In the morning session, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger discuss recent bank failures and what Washington needs to do to restore depositors’ confidence, the hype surrounding artificial intelligence, and their concerns over growing economic tensions between the United States and China.

在上午场次中，沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格讨论了近期银行倒闭事件、华盛顿应如何恢复储户信心、围绕人工智能的炒作，以及他们对美中经济紧张局势加剧的担忧。

Most Berkshire businesses will report lower earnings next year (大多数伯克希尔企业明年将报告较低的收益)

Most Berkshire businesses will report lower earnings next year
大多数伯克希尔企业明年将报告较低的收益

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1. Berkshire’s own ‘King Charles’ (伯克希尔的“查尔斯国王”)

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning, good morning. And thanks for coming. Omaha loves it, I love it, Charlie loves it. We’re glad to have you here.
沃伦·巴菲特：早上好，早上好。感谢大家的到来。奥马哈喜欢这次会议，我喜欢，查理也喜欢。我们很高兴你们在这里。

We’re going to make this preliminary, before the questions, very short because we want to get in at least 60 questions, half divided by the audience outside this arena and half from you.
我们会将开场白尽量简短，因为我们希望回答至少60个问题，一半来自场外观众，一半来自你们。

So, I would just like to get right to the directors and the earnings that have been put up on a web page this morning, but we’ll cover those very fast and then we’ll get to the questions. Now, when I woke up this morning, I realized that we had a competitive broadcast going out somewhere in the UK.
所以，我想直接介绍董事和今早在网页上发布的收益情况，我们会很快覆盖这些内容，然后进入提问环节。今天早上醒来时，我意识到英国某地正在进行一场竞争性广播。

And (Laughter) they were celebrating a King Charles, and we’ve got our own King Charles here today. (APPLAUSE AND CHEERING)
（笑声）他们在庆祝查尔斯国王，而我们今天也有自己的“查尔斯国王”。（掌声和欢呼）

And next to him we have Greg Abel, who’s in charge of all the operations except for insurance. (Applause)
在他旁边的是格雷格·阿贝尔，负责除保险业务外的所有运营。（掌声）

And next to Greg, we have a man I ran into in 1986 and has made us look good ever since. We have the man in charge of insurance, Ajit Jain. Ajit? (Applause and cheering)
在格雷格旁边，是我在1986年遇到的一个人，他从那时起一直让我们表现得很出色。他是负责保险业务的人，阿吉特·贾因。阿吉特？（掌声和欢呼）

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2. Directors introduced (介绍董事)

WARREN BUFFETT: And now we have our directors here in front. And if they would just stand briefly and then I’ll go onto the next one, and they’re all here today.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们的董事都在前面。如果他们能简单起立，我会逐一介绍，他们今天都在这里。

First of all, doing it alphabetically, there’s Howard Buffett, (Applause). There’s Susie Buffett, there’s Steve Burke, Ken Chenault, Chris Davis, Sue Decker, Charlotte Guyman, Tom Murphy Jr., Ron Olson, Wally Weitz, and Meryl Witmer.
首先，按字母顺序介绍，有霍华德·巴菲特，（掌声）。还有苏茜·巴菲特、史蒂夫·伯克、肯·切诺特、克里斯·戴维斯、苏·德克尔、夏洛特·盖曼、湯姆·墨菲二世、罗恩·奥尔森、沃利·魏茨和梅丽尔·威特默。

That’s as good as you can get.
这是你能得到的最好的团队。

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3. The woman who organized the whole thing (组织整个会议的女性)

WARREN BUFFETT: And there’s one other person I would like to mention before we get onto the earnings that were put in the press release this morning. Well, let’s see who we have here. We’ve got —
沃伦·巴菲特：在我们进入今早新闻发布会上公布的收益之前，我想再提到一个人。让我们看看这里有谁。我们有——

This is hard to believe. Can you imagine a name, Melissa Shapiro Shapiro? (Laugh) And she was Melissa Shapiro till she married another Shapiro, and she put this whole thing together with no help from me, no help from Charlie, (Applause) and a lot of help from the people in the other room. Melissa. (APPLAUSE and CHEERING)
这难以置信。你能想象一个名字叫梅丽莎·夏皮罗·夏皮罗吗？（笑声）她原本是梅丽莎·夏皮罗，直到她嫁给了另一个夏皮罗。她独自组织了整个会议，没有我的帮助，也没有查理的帮助，（掌声）但得到了其他房间里很多人的帮助。梅丽莎。（掌声和欢呼）

Yeah, it’s very easy. If you can remember her second name, you can remember her third name. So, Melissa Shapiro Shapiro.
是的，很简单。如果你能记住她的第二个名字，就能记住她的第三个名字。所以，梅丽莎·夏皮罗·夏皮罗。

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4. Most Berkshire businesses will report lower earnings next year (大多数伯克希尔企业明年将报告较低的收益)

WARREN BUFFETT: And with that, I would like to next move onto the earnings and a couple small slides that explain what we’re all about, and then we’re going to get to Q&A. And the slide is up behind me, and there it is.
沃伦·巴菲特：接下来，我想谈谈收益和几页幻灯片，解释我们的业务，然后我们会进入问答环节。幻灯片在我身后，已经显示出来了。

We reported in the first quarter operating earnings a little over $8 billion. And when we talk about operating earnings, we’re basically referring to the earnings of Berkshire Hathaway as required under GAAP, excluding however, capital gains both realized and unrealized.
我们报告第一季度运营收益略高于80亿美元。当我们谈到运营收益时，基本上是指根据公认会计准则（GAAP）要求的伯克希尔·哈撒韦的收益，但不包括已实现和未实现的资本收益。

There’s a few other very minor items, but basically, we expect to make capital gains over time. Why would we own the stocks otherwise? Doesn’t always work out, but overall, it works out pretty well over time. But in any day, any quarter, any year, even occasionally over a five-year period, the stock prices move around capriciously.
还有一些非常小的项目，但基本上，我们预期长期会实现资本收益。否则我们为什么要持有这些股票呢？并非总是成功，但总体上长期来看效果不错。但在任何一天、任何季度、任何一年，甚至偶尔在五年期间，股价都会反复无常地波动。

Now, we own a lot of other businesses. We consider those stocks businesses. We own a lot of other businesses where they get consolidated, and they don’t move around in value. Now, if we had a little bit of Burlington stock outstanding, if we had a little bit of the energy stock trading, those stocks would move around a lot.
现在，我们拥有很多其他业务。我们将这些股票视为业务。我们还拥有许多其他业务，它们的价值被合并后不会波动。如果我们有少量伯灵顿股票流通，或者有少量能源股票交易，那些股票价格会大幅波动。

But the businesses are what count. So, the operating earnings, as you’ll see in the first quarter, came it at about $8 billion. And I would say that in the general economy, the feedback we get is that, I would say, perhaps the majority of our businesses will actually report lower earnings this year than last year.
但业务才是最重要的。所以，正如你们所见，第一季度的运营收益约为80亿美元。我想说，根据我们从整体经济中得到的反馈，可能我们的大多数业务今年的收益实际上会低于去年。

In various degrees in the last six months or so, at various times, the businesses have left the incredible period, which is about extraordinary as I’ve seen a business since World War II, which poured out a lot of money to people who couldn’t get goods.
在过去六个月左右的各种时间点上，业务已经结束了二战以来我见过的最非凡时期，资金大量流向无法获得商品的人们。

It was more extreme in World War II, but this was extreme this time. And it was just a question of getting goods to deliver. And people bought, and they didn’t wait for sales. And if you couldn’t sell them one thing, they would put another thing in their backlog. It was an extraordinary period.
二战期间更为极端，但这次也很极端。问题只是如何交付商品。人们购买商品，不等待促销。如果你无法卖给他们一种商品，他们会将另一种商品列入积压订单。这是一个非凡的时期。

And that period has ended. As you know, it isn’t that employment has fallen off a cliff or anything, in the least. But it is a different climate than it was six months ago. And a number of our managers were surprised. Some of them had too much inventory on order, and then all of a sudden it got delivered, and people weren’t in the same frame of mind as earlier.
那个时期已经结束。如你所知，就业并未大幅下降。但现在的环境与六个月前不同。我们的许多经理感到惊讶。他们中的一些人订购了过多库存，然后突然到货，人们的心态已不像之前那样。

And now we’ll start having sales at places where we didn’t need to have sales before. But despite the fact that this year I think in general will be slower than last year, we actually are situated so that I would expect, and believe me when I say expect, nothing is sure.
现在我们将在之前不需要促销的地方开始促销。尽管我认为今年总体上会比去年慢，但我们实际上处于有利位置，我预计——请相信我说“预计”时，没有什么是确定的。

Nothing is sure tomorrow, nothing is sure next year, and nothing is ever sure, either in markets or in business forecasts, or in anything else. And we don’t pay much attention to markets or forecasts unless the markets happen to offer something interesting to do.
明天没有什么是确定的，明年没有什么是确定的，市场、商业预测或其他任何事情都没有什么是确定的。我们不太关注市场或预测，除非市场提供了有趣的事情可做。

But nevertheless, we are positioned in two respects, as you’ll see from this first report. Our investment income is going to be a lot larger this year than last year. And that’s built. I mean, as you’ll see in a minute, we’ve had $125 billion or so in very short-term investments.
尽管如此，正如你从这份第一季度报告中看到的，我们在两方面处于有利位置。我们的投资收入今年将比去年高得多。这是已经确定的。我是说，你马上就会看到，我们有大约1250亿美元的超短期投资。

And believe it or not, not that long ago we were getting four basis points, which is next to nothing on that $125 billion, which means we were getting $50 million a year. And now the same money, just the day before yesterday, we actually bought because of some funny twist the market, because of doubts about the debt ceiling.
信不信由你，不久前，我们在这1250亿美元上只有4个基点的收益，几乎微不足道，这意味着我们每年只有5000万美元的收益。而现在，同样的资金，就在前天，我们实际上因为市场的一些奇怪扭曲，因为对债务上限的疑虑而购买了。

We bought $3 billion of bills at 5-90. That’s 5.92 bond equivalent yield. So, we will have what produced just not that long ago on a 12-month basis was producing $50 million a year, producing something in the area of $5 billion a year. So, we’re in a position where the investment income is certain to increase quite a bit.
我们以5.90的收益率购买了30亿美元的国库券。这是5.92的债券等值收益率。所以，我们将从不久前12个月基础上的5000万美元年收益，变成大约50亿美元的年收益。所以，我们处于投资收入肯定会大幅增加的位置。

And insurance underwriting does not correlate with business activity. It depends on things like hurricanes, and earthquakes, and other events. So, on a perspective basis, on a probability basis, we’re likely to have a better year this year in insurance underwriting than we had last year.
保险承保与商业活动无关。它取决于飓风、地震和其他事件。所以，从概率角度看，我们今年的保险承保可能会比去年更好。

It just isn’t affected by what you might call the business cycle or what applies to generally in industry, retailing retailing, you name it. So, I would expect in one massive earthquake or one hurricane that came in at just the wrong place could affect that prediction. But on a probabalistic basis, our insurance looks better this year.
它不受你可能称之为商业周期或通常适用于工业、零售等的影响。所以，我预计，如果发生一场大规模地震或一场恰好在错误地点的飓风，可能会影响这一预测。但从概率上看，我们今年的保险业务看起来更好。

So, if you get two of the elements there of our main elements of earnings that look like they will swing in our direction, I would expect, but I can’t promise, that our operating earnings will be greater than last year.
所以，如果我们主要的收益来源中有两个因素看起来会向我们这边倾斜，我预计——但我不能保证——我们的运营收益会高于去年。

And if we’ll move to the second slide, I give you those operating earnings figures just to give you a overview of what has happened since the pandemic started, and also the year before as a base. And we retain all our earnings, as you know.
如果我们转到第二页幻灯片，我会给你那些运营收益数据，只是为了让你概览自疫情开始以来发生了什么，以及之前一年的基础数据。如你所知，我们保留了所有收益。

So, if we’re retaining $30 billion or $35 billion, or whatever it may be, a year, they should expect more operating earnings over time. I mean, this number should be significantly higher five, or ten, or 15 years from now because we have the advantage of retaining earnings, and that’s what got us to these figures because they were essentially nothing when we started.
所以，如果我们每年保留300亿或350亿美元，无论多少，他们应该预期随着时间推移会有更多的运营收益。我是说，这个数字在五年、十年或十五年后应该显著更高，因为我们有保留收益的优势，这就是我们达到这些数字的原因，因为我们刚开始时几乎什么都没有。

And they got there by retaining earnings and will keep retaining earnings. So, it’s no great triumph if these numbers move up. And what we hope is that they move up at a reasonable rate. Historically, they moved up at an unreasonable rate sometimes.
它们通过保留收益达到了这个水平，并且将继续保留收益。所以，如果这些数字上升，并不是什么了不起的成就。我们希望的是它们以合理的速度上升。历史上，它们有时以不合理的速度上升。

Sync Video to Paragraph
同步视频到段落

But we were working with much smaller sums then, and that can’t be repeated with our present capital base. Because I note there — I believe it’s on this slide. Let’s take a look. No, that will be — let’s see, it’s on the — well, on the next place, page. Let’s move to the next slide. We show that we had on March 31st, now what was it, $504 billion of GAAP net worth.
但那时我们处理的金额要小得多，以我们现在的资本基础无法重复。因为我注意到——我相信是在这页幻灯片上。让我们看看。不，那将是——让我们看，它在——嗯，下一页。让我们转到下一页幻灯片。我们显示截至3月31日，我们有5040亿美元的公认会计准则净值。

Now, what might surprise you is that there’s no other company in the United States that has a number that is that large. Now, that isn’t because we have the most valuable company in the United States. Other companies have used their money to repurchase shares.
现在，可能会让你惊讶的是，美国没有其他公司的这个数字有这么大。这并不是因为我们是美国最有价值的公司。其他公司用他们的钱回购了股票。

They could’ve accumulated $504 billion in GAAP. But basically, we have more under GAAP accounting now than any other company in the U.S. And of course, if you measure return on equity that becomes a very big number to increase at a rapid rate, but we hope to do so.
他们本可以积累5040亿美元的公认会计准则净值。但基本上，我们现在在公认会计准则会计下比美国任何其他公司都多。当然，如果你衡量股本回报率，这是一个很难快速增长的大数字，但我们希望做到。

Not a rapid rate, a decent rate. And right below that, you see something called float. And float is money that is left in our hands somewhat akin, but very importantly different, than a bank deposit. But you have to pay interest to get a bank deposit.
不是快速增长，而是适度的增长。就在下面，你会看到一个叫“浮存金”的东西。浮存金是留在我们手中的钱，有点类似于银行存款，但非常重要地不同。你必须支付利息来获得银行存款。

And you have to pay more interest these days, and you have to run a bank and do a lot of things. And basically, this is money that represents unpaid losses at this time. You get paid in advance in insurance. So, what shows up as a net liability on our balance sheet gives us funds to exercise with an amount of discretion that no other insurance company that I know of in the world enjoys, just because we have so much net worth.
现在你必须支付更多利息，你还得经营一家银行并做很多事情。基本上，这是目前代表未支付损失的钱。在保险中你是提前收到钱的。所以，我们资产负债表上显示为净负债的资金，给了我们一种世界上我所知的其他保险公司无法享有的自由裁量权，只是因为我们的净值如此之高。

And our float now comes to $165 billion, and the man sitting at the far left is responsible for moving that number up from a pittance in 1986 to this incredible figure, which in most years, practically all years, hasn’t cost us anything. So, it’s like having a bank with no employees, no interest, and no ability to withdraw the money in a hurry that we have working for us.
我们的浮存金现在达到了1650亿美元，坐在最左边的那个人负责将这个数字从1986年的微不足道提升到这个令人难以置信的数字，在大多数年份，几乎所有年份，都没有给我们带来任何成本。所以，这就像拥有一家没有员工、没有利息、无法快速提款的银行在为我们工作。

And it’s a very valuable asset that shows up as a liability. And Ajit is responsible for building up this treasure, which has been done by out-competing insurance companies all over the world. And now, a number of our insurance companies, in turn, are run by talented managers who contributed one way or another.
这是一个非常有价值的资产，却显示为负债。阿吉特负责建立这个宝藏，这是通过在全球范围内击败保险公司实现的。现在，我们的许多保险公司反过来由才华横溢的经理人管理，他们以各种方式做出了贡献。

Start with GEICO at the beginning of my career. And that float, if you think about it, just think of a balance sheet. You have liabilities here and you have assets over here, and the liability side finances the asset side. It’s very simple. And stockholders’ equity finances it, long-term debt finances it, and so on.
从我职业生涯开始的GEICO说起。如果你思考一下浮存金，想象一张资产负债表。这里有负债，那里有资产，负债方为资产方提供资金。很简单。股东权益为它提供资金，长期债务为它提供资金，等等。

But stockholders’ equity is very expensive in a real sense. Long-term debt has been cheap for a while, but it can get expensive, and it can also become due eventually and it may not be available. But float is another item that’s a liability but hasn’t cost us anything.
但股东权益在真正意义上是非常昂贵的。长期债务有一段时间很便宜，但它可能变得昂贵，而且最终可能到期，也可能无法获得。但浮存金是另一个项目，它是负债，但没有给我们带来任何成本。

And it can’t disappear in a hurry. And it finances the asset side in the same way as stockholders’ equity. And nobody else thinks of it much that way, but we’ve always thought of it that way, and it’s a build up over time. So, I show at the bottom what’s happened with cash and Treasury bills through March 31st.
它不会迅速消失。它以与股东权益相同的方式为资产方提供资金。其他人不太这么想，但我们一直是这样想的，它是随着时间积累起来的。所以，我在底部显示了截至3月31日的现金和国库券情况。

And I will tell you that in the month of April, we’ve probably added about $7 billion to that factor. Now, part of that is because we didn’t buy as much stock, because that reduces cash and Treasury bills. We bought about $400 million worth of stock in the month of April.
我会告诉你，在四月份，我们可能为此增加了大约70亿美元。现在，部分原因是我们在四月份购买了大约4亿美元的股票，因为这减少了现金和国库券。

That’s a minus in terms of cash available. And we, however, sold, net, some stock, which produced maybe $4 billion. And of course, we had operating earnings, probably $2.5 billion or something in that area. And my guess is we probably increased our cash and Treasury bills $6 billion and $7 billion in the month.
这在可用现金方面是一个减项。然而，我们净卖出了一些股票，可能会产生大约40亿美元。当然，我们有运营收益，大概在25亿美元左右。我猜我们在这个月可能增加了60亿到70亿美元的现金和国库券。

And I just want to give you a feel for how the cash flows at Berkshire. And then if we move to the final — I think it’s the final one. We should have the one up there, Class A equivalent shares outstanding. And you’ll notice that every year the number of our shares go down.
我只是想让你感受一下伯克希尔的现金流。然后，如果我们转到最后一张——我想是最后一张。上面应该有那一页，A类等值股份流通量。你会注意到，每年我们的股份数量都在下降。

So, if we own more businesses, and the businesses make more money, your share as shareholders at Berkshire increases every year without you laying out any money. Now you’re laying out the alternative which you could receive in dividends. But the reason we’ve gotten to where we are is because we kept the money.
所以，如果我们拥有更多业务，业务赚更多钱，作为伯克希尔的股东，你的份额每年都在增加，而你无需投入任何资金。现在你投入的是你可以收到股息的替代选择。但我们之所以能走到今天，是因为我们保留了资金。

We did pay a dividend in 1967, $0.10 a share. It was a terrible mistake. (Laugh) And I always tell people that I’d for the men’s room and the directors voted while I was gone. But that isn’t true. I was there, I confess. (Laugh) But we’ve reinvested, and it’s produced the $500 billion plus of shareholders’ equity and the $30 billion plus of operating earnings.
我们在1967年确实支付了每股0.10美元的股息。这是一个可怕的错误。（笑）我总是告诉人们，我去了洗手间，董事会在我不在时投票。但这不是真的。我在场，我承认。（笑）但我们进行了再投资，产生了超过5000亿美元的股东权益和超过300亿美元的运营收益。

And we’ll continue to follow that policy because it makes a great deal of sense. And with that, I think we’ve taken care of the preliminaries. The 10-Q is on the web page. And if you have a week or two vacation, you could spend it reading the 10-Q.
我们将继续遵循这一政策，因为这非常有意义。有了这些，我想我们已经完成了开场白。10-Q报告在网页上。如果你有一两周的假期，你可以花时间阅读10-Q报告。

But that is the essence of Berkshire.
但这就是伯克希尔的精髓。

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5. Failure to guarantee Silicon Valley Bank’s deposits would have been ‘catastrophic’ (未能担保硅谷银行的存款将是“灾难性的”)

WARREN BUFFETT: And with that, I will start with Becky Quick, and we will alternate between Becky and the audience. And her questions have come in from all of the country, and I believe you identified the sender. And go to it, Becky.
沃伦·巴菲特：有了这些，我将从贝基·奎克开始，我们将在贝基和观众之间交替提问。她的问题来自全国各地，我相信你已经确定了提问者。开始吧，贝基。

BECKY QUICK: Thanks, Warren. The first question comes in from Randy Jeffs in Irvine, California. And his question is, “If Silicon Valley Bank’s deposit had not been fully covered, what do you think the economic consequences would’ve been to the nation?”
贝基·奎克：谢谢，沃伦。第一个问题来自加州欧文的兰迪·杰夫斯。他的问题是：“如果硅谷银行的存款没有得到全额担保，你认为对国家的经济后果会是什么？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’d would just simply say it would’ve been catastrophic. (Laugh) And that’s why they were covered. And even though the FDIC limit is $250,000, that’s the way the statute reads, but that is not the way the U.S. is going to behave any more than they’re going to let the debt ceiling cause the world to go into turmoil.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我只会简单地说，那将是灾难性的。（笑）这就是为什么它们得到了担保。尽管FDIC的限额是25万美元，法规是这样写的，但美国不会这样做，就像他们不会让债务上限导致世界陷入混乱一样。

And I can’t imagine anybody in the administration, in the Congress, in the Federal Reserve, whatever it may have been, FDIC — I can’t imagine anybody saying, “I’d like to be the one to go on television tomorrow and explain to the American public why we’re keeping only $250,000 insured, and we’re going to start a run on every bank in the country and disrupt the world financial system.” (Laugh) So, I think it was inevitable. Charlie, do you have anything?
我无法想象行政部门、国会、联邦储备委员会、FDIC或任何机构中有人会说：“我想明天上电视向美国公众解释为什么我们只担保25万美元，我们将引发全国每家银行的挤兑，并扰乱世界金融系统。”（笑）所以，我认为这是不可避免的。查理，你有什么想说的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I have nothing to add.
查理·芒格：不，我没有什么要补充的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

Well, incidentally, I should mention this now, Ajit and Greg will be here in the morning session which ends at noon. And so, if you have questions to direct to them, the time to do it is in the first half of the show. And then after lunch Charlie and I will be back.
顺便说一句，我现在应该提到，阿吉特和格雷格将在上午的会议上，会议到中午结束。所以，如果你们有问题要直接问他们，上午是提问的时间。午餐后，查理和我会回来。

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6. We’ve never made an emotional investing decision (我们从未因情绪做出投资决定)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area one?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第一区域？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Narav (PH) Patel, Harel (PH), Massachusetts. Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, it seems like you found the sweet spot between being too conservative and too aggressive as investors. Do you ever make bad investment decisions because of your emotions? And what do you do to try to keep that from happening?
观众成员：嗨。纳拉夫·帕特尔，马萨诸塞州哈雷尔。巴菲特先生，芒格先生，你们似乎在作为投资者时找到了既不太保守也不太激进的甜蜜点。你们会因为情绪而做出错误的投资决定吗？你们做什么来防止这种情况发生？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we make bad investment decisions plenty of times. I make more than Charlie. I like to think it’s because I make more decisions, but probably my batting average is worse. (Laugh) But I can’t recall any time in the history of Berkshire that we made an emotional decision.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们确实多次做出错误的投资决定。我比查理犯的错误多。我想认为这是因为我做的决定更多，但可能我的命中率更差。（笑）但我无法回忆起伯克希尔历史上任何一次我们因情绪做出的决定。

I know the movie had Jamie Lee [Curtis] in there, (Laughter) but that was for laughs. I mean, Jamie Lee, she’s good, but she’s not good enough to get me or Charlie to make an emotional decision. (Laughter) Charlie, I’m sure you have something to add on that.
我知道电影里有杰米·李·柯蒂斯，（笑声）但那是用来逗乐的。我是说，杰米·李，她很好，但她还不足以让我或查理做出情绪化的决定。（笑声）查理，我相信你有话要补充。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s a different movie than is shown in most corporate meetings. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，这与大多数公司会议上播放的电影不同。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But have we ever made an emotional decision?
沃伦·巴菲特：但我们曾经做出过情绪化的决定吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：没有。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s in business we’re talking about. Yeah, no. You don’t want to be a no emotion person in all of your life, but you definitely want to be a no emotion person in making an investment or business decision.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们说的是在商业上。是的，没有。你不想在生活的方方面面都成为一个没有情绪的人，但你在做投资或商业决定时绝对要成为一个没有情绪的人。

You can argue that we’ve probably made an emotional decision, perhaps, when a manager has been with us for some period, and we’ve ignored the fact that perhaps they weren’t quite what they were earlier.
你可以争辩说，我们可能在某种程度上做出了情绪化的决定，比如当一个经理与我们共事了一段时间，我们忽略了他们可能不再像以前那样的事实。

But our businesses are so good that they run better sometimes when — I mean, I’ve talked about Wesco, for example, the wonderful Louis Vincenti. And it ran on automatic pilot for a while, but I don’t think we suffered by it. But you can argue if Louis as much as we did, we might’ve spotted it a little bit earlier. But I don’t think it made any difference in the results. Would you agree with that, Charlie?
但我们的业务非常好，有时它们在自动驾驶模式下运行得更好——我的意思是，比如我谈到过的Wesco，了不起的路易斯·文森蒂。它有一段时间在自动驾驶模式下运行，但我认为我们并未因此受到损失。但你可以争辩说，如果我们像路易斯那样关注，我们可能会更早发现一些问题。但我认为这对结果没有影响。你同意吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, (UNINTEL PHRASE) with it. I’m glad we the way we did at Wesco. By the way, we bought the thing for a few tens of millions, and it became worth $2 billion or $3 billion.
查理·芒格：是的，（听不清的短语）。我很高兴我们在Wesco的做法。顺便说一句，我们以几千万美元买下了它，后来它价值20亿或30亿美元。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that wasn’t common in the savings and loan business, as you may have noticed. (Laugh) They really went crazy in that industry, and we had a wonderful guy in Louis.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你可能已经注意到，这在储蓄和贷款行业中并不常见。（笑）那个行业真的很疯狂，而我们有路易斯这样一个了不起的人。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We didn’t go crazy.
查理·芒格：我们没有发疯。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we didn’t go crazy. Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们没有发疯。是的。

7. Jain: GEICO’s technology is ‘still a work in progress’ (贾因：GEICO的技术“仍在进展中”)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Ben Knoll in Minneapolis. He says he’s a Berkshire shareholder of three decades and he’s attended many Berkshire meetings. He’s here again this year.
贝基·奎克：这个问题来自明尼阿波利斯的本·诺尔。他说他是伯克希尔三十年的股东，参加过多次伯克希尔会议，今年他又来了。

And this is addressed to Ajit and Greg. He says, “Last year I asked you about how GEICO and BNSF appeared to lose ground to their leading competitors, GEICO on telematics and BNSF on precision scheduled railroading.
这个问题是给阿吉特和格雷格的。他说：“去年我问过你们，GEICO和BNSF似乎在领先竞争对手面前失去了优势，GEICO在远程信息处理方面，BNSF在精准调度铁路方面。

“Ajit, you responded by saying how you expected GEICO to make progress in about a year or two. Greg, you spoke about your pride in BNSF, but you didn’t directly address the threat of precision scheduled railroading. Will each of you please provide perspective on these competitive challenges and our company’s strategies to address them?”
“阿吉特，你回答说你预计GEICO在一两年内会取得进展。格雷格，你谈到了对BNSF的骄傲，但没有直接回应精准调度铁路的威胁。请你们各自提供对这些竞争挑战的看法以及我们公司的应对策略？”

AJIT JAIN: In terms of GEICO and telematics, let me make the observation that GEICO has certainly taken the bull by the horns and has made rapid strides in terms of trying to bridge the gap in terms of telematics and its competitors. They have now reached a point where on all new business, close to 90% has a telematics input to the pricing position.
阿吉特·贾因：关于GEICO和远程信息处理，我想说，GEICO确实迎难而上，在试图缩小与竞争对手在远程信息处理方面的差距上取得了快速进展。他们现在已经达到一个阶段，所有新业务的定价中有近90%都纳入了远程信息处理的数据。

