1988巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. (伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司)
# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: (致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们：)
Our gain in net worth during 1988 was $569 million, or 20.0%. Over the last 24 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,974.52, or at a rate of 23.0% compounded annually.
1988年，我们的净值增长了5.69亿美元，增幅为20.0%。在过去24年里（即现任管理层接手以来），我们的每股账面价值从19.46美元增长至2,974.52美元，年化复合增长率为23.0%。
We’ve emphasized in past reports that what counts, however, is intrinsic business value - the figure, necessarily an estimate, indicating what all of our constituent businesses are worth. By our calculations, Berkshire’s intrinsic business value significantly exceeds its book value. Over the 24 years, business value has grown somewhat faster than book value; in 1988, however, book value grew the faster, by a bit.
然而，我们在过去的报告中强调过，真正重要的是内在商业价值——这一数值本质上是个估计值，代表着我们所有下属企业的整体价值。根据我们的计算，伯克希尔的内在商业价值显著高于其账面价值。在这24年里，内在商业价值的增长速度略快于账面价值；但在1988年，账面价值的增长速度稍快一些。
Berkshire’s past rates of gain in both book value and business value were achieved under circumstances far different from those that now exist. Anyone ignoring these differences makes the same mistake that a baseball manager would were he to judge the future prospects of a 42-year-old center fielder on the basis of his lifetime batting average.
伯克希尔过去在账面价值和内在商业价值上的增长速度，是在与当前截然不同的环境下实现的。忽视这些差异的人，就好比棒球经理根据一位42岁中锋的终身击球率来判断其未来前景一样，犯了同样的错误。
Important negatives affecting our prospects today are: (1) a less attractive stock market than generally existed over the past 24 years; (2) higher corporate tax rates on most forms of investment income; (3) a far more richly-priced market for the acquisition of businesses; and (4) industry conditions for Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post Company - Berkshire’s three permanent investments, constituting about one-half of our net worth - that range from slightly to materially less favorable than those existing five to ten years ago. All of these companies have superb management and strong properties. But, at current prices, their upside potential looks considerably less exciting to us today than it did some years ago.
当前影响我们前景的主要负面因素包括：（1）与过去24年相比，股票市场的整体吸引力下降；（2）大多数投资收益适用的企业税率有所提高；（3）企业收购市场的价格远高于以往；（4）伯克希尔的三大永久投资——资本城/美国广播公司、盖可保险公司和《华盛顿邮报》公司（这三家公司约占我们净值的一半）所处的行业环境，与五到十年前相比，从略有不利到明显恶化。这些公司都拥有卓越的管理层和强大的资产。但以当前价格来看，它们的上涨潜力在我们眼中远不如几年前那么令人期待。
The major problem we face, however, is a growing capital base. You’ve heard that from us before, but this problem, like age, grows in significance each year. (And also, just as with age, it’s better to have this problem continue to grow rather than to have it “solved.”)
然而，我们面临的主要问题是不断增长的资本基础。我们之前也提过这一点，但这个问题就像年龄一样，其重要性逐年上升。（而且，就像年龄一样，让这个问题继续存在总比“解决”它要好。）
Four years ago I told you that we needed profits of $3.9 billion to achieve a 15% annual return over the decade then ahead. Today, for the next decade, a 15% return demands profits of $10.3 billion. That seems like a very big number to me and to Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner. (Should that number indeed prove too big, Charlie will find himself, in future reports, retrospectively identified as the senior partner.)
四年前我曾告诉大家，要在接下来的十年里实现15%的年化回报率，我们需要创造39亿美元的利润。如今，对于未来十年，15%的回报率则需要103亿美元的利润。对我和伯克希尔副董事长、我的合伙人查理·芒格来说，这似乎是一个天文数字。（如果这个数字最终被证明确实难以实现，那么在未来的报告中，查理会被追溯性地称为“资深合伙人”。）
As a partial offset to the drag that our growing capital base exerts upon returns, we have a very important advantage now that we lacked 24 years ago. Then, all our capital was tied up in a textile business with inescapably poor economic characteristics. Today part of our capital is invested in some really exceptional businesses.
我们不断增长的资本基础对回报率造成了拖累，而一个重要优势在一定程度上抵消了这种影响——这个优势是24年前我们所没有的。当时，我们所有的资本都被困在一家经济效益无可避免地糟糕的纺织企业中。如今，我们的部分资本投资于一些真正卓越的企业。
Last year we dubbed these operations the Sainted Seven: Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See’s, and World Book. In 1988 the Saints came marching in. You can see just how extraordinary their returns on capital were by examining the historical-cost financial statements on page 45, which combine the figures of the Sainted Seven with those of several smaller units. With no benefit from financial leverage, this group earned about 67% on average equity capital.
去年，我们将这些业务命名为“七圣”：《布法罗新闻报》、费奇海默、柯比、内布拉斯加家具卖场、斯科特·费策制造集团、喜诗糖果和《世界图书百科全书》。1988年，这些“圣徒”们再创佳绩。通过查看第45页的历史成本财务报表（其中合并了“七圣”和几家较小单位的数据），你可以看到它们的资本回报率有多惊人。在没有财务杠杆助力的情况下，这一组合的平均权益资本回报率约为67%。
In most cases the remarkable performance of these units arises partially from an exceptional business franchise; in all cases an exceptional management is a vital factor. The contribution Charlie and I make is to leave these managers alone.
在大多数情况下，这些单位的卓越表现部分源于其非凡的商业特许经营权；而在所有情况下，卓越的管理层都是关键因素。我和查理所做的贡献，就是不干预这些管理者。
In my judgment, these businesses, in aggregate, will continue to produce superb returns. We’ll need these: Without this help Berkshire would not have a chance of achieving our 15% goal. You can be sure that our operating managers will deliver; the question mark in our future is whether Charlie and I can effectively employ the funds that they generate.
在我看来，这些企业总体上将继续创造出色的回报。我们需要这样的回报：没有它们的助力，伯克希尔就没有机会实现15%的目标。可以肯定的是，我们的运营管理者会交出满意的答卷；我们未来的疑问在于，我和查理能否有效地运用他们创造的资金。
In that respect, we took a step in the right direction early in 1989 when we purchased an 80% interest in Borsheim’s, a jewelry business in Omaha. This purchase, described later in this letter, delivers exactly what we look for: an outstanding business run by people we like, admire, and trust. It’s a great way to start the year.
在这方面，1989年初我们迈出了正确的一步——收购了奥马哈一家珠宝企业博施海姆80%的股权。这一收购（本信后文将详细描述）完全符合我们的收购标准：一家出色的企业，由我们喜欢、敬佩且信任的人经营。这是开启新一年的绝佳方式。
# Accounting Changes (会计变更)
We have made a significant accounting change that was mandated for 1988, and likely will have another to make in 1990. When we move figures around from year to year, without any change in economic reality, one of our always-thrilling discussions of accounting is necessary.
我们已按规定在1988年进行了一项重大会计变更，1990年可能还会有另一项变更。当我们在经济实质未发生任何变化的情况下，年复一年地调整数据时，就有必要进行一次我们一贯认为“激动人心”的会计讨论了。
First, I’ll offer my customary disclaimer: Despite the shortcomings of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), I would hate to have the job of devising a better set of rules. The limitations of the existing set, however, need not be inhibiting: CEOs are free to treat GAAP statements as a beginning rather than an end to their obligation to inform owners and creditors - and indeed they should. After all, any manager of a subsidiary company would find himself in hot water if he reported barebones GAAP numbers that omitted key information needed by his boss, the parent corporation’s CEO. Why, then, should the CEO himself withhold information vitally useful to his bosses - the shareholder-owners of the corporation?
首先，我要做一个惯例声明：尽管一般公认会计原则（GAAP）存在缺陷，但我可不愿意承担设计一套更好规则的任务。然而，现有规则的局限性不应成为阻碍：首席执行官们完全可以将GAAP报表视为向所有者和债权人履行告知义务的起点，而非终点——事实上他们也应该这样做。毕竟，任何子公司的经理如果只上报最基本的GAAP数据，却遗漏了其上司（母公司首席执行官）所需的关键信息，都会陷入麻烦。那么，首席执行官自己为何要隐瞒对其上司——公司的股东所有者——至关重要的信息呢？
What needs to be reported is data - whether GAAP, non-GAAP, or extra-GAAP - that helps financially-literate readers answer three key questions: (1) Approximately how much is this company worth? (2) What is the likelihood that it can meet its future obligations? and (3) How good a job are its managers doing, given the hand they have been dealt?
需要披露的数据——无论是GAAP、非GAAP还是超GAAP数据——应能帮助有财务知识的读者回答三个关键问题：（1）这家公司大概值多少钱？（2）它有多大可能履行未来的义务？（3）考虑到管理者所面临的处境，他们的工作做得有多好？
In most cases, answers to one or more of these questions are somewhere between difficult and impossible to glean from the minimum GAAP presentation. The business world is simply too complex for a single set of rules to effectively describe economic reality for all enterprises, particularly those operating in a wide variety of businesses, such as Berkshire.
在大多数情况下，仅从最基本的GAAP报表中，要回答上述一个或多个问题，不是困难重重，就是根本不可能。商业世界极其复杂，一套单一的规则无法有效描述所有企业的经济实质，尤其是像伯克希尔这样业务多元化的企业。
Further complicating the problem is the fact that many managements view GAAP not as a standard to be met, but as an obstacle to overcome. Too often their accountants willingly assist them. (“How much,” says the client, “is two plus two?” Replies the cooperative accountant, “What number did you have in mind?”) Even honest and well-intentioned managements sometimes stretch GAAP a bit in order to present figures they think will more appropriately describe their performance. Both the smoothing of earnings and the “big bath” quarter are “white lie” techniques employed by otherwise upright managements.
让问题更复杂的是，许多管理层不把GAAP视为需要遵守的标准，而是需要克服的障碍。他们的会计师往往很乐意提供帮助。（“客户问：‘2加2等于多少？’合作的会计师回答：‘您心里想的是多少呢？’”）即使是诚实且出于好意的管理层，有时也会稍微变通GAAP，以呈现他们认为更能恰当地描述其业绩的数据。利润平滑和“大洗澡”季度都是原本正直的管理层所使用的“善意谎言”技巧。
Then there are managers who actively use GAAP to deceive and defraud. They know that many investors and creditors accept GAAP results as gospel. So these charlatans interpret the rules “imaginatively” and record business transactions in ways that technically comply with GAAP but actually display an economic illusion to the world.
还有一些管理者故意利用GAAP进行欺骗和欺诈。他们知道许多投资者和债权人将GAAP结果视为真理。因此，这些骗子“富有想象力地”解读规则，以在技术上符合GAAP但实际上向世界展示经济假象的方式记录商业交易。
As long as investors - including supposedly sophisticated institutions - place fancy valuations on reported “earnings” that march steadily upward, you can be sure that some managers and promoters will exploit GAAP to produce such numbers, no matter what the truth may be. Over the years, Charlie and I have observed many accounting-based frauds of staggering size. Few of the perpetrators have been punished; many have not even been censured. It has been far safer to steal large sums with a pen than small sums with a gun.
只要投资者——包括那些据称成熟的机构投资者——对持续增长的报告“收益”给予过高估值，你可以肯定，一些管理者和推动者会利用GAAP来制造这样的数据，不管真相如何。多年来，我和查理目睹了许多基于会计的欺诈行为，其规模令人震惊。但很少有肇事者受到惩罚，许多人甚至没有受到谴责。用钢笔偷走大笔钱，比用枪抢走少量钱要安全得多。
Under one major change mandated by GAAP for 1988, we have been required to fully consolidate all our subsidiaries in our balance sheet and earnings statement. In the past, Mutual Savings and Loan, and Scott Fetzer Financial (a credit company that primarily finances installment sales of World Book and Kirby products) were consolidated on a “one-line” basis. That meant we (1) showed our equity in their combined net worths as a single-entry asset on Berkshire’s consolidated balance sheet and (2) included our equity in their combined annual earnings as a single-line income entry in our consolidated statement of earnings. Now the rules require that we consolidate each asset and liability of these companies in our balance sheet and each item of their income and expense in our earnings statement.
根据GAAP 1988年的一项重大变更要求，我们必须在资产负债表和收益表中对所有子公司进行全面合并。过去，互助储蓄贷款公司和斯科特·费策金融公司（一家主要为《世界图书百科全书》和柯比产品的分期付款销售提供融资的信贷公司）采用“单行合并法”。这意味着我们（1）在伯克希尔的合并资产负债表中，将我们在它们合并净值中的权益作为一项单一资产列示；（2）在我们的合并收益表中，将我们在它们合并年度收益中的权益作为一项单一收入列示。现在，规则要求我们在资产负债表中合并这些公司的每一项资产和负债，在收益表中合并它们的每一项收入和费用。
This change underscores the need for companies also to report segmented data: The greater the number of economically diverse business operations lumped together in conventional financial statements, the less useful those presentations are and the less able investors are to answer the three questions posed earlier. Indeed, the only reason we ever prepare consolidated figures at Berkshire is to meet outside requirements. On the other hand, Charlie and I constantly study our segment data.
这一变更凸显了公司披露分部数据的必要性：在传统财务报表中，经济性质各异的业务合并得越多，这些报表的用处就越小，投资者就越难回答前面提出的三个问题。事实上，伯克希尔编制合并报表的唯一原因是为了满足外部要求。另一方面，我和查理会不断研究我们的分部数据。
Now that we are required to bundle more numbers in our GAAP statements, we have decided to publish additional supplementary information that we think will help you measure both business value and managerial performance. (Berkshire’s ability to discharge its obligations to creditors - the third question we listed - should be obvious, whatever statements you examine.) In these supplementary presentations, we will not necessarily follow GAAP procedures, or even corporate structure. Rather, we will attempt to lump major business activities in ways that aid analysis but do not swamp you with detail. Our goal is to give you important information in a form that we would wish to get it if our roles were reversed.
