己和卖方的时间）。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuance of stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.
我们不会进行敌意收购。我们可以承诺：对洽谈内容完全保密，且会迅速反馈是否感兴趣——通常在5分钟内给出答复。我们更倾向于以现金收购，但如果能实现“所获内在业务价值与所付出价值相当”，也会考虑发行股票。我们邀请潜在卖方通过联系我们过往的合作伙伴，了解我们的信誉。对于合适的业务与合适的团队，我们能提供一个良好的发展平台。
* * * * *
About 96.4% of all eligible shares participated in our 1983 shareholder-designated contributions program. The total contributions made pursuant to this program - disbursed in the early days of 1984 but fully expensed in 1983 - were $3,066,501, and 1353 charities were recipients. Although the response measured by the percentage of shares participating was extraordinarily good, the response measured by the percentage of holders participating was not as good. The reason may well be the large number of new shareholders acquired through the merger and their lack of familiarity with the program. We urge new shareholders to read the description of the program on pages 52-53.
1983年，约96.4%的合格股份参与了我们的“股东指定捐赠计划”。该计划的捐赠总额为3,066,501美元（资金于1984年初拨付，但费用已全额计入1983年财报），共有1353家慈善机构受益。尽管从“参与股份比例”来看，股东响应度极高，但从“参与股东人数比例”来看，响应度则稍逊一筹。这很可能是因为通过合并新增了大量股东，而他们对该计划尚不熟悉。我们建议新股东阅读第52-53页关于该计划的说明。
If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure that your shares are registered in the actual owner’s name, not in “street” or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 28, 1984 will not be eligible for any 1984 program.
若你希望参与未来的捐赠计划，我们强烈建议你立即确认：你的股份是以实际持有人名义登记的，而非以“券商名义”或“代理人名义”登记。在1984年9月28日前未完成实际持有人名义登记的股份，将无资格参与1984年的任何捐赠计划。
* * * * *
The Blue Chip/Berkshire merger went off without a hitch. Less than one-tenth of 1% of the shares of each company voted against the merger, and no requests for appraisal were made. In 1983, we gained some tax efficiency from the merger and we expect to gain more in the future.
蓝筹印花公司与伯克希尔的合并进展顺利。两家公司中，反对合并的股份均不到0.1%，且未收到任何股份评估请求。1983年，我们已从合并中获得一定的税务效益，预计未来还将获得更多。
One interesting sidelight to the merger: Berkshire now has 1,146,909 shares outstanding compared to 1,137,778 shares at the beginning of fiscal 1965, the year present management assumed responsibility. For every 1% of the company you owned at that time, you now would own .99%. Thus, all of today’s assets - the News, See’s, Nebraska Furniture Mart, the Insurance Group, $1.3 billion in marketable stocks, etc. - have been added to the original textile assets with virtually no net dilution to the original owners.
合并带来一个有趣的细节：伯克希尔目前的流通股数量为1,146,909股，而1965财年初（即现任管理层接手之年）的流通股数量为1,137,778股。若你在1965年持有公司1%的股份，如今你仍持有约0.99%的股份。因此，如今公司的所有资产——《布法罗新闻》、喜诗糖果、内布拉斯加家具卖场、保险业务板块、13亿美元流通股等——都是在原有纺织资产基础上新增的，且几乎未对原始股东造成股权稀释。
We are delighted to have the former Blue Chip shareholders join us. To aid in your understanding of Berkshire Hathaway, we will be glad to send you the Compendium of Letters from the Annual Reports of 1977-1981, and/or the 1982 Annual report. Direct your request to the Company at 1440 Kiewit Plaza, Omaha, Nebraska 68131.
我们非常欢迎前蓝筹印花公司的股东加入伯克希尔大家庭。为帮助你更好地了解伯克希尔·哈撒韦，我们很乐意向你寄送1977-1981年年度报告中的《信件汇编》，以及/或1982年年度报告。如需索取，请致函公司，地址为：内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场1440号，邮编68131（1440 Kiewit Plaza, Omaha, Nebraska 68131）。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 14, 1984
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
1984年3月14日
# Appendix（附录）
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.（伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司）
# Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities（商誉及其摊销：规则与现实）
This appendix deals only with economic and accounting Goodwill – not the goodwill of everyday usage. For example, a business may be well liked, even loved, by most of its customers but possess no economic goodwill. (AT&T, before the breakup, was generally well thought of, but possessed not a dime of economic Goodwill.) And, regrettably, a business may be disliked by its customers but possess substantial, and growing, economic Goodwill. So, just for the moment, forget emotions and focus only on economics and accounting.