Unfortunately, less than half of that is being taken up by the policyholders. The other point I want to make is even though we have made improvements in terms of bridging the gap on telematics, we still haven’t started to realize the true benefit.
不幸的是，投保人接受的比例不到一半。我想说的另一点是，尽管我们在缩小远程信息处理差距方面取得了进步，但我们还没有开始实现真正的收益。

And the real culprit of the bottleneck is technology. GEICO’s technology needs a lot more work than I thought it did. It has more than 600 legacy systems that don’t really talk to each other. And we are trying to compress them to no more than 15, 16 systems that all talk to each other.
瓶颈的真正原因是技术。GEICO的技术比我想象的需要更多工作。它有超过600个遗留系统，彼此之间无法有效沟通。我们正试图将它们压缩到不超过15或16个系统，并且这些系统能够相互沟通。

That’s a monumental challenge, and because of that, even though we have made improvements in telematics, we still have a long way to go because of technology. Because of that, and because of the whole issue more broadly in terms of matching rate to risk, GEICO is still a work in progress.
这是一个巨大的挑战，因此，尽管我们在远程信息处理方面取得了改进，但由于技术问题，我们还有很长的路要走。因此，结合更广泛的匹配费率与风险的问题，GEICO仍在进展中。

I don’t know if any of you had a chance to look at the first quarter results, but GEICO has had a very good first quarter, coming in at a combined ratio of 93 and change, which means a margin of six and change. Even though that’s very good, it’s not something we can take to the bank because there are two unusual items that contributed to it.
我不知道你们是否有人看过第一季度的结果，但GEICO第一季度表现非常好，综合成本率为93点几，意味着利润率约为6点几。尽管这很好，但我们不能完全依赖它，因为有两个不寻常的因素促成了这个结果。

Firstly, we’ve had what is called prior year reserve releases. We’ve reduced reserves for the previous years, and that contributed to it. And secondly, every year the first quarter tends to be a seasonally good quarter for auto insurance writers.
首先，我们有所谓的上一年度准备金释放。我们减少了前几年的准备金，这对此有所贡献。其次，每年第一季度通常是汽车保险公司的季节性好季度。

So, if you adjust for those two factors, my guess is the end of the year GEICO will end up with a combined ratio just south of 100, as opposed to the target they’re shooting for is 96. I hope they reach the target of 96 by the end of next year.
所以，如果调整这两个因素，我的猜测是，到年底GEICO的综合成本率将略低于100，而不是他们目标的96。我希望他们能在明年年底达到96的目标。

But instead of getting too excited about it, I think it’s important to realize that even if you reach 96 it will come at the expense of having lost policyholders. There is a trade-off between profitability and growth, and clearly, we are going to emphasize profitability and not growth. And that will come at the expense of policyholders.
但与其对此过于兴奋，我认为重要的是要认识到，即使达到了96，也将以失去投保人为代价。盈利能力和增长之间存在权衡，显然，我们将优先考虑盈利能力而不是增长。这将以牺牲投保人为代价。

So, it will not be until two years from now that we’ll be back on track, fighting the battles on both the profitability and growth fronts.
所以，直到两年后，我们才能回到正轨，同时在盈利能力和增长两个战线上作战。

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8. Abel: BNSF continues to work on efficiency and safety improvements (阿贝尔：BNSF继续致力于效率和安全改进)

WARREN BUFFETT: Greg? Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格？是的。

GREG ABEL: Moving to BNSF, I’ll start again by expressing great pride in the BNSF team. We have an exceptional group led by [CEO] Katie [Farmer] and her managers that show up every day to do great work on the railroad. At the same time, they would be the first to acknowledge there’s more to be done there.
格雷格·阿贝尔：谈到BNSF，我想再次表达对BNSF团队的极大骄傲。我们有一个由首席执行官凯蒂·法默及其经理人领导的出色团队，他们每天都为铁路做出出色的工作。同时，他们会是第一个承认还有更多工作要做的人。

The specific reference to precision scheduled railroading, the other large Class A railroads in the U.S. follow that, and including the two in Canada. We’re well aware what they’re doing, and obviously pay close attention to their operating metrics.
具体提到精准调度铁路，美国其他大型一级铁路公司都遵循这一模式，包括加拿大的两家。我们很清楚他们在做什么，显然密切关注他们的运营指标。

And our team strives every day to be more efficient, obviously. I would say we balance it with the needs of our customers. If I look back to pre-2022, so we look at the three-year period of 2019, 2020, 2021, the BNSF team made significant progress on their efficiencies, and delivering overall value back to the shareholders and to their customers.
我们的团队每天都在努力提高效率，显然是这样。我想说，我们在效率和客户需求之间保持平衡。如果回顾2022年之前，2019年、2020年、2021年的三年期间，BNSF团队在效率方面取得了显著进展，为股东和客户创造了整体价值。

And at the same time, maintaining a very safe railroad for our employees. So, we’re making excellent progress. That didn’t stop last year. They made great progress.
同时，为我们的员工保持了一个非常安全的铁路。所以，我们取得了很好的进展。去年这并没有停止，他们取得了很大进展。

Again, the reality in 2022 is we did go through a period of time where we had to call it, “Reset the Railroad.”
再说一次，2022年的现实是，我们确实经历了一段时间，我们称之为“重置铁路”。

We came out of the pandemic, there were the supply challenges. We had certain other labor issues and other things going on at the port.
我们走出了疫情，面临供应链挑战。我们在港口还遇到了一些劳工问题和其他问题。

And the reality is, our team prioritized getting the railroad back in place for the long-term, not a short-term focus on hitting certain operating metrics in 2022. We’re well aware of where we were relative to those metrics.
现实是，我们的团队优先考虑让铁路为长期发展重新就位，而不是在2022年专注于实现某些短期运营指标。我们很清楚我们在这些指标上的位置。

But the real focus was to get the railroad reset in a safe manner so it could deliver long-term value and long-term service to our customers. And that’s really what we’ll continue to see with that team.
但真正的重点是以安全的方式重置铁路，使其能够为客户提供长期价值和长期服务。这就是我们将继续在这支团队身上看到的。

There’ll be continual progress. There’ll be years where it’s not as quick, or even we go backwards. But over the long-term, we’ll see exceptional results from that team, and couldn’t be more proud that we have that asset. Thank you. (Applause)
会有持续的进步。有些年份进展不那么快，甚至可能倒退。但从长远来看，我们将从这支团队看到卓越的结果，我为我们拥有这笔资产感到非常骄傲。谢谢。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I would just — well, he deserves — but both of them deserve applause.
沃伦·巴菲特：我想说——嗯，他值得——但他们俩都值得掌声。

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9. Todd Combs doing ‘wonderful job’ running GEICO (托德·库姆斯在GEICO表现出色)

WARREN BUFFETT: I would like to add one thing. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：我想补充一点。（掌声）

At GEICO, Todd Combs was Ajit’s choice and my choice to go back to GEICO to work on the problem of matching rate to risk, which is what insurance is all about. And he arrived with exquisite timing, right before the pandemic broke out and all kinds of things changed.
在GEICO，托德·库姆斯是阿吉特和我选择回去GEICO工作的人，解决匹配费率与风险的问题，这是保险的核心。他来的时机恰到好处，就在疫情爆发、各种事情发生变化之前。

But Todd is doing a wonderful job at GEICO. And he works closely with Ajit. He has a home in Omaha, he comes back here, and we get together on the weekend sometimes too. So, that’s been a remarkable accomplishment under difficult circumstances. And he’s not all the way home, but he’s made a very, very big change in multiple ways at GEICO.
但托德在GEICO干得非常出色。他与阿吉特密切合作。他在奥马哈有家，经常回来，我们有时也会在周末聚会。所以，这是在艰难环境下取得的非凡成就。他还没有完全完成任务，但他在GEICO的多个方面已经做出了非常大的改变。

And one other thing I would like to mention, there have been a lot of public companies created in the last decade or thereabouts in insurance. And there’s none of them that we would like to own, and they always started out in their perspective saying, “This is a tech company, not an insurance company.”
我想提到另一件事，过去十年左右，保险行业涌现了许多上市公司。我们没有一家想拥有的，它们总是从自己的角度说：“这是一家科技公司，而不是保险公司。”

Of course, they’re a tech company. Everybody, whether they’re insurance or a lot of other places, are using the facility but you still have to properly match rate to risk. And they invariably have reported huge losses, they’ve eaten up capital.
当然，它们是科技公司。每个人，无论是在保险还是其他许多行业，都在使用技术设施，但你仍然需要正确匹配费率与风险。它们总是报告巨大损失，消耗了资本。

But there’s been one company that nobody has generally heard of. There’s only been one that I know of, company started in the last ten years, that has been an overwhelming success. And that’s a company that Ajit and four people who joined with him set to develop a new business. It’s called Berkshire Hathaway Specialty. What’s the float, Ajit?
但有一家公司几乎无人知晓。据我所知，过去十年唯一一家取得巨大成功的公司，是阿吉特和与他一起的四个人创立的新业务，叫做伯克希尔哈撒韦专业保险。浮存金是多少，阿吉特？

AJIT JAIN: Coming up to $12 billion.
阿吉特·贾因：接近120亿美元。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’ve built more float than probably all these companies combined. It’s cost us essentially nothing in terms of an underwriting loss. The four people have turned into, I don’t know, 1,500 around the world. We took on the whole industry and we brought some unique talent in the four people that came.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们的浮存金可能比所有这些公司加起来还多。这在承保损失方面几乎没有让我们付出任何代价。四个人已经发展到，我不知道，全球大约1500人。我们挑战了整个行业，带来了四位独特的人才。

And now have, like I said, 1,500 or so worldwide. And we brought capital, and we brought capabilities that really only Berkshire could supply. So, it was the combination of brains, and talent, and energy, and money.
现在，正如我所说，全球大约有1500人。我们带来了资本，带来了只有伯克希尔才能提供的独特能力。所以，这是智慧、才能、能量和金钱的结合。

And no one has really successfully entered this space — plenty of people in the space who didn’t like us coming. And we did it without it costing us a dime of entry. And it’s been unmatched by any of the companies that went public. And people have seen us do it, but they can’t duplicate it.
没有人真正成功进入这个领域——很多在这一领域的人不喜欢我们的到来。我们进入时没有花费一分钱入场费。这一点是任何上市的公司都无法比拟的。人们看到我们做到了，但他们无法复制。

And that’s what Ajit has created. And Peter Eastwood has led this group, Berkshire Hathaway Specialty. And it’s just remarkable. So, anyway, with that — let’s go on — give them a hand for that. (Applause)
这就是阿吉特创造的。皮特·伊斯特伍德领导了这个团队，伯克希尔哈撒韦专业保险。这非常了不起。所以，无论如何——继续吧——为他们鼓掌。（掌声）

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10. Munger on AI: ‘Old-fashioned intelligence works pretty well’ (芒格谈AI：“老式智慧效果很好”)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s go to section two.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，转到第二区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Charlie. Hi, Warren. I’m Karen, here from Singapore.
观众成员：嗨，查理。嗨，沃伦。我是凯伦，来自新加坡。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m glad you got that in. Your priorities are right.
沃伦·巴菲特：我很高兴你先提到他。你的优先级是对的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. I have questions on AI and robotics. Here’s my questions. As AI and robotics continue to advance, what do you believe will be the positive and the negative impacts of this technology on both the stock market and society as a whole? And there any specific industries and companies that you believe will be most impacted? (Applause)
观众成员：是的。我有关于AI和机器人的问题。我的问题是，随着AI和机器人技术的持续进步，你们认为这项技术对股票市场和整个社会的正面和负面影响是什么？有没有特定行业或公司你们认为会受到最大影响？（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Karen, I thank you for asking Charlie that question. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：凯伦，谢谢你把这个问题问查理。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you went into BYD’s factories in China, you would see robotics going at an unbelievable rate. So, we’re going to see a lot more robotics in the world. I am personally skeptical of some of the hype that has gone into artificial intelligence. I think old-fashioned intelligence works pretty well. (Laughter) (Applause)
查理·芒格：嗯，如果你去中国的比亚迪工厂，你会看到机器人以惊人的速度运作。所以，我们将会在世界上看到更多机器人。我个人对人工智能的一些炒作持怀疑态度。我认为老式的智慧效果很好。（笑声）（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: There won’t be anything in AI that replaces Ajit. State that unqualifiedly. It can do amazing things. You know, Bill Gates brought me out maybe not the latest version, but one he thought maybe I could handle. (Laugh) He has to be careful with me, in terms of leading me too fast.
沃伦·巴菲特：人工智能不会取代阿吉特，绝对如此。它可以做很多惊人的事情。你知道，比尔·盖茨给我展示了一个版本，可能不是最新的，但他认为我能应付。（笑）他得小心，别带我走得太快。

And it did these remarkable things. But it couldn’t tell jokes. Bill told me that ahead of time, and it prepared me. And it just isn’t there. But you know, with things like checking all the legal opinions, you know, since the beginning of time and everything, and eliminating all the — I mean, it can do all kinds of things.
它确实做了很多了不起的事情。但它不会讲笑话。比尔提前告诉我了，这让我有所准备。它就是没有这种能力。但你知道，比如检查所有的法律意见，从一开始到现在，排除所有的——我的意思是，它可以做各种各样的事情。

And when something can do all kinds of things, I get a little bit worried because I know we won’t be able to un-invent it. And you know, we did invent, for a very, very good reason, the atom bomb in World War II. And it was enormously important that we did so.
当某样东西可以做各种各样的事情时，我有点担心，因为我知道我们无法让它“未被发明”。你知道，我们在二战中发明了原子弹，原因非常充分。这对我们来说极其重要。

But is it good for the next 200 years of the world that the ability to do so has been unleashed? We didn’t have any choice.
但对未来200年的世界来说，这种能力的释放是好事吗？我们别无选择。

When you start something — well, Einstein said after the atom bomb, he said, “This has changed everything in the world except how men think.”
当你开始某件事——嗯，爱因斯坦在原子弹之后说过：“这改变了世界上的一切，除了人类的思维方式。”

And I would say the same thing may — not the same thing — I don’t mean that — but I mean with AI, it can change everything in the world except how men think and behave. And that’s a big step to take. It’s a good question, and it’s the best answer we can give.
我想说，人工智能可能——不是同样的东西——我不是那个意思——但我的意思是，人工智能可以改变世界上的一切，除了人类的思维和行为方式。这是一个很大的步骤。这是一个好问题，这是我们能给出的最好答案。

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11. Munger: Commercial real estate downturn will be ‘quite significant and quite unpleasant’ (芒格：商业房地产低迷将“相当显著且相当不愉快”)

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?
沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Tom Seymour. He says, “The first sentence of a recent Financial Times article read, ‘Charlie Munger has warned of a brewing storm in the U.S. commercial property market with American banks full of what he said were bad loans as property prices fall.’
贝基·奎克：这个问题来自汤姆·西摩。他说：“最近《金融时报》的一篇文章首句写道，‘查理·芒格警告说，美国商业房地产市场正在酝酿一场风暴，美国银行充斥着他所说的不良贷款，因为房价下跌。’

“Please elaborate on what’s going on in commercial real estate. How bad will the losses be, and what sectors or geographies look particularly bad?”
“请详细说明商业房地产发生了什么。损失会有多严重，哪些行业或地区看起来特别糟糕？”

I’ll just add an addendum from another viewer who wrote in and wanted to know if Berkshire would be more active in commercial real estate as a result.
我再补充另一个观众的提问，他想知道伯克希尔会因此在商业房地产领域更活跃吗。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Berkshire’s never been very active in commercial real estate. It works better for taxable investors than it does for corporations to act the way that Berkshire is. So, I don’t anticipate huge effects on Berkshire. But I do think that the hollowing out of the downtowns in the United States and elsewhere in the world is going to be quite significant and quite unpleasant.
查理·芒格：嗯，伯克希尔在商业房地产领域从未非常活跃。对纳税投资者来说，这种方式比对像伯克希尔这样的公司更有效。所以，我不认为伯克希尔会受到巨大影响。但我认为，美国和其他地方市中心的空心化将是相当显著且相当不愉快的。

I think the country will get through it all right, but as they say, it will often involve a different set of owners.
我认为国家会顺利度过难关，但正如他们所说，这通常会涉及一组不同的业主。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and the buildings don’t go away, but —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，建筑物不会消失，但是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: The owners do.
查理·芒格：业主会消失。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, (Laughter) but most people like to buy with non-recourse in real estate. And one time I asked Charlie, there was some real estate guy, we were talking to him, you know, “How do they decide how much a building like this is worth?” And the answer is, “It’s whatever they can borrow without signing their name.”
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，（笑声）但大多数人喜欢用无追索权的方式购买房地产。有一次我问查理，我们在和一个房地产家伙交谈，你知道，“他们如何决定这样的建筑值多少钱？”答案是：“他们能借到多少钱，而不用签自己的名字。”

And if you look at real estate generally, you’ll understand the phenomenon that’s happening if you remind yourself that that’s the attitude of most people that have become big in the real estate business. And it does mean that the lenders are the ones that get the property.
如果你总体上看房地产，你会理解正在发生的现象，如果你提醒自己，这是大多数在房地产行业做大的人的态度。这确实意味着放贷者是获得物业的人。

And of course, they don’t want the property usually, so the real estate operator counts on negotiating with them, and the banks tend to, you know, extend and pretend. And there’s all kinds of activities that (UNINTEL) about us out of commercial real estate development, which occurs on a big scale.
当然，他们通常不想要物业，所以房地产经营者指望与他们谈判，银行倾向于，你知道，延长和假装。有各种各样的活动让我们远离大规模的商业房地产开发。

But it all has consequences, and I think we’re starting to see the consequences of people who could borrow at 2.5%, and find out it doesn’t work at current rates, and they hand it back to somebody that gave them all the money they needed to build it. Charlie’s had more experience. Charlie got his start in real estate, though.
但这一切都有后果，我想我们开始看到那些能以2.5%利率借贷的人的后果，他们发现当前利率下行不通，然后把物业还给那些给了他们建造所需全部资金的人。查理有更多经验。查理的职业生涯是从房地产开始的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, it’s difficult. I like what we do better. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的，这很困难。我更喜欢我们现在做的事情。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, as Charlie once said to me when I was leaving his house a few months ago — I was visiting him, we talked for a couple of hours. And as I left, there wasn’t anybody else in the house except one daughter. I said, “Charlie, I’ll just keep doing what we’ve been doing.” And Charlie, without looking up or pausing a second, said, “That’s all you know how to do, Warren.” (Laughter) He was right too.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，几个月前我离开查理家时，查理曾对我说——我去探望他，我们聊了几个小时。当我离开时，房子里只有他一个女儿。我说：“查理，我会继续做我们一直在做的事情。”查理头也没抬，停顿一秒就说：“沃伦，这是你唯一会做的事情。”（笑声）他说的也没错。

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12. ‘What gives you opportunities is other people doing dumb things’ (“给你机会的是别人做蠢事”)

WARREN BUFFETT: Station three, is it?
沃伦·巴菲特：第三区域，对吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is (UNINTEL PHRASE), I’m from Santa Clara, California. And my question is to Charlie and Warren. Given the rise of disruptive technologies that can improve productivity significantly, and AI being one of them, how do you envision the future of value investing in this new era? And what adaptations or new principles do you think investors should adopt? And any recommendations for investors to remain successful in this rapid changing landscape? Thank you.
观众成员：嗨。我的名字是（听不清的短语），我来自加州圣克拉拉。我的问题是给查理和沃伦的。鉴于能够显著提高生产力的颠覆性技术的兴起，人工智能是其中之一，你如何设想这个新时代的价值投资的未来？你认为投资者应该采取哪些适应或新原则？有什么建议给投资者在这个快速变化的环境中保持成功？谢谢。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m glad to take that one. I think value investors are going to have a harder time now that there’s so many of them competing for a diminished bunch of opportunities. So, my advice to value investors is to get used to making less.
查理·芒格：嗯，我很高兴回答这个问题。我认为价值投资者现在会面临更艰难的时期，因为有太多人在竞争越来越少的机会。所以，我对价值投资者的建议是，习惯于赚得更少。

WARREN BUFFETT: And Charlie has been telling me the same thing the whole time we’ve known each other. I mean, we get along wonderfully because —
沃伦·巴菲特：查理在我们认识的整个时间里一直对我说同样的话。我的意思是，我们相处得很好，因为——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we are making less.
查理·芒格：嗯，我们确实赚得少了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, but that mostly I think is (Laughter) (UNINTEL PHRASE) —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，但我认为主要是（笑声）（听不清的短语）——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We did that when we were younger.
查理·芒格：我们年轻时就是这么做的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we never thought we could manage $508 billion.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们从未想过我们能管理5080亿美元。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, we never did.
查理·芒格：不，我们从未想过。

WARREN BUFFETT: You know, but I would argue that there are going to be plenty of opportunities. And part of the reason there are going to be plenty of opportunities, the tech doesn’t make any difference for any of that. I mean, if you look at how the world’s changed in the years since 1942 when I started, you’d say, “Well, how does a kid that doesn’t know anything about airplanes, that doesn’t know anything about engines and cars, and doesn’t know anything about electricity and all that?” But new things coming along don’t take away the opportunities.
沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，但我想说，机会会很多。部分原因是机会会很多，技术对此没有任何影响。我的意思是，如果你看看自1942年我开始以来世界是如何变化的，你会说：“嗯，一个对飞机、引擎、汽车、电力一无所知的孩子是怎么做到的？”但新事物的出现不会带走机会。

What gives you opportunities is other people doing dumb things. (Laughter) (Applause) Well, the 58 years we’ve been running Berkshire, I would say there’s been a great increase in the number of people doing dumb things. And they do big, dumb things, and the reason they do it to some extent is because they can get money from other people so much easier than when we started.
给你机会的是别人做蠢事。（笑声）（掌声）嗯，我们经营伯克希尔的58年里，我会说做蠢事的人数量大大增加。他们做大的蠢事，某种程度上是因为他们比我们刚开始时更容易从别人那里拿到钱。

So, you could start ten or 15 dumb insurance companies in the last ten years, and you could become rich if you were adroit at it, whether the business succeeded or not, and the underwriters got paid, and the lawyers got paid. And if that’s done on a large scale — which it couldn’t be done 58 years ago.
所以，在过去十年里，你可以创立十家或十五家愚蠢的保险公司，如果你擅长操作，你可以变得富有，无论生意是否成功，承销商拿到了报酬，律师也拿到了报酬。如果这是在大规模上进行的——58年前是做不到的。

You couldn’t get the money to do some of the dumb things that we wanted to do, (Laugh) fortunately. And so, I think that investing has disappeared so much from this huge capitalistic market that anybody can play in, but that the big money is in selling other people ideas.
你无法拿到钱去做一些我们想做的蠢事，（笑）幸好如此。所以，我认为投资在这个巨大的资本主义市场中已经消失了很多，任何人都可以参与，但大钱在于向别人推销想法。

It isn’t outperforming. And I think if you don’t run too much money, which we do — but if you’re running small amounts of money, I think the opportunities will be greater. But then Charlie and I always differed on this subject. He likes to tell me how gloomy the world is, and I like to tell him, “We’ll find something.” And so far, we’ve both be kind of right. (Laugh) Charlie, would you budge an inch on that, or not? (Laughter)
不是超越市场。我认为如果你不管理太多钱，我们确实管理了很多——但如果你管理少量的钱，我认为机会会更大。但我和查理在这个问题上一直有分歧。他喜欢告诉我世界有多悲观，而我喜欢告诉他，“我们会找到一些东西。”到目前为止，我们俩似乎都有些对。（笑）查理，你会在这点上让步一英寸吗？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: There is so much money now in the hands of so many smart people, all trying to outsmart one another and out-promote one another, getting more money out of other people. And it’s a radically different world from the world we started in. And I suppose it will have its opportunities, but it’s also going to have some unpleasant episodes.
查理·芒格：现在有这么多钱掌握在这么多聪明人手中，他们都在试图比对方更聪明，互相推销，从别人那里拿到更多钱。这与我们开始时的世界完全不同。我想它会有它的机会，但也会有一些不愉快的事件。

WARREN BUFFETT: But they’re trying to outsmart each other in arenas that you don’t have to play. I mean, if you look at that government bond market, at the Treasury bill market, I mean, you have this one bill that’s out of line with the others, and went (UNINTEL PHRASE) $3 billion of it the other day.
沃伦·巴菲特：但他们在你不必参与的领域里试图比对方更聪明。我的意思是，如果你看看政府债券市场，国库券市场，你会发现有一张券与其他的不一致，前几天我们（听不清的短语）买了30亿美元。

But the world is overwhelmingly short-term focused. And if you go to an investor relations call, they’re all trying to figure out how to fill out a sheet to show the earnings for the year. And the management is interested in feeding them expectations, so we’ll slightly be beaten.
但世界绝大多数是短期导向的。如果你参加一个投资者关系电话会议，他们都在试图弄清楚如何填写一张表格来展示今年的收益。管理层有兴趣为他们提供预期，这样我们会略微被击败。

I mean, that is a world that’s made to order for anybody that’s trying to think about what you do that should work over five, or ten, or 20 years. And I just think that I would love to be born today, and go out with not too much money, and hopefully turn it into a lot of money. And Charlie would too, actually. (Laugh)
我的意思是，这个世界是为那些试图思考在五、十、二十年后应该做什么的人量身定做的。我只是觉得，我很想今天出生，带着不多的钱出去，然后希望把它变成很多钱。查理其实也是这样想的。（笑）

He would find something to do, I will just guarantee you. And it wouldn’t be exactly the same as before, but he would have a big, big, big pile.
我保证他会找到一些事情做。不会和以前完全一样，但他会有很大、很大、很大的一堆财富。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would not like the thrill of losing my big pile into a small pile. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我不喜欢把我的大堆财富变成小堆的刺激。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But we might —
沃伦·巴菲特：但我们可能——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I like my big pile just the way it is. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我喜欢我的大堆财富现在的样子。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We agree on that, incidentally.
沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一句，我们在这点上意见一致。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, we do. (Laughter) You’re one of the most extreme lovers of the big pile. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的，我们确实如此。（笑声）你是最极端的财富大堆爱好者之一。（笑声）

13. AIG liability assumption deal is turning out to be ‘good but not great’ (AIG负债承接交易表现“不错但非最佳”)

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?
沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question is for both Warren and Ajit. Comes from Jason Plonner (PH) in Livingston, New Jersey.
贝基·奎克：这个问题是给沃伦和阿吉特的，来自新泽西利文斯顿的杰森·普隆纳（音译）。

He says, “In 2016, you entered into a very unique transition with AIG where you assumed up to $20 billion of liabilities in exchange for about $10 billion upfront. Can you please provide an update on this transition in light of the increase in interest rates?
他说：“2016年，你们与AIG进行了一项非常独特的交易，承接了高达200亿美元的负债，换取约100亿美元的预付款。鉴于利率上升，请提供这项交易的最新情况？

And then in Tokyo just a few weeks ago, you talked about the risks of banks with assets that were susceptible to rising interest rates. Any insight as to how Berkshire liabilities are susceptible to duration would be appreciated.”
几周前在东京，你谈到了银行资产因利率上升而面临的风险。请提供一些关于伯克希尔负债如何受期限影响的见解。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Is that directed to Ajit, or me, or what?
沃伦·巴菲特：这个问题是给阿吉特，还是我，还是怎么回事？

BECKY QUICK: Both.
贝基·奎克：给你们俩。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Let me introduce my one thing, but Ajit is the key to this. He’s the one that put the deal together. But we got handed $10 billion, we’ll say. But we weren’t restricted to putting that into bonds. So, interest rates affect us to some degree maybe, in terms of the deal we did with AIG, or anybody we would do a similar deal with like that.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我先介绍一下，但阿吉特是关键。他是促成这笔交易的人。我们拿到了大约100亿美元。但我们没有被限制只能投资债券。所以，利率可能会在某种程度上影响我们，比如我们与AIG的交易，或者类似的交易。

But we don’t have to put it in matching bonds or anything of the sort. It goes into a general pool of assets, which we manage, and the liquid assets now are $130 plus. But it is not set aside in some little compartment like people like to think.
但我们不需要将其投资于匹配的债券之类的东西。它进入了我们管理的一个通用资产池，我们的流动资产现在超过1300亿美元。但它并没有像人们想象的那样被单独隔离在一个小隔间里。