既然我们被要求在GAAP报表中纳入更多数据，我们决定发布额外的补充信息，我们认为这些信息将有助于您评估商业价值和管理业绩。（无论查看哪些报表，伯克希尔履行对债权人义务的能力——我们列出的第三个问题——都应该是显而易见的。）在这些补充披露中，我们不一定遵循GAAP程序，甚至不一定遵循公司结构。相反，我们会尝试以有助于分析但又不会让您淹没在细节中的方式整合主要业务活动。我们的目标是，以一种如果我们角色互换时希望获得信息的形式，向您提供重要信息。
On pages 41-47 we show separate combined balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial; (2) our insurance operations, with their major investment positions itemized; (3) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; and (4) an all-other category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the companies in (3) as well as various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.
在第41-47页，我们分别列示了以下合并资产负债表和收益表：（1）从事金融类业务的子公司，即互助储蓄贷款公司和斯科特·费策金融公司；（2）保险业务，及其主要投资头寸明细；（3）制造、出版和零售业务，剔除了某些非经营性资产和购买价会计调整；（4）其他所有类别，包括（3）中公司持有的非经营性资产（主要是有价证券）以及韦斯科公司和伯克希尔母公司的各类资产与负债。
If you combine the earnings and the net worths of these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements. However, we want to emphasize that our new presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in no way bless it. (In fact, they may be horrified; I don’t want to ask.)
如果您将这四个分部的收益和净值相加，得出的总额将与我们GAAP报表中的总额一致。然而，我们需要强调的是，我们的新披露形式不在审计师的审查范围内，他们对此不承担任何责任。（事实上，他们可能会感到震惊，我可不想去问。）
I referred earlier to a major change in GAAP that is expected in 1990. This change relates to the calculation of deferred taxes, and is both complicated and controversial - so much so that its imposition, originally scheduled for 1989, was postponed for a year.
我 earlier提到，GAAP预计在1990年有一项重大变更。这项变更涉及递延税项的计算，既复杂又具争议性——以至于其实施时间从原计划的1989年推迟了一年。
When implemented, the new rule will affect us in various ways. Most important, we will be required to change the way we calculate our liability for deferred taxes on the unrealized appreciation of stocks held by our insurance companies.
新规则实施后，将在多个方面对我们产生影响。最重要的是，我们将被要求改变保险公司所持股票未实现增值部分的递延税项负债计算方式。
Right now, our liability is layered. For the unrealized appreciation that dates back to 1986 and earlier years, $1.2 billion, we have booked a 28% tax liability. For the unrealized appreciation built up since, $600 million, the tax liability has been booked at 34%. The difference reflects the increase in tax rates that went into effect in 1987.
目前，我们的负债是分层计算的。对于1986年及更早年度累积的12亿美元未实现增值，我们计提了28%的税负。对于此后累积的6亿美元未实现增值，税负按34%计提。这一差异反映了1987年生效的税率上调。
It now appears, however, that the new accounting rule will require us to establish the entire liability at 34% in 1990, taking the charge against our earnings. Assuming no change in tax rates by 1990, this step will reduce our earnings in that year (and thereby our reported net worth) by $71 million. The proposed rule will also affect other items on our balance sheet, but these changes will have only a minor impact on earnings and net worth.
然而，现在看来，新会计规则将要求我们在1990年按34%的税率计提全部负债，并计入当期损益。假设到1990年税率不变，这一步骤将使我们当年的收益（进而使报告净值）减少7100万美元。拟议的规则还将影响我们资产负债表上的其他项目，但这些变化对收益和净值的影响微乎其微。
We have no strong views about the desirability of this change in calculation of deferred taxes. We should point out, however, that neither a 28% nor a 34% tax liability precisely depicts economic reality at Berkshire since we have no plans to sell the stocks in which we have the great bulk of our gains.
我们对递延税项计算方式的这一变更是否可取没有强烈的看法。然而，我们应该指出，无论是28%还是34%的税负，都不能准确反映伯克希尔的经济实质，因为我们不打算出售那些为我们带来大部分收益的股票。
To those of you who are uninterested in accounting, I apologize for this dissertation. I realize that many of you do not pore over our figures, but instead hold Berkshire primarily because you know that: (1) Charlie and I have the bulk of our money in Berkshire; (2) we intend to run things so that your gains or losses are in direct proportion to ours; and (3) the record has so far been satisfactory. There is nothing necessarily wrong with this kind of “faith” approach to investing. Other shareholders, however, prefer an “analysis” approach and we want to supply the information they need. In our own investing, we search for situations in which both approaches give us the same answer.
对于那些对会计不感兴趣的人，我为这篇冗长的论述表示歉意。我知道你们中的许多人不会仔细研究我们的数据，而是持有伯克希尔的股票，主要是因为你们知道：（1）我和查理的大部分资金都投在伯克希尔；（2）我们打算以一种让你们的盈亏与我们的盈亏直接成正比的方式来经营公司；（3）到目前为止，业绩记录令人满意。这种“信任”式的投资方式并无不妥。然而，其他股东更喜欢“分析”式的投资方式，我们希望提供他们所需的信息。在我们自己的投资中，我们会寻找两种方式能得出相同答案的情况。
# Sources of Reported Earnings (报告收益的来源)
In addition to supplying you with our new four-sector accounting material, we will continue to list the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings just as we have in the past.
除了向您提供新的四部门会计资料外，我们还将像过去一样，继续列出伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。
In the following table, amortization of Goodwill (商誉摊销) and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments (其他重大购买价会计调整) are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I’ve explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP presentation, which makes purchase-price adjustments on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings (净收益总额) we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements (经审计的财务报表).
在下表中，商誉摊销和其他重大购买价会计调整并未计入其适用的特定业务，而是汇总后单独列示。这种方式能让您看到，如果我们没有收购这些业务，它们原本会报告的收益情况。我在过去的报告中已经解释过，为什么这种列示方式在我们看来，比按业务逐项进行购买价调整的标准GAAP列示方式对投资者和管理者更有用。当然，我们在表中显示的净收益总额与经审计财务报表中的GAAP总额是一致的。
Further information about these businesses is given in the Business Segment (业务分部) section on pages 32-34, and in the Management’s Discussion (管理层讨论) section on pages 36-40. In these sections you also will find our segment earnings (分部收益) reported on a GAAP basis. For information on Wesco’s businesses, I urge you to read Charlie Munger’s letter, which starts on page 52. It contains the best description I have seen of the events that produced the present savings-and-loan crisis (储蓄贷款危机). Also, take special note of Dave Hillstrom’s performance at Precision Steel Warehouse, a Wesco subsidiary. Precision operates in an extremely competitive industry, yet Dave consistently achieves good returns on invested capital (投入资本回报率). Though data is lacking to prove the point, I think it is likely that his performance, both in 1988 and years past, would rank him number one among his peers.
关于这些业务的更多信息，请参见第32-34页的业务分部部分和第36-40页的管理层讨论部分。在这些部分中，您还会找到按GAAP基准报告的分部收益。关于韦斯科的业务，我强烈建议您阅读查理·芒格的信（从第52页开始）。其中对当前储蓄贷款危机的成因进行了我所见过的最精彩的描述。另外，特别要注意戴夫·希尔斯托姆在韦斯科子公司精密钢铁仓库的表现。精密钢铁仓库所处行业竞争异常激烈，但戴夫始终能实现良好的投入资本回报率。尽管缺乏数据证明，但我认为，无论是在1988年还是过去几年，他的表现很可能在同行中排名第一。
| Pre-Tax Earnings (税前收益) | Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) (伯克希尔的净收益份额（税后及扣除少数股东权益后）) | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1988 | 1987 | 1988 | 1987 | |
| Operating Earnings (经营收益): | ||||
| Insurance Group (保险集团): | ||||
| Underwriting (承保) | $(11,081) | $(55,429) | $(1,045) | $(20,696) |
| Net Investment Income (净投资收益) | 231,250 | 152,483 | 197,779 | 136,658 |
| Buffalo News (《布法罗新闻报》) | 42,429 | 39,410 | 25,462 | 21,304 |
| Fechheimer (费奇海默) | 14,152 | 13,332 | 7,720 | 6,580 |
| Kirby (柯比) | 26,891 | 22,408 | 17,842 | 12,891 |
| Nebraska Furniture Mart (内布拉斯加家具卖场) | 18,439 | 16,837 | 9,099 | 7,554 |
| Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group (斯科特·费策制造集团) | 28,542 | 30,591 | 17,640 | 17,555 |
| See’s Candies (喜诗糖果) | 32,473 | 31,693 | 19,671 | 17,363 |
| Wesco - other than Insurance (韦斯科 - 保险以外业务) | 16,133 | 6,209 | 10,650 | 4,978 |
| World Book (《世界图书百科全书》) | 27,890 | 25,745 | 18,021 | 15,136 |
| Amortization of Goodwill (商誉摊销) | (2,806) | (2,862) | (2,806) | (2,862) |
| Other Purchase-Price Accounting Charges (其他购买价会计费用) | (6,342) | (5,546) | (7,340) | (6,544) |
| Interest on Debt* (债务利息*) | (35,613) | (11,474) | (23,212) | (5,905) |
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions (股东指定捐赠) | (4,966) | (4,938) | (3,217) | (2,963) |
| Other (其他) | 41,059 | 23,217 | 27,177 | 13,697 |
| Operating Earnings (经营收益) | 418,450 | 281,676 | 313,441 | 214,746 |
| Sales of Securities (证券销售) | 131,671 | 28,838 | 85,829 | 19,806 |
| Total Earnings - All Entities (总收益 - 所有实体) | $550,121 | $310,514 | $399,270 | $234,552 |
*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group. (*不包括斯科特·费策金融集团的利息费用。)
The earnings achieved by our operating businesses are superb, whether measured on an absolute basis or against those of their competitors. For that we thank our operating managers: You and I are fortunate to be associated with them.
我们的经营业务所取得的收益非常出色，无论是从绝对水平还是与竞争对手相比都是如此。为此，我们要感谢我们的运营管理者：你我都很幸运能与他们共事。
At Berkshire, associations like these last a long time. We do not remove superstars from our lineup merely because they have attained a specified age - whether the traditional 65, or the 95 reached by Mrs. B on the eve of Hanukkah in 1988. Superb managers are too scarce a resource to be discarded simply because a cake gets crowded with candles. Moreover, our experience with newly-minted MBAs has not been that great. Their academic records always look terrific and the candidates always know just what to say; but too often they are short on personal commitment to the company and general business savvy. It’s difficult to teach a new dog old tricks.
在伯克希尔，这样的合作关系会持续很长时间。我们不会仅仅因为超级明星达到了特定年龄就将他们从团队中移除——无论是传统的65岁，还是B夫人在1988年光明节前达到的95岁。优秀的管理者是极其稀缺的资源，不能仅仅因为生日蛋糕上蜡烛多了就被抛弃。此外，我们与刚毕业的MBA们打交道的经历并不那么愉快。他们的学术记录看起来总是很棒，面试时也总能对答如流，但他们往往缺乏对公司的个人承诺和基本的商业头脑。教新狗学老把戏是很难的。
Here’s an update on our major non-insurance operations:
以下是我们主要非保险业务的最新情况：
o At Nebraska Furniture Mart, Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin) and her cart roll on and on. She’s been the boss for 51 years, having started the business at 44 with $500. (Think what she would have done with $1,000!) With Mrs. B, old age will always be ten years away.
在内布拉斯加家具卖场，B夫人（罗斯·布卢姆金）和她的手推车还在不停地忙碌着。她44岁时用500美元创办了这家企业，至今已当了51年老板。（想想如果她有1000美元会做出什么成就！）对B夫人来说，衰老永远还有十年才会到来。
The Mart, long the largest home furnishings store in the country, continues to grow. In the fall, the store opened a detached 20,000 square foot Clearance Center, which expands our ability to offer bargains in all price ranges.
这家长期以来一直是美国最大的家居用品商店的卖场仍在继续发展。去年秋天，该店开设了一个独立的20,000平方英尺的清仓中心，这增强了我们在各个价格区间提供特价商品的能力。
Recently Dillard’s, one of the most successful department store operations in the country, entered the Omaha market. In many of its stores, Dillard’s runs a full furniture department, undoubtedly doing well in this line. Shortly before opening in Omaha, however, William Dillard, chairman of the company, announced that his new store would not sell furniture. Said he, referring to NFM: “We don’t want to compete with them. We think they are about the best there is.”
最近，美国最成功的百货公司之一迪拉德百货进入了奥马哈市场。迪拉德百货在其许多门店都设有完整的家具部门，在这一领域无疑做得很好。然而，在奥马哈门店开业前不久，该公司董事长威廉·迪拉德宣布，他的新店不会销售家具。在提到内布拉斯加家具卖场时，他说：“我们不想和他们竞争。我们认为他们是最好的。”
At the Buffalo News we extol the value of advertising, and our policies at NFM prove that we practice what we preach. Over the past three years NFM has been the largest ROP advertiser in the Omaha World-Herald. (ROP advertising is the kind printed in the paper, as contrasted to the preprinted-insert kind.) In no other major market, to my knowledge, is a home furnishings operation the leading customer of the newspaper. At times, we also run large ads in papers as far away as Des Moines, Sioux City and Kansas City - always with good results. It truly does pay to advertise, as long as you have something worthwhile to offer.