本附录仅讨论“经济商誉”与“会计商誉”，不涉及日常语境中的“好感”。例如，一家企业可能深受大多数客户喜爱，甚至被追捧，却不存在经济商誉（美国电话电报公司AT&T在拆分前，公众评价普遍良好，但经济商誉却为零）。反之，遗憾的是，有些企业可能不受客户待见，却拥有庞大且持续增长的经济商誉。因此，此刻请暂时抛开情感因素，仅聚焦于经济与会计层面的分析。
When a business is purchased, accounting principles require that the purchase price first be assigned to the fair value of the identifiable assets that are acquired. Frequently the sum of the fair values put on the assets (after the deduction of liabilities) is less than the total purchase price of the business. In that case, the difference is assigned to an asset account entitled "excess of cost over equity in net assets acquired". To avoid constant repetition of this mouthful, we will substitute "Goodwill".
根据会计准则，收购企业时，首先需将收购价格分摊至所收购的“可辨认资产”的公允价值。通常情况下，资产公允价值总和（扣除负债后）会低于企业总收购价。此时，差额需计入一个名为“所获净资产权益的成本超出额”的资产科目。为避免重复使用这一冗长术语，我们将其简称为“商誉（Goodwill）”。
Accounting Goodwill arising from businesses purchased before November 1970 has a special standing. Except under rare circumstances, it can remain an asset on the balance sheet as long as the business bought is retained. That means no amortization charges to gradually extinguish that asset need be made against earnings.
1970年11月之前收购企业所产生的会计商誉，享有特殊处理待遇。除非出现极少数特殊情况，只要所收购的企业仍在持有，该商誉就可一直作为资产保留在资产负债表中，无需通过摊销费用逐步冲减该资产并影响利润。
The case is different, however, with purchases made from November 1970 on. When these create Goodwill, it must be amortized over not more than 40 years through charges – of equal amount in every year – to the earnings account. Since 40 years is the maximum period allowed, 40 years is what managements (including us) usually elect. This annual charge to earnings is not allowed as a tax deduction and, thus, has an effect on after-tax income that is roughly double that of most other expenses.
然而，1970年11月之后的收购所产生的商誉，处理方式则有所不同。此类商誉必须在不超过40年的期限内，通过每年等额计提摊销费用的方式冲减利润。由于40年是允许的最长摊销期限，包括我们在内的管理层通常会选择按40年进行摊销。这一每年计提的摊销费用不得在税前扣除，因此其对税后利润的影响，约为其他大多数费用的两倍。
That’s how accounting Goodwill works. To see how it differs from economic reality, let’s look at an example close at hand. We’ll round some figures, and greatly oversimplify, to make the example easier to follow. We’ll also mention some implications for investors and managers.
以上便是会计商誉的运作规则。要理解其与经济现实的差异，我们可以结合一个身边的案例进行分析。为便于理解，我们会对部分数据进行取整，并大幅简化案例，同时还会提及该案例对投资者与管理者的启示。
Blue Chip Stamps bought See’s early in 1972 for $25 million, at which time See’s had about $8 million of net tangible assets. (Throughout this discussion, accounts receivable will be classified as tangible assets, a definition proper for business analysis.) This level of tangible assets was adequate to conduct the business without use of debt, except for short periods seasonally. See’s was earning about $2 million after tax at the time, and such earnings seemed conservatively representative of future earning power in constant 1972 dollars.
1972年初，蓝筹印花公司（Blue Chip Stamps）以2500万美元收购了喜诗糖果（See’s）。当时喜诗糖果的净有形资产约为800万美元（在本文讨论中，应收账款将被归类为有形资产，这一界定符合商业分析的常规标准）。这一规模的有形资产足以支撑业务运营，除季节性短期需求外，无需依赖债务融资。当时喜诗糖果的税后利润约为200万美元，以1972年不变美元价值计算，这一利润水平保守反映了其未来的盈利能力。
Thus our first lesson: businesses logically are worth far more than net tangible assets when they can be expected to produce earnings on such assets considerably in excess of market rates of return. The capitalized value of this excess return is economic Goodwill.