Now, no other insurance company could do it. But they can’t think that way. They aren’t even used to thinking that way. But they can’t think that way because they don’t have our balance sheet. We account for 26% or something like that of the net worth of all property casualty companies in the United States.
现在，没有其他保险公司能做到这一点。他们无法这样思考。他们甚至不习惯这样思考。但他们不能这样思考，因为他们没有我们的资产负债表。我们占美国所有财产意外险公司净值的26%左右。

So far, the payments that we have had to make have run modestly. And Ajit will correct me on this if I’m wrong, because he paid attention. The amount we have had to pay has run slightly below the amount we anticipated having to pay in terms of our share of the losses.
到目前为止，我们需要支付的金额相当温和。如果我错了，阿吉特会纠正我，因为他一直在关注。我们支付的金额略低于我们预期需要支付的损失份额。

But it served AIG’s purposes. It came to us where we are in a unique position. There’s nobody else that was able to write that, just like when we took on Lloyd’s. I mean, Lloyd’s said there was no choice other than Berkshire Hathaway when they essentially resuscitated their market by laying off a lot of liabilities on Berkshire Hathaway.
但这符合AIG的目的。我们处于一个独特的位置，没有其他人能够承接这样的交易，就像我们接手劳埃德保险市场时一样。劳埃德说，除了伯克希尔哈撒韦，他们别无选择，通过将大量负债转移给伯克希尔哈撒韦，他们实际上重振了市场。

So, we won’t see those deals very often. If they’re for $500 million or something like that, somebody else will go in there and offer more money. And everybody’s looking for money on Wall Street. But if they start talking with the deal like the AIG deal, there isn’t any other stop now. Correct me on all my numbers there, Ajit. (Laughter)
所以，我们不会经常看到这样的交易。如果是5亿美元左右的交易，别人会出更高的价格。华尔街的每个人都在寻找资金。但如果他们开始谈像AIG这样的交易，现在没有其他选择。阿吉特，纠正我如果数字有误。（笑声）

AJIT JAIN: No. One way to look at how the deal is performing since we did the deal is at the point in time when we did the deal, we had made certain projections of how much we will pay out each year. And what we do is monitor what the action payments are since the inception of the deal, and how does that compare with what we expected to pay out.
阿吉特·贾因：没有。评估这笔交易表现的一个方法是，我们在交易时做了一些每年支付多少的预测。我们监控自交易开始以来的实际支付情况，并将其与我们预期支付的金额进行比较。

As Warren mentioned, these two numbers are very close to each other. More specifically, the actual payouts are 96% of what we had projected to pay out at this point in time, which is good but not great. We are still ahead of the curve. If we do end up paying out less than what we projected, not only would we have borrowed money at a very attractive rate, meaning significantly less than 4%, in addition to that we would have made a fee, which in 2015 dollars would be $1 million.
正如沃伦提到的，这两个数字非常接近。更具体地说，实际支付额是我们预计支付额的96%，这不错但不是最佳。我们仍然领先。如果我们最终支付的金额少于预测，不仅我们以非常有吸引力的利率借了钱，意味着远低于4%，此外我们还会赚到一笔费用，按2015年的美元计算为100万美元。

So, we would’ve borrowed money at less than 4% and we would’ve made $1 million fee, which is slightly more than what we were expecting to do. So, net/net, we’re very happy with the deal, we’re happy we did it. But the game is not over. There are tort liabilities that are coming down the pike every second day. So, I’m cautiously optimistic that the deal will work out better than how we expected it to work out.
所以，我们以低于4%的利率借了钱，还赚了100万美元的费用，这略高于我们的预期。所以，总体来说，我们对这笔交易非常满意，我们很高兴做了这笔交易。但游戏还没有结束。每隔一天就有侵权责任出现。所以，我谨慎乐观地认为，这笔交易的结果会比我们预期的更好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the really interesting thing is that within Berkshire, the casualty insurance companies have four times as much stockholder capital behind each dollar of premium value. Four times normal. And of course, we see the big deals. Who would you trust if you had a big liability you wanted to dump on somebody?
查理·芒格：嗯，真正有趣的是，在伯克希尔内部，意外险公司每美元保费背后有四倍于正常的股东资本。当然，我们会看到大交易。如果你要卸下一个大负债，你会信任谁？

WARREN BUFFETT: And we have $25 billion or more coming in from things other than insurance, uncorrelated to insurance, every year with no obligations. We don’t pay dividends. If we pay dividends, you know, and you cut your dividend, try going around trying to write insurance the next day.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们每年有250亿美元或更多的非保险相关收入，与保险无关，没有任何义务。我们不支付股息。如果你支付股息，然后削减股息，第二天再去尝试承保保险试试。

I mean, and it’s a business where people are counting on you to pay. And when we take that $10 billion, we don’t agree to put it in five-year bonds and ten-year bonds. We don’t even think that way. And the people that do business with us know that they have somebody like nobody else on those that’s going to be able to pay $10 billion no matter what happens to the economy.
我的意思是，这是一个人们指望你支付的行业。当我们拿那100亿美元时，我们没有同意将其投资于五年期或十年期债券。我们甚至不这样思考。与我们做生意的人知道，他们有一个无人能比的合作伙伴，无论经济发生什么，都能支付100亿美元。

So, it’s not only the presence of enormous strength in the insurance companies, it’s the fact we have all these earnings that essentially come in every month, we don’t have a lot of debt. I mean, we have debt at the railroad and the energy level. But in terms of the rest of the operation — And we don’t guarantee that debt, but it’s (UNINTEL).
所以，不仅是保险公司拥有巨大的实力，还有我们每个月都有这些收入流入，我们没有很多债务。我的意思是，我们在铁路和能源层面有债务。但就其他运营而言——我们不担保那些债务，但它是（听不清）。

And there just isn’t another Berkshire, and Ajit recognizes that when he’s negotiating. So does the other party if the sums are big enough. There’s all kinds of people that love to get $500 million or $300 million, and they may think in terms of lending it out because that’s what their insurance companies can do at a somewhere higher rate. But that is not a game we play, and we don’t have any interest in playing in.
世界上没有另一个伯克希尔，阿吉特在谈判时认识到了这一点。如果金额足够大，另一方也是如此。有很多人喜欢拿到5亿美元或3亿美元，他们可能会考虑将其借出，因为他们的保险公司可以以更高的利率这样做。但这不是我们玩的游戏，我们也没有兴趣参与。

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14. Never write a will without input from your children (不要在没有子女意见的情况下写遗嘱)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station four?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第四区域？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. I’m Marvin Blum, an estate planning lawyer from Fort Worth, Texas, home to many of your companies. In fact, Warren, I met you at the memorial for our beloved Paul Andrews, who was manager of TTI. I’d like to get your thoughts on a widespread problem in the world of estate planning.
观众成员：你好。我是马文·布卢姆，来自德克萨斯州沃斯堡的遗产规划律师，那里居住着你的许多公司。实际上，沃伦，我在TTI经理，我们敬爱的保罗·安德鲁斯的追悼会上见过你。我想听听你对遗产规划领域一个普遍问题的看法。

And that’s the failure of most parents to prepare the next generation for the inheritance coming their way. In particular, if the estate includes a family business, most parents fail to do business succession planning to plan for who’ll run the business on the day when, not if, the创始人 is no longer there to run it.
那就是大多数父母未能让下一代为即将到来的遗产做好准备。特别是，如果遗产包括家族企业，大多数父母未能进行企业接班规划，以计划在创始人不再管理企业的那一天——不是如果，而是何时——谁来管理企业。

The kids aren’t prepared, unlike the other King Charles, not King Charlie Munger, (Laughter) who has been preparing for his job as King of England now for more than 70 years. I sometimes describe the situation like this: Picture a football game. At one end of the field is a quarterback.
孩子们没有准备好，不像另一个查尔斯国王，不是查理·芒格国王，（笑声）他为成为英格兰国王的角色准备了超过70年。我有时这样描述这种情况：想象一场橄榄球比赛。场地一端有一个四分卫。

He has great skills; he throws a beautiful pass to the other end of the field. And at the other end of the field are the receivers. They’ve never been to a practice, they don’t know the rules of the game, they don’t know how to work together as a team. They’re clueless. So, the quarterback is the patriarch and the matriarch. The football is the inheritance or the family business, and the receivers are the kids. So, what are the odds that they’re going to catch the football and go score a touchdown? Probably only around 10%.
他有出色的技能，他向场地另一端抛出一个漂亮的传球。而场地另一端的接球手从未参加过训练，他们不知道比赛规则，不知道如何作为一个团队合作。他们毫无头绪。所以，四分卫是家族的家长，橄榄球是遗产或家族企业，接球手是孩子们。那么，他们接住球并得分的机会有多大？可能只有大约10%。

WARREN BUFFETT: I have the picture. (Laughter) (Applause) Just because of my age, and to some extent because of things like the giving pledges, I probably observed as many particularly wealthy families, the problems, and they all are very particular to the family.
沃伦·巴菲特：我明白了。（笑声）（掌声）由于我的年龄，某种程度上也因为像“给予誓言”这样的事情，我可能观察过许多特别富裕的家庭，他们的问题，每个家庭都有其特殊性。

And in my family, I do not sign a will until my three children have read it, understand it, and made suggestions. Now, my children are in their 60s and that would not have been a great success if I’d done the same thing in their 20s. It depends on the family; it depends on how the kids feel about each other.
在我的家庭中，我不会在三个孩子阅读、理解并提出建议之前签署遗嘱。现在，我的孩子们都60多岁了，如果他们在20多岁时这样做，可能不会很成功。这取决于家庭，取决于孩子们对彼此的感情。

There’s all kinds of things. Depends on the kind of business you have. So, there’s a thousand variables. But I do think that if the children are grown, and when the will is read to them, it’s the first they’ve heard about what the deceased thought about things, the parents have made a terrible mistake.
有很多因素。取决于你拥有什么样的企业。所以，有上千个变量。但我认为，如果孩子们已经成年，当遗嘱被宣读时，这是他们第一次听到逝者对事情的想法，父母犯了一个严重的错误。

And I’ve run into all kinds of situations, and some people don’t tell their children anything, and some of them try and get them to bend to their will by using their own personal will. They make a million mistakes. And that’s one you don’t get to correct. Well, Charlie’s had a lot of experience too with the —
我遇到过各种各样的情况，有些人不告诉他们的孩子任何事情，有些人试图通过自己的遗嘱让孩子们屈从于他们的意愿。他们犯了无数错误。而这是一个你无法纠正的错误。嗯，查理在这方面也有很多经验——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, at Berkshire we have a simple problem of estate planning. Just hold the goddamn stock. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，在伯克希尔，我们的遗产规划问题很简单。就是拿着该死的股票。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, (Applause) but that doesn’t fit everybody, Charlie.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，（掌声）但这并不适合所有人，查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, it only fits 95%. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：不，它只适合95%的人。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t know necessarily whether if you have billions of dollars, you want to leave it to all of your children. I mean, that’s something —
沃伦·巴菲特：我不确定如果你有数十亿美元，你是否想把它们全部留给你的孩子们。我的意思是，那是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s another question. But if you’re going to place it somewhere, I’d just as soon have Berkshire stock.
查理·芒格：嗯，那是另一个问题。但如果你要把它放在某个地方，我宁愿是伯克希尔的股票。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, oh, you’re solving the investment problems one. But you have the personal problem of the fact that when they were four, one of the kids pulled the other kid’s cat’s tail or something like that. I mean, you’re dealing with human beings.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，哦，你解决了投资问题。但你有个人问题，比如他们在四岁时，一个孩子拉了另一个孩子家猫的尾巴之类的事情。我的意思是，你在和人类打交道。

And the biggest thing you want is you want your children to get along. And you want that all through your life, and the estate isn’t the only place where you can mess that up. But I mean, I know a number of cases where the people did not know what was in the will where there were huge sums involved.
你最想要的是你的孩子们和睦相处。你希望这贯穿你的整个生活，遗产不是唯一会搞砸的地方。但我的意思是，我知道一些案例，涉及巨额财富，人们不知道遗嘱的内容。

And you know, within about 15 minutes each one of them had a lawyer, and you know, they don’t get along since. It’s important to handle it target. And if you want your kids to have certain values, it’s important that you live those values. It’s important that you talk about it to them. (Laugh)
你知道，大约15分钟内，他们每个人都请了律师，从那以后他们就不和了。正确处理这一点很重要。如果你要你的孩子有某些价值观，你自己活出这些价值观很重要。你需要和他们谈论这些。（笑）

They’re learning from you from the day they’re born, what you’re really like. And don’t think that a cleverly drawn will substitute for your own behavior in teaching your kids the values you hope that they will have. And then your will should be in conjunction with that.
他们从出生那天起就在学习你的真实样子。不要以为一份巧妙起草的遗嘱可以替代你自己的行为来教导孩子们你希望他们拥有的价值观。然后你的遗嘱应该与此相一致。

And they grow older, and then they learn to pass along their values in connection with the size of the estate. If there’s family farms it’s one thing, if it’s a bunch of marketable securities it’s something else.
他们长大了，然后学会根据遗产的规模传承他们的价值观。如果是家族农场是一回事，如果是一堆可交易证券又是另一回事。

But I know one instance by a particularly rich fellow that once a year he’d get his kids together, and have a dinner, and do all kinds of things to get them to sign their income tax returns in blank, because he didn’t want them to know how much money they had and everything.
但我知道一个特别富有的家伙，每年会把孩子们聚在一起，吃顿饭，做各种事情让他们在空白的所得税申报表上签字，因为他不想让他们知道自己有多少钱等等。

Well, that isn’t going to work. I mean, I don’t know necessarily what would’ve worked with him. But Charlie and I have said, if you want to figure out how you want to live your life, you write your obituary and reverse engineer it. You know, and Paul Andrews incidentally, who you mentioned at TTI, lived as great a life as anybody I’ve known.
嗯，那是行不通的。我的意思是，我不一定知道对他来说什么会有效。但查理和我说过，如果你想弄清楚你想如何生活，你就写下你的讣告，然后逆向推导。你知道，顺便说一句，你提到的TTI的保罗·安德鲁斯，他的生活是我认识的人中最精彩的。

And he thought about these problems, and he came to me. He was 61, I think, had all the money way beyond what he needed. He liked to give it to people. He had all kinds of good things he wanted to do. And he said, “For a year I’ve been worried about my business, TTI.”
他思考过这些问题，他来找我。我想他当时61岁，拥有的钱远远超过他所需的。他喜欢把钱给别人。他有很多想做的好事。他说：“一年来，我一直在担心我的公司TTI。”

And he said, “I have all the money I need. The family has all the money they need. But what do I do with the business? These people have helped me throughout my life.” And he said, “I can sell it to a competitor. And if I sold it to a competitor, they’d fire my people and keep their people when they put it together.
他说：“我有足够的钱。家人也有足够的钱。但我该拿公司怎么办？这些人在我一生中帮助过我。”他说：“我可以把它卖给竞争对手。如果我卖给竞争对手，他们会解雇我的人，保留他们自己的人来整合。”

“And if I sell it to a private equity firm or something, they’ll be figuring out their exit strategy as they sign the papers.” And he said, “It isn’t that you’re such a great guy, it’s just that you’re the only one left.” (Laughter)
“如果我卖给私募股权公司之类，他们在签文件时就会开始考虑退出策略。”他说：“不是因为你是个多好的人，只是因为你是唯一剩下的选择。”（笑声）

And we bought it, and we lived happily ever after. And that was a man that knew the life was about.
我们买下了它，从此过上了幸福的生活。那是一个懂得生活真谛的人。

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15. BNSF takes derailments ‘incredibly seriously’ (BNSF对脱轨事件“极其认真”)

WARREN BUFFETT: So, with that, let’s go onto Becky. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：有了这些，我们继续到贝基。（掌声）

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Don Glickstein in Seattle. He says, “Warren has criticized Norfolk Southern’s handling of its train derailment, yet has been silent about BNSF’s conduct. A federal judge ruled in March that BNSF intentionally and illegally violated an easement agreement on tribal land in Washington State by transporting long trains of crude oil.
贝基·奎克：这个问题来自西雅图的唐·格利克斯坦。他说：“沃伦批评了诺福克南方对其火车脱轨事件的处理，但对BNSF的行为保持沉默。三月，一名联邦法官裁定，BNSF在华盛顿州部落土地上故意且非法违反了地役权协议，运输了长列的原油列车。

“The same money the judge made his ruling a BNSF train derailed on tribal land, spilling oil in an environmentally sensitive area” What is Warren doing to ensure that BNSF and the Berkshire subsidiaries fulfill their ethical responsibilities? He says he’s been a Berkshire owner for more than two decades and he’s concerned that Berkshire has no systems to identify and address what he calls reprehensible behavior at BNSF and other subsidiaries?
“就在法官作出裁决的同一天，一列BNSF火车在部落土地上脱轨，泄漏了石油，污染了环境敏感区域。”沃伦在做什么以确保BNSF和伯克希尔子公司履行其道德责任？他说他持有伯克希尔股票超过二十年，他担心伯克希尔没有系统来识别和处理他称为BNSF和其他子公司的恶劣行为？

WARREN BUFFETT: Greg?
沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格？

GREG ABEL: Sure. It is a valid issue that our team obviously has been dealing with at BNSF. We did move crude across that tribal land. We had an agreement that allowed us to move X number of units per day. And we did breach it. We went over it. There were some fundamental breakdowns there that our team didn’t understand the number of trains that they could move.
格雷格·阿贝尔：当然。这是一个有效的问题，我们的团队显然一直在BNSF处理。我们确实在部落土地上运输了原油。我们有一个协议，允许我们每天运输X个单位。但我们违反了协议，超出了限制。我们的团队在理解他们可以运输的火车数量上存在一些根本性失误。

We have had significant discussions with the tribe looking to resolve the issues, recognizing we obviously benefited from moving those trains. And those type discussions will continue. I would say there’s lessons learned there that we have to, when we make a commitment, understand what that commitment is and live by it.
我们与部落进行了重要讨论，试图解决这些问题，认识到我们显然从运输这些火车中受益。这类讨论将继续进行。我想说，我们从中吸取了教训，当我们做出承诺时，必须理解承诺是什么，并遵守它。

Or don’t assume we can just move our trains as we wish or the cargo as we wish. We have to respect those agreements. There’s been a moment learned there. But at the same time, we’ve taken it very seriously and attempted to reach a resolution. And at some point, I hope we do come to a true resolution that’s fair both to the tribe and to BNSF.
或者不要假设我们可以随意移动我们的火车或货物。我们必须尊重这些协议。我们从中吸取了教训。但与此同时，我们非常认真对待此事，并试图达成解决方案。我希望在某个时候，我们能达成一个对部落和BNSF都公平的真正解决方案。

On the derailment side, we did have an issue around the track derailed. We worked very closely with the tribe to mitigate that issue instantly or at least over a very reasonable period of time. They were very responsive. Our team was very responsive. And there were really no long-term environmental impacts to that spill.
在脱轨方面，我们确实遇到了轨道脱轨的问题。我们与部落密切合作，立即或在合理的时间内缓解了这个问题。他们的反应很快，我们的团队也反应很快。那次泄漏实际上没有造成长期环境影响。

And as our teams highlighted in other comments, obviously derailments do occur in the industry. We take them incredibly seriously. They’re not all hazardous, but irrespective of that, we’re constantly looking at how do we prevent them. How do we detect them when we potentially have one that’s going to occur? And what do we do with our trains? And then ultimately it comes down responding properly. Because they will occur. And I think we have an incredibly dedicated team that’s always ready to respond to the communities they’re impacting.
正如我们的团队在其他评论中强调的，显然，脱轨事件在行业中确实会发生。我们对此极其认真。它们并不都是危险的，但无论如何，我们一直在研究如何预防它们。如何在我们可能发生脱轨时检测到它们？我们对火车做什么？最终归结为正确应对。因为它们会发生。我认为我们有一个非常敬业的团队，随时准备应对受影响的社区。

WARREN BUFFETT: There are derailments. How many a year?
沃伦·巴菲特：有脱轨事件。一年有多少次？

GREG ABEL: Yeah, well, there’s a thousand-plus in the industry.
格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，嗯，行业内有超过一千次。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. You know, you start hauling freight, and we’re a common carrier. And we take very heavy freight. And we take them in 100° weather. And we take it at 0° and we go around curves. And we have grades. (Laugh) And even a 1% grade, if you’re going down a hill with, I don’t know how much weight behind you, I mean, railroading is not an easy business.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。你知道，你开始运输货物，我们是公共承运人。我们运输非常重的货物。我们在100°F的天气下运输，也在0°F下运输，我们要绕过弯道，我们有坡度。（笑）即使是1%的坡度，如果你下山，后面不知道有多少重量，我的意思是，铁路运输不是一个简单的行业。

And of course, the systems were designed, you know, basically in the late 1800s, amid the late 1800s. And we have 22,000, I think it is, miles of track. And that doesn’t count sidings and some other things. It is not an easy business. We’ll make mistakes.
当然，这些系统基本上是在19世纪末设计的。我们有，我想是22000英里的轨道。这还不包括侧线和其他一些东西。这不是一个简单的行业。我们会犯错误。

We’re not making a mistake because we have a derailment. We will have derailments ten, 20 years, or 30 years from now. And we have to carry certain products we wish we didn’t have to carry. We’re a common carrier. Do we like carrying chlorine and ammonia and all? No.
我们不是因为脱轨而犯错。十年、二十年或三十年后我们仍然会有脱轨。我们必须运输一些我们希望不必运输的产品。我们是公共承运人。我们喜欢运输氯气和氨气之类的东西吗？不。

But they’re going to move from one place to another in this society. And we are a common carrier. And we load them if they select our railroad.
但在社会中，这些东西需要从一个地方运到另一个地方。我们是公共承运人。如果他们选择我们的铁路，我们就装载。

But we are better than we used to be. But we’ve got a long way to go. Is that a fair enough statement?
但我们比过去做得更好。但我们还有很长的路要走。这是一个足够公平的说法吗？

GREG ABEL: Absolutely.
格雷格·阿贝尔：绝对是。

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16. Berkshire utilities focusing on clean energy but coordinated national effort is needed (伯克希尔公用事业聚焦清洁能源，但需要全国协调努力)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station five.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第五区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Warren and Mr. Munger. My name is Soo Jing Hua (PH) from China, (FOREIGN LANGUAGE) company. And first of all, I’m so excited and very honored to be here today. And my question is: With more and more people focusing now on environmental competition protection and the government supporting the new energy industry as well, so what are your thoughts on the continued development of new energy? How may the new energy firms achieve better developments in the future?
观众成员：嗨，沃伦先生和芒格先生。我叫苏静华（音译），来自中国，（外语）公司。首先，我今天非常兴奋，也非常荣幸能在这里。我的问题是：随着越来越多的人关注环境竞争保护，政府也支持新能源产业，你对新能源的持续发展有什么看法？新能源公司在未来如何实现更好的发展？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, Greg I think, is the best to answer that because since we bought a company called MidAmerican but now called Berkshire Hathaway Energy. But he has been talking about it yearly, preparing reports hoping that we can help solve a number of the problems. And we probably spent more money than any utility, I would guess, in the United States.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，嗯，我认为格雷格是回答这个问题的最佳人选，因为自从我们买下了名为中美能源、现在叫伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的公司以来，他每年都在谈论这个问题，准备报告，希望我们能帮助解决一些问题。我猜我们可能比美国任何一家公用事业公司花的钱都多。

GREG ABEL: Absolutely.
格雷格·阿贝尔：绝对是。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we’ve just scratched the surface. But it is not easy when you cross state lines. I mean, you’ve got different jurisdictions. And this country should be ahead of where it is in terms of transmission. We have been the biggest factor in helping that. But why don’t you tell them a little bit about it?
沃伦·巴菲特：我们只是触及了表面。但跨州界并不容易。我的意思是，你会遇到不同的管辖区。这个国家在传输方面应该比现在领先。我们是帮助这方面最大的因素。但你为什么不给他们讲讲？

GREG ABEL: Sure, thanks, Warren. So, there’s no question there’s an energy transformation going on around the globe and as Warren touched on, in the U.S. And in some ways, I would hope here in the U.S. we’d at least have a clear plan across the nation as to how to approach that.
格雷格·阿贝尔：当然，谢谢，沃伦。毫无疑问，全球正在进行能源转型，正如沃伦提到的，在美国。某种程度上，我希望在美国我们至少有一个全国性的明确计划来处理这个问题。

But the reality is it is state by state with some exceptions. So, as a result, when you think of Berkshire Hathaway Energy, we own three U.S. utilities there. And they all participate in multiple states. But they’re developing plans state by state and then trying to integrate them across the various states.
但现实是，除了某些例外，情况是州际的。因此，当你想到伯克希尔哈撒韦能源，我们在美国拥有三家公用事业公司。它们都在多个州参与运营。但它们在逐州制定计划，然后试图在各州之间整合这些计划。

The opportunities are significant because there is a transformation going on. We’ve outlined our goal on where we’re going relative to carbon at BHE where they’ll by 2030 reduce their carbon footprint by 50% relative to 2005. So, that’s the Paris Accord and the standard they want to hold the utility industry or the utility companies to.
机会是显著的，因为正在发生转型。我们已经概述了BHE在碳排放方面的目标，到2030年将碳足迹相对于2005年减少50%。这是《巴黎协定》和他们希望公用事业行业或公司遵守的标准。

And we’re well on that path. But to achieve it is a true journey. I’ve often talked to Warren. When we bought Pacific back in the mid-2000s, we immediately recognized to build a lot of renewable energy like we’ve been doing in the Midwest and Iowa.
我们在这条路上进展顺利。但要实现它是一个真正的旅程。我经常和沃伦谈起。当我们在2000年代中期买下PacifiCorp时，我们立即意识到要像我们在中西部和爱荷华州那样建设大量可再生能源。

But that was basically in a single state. Now PacifiCorp, we’re in six states. We started that back in the mid-2000s. Here we are. And we laid out a great transmission plan. Here’s how we’re going to build it. Here’s how we’re going effectuate it, and all the benefits for our customers over that period of time.
但那基本上是在一个州内。现在PacifiCorp，我们在六个州运营。我们从2000年代中期开始。到了现在，我们制定了一个很好的传输计划。这是我们将如何建设它。这是我们将如何实施它，以及在此期间为客户带来的所有好处。

Here we are in 2023, and we have a little more than a third of that. At the time it was a $6 billion transmission project. Today we have a little more than a third of it built. And we’ve spent probably closer to $7 billion. And it’s the right outcome.
现在是2023年，我们只完成了三分之一多一点。当时这是一个60亿美元的传输项目。今天我们建成了三分之一多一点，可能花了接近70亿美元。这是正确的成果。

It’s still a great outcome for our customers. But as part of the transformation, you absolutely have to build it to move all that renewable energy. And that’s sort of the complexity Warren was highlighting. You can’t just wake up one day and solve this problem.
这对我们的客户来说仍然是一个很好的成果。但作为转型的一部分，你绝对必须建设它来移动所有可再生能源。这就是沃伦强调的复杂性。你不能某天醒来就解决这个问题。

You start with transmission, and then you build the resources. But at that same company, and if we look at what we’re doing across BHE Energy and that energy transformation, we have $70 billion of known projects that are really required to properly serve our customers and achieve that type of energy transformation across those utilities.
你从传输开始，然后建设资源。但在同一家公司，如果我们看看我们在BHE能源和能源转型方面所做的工作，我们有700亿美元的已知项目，这些项目确实是正确服务我们的客户和实现这些公用事业能源转型所需的。

And that’s in the coming ten years. So, we have a team that’s absolutely up to the challenge. They’re delivering on their commitments. And it’s a very good business opportunity for each of our companies and for our shareholders. Because as we deploy that capital, we obviously earn a return on equity of it. But it will be a long journey. It’ll happen over an extended period of time. And the further you get out there, the more dependent upon the evolution of a variety of technologies that are progressing, but not there yet.
这是在未来十年内。所以，我们有一个完全能够应对挑战的团队。他们在履行承诺。这对我们的每家公司和股东来说都是一个很好的商业机会。因为当我们部署这些资本时，我们显然会从中获得股本回报。但这将是一个漫长的旅程。它将在很长一段时间内发生。你走得越远，就越依赖于各种正在进步但尚未成熟的技术的演变。

WARREN BUFFETT: You’ve raised a question. I want to just take an extra minute now because it’s so important. And I don’t really know whether our form of government is ideal at all in terms of solving the problem you describe. We have solved it one time. In World War II, we took a country that was semi-limping along.
沃伦·巴菲特：你提出了一个问题。我想再多花一分钟，因为这太重要了。我真的不知道我们的政府形式在解决你描述的问题方面是否理想。我们曾经解决过一次。在二战期间，我们接手了一个半瘸半拐的国家。