在《布法罗新闻报》，我们推崇广告的价值，而我们在内布拉斯加家具卖场的政策证明我们言行一致。在过去三年里，内布拉斯加家具卖场一直是《奥马哈世界先驱报》最大的ROP广告客户。（ROP广告是指印刷在报纸上的广告，与预先印刷的插页广告不同。）据我所知，在其他主要市场，没有一家家居用品企业是报纸的主要客户。有时，我们还在远至得梅因、苏城和堪萨斯城的报纸上刊登大幅广告——效果总是很好。只要你有值得提供的东西，做广告确实是值得的。
Mrs. B’s son, Louie, and his boys, Ron and Irv, complete the winning Blumkin team. It’s a joy to work with this family. All its members have character that matches their extraordinary abilities.
B夫人的儿子路易以及他的儿子罗恩和欧文，组成了成功的布卢姆金团队。与这个家庭合作是一种乐趣。这个家庭的所有成员都有着与他们非凡能力相匹配的品格。
o Last year I stated unequivocally that pre-tax margins at The Buffalo News would fall in 1988. That forecast would have proved correct at almost any other newspaper our size or larger. But Stan Lipsey - bless him - has managed to make me look foolish.
去年，我明确表示《布法罗新闻报》1988年的税前利润率将会下降。对于几乎所有与我们规模相当或更大的报纸来说，这一预测都会被证明是正确的。但斯坦·利普西——谢天谢地——成功地让我看起来像个傻瓜。
Though we increased our prices a bit less than the industry average last year, and though our newsprint costs and wage rates rose in line with industry norms, Stan actually improved margins a tad. No one in the newspaper business has a better managerial record. He has achieved it, furthermore, while running a paper that gives readers an extraordinary amount of news. We believe that our “newshole” percentage - the portion of the paper devoted to news - is bigger than that of any other dominant paper of our size or larger. The percentage was 49.5% in 1988 versus 49.8% in 1987. We are committed to keeping it around 50%, whatever the level or trend of profit margins.
尽管去年我们的提价幅度略低于行业平均水平，而且我们的新闻纸成本和工资水平也按照行业标准上涨，但斯坦实际上还是略微提高了利润率。在报业，没有人有比他更好的管理记录。此外，他在经营一份为读者提供大量新闻的报纸的同时取得了这一成绩。我们相信，我们的“新闻版面”比例——报纸用于新闻的部分——比任何其他与我们规模相当或更大的主流报纸都要高。1988年这一比例为49.5%，1987年为49.8%。无论利润率的水平或趋势如何，我们都致力于将这一比例保持在50%左右。
Charlie and I have loved the newspaper business since we were youngsters, and we have had great fun with the News in the 12 years since we purchased it. We were fortunate to find Murray Light, a top-flight editor, on the scene when we arrived and he has made us proud of the paper ever since.
查理和我从小就热爱报业，在我们收购《布法罗新闻报》的12年里，我们从中获得了极大的乐趣。我们很幸运，在我们接手时就找到了一流的编辑默里·莱特，从那以后，他让我们为这份报纸感到自豪。
o See’s Candies sold a record 25.1 million pounds in 1988. Prospects did not look good at the end of October, but excellent Christmas volume, considerably better than the record set in 1987, turned the tide.
1988年，喜诗糖果的销量达到了创纪录的2510万磅。10月底时，前景看起来并不乐观，但出色的圣诞销量（远好于1987年创下的纪录）扭转了局势。
As we’ve told you before, See’s business continues to become more Christmas-concentrated. In 1988, the Company earned a record 90% of its full-year profits in December: $29 million out of $32.5 million before tax. (It’s enough to make you believe in Santa Claus.) December’s deluge of business produces a modest seasonal bulge in Berkshire’s corporate earnings. Another small bulge occurs in the first quarter, when most World Book annuals are sold.
正如我们之前告诉过你们的，喜诗糖果的业务继续越来越集中在圣诞节期间。1988年，该公司12月份的利润占全年利润的90%，创下纪录：在3250万美元的税前利润中，12月份占2900万美元。（这足以让你相信圣诞老人的存在。）12月份的业务洪流使伯克希尔的公司收益出现适度的季节性增长。另一个小的增长出现在第一季度，此时大多数《世界图书百科全书》年鉴被售出。
Charlie and I put Chuck Huggins in charge of See’s about five minutes after we bought the company. Upon reviewing his record, you may wonder what took us so long.
在我们收购喜诗糖果大约五分钟后，我和查理就让查克·哈金斯负责管理它。回顾他的业绩，你可能会想，我们为什么花了这么长时间才做出这个决定。
o At Fechheimer, the Heldmans - Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred - are the Cincinnati counterparts of the Blumkins. Neither furniture retailing nor uniform manufacturing has inherently attractive economics. In these businesses, only exceptional managements can deliver high returns on invested capital. And that’s exactly what the five Heldmans do. (As Mets announcer Ralph Kiner once said when comparing pitcher Steve Trout to his father, Dizzy Trout, the famous Detroit Tigers pitcher: “There’s a lot of heredity in that family.”)
在费奇海默，赫尔德曼家族——鲍勃、乔治、加里、罗杰和弗雷德——是辛辛那提的布卢姆金家族。无论是家具零售业还是制服制造业，本质上都没有吸引人的经济效益。在这些行业，只有卓越的管理层才能实现高投入资本回报率。而这正是这五位赫尔德曼所做的。（就像大都会队播音员拉尔夫·金纳在将投手史蒂夫·特劳特与其父亲——著名的底特律老虎队投手迪兹·特劳特比较时所说的：“这个家族有很强的遗传因素。”）
Fechheimer made a fairly good-sized acquisition in 1988. Charlie and I have such confidence in the business savvy of the Heldman family that we okayed the deal without even looking at it. There are very few managements anywhere - including those running the top tier companies of the Fortune 500 - in which we would exhibit similar confidence.
费奇海默在1988年进行了一次相当大规模的收购。我和查理对赫尔德曼家族的商业头脑充满信心，以至于我们甚至没有看一眼就批准了这笔交易。在任何地方，很少有管理层——包括那些经营《财富》500强顶级公司的管理层——能让我们表现出类似的信心。
Because of both this acquisition and some internal growth, sales at Fechheimer should be up significantly in 1989.
由于这次收购和一些内部增长，费奇海默1989年的销售额应该会大幅上升。
o All of the operations managed by Ralph Schey - World Book, Kirby, and The Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group - performed splendidly in 1988. Returns on the capital entrusted to Ralph continue to be exceptional.
由拉尔夫·谢伊管理的所有业务——《世界图书百科全书》、柯比和斯科特·费策制造集团——在1988年都表现出色。托付给拉尔夫的资本所获得的回报仍然非常优异。
Within the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, particularly fine progress was recorded at its largest unit, Campbell Hausfeld. This company, the country’s leading producer of small and medium-sized air compressors, has more than doubled earnings since 1986.
在斯科特·费策制造集团内部，其最大的子公司坎贝尔·豪斯菲尔德取得了特别显著的进步。这家公司是美国领先的中小型空气压缩机生产商，自1986年以来，收益增长了一倍多。
Unit sales at both Kirby and World Book were up significantly in 1988, with export business particularly strong. World Book became available in the Soviet Union in September, when that country’s largest American book store opened in Moscow. Ours is the only general encyclopedia offered at the store.
柯比和《世界图书百科全书》1988年的单位销售额都大幅上升，出口业务尤其强劲。9月，苏联最大的美国书店在莫斯科开业，《世界图书百科全书》开始在苏联上市。我们的百科全书是该书店唯一出售的通用百科全书。
Ralph’s personal productivity is amazing: In addition to running 19 businesses in superb fashion, he is active at The Cleveland Clinic, Ohio University, Case Western Reserve, and a venture capital operation that has spawned sixteen Ohio-based companies and resurrected many others. Both Ohio and Berkshire are fortunate to have Ralph on their side.
拉尔夫的个人工作效率令人惊叹：除了出色地管理着19家企业外，他还活跃于克利夫兰诊所、俄亥俄大学、凯斯西储大学以及一家风险投资机构（该机构已培育了16家位于俄亥俄州的公司，并使许多其他公司起死回生）。俄亥俄州和伯克希尔都很幸运有拉尔夫这样的人支持。
# Borsheim’s (博施海姆珠宝店)
It was in 1983 that Berkshire purchased an 80% interest in The Nebraska Furniture Mart. Your Chairman blundered then by neglecting to ask Mrs. B a question any schoolboy would have thought of: “Are there any more at home like you?” Last month I corrected the error: We are now 80% partners with another branch of the family.
1983年，伯克希尔收购了内布拉斯加家具卖场80%的股份。当时，你们的董事长犯了一个错误，忘了问B夫人一个任何学童都会想到的问题：“家里还有像你这样的人吗？”上个月，我纠正了这个错误：我们现在与这个家族的另一个分支拥有80%的合作关系。
After Mrs. B came over from Russia in 1917, her parents and five siblings followed. (Her two other siblings had preceded her.) Among the sisters was Rebecca Friedman who, with her husband, Louis, escaped in 1922 to the west through Latvia in a journey as perilous as Mrs. B’s earlier odyssey to the east through Manchuria. When the family members reunited in Omaha they had no tangible assets. However, they came equipped with an extraordinary combination of brains, integrity, and enthusiasm for work - and that’s all they needed. They have since proved themselves invincible.
1917年B夫人从俄罗斯来到美国后，她的父母和五个兄弟姐妹也随后而来。（她的另外两个兄弟姐妹在她之前就已来到美国。）其中一个姐妹是丽贝卡·弗里德曼，1922年，她和丈夫路易斯经拉脱维亚逃往西方，这段旅程与B夫人早些时候经满洲前往东方的漫长冒险一样危险。当这家人在奥马哈团聚时，他们没有任何有形资产。然而，他们拥有非凡的智慧、正直的品格和对工作的热情——这就是他们所需要的一切。从那以后，他们证明了自己是不可战胜的。
In 1948 Mr. Friedman purchased Borsheim’s, a small Omaha jewelry store. He was joined in the business by his son, Ike, in 1950 and, as the years went by, Ike’s son, Alan, and his sons-in-law, Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale, came in also.
1948年，弗里德曼先生收购了奥马哈一家小型珠宝店——博施海姆珠宝店。1950年，他的儿子艾克加入了这项业务，随着时间的推移，艾克的儿子艾伦以及他的女婿马文·科恩和唐纳德·耶尔也加入了进来。
You won’t be surprised to learn that this family brings to the jewelry business precisely the same approach that the Blumkins bring to the furniture business. The cornerstone for both enterprises is Mrs. B’s creed: “Sell cheap and tell the truth.” Other fundamentals at both businesses are: (1) single store operations featuring huge inventories that provide customers with an enormous selection across all price ranges, (2) daily attention to detail by top management, (3) rapid turnover, (4) shrewd buying, and (5) incredibly low expenses. The combination of the last three factors lets both stores offer everyday prices that no one in the country comes close to matching.
得知这个家族将布卢姆金家族经营家具业务的方法完全运用到珠宝业务中，你不会感到惊讶。这两家企业的基石都是B夫人的信条：“低价销售，诚信经营。”这两家企业的其他基本准则是：（1）单店经营，库存庞大，为客户提供各个价格区间的丰富选择；（2）高层管理人员每天关注细节；（3）快速周转；（4）精明采购；（5）极低的费用。最后三个因素的结合，使得这两家店能够提供全国范围内无人能及的日常价格。
Most people, no matter how sophisticated they are in other matters, feel like babes in the woods when purchasing jewelry. They can judge neither quality nor price. For them only one rule makes sense: If you don’t know jewelry, know the jeweler.
大多数人，无论在其他事情上多么老练，在购买珠宝时都会感到茫然不知所措。他们既无法判断质量，也无法判断价格。对他们来说，只有一条规则是有意义的：如果你不懂珠宝，那就了解珠宝商。
I can assure you that those who put their trust in Ike Friedman and his family will never be disappointed. The way in which we purchased our interest in their business is the ultimate testimonial. Borsheim’s had no audited financial statements; nevertheless, we didn’t take inventory, verify receivables or audit the operation in any way. Ike simply told us what was so - and on that basis we drew up a one-page contract and wrote a large check.
我可以向你保证，那些信任艾克·弗里德曼及其家族的人永远不会失望。我们收购他们业务股份的方式就是最好的证明。博施海姆珠宝店没有经审计的财务报表；然而，我们没有进行 inventory盘点、应收账款核实或任何形式的业务审计。艾克只是告诉我们实际情况——基于此，我们拟定了一份一页纸的合同，并开出了一张大额支票。
Business at Borsheim’s has mushroomed in recent years as the reputation of the Friedman family has spread. Customers now come to the store from all over the country. Among them have been some friends of mine from both coasts who thanked me later for getting them there.
近年来，随着弗里德曼家族声誉的传播，博施海姆珠宝店的业务迅速发展。现在，顾客从全国各地来到这家店。其中包括我来自东西海岸的一些朋友，他们后来感谢我让他们知道了这家店。
Borsheim’s new links to Berkshire will change nothing in the way this business is run. All members of the Friedman family will continue to operate just as they have before; Charlie and I will stay on the sidelines where we belong. And when we say “all members,” the words have real meaning. Mr. and Mrs. Friedman, at 88 and 87, respectively, are in the store daily. The wives of Ike, Alan, Marvin and Donald all pitch in at busy times, and a fourth generation is beginning to learn the ropes.