由此我们得出第一个结论：若一家企业的净资产收益率有望显著高于市场平均水平，那么从逻辑上讲，该企业的价值远高于其净有形资产价值。这种超额收益的资本化价值，就是“经济商誉”。
In 1972 (and now) relatively few businesses could be expected to consistently earn the 25% after tax on net tangible assets that was earned by See’s – doing it, furthermore, with conservative accounting and no financial leverage. It was not the fair market value of the inventories, receivables or fixed assets that produced the premium rates of return. Rather it was a combination of intangible assets, particularly a pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based upon countless pleasant experiences they have had with both product and personnel.
无论是1972年还是如今，能像喜诗糖果那样，在采用保守会计方法且无财务杠杆的情况下，持续实现25%净有形资产税后收益率的企业都相对稀少。喜诗糖果之所以能获得如此高的收益率，并非源于其存货、应收账款或固定资产的公允价值，而是源于一系列无形资产的组合——尤其是消费者对其产品与服务人员的无数次良好体验，铸就了广泛的良好口碑。
Such a reputation creates a consumer franchise that allows the value of the product to the purchaser, rather than its production cost, to be the major determinant of selling price. Consumer franchises are a prime source of economic Goodwill. Other sources include governmental franchises not subject to profit regulation, such as television stations, and an enduring position as the low cost producer in an industry.
这种口碑形成了“消费者特许经营权”，使得产品售价的主要决定因素是“产品对消费者的价值”，而非“产品的生产成本”。消费者特许经营权是经济商誉的主要来源之一，其他来源还包括不受利润监管限制的政府特许经营权（如电视台），以及在行业中长期保持的“低成本生产商”地位。
Let’s return to the accounting in the See’s example. Blue Chip’s purchase of See’s at $17 million over net tangible assets required that a Goodwill account of this amount be established as an asset on Blue Chip’s books and that $425,000 be charged to income annually for 40 years to amortize that asset. By 1983, after 11 years of such charges, the $17 million had been reduced to about $12.5 million. Berkshire, meanwhile, owned 60% of Blue Chip and, therefore, also 60% of See’s. This ownership meant that Berkshire’s balance sheet reflected 60% of See’s Goodwill, or about $7.5 million.
我们回到喜诗糖果案例的会计处理层面。蓝筹印花公司以超出净有形资产1700万美元的价格收购喜诗糖果，这意味着蓝筹印花公司的账簿中需设立一个1700万美元的商誉资产科目，并在40年内每年计提42.5万美元的摊销费用冲减利润。到1983年，经过11年的摊销后，该商誉余额已从1700万美元降至约1250万美元。与此同时，伯克希尔持有蓝筹印花公司60%的股权，因此也间接持有喜诗糖果60%的股权。这意味着伯克希尔的资产负债表中，需反映喜诗糖果商誉的60%，即约750万美元。
In 1983 Berkshire acquired the rest of Blue Chip in a merger that required purchase accounting as contrasted to the "pooling" treatment allowed for some mergers. Under purchase accounting, the "fair value" of the shares we gave to (or "paid") Blue Chip holders had to be spread over the net assets acquired from Blue Chip. This "fair value" was measured, as it almost always is when public companies use their shares to make acquisitions, by the market value of the shares given up.
1983年，伯克希尔通过合并收购了蓝筹印花公司剩余的股权。此次合并需采用“购买法”会计处理，而非部分合并所允许的“权益结合法”。根据购买法，我们向蓝筹印花公司股东发行股票（即“支付对价”）的“公允价值”，需分摊至从蓝筹印花公司收购的净资产中。与上市公司通常采用股票收购的做法一致，此处的“公允价值”以所发行股票的市值为准。
The assets "purchased" consisted of 40% of everything owned by Blue Chip (as noted, Berkshire already owned the other 60%). What Berkshire "paid" was more than the net identifiable assets we received by $51.7 million, and was assigned to two pieces of Goodwill: $28.4 million to See’s and $23.3 million to Buffalo Evening News.