And we found ourselves in a world war. And what we did in a world war is we brought a bunch of people to Washington at a $1 a year. I don’t know whether it was Sidney Weinberg or Goldman Sachs. You just name them. And we gave them enormous power to reorient the resources of the United States to face the problem that they faced, which was to create a war machine.
我们发现自己身处世界大战。我们在战争中所做的是，我们以每年1美元的薪水把一群人带到华盛顿。我不知道是西德尼·温伯格还是高盛。你随便说。他们被赋予了巨大的权力，以重新调整美国的资源来面对他们面临的问题，即创建战争机器。

And what they did was they found Henry Kaiser, you know, and told him to build ships. And they went to the Ford Motor Company and said, “You build tanks and some airplanes.” And they reordered the industrial enterprise of the United States in a way that was unbelievable.
他们做了什么？他们找到了亨利·凯撒，你知道，告诉他去造船。他们去了福特汽车公司，说：“你造坦克和一些飞机。”他们以一种不可思议的方式重新调整了美国的工业企业。

Because they had the power of the federal government. And they had the ingenuity of American business. And they had the facilities of American business. And it led to a very successful outcome. But can we do that in a peace time where you’ve got 50 states and you have to get them to cooperate?
因为他们拥有联邦政府的权力。他们有美国企业的独创性。他们有美国企业的设施。这带来了非常成功的结果。但在和平时期，我们能做到吗？有50个州，你必须让他们合作？

And you can issue orders. But you can’t designate where the capital goes. It’s the other end. And, you know, we try and do it with tax incentives and all of that sort of thing. But we haven’t created the unity of purpose and the machinery that worked in World War II where essentially everybody felt their one job was to win the war.
你可以发布命令。但你不能指定资本流向哪里。这是另一端。你知道，我们尝试用税收激励之类的东西来做。但我们还没有创造出二战中那种统一的目标和机制，当时基本上每个人都觉得他们的唯一工作是赢得战争。

And we figured out how to use our industrial capacity to in effect defeat the Axis powers. And how do you recreate that with, you know, the present democratic system? I’m not sure I know the answer. But I sure know the problem. And I think that if you’ve got an emergency on your hands, I mean, you really need to re-engineer the energy system of the United States.
我们想出了如何利用我们的工业能力来实际上击败轴心国。你如何在现在的民主系统中重现这一点？你知道，我不确定我知道答案。但我肯定知道问题所在。我认为，如果你手头有紧急情况，我的意思是，你真的需要重新设计美国的能源系统。

I don’t think you can do it without something resembling the machinery, the urgency, whatever. The capital’s there. The people are there. The objective is obvious. And we just don’t seem to be able to do it in a peace time where we’re used to following a given set of procedures.
我认为没有类似二战那样的机制、紧迫感之类的东西，你无法做到。资本在那里。人在那里。目标显而易见。我们只是似乎无法在和平时期做到，我们习惯于遵循一套既定的程序。

And, you know, China’s one country. And we’ve got 50 states. And we got a whole different system of government.
你知道，中国是一个国家。我们有50个州。我们有一套完全不同的政府系统。

We should be up to the test, but so far it hasn’t worked. So, thank you for the question.
我们应该能够应对这个考验，但到目前为止还没有成功。所以，谢谢你的问题。

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17. Abel will decide on next generation of Berkshire managers (阿贝尔将决定伯克希尔下一代管理者)

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky.
沃伦·巴菲特：贝基。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Chris Freed in Philadelphia. He says, “We know that Greg Abel and Ajit Jain are the next generation of Berkshire leaders. Who are currently behind Greg and Ajit in their respective roles?”
贝基·奎克：这个问题来自费城的克里斯·弗里德。他说：“我们知道格雷格·阿贝尔和阿吉特·贾因是伯克希尔的下一代领导者。目前在他们各自角色之后的人是谁？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that will be the question. Well, Greg will be, absent some extraordinary circumstance, but he’s going to succeed me. And then he will be sitting in a position where he needs his equivalent or something closer to his equivalent, because he’s better at many things than I’ve been.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这将是一个问题。嗯，除非出现特殊情况，格雷格将接替我。然后他将处于一个需要他的等同者或接近等同者的位置，因为他在很多方面比我做得更好。

He will need that substitute. And when the question comes, we know Ajit’s opinion on that. But Greg will probably be the one that will make the final decision, I mean, being his responsibility. And Ajit will give him his best advice. And I think the odds are very, very, very high (Laugh) that Greg would follow it.
他将需要那个替代者。当这个问题出现时，我们知道阿吉特的意见。但格雷格可能会是做出最终决定的人，我的意思是，这是他的责任。阿吉特会给他最好的建议。我认为格雷格遵循的可能性非常非常非常高（笑）。

But those are not easy questions. Everybody talks about the executive bench and all of that sort of thing, which is baloney. I mean, you know, they don’t have that many people that can run five of the largest net worth companies and all kinds of diverse businesses.
但这些不是简单的问题。每个人都谈论高管储备之类的事情，那是胡扯。我的意思是，你知道，他们没有那么多人能够管理五家净值最大的公司和各种不同的业务。

But you don’t need five people either. And you need a lot of good operating managers. And you need somebody at the top that allocates capital and makes sure that you’ve got the right operating manager. And we’ve designed something where we separate the insurance and the rest of the business.
但你也不需要五个人。你需要很多优秀的运营经理。你需要一个在顶端分配资本并确保有正确运营经理的人。我们设计了一个将保险业务与其他业务分开的东西。

And I think it’s a very good design. But we wouldn’t be smart to name that decision now about the two different areas of the business because a lot can change between now and then. And the most likely (Laugh) change is that this job changes. Charlie.
我认为这是一个很好的设计。但我们现在就指定这两个不同业务领域的决定是不明智的，因为从现在到那时可能会发生很多变化。最可能的（笑）变化是这个工作会改变。查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I got nothing to add. We have a lot of good people that have risen in the Berkshire subsidiaries. And there’s a reason why our operations have by and large done better than other big conglomerate companies. And one of them is that we change managers way less frequently than other people do. And that’s helped us.
查理·芒格：我没什么要补充的。我们在伯克希尔子公司中有很多优秀的人才脱颖而出。我们的运营总体上比其他大型企业集团做得更好的原因之一是，我们更换经理的频率远低于其他人。这对我们有帮助。

WARREN BUFFETT: When Paul Andrews died, we knew who he thought should take over there. But there wasn’t any reason to announce that. I mean, we should live to be 100. We had one of our managers die not long ago. And how old was he, at Garan?
沃伦·巴菲特：当保罗·安德鲁斯去世时，我们知道他认为谁应该接替。但没有理由宣布那个决定。我的意思是，我们应该活到100岁。不久前我们的一位经理去世了。他在Garan时多大？

GREG ABEL: Yeah, mid-90s, Seymour.
格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，90多岁，西摩。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Seymour Lichtenstein. And Seymour, I wrote him a letter when he was 80 and I said, you know, “I’m glad you’re 80. And I’ll write you again when you’re 90.” And (Laugh) I wrote him again when he was 90. And (Laugh) he didn’t make it to a hundred.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，西摩·利希滕斯坦。西摩，我在他80岁时给他写了一封信，我说，你知道，“我很高兴你80岁了。我会在你90岁时再给你写信。”（笑）我在他90岁时又给他写了信。（笑）他没能活到100岁。

But he had a terrific fellow following him. And he really managed it jointly, to some extent, as the years went by. But it’s case by case. And the main thing to do is have the right person running the whole place.
但他有一个很棒的人接替他。随着时间推移，他在某种程度上是联合管理的。但这是个案处理。主要的事情是让合适的人管理整个地方。

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18. America has too much ‘tribalism’ (美国有太多的“部落主义”)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station six.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第六区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, my name is Hatch Okamamti (PH) from Miyazaki, Japan. Mr. Buffett, I was one of the 8,000 employees at Salomon Brothers that you saved. I was younger back then. I was working at 7 World Trade Center. I’ve always, always wanted to thank you in person for saving that company, its employees, including myself and my family. So, thank you, Mr. Buffett. (Applause)
观众成员：早上好，我的名字是哈奇·奥卡马姆蒂（音译），来自日本宫崎。巴菲特先生，我是您救下的所罗门兄弟8000名员工之一。那时我还年轻。我在7号世贸中心工作。我一直、一直想当面感谢您救下了那家公司，它的员工，包括我和我的家人。所以，谢谢您，巴菲特先生。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause) And thank Deryck Maughan who actually had been over in Japan before that and who I met for the first time the day before I put him in. And it wouldn’t have worked if Deryck hadn’t come. So, whatever you taught him in Japan, (Laugh) thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）也要感谢德里克·莫恩，他之前在日本工作，我在任命他的前一天第一次见到他。如果德里克没有来，这不会成功。所以，不管你在日本教了他什么，（笑）谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, sir. Now, my question time to time you have reminded us to not bet against America. What do you think are the most important things for you guys to remain strong? On the risk side, if the strength of the country’s undermined, what could be the reasons?
观众成员：谢谢您，先生。现在，我的问题是，您时常提醒我们不要做空美国。您认为保持国家强大的最重要的事情是什么？在风险方面，如果国家的力量被削弱，可能是什么原因？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve had (Applause) a lot of tests. I mean, we’re such a young country. You know, when you think about Japan and you think about the United States, it’s just incredible how new we are to the block. I mean, you know, what are we? 234 years old since we started.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们经历了很多考验。（掌声）我的意思是，我们是一个如此年轻的国家。你知道，当你想到日本和美国，想到我们是多么新奇的存在，简直不可思议。我的意思是，你知道，我们有多大？自我们开始以来才234年。

That’s nothing. I mean, you know, Charlie and I combined, we’ve lived two thirds the life of the country. (Laughter) I mean, we’ve been tested at 46 national elections. And we made some bad choices. And we’ve had a civil war. I mean, so the country has had enormous advantages though in some way.
这不算什么。我的意思是，你知道，查理和我加起来，我们活了这个国家三分之二的寿命。（笑声）我的意思是，我们在46次全国选举中接受了考验。我们做过一些糟糕的选择。我们还经历过内战。我的意思是，这个国家在某些方面拥有巨大的优势。

Because we started with one half of 1% of the world’s population in 1790. And we now have something close to 25% of the world’s GDP. And it wasn’t because we had some incredible advantage in terms of the land. It was nice to have two oceans on each side back when people tried to rule the world by ruling the waves.
因为我们在1790年只占世界人口的0.5%。现在我们的GDP接近世界总量的25%。这并不是因为我们在土地上有什么惊人的优势。在人们试图通过统治海洋来统治世界时，两边有两大洋确实不错。

You know, and we’ve had good neighbors in Canada and Mexico. But it’s a miracle. And you say, “How do we keep the good parts of the system?” Well, culling out our obvious defects. And we do it in a very herky-jerky manner. But net, the United States is a better place to live than it was when I was born by a huge factor.
你知道，我们有加拿大和墨西哥这样的好邻居。但这是一个奇迹。你说：“我们如何保持系统的好部分？”嗯，剔除我们明显的缺陷。我们以一种断断续续的方式做到这一点。但总体而言，美国现在比我出生时是一个好得多的居住地，差距巨大。

I mean, I just got a root canal a week ago. And I was just thinking, “I don’t know who invented Novocain, but I’m for him.” You know, I mean, (Laugh) but in a million ways. I mean, you can romanticize about the past. But forget it. It is work. But now we do have an atom bomb and we wish nuclear power.
我的意思是，我一周前刚做了根管治疗。我当时在想，“我不知道谁发明了诺沃卡因，但我支持他。”你知道，我的意思是，（笑）但在无数方面。你可以浪漫化过去。但忘了吧。这是行得通的。但现在我们有了原子弹，我们希望有核能。

You know, we wish the atom had never been split. But it has been. And you can’t put it back in the bottle. So, the challenges are huge. You know, my dad was in Congress back in the 1940s. And it looked like a mess then. Although it was unified by the war to some degree.
你知道，我们希望原子从未被分裂。但它已经被分裂了。你无法把它放回瓶子里。所以，挑战是巨大的。你知道，我父亲在1940年代在国会工作。当时看起来一片混乱。尽管战争在某种程度上统一了国家。

But it was still very partisan. Now the problem we have, I think, is that partisanship, it seems to me, has moved toward tribalism. And tribalism just doesn’t work as well. I mean, when it gets to tribalism, you don’t even hear the other side. And tribalism can lead to mobs.
但它仍然非常党派化。现在我们的问题，我认为，是党派之争，在我看来，已经转向了部落主义。部落主义效果不太好。我的意思是，当变成部落主义时，你甚至听不到另一方的声音。部落主义可能导致暴民。

I mean, it just flows. I mean, you’ve seen it (UNINTEL). We’ve seen it to a degree here. So, we have to refine in a certain way our democracy as we go along. We deal with the world we live in. But if I still had a choice of any place to be born in the world, I’d want to be born in the United States.
我的意思是，它就这样发展。你见过（听不清）。我们在这里也看到了一些。所以，我们必须以某种方式不断完善我们的民主。我们应对我们生活的世界。但如果我还有选择，我想出生在世界上任何一个地方，我会想出生在美国。

And I’d want to be born today. I mean, it is a better world than we have ever had. And with present-day communications, we can also see much more how terrible it is in many ways. And it’s got problems. When I was born in 1930, there were 2 billion in the world.
我想今天出生。我的意思是，这是一个比我们以往任何时候都更好的世界。有了现在的通讯技术，我们也能更清楚地看到它在许多方面的糟糕之处。它有问题。我1930年出生时，世界上有20亿人口。

And now there’s maybe 7.7 billion and growing. And we went millennia with really no change in population. And of course, we’ve introduced energy in an incredible way into something where we now have 7.7 billion people using way more energy than they did when I was born when there were 2 billion people.
现在可能有77亿人口，而且还在增长。我们经历了几千年，人口几乎没有变化。当然，我们以一种不可思议的方式引入了能源，现在77亿人使用的能源远比我出生时20亿人时多得多。

So, it’s an exciting world. It’s a challenging world. And, you know, I don’t know the solutions on things. I do think that we do need to think about different solutions in terms of how we get important problems solves and that we don’t kid ourselves that something magic will happen or that everybody will get together and we’ll all just cheer, and it’ll go away by 2050.
所以，这是一个激动人心的世界。是一个充满挑战的世界。你知道，我不知道解决方案。我确实认为我们需要考虑不同的解决方案，如何解决重要问题，我们不要自欺欺人，以为会发生什么神奇的事情，或者每个人都会聚在一起，我们都会欢呼，到2050年问题就会消失。

And how well we adapt to that, we will see. I would say so far it doesn’t look very promising. But then I’m sure that when Lincoln looked out at what was going on in the Civil War it didn’t look very promising either. So, I think that the U.S. is capable of doing remarkable things. And I think it wouldn’t surprise me if they do it again. Charlie may —
我们适应得如何，我们拭目以待。我会说，到目前为止看起来不太乐观。但我相信，当林肯看着内战发生的事情时，也不太乐观。所以，我认为美国有能力做非凡的事情。我认为如果他们再次做到，我不会感到惊讶。查理可能——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m slightly less optimistic than Warren is. (Laughter) I think the best road ahead to human happiness is to expect less. I think it’s going to get tougher. And I think the solution of having a huge proportion of the young and brilliant people all go into wealth management is a crazy development in terms of its natural consequences for American civilianization. We don’t need as many wealth managers as we have.
查理·芒格：嗯，我比沃伦略微不那么乐观。（笑声）我认为通向人类幸福的最佳道路是降低期望。我认为会变得更艰难。我认为让一大群年轻有才华的人都去从事财富管理，这对美国文明的自然后果来说是一个疯狂的发展。我们不需要那么多财富管理者。

WARREN BUFFETT: But Charlie was born on January 1st, 1924. And you’d hate to go back to that, wouldn’t you, Charlie? (Laugh)
沃伦·巴菲特：但查理是1924年1月1日出生的。你不想回到那个时候，对吧，查理？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, I would. And I like more wealth managers who are just merely reflecting the fact there’s more wealth. But I don’t like everybody going into wealth management. Better go to MIT or something. I think the world’s a little crazy now.
查理·芒格：是的，我不想。我喜欢更多的财富管理者，他们只是反映了财富增多的现实。但我不喜欢每个人都去从事财富管理。最好去麻省理工之类的地方。我认为现在世界有点疯狂。

WARREN BUFFETT: Take your choice. (Laugh)
沃伦·巴菲特：你自己选。（笑）

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19. No corporate raider will have enough money to target Berkshire after Buffett (巴菲特之后，没有企业掠夺者有足够资金针对伯克希尔)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。（笑声）

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Dennis DeJaniero. As Warren stated in the 2022 annual report, Berkshire will always hold a boat load of cash in U.S. Treasury bills. It will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs at inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses.
贝基·奎克：这个问题来自丹尼斯·德贾尼罗。正如沃伦在2022年年报中所说，伯克希尔将始终持有大量现金和美国国库券。它还将避免可能在不方便时导致不适现金需求的行为，包括金融恐慌和前所未有的保险损失。

After Warren passes away, his A shares will be converted into B shares and distributed to various foundations. These foundations will then sell the shares to fund their causes. Warren estimates it will take 12-15 years for all his shares to be sold.
沃伦去世后，他的A类股将转换为B类股，并分配给各个基金会。这些基金会将出售这些股份以资助他们的事业。沃伦估计，他的所有股份需要12-15年才能全部卖出。

I worry that a corporate raider like Carl Icahn or a group will buy up enough of these shares to take control of Berkshire and completely disregard Warren’s philosophy of holding a lot of cash and U.S. Treasury bills, and instead be greedy, reckless, and highly speculative and ruin Berkshire’s position as a rock-solid financial fortress. I also worry that changes might be made in how Berkshire’s subsidiaries are run. Do Warren and Charlie worry that these things could happen?
我担心像卡尔·伊坎这样的企业掠夺者或某个团体会买下足够的股份来控制伯克希尔，完全无视沃伦持有大量现金和美国国库券的哲学，转而变得贪婪、鲁莽和高风险投机，毁掉伯克希尔作为坚如磐石的金融堡垒的地位。我还担心伯克希尔的子公司运营方式可能会发生变化。沃伦和查理担心这些事情会发生吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it’s fair to say we think about it plenty. But I don’t worry enormously. It is true that Greg and the directors will have a honeymoon period for a long time simply because other votes that will still remain. But it’s true that eventually they will get judged based on how well our operation fares versus others.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想说我们考虑了很多。但我并不特别担心。确实，格雷格和董事会在很长一段时间内会有一个蜜月期，仅仅因为其他投票权仍然存在。但确实，最终他们将根据我们的运营与其他人相比的表现来判断。

Now if we don’t pay any dividends in 12 or 15 years, you’re talking a trillion and a half that it would take to take over. And I think that limits the group. They like to think about how much they can borrow against it. (Laugh) It doesn’t work.
现在，如果我们在12或15年内不支付任何股息，你说的是需要1.5万亿美元来接管。我认为这限制了潜在的团体。他们喜欢考虑能借多少钱来对抗它。（笑）这是行不通的。

And there’s nobody that can come close to doing it themselves. And I think the important thing is that Berkshire be regarded as a national asset rather than a national liability. We’ve got to be a plus to the country with our form of operation. And we certainly have got a record which will then be 12 or 15 years longer, done with much more capital, more companies.
没有人能靠自己接近做到这一点。我认为重要的是，伯克希尔被视为国家资产而不是国家负债。我们的运营模式必须为国家做出积极贡献。我们当然有一个记录，到那时会再延长12或15年，用更多的资本，更多的公司。

More things will have happened where our hundreds of billions can work its way into the economy in terms of lots of jobs, lots of products, lots of behavior. And it can be compared with other things. So, I think we win out if we deserve to win out. And I think the odds of that happening are very, very, very high. Charlie.
更多的东西会发生，我们的数千亿美元将通过大量就业、大量产品、大量行为融入经济。这可以与其他事物进行比较。所以，我认为如果我们值得胜出，我们就会胜出。我认为这种可能性非常非常非常高。查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t spend much time worrying about something that happened 50 years ago after I’m dead. I think if you sort of take care. Each day’s responsibility is pretty low. And think ahead as well as you can. Then you just take the results as they fall. So, I’m philosophical. But I’m not — I think he’s fretting unnecessarily.
查理·芒格：嗯，我不会花太多时间担心我死后50年发生的事情。我认为如果你小心应对。每一天的责任都很低。尽可能地提前思考。然后你就接受结果。所以，我很豁达。但我不是——我认为他担心得太多了。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Neither one of us are worried, basically. (Laughter) But we plan. We do plan. And, you know, I’ve got a model in my mind of what Berkshire has been the model. It’s been modified plenty of times over 58 years. The one thing I knew initially or very quickly was it shouldn’t be a textile company.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们俩基本上都不担心。（笑声）但我们有计划。我们确实有计划。你知道，我脑海中有伯克希尔的模型。它在58年里被修改了很多次。我最初或很快知道的一件事是，它不应该是一家纺织公司。

(Laugh) That was an important decision. (Laughter) And, I mean, we’ve just played the hand as it came along. And we made a few really good decisions. We’ll never make a decision that kills us. Only things that are a threat to the planet, we don’t have any answer for those.
（笑）那是一个重要的决定。（笑声）我的意思是，我们只是随着事情发展而应对。我们做了一些非常好的决定。我们永远不会做出让我们致命的决定。只有那些对地球构成威胁的事情，我们没有答案。

But we keep ourselves in better shape than anybody else. And we just aren’t going to have big maturities of debt that come along. We aren’t going to have insurance policies that can be cashed in en masse. And we will sit with what looks a huge amount of capital.
但我们让自己比任何人都保持更好的状态。我们不会让大额债务到期。我们不会让保险单可以集体兑现。我们将持有看起来巨大的资本。

And it is a huge amount of capital. But there’s a huge amount of earning power. There’s a huge amount of diversity, everything. So, our business model will be graded, and it’ll be graded against a lot of people that we like to be graded against. So, I think we’re handing something very secure over to the future.
这是巨大的资本。但有巨大的盈利能力。有巨大的多样性，一切。所以，我们的商业模式将被评判，它将与我们愿意与之比较的许多人进行评判。所以，我认为我们将一个非常安全的东西交给未来。

And I think we’ve got a shareholder base like nobody has. I mean, there isn’t anybody in the country that I know of unless they’ve had a employee-owned company prior to going public or something of the sort. But this is the product of, you know, 58 years of regarding the shareholder as the owner of the company.
我认为我们的股东基础是无人能比的。我的意思是，我不知道国内有谁，除非他们在上市前拥有一家员工所有的公司之类。但这是，你知道，58年将股东视为公司所有者的产物。

But what does that mean? That means having happy customers. It means being (Applause) welcomed by your community rather than having them turn you away. It means that the government feels better with you if there’s a financial crisis. Because you can provide something that actually the country can’t under some circumstances.
但这意味着什么？这意味着拥有满意的客户。这意味着（掌声）被你的社区欢迎，而不是被拒绝。这意味着如果发生金融危机，政府对你感觉更好。因为你可以提供一些在某些情况下国家无法提供的东西。

And you’ll be there. And at the same time, it’ll be good for the business. And we will have crises of one sort or another. But if they aren’t challenging the planet, which worries you in terms of some of the threats that we have, we’ll be a plus to the United States. And if we’re a plus to the United States, we’ll survive.
你会在那里。同时，这对生意有好处。我们会遇到各种各样的危机。但如果它们不是挑战地球，你担心的某些威胁，我们将是美国的加分项。如果我们是美国的加分项，我们就会生存下去。

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20. Stories about finding Ajit Jain and Ben Rosner’s Chicago submarine (关于发现阿吉特·贾因和本·罗斯纳芝加哥潜艇的故事)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause) Station seven.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声）第七站。

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thank you for having us this weekend. My name is Beau Clayton (PH), and I’m from Durham, North Carolina.

观众：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，感谢您这个周末接待我们。我叫博·克莱顿，来自北卡罗来纳州的达勒姆。

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One of the reasons that we are all here is that you’re great storytellers. And we carry those stories back home with us.

我们聚集在这里的一个原因是你们是非常出色的故事讲述者。我们会把这些故事带回家。

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Can you please share a couple stories that maybe we haven’t heard before (Laughter) about Mr. Abel and Mr. Jain that capture their character and their caliber as leaders? (Applause)

能否分享一些我们可能没听过的关于阿贝尔先生和贾因先生的故事（笑声），以展现他们的品格和作为领导者的才能？（掌声）

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’ll start out with Ajit. (Laugh) He walked into the office in 1986, and I’d gotten the bright idea of going into the reinsurance business I think in maybe 1969. So, I’d stumbled along for 17 years. And I had a wonderful guy that ran it.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我先从阿吉特开始。（笑）他1986年走进办公室，我想我大概是在1969年有了进入再保险业务的聪明想法。所以，我摸索了17年。我有一个很棒的人在管理。

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But he also liked certain brokers. I mean, he was running it the traditional way. Top quality and everything else, but he didn’t try and change the system. He tried to improve the system to some degree. And we went nowhere. Seventeen years wandering around in the wilderness.

但他也喜欢某些经纪人。我的意思是，他以传统方式管理。品质一流，等等，但他没有试图改变系统。他在某种程度上试图改进系统。但我们毫无进展。17年在荒野中徘徊。

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And I thought we could have something good. And then Ajit came in on a Saturday and Mike Goldberg (PH) had steered him in, I think. And Mike deserves to be enshrined (Laugh) in perpetuity for that act. And I talked with him a while. I think maybe I was opening the mail on Saturday while I talked with him.

我想我们能做点好的东西。然后阿吉特在一个周六来了，我想是迈克·戈德堡引导他来的。迈克因为这件事应该被永远铭记（笑）。我和他谈了一会儿。我想我可能一边在周六拆邮件一边和他聊天。

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And he had absolutely zero experience with insurance. But he’d actually seen a good bit about how corporate America operated, because he’d been in management consulting. And after talking with him, I knew I’d struck gold. And so, I hired him and gave him the backing of some money.

他完全没有保险经验。但他实际上对美国企业如何运作有不少了解，因为他做过管理咨询。在和他交谈后，我知道我发现了金矿。于是，我雇了他，给了他一些资金支持。

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And we hit a very good period in the market almost right away for him to act. And Ajit, you know, if I had the top pick of ten insurance managers in the world, I could take all ten and you can’t replace Ajit. And we still enjoy talking.

市场几乎立刻进入了一个非常好的时期，让他可以采取行动。阿吉特，你知道，如果我能选世界上十个顶尖保险经理，我可以拿走全部十个，但你无法取代阿吉特。我们现在仍然喜欢交谈。

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We don’t talk as frequently as we used to, but we used to talk about every day. But he’s one of a kind. And, you know, if you’re going to stick around long enough, you only need one of a kind. (Laugh)

我们不像以前那样频繁交谈了，但我们过去几乎每天都聊。但他是独一无二的。你知道，如果你坚持得够久，你只需要一个独一无二的人。（笑）

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Paul Andrews (PH) stuck around at TTI, had all the money in the world.

保罗·安德鲁斯在TTI坚持下来，拥有世界上所有的钱。

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Every time I talked to him about getting a raise or something of the sort, he said, “We’ll talk about that next year.” He was not what you get when you get the top draft picks from the leading business schools. And I will say this, I have never looked at where anybody went to school in terms of hiring.

每次我和他谈加薪之类的事，他都说：“我们明年再谈。”他不是你从顶尖商学院挑选顶尖人才时会得到的那种人。我要说的是，在招聘时我从不看一个人上过哪所学校。

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I mean, somebody mails me a resume or something, I don’t care where they went to school. And it just so happens that Ajit went to some pretty good schools. But he isn’t Ajit because he went to those schools. And Charlie, you can tell a story or two. How’d you find Louis Vincenti? (Laugh)

我的意思是，有人给我寄简历之类的东西，我不在乎他们上过哪所学校。碰巧阿吉特上过一些很好的学校。但他不是因为上了那些学校才成为阿吉特的。查理，你可以讲一两个故事。你是怎么找到路易斯·文森蒂的？（笑）

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, he was there. But you’ve got to recognize him. I asked Louis once how he managed to play first-string football at, I think, Stanford when he only weighed 155 pounds. And he said, “Well,” he said, “I was pretty quick.” And he was pretty quick. But (Laugh) we have found a lot of people within our companies who are pretty quick.