博施海姆珠宝店与伯克希尔的新联系不会改变这家店的经营方式。弗里德曼家族的所有成员将继续像以前一样经营；我和查理将待在我们该待的 sidelines旁观者位置。当我们说“所有成员”时，这个词是有实际意义的。弗里德曼夫妇分别为88岁和87岁，每天都在店里。艾克、艾伦、马文和唐纳德的妻子在繁忙时都会帮忙，第四代也开始学习业务诀窍。
It is great fun to be in business with people you have long admired. The Friedmans, like the Blumkins, have achieved success because they have deserved success. Both families focus on what’s right for the customer and that, inevitably, works out well for them, also. We couldn’t have better partners.
与你长期钦佩的人一起做生意是非常有趣的。弗里德曼家族和布卢姆金家族一样，取得了成功，因为他们值得成功。这两个家族都专注于为客户做正确的事，这不可避免地也会给他们带来好结果。我们不可能有更好的合作伙伴了。
# Insurance Operations (保险业务)
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the insurance industry:
以下是我们常用表格的更新版本，列出了保险业的关键数据：
| Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%) (承保保费年度变化率（%）) | Statutory Combined Ratio After Policyholder Dividends (法定综合成本率（扣除保户股息后）) | Yearly Change in Incurred Losses (%) (已发生损失年度变化率（%）) | Inflation Rate Measured by GNP Deflator (%) (以国民生产总值平减指数衡量的通货膨胀率（%）) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1981 ..... | 3.8 | 106.0 | 6.5 | 9.6 |
| 1982 ..... | 3.7 | 109.6 | 8.4 | 6.4 |
| 1983 ..... | 5.0 | 112.0 | 6.8 | 3.8 |
| 1984 ..... | 8.5 | 118.0 | 16.9 | 3.7 |
| 1985 ..... | 22.1 | 116.3 | 16.1 | 3.2 |
| 1986 ..... | 22.2 | 108.0 | 13.5 | 2.7 |
| 1987 ..... | 9.4 | 104.6 | 7.8 | 3.3 |
| 1988 (Est.) | 3.9 | 105.4 | 4.2 | 3.6 |
Source: A.M. Best Co. (来源：A.M. 贝斯特公司)
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders’ funds (“the float”) is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.
综合成本率代表总保险成本（已发生损失加上费用）与保费收入的比率：该比率低于100表示承保盈利，高于100则表示承保亏损。当考虑到保险公司从持有保户资金（“浮存金”）中获得的投资收益时，综合成本率在107-111区间内，通常能实现总体收支平衡（不包括股东投入资金所产生的收益）。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry’s incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually, even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower. If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry’s tendency to underreserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time. As the table shows, the industry’s underwriting loss grew in 1988. This trend is almost certain to continue - and probably will accelerate - for at least two more years.
基于之前报告中阐述的原因，我们预计保险业的已发生损失将以每年约10%的速度增长，即便在总体通胀率远低于此的年份也是如此。如果与此同时，保费增长显著低于10%，承保亏损将会加剧，尽管在业务恶化时，行业倾向于计提不足的准备金，这可能会在一段时间内掩盖亏损的规模。正如表格所示，1988年行业承保亏损有所扩大。这一趋势几乎肯定会持续，且很可能在至少未来两年内加速。
The property-casualty insurance industry is not only subnormally profitable, it is subnormally popular. (As Sam Goldwyn philosophized: “In life, one must learn to take the bitter with the sour.”) One of the ironies of business is that many relatively-unprofitable industries that are plagued by inadequate prices habitually find themselves beat upon by irate customers even while other, hugely profitable industries are spared complaints, no matter how high their prices.
财产意外险行业不仅利润低于正常水平，受欢迎程度也低于正常水平。（正如山姆·高德温的哲理名言：“生活中，人必须学会逆来顺受。”）商业中一个颇具讽刺意味的现象是：许多利润相对微薄、受困于定价不足的行业，习惯性地遭到愤怒客户的指责；而其他利润丰厚的行业，无论定价多高，却很少受到抱怨。
Take the breakfast cereal industry, whose return on invested capital is more than double that of the auto insurance industry (which is why companies like Kellogg and General Mills sell at five times book value and most large insurers sell close to book). The cereal companies regularly impose price increases, few of them related to a significant jump in their costs. Yet not a peep is heard from consumers. But when auto insurers raise prices by amounts that do not even match cost increases, customers are outraged. If you want to be loved, it’s clearly better to sell high-priced corn flakes than low-priced auto insurance.
以早餐麦片行业为例，其投入资本回报率是汽车保险行业的两倍多（这就是为什么家乐氏和通用磨坊等公司的股价是账面价值的五倍，而大多数大型保险公司的股价接近账面价值）。麦片公司定期提价，且多数提价与成本大幅上涨无关，却听不到消费者一句抱怨。但当汽车保险公司的提价幅度甚至赶不上成本上涨时，客户却怒不可遏。如果你想受人喜爱，显然卖高价玉米片比卖低价汽车保险更好。
The antagonism that the public feels toward the industry can have serious consequences: Proposition 103, a California initiative passed last fall, threatens to push auto insurance prices down sharply, even though costs have been soaring. The price cut has been suspended while the courts review the initiative, but the resentment that brought on the vote has not been suspended: Even if the initiative is overturned, insurers are likely to find it tough to operate profitably in California. (Thank heavens the citizenry isn’t mad at bonbons: If Proposition 103 applied to candy as well as insurance, See’s would be forced to sell its product for $5.76 per pound rather than the $7.60 we charge - and would be losing money by the bucketful.)
公众对该行业的敌意可能会引发严重后果：去年秋天加州通过的第103号提案，威胁要大幅压低汽车保险价格，尽管成本一直在飙升。在法院审议该提案期间，降价已被暂缓，但引发此次投票的不满情绪并未消散：即便该提案被推翻，保险公司在加州也可能难以盈利运营。（谢天谢地，民众没有对糖果发怒：如果第103号提案既适用于保险也适用于糖果，喜诗糖果将被迫以每磅5.76美元而非我们现在收取的7.60美元出售产品——那样的话，公司将会亏损惨重。）
The immediate direct effects on Berkshire from the initiative are minor, since we saw few opportunities for profit in the rate structure that existed in California prior to the vote. However, the forcing down of prices would seriously affect GEICO, our 44%-owned investee, which gets about 10% of its premium volume from California. Even more threatening to GEICO is the possibility that similar pricing actions will be taken in other states, through either initiatives or legislation.
该提案对伯克希尔的直接即时影响较小，因为在投票前，我们就发现加州当时的费率结构几乎没有盈利机会。然而，强行压价将严重影响盖可保险公司（我们持有其44%的股份），该公司约10%的保费收入来自加州。对盖可而言，更具威胁的是，其他州可能通过公民提案或立法采取类似的定价措施。
If voters insist that auto insurance be priced below cost, it eventually must be sold by government. Stockholders can subsidize policyholders for a short period, but only taxpayers can subsidize them over the long term. At most property-casualty companies, socialized auto insurance would be no disaster for shareholders. Because of the commodity characteristics of the industry, most insurers earn mediocre returns and therefore have little or no economic goodwill to lose if they are forced by government to leave the auto insurance business. But GEICO, because it is a low-cost producer able to earn high returns on equity, has a huge amount of economic goodwill at risk. In turn, so do we.
如果选民坚持汽车保险定价低于成本，那么最终只能由政府来提供这项保险。股东可以在短期内补贴保户，但从长期来看，只有纳税人才能补贴他们。对大多数财产意外险公司而言，汽车保险社会化不会对股东造成灾难。由于该行业具有商品属性，大多数保险公司回报率平平，因此如果被政府强制退出汽车保险业务，它们几乎不会损失什么经济商誉。但盖可是低成本运营商，能够获得高股本回报率，因此存在大量经济商誉面临风险。相应地，我们也是如此。
At Berkshire, in 1988, our premium volume continued to fall, and in 1989 we will experience a large decrease for a special reason: The contract through which we receive 7% of the business of Fireman’s Fund expires on August 31. At that time, we will return to Fireman’s Fund the unearned premiums we hold that relate to the contract. This transfer of funds will show up in our “premiums written” account as a negative $85 million or so and will make our third-quarter figures look rather peculiar. However, the termination of this contract will not have a significant effect on profits.
1988年，伯克希尔的保费规模继续下降，而1989年将因一个特殊原因出现大幅下降：我们从消防员基金获得7%业务的合同将于8月31日到期。届时，我们将向消防员基金返还与该合同相关的未赚保费。这笔资金转移将在我们的“承保保费”账户中体现为约-8500万美元，这会使我们第三季度的数据看起来相当异常。不过，该合同的终止不会对利润产生重大影响。
Berkshire’s underwriting results continued to be excellent in 1988. Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance) was 104. Reserve development was favorable for the second year in a row, after a string of years in which it was very unsatisfactory. Details on both underwriting and reserve development appear on pages 36-38.
1988年，伯克希尔的承保业绩继续保持优异。我们的综合成本率（按法定基准，不包括结构化 settlements和财务再保险）为104。在经历了连续多年的不理想之后，准备金提存连续第二年出现利好。承保和准备金提存的详情见第36-38页。
Our insurance volume over the next few years is likely to run very low, since business with a reasonable potential for profit will almost certainly be scarce. So be it. At Berkshire, we simply will not write policies at rates that carry the expectation of economic loss. We encounter enough troubles when we expect a gain.
未来几年，我们的保险业务量可能会非常低，因为具有合理盈利潜力的业务几乎肯定会很稀缺。顺其自然吧。在伯克希尔，我们绝不会以预期会造成经济损失的费率承保保单。即便在预期盈利的情况下，我们遇到的麻烦已经够多了。
Despite - or perhaps because of - low volume, our profit picture during the next few years is apt to be considerably brighter than the industry’s. We are sure to have an exceptional amount of float compared to premium volume, and that augurs well for profits. In 1989 and 1990 we expect our float/premiums ratio to be at least three times that of the typical property/casualty company. Mike Goldberg, with special help from Ajit Jain, Dinos Iordanou, and the National Indemnity managerial team, has positioned us well in that respect.
尽管业务量低（或许正因为如此），我们未来几年的利润前景很可能会比行业整体光明得多。与保费规模相比，我们的浮存金规模肯定会异常庞大，这对利润是个好兆头。1989年和1990年，我们预计浮存金与保费的比率至少是典型财产意外险公司的三倍。在阿吉特·贾恩、迪诺斯·约尔达努以及国民保险公司管理团队的特别协助下，迈克·戈德堡在这方面为我们奠定了良好基础。
At some point - we don’t know when - we will be deluged with insurance business. The cause will probably be some major physical or financial catastrophe. But we could also experience an explosion in business, as we did in 1985, because large and increasing underwriting losses at other companies coincide with their recognition that they are far underreserved. In the meantime, we will retain our talented professionals, protect our capital, and try not to make major mistakes.
在某个时刻——我们不知道何时——我们会迎来保险业务的爆发式增长。原因可能是某种重大自然灾害或金融灾难。但我们也可能像1985年那样，因其他公司承保亏损巨大且不断扩大，同时它们意识到自己准备金严重不足，而迎来业务激增。在此期间，我们会留住有才华的专业人士，保护我们的资本，并努力不犯重大错误。
# Marketable Securities (有价证券)
In selecting marketable securities for our insurance companies, we can choose among five major categories: (1) long-term common stock investments (长期普通股投资), (2) medium-term fixed-income securities (中期固定收益证券), (3) long-term fixed-income securities (长期固定收益证券), (4) short-term cash equivalents (短期现金等价物), and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments (短期套利承诺).
在为我们的保险公司选择有价证券时，我们可在五大类中进行选择：（1）长期普通股投资；（2）中期固定收益证券；（3）长期固定收益证券；（4）短期现金等价物；（5）短期套利承诺。
We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories. We just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax returns as measured by “mathematical expectation,” limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal, rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.
在选择这些类别时，我们没有特别的偏好。我们只是不断在其中寻找以“数学期望”衡量的最高税后回报，并且始终局限于我们认为自己理解的投资标的。我们的标准与最大化即时可报告收益无关；相反，我们的目标是最大化最终净值。
o Below we list our common stock holdings having a value over $100 million, not including arbitrage commitments, which will be discussed later. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
以下是我们价值超过1亿美元的普通股持仓（不包括套利承诺，后者将在稍后讨论）。这些投资中有一小部分属于伯克希尔持股不足100%的子公司。
| Shares (股数) | Company (公司) | Cost (成本) | Market (市值) |
|---|---|---|---|
| (000s omitted) (单位：千美元) | |||
| 3,000,000 | Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (资本城/美国广播公司) | $517,500 | $1,086,750 |
| 14,172,500 | The Coca-Cola Company (可口可乐公司) | $592,540 | $632,448 |
| 2,400,000 | Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Preferred* (联邦住房贷款抵押公司优先股*) | $71,729 | $121,200 |
| 6,850,000 | GEICO Corporation (盖可保险公司) | $45,713 | $849,400 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company (《华盛顿邮报》公司) | $9,731 | $364,126 |
*Although nominally a preferred stock, this security is financially equivalent to a common stock. (*尽管名义上是优先股，但该证券在财务上等同于普通股。)
Our permanent holdings - Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post Company - remain unchanged. Also unchanged is our unqualified admiration of their managements: Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities, Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post. Charlie and I appreciate enormously the talent and integrity these managers bring to their businesses.