此次“收购”的资产，是蓝筹印花公司全部资产的40%（如前所述，伯克希尔已持有其余60%）。伯克希尔“支付的对价”超出所获可辨认净资产的部分为5170万美元，该差额被分摊至两项商誉：其中2840万美元归属于喜诗糖果，2330万美元归属于《布法罗晚报》。
After the merger, therefore, Berkshire was left with a Goodwill asset for See’s that had two components: the $7.5 million remaining from the 1971 purchase, and $28.4 million newly created by the 40% "purchased" in 1983. Our amortization charge now will be about $1.0 million for the next 28 years, and $.7 million for the following 12 years, 2002 through 2013.
因此，合并后伯克希尔持有的喜诗糖果商誉资产由两部分构成：一是1972年收购所剩余的750万美元商誉，二是1983年“收购”40%股权新产生的2840万美元商誉。我们未来的摊销费用安排为：未来28年每年约100万美元，2002年至2013年（后续12年）每年约70万美元。
In other words, different purchase dates and prices have given us vastly different asset values and amortization charges for two pieces of the same asset. (We repeat our usual disclaimer: we have no better accounting system to suggest. The problems to be dealt with are mind boggling and require arbitrary rules.)
换句话说，针对同一项资产（喜诗糖果的商誉），不同的收购时间与收购价格，导致其在我们账簿中呈现出截然不同的资产价值与摊销费用。（我们在此重申一贯的免责声明：我们无法提出更优的会计制度。此类问题极为复杂，需要依赖人为设定的规则来解决。）
But what are the economic realities? One reality is that the amortization charges that have been deducted as costs in the earnings statement each year since acquisition of See’s were not true economic costs. We know that because See’s last year earned $13 million after taxes on about $20 million of net tangible assets – a performance indicating the existence of economic Goodwill far larger than the total original cost of our accounting Goodwill. In other words, while accounting Goodwill regularly decreased from the moment of purchase, economic Goodwill increased in irregular but very substantial fashion.
但经济现实究竟如何？第一个现实是：自收购喜诗糖果以来，我们每年在利润表中作为成本扣除的商誉摊销费用，并非真实的经济成本。我们之所以得出这一结论，是因为去年喜诗糖果仅凭借约2000万美元的净有形资产，就实现了1300万美元的税后利润——这一业绩表明，其经济商誉规模远高于我们会计商誉的初始总成本。换句话说，会计商誉自收购之日起便逐年递减，而经济商誉却以不规则但幅度巨大的方式持续增长。
Another reality is that annual amortization charges in the future will not correspond to economic costs. It is possible, of course, that See’s economic Goodwill will disappear. But it won’t shrink in even decrements or anything remotely resembling them. What is more likely is that the Goodwill will increase – in current, if not in constant, dollars – because of inflation.
第二个现实是：未来的年度商誉摊销费用，也无法反映真实的经济成本。当然，喜诗糖果的经济商誉存在消失的可能性，但它绝不会以“等额递减”或类似的规律缩水。更有可能的情况是，即便以不变美元价值计算不会增长，以当前美元价值计算，其经济商誉也会因通货膨胀而增长。
That probability exists because true economic Goodwill tends to rise in nominal value proportionally with inflation. To illustrate how this works, let’s contrast a See’s kind of business with a more mundane business. When we purchased See’s in 1972, it will be recalled, it was earning about $2 million on $8 million of net tangible assets. Let us assume that our hypothetical mundane business then had $2 million of earnings also, but needed $18 million in net tangible assets for normal operations. Earning only 11% on required tangible assets, that mundane business would possess little or no economic Goodwill.
这种可能性之所以存在，是因为真实的经济商誉名义价值往往会随通货膨胀成比例增长。为解释这一机制，我们将喜诗糖果这类企业与一家普通企业进行对比。回顾1972年我们收购喜诗糖果时，其凭借800万美元净有形资产实现了约200万美元利润。假设我们虚构的“普通企业”当时也实现了200万美元利润，但正常运营需要1800万美元净有形资产。由于该普通企业的净有形资产收益率仅为11%，因此其几乎不存在经济商誉。
A business like that, therefore, might well have sold for the value of its net tangible assets, or for $18 million. In contrast, we paid $25 million for See’s, even though it had no more in earnings and less than half as much in "honest-to-God" assets. Could less really have been more, as our purchase price implied? The answer is "yes" – even if both businesses were expected to have flat unit volume – as long as you anticipated, as we did in 1972, a world of continuous inflation.