查理·芒格：嗯，他就在那里。但你得认出他。我有一次问路易斯，他是怎么在，我想是斯坦福大学，体重只有155磅的情况下还能打首发橄榄球的。他说：“嗯，我很快。”他确实很快。但（笑）我们在公司里发现了很多很快的人。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we had one guy that quit at fourth grade, didn’t we? Ben Rosner. Am I wrong?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们有一个家伙四年级就辍学了，对吧？本·罗斯纳。我没记错吧？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yeah. Totally self-educated. Ben Rosner knew more about retailing in those old neighborhoods than anybody. And he watched everything in his business like a hawk, and he was amazing. Now there was an example. We never found anybody who could do what — when Ben died, that ability left us.

查理·芒格：哦，是的。完全自学成才。本·罗斯纳对那些老社区的零售业了解得比任何人都多。他像鹰一样盯着自己生意中的一切，他很了不起。这是一个例子。我们再也没找到任何人能做到——本去世后，那种能力就离开了我们。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and you want a story that’s kind of interesting, because Ben Rosner had a partner, Leo Simon. And Leo Simon was Mo Annenberg’s son-in-law. And Leo, therefore, was very, very, very wealthy. And Ben started with nothing. But they liked each other.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你想听一个有点有趣的故事，因为本·罗斯纳有一个合伙人，利奥·西蒙。利奥·西蒙是莫·安纳伯格的女婿。因此，利奥非常非常非常富有。而本从一无所有开始。但他们彼此喜欢对方。

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And one time well before they got involved in the business we bought, they got the idea of buying a submarine from World War I and taking it to the Century of Progress, which was the World’s Fair, in effect, in Chicago I think in 1933. So, they bought the submarine for practically nothing.

在他们参与我们买下的生意之前很久，他们有了一个想法，买一艘一战时期的潜艇，带到“进步世纪”，也就是1933年在芝加哥举办的，实际上是世界博览会。所以，他们几乎没花多少钱就买了这艘潜艇。

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And they figured the average guy from Omaha who’s going to his第一次参加世博会的人可以花两毛五美分体验潜艇，他们觉得这些人会愿意付钱。于是，他们从佛罗里达或其他地方把潜艇拖到芝加哥。

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And then they got into Chicago, and they were hauling a submarine down the streets of Chicago. (Laugh)

然后他们到了芝加哥，在芝加哥的街道上拖着这艘潜艇。（笑）

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And, you know, it was creating traffic problems like nobody could imagine. So, a cop came over and he said to Ben, he says, “Where do you think you guys are going with that submarine?” (Laugh) And Ben says, “You’ll have to talk to my partner, Mr. Capone.” (Laugh)

你知道，这造成了没人能想象的交通问题。于是，一个警察走过来，对本说：“你们拖着这艘潜艇要去哪儿？”（笑）本说：“你得和我的合伙人卡彭先生谈谈。”（笑）

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And the cop says, “You’re on. You know, just keep going.” And (Laughter) that was Ben Rosner. And then Leo Simon died, and when he died in 1967 or so, Ben Rosner kept delivering half the profits to his widow, who was incredibly rich, of course, being Mo Annenberg’s first-born daughter.

警察说：“好吧，继续走吧。”（笑声）这就是本·罗斯纳。后来利奥·西蒙去世了，大概在1967年左右，本·罗斯纳继续把一半的利润交给他的寡妇，她当然非常富有，因为她是莫·安纳伯格的长女。

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I think Mo had nine girls in a row before Walter came along, the tenth. I may be off by one. But anyway, I went to his fancy apartment. And anyway, Ben kept her in for half the deal. And he had her sign the rent checks just so she would look like she was doing something in this business.

我想莫连续生了九个女孩，然后才有了第十个孩子沃尔特。我可能记错了一个。但总之，我去了他豪华的公寓。总之，本继续让她拿一半的收益。他让她签租金支票，只是为了让她看起来在这个生意里做了点什么。

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And she didn’t need the money, obviously, but he just felt he was obligated once his partner, Leo, died. And then she started criticizing him. And at that point, Ben went to his lawyer, who was her lawyer, actually, Will Salsteiner (PH). I don’t know whatever happened to Will.

显然她不需要这些钱，但他觉得自从他的合伙人利奥去世后，他有义务这样做。然后她开始批评他。这时，本去找了他的律师，实际上也是她的律师，威尔·萨尔斯坦纳。我不知道威尔后来怎么样了。

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But he gave me a call because Ben wanted to call me because he wanted me to buy it. And he wanted me, if I bought it, he’d be rid of the ex-partner’s wife. And he had Charlie and me come back, and we went to Will Salsteiner’s office. And Ben says, “I’ll work until the end of the year, and that’s all. But I’ll sell you this thing for $6 million bucks.”

但他给我打了电话，因为本想让我买下它。他希望如果我买了，他就能摆脱前合伙人的妻子。他让我和查理回去，我们去了威尔·萨尔斯坦纳的办公室。本说：“我会干到年底，仅此而已。但我可以600万美元卖给你这个东西。”

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And I had $2 million in cash, and a couple of million in real estate, and a couple million of operating earnings. It was just crazy. But he felt if he was getting a lousy price, she was taking a half of the lousy price for half the money. So, he looked at me at some point. Charlie, you describe the rest of it. (Laugh)

我有200万美元现金，几百万的房地产，还有几百万的运营收益。这太疯狂了。但他觉得如果他得到一个糟糕的价格，她也会因为一半的钱而拿到一半的糟糕价格。所以，他在某个时候看着我。查理，你来描述剩下的部分。（笑）

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CHARLIE MUNGER: He said, “I hear you’re the fastest draw in the West.” He says, “Draw.” (Laughter)

查理·芒格：他说：“我听说你是西部最快的枪手。”他说：“拔枪吧。”（笑声）

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WARREN BUFFETT: We’re in a New York lawyer’s office. (Laugh) And this guy is selling his baby. And he told us he’s leaving. I got Charlie on the side, I said, “If this guy leaves at the end of the year, you can throw away every psychology book that’s ever been written. I mean, it isn’t going to happen.”

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在纽约一个律师的办公室。（笑）这个家伙在卖他的心血。他告诉我们他要离开。我把查理拉到一边，我说：“如果这个家伙年底真的离开，你可以把所有心理学书都扔了。我是说，这不可能发生。”

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And so, we bought it and we lived happily ever after with Ben. And one time he was taking me over to see a property we had in Brooklyn. And along the way I said, “Ben, you know, I promised you I wouldn’t interfere in the business when we started.” And he knew a “but” was coming. And he just said, “Thank you, Warren,” and then he shut me up. (Laughter)

于是，我们买下了它，和本一起过上了幸福的生活。有一次他带我去看我们在布鲁克林的一处物业。在路上我说：“本，你知道，我们开始时我承诺不会干涉生意。”他知道接下来会有个“但是”。他只是说：“谢谢你，沃伦”，然后让我闭嘴。（笑声）

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He was a lot of fun. We have so many Ben Rosner stories, but now you’ve heard one that hasn’t been published before.

他很有趣。我们有很多本·罗斯纳的故事，但现在你听到了一个从未发表过的。

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21. Jain is happy with property catastrophe reinsurance portfolio (贾因对财产灾难再保险组合感到满意)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

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BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Chai Gohill (PH). This he writes, this is for Ajit. “Reinsurance industry is going through one of the hardest pricing environments in the last 15 years. Berkshire historically has participated during these stressed times when economic returns are very attractive.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自柴·戈希尔。他写道，这是给阿吉特的。“再保险行业正经历过去15年来最艰难的定价环境。伯克希尔历史上在这些压力时期参与其中，因为经济回报非常吸引人。

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“This year, it appears Berkshire has not been interested in deploying its resources towards property cat reinsurance despite such strong returns. Can you elaborate on reasons for not participating despite these returns, and your broader view on how you’re planning to shape your reinsurance business post-acquisition of Alleghany?”

“今年，伯克希尔似乎对部署资源到财产灾难再保险不感兴趣，尽管回报很强劲。你能详细说明尽管有这些回报仍不参与的原因，以及你在收购阿勒格尼后计划如何塑造再保险业务的更广泛看法吗？”

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AJIT JAIN: OK. In terms of Alleghany, that’s an easy response. We treat our operating units independent of each other. And as far as Alleghany is concerned, they have a major presence in the reinsurance business under the brand name of TransAtlantic Re.

阿吉特·贾因：好的。关于阿勒格尼，这个回答很简单。我们将运营单位视为彼此独立的。至于阿勒格尼，他们在再保险业务中有重要地位，品牌是TransAtlantic Re。

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That company will operate the way it’s been operating in the past. There will be no change in terms of strategy or management. And they will keep doing what they’re doing. They’ve been very successful, and hopefully will keep being successful.

那家公司将按照过去的方式运营。战略或管理层不会有变化。他们将继续做他们一直在做的事情。他们一直很成功，希望能继续成功。

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Now, in terms of the property cat business that I have been active in over these last several years, you’re right that the last 15 years has been a difficult time. Prices have not been attractive. And even though we have had some presence in the property cat business in the last 15 years, it really has been minimal.

现在，关于我过去几年活跃的财产灾难再保险业务，你说得对，过去15年是一个艰难时期。价格一直不吸引人。虽然我们在过去15年在财产灾难业务中有一些参与，但实际上非常有限。

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This December 31st, which is a big renewal date for cat reinsurance, we were hoping that we would get a few days in the sun, and we’d be able to deploy our capital, and be able to write some fairly attractive business. As it happened towards the end of December, until about the third week of December, I was very optimistic that we would get a chance to put several billion dollars on the books.

12月31日是灾难再保险的一个重要续保日期，我们希望能有几天好日子，能够部署我们的资本，写一些相当吸引人的业务。结果到了12月底，直到12月的第三周，我还非常乐观，认为我们有机会将几十亿美元记入账本。

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But in the last ten days of December, unfortunately a lot of capacity came out of the woodworks. Pricing that we were expecting to realize didn’t really come and meet our pricing requirements, as a result of which January 1 was a big disappointment.

但在12月的最后十天，不幸的是，市场上突然涌现了很多产能。我们期待的定价并未达到我们的定价要求，因此1月1日是一个巨大的失望。

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We did not write as much as we were hoping to write. Now, fast forward to April 1, which is another big renewal date, we had a lot of powder dry. And we were lucky that we kept the powder dry. Because April 1, suddenly prices zoomed up again, a lot higher than what they were on January 1, and started to look attractive to us.

我们没有写下我们希望的那么多业务。现在快进到4月1日，这是另一个重要的续保日期，我们保留了很多未动用的资金。我们很幸运保持了这些资金。因为4月1日，价格突然再次飙升，比1月1日高了很多，开始对我们变得有吸引力。

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So, now we have a portfolio that is very heavily exposed to property catastrophe. To put that in perspective, our exposure today is almost 50% more than what it was five, six months ago. So, I think we have written as much as our capacity will allow us to write.

所以，现在我们的投资组合在财产灾难方面敞口非常大。为了说明这一点，我们现在的敞口比五六个月前高出近50%。所以，我认为我们已经写下了我们容量允许的最大业务量。

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We are very happy with what we’ve written. The margins have been healthy. The only thing that I want to mention to you is that, while the mentions have been healthy, we have a very unbalanced portfolio. What that means is if there’s a big hurricane in Florida, we will have a very substantial loss.

我们对自己写下的业务非常满意。利润率一直很健康。我唯一想提到的是，虽然利润率健康，但我们的投资组合非常不平衡。这意味着如果佛罗里达发生大飓风，我们将遭受非常大的损失。

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As opposed to that if we have a very big loss anywhere other than Florida, relative to我们的竞争对手，我们的损失会小得多。总体来说，我对这个投资组合非常满意。它比过去好很多。我不知道这种情况会持续多久，当然，如果佛罗里达发生飓风，我们所有单位加起来可能会损失高达150亿美元。如果没有损失，我们将赚几十亿美元的利润。

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WARREN BUFFETT: And, Ajit, when you called me and said you’d like to expose us to whatever it was, a couple billion more of exposure, how long I took to say yes. (Laugh)

沃伦·巴菲特：阿吉特，当你打电话给我说你想让我们再增加几十亿美元的敞口时，我用了多久说“好”？（笑）

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AJIT JAIN: Yeah, so the way we think about our exposure is, you know, in the insurance operations collectively across the entire company. Given that we have about a little less than $3000亿的资本，我们认为我们可以承受5%的敞口。

阿吉特·贾因：是的，我们考虑敞口的方式是，你知道，在整个公司的保险业务中综合考虑。鉴于我们有大约不到3000亿美元的资本，我们认为可以承受5%的敞口。

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So, to complete Warren’s story, a few weeks ago we had about $13 billion of exposure all across the globe. And I called up Warren and I said, “We’re up to $13. It’ll be nice if we can go up to $15. That’s a good round number.” And that was less than a 30-second phone call. (Laugh) I think Warren said yes without even listening to what the numbers were. (Laughter)

所以，为了完成沃伦的故事，几周前我们在全球的敞口大约是130亿美元。我打电话给沃伦，我说：“我们已经到130亿了。如果能增加到150亿会很好，这是个不错的整数。”那次通话不到30秒。（笑）我想沃伦甚至没听具体数字就说“好”。（笑声）

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WARREN BUFFETT: I hope he calls me again. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我希望他再次 tako他再次给我打电话。（笑声）

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22. ‘We don’t get smarter’ but ‘we get a little wiser’ (我们不会变得更聪明，但会更睿智一点)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station eight.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第八站。

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Adal Flores (PH), and I’ve been a shareholder for about 16 years. And I’m coming from Guadalajara, Mexico.

观众：你好。我叫阿达尔·弗洛雷斯，我是股东大约16年了。我来自墨西哥瓜达拉哈拉。

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My question is for Warren and Charlie. Companies have the eternal dilemma between building products that can make profits and increase their company’s competitive position.

我的问题是给沃伦和查理的。公司总是面临一个永恒的困境：在打造能盈利的产品和提升公司竞争地位之间做出选择。

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In the best case, you can build products that have both characteristics at the same time, like Google did.

在最佳情况下，你可以打造同时具备这两种特性的产品，就像谷歌那样。

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But most of the time, companies need to choose between short-term profits and long-term defensibility. For example, Amazon was focused on building their famous Amazon flywheel with limited profits initially, in order to obtain stronger network effects, with the hope of getting more defensible profits in the future.

但大多数时候，公司需要在短期利润和长期防御性之间做出选择。例如，亚马逊最初专注于打造他们著名的亚马逊飞轮，利润有限，以获得更强的网络效应，希望在未来获得更具防御性的利润。

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When you invest, you constantly speak about the importance of building competitive moats. What advice would you give to CEOs about how to balance this dilemma, which is essentially short-term profits versus long-term defensibility? Thank you.

当你投资时，你不断谈到建立竞争护城河的重要性。你会给CEO们什么建议，关于如何平衡这个困境，基本上是短期利润与长期防御性之间的权衡？谢谢。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is to control your destiny, which we’ve been able to do at Berkshire. We feel no pressure from Wall Street. You know, we don’t have investor calls. We don’t have to make promises. We get a chance to make our own mistakes, and occasionally find something that works well.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，答案是掌控自己的命运，这是我们在伯克希尔能够做到的。我们不感受到来自华尔街的压力。你知道，我们没有投资者电话会议。我们不必做出承诺。我们有机会犯自己的错误，偶尔找到一些行之有效的东西。

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But we recognize that the people in this room and people like them are the ones that we’re working for. And we’re not working for a bunch of people that care about whether we meet the core estimate or anything. So, we have a freedom that we get to use.

但我们认识到，这个房间里的人和像他们一样的人是我们为之工作的人。我们不是为那些关心我们是否达到核心预期的人工作。所以，我们有可以利用的自由。

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And we’re interested in owning a wonderful business forever. We learned from many wonderful businesses. But we do learn a lot as we go along. Charlie and I have often mentioned how we learned so much when we bought See’s Candies, which we did.

我们有兴趣永远拥有一家出色的企业。我们从许多出色的企业中学到了东西。但我们在前进中确实学到了很多。查理和我经常提到我们在买下See’s Candies时学到了多少。

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But we learned when we bought Ben Rosner’s chain of women’s dress shops spread all over the eastern part of the country. We learned when we tried getting into the department store business back in 1966. And as the ink was drying on our purchase price, we realized we’d done something (Laugh) dumb.

但我们在买下本·罗斯纳遍布美国东部的女装店连锁时学到了东西。我们在1966年试图进入百货商店业务时学到了东西。当我们购买价格的墨水还未干时，我们意识到我们做了一件（笑）蠢事。

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I mean, we’re learning all the time how consumers behave. I’m not going to be able to learn the technical aspects of businesses. It’d be nice if I knew it, but it isn’t essential. And, you know, obviously we’ve got a business at Apple, which is larger than our energy business.

我的意思是，我们一直在学习消费者的行为。我无法学习业务的技术方面。如果我知道这些会很好，但这不是必需的。你知道，显然我们在苹果的业务比我们的能源业务还大。

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And we may only own five points, 6% or 7%. But our ownership goes up every year, and I don’t understand the phone at all. But I do understand consumer behavior. And I know how people think about whether to buy a second car. I know how they go out to different — we own auto dealerships.

我们可能只拥有5个点，6%或7%。但我们的所有权每年都在增加，我完全不懂手机。但我确实了解消费者行为。我知道人们如何考虑是否买第二辆车。我知道他们如何去不同的——我们拥有汽车经销店。

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We’re learning all the time from all of our businesses how people react to Garanimals versus selling them something else. And so, See’s was a sort of breakthrough. But we just keep learning as to more about how people behave and how a good business can turn into a bad business, and how some good businesses can maintain their competitive advantage over time.

我们一直在从我们所有的业务中学习人们对Garanimals的反应与卖给他们其他东西的反应。所以，See’s是一个突破。但我们只是继续学习更多关于人们行为的信息，以及一家好企业如何变成坏企业，以及一些好企业如何长期保持竞争优势。

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And so, we don’t have some formula, Berkshire people. But we can also tell in ten seconds whether it’s something of interest. I mean, when I get these calls and we want to send decks and all that sort of thing, which is nonsense, I mean, it’s a bunch of guys (Laugh) that get paid for drawing up these projections of the future and everything like that.

所以，我们没有某种公式，伯克希尔的人。但我们也能在十秒钟内判断出这是否是我们感兴趣的东西。我的意思是，当我接到这些电话，他们想发送演示文稿之类的东西，这是胡扯，我是说，是一群（笑）为了制定这些未来预测之类的东西而拿报酬的家伙。

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If they knew the future, you know, we don’t know the future, but we do know certain kinds of businesses. We know what the right price is, and we know what we think we can project out in terms of consumer behavior and threats to a business. And that’s what we’ve been about and that’s what we’ll continue to be about.

如果他们知道未来，你知道，我们不知道未来，但我们确实知道某些类型的企业。我们知道正确的价格是什么，我们知道我们认为可以预测的消费者行为和对企业的威胁。这就是我们一直在做的，也是我们将继续做的。

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We don’t get smarter over time, we get a little wiser, though, following it over time. And you can do it while sitting in the office with a telephone, too, which we like. Charlie?

我们不会随着时间变得更聪明，但我们会变得更睿智一点，随着时间的推移。你也可以坐在办公室里用电话做这件事，这我们喜欢。查理？

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23. Why Buffett invested billions in Japanese ‘trading houses’ (为什么巴菲特在日本“贸易公司”投资数十亿美元)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, tell them the story of the Japanese investment. That should be told again. That’s a nice story.

查理·芒格：嗯，告诉他们日本投资的故事。这个故事应该再讲一遍。这是一个好故事。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it was pretty simple. I mean, back when I started other people were going through Playboy and I was going through Moody’s, I mean, basically. And there’s a movie out called “Turn Every Page,” which I saw again for the second time a couple of days ago, Lizzie Gottlieb.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这很简单。我的意思是，当我开始时，其他人在翻看《花花公子》，而我在翻看穆迪的，基本上是这样。有一部电影叫《翻遍每一页》，我几天前又看了一遍，这是第二次，丽兹·戈特利布。

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And I recommend everybody in this world watch that, because I turned every page in the past. And I did it for thousands and thousands of pages advises Moody’s, and I did it at the Department of Public Utilities in Boston. I did it in the insurance department. I just kept turning pages. Well, that goes on for a while. But now we need big ideas in order to find things. And what was your question, Charlie?

我推荐世界上每个人都去看这部电影，因为我过去翻遍了每一页。我在穆迪的翻了成千上万页，在波士顿的公共事业部门也这样做，在保险部门也是如此。我只是不停地翻页。嗯，这持续了一段时间。但现在我们需要大想法来找到东西。你的问题是什么，查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Tell them about the Japanese.

查理·芒格：告诉他们关于日本的事。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the Japanese thing was simple. I mean, Ben and I liked looking at companies. I mean, I like looking at figures about companies. And here were five very, very substantial companies, understandable companies. Most of them, maybe all of them we’d done business with in a dozen different ways.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，日本的事很简单。我是说，本和我喜欢看公司。我是说，我喜欢看公司的数字。这里有五家非常非常重要的公司，可以理解的公司。他们中的大多数，也许是全部，我们以十几种不同方式做过生意。

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If you go a couple miles from where this place is, our last coal generating plant was built by one of the companies. So here they were. They were sitting as a group where they were earning, we’ll say 14% on what we were going to pay to buy them.

如果你从这个地方走几英里，我们的最后一座燃煤发电厂是由其中一家公司建造的。所以他们就在这里。他们作为一个群体，赚了，我们假设是14%的回报，基于我们将要支付的购买价格。

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They were paying decent dividends. They were going to repurchase shares in some cases. They owned a whole bunch of businesses that we could understand as a group, although it didn’t mean we had deep understanding on any. But we’d seen them operate and everything.

他们在支付不错的股息。在某些情况下他们会回购股份。他们拥有一大堆我们作为一个群体可以理解的业务，尽管这并不意味着我们对任何一个有深入的了解。但我们见过他们的运营和一切。

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There wasn’t anything to it. And at the same time, we could take out the currency risk by financing in the end. And that was going to cost a half of 1%. Well, if you get 14% on one side and a half a percent on the other side, and you’ve got money forever, and they’re doing intelligent things, and they’re sizable, so we just started buying them.

这没什么大不了的。同时，我们可以通过最终融资来消除货币风险。那将花费0.5%的成本。嗯，如果你在这一边得到14%的回报，在另一边是0.5%，而且你有永久的资金，他们在做聪明的事情，他们规模很大，所以我们就开始买他们。

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I didn’t even probably tell Greg until maybe six months after we’d gotten going. And then when we hit 5% in all of them, we announced on my birthday, 90th, that we owned over 5%. And recently went over for the first time to visit with them. And we were more than pleasantly surprised, delighted, with what we find there. And now we own 7.4% of them. We won’t go over 9.9% without their agreeing, and we sold another $164, whatever it is billion by the end.

我甚至可能在开始六个月后才告诉格雷格。然后当我们在所有公司中达到5%时，我们在我的90岁生日那天宣布我们拥有超过5%的股份。最近我们第一次去拜访他们。我们对那里的发现感到非常惊喜，高兴。现在我们拥有他们7.4%的股份。没有他们的同意，我们不会超过9.9%，到最后我们又卖了1640亿，无论是多少。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: They would’ve done it for us if we only had $5 billion or something. And it made $10 billion simply in that way. We would look like heroes. Now $10 billion just sort of disappears as if it’s a little dot in Berkshire’s reports.

查理·芒格：如果我们只有50亿美元之类的东西，他们也会为我们这样做。仅仅通过这种方式就赚了100亿美元。我们会看起来像英雄。现在100亿美元在伯克希尔的报告中就像一个小点一样消失了。

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WARREN BUFFETT: But it’s fun.

沃伦·巴菲特：但这很有趣。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: It is fun, and it is $10 billion.

查理·芒格：这很有趣，而且是100亿美元。

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WARREN BUFFETT: And Charlie says it keeps (Laughter) me out of bars when I talk to him about it. And I probably talked to Charlie about those the year after I started. But who knows? I mean, I knew he’d like it, I mean, obviously.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理说这让我（笑声）不去酒吧，当我和他说起这个时。我可能在开始后的那一年和查理谈过这些。但谁知道呢？我的意思是，我知道他会喜欢，显然。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: We tried to do every dollar. We would do — we could only do about $10 billion.

查理·芒格：我们试图用每一美元去做。我们会做——我们只能做大约100亿美元。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, not even quite that much. But, you know, we are $4 or $5 billion ahead, plus dividends. And we’ve got a carry that’s terrific. And they welcome us, and they should welcome us. But we love it the way we’re operating. We’re not there to tell them what to do in the least.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，甚至还不到那么多。但，你知道，我们领先了40亿或50亿美元，加上股息。我们有一个很棒的利差。他们欢迎我们，他们应该欢迎我们。但我们喜欢我们运营的方式。我们一点也不去告诉他们该做什么。

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But we did say we’d never go over 9.9%, and we mean it. And they know that we’ll be true to our word. And I went over there, partly to introduce Greg to those people, because we’re going to be with them 10, 20, 30, 40 years from now. And they may occasionally find something that we can do jointly. And they look forward to doing that, and we look forward to it, and in addition we have some other operating businesses in Japan. So, Greg, do you have anything?

但我们确实说过我们永远不会超过9.9%，我们是认真的。他们知道我们会信守诺言。我去那里，部分是为了向那些人介绍格雷格，因为我们将在未来10年、20年、30年、40年与他们在一起。他们可能偶尔会找到一些我们可以一起做的事情。他们期待这样做，我们也期待这样做，此外我们在日本还有一些其他运营业务。那么，格雷格，你有什么要说的吗？

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GREG ABEL: No, the only thing I would add is that 1) as, Warren, you went over there, it was to build the trust with these Japanese companies. Because we do hope there’s long-term opportunities. But fundamentally, as you highlighted, they’ve been a very good investment.

格雷格·阿贝尔：没有，我唯一想补充的是，1）正如，沃伦，你去那里，是为了与这些日本公司建立信任。因为我们确实希望有长期的机会。但基本上，正如你所强调的，它们一直是一个很好的投资。

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I’d also highlight the five meetings we had were really quite remarkable. I mean, these companies, the culture and the history around it, and how proud they are, you know, there’s just moments of learning from them. So, it was just a great experience to spend really two days with the five companies.

我还想强调，我们的五次会议真的非常了不起。我的意思是，这些公司，围绕它们的文化和历史，以及他们是多么骄傲，你知道，从他们那里总有一些学习的时刻。所以，与这五家公司真正度过两天是一次很棒的经历。

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WARREN BUFFETT: And an issue that we intended to be 56 billion of yen that we were issuing and selling turned out to be 164.4 or something like that. And everything’s worked so well. And as Charlie says, you know, it doesn’t move $500 billion of net worth that much.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们打算发行和出售560亿日元的债券，结果变成了1644亿左右。一切都进行得很顺利。正如查理所说，你知道，这对5000亿美元的净值影响不大。

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But this one, you know, will keep adding over the years to Berkshire’s value with this very widespread, probably $4 or $500 million a year. And, you know, we’ll just keep looking for more opportunities. And Japan, Berkshire is the largest borrower, outside of corporate borrowers, outside of Japan that exists.

但这个，你知道，将在未来几年继续为伯克希尔增加价值，范围很广，可能每年4亿或5亿美元。你知道，我们将继续寻找更多机会。在日本，伯克希尔是除日本以外的最大的非企业借款人。

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And we didn’t set out to be that. But (Laugh) it’s turned out that way. And we’re not done. I mean, you know, in terms of what may come along there. And we have some direct operations there, as I mentioned. And we’ve got some really wonderful partners working for us. And I don’t have to do anything.

我们并没有打算成为那样。但（笑）结果就是这样。我们还没完。我的意思是，你知道，关于那里可能会出现的机会。我提到过，我们在那里有一些直接运营。我们有一些非常棒的合作伙伴为我们工作。我什么都不用做。

24. Apple is a ‘better business’ than any Berkshire company (苹果是比伯克希尔任何公司都更好的企业)

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughter) OK, Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑声）好的，贝基？

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BECKY QUICK: This next question comes from Ellie Amin Tebet (PH), who asks, “During an episode of Investing the Templeton Way podcast, Professor Damodaran, who he respects almost as much as Warren and Charlie, mentioned that he is not comfortable with positions becoming a large part of his portfolio. For example, when they reach 25-35%. He mentioned that Apple is now 35% of Berkshire’s portfolio and thinks that that is near a danger zone.” Wonders if Warren and Charlie can comment.