我们的永久持仓——资本城/美国广播公司、盖可保险公司和《华盛顿邮报》公司——保持不变。我们对其管理层的由衷钦佩也未改变：资本城的汤姆·墨菲和丹·伯克、盖可的比尔·斯奈德和卢·辛普森，以及《华盛顿邮报》的凯·格雷厄姆和迪克·西蒙斯。我和查理对这些管理者在业务中展现的才能和正直品格深表赞赏。
Their performance, which we have observed at close range, contrasts vividly with that of many CEOs, which we have fortunately observed from a safe distance. Sometimes these CEOs clearly do not belong in their jobs; their positions, nevertheless, are usually secure. The supreme irony of business management is that it is far easier for an inadequate CEO to keep his job than it is for an inadequate subordinate.
我们近距离观察到的他们的表现，与我们有幸从安全距离观察到的许多首席执行官的表现形成鲜明对比。有时，这些首席执行官显然不适合他们的职位；然而，他们的职位通常是稳固的。企业管理中最大的讽刺是，不称职的首席执行官比不称职的下属更容易保住工作。
If a secretary, say, is hired for a job that requires typing ability of at least 80 words a minute and turns out to be capable of only 50 words a minute, she will lose her job in no time. There is a logical standard for this job; performance is easily measured; and if you can’t make the grade, you’re out. Similarly, if new sales people fail to generate sufficient business quickly enough, they will be let go. Excuses will not be accepted as a substitute for orders.
比如说，如果一名秘书应聘的岗位要求打字速度至少每分钟80字，而实际上她只能达到每分钟50字，她很快就会丢掉工作。这个岗位有合理的标准，业绩易于衡量，达不到标准就会被解雇。同样，如果新销售人员不能迅速创造足够的业务，他们也会被辞退。借口不能替代订单。
However, a CEO who doesn’t perform is frequently carried indefinitely. One reason is that performance standards for his job seldom exist. When they do, they are often fuzzy or they may be waived or explained away, even when the performance shortfalls are major and repeated. At too many companies, the boss shoots the arrow of managerial performance and then hastily paints the bullseye around the spot where it lands.
然而，不称职的首席执行官往往能无限期留任。原因之一是，其工作的业绩标准很少存在。即便存在，这些标准也往往模糊不清，或者即便业绩多次出现重大不足，标准也可能被放弃或找借口搪塞。在太多公司里，老板射出管理业绩之箭，然后匆忙在箭落之处画上靶心。
Another important, but seldom recognized, distinction between the boss and the foot soldier is that the CEO has no immediate superior whose performance is itself getting measured. The sales manager who retains a bunch of lemons in his sales force will soon be in hot water himself. It is in his immediate self-interest to promptly weed out his hiring mistakes. Otherwise, he himself may be weeded out. An office manager who has hired inept secretaries faces the same imperative.
老板与下属之间另一个重要但很少被认识到的区别是，首席执行官没有直接上级对其业绩进行考核。如果销售经理手下留着一群无能的销售人员，他自己很快就会陷入麻烦。及时剔除招聘失误的人员符合他的直接自身利益，否则他自己可能会被剔除。招聘了不称职秘书的办公室经理也面临同样的压力。
These points should not be interpreted as a blanket condemnation of CEOs or Boards of Directors: Most are able and hard-working, and a number are truly outstanding. But the management failings that Charlie and I have seen make us thankful that we are linked with the managers of our three permanent holdings. They love their businesses, they think like owners, and they exude integrity and ability.
这些观点不应被解读为对首席执行官或董事会的全盘谴责：大多数人能力出众、工作勤奋，其中一些人确实非常出色。但我和查理所见到的管理失误，让我们庆幸能与我们三大永久持仓公司的管理者合作。他们热爱自己的业务，像所有者一样思考，并且浑身散发着正直和能力的气息。
o In 1988 we made major purchases of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Pfd. (“Freddie Mac”) and Coca Cola. We expect to hold these securities for a long time. In fact, when we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favorite holding period is forever. We are just the opposite of those who hurry to sell and book profits when companies perform well but who tenaciously hang on to businesses that disappoint. Peter Lynch aptly likens such behavior to cutting the flowers and watering the weeds. Our holdings of Freddie Mac are the maximum allowed by law, and are extensively described by Charlie in his letter. In our consolidated balance sheet these shares are carried at cost rather than market, since they are owned by Mutual Savings and Loan, a non-insurance subsidiary.
1988年，我们大量购入联邦住房贷款抵押公司优先股（“房地美”）和可口可乐股票。我们预计将长期持有这些证券。事实上，当我们持有优秀企业的部分股权且其管理层卓越时，我们最喜欢的持有期限是永远。有些人在公司表现良好时急于卖出获利，而在公司令人失望时却固执地持有，我们则恰恰相反。彼得·林奇恰当地将这种行为比作剪掉鲜花、浇灌杂草。我们持有的房地美股票达到了法律允许的上限，查理在他的信中对此有详细描述。在我们的合并资产负债表中，这些股票按成本而非市值列示，因为它们由非保险子公司互助储蓄贷款公司持有。
We continue to concentrate our investments in a very few companies that we try to understand well. There are only a handful of businesses about which we have strong long-term convictions. Therefore, when we find such a business, we want to participate in a meaningful way. We agree with Mae West: “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful.”
我们继续将投资集中在少数几家我们努力深入了解的公司上。只有少数几家企业能让我们抱有强烈的长期信心。因此，当我们找到这样的企业时，我们希望以有意义的方式参与其中。我们同意梅·韦斯特的观点：“好东西越多越美妙。”
o We reduced our holdings of medium-term tax-exempt bonds by about $100 million last year. All of the bonds sold were acquired after August 7, 1986. When such bonds are held by property-casualty insurance companies, 15% of the “tax-exempt” interest earned is subject to tax.
去年，我们将中期免税债券持仓减少了约1亿美元。所有售出的债券都是1986年8月7日之后购入的。当财产意外险公司持有此类债券时，所赚取的“免税”利息中有15%需缴税。
The $800 million position we still hold consists almost entirely of bonds “grandfathered” under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which means they are entirely tax-exempt. Our sales produced a small profit and our remaining bonds, which have an average maturity of about six years, are worth modestly more than carrying value.
我们仍持有的8亿美元持仓几乎全部是1986年《税收改革法案》下“ grandfathered”的债券，这意味着它们完全免税。我们的出售产生了少量利润，剩余债券平均期限约为六年，市值略高于账面价值。
Last year we described our holdings of short-term and intermediate-term bonds of Texaco, which was then in bankruptcy. During 1988, we sold practically all of these bonds at a pre-tax profit of about $22 million. This sale explains close to $100 million of the reduction in fixed-income securities on our balance sheet.
去年，我们描述了对当时处于破产状态的德士古公司的短期和中期债券持仓。1988年，我们几乎卖出了所有这些债券，获得约2200万美元的税前利润。此次出售解释了我们资产负债表中固定收益证券减少近1亿美元的原因。
We also told you last year about our holdings of another security whose predominant characteristics are those of an intermediate fixed-income issue: our $700 million position in Salomon Inc 9% convertible preferred. This preferred has a sinking fund that will retire it in equal annual installments from 1995 to 1999. Berkshire carries this holding at cost. For reasons discussed by Charlie on page 69, the estimated market value of our holding has improved from moderately under cost at the end of last year to moderately over cost at 1988 year end.
去年我们还告诉过你们，我们持有另一种证券，其主要特征为中期固定收益工具：我们持有的7亿美元所罗门公司9%可转换优先股。这种优先股设有偿债基金，将在1995年至1999年期间以等额年度分期付款方式赎回。伯克希尔按成本列示这笔持仓。由于查理在第69页讨论的原因，我们持仓的估计市值已从去年年底略低于成本，改善至1988年底略高于成本。
The close association we have had with John Gutfreund, CEO of Salomon, during the past year has reinforced our admiration for him. But we continue to have no great insights about the near, intermediate or long-term economics of the investment banking business: This is not an industry in which it is easy to forecast future levels of profitability. We continue to believe that our conversion privilege could well have important value over the life of our preferred. However, the overwhelming portion of the preferred’s value resides in its fixed-income characteristics, not its equity characteristics.
过去一年，我们与所罗门公司首席执行官约翰·古特弗罗因德的密切接触，进一步加深了我们对他的钦佩。但我们仍然对投资银行业务的短期、中期或长期经济前景没有深刻见解：这不是一个容易预测未来盈利水平的行业。我们仍然相信，在优先股的存续期内，我们的转换权很可能具有重要价值。然而，该优先股的绝大部分价值在于其固定收益特性，而非权益特性。
o We have not lost our aversion to long-term bonds. We will become enthused about such securities only when we become enthused about prospects for long-term stability in the purchasing power of money. And that kind of stability isn’t in the cards: Both society and elected officials simply have too many higher-ranking priorities that conflict with purchasing-power stability. The only long-term bonds we hold are those of Washington Public Power Supply Systems (WPPSS). A few of our WPPSS bonds have short maturities and many others, because of their high coupons, are likely to be refunded and paid off in a few years. Overall, our WPPSS holdings are carried on our balance sheet at $247 million and have a market value of about $352 million.
我们对长期债券的厌恶丝毫未减。只有当我们对货币购买力的长期稳定性前景感到乐观时，我们才会对这类证券感兴趣。但这种稳定性是不可能实现的：社会和民选官员有太多更优先的事项与购买力稳定相冲突。我们持有的唯一长期债券是华盛顿公共电力供应系统（WPPSS）的债券。我们持有的部分WPPSS债券期限较短，其他许多债券由于票面利率较高，可能在几年内被再融资并偿付。总体而言，我们的WPPSS持仓在资产负债表中列示为2.47亿美元，市值约为3.52亿美元。
We explained the reasons for our WPPSS purchases in the 1983 annual report, and are pleased to tell you that this commitment has worked out about as expected. At the time of purchase, most of our bonds were yielding around 17% after taxes and carried no ratings, which had been suspended. Recently, the bonds were rated AA- by Standard & Poor’s. They now sell at levels only slightly below those enjoyed by top-grade credits.
我们在1983年的年报中解释了购买WPPSS债券的原因，很高兴地告诉你们，这项投资的结果与预期大致相符。购买时，我们持有的大多数债券税后收益率约为17%，且评级已被暂停，因此没有评级。最近，标准普尔将这些债券评为AA-级。它们现在的售价仅略低于顶级信用债券。
In the 1983 report, we compared the economics of our WPPSS purchase to those involved in buying a business. As it turned out, this purchase actually worked out better than did the general run of business acquisitions made in 1983, assuming both are measured on the basis of unleveraged, after tax returns achieved through 1988.
在1983年的报告中，我们将购买WPPSS债券的经济效益与收购企业的经济效益进行了比较。事实证明，以1988年为止的无杠杆税后回报来衡量，这项投资的结果实际上比1983年进行的一般企业收购要好。
Our WPPSS experience, though pleasant, does nothing to alter our negative opinion about long-term bonds. It only makes us hope that we run into some other large stigmatized issue, whose troubles have caused it to be significantly misappraised by the market.
我们在WPPSS的经历虽然愉快，但丝毫没有改变我们对长期债券的负面看法。这只会让我们希望能遇到其他大规模的“受污”证券，其困境导致市场对其严重误判。
# Arbitrage (套利)
In past reports we have told you that our insurance subsidiaries sometimes engage in arbitrage as an alternative to holding short-term cash equivalents. We prefer, of course, to make major long-term commitments, but we often have more cash than good ideas. At such times, arbitrage sometimes promises much greater returns than Treasury Bills and, equally important, cools any temptation we may have to relax our standards for long-term investments. (Charlie’s sign off after we’ve talked about an arbitrage commitment is usually: “Okay, at least it will keep you out of bars.”)
在过去的报告中，我们曾告诉过大家，我们的保险子公司有时会进行套利交易，以此替代持有短期现金等价物。当然，我们更倾向于进行重大的长期投资，但我们常常现金充裕却缺乏好的投资点子。这种时候，套利有时能带来比短期国债高得多的回报，同样重要的是，它能抑制我们可能放松长期投资标准的冲动。（在我们讨论完一项套利交易后，查理的结束语通常是：“好吧，至少这能让你远离酒吧。”）
During 1988 we made unusually large profits from arbitrage, measured both by absolute dollars and rate of return. Our pre-tax gain was about $78 million on average invested funds of about $147 million.
1988年，我们从套利交易中获得了异常丰厚的利润，无论是从绝对金额还是回报率来看都是如此。我们在平均约1.47亿美元的投资资金上实现了约7800万美元的税前收益。
This level of activity makes some detailed discussion of arbitrage and our approach to it appropriate. Once, the word applied only to the simultaneous purchase and sale of securities or foreign exchange in two different markets. The goal was to exploit tiny price differentials that might exist between, say, Royal Dutch stock trading in guilders in Amsterdam, pounds in London, and dollars in New York. Some people might call this scalping; it won’t surprise you that practitioners opted for the French term, arbitrage.
鉴于这种交易规模，有必要详细讨论一下套利以及我们的套利方法。曾经，“套利”一词仅指在两个不同市场同时买卖证券或外汇。其目的是利用可能存在的微小价格差异，例如荷兰皇家石油股票在阿姆斯特丹以荷兰盾交易、在伦敦以英镑交易、在纽约以美元交易时的价格差异。有些人可能会称之为“剥头皮”交易；从业者们更倾向于使用法语词汇“arbitrage”（套利），这不足为奇。
Since World War I the definition of arbitrage - or “risk arbitrage,” as it is now sometimes called - has expanded to include the pursuit of profits from an announced corporate event such as sale of the company, merger, recapitalization, reorganization, liquidation, self-tender, etc. In most cases the arbitrageur expects to profit regardless of the behavior of the stock market. The major risk he usually faces instead is that the announced event won’t happen.