因此，这类普通企业的售价很可能与其净有形资产价值相当，即1800万美元。与之相反，我们为喜诗糖果支付了2500万美元，尽管其利润规模与普通企业相同，且“实实在在”的资产规模还不到普通企业的一半。正如我们的收购价所暗示的，“资产更少”是否真的能意味着“价值更高”？答案是肯定的——即便两家企业的销量预计均保持稳定，只要你像我们在1972年那样，预判到未来将是一个持续通货膨胀的环境，情况就会如此。
To understand why, imagine the effect that a doubling of the price level would subsequently have on the two businesses. Both would need to double their nominal earnings to $4 million to keep themselves even with inflation. This would seem to be no great trick: just sell the same number of units at double earlier prices and, assuming profit margins remain unchanged, profits also must double.
要理解背后的原因，不妨设想物价水平翻倍对两家企业的影响。为抵消通货膨胀的影响，两家企业的名义利润都需要翻倍至400万美元。这看似并非难事：只需将产品售价翻倍（销量保持不变），假设利润率维持不变，利润自然会翻倍。
But, crucially, to bring that about, both businesses probably would have to double their nominal investment in net tangible assets, since that is the kind of economic requirement that inflation usually imposes on businesses, both good and bad. A doubling of dollar sales means correspondingly more dollars must be employed immediately in receivables and inventories. Dollars employed in fixed assets will respond more slowly to inflation, but probably just as surely. And all of this inflation-required investment will produce no improvement in rate of return. The motivation for this investment is the survival of the business, not the prosperity of the owner.
但关键在于，要实现这一目标，两家企业可能都需要将其净有形资产的名义投资额翻倍——因为无论企业优劣，通货膨胀通常都会对企业提出这样的经济要求。销售额（以美元计）翻倍，意味着应收账款与存货所需占用的资金也需立即相应翻倍；固定资产所占用的资金对通货膨胀的反应虽较慢，但最终也必然会随之增加。而且，所有这些因通货膨胀而被迫进行的投资，都无法提升资产收益率。企业进行这类投资的目的是“维持生存”，而非“为所有者创造收益”。
Remember, however, that See’s had net tangible assets of only $8 million. So it would only have had to commit an additional $8 million to finance the capital needs imposed by inflation. The mundane business, meanwhile, had a burden over twice as large – a need for $18 million of additional capital.
但请记住，喜诗糖果当时的净有形资产仅为800万美元。因此，为满足通货膨胀带来的资金需求，它只需额外投入800万美元。而那家普通企业的负担则是喜诗的两倍多——需要额外投入1800万美元。
After the dust had settled, the mundane business, now earning $4 million annually, might still be worth the value of its tangible assets, or $36 million. That means its owners would have gained only a dollar of nominal value for every new dollar invested. (This is the same dollar-for-dollar result they would have achieved if they had added money to a savings account.)
尘埃落定后，这家普通企业如今的年利润为400万美元，但其价值可能仍与其有形资产价值相当，即3600万美元。这意味着所有者每新增1美元投资，仅能获得1美元的名义价值增长（这与将资金存入储蓄账户的“一美元换一美元”效果无异）。
See’s, however, also earning $4 million, might be worth $50 million if valued (as it logically would be) on the same basis as it was at the time of our purchase. So it would have gained $25 million in nominal value while the owners were putting up only $8 million in additional capital – over $3 of nominal value gained for each $1 invested.
然而，同样实现400万美元年利润的喜诗糖果，若按照我们收购时的估值逻辑进行定价，其价值可能达到5000万美元。因此，在所有者仅额外投入800万美元的情况下，喜诗的名义价值增长了2500万美元——每投入1美元，可获得超过3美元的名义价值增长。
Remember, even so, that the owners of the See’s kind of business were forced by inflation to ante up $8 million in additional capital just to stay even in real profits. Any unleveraged business that requires some net tangible assets to operate (and almost all do) is hurt by inflation. Businesses needing little in the way of tangible assets simply are hurt the least.