贝基·奎克：下一个问题来自艾莉·阿明·特贝特，他问道：“在《坦普顿之道投资》播客的一集中，达莫达兰教授，他几乎和沃伦及查理一样受我尊敬，提到他对投资组合中某项资产占比过大感到不舒服。例如，当占比达到25-35%时。他提到苹果现在占伯克希尔投资组合的35%，认为这接近危险区域。”想知道沃伦和查理能否对此发表评论。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’d like to make one comment first, but Charlie will come up with —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想先发表一个评论，但查理会——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: I think he’s out of his mind.

查理·芒格：我认为他疯了。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I knew that was coming. (Laughter) Apple is not 35% of Berkshire’s portfolio. Berkshire’s portfolio includes the railroad, the energy business, Garanimals, you name it, See’s Candies, they’re all businesses. And, you know, the good thing about Apple is that we can go up.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我就知道他会这么说。（笑声）苹果并不是伯克希尔投资组合的35%。伯克希尔的投资组合包括铁路、能源业务、Garanimals，等等，See’s Candies，它们都是业务。你知道，苹果的好处是我们可以继续增持。

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They buy in their stock, and instead of owning 5.6%, they got about 15 billion, 700 and some million shares outstanding. They get down to 15 and a quarter billion without us doing anything. We got 6%. So, we can’t own more than 100% of the BNSF.

他们回购股票，我们的持股比例从5.6%上升，他们有大约150亿7千万股流通股。即使我们什么都不做，他们的流通股减少到152.5亿股，我们就有了6%。所以，我们不可能拥有超过100%的BNSF。

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We can’t own more than 100% of Garanimals or See’s Candies. And it would be nice. We’d love to own 200%, but it just isn’t doable. But they’re all the same. They’re good businesses. And to think that our criteria for Apple is different than the other businesses we own, it just happens to be a better business than any we own.

我们不可能拥有超过100%的Garanimals或See’s Candies。这会很好。我们很想拥有200%，但这是不可能的。但它们都是一样的。它们是好企业。认为我们对苹果的标准与其他我们拥有的企业不同，苹果只是恰好比我们拥有的任何企业都更好。

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And we put a fair amount of money in it, but we haven’t got more money in it than we’ve got in the railroad. And Apple is a better business. Our railroad is a very good business. But it’s not remotely as good as Apple’s business. Apple, you know, has a position with consumers where they’re paying, you know, maybe the $1,500 bucks or whatever it may be for a phone.

我们在苹果上投入了不少资金，但我们投入的资金并不比铁路多。苹果是更好的企业。我们的铁路是非常好的企业。但它远不如苹果的业务好。苹果，你知道，在消费者中占据了一个位置，他们愿意为一部手机支付，比如1500美元或任何价格。

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And these same people pay $35,000 for having a second car. And if they had to give up a second car or give up their iPhone, they’d give up their second car. I mean, it’s an extraordinary product. We don’t have anything like that that we own 100% of.

这些同样的人会花3.5万美元买第二辆车。如果他们必须在放弃第二辆车或放弃iPhone之间选择，他们会放弃第二辆车。我的意思是，这是一个非凡的产品。我们没有任何100%拥有的类似产品。

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But we’re very, very, very happy to have 5.6%, or whatever it may be, and we’re delighted every tenth of a percent that goes up. That’s like adding $100 million to our share of the earnings. And they use the earnings to buy out our partners, which we’re glad to see them sell out, too.

但我们非常非常非常高兴拥有5.6%，或任何比例，我们为每增加0.1%感到高兴。这就像为我们的收益份额增加了1亿美元。他们用收益回购我们的合作伙伴的股份，我们也很高兴看到他们卖出。

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The index funds have to sell if they (Laugh) bring the number of shares down. And, you know, we went up slightly last year, and I made a mistake a couple years ago when I sold some shares when I had certain reasons why gains were useful to take that year from a tax standpoint.

如果他们（笑）减少了股份数量，指数基金就必须卖出。你知道，去年我们的持股略有增加，我在几年前卖了一些股份时犯了一个错误，当时我有某些理由认为从税务角度来看那年实现收益是有用的。

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But having heard me say that, it was a dumb decision. (Laugh) And, Charlie, you’ve already given your comment about it. But we do not have 35% of Berkshire’s portfolio. Berkshire’s portfolio is the funds we have to work with. And we want to own good businesses. And we also want to have plenty of liquidity. And beyond that, you know, the sky’s the limit or our mistakes. Who knows what the bottom is? (Laugh) Charlie, do you want to add anything to your earlier comment?

但听我说，这是一个愚蠢的决定。（笑）查理，你已经对此发表了评论。但我们没有将伯克希尔投资组合的35%放在苹果上。伯克希尔的投资组合是我们可以使用的资金。我们想拥有好企业。我们也想保持充足的流动性。除此之外，你知道，天空是极限，或者是我们的错误。谁知道底线是什么？（笑）查理，你想对之前的评论补充什么吗？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think one of the inane things that’s taught in modern university education is that a vast diversification is absolutely mandatory in investing in common stocks. That is an insane idea. It’s not that easy to have a vast plethora of good opportunities that are easily identified.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为现代大学教育中教的一些愚蠢的东西之一是，在普通股投资中绝对需要广泛的多样化。这是一个疯狂的想法。找到一大堆容易识别的好机会并不那么容易。

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And if you’ve only got three, I’d rather be in my best ideas instead of my worst. And now, some people can’t tell their best ideas from their worst. And the act of deciding that an investment is already good, they get to thinking it’s better than it is.

如果你只有三个机会，我宁愿投资于我最好的想法，而不是最差的。现在，有些人无法区分他们的最佳想法和最差想法。他们决定一项投资已经很好，就开始认为它比实际更好。

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I think we make fewer mistakes like that than other people. And that is a blessing to us.

我想我们在这方面犯的错误比其他人少。这对我们来说是一种福气。

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We’re not so smart, but we kind of know where the edge of our smartness is. That is a very important part of practical intelligence. And a lot of people who are geniuses on IQ tests think they’re a lot smarter than they are. And what they are is dangerous.

我们并不那么聪明，但我们有点知道我们聪明的边界在哪里。这是实用智慧的重要部分。很多在智商测试中是天才的人认为他们比实际聪明得多。他们是危险的。

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But if you know the edge of your own ability pretty well, you should ignore most of the notions of our experts about what I call “deworsification” of portfolios.

但如果你很清楚自己能力的边界，你应该忽略我们专家关于我称之为投资组合“去优化”的观点。

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25. U.S. and China both need to reduce ‘stupid, stupid, stupid’ economic tensions (美国和中国都需要减少“愚蠢、愚蠢、愚蠢”的经济紧张关系)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause) Station nine?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声）第九站？

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Charlie and Warren. Thank you for this superb shareholder meeting celebration. My name is David Chung (PH) from Hong Kong, and a proud graduate of Chicago Booth. I’m also here with my two sons, Aiden (PH) and Ashen (PH), who are currently studying at the University of Chicago as a freshman and sophomore.

观众：嗨，查理和沃伦。感谢这次精彩的股东大会庆祝活动。我叫大卫·钟，来自香港，是芝加哥布斯商学院的骄傲毕业生。我还带了我的两个儿子，艾登和阿申，他们目前在芝加哥大学读大一和大二。

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This is my second time attending the conference, last being 2019 four years ago, which I was only a guest shareholder of my friend, Andrew. So, after the shareholder meeting, I have decided to buy into Berkshire Hathaway, which has given me a great return of 62% since 2019.

这是我第二次参加大会，上次是四年前的2019年，当时我只是我朋友安德鲁的客座股东。所以，在股东大会后，我决定买入伯克希尔哈撒韦的股票，自2019年以来给了我62%的丰厚回报。

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So, I wanted to thank you for that. (Applause) I have also taken your advice to give my children a share for each of their birthdays. Although they want Berkshire Hathaway A shares, (Laughter) they will do just fine with B shares. (Laughter)

所以，我想为此感谢你们。（掌声）我也听从了你们的建议，在孩子们的每个生日给他们一股。虽然他们想要伯克希尔哈撒韦的A类股，（笑声）但B类股也完全可以。（笑声）

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My question is how do you see the current U.S./China internet companies’ valuation and the price disparity, given there have been many uncertainties such as geopolitical tensions, significant cost optimizations with leading U.S. tech firms, while China tech has been through all that already? Thank you.

我的问题是，鉴于存在许多不确定性，如地缘政治紧张局势，美国领先科技公司的大幅成本优化，而中国科技公司已经经历了这些，你如何看待当前美国/中国互联网公司的估值和价格差异？谢谢。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you want to?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你想回答吗？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s been some tension in the economic relationship of United States and China. I think that that tension has been wrongly created on both sides. I think we’re equally guilty of being stupid. If there’s one thing we should do, it’s get along with China.

查理·芒格：嗯，美国和中国的经济关系中存在一些紧张。我认为这种紧张是双方错误造成的。我认为我们同样有愚蠢的罪责。如果有一件事我们应该做，那就是与中国好好相处。

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And we should have a lot of free trade with China in our mutual interest. (Applause)

我们应该与中国进行大量自由贸易，这符合我们的共同利益。（掌声）

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And I just can’t imagine. It’s just so obvious. There’s so much safety and so much creativity that’s possible. Think of what Apple has done by engaging in a partnership with China as a big supplier.

我只是无法想象。这太明显了。有这么多的安全性和创造性是可能的。想想苹果通过与中国作为主要供应商的合作所取得的成就。

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It’s been good for Apple and good for China. That’s the kind of business we ought to be doing with China. And more of it. Everything that increases the tension between the two countries is stupid, stupid, stupid. It ought to be stopped on each side. And each side ought to respond to the other side’s stupidity with reciprocal kindness. That’s my view.

这对苹果和中国都有好处。这就是我们应该与中国做的生意。而且要更多。任何增加两国之间紧张的事情都是愚蠢、愚蠢、愚蠢的。双方都应该停止这种行为。每一方都应该以相互的善意回应对方的愚蠢。这是我的看法。

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WARREN BUFFETT: And it creates one enormous problem, of course, which is that you have the two superpowers of the world, and they know they have to get along with each other. Either one can destroy the other. And they’re going to be competitive with each other. But part of it is, always in a game like that, is trying to judge how far you can push the other guy without them reacting wrong.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然，这带来了一个巨大的问题，那就是世界上有两个超级大国，他们知道他们必须相互相处。任何一方都可以摧毁另一方。他们之间会有竞争。但在这类游戏中，总是要判断你能把对方推多远，而不让他们做出错误的反应。

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And, you know, if either side is a bully in some ways, they can get away with it, to an extent, because the alternative would drive them both into destruction. But if they push it too far, they increase the probability that something really does go wrong.

你知道，如果任何一方在某些方面是霸凌者，他们可以在一定程度上得逞，因为替代方案会将双方推向毁灭。但如果他们推得太远，他们会增加真正出错的概率。

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So, it’s one of those game theory dilemmas. But you really need the leader of both countries. And you need the populace to understand, at least, the general situation in which these countries are going to operate over the next century. And know that some leader that promises too much can get you in a hell of a lot of trouble.

所以，这是一个博弈论的困境。但你确实需要两国的领导人。还需要公众至少理解这两个国家在下一个世纪将要运作的大致情况。并知道一些承诺过多的领导人会给你带来很多麻烦。

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And, you know, you’ve got one kind of a system that gets its leader one way. They’ve got another system that gets its leader another way. And keeping either side from trying to play the game too hard, and thinking the other side will go along, you know, it’s like playing chicken, you know, and driving toward a cliff.

你知道，你有一种系统以某种方式选出领导人。他们有另一种系统以另一种方式选出领导人。防止任何一方试图玩得太狠，认为对方会顺从，你知道，这就像玩懦夫游戏，朝悬崖开车。

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So, if you’ve got any diplomacy skills, persuasive skills, or anything like that, you really want people that will convince the other country, as well as his own or her own country, that, “This is what we’re engaged in. We’ve got to do it right. We won’t give away the store, but we won’t try and take the whole store, either.”

所以，如果你有任何外交技巧、说服技巧或类似的东西，你真的需要那些能说服对方国家以及他或她自己国家的人，“这就是我们正在做的事情。我们必须做对。我们不会放弃整个商店，但我们也不会试图拿走整个商店。”

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And we’re just at the beginning of this, unfortunately. I mean, we learned what the situation was. It used to be the Soviet. And mutually assured destruction was our policy then. And that kept a lot of things from happening, but it also came with a very, very, very close call with Cuba.

不幸的是，我们才刚开始。我的意思是，我们了解了情况。过去是苏联。当时我们的政策是相互确保毁灭。这阻止了很多事情发生，但也带来了与古巴非常非常非常接近的危机。

---

And these are different games that existed hundreds of years ago. Britain might rule and seize France or Spain, but now you’re playing with a game that you can’t really make a huge mistake in. And I think that the better that’s understood in both countries, the more the leaders feel that their citizenry does understand that, the better off we’ll be.

这些是几百年前存在的不同游戏。英国可能统治并夺取法国或西班牙，但现在你在玩一个不能犯大错的游戏。我认为，两国对此理解得越好，领导人越觉得他们的公民理解这一点，我们就越好。

---

And that a lot of demography, or a lot of inflammatory speaking, but a lot of authoritarian action, I mean, it all carries its dangers. And the world has stumbled through the years post 1945 with a lot of close calls in the nuclear arena.

很多人口统计，或很多煽动性言论，但很多威权行动，我的意思是，这些都有其危险。1945年后的世界在核领域跌跌撞撞，经历了很多次险情。

---

And now we’ve got pandemics. And we’ve got cyber, and a whole bunch of other things. So, we’ve got more tools of destruction than the world’s ever had. And it’s imperative that China and the United States both understand what the game is and understand that you can’t push too hard.

现在我们有了流行病。还有网络，以及一大堆其他东西。所以，我们拥有的破坏工具比以往任何时候都多。中国和美国都必须理解这个游戏是什么，并且明白不能推得太狠。

---

But both places are going to be competitive. And both can prosper. That’s the vision that is out there, that China will have a more wonderful country, the United States will have a more wonderful country. And the two are not [incompatible].

但两个地方都会有竞争。两者都可以繁荣。这是一个愿景，中国将拥有一个更美好的国家，美国也将拥有一个更美好的国家。两者并非[不相容的]。

---

They’re almost imperative in terms of what’s going to happen in the next 100 years or so. And I think that the leaders of both countries have got an important job in having that understood, and not to do inflammatory things. And we’ll see whether the luck that has taken us from 1945 to present holds out. And I think we can affect, to some extent, that luck. And with that cheery message, we will hand it to Becky. (Laugh)

在未来100年左右的时间里，这几乎是必须的。我认为，两国领导人有一个重要的工作，让人们理解这一点，而不是做煽动性的事情。我们将看看从1945年至今的运气是否能持续。我认为我们可以在某种程度上影响这种运气。带着这个乐观的信息，我们将交给贝基。（笑）

---

26. ‘I feel better about the capital we’ve deployed in Japan than Taiwan’ (我对我们在日本部署的资本感觉比台湾好)

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Roheet Bellany (PH). “Berkshire bought a substantial position in Taiwan Semiconductor, and contrary to its normal holding timeline, sold almost the entire position within a few short months.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自罗希特·贝拉尼。“伯克希尔购买了台湾半导体的大量股份，与其正常的持有时间线相反，在短短几个月内几乎卖掉了全部股份。

---

While you cited in a CNBC interview that geopolitical issues were the catalyst, these issues were seemingly no different when you acquired that stock.

你在CNBC的采访中提到地缘政治问题是催化剂，但这些问题在你收购该股票时似乎并没有什么不同。

---

So, what else, if anything, changed in those few months and prompted the firm to offload close to $5 billion worth of Taiwan Semiconductor shares?”

那么，在那几个月里还有什么变化，如果有的话，促使公司卖掉了近50亿美元的台湾半导体股份？”

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Taiwan Semiconductor’s one of the best managed companies and important companies in the world. And I think you’ll be able to say the same thing five, or ten, or 20 years from now.

沃伦·巴菲特：台湾半导体是世界上管理最好、最重要的公司之一。我认为五年、十年或二十年后你仍然会这么说。

---

I don’t like its location. And I’ve reevaluated that. I mean, I don’t think it should be any place but Taiwan, although they will be, obviously, opening up chip capacity in this country.

我不喜欢它的地理位置。我已经重新评估了这一点。我的意思是，我认为它不应该在台湾以外的地方，尽管显然他们将在这个国家开设芯片产能。

---

And actually, one of our subsidiaries that we got in Alleghany is participating in their Arizona construction activities.

实际上，我们在阿勒格尼收购的一家子公司正在参与他们在亚利桑那的建设活动。

---

But it’s a question of we would rather have the same kind of company. And there’s nobody in the chip industry that’s in their league, at least in my view.

但问题是我们宁愿拥有同类型的公司。在芯片行业中，至少在我看来，没有人能与他们匹敌。

---

And the man that is a 91-year-old or so connected with it, that I think I played bridge with in Albuquerque, and they’re marvelous people, marvelous company. But I’d rather find marvelous people — and I won’t find it in the chip industry.

与它相关的那个大约91岁的人，我想我在阿尔伯克基和他打过桥牌，他们是了不起的人，了不起的公司。但我宁愿找到了不起的人——在芯片行业我找不到。

---

But marvelous people and marvelous competitive position and.reference everything, I’d rather find it in the United States.

但了不起的人和了不起的竞争地位以及一切，我宁愿在美国找到。

---

I feel better about the capital that we’ve deployed in Japan than Taiwan. I wish it weren’t so, but I think that’s the reality. And I’ve reevaluated that in the light of certain things that were going on. Charlie?

我对我们在日本部署的资本感觉比台湾好。我希望不是这样，但我想这就是现实。我根据正在发生的一些事情重新评估了这一点。查理？

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my view is that Warren ought to feel comfortable if he wants to. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我的看法是，如果沃伦想感到舒服，他就应该感到舒服。（笑声）

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. Put that in the minutes. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。记入会议记录。（笑声）

---

27. Ben Graham’s great investment book is still popular (本·格雷厄姆的伟大投资书籍仍然很受欢迎)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station ten?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第十站？

---

AUDIENCE MEMBER: First of all, thank you for making our lives better. My name is Bugomil Baranowsky. I’m a founding partner of Sicart Associates in New York. We manage multi-generational family fortunes, hence my question. Mr. Buffet, in 1976 in your tribute to Benjamin Graham you wrote, “Walter Lippmann spoke of men who plant trees that other men will sit under.” Ben Graham was such a man. You’re both such people. Could you share with us your 100-year vision for Berkshire? It’s a question to you both.

观众：首先，感谢你们让我们的生活更美好。我叫布戈米尔·巴拉诺夫斯基。我是纽约Sicart Associates的创始合伙人。我们管理多代家族财富，因此有了我的问题。巴菲特先生，1976年您在向本杰明·格雷厄姆致敬时写道：“沃尔特·李普曼谈到那些种树让他人乘凉的人。”本·格雷厄姆就是这样的人。你们两位都是这样的人。能否与我们分享您对伯克希尔100年的愿景？这是对你们两人的问题。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would like to add one thing about Ben Graham. Ben Graham did all kinds of things for me, and he never expected one thing in return. I mean, just you name it, and he did it, and there wasn’t any hidden — you know, the slightest hint, I should say, of anything he expected in return.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我想补充一点关于本·格雷厄姆的事。本·格雷厄姆为我做了很多事，他从未期望任何回报。我的意思是，你随便说，他都做了，没有任何隐藏的——应该说，没有一丝他期望回报的暗示。

---

And I checked: He wrote a book in 1949 that, in a sense, said to me, in very persuasive terms, that what I’d been spending the previous eight or nine years worked at, and loving, was all wrong. And that book has been — I check it every now and then on Amazon where it ranks, and, you know, Amazon ranks hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of thousands of books by sales.

我查了一下：他在1949年写了一本书，在某种意义上，用非常有说服力的语言告诉我，我之前八九年努力并热爱的事情都是错的。那本书——我时不时在亚马逊上查看它的排名，你知道，亚马逊根据销量对数十万本书进行排名。

---

And Ben Graham’s book has been up there, like, number 300, or 350, or something like that, forever. And there isn’t book like it. I wrote Harper Collins a note the other day because they’re bringing out another edition. And I asked them how many copies have been sold. And they said the records didn’t go back far enough, but they had 7.3 million copies of this little book that changed my life and continues to outsell every investment book ever.

本·格雷厄姆的书一直在那里，像是第300或350名，诸如此类，永远如此。没有哪本书能与之相比。前几天我给哈珀柯林斯写了一封信，因为他们要推出新版。我问他们卖了多少本。他们说记录不够久远，但这本改变我人生的小书已经卖了730万本，并且继续超过所有投资书籍。

---

Investment books come along and, you know, they’re number 400, or 1000 or something for a while, and then all of a sudden, they’re number 25,000, or (Laugh) 200,000.

投资书籍不断出现，你知道，它们可能是第400或1000名一段时间，然后突然间，它们变成了第25000或（笑）200000名。

---

And this book — you know, in how many areas can you find any book that has had that sustained position? You go back and look at number one in 1950, or number two or number three, and you look at it in ’51 and ’52: They don’t continue.

这本书——你知道，在多少领域你能找到一本有如此持续地位的书？你回头看看1950年的第一、第二或第三名，然后再看1951年和1952年：它们不会持续。

---

I mean, they just don’t continue. Cookbooks, maybe one or two of them, last for a while, but there is nothing. And this book lives on, and everybody keeps bringing out new books, and saying a lot of other things. But they aren’t saying anything that’s as important as what he.Part of practical intelligence. And a lot of people who are geniuses on IQ tests think they’re a lot smarter than they are. And what they are is dangerous.

但如果你很清楚自己能力的边界，你应该忽略我们专家关于我称之为投资组合“去优化”的观点。

---

25. U.S. and China both need to reduce ‘stupid, stupid, stupid’ economic tensions (美国和中国都需要减少“愚蠢、愚蠢、愚蠢”的经济紧张关系)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause) Station nine?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声）第九站？

---

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Charlie and Warren. Thank you for this superb shareholder meeting celebration. My name is David Chung (PH) from Hong Kong, and a proud graduate of Chicago Booth. I’m also here with my two sons, Aiden (PH) and Ashen (PH), who are currently studying at the University of Chicago as a freshman and sophomore.

观众：嗨，查理和沃伦。感谢这次精彩的股东大会庆祝活动。我叫大卫·钟，来自香港，是芝加哥布斯商学院的骄傲毕业生。我还带了我的两个儿子，艾登和阿申，他们目前在芝加哥大学读大一和大二。

---

This is my second time attending the conference, last being 2019 four years ago, which I was only a guest shareholder of my friend, Andrew. So, after the shareholder meeting, I have decided to buy into Berkshire Hathaway, which has given me a great return of 62% since 2019.

这是我第二次参加大会，上次是四年前的2019年，当时我只是我朋友安德鲁的客座股东。所以，在股东大会后，我决定买入伯克希尔哈撒韦的股票，自2019年以来给了我62%的丰厚回报。

---

So, I wanted to thank you for that. (Applause) I have also taken your advice to give my children a share for each of their birthdays. Although they want Berkshire Hathaway A shares, (Laughter) they will do just fine with B shares. (Laughter)

所以，我想为此感谢你们。（掌声）我也听从了你们的建议，在孩子们的每个生日给他们一股。虽然他们想要伯克希尔哈撒韦的A类股，（笑声）但B类股也完全可以。（笑声）

---

My question is how do you see the current U.S./China internet companies’ valuation and the price disparity, given there have been many uncertainties such as geopolitical tensions, significant cost optimizations with leading U.S. tech firms, while China tech has been through all that already? Thank you.

我的问题是，鉴于存在许多不确定性，如地缘政治紧张局势，美国领先科技公司的大幅成本优化，而中国科技公司已经经历了这些，你如何看待当前美国/中国互联网公司的估值和价格差异？谢谢。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you want to?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你想回答吗？

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s been some tension in the economic relationship of United States and China. I think that that tension has been wrongly created on both sides. I think we’re equally guilty of being stupid. If there’s one thing we should do, it’s get along with China.

查理·芒格：嗯，美国和中国的经济关系中存在一些紧张。我认为这种紧张是双方错误造成的。我认为我们同样有愚蠢的罪责。如果有一件事我们应该做，那就是与中国好好相处。

---

And we should have a lot of free trade with China in our mutual interest. (Applause)

我们应该与中国进行大量自由贸易，这符合我们的共同利益。（掌声）

---

And I just can’t imagine. It’s just so obvious. There’s so much safety and so much creativity that’s possible. Think of what Apple has done by engaging in a partnership with China as a big supplier.

我只是无法想象。这太明显了。有这么多的安全性和创造性是可能的。想想苹果通过与中国作为主要供应商的合作所取得的成就。

---

It’s been good for Apple and good for China. That’s the kind of business we ought to be doing with China. And more of it. Everything that increases the tension between the two countries is stupid, stupid, stupid. It ought to be stopped on each side. And each side ought to respond to the other side’s stupidity with reciprocal kindness. That’s my view.

这对苹果和中国都有好处。这就是我们应该与中国做的生意。而且要更多。任何增加两国之间紧张的事情都是愚蠢、愚蠢、愚蠢的。双方都应该停止这种行为。每一方都应该以相互的善意回应对方的愚蠢。这是我的看法。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: And it creates one enormous problem, of course, which is that you have the two superpowers of the world, and they know they have to get along with each other. Either one can destroy the other. And they’re going to be competitive with each other. But part of it is, always in a game like that, is trying to judge how far you can push the other guy without them reacting wrong.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然，这带来了一个巨大的问题，那就是世界上有两个超级大国，他们知道他们必须相互相处。任何一方都可以摧毁另一方。他们之间会有竞争。但在这类游戏中，总是要判断你能把对方推多远，而不让他们做出错误的反应。

---

And, you know, if either side is a bully in some ways, they can get away with it, to an extent, because the alternative would drive them both into destruction. But if they push it too far, they increase the probability that something really does go wrong.

你知道，如果任何一方在某些方面是霸凌者，他们可以在一定程度上得逞，因为替代方案会将双方推向毁灭。但如果他们推得太远，他们会增加真正出错的概率。

---

So, it’s one of those game theory dilemmas. But you really need the leader of both countries. And you need the populace to understand, at least, the general situation in which these countries are going to operate over the next century. And know that some leader that promises too much can get you in a hell of a lot of trouble.

所以，这是一个博弈论的困境。但你确实需要两国的领导人。还需要公众至少理解这两个国家在下一个世纪将要运作的大致情况。并知道一些承诺过多的领导人会给你带来很多麻烦。

---

And, you know, you’ve got one kind of a system that gets its leader one way | They’ve got another system that gets its leader another way. And keeping either side from trying to play the game too hard, and thinking the other side will go along, you know, it’s like playing chicken, you know, and driving toward a cliff.

你知道，你有一种系统以某种方式选出领导人。他们有另一种系统以另一种方式选出领导人。防止任何一方试图玩得太狠，认为对方会顺从，你知道，这就像玩懦夫游戏，朝悬崖开车。

---

So, if you’ve got any diplomacy skills, persuasive skills, or anything like that, you really want people that will convince the other country, as well as his own or her own country, that, “This is what we’re engaged in. We’ve got to do it right. We won’t give away the store, but we won’t try and take the whole store, either.”

所以，如果你有任何外交技巧、说服技巧或类似的东西，你真的需要那些能说服对方国家以及他或她自己国家的人，“这就是我们正在做的事情。我们必须做对。我们不会放弃整个商店，但我们也不会试图拿走整个商店。”

---

And we’re just at the beginning of this, unfortunately. I mean, we learned what the situation was. It used to be the Soviet. And mutually assured destruction was our policy then. And that kept a lot of things from happening, but it also came with a very, very, very close call with Cuba.

不幸的是，我们才刚开始。我的意思是，我们了解了情况。过去是苏联。当时我们的政策是相互确保毁灭。这阻止了很多事情发生，但也带来了与古巴非常非常非常接近的危机。

---

And these are different games that existed hundreds of years ago. Britain might rule and seize France or Spain, but now you’re playing with a game that you can’t really make a huge mistake in. And I think that the better that’s understood in both countries, the more the leaders feel that their citizenry does understand that, the better off we’ll be.

这些是几百年前存在的不同游戏。英国可能统治并夺取法国或西班牙，但现在你在玩一个不能犯大错的游戏。我认为，两国对此理解得越好，领导人越觉得他们的公民理解这一点，我们就越好。

---

And that a lot of demography, or a lot of inflammatory speaking, but a lot of authoritarian action, I mean, it all carries its dangers. And the world has stumbled through the years post 1945 with a lot of close calls in the nuclear arena.