第一次世界大战以来，套利（有时现在被称为“风险套利”）的定义已扩大到包括从已宣布的公司事件中获利，例如公司出售、合并、资本重组、重组、清算、自我要约收购等。在大多数情况下，套利者期望无论股市走势如何都能获利。相反，他通常面临的主要风险是已宣布的事件不会发生。
Some offbeat opportunities occasionally arise in the arbitrage field. I participated in one of these when I was 24 and working in New York for Graham-Newman Corp. Rockwood & Co., a Brooklyn based chocolate products company of limited profitability, had adopted LIFO inventory valuation in 1941 when cocoa was selling for 5¢ per pound. In 1954 a temporary shortage of cocoa caused the price to soar to over 60¢. Consequently Rockwood wished to unload its valuable inventory - quickly, before the price dropped. But if the cocoa had simply been sold off, the company would have owed close to a 50% tax on the proceeds.
套利领域偶尔会出现一些非常规的机会。我24岁在纽约为格雷厄姆-纽曼公司工作时，就参与过一次这样的交易。洛克伍德公司是布鲁克林一家盈利能力有限的巧克力制品公司，1941年可可价格为每磅5美分时，该公司采用了后进先出法（LIFO）进行存货计价。1954年，可可暂时短缺导致价格飙升至每磅60多美分。因此，洛克伍德希望在价格下跌前迅速抛售其宝贵的存货。但如果直接出售可可，公司需为销售收益缴纳近50%的税款。
The 1954 Tax Code came to the rescue. It contained an arcane provision that eliminated the tax otherwise due on LIFO profits if inventory was distributed to shareholders as part of a plan reducing the scope of a corporation’s business. Rockwood decided to terminate one of its businesses, the sale of cocoa butter, and said 13 million pounds of its cocoa bean inventory was attributable to that activity. Accordingly, the company offered to repurchase its stock in exchange for the cocoa beans it no longer needed, paying 80 pounds of beans for each share.
1954年的《税法》帮了大忙。其中有一项晦涩的条款规定，如果作为缩小公司业务范围计划的一部分，将存货分配给股东，那么后进先出法下的利润无需缴税。洛克伍德决定终止其一项业务——可可脂销售，并表示其1300万磅可可豆存货与该业务相关。因此，公司提出以不再需要的可可豆回购股票，每股支付80磅可可豆。
For several weeks I busily bought shares, sold beans, and made periodic stops at Schroeder Trust to exchange stock certificates for warehouse receipts. The profits were good and my only expense was subway tokens.
连续几周，我忙着买入股票、卖出可可豆，并定期前往施罗德信托公司，用股票凭证换取仓单。利润相当可观，我唯一的开支就是地铁代币。
The architect of Rockwood’s restructuring was an unknown, but brilliant Chicagoan, Jay Pritzker, then 32. If you’re familiar with Jay’s subsequent record, you won’t be surprised to hear the action worked out rather well for Rockwood’s continuing shareholders also. From shortly before the tender until shortly after it, Rockwood stock appreciated from 15 to 100, even though the company was experiencing large operating losses. Sometimes there is more to stock valuation than price-earnings ratios.
洛克伍德重组计划的设计者是一位当时不知名但才华横溢的芝加哥人——32岁的杰伊·普利兹克。如果你了解杰伊后来的业绩，就不会对以下事实感到惊讶：这一举措对洛克伍德的继续持股股东来说结果也相当不错。从要约收购前不久到之后不久，尽管公司出现巨额经营亏损，洛克伍德的股价仍从15美元涨到了100美元。有时，股票估值远不止市盈率那么简单。
In recent years, most arbitrage operations have involved takeovers, friendly and unfriendly. With acquisition fever rampant, with anti-trust challenges almost non-existent, and with bids often ratcheting upward, arbitrageurs have prospered mightily. They have not needed special talents to do well; the trick, a la Peter Sellers in the movie, has simply been “Being There.” In Wall Street the old proverb has been reworded: “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach him how to arbitrage and you feed him forever.” (If, however, he studied at the Ivan Boesky School of Arbitrage, it may be a state institution that supplies his meals.)
近年来，大多数套利交易都涉及友好和不友好的收购。随着收购热潮肆虐、反垄断挑战几乎不存在，且收购报价往往不断攀升，套利者们大发其财。他们并不需要特殊才能就能做得很好；就像电影中彼得·塞勒斯那样，诀窍只是“在场”。在华尔街，那句古老的谚语被改写为：“授人以鱼，不如授人以套利之术。”（然而，如果他是在伊凡·博斯基套利学校学习的，那么提供他食物的可能是国家机构。）
To evaluate arbitrage situations you must answer four questions: (1) How likely is it that the promised event will indeed occur? (2) How long will your money be tied up? (3) What chance is there that something still better will transpire - a competing takeover bid, for example? and (4) What will happen if the event does not take place because of anti-trust action, financing glitches, etc.?
要评估套利情况，你必须回答四个问题：（1）承诺的事件真正发生的可能性有多大？（2）你的资金会被占用多久？（3）出现更好情况的可能性有多大——例如，出现竞争性收购报价？（4）如果因反垄断行动、融资故障等原因导致事件未能发生，会出现什么情况？
Arcata Corp., one of our more serendipitous arbitrage experiences, illustrates the twists and turns of the business. On September 28, 1981 the directors of Arcata agreed in principle to sell the company to Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR), then and now a major leveraged-buy out firm. Arcata was in the printing and forest products businesses and had one other thing going for it: In 1978 the U.S. Government had taken title to 10,700 acres of Arcata timber, primarily old-growth redwood, to expand Redwood National Park. The government had paid $97.9 million, in several installments, for this acreage, a sum Arcata was contesting as grossly inadequate. The parties also disputed the interest rate that should apply to the period between the taking of the property and final payment for it. The enabling legislation stipulated 6% simple interest; Arcata argued for a much higher and compounded rate.
阿卡塔公司的案例是我们一次较为意外的套利经历，它展示了套利业务的曲折。1981年9月28日，阿卡塔公司的董事原则上同意将公司出售给科尔伯格-克拉维斯-罗伯茨公司（KKR），该公司当时和现在都是一家主要的杠杆收购公司。阿卡塔从事印刷和林产品业务，还有另一件事值得一提：1978年，美国政府为扩建红木国家公园，征用了阿卡塔10,700英亩的林地，主要是原始红木林。政府分几期支付了9790万美元，但阿卡塔认为这笔钱严重不足，对此提出异议。双方还对应适用于征用财产至最终付款期间的利率存在争议。授权立法规定为6%的单利；阿卡塔则主张更高的复利利率。
Buying a company with a highly-speculative, large-sized claim in litigation creates a negotiating problem, whether the claim is on behalf of or against the company. To solve this problem, KKR offered $37.00 per Arcata share plus two-thirds of any additional amounts paid by the government for the redwood lands.
收购一家拥有高投机性、大额诉讼索赔的公司，无论索赔是代表公司还是针对公司，都会产生谈判问题。为解决这一问题，KKR提出每股37美元收购阿卡塔股票，外加政府为红木林地支付的任何额外款项的三分之二。
Appraising this arbitrage opportunity, we had to ask ourselves whether KKR would consummate the transaction since, among other things, its offer was contingent upon its obtaining “satisfactory financing.” A clause of this kind is always dangerous for the seller: It offers an easy exit for a suitor whose ardor fades between proposal and marriage. However, we were not particularly worried about this possibility because KKR’s past record for closing had been good.
评估这个套利机会时，我们必须问自己，KKR是否会完成这笔交易，因为其报价取决于能否获得“令人满意的融资”等条件。这类条款对卖方来说总是很危险：它为那些在求婚和结婚之间热情消退的追求者提供了一个轻易退出的机会。不过，我们并不特别担心这种可能性，因为KKR过去完成交易的记录很好。
We also had to ask ourselves what would happen if the KKR deal did fall through, and here we also felt reasonably comfortable: Arcata’s management and directors had been shopping the company for some time and were clearly determined to sell. If KKR went away, Arcata would likely find another buyer, though of course, the price might be lower.
我们还必须问自己，如果KKR的交易告吹会发生什么，对此我们也感到相当放心：阿卡塔的管理层和董事们一段时间以来一直在为公司寻找买家，显然决心将其出售。如果KKR退出，阿卡塔很可能会找到另一个买家，当然，价格可能会更低。
Finally, we had to ask ourselves what the redwood claim might be worth. Your Chairman, who can’t tell an elm from an oak, had no trouble with that one: He coolly evaluated the claim at somewhere between zero and a whole lot.
最后，我们必须问自己，红木索赔可能值多少钱。你们的董事长（他分不清榆树和橡树）在这一点上倒是没什么困难：他冷静地评估该索赔价值在零到一大笔钱之间。
We started buying Arcata stock, then around $33.50, on September 30 and in eight weeks purchased about 400,000 shares, or 5% of the company. The initial announcement said that the $37.00 would be paid in January, 1982. Therefore, if everything had gone perfectly, we would have achieved an annual rate of return of about 40% - not counting the redwood claim, which would have been frosting.
9月30日，我们开始买入当时股价约为33.50美元的阿卡塔股票，在八周内购买了约40万股，占公司股份的5%。最初的公告称，37美元将在1982年1月支付。因此，如果一切顺利，我们将实现约40%的年化回报率——还不包括红木索赔，那将是额外的收益。
All did not go perfectly. In December it was announced that the closing would be delayed a bit. Nevertheless, a definitive agreement was signed on January 4. Encouraged, we raised our stake, buying at around $38.00 per share and increasing our holdings to 655,000 shares, or over 7% of the company. Our willingness to pay up - even though the closing had been postponed - reflected our leaning toward “a whole lot” rather than “zero” for the redwoods.
事情并非一帆风顺。12月，有消息称交易完成将推迟一段时间。尽管如此，1月4日还是签署了最终协议。受到鼓舞，我们增持了股份，以每股约38美元的价格买入，将持股量增加到65.5万股，占公司股份的7%以上。我们愿意加价——尽管交易完成已被推迟——反映出我们更倾向于红木索赔价值“一大笔钱”而非“零”。
Then, on February 25 the lenders said they were taking a “second look” at financing terms “ in view of the severely depressed housing industry and its impact on Arcata’s outlook.” The stockholders’ meeting was postponed again, to April. An Arcata spokesman said he “did not think the fate of the acquisition itself was imperiled.” When arbitrageurs hear such reassurances, their minds flash to the old saying: “He lied like a finance minister on the eve of devaluation.”
然后，2月25日，贷款人表示，“鉴于住房行业严重萧条及其对阿卡塔前景的影响”，他们正在“重新审视”融资条款。股东大会再次推迟到4月。阿卡塔的一位发言人表示，他“不认为收购本身的命运受到威胁”。当套利者听到这样的保证时，他们会立刻想到一句老话：“他撒谎就像贬值前夕的财政部长。”
On March 12 KKR said its earlier deal wouldn’t work, first cutting its offer to $33.50, then two days later raising it to $35.00. On March 15, however, the directors turned this bid down and accepted another group’s offer of $37.50 plus one-half of any redwood recovery. The shareholders okayed the deal, and the $37.50 was paid on June 4.
3月12日，KKR表示其先前的交易无法进行，首先将报价降至33.50美元，两天后又将其提高到35.00美元。然而，3月15日，董事们拒绝了这一报价，接受了另一个集团的报价：37.50美元每股，外加红木索赔回收款的一半。股东们批准了这笔交易，37.50美元于6月4日支付。
We received $24.6 million versus our cost of $22.9 million; our average holding period was close to six months. Considering the trouble this transaction encountered, our 15% annual rate of return excluding any value for the redwood claim - was more than satisfactory.
我们收到了2460万美元，而成本为2290万美元；我们的平均持有期接近六个月。考虑到这笔交易遇到的麻烦，我们15%的年化回报率（不包括红木索赔的任何价值）已经非常令人满意。
But the best was yet to come. The trial judge appointed two commissions, one to look at the timber’s value, the other to consider the interest rate questions. In January 1987, the first commission said the redwoods were worth $275.7 million and the second commission recommended a compounded, blended rate of return working out to about 14%.
但最好的还在后头。初审法官任命了两个委员会，一个负责评估木材价值，另一个负责考虑利率问题。1987年1月，第一个委员会称这些红木价值2.757亿美元，第二个委员会建议采用约14%的复合混合回报率。
In August 1987 the judge upheld these conclusions, which meant a net amount of about $600 million would be due Arcata. The government then appealed. In 1988, though, before this appeal was heard, the claim was settled for $519 million. Consequently, we received an additional $29.48 per share, or about $19.3 million. We will get another $800,000 or so in 1989.
1987年8月，法官支持了这些结论，这意味着阿卡塔将获得约6亿美元的净额。政府随后提出上诉。然而，1988年，在上诉审理之前，该索赔以5.19亿美元达成和解。因此，我们每股额外获得29.48美元，总计约1930万美元。1989年我们还将获得约80万美元。
Berkshire’s arbitrage activities differ from those of many arbitrageurs. First, we participate in only a few, and usually very large, transactions each year. Most practitioners buy into a great many deals perhaps 50 or more per year. With that many irons in the fire, they must spend most of their time monitoring both the progress of deals and the market movements of the related stocks. This is not how Charlie nor I wish to spend our lives. (What’s the sense in getting rich just to stare at a ticker tape all day?)
伯克希尔的套利活动与许多套利者不同。首先，我们每年只参与少数几个交易，而且通常是非常大的交易。大多数从业者每年会参与很多交易，可能50个或更多。由于有这么多事情要做，他们必须花费大部分时间监控交易进展和相关股票的市场走势。我和查理都不希望这样度过我们的一生。（致富的意义难道就是整天盯着股票行情纸带吗？）
Because we diversify so little, one particularly profitable or unprofitable transaction will affect our yearly result from arbitrage far more than it will the typical arbitrage operation. So far, Berkshire has not had a really bad experience. But we will - and when it happens we’ll report the gory details to you.