即便如此，仍需记住：喜诗糖果这类企业的所有者，为维持实际利润不缩水，仍需被迫额外投入800万美元以应对通货膨胀。任何需要一定净有形资产才能运营的无杠杆企业（几乎所有企业都是如此），都会受到通货膨胀的冲击。只是对有形资产需求较少的企业，受到的冲击相对最小。
And that fact, of course, has been hard for many people to grasp. For years the traditional wisdom – long on tradition, short on wisdom – held that inflation protection was best provided by businesses laden with natural resources, plants and machinery, or other tangible assets ("In Goods We Trust"). It doesn’t work that way. Asset-heavy businesses generally earn low rates of return – rates that often barely provide enough capital to fund the inflationary needs of the existing business, with nothing left over for real growth, for distribution to owners, or for acquisition of new businesses.
当然，这一事实对许多人而言难以理解。多年来，一种“重传统、轻智慧”的传统观点认为，拥有自然资源、厂房设备或其他有形资产的企业，最能抵御通货膨胀（即“有形资产为王”）。但实际情况并非如此。资产密集型企业通常净资产收益率较低，其收益往往仅够为现有业务应对通货膨胀提供资金，根本没有剩余资金用于实际增长、向所有者分红或收购新业务。
In contrast, a disproportionate number of the great business fortunes built up during the inflationary years arose from ownership of operations that combined intangibles of lasting value with relatively minor requirements for tangible assets. In such cases earnings have bounded upward in nominal dollars, and these dollars have been largely available for the acquisition of additional businesses. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in the communications business. That business has required little in the way of tangible investment – yet its franchises have endured. During inflation, Goodwill is the gift that keeps giving.
相反，在通货膨胀时期积累的大量巨额商业财富，大多源于对“拥有持久价值无形资产、且对有形资产需求较少”的企业的持有。在这类企业中，名义美元利润会大幅增长，且这些利润大部分可用于收购更多业务。这一现象在传媒行业尤为明显：该行业对有形资产投资需求极少，但其特许经营权却能长期存续。在通货膨胀时期，商誉是一份“持续增值的礼物”。
But that statement applies, naturally, only to true economic Goodwill. Spurious accounting Goodwill – and there is plenty of it around – is another matter. When an overexcited management purchases a business at a silly price, the same accounting niceties described earlier are observed. Because it can’t go anywhere else, the silliness ends up in the Goodwill account. Considering the lack of managerial discipline that created the account, under such circumstances it might better be labeled "No-Will". Whatever the term, the 40-year ritual typically is observed and the adrenalin so capitalized remains on the books as an "asset" just as if the acquisition had been a sensible one.
但显然，这一说法仅适用于“真实的经济商誉”。而“虚假的会计商誉”（现实中这类情况并不少见）则另当别论。当头脑发热的管理层以离谱价格收购企业时，仍需遵循前述会计规则。由于这部分超额支出无处可去，最终只能计入商誉科目。考虑到这类商誉源于管理层缺乏纪律性的决策，将其称为“无商誉（No-Will）”或许更为贴切。无论名称如何，企业通常仍会按40年期限进行摊销，而这笔因冲动决策形成的资本化金额，会像“明智收购产生的商誉”一样，作为“资产”留在账簿中。
* * * * *
If you cling to any belief that accounting treatment of Goodwill is the best measure of economic reality, I suggest one final item to ponder.
Assume a company with $20 per share of net worth, all tangible assets. Further assume the company has internally developed some magnificent consumer franchise, or that it was fortunate enough to obtain some important television stations by original FCC grant. Therefore, it earns a great deal on tangible assets, say $5 per share, or 25%.
With such economics, it might sell for $100 per share or more, and it might well also bring that price in a negotiated sale of the entire business.
Assume an investor buys the stock at $100 per share, paying in effect $80 per share for Goodwill (just as would a corporate purchaser buying the whole company). Should the investor impute a $2 per share amortization charge annually ($80 divided by 40 years) to calculate "true" earnings per share? And, if so, should the new "true" earnings of $3 per share cause him to rethink his purchase price?