很多人口统计，或很多煽动性言论，但很多威权行动，我的意思是，这些都有其危险。1945年后的世界在核领域跌跌撞撞，经历了很多次险情。

---

And now we’ve got pandemics. And we’ve got cyber, and a whole bunch of other things. So, we’ve got more tools of destruction than the world’s ever had. And it’s imperative that China and the United States both understand what the game is and understand that you can’t push too hard.

现在我们有了流行病。还有网络，以及一大堆其他东西。所以，我们拥有的破坏工具比以往任何时候都多。中国和美国都必须理解这个游戏是什么，并且明白不能推得太狠。

---

But both places are going to be competitive. And both can prosper. That’s the vision that is out there, that China will have a more wonderful country, the United States will have a more wonderful country. And the two are not [incompatible].

但两个地方都会有竞争。两者都可以繁荣。这是一个愿景，中国将拥有一个更美好的国家，美国也将拥有一个更美好的国家。两者并非[不相容的]。

---

They’re almost imperative in terms of what’s going to happen in the next 100 years or so. And I think that the leaders of both countries have got an important job in having that understood, and not to do inflammatory things. And we’ll see whether the luck that has taken us from 1945 to present holds out. And I think we can affect, to some extent, that luck. And with that cheery message, we will hand it to Becky. (Laugh)

在未来100年左右的时间里，这几乎是必须的。我认为，两国领导人有一个重要的工作，让人们理解这一点，而不是做煽动性的事情。我们将看看从1945年至今的运气是否能持续。我认为我们可以在某种程度上影响这种运气。带着这个乐观的信息，我们将交给贝基。（笑）

---

26. ‘I feel better about the capital we’ve deployed in Japan than Taiwan’ (我对我们在日本部署的资本感觉比台湾好)

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Roheet Bellany (PH). “Berkshire bought a substantial position in Taiwan Semiconductor, and contrary to its normal holding timeline, sold almost the entire position within a few short months.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自罗希特·贝拉尼。“伯克希尔购买了台湾半导体的大量股份，与其正常的持有时间线相反，在短短几个月内几乎卖掉了全部股份。

---

While you cited in a CNBC interview that geopolitical issues were the catalyst, these issues were seemingly no different when you acquired that stock.

你在CNBC的采访中提到地缘政治问题是催化剂，但这些问题在你收购该股票时似乎并没有什么不同。

---

So, what else, if anything, changed in those few months and prompted the firm to offload close to $5 billion worth of Taiwan Semiconductor shares?”

那么，在那几个月里还有什么变化，如果有的话，促使公司卖掉了近50亿美元的台湾半导体股份？”

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Taiwan Semiconductor’s one of the best managed companies and important companies in the world. And I think you’ll be able to say the same thing five, or ten, or 20 years from now.

沃伦·巴菲特：台湾半导体是世界上管理最好、最重要的公司之一。我认为五年、十年或二十年后你仍然会这么说。

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I don’t like its location. And I’ve reevaluated that. I mean, I don’t think it should be any place but Taiwan, although they will be, obviously, opening up chip capacity in this country.

我不喜欢它的地理位置。我已经重新评估了这一点。我的意思是，我认为它不应该在台湾以外的地方，尽管显然他们将在这个国家开设芯片产能。

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And actually, one of our subsidiaries that we got in Alleghany is participating in their Arizona construction activities.

实际上，我们在阿勒格尼收购的一家子公司正在参与他们在亚利桑那的建设活动。

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But it’s a question of we would rather have the same kind of company. And there’s nobody in the chip industry that’s in their league, at least in my view.

但问题是我们宁愿拥有同类型的公司。在芯片行业中，至少在我看来，没有人能与他们匹敌。

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And the man that is a 91-year-old or so connected with it, that I think I played bridge with in Albuquerque, and they’re marvelous people, marvelous company. But I’d rather find marvelous people — and I won’t find it in the chip industry.

与它相关的那个大约91岁的人，我想我在阿尔伯克基和他打过桥牌，他们是了不起的人，了不起的公司。但我宁愿找到了不起的人——在芯片行业我找不到。

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But marvelous people and marvelous competitive position and everything, I’d rather find it in the United States.

但了不起的人和了不起的竞争地位以及一切，我宁愿在美国找到。

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I feel better about the capital that we’ve deployed in Japan than Taiwan. I wish it weren’t so, but I think that’s the reality. And I’ve reevaluated that in the light of certain things that were going on. Charlie?

我对我们在日本部署的资本感觉比台湾好。我希望不是这样，但我想这就是现实。我根据正在发生的一些事情重新评估了这一点。查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my view is that Warren ought to feel comfortable if he wants to. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我的看法是，如果沃伦想感到舒服，他就应该感到舒服。（笑声）

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. Put that in the minutes. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。记入会议记录。（笑声）

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27. Ben Graham’s great investment book is still popular (本·格雷厄姆的伟大投资书籍仍然很受欢迎)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station ten?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第十站？

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: First of all, thank you for making our lives better. My name is Bugomil Baranowsky. I’m a founding partner of Sicart Associates in New York. We manage multi-generational family fortunes, hence my question. Mr. Buffet, in 1976 in your tribute to Benjamin Graham you wrote, “Walter Lippmann spoke of men who plant trees that other men will sit under.” Ben Graham was such a man. You’re both such people. Could you share with us your 100-year vision for Berkshire? It’s a question to you both.

观众：首先，感谢你们让我们的生活更美好。我叫布戈米尔·巴拉诺夫斯基。我是纽约Sicart Associates的创始合伙人。我们管理多代家族财富，因此有了我的问题。巴菲特先生，1976年您在向本杰明·格雷厄姆致敬时写道：“沃尔特·李普曼谈到那些种树让他人乘凉的人。”本·格雷厄姆就是这样的人。你们两位都是这样的人。能否与我们分享您对伯克希尔100年的愿景？这是对你们两人的问题。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would like to add one thing about Ben Graham. Ben Graham did all kinds of things for me, and he never expected one thing in return. I mean, just you name it, and he did it, and there wasn’t any hidden — you know, the slightest hint, I should say, of anything he expected in return.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我想补充一点关于本·格雷厄姆的事。本·格雷厄姆为我做了很多事，他从未期望任何回报。我的意思是，你随便说，他都做了，没有任何隐藏的——应该说，没有一丝他期望回报的暗示。

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And I checked: He wrote a book in 1949 that, in a sense, said to me, in very persuasive terms, that what I’d been spending the previous eight or nine years worked at, and loving, was all wrong. And that book has been — I check it every now and then on Amazon where it ranks, and, you know, Amazon ranks hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of thousands of books by sales.

我查了一下：他在1949年写了一本书，在某种意义上，用非常有说服力的语言告诉我，我之前八九年努力并热爱的事情都是错的。那本书——我时不时在亚马逊上查看它的排名，你知道，亚马逊根据销量对数十万本书进行排名。

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And Ben Graham’s book has been up there, like, number 300, or 350, or something like that, forever. And there isn’t book like it. I wrote Harper Collins a note the other day because they’re bringing out another edition. And I asked them how many copies have been sold. And they said the records didn’t go back far enough, but they had 7.3 million copies of this little book that changed my life and continues to outsell every investment book ever.

本·格雷厄姆的书一直在那里，像是第300或350名，诸如此类，永远如此。没有哪本书能与之相比。前几天我给哈珀柯林斯写了一封信，因为他们要推出新版。我问他们卖了多少本。他们说记录不够久远，但这本改变我人生的小书已经卖了730万本，并且继续超过所有投资书籍。

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Investment books come along and, you know, they’re number 400, or 1000 or something for a while, and then all of a sudden, they’re number 25,000, or (Laugh) 200,000.

投资书籍不断出现，你知道，它们可能是第400或1000名一段时间，然后突然间，它们变成了第25000或（笑）200000名。

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And this book — you know, in how many areas can you find any book that has had that sustained position? You go back and look at number one in 1950, or number two or number three, and you look at it in ’51 and ’52: They don’t continue.

这本书——你知道，在多少领域你能找到一本有如此持续地位的书？你回头看看1950年的第一、第二或第三名，然后再看1951年和1952年：它们不会持续。

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I mean, they just don’t continue. Cookbooks, maybe one or two of them, last for a while, but there is nothing. And this book lives on, and everybody keeps bringing out new books, and saying a lot of other things. But they aren’t saying anything that’s as important as what he said in 1949 in this relatively thin little book.

我的意思是，它们就是不会持续。食谱书，也许有一两本能持续一段时间，但没有其他书能比得上。这本书继续流传，每个人都在推出新书，讲很多其他东西。但他们说的没有他在1949年这本相对薄的小书中说的那么重要。

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So, you know, our vision for Berkshire is exactly what we said today: We want it to be a company that is owned by shareholders and behaves in a way that society is happy that it exists, and not unhappy. And we will have unlimited capital, we’ll get lots of talent, and we’ve got a base that can’t be beat.

所以，你知道，我们对伯克希尔的愿景正是我们今天所说的：我们希望它是一家由股东拥有的公司，行为方式让社会对其存在感到高兴，而不是不高兴。我们将拥有无限的资本，我们会吸引很多人才，我们有一个无与伦比的基础。

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And there’s no reason why it can’t be perpetuated, just like Ben’s book, and maybe be an example to other people. And, if so, we’ll be very happy. Charlie?

没有理由它不能像本的书一样延续下去，也许还能成为其他人的榜样。如果是这样，我们会非常高兴。查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. One of the really interesting things about Ben Graham: He was a really gifted teacher, a very honorable profession. And that is what has lasted. However, an interesting fact that he was sheepish about in his old age, was that more than half of all the investment return that Ben Graham made in his whole life came from one stock, one growth stock: GEICO, Berkshire subsidiary.

查理·芒格：是的。关于本·格雷厄姆一个真正有趣的事情是：他是一个非常有天赋的老师，这是一个非常光荣的职业。这就是他留下的东西。然而，一个他晚年有些羞于提及的有趣事实是，他一生中超过一半的投资回报来自一只股票，一只成长股：GEICO，伯克希尔的子公司。

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And at the time he operated, there were a lot of sort of lousy companies that were too cheap, and you could make a little money floating from one to another. But the big money he made was one growth stock, buying one undervalued great company is a very good thing, as Berkshire has found out again and again and again.

在他操作的那个时代，有很多有点糟糕但价格太低的公司，你可以从一个跳到另一个赚点小钱。但他赚的大钱来自一只成长股，买入一家被低估的伟大公司是一件非常好的事情，正如伯克希尔一次又一次发现的。

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WARREN BUFFETT: And Ben wrote a postscript to the ’49 edition pointing out exactly that fact, and acknowledging it, but also took some good lessons from it. “You know,” he said, “that’s the way life is: That you prepare, and you, you know, don’t lose on everything along the way, and then something comes along.”

沃伦·巴菲特：本在49年版的后记中指出了这个事实，并承认了这一点，但也从中吸取了一些很好的教训。他说：“你知道，生活就是这样：你准备好，你知道，沿途不至于输掉一切，然后某件事就出现了。”

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And GEICO came along because a banker in Fort Worth that had financed Leo Davidson, and I think the banker got three-quarters of it. I don’t mean “Leo Davidson,” Leo Goodwin, who founded GEICO then called Government Employees Insurance Company, and you can figure out the acronym.

GEICO的出现是因为沃斯堡的一位银行家资助了利奥·戴维森，我想银行家拿了四分之三。我不是说“利奥·戴维森”，是利奥·古德温，他创立了GEICO，当时叫政府雇员保险公司，你可以猜出这个缩写。

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The deal almost fell apart. The deal was, as I remember, for maybe a million and a half or something like — a million and a quarter. And it almost fell apart because of a difference of $25,000 in the net worth delivered. This is a business that’s, you know, worth tens of billions.

这笔交易差点泡汤。我记得，这笔交易大概是150万或125万左右。差点因为交付净值差了2.5万美元而失败。这是一家现在价值数百亿的生意。

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But he pointed out the irony in that, too. I mean, he was honest, he was totally intellectually honest about the failings, and also the strengths, of his approach. And, to some extent, you know, Charlie and I have seen that in our lives.

但他也指出了其中的讽刺。我的意思是，他很诚实，对自己方法的失败和优势完全保持智力上的诚实。在某种程度上，你知道，查理和我也在我们的生活中看到了这一点。

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I mean, sort of the prepared mind, the willingness to act when you need to act, and the willing to ignore every salesman in the world — and it’s imperative to ignore them, and it’s one or two things that make the right decision.

我的意思是，有点像有准备的头脑，愿意在需要行动时行动，愿意忽略世界上每一个推销员——忽略他们是必须的，是一两件事促成了正确的决定。

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If you make the right decision on a spouse, I mean, you’ve won the game. You know, there’s an enormously important decision, and you’ve got all the time in the world. I mean, you’ve got more time than you used to have when I was a kid to make that decision.

如果你在配偶上做出了正确的决定，我的意思是，你就赢得了游戏。你知道，这是一个极其重要的决定，你有全世界的时间。我的意思是，你比我小时候有更多的时间来做这个决定。

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And, you know, I don’t know whether a third, or whatever percentage, blow that one. You know, it is really interesting.

你知道，我不知道是否有三分之一，或任何百分比，搞砸了这个决定。你知道，这真的很有趣。

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The thing to do is just keep trying to think things through and not do too many stupid things, “And, sooner or later, you have a lollapalooza,” as Charlie would say.

要做的事情就是不断尝试思考清楚，不要做太多愚蠢的事情，“迟早，你会有一个大成功，”正如查理会说的。

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28. GEICO is talking to carmakers about selling insurance in the showroom (GEICO正在与汽车制造商讨论在展厅销售保险)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

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BECKY QUICK: “All right. This question comes from Terafta (PH), a shareholder in Sierra Vista, Arizona, who is asking a question of Ajit.

贝基·奎克：“好的。这个问题来自亚利桑那州谢拉维斯塔的股东特拉夫塔，他向阿吉特提问。

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He wants to know about electric vehicles getting insurance from the manufacturer instead of car insurance companies. A recent article in The Wall Street Journal shows that EVs are a small-but-growing percentage of sales. Tesla and GM are offering their own electric vehicle insurance: What will GEICO do to combat this?

他想知道电动车从制造商而不是汽车保险公司获得保险的情况。《华尔街日报》最近的一篇文章显示，电动车的销售占比虽小但在增长。特斯拉和通用汽车正在提供自己的电动车保险：GEICO将如何应对？

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AJIT JAIN: Yeah. So, GEICO is talking to a number of original equipment manufacturers as well to try and see how best they can work with the auto manufacturers and offer insurance at the point of sale. There haven’t been very many success stories (Laugh) as yet.

阿吉特·贾因：是的。所以，GEICO也在与多家原始设备制造商交谈，试图看看如何最好地与汽车制造商合作，并在销售点提供保险。目前还没有很多成功的故事（笑）。

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So, we’ll wait and see. You know, clearly, it is a very convenient way to sell auto insurance at the point of sale. But there’s a fair amount of data that needs to be collected on the driver, not just the car. And that makes it a little more complicated.

所以，我们拭目以待。你知道，显然，在销售点销售汽车保险是一种非常方便的方式。但需要收集相当多的关于司机的信息，而不仅仅是车。这让事情变得有点复杂。

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So, we are talking to some auto manufacturers ourselves, we are hopeful that we will strike a deal with some of them before too long.

所以，我们自己也在与一些汽车制造商交谈，我们希望不久能与其中一些达成协议。

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Tesla and GM both have talked a lot in the press in terms of getting into the insurance business. And, in fact, GM, I think, has projected they’ll write $3 billion of premiums. Which, you know, it’s hard to imagine where it’ll come from. But there all hot to trot. I think somebody will find the secret sauce before too long, and we ourselves are in that race.

特斯拉和通用汽车都在媒体上大谈进入保险业务。事实上，我想，通用汽车预计他们将写下30亿美元的保费。你知道，很难想象这些保费从哪里来。但他们都跃跃欲试。我认为不久会有人找到秘诀，我们自己也在这场竞赛中。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would point out that — General Motors Insurance, for decades — and, I mean, this is not a new idea. And Uber wrote a lot of insurance for a while, they laid it off with somebody, and that company got killed by it. But — and I don’t know the deal between Uber and — I forget the name of the company that took it on, Ajit would probably know.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我想指出——通用汽车保险，几十年来——我的意思是，这不是一个新想法。优步有一段时间写了很多保险，他们把它转给了别人，那家公司因此被搞垮了。但——我不知道优步和——我忘了接手的公司的名字，阿吉特可能知道。

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AJIT JAIN: James River.

阿吉特·贾因：詹姆斯河。

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WARREN BUFFETT: James — yeah. And, you know, it is not a new idea, it’s not magic in the least. I mean, it is hard to come up with something that is better at matching risk to reward — I’m sorry, risk to price, than a bunch of very smart people are doing at Progressive, and a bunch of very smart people are doing, to a greater extent, at GEICO.

沃伦·巴菲特：詹姆斯——是的。你知道，这不是一个新想法，一点也不神奇。我的意思是，很难想出比Progressive的一群非常聪明的人，以及GEICO的更多聪明人做得更好的风险与价格匹配的方法。

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And, I mean, it just was fascinating to me when Uber went into it, you know? And they were going to get their head handed to them. But they laid off a good bit of it — a very substantial percentage of it, with somebody else, who got their head handed to them.

我的意思是，当优步进入这个领域时，我觉得很有趣，你知道吗？他们会被打得头破血流。但他们把很大一部分——相当大的百分比，转给了别人，结果那个人被打得头破血流。

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(Laugh) And, you know, but it was a story, you know, and Wall Street loves it. We’ve got 80 car dealerships that do a lot of business, and, you know, we’ve got the people buying the cars, and the place, and we form an insurance company around those dealer groups, for some reason, that writes insurance: You know, it’s hard to improve on the present system. And — (Laugh)

（笑）你知道，但这是一个故事，你知道，华尔街喜欢这个。我们有80家汽车经销商，做很多生意，你知道，我们有买车的人，有地方，我们出于某种原因围绕这些经销商集团成立了一家保险公司，写保险：你知道，很难改进现在的系统。而且——（笑）

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AJIT JAIN: Yeah.

阿吉特·贾因：是的。

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WARREN BUFFETT: I wouldn’t pay a penny — oh, I’d pay to avoid it, actually. I mean — (laughs) and — go ahead, Ajit.

沃伦·巴菲特：我一分钱都不会付——哦，实际上我会付钱来避免它。我的意思是——（笑）继续，阿吉特。

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AJIT JAIN: Yeah. The only point I’d like to add is the margins on writing auto insurance are 4%. Which is a very small number, and once there are more people that are trying to take a bite of the apple, it just becomes very, very difficult to keep all the mouths fed in a profitable manner.

阿吉特·贾因：是的。我想补充的唯一一点是，写汽车保险的利润率是4%。这是一个很小的数字，一旦有更多人试图分一杯羹，就变得非常非常难以盈利地满足所有人的需求。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You can say there was one big, new idea in property — in car insurance, back in 1920 or so when State Farm started, and State Farm still has it. Next to Berkshire, it’s the leader in having net worth. It’s a mutual company, but some guy just figured that there was a cartel running car insurance. “A Farmer from Merna” is the name of the book, I think, over in Illinois, and he created a system where he really took 20 points or so out of the cost.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你可以说在1920年左右，当州立农场开始时，财产——汽车保险领域有一个大的新想法，州立农场仍然拥有它。在伯克希尔之后，它是净值领先者。它是一家互助公司，但有个人只是觉得有一个卡特尔在经营汽车保险。我想，书的名字是《来自默纳的农民》，在伊利诺伊州，他创建了一个系统，真正将成本降低了大约20个百分点。

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And surprise, surprise, here he is, you know? And nobody’s owned stock in State Farm — it’s an insult to capitalism, actually. Everything (Laughs) you learned at the business school says it shouldn’t work, because nobody owns it, nobody’s going public with it, no nothing.

令人惊讶的是，他做到了，你知道吗？没有人拥有州立农场的股票——这实际上是对资本主义的侮辱。你在商学院学到的一切（笑）都说这不应该有效，因为没有人拥有它，没有人让它上市，什么都没有。

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But it’s got more net worth — it’s almost probably double. Leaving Berkshire out of the picture, it’s probably double the next guy, and nobody’s really improved on their system that much.

但它的净值更高——几乎可能是下一个家伙的两倍。不考虑伯克希尔，它可能是下一个家伙的两倍，没有人真正改进了他们的系统。

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So, it’s fascinating how people don’t really look at the essence. You know, these are cases that should carry a message. But the truth is, in Wall Street anything can get sold.

所以，人们如何不真正关注本质是很有趣的。你知道，这些案例应该传递一个信息。但事实是，在华尔街，任何东西都能卖出去。

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The test is whether you can sell it or not. If you can sell it, it’ll get sold, and a bunch of insurance companies came along and got it sold. And this can be a story about this stock or that stock, and it sounded good when they talked about it at Uber for a while. And it is really interesting. The investing public does not learn much.

考验是你能不能卖出去。如果能卖，它就会被卖掉，一堆保险公司出现了，卖掉了这些东西。这可能是一个关于这只股票或那只股票的故事，他们在优步谈了一段时间，听起来不错。这真的很有趣。投资公众学到的不多。

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29. Index funds are ‘backing off’ from using voting power (指数基金正在“退缩”使用投票权)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第十一站。

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name’s Jeff Merriam (PH). I’m from Edina, Minnesota. We’ve been coming for years. To make that professor from the earlier question really nervous, half our family’s wealth is in Berkshire Hathaway. (Laugh)

观众：嗨。我叫杰夫·梅里亚姆，来自明尼苏达州伊代纳。我们多年来一直参加。为了让之前提问的那位教授真的紧张，我们家族一半的财富都在伯克希尔哈撒韦。（笑）

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WARREN BUFFETT: (Laugh) But let’s make Charlie nervous. (Laugh)

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）但让我们让查理紧张。（笑）

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question has to do with voting control in the future. There was a question earlier about corporate raider. I was more wondering about who is actually going to own the voting control? Is it going to be institutions? CalPERS? BlackRock? Are they eventually going to get their way with the ESG checkboxes that we’re going to have to check? And what should we be thinking about that?

观众：我的问题与未来的投票控制有关。早些时候有一个关于企业掠夺者的问题。我更想知道谁将实际拥有投票控制权？会是机构吗？加州公务员退休系统？贝莱德？他们最终会通过ESG检查框得逞吗？我们应该对此怎么想？

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you’re thinking very well. And the interesting thing is the big aggregations look like, of course, they’d be in index funds. But what index funds want is they want a world in which society doesn’t get upset with them about the fact they’ve got all the voting power. And I would say in the last year or two it’s looked like a better idea for them not quite to get as — what was the phrase that Charlie used?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你想得很好。有趣的是，大的集合体看起来当然会在指数基金中。但指数基金想要的是一个社会不会因为他们拥有所有投票权而对他们不满的世界。我会说，在过去一两年里，对他们来说不太——查理用的那个词是什么？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: But they’ve backed off a lot.

查理·芒格：但他们已经退缩了很多。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, they backed off a lot. And it’s in their interest to back off. And, interestingly enough, in looking at money management, you know, the game is not performance, it’s assets under management. And index funds produce a tiny, tiny, tiny fee on assets under management. Because it was pioneered by Vanguard, and when it became successful it was very easy to replicate. Not so “easy,” but, I mean, it was inevitable that it be copied.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，他们退缩了很多。这符合他们的利益。有趣的是，在看资金管理时，你知道，游戏不是表现，而是管理的资产。指数基金在管理的资产上产生微乎其微的费用。因为这是由先锋领航开创的，当它成功时，复制它非常容易。不是那么“容易”，但我的意思是，它被复制是不可避免的。

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But it came with a management fee of two basis points. So, what people that have offered index funds would really like is you to buy their other funds, or let them manage money in some other way, so that they get higher fee on assets under management.

但它的管理费只有两个基点。所以，提供指数基金的人真正希望的是你购买他们的其他基金，或者让他们以其他方式管理资金，这样他们在管理的资产上就能获得更高的费用。

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Which, of course, is (Laugh) exactly why the index fund was invented in the first place. So, it’s not a “loss leader,” but it is a way to pull money in, and then you hope that people ignore what was said by —what’s the name that — you know, that — John Bogel — Jack Bogel — ignore him.

当然，这（笑）正是指数基金最初被发明的原因。所以，它不是“引流品”，但它是一种吸引资金的方式，然后你希望人们忽略——那个名字是什么——你知道，那个——约翰·博格尔——杰克·博格尔——忽略他。

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And, essentially, they give up the (UNINTEL) idea, “And that we’ll offer you a fund that does this in India, and we’ll offer you another fund that does that.” And, of course, those management fees are higher.

基本上，他们放弃了（听不清）的想法，“我们会为你提供一个在印度做这个的基金，我们会再提供另一个做那个的基金。”当然，那些管理费更高。

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So, they’re really counter-selling the idea that John Bogel came along with. But in the process, they have achieved a lot of votes, and that was fun for a while, but the last thing in the world they want to do is have Washington, or the American public, decide that they’re throwing around their weight too much.

所以，他们实际上在反向销售约翰·博格尔提出的想法。但在这个过程中，他们获得了很多投票权，这一度很有趣，但他们最不想做的事情是让华盛顿或美国公众决定他们过于滥用自己的影响力。

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So, they’re tending to back off. Now, if you figure out where their self-interest is, you can judge where their behavior is going to go. Charlie? You want to defend them? (Laugh)

所以，他们倾向于退缩。现在，如果你弄清楚他们的自身利益在哪里，你就能判断他们的行为会走向何方。查理？你想为他们辩护吗？（笑）

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CHARLIE MUNGER: No, you can square what you just said. (Laugh) You’re totally right on everything.

查理·芒格：不，你说的完全正确。（笑）你说的每一件事都完全正确。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in that case I won’t ask anybody else.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，既然如此，我就不问其他人了。

30. Buffett: Greg Abel ‘understands capital allocation as well as I do’ (巴菲特：格雷格·阿贝尔“对资本分配的理解和我一样好”)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？（笑声）

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BECKY QUICK: All right. This question comes from Almu (PH) Grinnell (PH), and this is for Warren and Greg.

贝基·奎克：好的。这个问题来自阿尔穆·格林内尔，提问对象是沃伦和格雷格。

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“Since 2019 Berkshire repurchased huge amounts of stock, reducing approximately 10% of the share count, and increasing the intrinsic value per share for the continuing shareholders. Greg is expected to be the successor of Warren as CEO, so will he be in charge of the main capital allocation decisions, including future share buybacks?

“自2019年以来，伯克希尔回购了大量股票，减少了大约10%的股份数量，并为继续持股的股东增加了每股内在价值。格雷格预计将接替沃伦担任首席执行官，那么他会负责主要的资本分配决定，包括未来的股票回购吗？

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Greg has been key in the development of Berkshire Hathaway Energy, and I think a good capital allocator. Has he been involved in the share repurchases that have been executed over the past years?

格雷格在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的发展中发挥了关键作用，我认为他是一个很好的资本分配者。他参与了过去几年执行的股票回购吗？

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And do you, both Warren and Greg, work together in the estimation of Berkshire’s intrinsic value, and the share buyback decisions?”

你们，沃伦和格雷格，是否一起合作估算伯克希尔的内在价值，以及股票回购的决定？”

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is that Greg — I’m going to turn it over to him, but the answer is Greg understands capital allocation as well as I do, and that’s lucky for us.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，答案是格雷格——我会把这个问题交给他，但答案是格雷格对资本分配的理解和我一样好，这对我们来说是幸运的。

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And he will make those decisions, I think, very much in the same framework as I would make them. And we’ve laid out that framework now for 30 years, (Laugh) or something like that. People make it way more complicated than — I mean, particularly if you’re working on a doctorate or something, it’s just a great subject to have lots of footnotes in, you know, 50 pages, or 100 pages.

我认为，他会以和我相同的框架做出这些决定。我们现在已经铺设了这个框架30年了，（笑）大概是这个时间。人们把它弄得太复杂了——我的意思是，特别是如果你在写博士论文之类的东西，这是一个有很多脚注的好主题，你知道，50页或100页。

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But it’s no more complicated than if you and I and Charlie had a business, and you wanted to sell your interest, and we could buy it for less than we thought it was worth, and without misleading you in any way about what was going on. And we’d buy it then. But, Greg, you’re on because you’re going to be doing it in the future. (Laugh)

但它并不比你、我、查理一起做生意复杂，如果你想卖掉你的股份，我们可以以低于我们认为的价值的价位买进，而且不会以任何方式误导你关于正在发生的事情。我们就会买。但，格雷格，你来回答，因为未来是你来做这件事。（笑）

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GREG ABEL: Right. Yeah, well, I think, Warren, you said it really well. I mean, the framework’s been laid out, we know how you approach it, and how you and Charlie have approached it, and really don’t see that framework changing. When the opportunity presents itself, we’ll want to be an active repurchaser of Berkshire shares. We think it’s a great outcome for Berkshire shareholders to own a larger piece of each of our operating businesses and the portfolio of the equity companies when the opportunity presents itself.