由于我们很少分散投资，一笔特别盈利或亏损的交易对我们年度套利结果的影响，远大于对典型套利操作的影响。到目前为止，伯克希尔还没有遇到过真正糟糕的经历。但我们总会遇到的——当那一天到来时，我们会向你们报告详细的糟糕情况。
The other way we differ from some arbitrage operations is that we participate only in transactions that have been publicly announced. We do not trade on rumors or try to guess takeover candidates. We just read the newspapers, think about a few of the big propositions, and go by our own sense of probabilities.
我们与一些套利操作的另一个不同之处是，我们只参与已公开宣布的交易。我们不会根据谣言交易，也不会试图猜测可能被收购的公司。我们只是阅读报纸，思考一些重大提议，并根据自己对概率的判断行事。
At yearend, our only major arbitrage position was 3,342,000 shares of RJR Nabisco with a cost of $281.8 million and a market value of $304.5 million. In January we increased our holdings to roughly four million shares and in February we eliminated our position. About three million shares were accepted when we tendered our holdings to KKR, which acquired RJR, and the returned shares were promptly sold in the market. Our pre-tax profit was a better-than-expected $64 million.
年底时，我们唯一的主要套利头寸是3,342,000股RJR纳贝斯克，成本为2.818亿美元，市值为3.045亿美元。1月，我们将持股量增加到约400万股，2月我们清空了头寸。当我们向收购RJR的KKR tender（要约）所持股份时，约300万股被接受，退回的股份迅速在市场上出售。我们的税前利润为6400万美元，好于预期。
Earlier, another familiar face turned up in the RJR bidding contest: Jay Pritzker, who was part of a First Boston group that made a tax-oriented offer. To quote Yogi Berra; “It was deja vu all over again.”
早些时候，另一个熟悉的面孔出现在RJR的竞标中：杰伊·普利兹克，他是第一波士顿集团的一员，该集团提出了一项以税收为导向的报价。用尤吉·贝拉的话来说：“这又是一场似曾相识的情景。”
During most of the time when we normally would have been purchasers of RJR, our activities in the stock were restricted because of Salomon’s participation in a bidding group. Customarily, Charlie and I, though we are directors of Salomon, are walled off from information about its merger and acquisition work. We have asked that it be that way: The information would do us no good and could, in fact, occasionally inhibit Berkshire’s arbitrage operations.
在我们通常会购买RJR股票的大部分时间里，由于所罗门参与了一个竞标集团，我们在该股票上的活动受到了限制。通常情况下，尽管我和查理是所罗门的董事，但我们被隔离在其并购工作信息之外。我们要求这样做：这些信息对我们没有好处，事实上，偶尔可能会阻碍伯克希尔的套利操作。
However, the unusually large commitment that Salomon proposed to make in the RJR deal required that all directors be fully informed and involved. Therefore, Berkshire’s purchases of RJR were made at only two times: first, in the few days immediately following management’s announcement of buyout plans, before Salomon became involved; and considerably later, after the RJR board made its decision in favor of KKR. Because we could not buy at other times, our directorships cost Berkshire significant money.
然而，所罗门提议在RJR交易中投入异常庞大的资金，这要求所有董事都充分了解情况并参与其中。因此，伯克希尔仅在两个时间点购买了RJR的股票：第一次是在管理层宣布收购计划后的几天内，在所罗门参与之前；第二次是在很久之后，在RJR董事会做出支持KKR的决定之后。由于我们在其他时间不能购买，我们的董事身份让伯克希尔损失了一大笔钱。
Considering Berkshire’s good results in 1988, you might expect us to pile into arbitrage during 1989. Instead, we expect to be on the sidelines.
考虑到伯克希尔1988年的良好业绩，你可能会期望我们在1989年大举投身套利交易。相反，我们预计会袖手旁观。
One pleasant reason is that our cash holdings are down - because our position in equities that we expect to hold for a very long time is substantially up. As regular readers of this report know, our new commitments are not based on a judgment about short-term prospects for the stock market. Rather, they reflect an opinion about long-term business prospects for specific companies. We do not have, never have had, and never will have an opinion about where the stock market, interest rates, or business activity will be a year from now.
一个令人愉快的原因是，我们的现金持有量有所下降——因为我们预计将长期持有的股票头寸大幅增加。正如本报告的老读者所知，我们的新投资并非基于对股市短期前景的判断。相反，它们反映了我们对特定公司长期业务前景的看法。我们现在没有、过去没有、将来也不会有关于一年后股市、利率或商业活动走势的看法。
Even if we had a lot of cash we probably would do little in arbitrage in 1989. Some extraordinary excesses have developed in the takeover field. As Dorothy says: “Toto, I have a feeling we’re not in Kansas any more.”
即使我们有大量现金，1989年我们在套利方面可能也不会有太多动作。收购领域已经出现了一些非同寻常的过度行为。就像桃乐丝说的：“托托，我感觉我们不在堪萨斯了。”
We have no idea how long the excesses will last, nor do we know what will change the attitudes of government, lender and buyer that fuel them. But we do know that the less the prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we should conduct our own affairs. We have no desire to arbitrage transactions that reflect the unbridled - and, in our view, often unwarranted - optimism of both buyers and lenders. In our activities, we will heed the wisdom of Herb Stein: “If something can’t go on forever, it will end.”
我们不知道这种过度行为会持续多久，也不知道什么会改变助长这种行为的政府、贷款人及买家的态度。但我们确实知道，其他人处理事务时越是不谨慎，我们自己处理事务时就越应该谨慎。我们不想对那些反映出买家和贷款人无节制（在我们看来往往是毫无根据的）乐观情绪的交易进行套利。在我们的活动中，我们会铭记赫伯·斯坦的智慧：“如果某件事不能永远持续下去，它就会结束。”
# Efficient Market Theory (有效市场理论)
The preceding discussion about arbitrage makes a small discussion of “efficient market theory” (EMT) also seem relevant. This doctrine became highly fashionable - indeed, almost holy scripture in academic circles during the 1970s. Essentially, it said that analyzing stocks was useless because all public information about them was appropriately reflected in their prices. In other words, the market always knew everything. As a corollary, the professors who taught EMT said that someone throwing darts at the stock tables could select a stock portfolio having prospects just as good as one selected by the brightest, most hard-working security analyst. Amazingly, EMT was embraced not only by academics, but by many investment professionals and corporate managers as well. Observing correctly that the market was frequently efficient, they went on to conclude incorrectly that it was always efficient. The difference between these propositions is night and day.
前面关于套利的讨论使得对“有效市场理论”（EMT）的简短讨论也显得相关。这一学说在20世纪70年代变得非常流行——事实上，在学术界几乎成了圣经。本质上，它认为分析股票是无用的，因为关于股票的所有公开信息都已恰当地反映在其价格中。换句话说，市场总是无所不知。由此推论，教授有效市场理论的教授们说，一个对着股票列表掷飞镖的人选出的股票组合，其前景与最聪明、最勤奋的证券分析师选出的一样好。令人惊讶的是，有效市场理论不仅被学术界接受，还被许多投资专业人士和企业管理者接受。他们正确地观察到市场经常是有效的，却错误地得出市场总是有效的结论。这两个命题之间有着天壤之别。
In my opinion, the continuous 63-year arbitrage experience of Graham-Newman Corp. Buffett Partnership, and Berkshire illustrates just how foolish EMT is. (There’s plenty of other evidence, also.) While at Graham-Newman, I made a study of its earnings from arbitrage during the entire 1926-1956 lifespan of the company. Unleveraged returns averaged 20% per year. Starting in 1956, I applied Ben Graham’s arbitrage principles, first at Buffett Partnership and then Berkshire. Though I’ve not made an exact calculation, I have done enough work to know that the 1956-1988 returns averaged well over 20%. (Of course, I operated in an environment far more favorable than Ben’s; he had 1929-1932 to contend with.)
在我看来，格雷厄姆-纽曼公司、巴菲特合伙公司和伯克希尔长达63年的连续套利经验，恰恰说明了有效市场理论是多么愚蠢。（还有很多其他证据。）在格雷厄姆-纽曼公司时，我研究了该公司1926-1956年整个存续期间的套利收益。无杠杆回报率平均每年为20%。从1956年开始，我应用本·格雷厄姆的套利原则，先是在巴菲特合伙公司，后来在伯克希尔。虽然我没有做过精确计算，但我做了足够的研究，知道1956-1988年的回报率平均远超过20%。（当然，我所处的环境比本有利得多；他还要应对1929-1932年的情况。）
All of the conditions are present that are required for a fair test of portfolio performance: (1) the three organizations traded hundreds of different securities while building this 63-year record; (2) the results are not skewed by a few fortunate experiences; (3) we did not have to dig for obscure facts or develop keen insights about products or managements - we simply acted on highly-publicized events; and (4) our arbitrage positions were a clearly identified universe - they have not been selected by hindsight.
要对投资组合表现进行公平测试所需的所有条件都已具备：（1）这三个机构在建立这63年记录的过程中交易了数百种不同的证券；（2）结果没有被少数幸运的经历所扭曲；（3）我们不必挖掘晦涩的事实或对产品或管理层形成敏锐的见解——我们只是根据高度公开的事件采取行动；（4）我们的套利头寸是一个明确界定的范围——它们不是事后诸葛亮选出来的。
Over the 63 years, the general market delivered just under a 10% annual return, including dividends. That means $1,000 would have grown to $405,000 if all income had been reinvested. A 20% rate of return, however, would have produced $97 million. That strikes us as a statistically-significant differential that might, conceivably, arouse one’s curiosity.
63年来，大盘的年化回报率略低于10%（包括股息）。这意味着如果所有收入都进行再投资，1000美元将增长到405,000美元。然而，20%的回报率将产生9700万美元。在我们看来，这是一个统计上显著的差异，可以想象，这可能会引起人们的好奇心。
Yet proponents of the theory have never seemed interested in discordant evidence of this type. True, they don’t talk quite as much about their theory today as they used to. But no one, to my knowledge, has ever said he was wrong, no matter how many thousands of students he has sent forth misinstructed. EMT, moreover, continues to be an integral part of the investment curriculum at major business schools. Apparently, a reluctance to recant, and thereby to demystify the priesthood, is not limited to theologians.
然而，该理论的支持者似乎从未对这类不一致的证据感兴趣。诚然，他们现在不像过去那样经常谈论他们的理论了。但据我所知，没有人说过自己错了，无论他误导了多少学生。此外，有效市场理论仍然是主要商学院投资课程的组成部分。显然，不愿放弃（从而揭开神职人员的神秘面纱）的不仅仅是神学家。
Naturally the disservice done students and gullible investment professionals who have swallowed EMT has been an extraordinary service to us and other followers of Graham. In any sort of a contest - financial, mental, or physical - it’s an enormous advantage to have opponents who have been taught that it’s useless to even try. From a selfish point of view, Grahamites should probably endow chairs to ensure the perpetual teaching of EMT.
当然，那些轻信有效市场理论的学生和易受骗的投资专业人士受到的误导，对我们和其他格雷厄姆的追随者来说却是极大的帮助。在任何形式的竞赛中——金融、智力或体育竞赛——如果对手被教导说即使尝试也是徒劳的，那将是一个巨大的优势。从自私的角度来看，格雷厄姆的追随者或许应该捐赠教席，以确保有效市场理论得到永久传授。
All this said, a warning is appropriate. Arbitrage has looked easy recently. But this is not a form of investing that guarantees profits of 20% a year or, for that matter, profits of any kind. As noted, the market is reasonably efficient much of the time: For every arbitrage opportunity we seized in that 63-year period, many more were foregone because they seemed properly-priced.
话虽如此，有一个警告是恰当的。最近套利似乎很容易。但这并不是一种能保证每年20%利润的投资方式，也不能保证任何形式的利润。如前所述，市场在很多时候是相当有效的：在那63年里，我们抓住的每一个套利机会，都有更多的机会因为看起来定价合理而被放弃。
An investor cannot obtain superior profits from stocks by simply committing to a specific investment category or style. He can earn them only by carefully evaluating facts and continuously exercising discipline. Investing in arbitrage situations, per se, is no better a strategy than selecting a portfolio by throwing darts.
投资者不能仅仅通过投身于特定的投资类别或风格就从股票中获得超额利润。他只能通过仔细评估事实并不断自律来获得超额利润。就其本身而言，投资于套利情况并不比通过掷飞镖选择投资组合更好。
# New York Stock Exchange Listing (纽约证券交易所上市)
Berkshire’s shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange on November 29, 1988. On pages 50-51 we reproduce the letter we sent to shareholders concerning the listing.
伯克希尔的股票于1988年11月29日在纽约证券交易所上市。在第50-51页，我们转载了我们就上市事宜发给股东的信函。
Let me clarify one point not dealt with in the letter: Though our round lot for trading on the NYSE is ten shares, any number of shares from one on up can be bought or sold.
让我澄清信函中没有涉及的一点：尽管我们在纽约证券交易所的交易单位是10股，但可以买卖1股及以上的任何数量的股票。
As the letter explains, our primary goal in listing was to reduce transaction costs, and we believe this goal is being achieved. Generally, the spread between the bid and asked price on the NYSE has been well below the spread that prevailed in the over-the-counter market.