若你仍认为“商誉的会计处理是衡量经济现实的最佳方式”，我建议你思考最后一个问题：
假设某公司每股净资产为20美元，且全部为有形资产。进一步假设该公司通过内部发展形成了卓越的消费者特许经营权，或有幸通过美国联邦通信委员会（FCC）的初始授权获得了若干重要电视台的运营权。因此，该公司凭借有形资产实现了高额收益，假设每股收益为5美元，即净资产收益率达25%。
基于这样的盈利能力，该公司股价可能达到每股100美元甚至更高，若通过谈判整体出售企业，也很可能获得这一价格。
假设某投资者以每股100美元的价格买入该公司股票，实际上相当于为每股商誉支付了80美元（这与企业收购方整体收购该公司时的商誉成本逻辑一致）。那么，该投资者是否应每年计提每股2美元的商誉摊销费用（80美元÷40年），以计算“真实”每股收益？若答案是肯定的，那么每股3美元的“新真实收益”，是否会让他重新审视当初的买入价格？
* * * * *
We believe managers and investors alike should view intangible assets from two perspectives:
- In analysis of operating results – that is, in evaluating the underlying economics of a business unit – amortization charges should be ignored. What a business can be expected to earn on unleveraged net tangible assets, excluding any charges against earnings for amortization of Goodwill, is the best guide to the economic attractiveness of the operation. It is also the best guide to the current value of the operation’s economic Goodwill.
- In evaluating the wisdom of business acquisitions, amortization charges should be ignored also. They should be deducted neither from earnings nor from the cost of the business. This means forever viewing purchased Goodwill at its full cost, before any amortization. Furthermore, cost should be defined as including the full intrinsic business value – not just the recorded accounting value – of all consideration given, irrespective of market prices of the securities involved at the time of merger and irrespective of whether pooling treatment was allowed. For example, what we truly paid in the Blue Chip merger for 40% of the Goodwill of See’s and the News was considerably more than the $51.7 million entered on our books. This disparity exists because the market value of the Berkshire shares given up in the merger was less than their intrinsic business value, which is the value that defines the true cost to us.
我们认为，管理者与投资者都应从两个角度看待无形资产：
- 在分析经营业绩（即评估业务单元的底层经济状况）时，应忽略商誉摊销费用。衡量一项业务经济吸引力的最佳指标，是其在无杠杆情况下，基于净有形资产所能实现的收益（不扣除商誉摊销对利润的影响）。这一指标同样也是衡量该业务当前经济商誉价值的最佳依据。
- 在评估企业收购决策的合理性时，同样应忽略商誉摊销费用。既不应从收益中扣除摊销费用，也不应将其从收购成本中扣除。这意味着，应始终以商誉的初始总成本（未扣除任何摊销）来看待所收购的商誉。此外，“成本”的定义应包含“所付出全部对价的内在业务价值总额”，而非仅包含会计记录的价值——无论合并时涉及证券的市场价格如何，也无论是否采用权益结合法会计处理。例如，在蓝筹印花公司合并中，我们为收购喜诗糖果和《布法罗晚报》40%的商誉所支付的真实成本，远高于账簿上记录的5170万美元。产生这一差异的原因是，合并中我们发行的伯克希尔股票的市值，低于其内在业务价值——而内在业务价值才是界定我们真实成本的依据。
Operations that appear to be winners based upon perspective (1) may pale when viewed from perspective (2). A good business is not always a good purchase – although it’s a good place to look for one.
We will try to acquire businesses that have excellent operating economics measured by (1) and that provide reasonable returns measured by (2). Accounting consequences will be totally ignored.
从角度（1）看表现优异的业务，从角度（2）看可能并不出众。一家优秀的企业，未必是一笔划算的收购——尽管优秀企业是寻找收购标的的好方向。
我们将努力收购那些“从角度（1）衡量具有卓越运营经济性、从角度（2）衡量能带来合理回报”的企业，完全忽略会计处理带来的影响。
At yearend 1983, net Goodwill on our accounting books totaled $62 million, consisting of the $79 million you see stated on the asset side of our balance sheet, and $17 million of negative Goodwill that is offset against the carrying value of our interest in Mutual Savings and Loan.
We believe net economic Goodwill far exceeds the $62 million accounting number.
1983年末，我们账簿上的净商誉总额为6200万美元，由两部分构成：一是资产负债表资产端列示的7900万美元商誉，二是1700万美元的负商誉（用于抵消我们在互助储蓄与贷款公司持股的账面价值）。
我们认为，实际的净经济商誉规模，远超过会计记录的6200万美元。