正如信函所解释的，我们上市的主要目标是降低交易成本，我们相信这一目标正在实现。一般来说，纽约证券交易所的买卖价差远低于场外市场的价差。
Henderson Brothers, Inc., the specialist in our shares, is the oldest continuing specialist firm on the Exchange; its progenitor, William Thomas Henderson, bought his seat for $500 on September 8, 1861. (Recently, seats were selling for about $625,000.) Among the 54 firms acting as specialists, HBI ranks second in number of stocks assigned, with 83. We were pleased when Berkshire was allocated to HBI, and have been delighted with the firm’s performance. Jim Maguire, Chairman of HBI, personally manages the trading in Berkshire, and we could not be in better hands.
亨德森兄弟公司是我们股票的做市商，也是交易所历史最悠久的持续经营的做市商公司；其创始人威廉·托马斯·亨德森于1861年9月8日以500美元买下了交易席位。（最近，席位售价约为625,000美元。）在54家做市商公司中，HBI所负责的股票数量排名第二，有83只。当伯克希尔被分配给HBI时，我们感到很高兴，并且对该公司的表现感到满意。HBI的董事长吉姆·马奎尔亲自管理伯克希尔的交易，有他负责我们再放心不过了。
In two respects our goals probably differ somewhat from those of most listed companies. First, we do not want to maximize the price at which Berkshire shares trade. We wish instead for them to trade in a narrow range centered at intrinsic business value (which we hope increases at a reasonable - or, better yet, unreasonable - rate). Charlie and I are bothered as much by significant overvaluation as significant undervaluation. Both extremes will inevitably produce results for many shareholders that will differ sharply from Berkshire’s business results. If our stock price instead consistently mirrors business value, each of our shareholders will receive an investment result that roughly parallels the business results of Berkshire during his holding period.
在两个方面，我们的目标可能与大多数上市公司有所不同。首先，我们不想最大化伯克希尔股票的交易价格。相反，我们希望它们在以内在商业价值为中心的窄幅范围内交易（我们希望内在价值以合理的——或者更好的是，不合理的——速度增长）。我和查理对严重的高估和严重的低估同样感到困扰。这两种极端情况都不可避免地会给许多股东带来与伯克希尔业务业绩大相径庭的结果。如果我们的股价始终反映业务价值，那么我们的每位股东将获得与其持有期间伯克希尔业务业绩大致相当的投资结果。
Second, we wish for very little trading activity. If we ran a private business with a few passive partners, we would be disappointed if those partners, and their replacements, frequently wanted to leave the partnership. Running a public company, we feel the same way.
其次，我们希望交易活动非常少。如果我们经营一家有几个被动合伙人的私人企业，要是这些合伙人以及他们的继任者频繁想要退出合伙关系，我们会感到失望。经营一家上市公司，我们也有同样的感受。
Our goal is to attract long-term owners who, at the time of purchase, have no timetable or price target for sale but plan instead to stay with us indefinitely. We don’t understand the CEO who wants lots of stock activity, for that can be achieved only if many of his owners are constantly exiting. At what other organization - school, club, church, etc. - do leaders cheer when members leave? (However, if there were a broker whose livelihood depended upon the membership turnover in such organizations, you could be sure that there would be at least one proponent of activity, as in: “There hasn’t been much going on in Christianity for a while; maybe we should switch to Buddhism next week.“)
我们的目标是吸引长期所有者，他们在购买时没有出售的时间表或价格目标，而是计划无限期地与我们在一起。我们不理解那些希望股票交易活跃的首席执行官，因为只有当他的许多所有者不断退出时，交易才能活跃起来。在其他什么组织——学校、俱乐部、教堂等——里，成员离开时领导者会欢呼呢？（然而，如果有一个经纪人的生计依赖于这类组织的成员流动率，你可以肯定至少会有一个人支持活跃的流动，比如：“基督教有一段时间没什么动静了；也许我们下周应该改信佛教。”）
Of course, some Berkshire owners will need or want to sell from time to time, and we wish for good replacements who will pay them a fair price. Therefore we try, through our policies, performance, and communications, to attract new shareholders who understand our operations, share our time horizons, and measure us as we measure ourselves. If we can continue to attract this sort of shareholder - and, just as important, can continue to be uninteresting to those with short-term or unrealistic expectations - Berkshire shares should consistently sell at prices reasonably related to business value.
当然，一些伯克希尔的所有者有时会需要或想要出售股票，我们希望有好的买家以公平的价格购买他们的股票。因此，我们努力通过我们的政策、业绩和沟通，吸引那些了解我们业务、与我们有相同时间跨度、并以我们衡量自己的方式衡量我们的新股东。如果我们能继续吸引这类股东——同样重要的是，能继续让那些有短期或不切实际期望的人对我们不感兴趣——伯克希尔的股票应该会始终以与业务价值合理相关的价格交易。
# David L. Dodd (戴维·L·多德)
Dave Dodd, my friend and teacher for 38 years, died last year at age 93. Most of you don’t know of him. Yet any long-time shareholder of Berkshire is appreciably wealthier because of the indirect influence he had upon our company.
戴维·多德是我38年的挚友和导师，去年以93岁高龄离世。你们大多数人并不了解他。然而，伯克希尔的任何一位长期股东都因他对我们公司的间接影响而显著致富。
Dave spent a lifetime teaching at Columbia University, and he co-authored Security Analysis with Ben Graham. From the moment I arrived at Columbia, Dave personally encouraged and educated me; one influence was as important as the other. Everything he taught me, directly or through his book, made sense. Later, through dozens of letters, he continued my education right up until his death.
多德一生都在哥伦比亚大学任教，他与本·格雷厄姆合著了《证券分析》。从我来到哥伦比亚大学的那一刻起，多德就亲自鼓励我、教导我，这两方面的影响同样重要。他直接教我的，或者通过他的书教我的，每一点都有道理。后来，通过数十封信件，他一直指导我的学习，直到生命的最后一刻。
I have known many professors of finance and investments but I have never seen any, except for Ben Graham, who was the match of Dave. The proof of his talent is the record of his students: No other teacher of investments has sent forth so many who have achieved unusual success.
我认识许多金融和投资学教授，但除了本·格雷厄姆，没有任何人能与多德相提并论。他才华的证明在于他学生的成就：没有任何一位投资学教师能培养出如此多取得非凡成功的学生。
When students left Dave’s classroom, they were equipped to invest intelligently for a lifetime because the principles he taught were simple, sound, useful, and enduring. Though these may appear to be unremarkable virtues, the teaching of principles embodying them has been rare.
学生们离开多德的课堂时，已经具备了终身明智投资的能力，因为他所教授的原则简单、合理、实用且持久。尽管这些美德看似平凡，但能传授体现这些美德的原则的情况却很少见。
It’s particularly impressive that Dave could practice as well as preach. Just as Keynes became wealthy by applying his academic ideas to a very small purse, so, too, did Dave. Indeed, his financial performance far outshone that of Keynes, who began as a market-timer (leaning on business and credit-cycle theory) and converted, after much thought, to value investing. Dave was right from the start.
尤其令人印象深刻的是，多德不仅能言传，还能身教。就像凯恩斯通过将自己的学术思想应用到少量资金上而致富一样，多德也是如此。事实上，他的财务业绩远超凯恩斯——凯恩斯起初是一位市场时机选择者（依赖商业和信贷周期理论），经过深思熟虑后才转向价值投资。而多德从一开始就是正确的。
In Berkshire’s investments, Charlie and I have employed the principles taught by Dave and Ben Graham. Our prosperity is the fruit of their intellectual tree.
在伯克希尔的投资中，我和查理运用了多德和本·格雷厄姆传授的原则。我们的成功是他们智慧之树结出的果实。
# Miscellaneous (杂项)
We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.
我们希望购买更多与我们现有业务相似的企业，也希望能得到一些帮助。如果您有符合以下标准的企业，欢迎致电我，或者最好是写信联系我。
Here’s what we’re looking for:
我们的收购标准如下：
(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),（1）大规模收购（税后收益至少1000万美元）；
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turnaround” situations),（2）具有持续稳定的盈利能力（我们对未来预测兴趣不大，对“扭亏为盈”的情况也不感兴趣）；
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,（3）能在很少或不使用债务的情况下获得良好的股本回报率；
(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),（4）管理层到位（我们无法提供管理层）；
(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),（5）业务简单（如果涉及大量技术，我们理解不了）；
(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).（6）有明确的报价（在价格未知的情况下，我们甚至不想进行初步的交易洽谈，以免浪费我们和卖方的时间）。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.
我们不会进行不友好的收购。我们可以保证完全保密，并且会非常迅速地给出是否感兴趣的答复——通常在五分钟内。我们更倾向于现金收购，但如果能获得与我们付出的内在商业价值相当的回报，也会考虑发行股票。
Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company’s owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. However, these managers also wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with these objectives and invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.
我们最青睐的收购形式是符合布卢姆金、弗里德曼和赫尔德曼模式的收购。在这类情况下，公司的所有者兼管理者希望获得大量现金，有时是为自己，通常也是为家人或不参与经营的股东。然而，这些管理者也希望继续作为重要所有者，像过去一样经营公司。我们认为，对于有这些目标的所有者来说，我们是非常合适的收购方，并邀请潜在卖方通过联系我们过去的合作伙伴来了解我们。
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: We’ve found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. Our interest in new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales can best be expressed by another Goldwynism: “Please include me out.”
我和查理经常会接触到一些完全不符合我们标准的收购机会：我们发现，如果你表示有兴趣买柯利牧羊犬，很多人会打电话来想卖给你他们的可卡犬。用高德温的另一句名言来表达我们对新企业、扭亏为盈项目或类似拍卖式销售的兴趣再合适不过了：“请别把我算在内。”
Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon. We have a special interest in purchasing convertible preferreds as a long-term investment, as we did at Salomon.
除了有兴趣收购上述类型的企业外，我们也有兴趣通过协商购买大量（但非控股）股票，类似于我们在资本城和所罗门持有的股票。我们特别有兴趣购买可转换优先股作为长期投资，就像我们在索罗门所做的那样。
We received some good news a few weeks ago: Standard & Poor’s raised our credit rating to AAA, which is the highest rating it bestows. Only 15 other U.S. industrial or property-casualty companies are rated AAA, down from 28 in 1980.
几周前我们收到了一个好消息：标准普尔将我们的信用评级提升至AAA，这是其授予的最高评级。目前美国其他获得AAA评级的工业或财产意外险公司仅有15家，而1980年时有28家。
Corporate bondholders have taken their lumps in the past few years from “event risk.” This term refers to the overnight degradation of credit that accompanies a heavily-leveraged purchase or recapitalization of a business whose financial policies, up to then, had been conservative. In a world of takeovers inhabited by few owner-managers, most corporations present such a risk. Berkshire does not. Charlie and I promise bondholders the same respect we afford shareholders.
过去几年，公司债券持有人因“事件风险”遭受了损失。这个术语指的是，一家财务政策一直保守的公司，在进行高杠杆收购或资本重组后，信用评级在一夜之间下降。在一个收购盛行且所有者兼管理者寥寥无几的世界里，大多数公司都存在这种风险。但伯克希尔不存在。我和查理向债券持有人保证，我们会给予他们与股东同等的尊重。
About 97.4% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1988 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $5 million, and 2,319 charities were recipients. If we achieve reasonable business results, we plan to increase the per-share contributions in 1989.
伯克希尔1988年股东指定捐赠计划的参与率约为97.4%（基于所有合格股份）。通过该计划捐赠的金额为500万美元，2319家慈善机构受益。如果我们取得合理的经营业绩，计划在1989年提高每股捐赠金额。
We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 48-49. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1989 will be ineligible for the 1989 program.
我们敦促新股东阅读第48-49页关于我们股东指定捐赠计划的说明。如果您希望参与未来的计划，我们强烈建议您立即确保您的股票以实际所有者的名义登记，而不是以经纪人、银行或存管机构的名义登记。在1989年9月30日未按此方式登记的股票将没有资格参与1989年的计划。
Berkshire’s annual meeting will be held in Omaha on Monday, April 24, 1989, and I hope you will come. The meeting provides the forum for you to ask any owner-related questions you may have, and we will keep answering until all (except those dealing with portfolio activities or other proprietary information) have been dealt with.
伯克希尔的年度股东大会将于1989年4月24日（星期一）在奥马哈举行，希望您能来参加。这次会议为您提供了一个提问的平台，您可以提出任何与所有者相关的问题，我们会一直回答，直到所有问题（涉及投资组合活动或其他专有信息的问题除外）都得到解答。
After the meeting we will have several buses available to take you to visit Mrs. B at The Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike Friedman at Borsheim’s. Be prepared for bargains.
会议结束后，我们会安排几辆巴士带您去内布拉斯加家具卖场拜访B夫人，去博施海姆珠宝店拜访艾克·弗里德曼。准备好买些特价商品吧。
Out-of-towners may prefer to arrive early and visit Mrs. B during the Sunday store hours of noon to five. (These Sunday hours seem ridiculously short to Mrs. B, who feels they scarcely allow her time to warm up; she much prefers the days on which the store remains open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m.) Borsheims, however, is not open on Sunday.
外地的股东可能更愿意早点到，在周日中午到下午五点的营业时间去拜访B夫人。（对B夫人来说，周日的营业时间短得离谱，她觉得这几乎不够她热身；她更愿意商店在上午10点到晚上9点营业。）不过，博施海姆珠宝店周日不营业。
Ask Mrs. B the secret of her astonishingly low carpet prices. She will confide to you - as she does to everyone - how she does it: “I can sell so cheap ‘cause I work for this dummy who doesn’t know anything about carpet.”
问问B夫人她的地毯价格低得惊人的秘诀。她会像对每个人一样向你吐露：“我能卖这么便宜，是因为我为这个对地毯一窍不通的傻瓜工作。”
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 28, 1989
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事长
1989年2月28日