格雷格·阿贝尔：是的。嗯，我想，沃伦，你说得很好。我的意思是，框架已经定好了，我们知道你和查理是如何处理这件事的，真的看不到这个框架会改变。当机会出现时，我们会希望积极回购伯克希尔的股份。我们认为，当机会出现时，伯克希尔股东拥有我们每个运营业务和股权公司投资组合的更大份额是一个很好的结果。

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WARREN BUFFETT: It can be the dumbest thing you can do, or it can be the smartest thing you can do. And (Laugh) you know, to make it more complicated than that, and start getting into all this (UNINTEL), you obviously do what the business needs to do first if the opportunities are there: Grow your present business, buy additional businesses, whatever it may be.

沃伦·巴菲特：这可能是你能做的最蠢的事，也可能是你能做的最聪明的事。（笑）你知道，把它弄得比这更复杂，开始涉及所有这些（听不清），显然你首先要做生意需要做的事，如果有机会的话：发展现有业务，购买额外的业务，等等。

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And then you make a decision on dividends. But that decision becomes pretty irrevocable because you don’t cut dividends without having major effects in your shareholder base and a lot of things.

然后你决定是否分红。但这个决定几乎是不可逆转的，因为你不削减股息就不会对你的股东基础和很多事情产生重大影响。

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And then, if you’ve got ample capital, and you don’t see that you’re going to use it all, and your stock is attractive, and it enhances the intrinsic value for the remaining shareholders, it’s a no-brainer.

然后，如果你的资本充足，你看不到会全部用掉，而且你的股票很有吸引力，并且它能提升剩余股东的内在价值，这是一个显而易见的决定。

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And if it’s above the price of intrinsic value, it’s a no-brainer that you don’t even listen to anybody, no matter what investment banker comes in and tells you, “Here’s how to do a repurchase program.”

如果股价高于内在价值，你就不听任何人的意见，无论投资银行家进来告诉你，“这是如何制定回购计划的”，这也是显而易见的。

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31. Munger has two words for COVID vaccine skeptic (芒格对新冠疫苗怀疑者说了两个字)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK: Station 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的：第一站。

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Tom Nelson, a podcaster from North Oaks, Minnesota.

观众：我是汤姆·纳尔逊，来自明尼苏达州北橡树的播客主。

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Charlie, in 2022 you used phrases like, “really massively stupid,” “massive kind of ignorance,” and “crazy” to describe what you said was the 30% of Americans hesitant to submit themselves to untested mRNA COVID gene therapy. Do you stand behind those quotes today?

查理，2022年你用了“极其愚蠢”、“巨大的无知”和“疯狂”等词来形容你所说的30%不愿接受未经测试的mRNA新冠基因疗法的美国人。你今天还坚持这些说法吗？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Sure. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：是的，当然。（笑声和掌声）

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we got time for one more, then, before lunch.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，那我们还有时间再回答一个问题，然后就去吃午饭。

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32. ‘It’s hard to judge successor management in a really good business’ like Berkshire (在像伯克希尔这样的好企业中“很难判断继任管理层”)

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughter) Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑声）贝基？

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BECKY QUICK: OK. (Laughter) Thought I was out, but let’s see. How about — let’s see here — (Laughter)

贝基·奎克：好的。（笑声）以为我没事了，但让我们看看。怎么样——让我们看看这里——（笑声）

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WARREN BUFFETT: Could be, “How about lunch?” pretty soon. But —

沃伦·巴菲特：可能很快就是“吃午饭怎么样？”不过——

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BECKY QUICK: (Laugh) No, no, OK. Let’s take that one for you. This one comes from Drew Estes. This is a question for Warren: “In your 1969 Letter to Partners you said, ‘In any company where the founder and chief driving force behind the enterprise is still active, it’s still very difficult to evaluate second men.’”

贝基·奎克：（笑）不，不，好的。我们来回答这个问题。这个问题来自德鲁·埃斯特斯。这是给沃伦的问题：“在你1969年给合伙人的信中，你说，‘在任何一家创始人及其主要推动力仍在活跃的公司中，评估第二号人物仍然非常困难。’”

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‘“The only real way to see how someone is going to do when running a company is to let them run it.’

“‘唯一真正了解一个人在管理公司时表现如何的方法就是让他去管理。’

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This wise statement now applies to Berkshire. Once the ‘second men’ are running Berkshire, what would you advise owners of Berkshire to watch for? Specifically what actions, if taken, should give us concern?”

这个明智的说法现在适用于伯克希尔。一旦‘第二号人物’开始管理伯克希尔，你会建议伯克希尔的股东关注什么？具体来说，如果采取了哪些行动，应该让我们感到担忧？”

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think I would have some comfort in the fact that 99% of my net worth is (Laugh) in the company — so I’ve probably got a stronger interest in it, and perhaps $100 billion or more of philanthropy will be affected by it. But I would say that I don’t have a second choice. I mean, it is that tough to find, but I’ve also seen Greg in action, and I feel 100% comfortable.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想我会有些安慰，因为我99%的净资产（笑）都在这家公司——所以我可能对它有更强的兴趣，也许1000亿美元或更多的慈善事业会受到影响。但我要说，我没有第二个选择。我的意思是，找到这样的人真的很难，但我见过格雷格的实际表现，我感到100%放心。

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And, like I say, I don’t know: If something happened to Greg I would tell the directors, you know, they have a problem, and I don’t have anybody to name, and if they put somebody in Berkshire on automatic pilot, it can work extremely well for a long time.

就像我说的，我不知道：如果格雷格出了什么事，我会告诉董事会，你知道，他们有麻烦了，我没有人可以推荐，如果他们让某人在伯克希尔上自动驾驶，它可以非常好地运行很长时间。

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I mean, it isn’t like the businesses go away or any other thing of the sort. And it’s hard to judge successor management in a really good business. Because if they don’t show up at the office, it’ll keep working for a long time. And maybe that lack of useful input may show itself in five years. I mean, it may go a long, long, long time.

我的意思是，不是说业务会消失或诸如此类的事情。在一个真正好的企业中，很难判断继任管理层。因为如果他们不出现在办公室，业务还能继续运行很长时间。也许缺乏有用的输入可能在五年后显现出来。我的意思是，它可能会持续很长很长时间。

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And how are the shareholders, you know, advised by a bunch of people that are concerned about whether you’re meeting earnings projections or something telling them whether the management’s any good? It is very, very hard, it’s very hard. I’ve been on the board of 20 companies: It’s very hard. If you asked me to rank the management of each one, it’s very difficult to do.

股东们，你知道，被一群关心你是否达到盈利预测的人建议，告诉他们管理层是否优秀？这非常非常困难，真的很难。我在20家公司的董事会待过：这很难。如果你让我对每个公司的管理层进行排名，真的很难做到。

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Because some are just better businesses than others. Some would be better off not managed hardly at all. Others really need help, but they got a lousy business. And Tom Murphy told me a long, long, long time ago, he said, “The secret of business is to buy a good business. And it’s OK to inherit one, too.” (Laugh)

因为有些业务就是比其他的好。有些几乎不需要管理会更好。其他确实需要帮助，但它们是个烂生意。汤姆·墨菲很久很久以前告诉我，他说：“生意的秘诀是买一个好生意。继承一个也没问题。”（笑）

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And Greg is inheriting a good business, and I think he will make it better. But I don’t think it’s easy to put any one of the next ten nominees in and try and judge, three years later, whether they’ve done a good job or not. So, that’ll be a very interesting job for the board.

格雷格正在继承一个好生意，我认为他会让它变得更好。但我不认为随便把接下来的十个候选人中的一个放进去，然后三年后试图判断他们是否干得好是件容易的事。所以，这对董事会来说将是一个非常有趣的工作。

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But it shouldn’t listen to Wall Street on it. They’ve got the job. If they put somebody in — if there’s a surprise, we both go down in a plane, they put somebody in, they’ve got a real job in assessing that person. I mean, it will depend on how good he or she is as a talker, it’ll depend on, you know, them courting Wall Street to be supportive of them, all kinds of things.

但他们不应该听华尔街的意见。他们有这个职责。如果他们选了某人——如果有意外，我们俩在飞机上出了事，他们选了某人，他们得认真评估这个人。我的意思是，这取决于他或她作为演讲者的能力，取决于，你知道，他们讨好华尔街以获得支持，各种各样的事情。

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And we’ve got some very good people on the board, but they would be challenged in that position, as would I, where I have been in that position in other companies, where a very great leader has left, and on the way from the funeral, you know, nobody knows what to do exactly.

我们董事会里有一些非常优秀的人，但他们在这个位置上会面临挑战，就像我一样，我在其他公司也遇到过这种情况，一个非常伟大的领导者离开了，在从葬礼回来的路上，你知道，没人确切知道该做什么。

33. Washington should explicitly guarantee all U.S. bank deposits (华盛顿应明确担保所有美国银行存款)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, so take your seats please. Sales are terrific out there, so you’re my kind of crowd. (LAUGHTER) I’ve been getting reports we’re breaking all kinds of records. And we’re going to start off with question number 26, which goes to station two.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请大家就座。外面的销售非常好，你们是我喜欢的观众。（笑声）我收到报告说我们打破了各种记录。我们将从第26个问题开始，来自第二站。

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi Warren and Charlie. My name is James from Malaysia. Given the recent challenges faced by the U.S. banks, what is your outlook on the banking industry? How do you assess the risk and the opportunity in this section?

观众：嗨，沃伦和查理。我叫詹姆斯，来自马来西亚。鉴于美国银行业最近面临的挑战，您对银行业的展望是什么？您如何评估这个行业的风险和机会？

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, anticipating a few questions on banks, I decided we should start using bank language here to (LAUGHTER) describe —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，预计会有一些关于银行的问题，我决定我们应该开始使用银行术语来（笑声）描述——

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And Charlie. (LAUGHTER AND APPLAUSE)

还有查理。（笑声和掌声）

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The situation in banking is very similar to what it’s always been in banking, that fear is contagious, always.

银行业的情况与一直以来的情况非常相似，恐惧总是具有传染性。

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And historically sometimes the fear was justified, and sometimes it wasn’t. My dad lost his job in 1931 because of a bank run, and they had a bank run on state banks. And the head of the Alamo National Bank said, “Well, we’re a national bank, and they didn’t never a run on the national banks.”

历史上，有时候恐惧是有理由的，有时候不是。我父亲在1931年因为银行挤兑失去了工作，他们对州立银行发生了挤兑。阿拉莫国家银行的负责人说，“嗯，我们是国家银行，从来没有发生过国家银行的挤兑。”

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And, of course, they both faced the same problem. So, it used to be that if you saw people lining up at a bank, the proper response was to get into the line. And they’d always leave it. And the story is that Sidney Weinberg of Goldman Sachs, during one of the bank runs back in 1907 or thereabouts, had a job as a runner at Goldman Sachs, and asked his boss if he could take the week off.

当然，它们都面临同样的问题。所以，过去如果你看到人们在银行排队，正确的反应是加入队伍。他们总是会离开。据说高盛的西德尼·温伯格在1907年左右的一次银行挤兑中，在高盛做跑腿工作，他问老板能不能请一周的假。

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And the boss said, “Sure, not much is going on anyway.” So, he got in line, whether it was the Knickerbocker Trust or wherever. And as he got toward the front of the line, he sold his place in line to somebody. He didn’t have an account at the bank, but that was an asset. (LAUGHTER)

老板说，“当然，反正也没什么事。”于是，他排队了，不管是尼克博克信托还是哪里。当他快到队伍前面时，他把自己的位置卖给了别人。他在银行没有账户，但那是一个资产。（笑声）

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And the banking system has changed so much over the years. And we did something enormously sensible, in my view, when we set up the FDIC. As many as 2,000 banks had failed in one year back after World War I. I mean, bank runs were just part of the picture.

银行业多年来发生了巨大变化。在我看来，我们设立FDIC是非常明智的举措。第一次世界大战后，一年内有多达2000家银行倒闭。我的意思是，银行挤兑只是常态。

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And if you have people that are worried about whether their money is safe in the bank and are all trying to withdraw, you can’t run an economy very well. So, the FDIC was very logical. It’s got changed over the years some, but here we are in, you know, 2023.

如果人们担心他们在银行的钱是否安全，都试图取款，你就无法很好地运营经济。所以，FDIC非常合乎逻辑。这些年来它有所变化，但现在是2023年。

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And we actually see the FDIC pay off at a hundred cents on the dollar to everybody or make it available on all demand deposits. And yet you still have people very worried about their — periodically, geographically, all kinds of crazy ways.

我们实际上看到FDIC对所有人的活期存款以100%的比例赔付或提供保障。然而，仍然有很多人非常担心他们的存款——周期性地、地理上，以各种疯狂的方式。

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And that just shouldn’t happen. So, the messaging has been very poor. It’s been poor by the politicians, who sometimes have an interest in having it poor. It’s been poor by the agencies, and I would say it’s been poor by the press.

这不应该发生。所以，信息传递非常糟糕。政客们的传递很差，他们有时候希望它差。机构的传递也很差，我会说媒体的传递也很差。

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I mean, you shouldn’t have so many people that misunderstand the fact that although there may be a debt ceiling, it’s going to get changed.

我的意思是，不应该有那么多人误解，尽管可能有债务上限，但它会改变。

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Although there’s a $250,000 limit on FDIC, the FDIC and the U.S. government and the American public have no interest in having a bank fail and have deposits actually lost by people. We had a demonstration project the weekend of Silicon Valley Bank, and the public is still confused.

尽管FDIC有25万美元的限额，但FDIC、美国政府和美国公众都不希望银行倒闭，让人们的存款真正损失。我们在硅谷银行那个周末进行了一个示范项目，公众仍然困惑。

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So, it really, it’s something to have a law that became effective in 1934, although mollified it in some ways, not understood about something as important as the banking system.

所以，真的，一个在1934年生效的法律，尽管在某些方面有所缓和，但对于像银行系统这样重要的事情却不被理解。

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I don’t think the American public is that dumb, and I just, well, I made that offer over in Tokyo, incidentally, that I haven’t heard from anybody that wants to take up my $1 million bet on whether the public will lose money if they have a demand deposit at a bank, no matter what the size.

我不认为美国公众那么愚蠢，我只是，嗯，顺便说一句，我在东京提出了那个提议，100万美元的赌注，赌公众如果在银行有活期存款，无论金额大小，是否会损失钱，我还没有听到有人想接受这个赌注。

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So that’s the world we live in. It means that a lighted match can turn into a conflagration, or it can be blown out. And who knows what will happen. And we don’t have any worry — we keep our money in cash and Treasury bills at Berkshire, because we keep $128 billion or whatever it was at the end of the quarter.

这就是我们生活的世界。这意味着一根点燃的火柴可能引发大火，也可能被吹灭。谁知道会发生什么。我们并不担心——我们在伯克希尔将资金持有现金和国库券，因为我们在季度末持有1280亿美元或类似金额。

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And we want to be there if the banking system temporarily even gets stalled in some way. It shouldn’t, I don’t think it will, but I think it could. And I think that the incentives in bank regulation are so messed up, and so many people have an interest in having them messed up, that it’s totally crazy.

我们希望在银行系统即使暂时出现某种停滞时也能在那里。这不应该发生，我认为不会，但我认为可能会。我认为银行监管的激励机制非常混乱，很多人都希望它混乱，这是完全疯狂的。

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I mean, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were doing 40% or so of the mortgage business in the United States. That is huge. They were regulated, just those two companies were regulated by some group. I forget what they called it. But they had 150 people that were in charge of just figuring out whether Freddie and Fannie were doing the right thing.

我的意思是，房利美和房地美在美国处理了大约40%的抵押贷款业务。这是巨大的。它们受到监管，只有这两家公司受到某个团体的监管。我忘了他们叫什么。但他们有150人专门负责弄清楚房地美和房利美是否在做正确的事情。

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Well, I could’ve done it. You know, Charlie could’ve done it. You know, and I’m not sure they needed an assistant even to do it. But the incentives were all wrong. And Freddie and Fannie, which were doing fine in August, or apparently doing fine in July and August of 2008, were put into conservatorship, you know, early in September.

嗯，我可以做到。你知道，查理也可以做到。你知道，我不确定他们甚至需要助手来做这件事。但激励机制完全错误。房地美和房利美，2008年7月和8月看似运作良好，但在9月初被置于托管状态。

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And the things that followed from that were just incredible. So, there are second order and third order and fourth order effects that are somewhat unpredictable, as to what they will be and the sequence and all that. But things change. And if people think that deposits are sticky anymore, they’re just living in a different era.

随之而来的事情简直不可思议。所以，有二阶、三阶、四阶效应，有些是不可预测的，至于它们会是什么、顺序如何等等。但事情在变化。如果人们还认为存款有粘性，他们只是生活在不同的时代。

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You know, press a button, you don’t have to get in a line and wait for days and have the teller counting out the money slowly in gold so (LAUGHTER) that you hope the line goes away. You’re going to have a run in a few seconds. So, the way it hasn’t been addressed properly is a problem.

你知道，按一个按钮，你不必排队等几天，让柜员慢慢地数金子（笑声），希望队伍消失。几秒钟内就会发生挤兑。所以，没有妥善处理这个问题是一个问题。

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And who knows where it leads.

谁知道这会导致什么。

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34. Buffett: CEOs of failed banks should be punished (巴菲特：倒闭银行的首席执行官应受惩罚)

WARREN BUFFETT: But you will have to have a punishment for the people that do the wrong thing. And if you take First Republic, for example, you could look at their 10-K and see that they were offering non-government guaranteed mortgages to, in jumbo amounts, at fixed rates, sometimes for ten years before they changed to floating.

沃伦·巴菲特：但你必须对做错事的人进行惩罚。例如，以第一共和国银行为例，你可以看看他们的10-K报告，看到他们提供非政府担保的巨额抵押贷款，固定利率，有时长达十年才转为浮动利率。

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And that’s a crazy proposition. If it’s to the advantage of a bank, they’ve got the guy coming in and says, “I’ll refinance at 1.5% and then 1%,” and if it’s to the advantage the other way, they keep it out ten years. You don’t give options like that.

这是个疯狂的提议。如果对银行有利，他们会有人进来说，“我将以1.5%再融资，然后1%，”如果反过来对他们有利，他们就保持十年不变。你不会提供这样的选择。

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But that what First Republic was doing, and it was in plain sight. And the world ignored it till it blew up. And some of the stock in some of these banks that were held by insiders was sold. And who knows whether they had a plan, or some plan that was innocent, or whether they started sensing what was coming.

但这就是第一共和国银行在做的事情，公开可见。世界忽略了它，直到它崩溃。这些银行中一些内部人士持有的股票被卖掉了。谁知道他们是否有计划，或者是无辜的计划，还是他们开始感觉到即将发生的事情。

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But you do know that the directors are not going to be able to read some book or anything like that. But they do have the ability to hold the CEO accountable. The CEO gets the bank in trouble, both the CEO and the director should suffer.

但你知道，董事会不会去读什么书或类似的东西。但他们有能力让首席执行官负责。首席执行官让银行陷入麻烦，首席执行官和董事都应该受罚。

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The stockholders of the future shouldn’t suffer. They didn’t do anything. It doesn’t teach anybody any lessons or anything, it teaches the lesson that if you run a bank and you screw it up, you’re still a rich guy and the clubs don’t drop you and the charity groups don’t quit asking you to their benefits.

未来的股东不应该受罚。他们什么也没做。这不会给任何人教训，它教会的教训是，如果你经营一家银行并搞砸了，你仍然是个富翁，俱乐部不会抛弃你，慈善团体不会停止邀请你参加他们的活动。

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And the world goes on. And that is not a good lesson to teach people who are holding the behavior of the economy in their hands. So, I think there’s some work to be done, but it’s not a difficult problem. It’s just we’ve screwed up the answer and we’ve screwed up the communication of it. Charlie?

世界继续运转。这不是一个好的教训，教给那些掌握经济行为的人。所以，我认为还有一些工作要做，但这不是一个难题。只是我们搞砸了答案，搞砸了沟通。查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m so old fashioned that I kind of liked it that when banks didn’t do investment banking. That makes me very outmoded in the modern world.

查理·芒格：嗯，我太老派了，我有点喜欢银行不做投资银行业务的时候。这让我在现代世界显得非常过时。

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WARREN BUFFETT: And the country decided it was contrary to public interest for a while, and then the banks wanted to get back into it.

沃伦·巴菲特：国家一度认为这违背公共利益，但后来银行想重新进入。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Did they ever.

查理·芒格：他们确实想。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. No, I mean —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我的意思是——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: And I don’t think having a bunch of bankers, all of whom are trying to get rich, leads to good things. But I (APPLAUSE) think a banker should be more like an engineer. He’s more, like, into avoiding trouble than he is getting rich.

查理·芒格：我不认为有一群都想发财的银行家会带来好事。但我（掌声）认为银行家应该更像工程师。他更像是避免麻烦，而不是发财。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and they could do fine.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，他们可以做得很好。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: They can do fine that way. And I think that we’re making a big mistake when we get a bank where everybody who joins it plans to get rich. It’s a contradiction in values.

查理·芒格：他们那样可以做得很好。我认为，当我们让一家银行的每个人都计划发财时，我们犯了一个大错误。这是价值观的矛盾。

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WARREN BUFFETT: And we came to that conclusion, I don’t know when Glass-Steagall was passed or anything, but then they want to get back in. How many of you know, and maybe I’m wrong on this, I haven’t looked lately, but the Federal Reserve actually was given the responsibility for setting margin requirements.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们得出了这个结论，我不知道《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》是什么时候通过的，但后来他们想重新进入。有多少人知道，也许我错了，我最近没查，但美联储实际上被赋予了设定保证金要求的责任。

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And they change margin requirements a lot of time because it was known that people that borrow a lot of money cause a danger to the banking system if you get too many in the picture and all of that sort of thing. And what’s happened? The banks figured out a thousand different ways to get so you could borrow on 100% margin, you know? I mean, through derivatives and everything, they just totally distorted all the lessons that were learned in the ’29 crash and —

他们多次更改保证金要求，因为众所周知，如果有太多人借了很多钱，会对银行系统造成危险，诸如此类的事情。结果呢？银行想出了一千种不同的方法，让你可以100%保证金借款，你知道吗？我的意思是，通过衍生品和一切，他们完全扭曲了1929年崩盘中学到的教训和——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Imagine taking banking into derivatives trading. Who in his right mind would have allowed that?

查理·芒格：想象一下把银行业带入衍生品交易。哪个头脑正常的人会允许这种事？

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, there’s more money in it. And —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，嗯，那里钱更多。而且——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s why they’re in on it.

查理·芒格：嗯，这就是他们参与的原因。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。而且——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: And but it isn’t necessarily a great social outcome for the rest of us.

查理·芒格：但这对我们其他人来说不一定是伟大的社会结果。

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WARREN BUFFETT: That’s what those Senate committees decided back in 1931 and ’32. And then in the late 1990s, particularly, I mean, very decent people, but, you know, Bob Ruhlman and some of the people, you know, they said this was the modern world. And here’s what the modern world has turned out to hand us. And banking can have all kinds of new inventions, but it needs to have old values. And —

沃伦·巴菲特：这就是1931年和1932年参议院委员会决定的。到了1990年代末，特别是，我的意思是，非常正派的人，但，你知道，鲍勃·鲁尔曼和一些人，你知道，他们说这是现代世界。这就是现代世界交给我们的结果。银行业可以有各种新发明，但它需要有老的价值观。而且——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if we do —

查理·芒格：嗯，如果我们——

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WARREN BUFFETT: —we don’t know what’s going to happen. You know, because there are a lot of things that could happen out of the present situation.

沃伦·巴菲特：——我们不知道会发生什么。你知道，因为当前情况可能发生很多事情。

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Depositors will not lose money. Stockholders and debt holders, the holding company and all that, they should lose money.

存款人不会损失钱。股东和债务持有人，控股公司等等，他们应该损失钱。

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35. ‘You should write your obituary and then try and figure out how to live up to it’ (你应该写下你的讣告，然后努力活出它)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station four?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第四站？

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is J.C. I am 15 years old and I’m from Ohio. This is my fourth in-person Berkshire meeting. I have a lot of passion learning from your speeches, interviews, and articles. Thank you for sharing your wisdom all the time.

观众：下午好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫J.C.，15岁，来自俄亥俄州。这是我的第四次亲自参加伯克希尔股东大会。我非常喜欢从你们的演讲、采访和文章中学习。感谢你们一直分享智慧。

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Mr. Buffett, in your annual shareholder letter this year, you said that Berkshire’s journey consisted of “continuous savings, the power of compounding, the American tailwind, and avoidance of major mistakes”. You have humbly admitted in the past that you have made many mistakes.

巴菲特先生，您在今年的股东信中说，伯克希尔的历程包括“持续储蓄、复利的力量、美国的顺风以及避免重大错误”。您过去谦虚地承认自己犯过许多错误。

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But this is the first time that major mistakes stood out to me. Could you please advise us on what major mistakes we should avoid in both investing and in life? I would also like to have Mr. Munger’s thoughts too, please. Thank you very much.

但这是我第一次注意到“重大错误”这个词。请您建议我们在投资和生活中应该避免哪些重大错误？我也想听听芒格先生的看法。非常感谢。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the main, (APPLAUSE) Charlie said the major mistake you could make, you know, you’re lucky if you’re in the United States. If you go around the world you don’t have a lot of choices in some places.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，主要的，（掌声）查理说过，你可能犯的最大错误，你知道，如果你在美国，你很幸运。如果你在世界各地，有些地方你没有太多选择。

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But you should write your obituary and then try and figure out how to live up to it.

但你应该写下你的讣告，然后努力活出它。

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And, you know, that’s something you get wiser on as you go along. The business mistakes, you just want to make sure you don’t make any mistakes that take you out of the game or come close to taking you out of your game. You should never have a night when you’re worried about investing, I mean, assuming you have any money to invest at all.

你知道，这是你随着时间推移会变得更明智的事情。商业上的错误，你只需要确保不犯那些让你出局或接近出局的错误。你不应该有任何一个晚上因为投资而担心，我的意思是，假设你有任何钱可以投资。

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And you should just spend a little bit less than you earn. And you can spend a little bit more than you earn, and then you’ve got debt, and the chances are you’ll never get out of debt. I’ll make an exception in terms of a mortgage on your house.

你应该只花比你赚的少一点的钱。你可以花比你赚的多一点，然后你就有了债务，很有可能你永远无法摆脱债务。我会例外考虑房子的抵押贷款。

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But credit card debt, and we’re in the credit card business big time, and we’ll stay in the credit card business, but why get behind the game? And if you’re effectively paying 12% or 14% or whatever percent you’re paying on a credit card, you know, you’re saying, “I’m going to earn more than 12% or 14% of my money.”

但信用卡债务，我们在信用卡业务上是大手笔，我们会继续留在信用卡业务，但为什么要让自己落后？如果你实际上在信用卡上支付12%或14%或任何百分比的利息，你知道，你是在说，“我的钱会赚超过12%或14%的回报。”

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And if you can do that, come to Berkshire Hathaway. So, it’s, I hate to say this when Charlie’s around me, but it’s straight out of Ben Franklin. I mean, (LAUGH) and it’s not that complicated. But you, well, I’ll give you a couple lessons.

如果你能做到这一点，就来伯克希尔哈撒韦。所以，我在查理身边时不想说这个，但这是直接来自本·富兰克林。我的意思是，（笑）这并不复杂。但你，嗯，我会给你几条建议。

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You know, Tom Murphy, the first time I met him, said two things to me. He said, “You can always tell someone to go to hell tomorrow.” Well, that was great advice then. And think of what great advice it is when you can sit down at a computer and screw your life up forever by telling somebody to go to hell, or something else, in 30 seconds. And you can’t erase it.

你知道，汤姆·墨菲第一次见我时，对我说过两件事。他说，“你总可以在明天告诉别人去见鬼。”嗯，那时候这是很棒的建议。想想现在这是多么好的建议，当你可以坐在电脑前，在30秒内通过告诉别人去见鬼或其他东西，永远搞砸你的生活。而且你无法抹去它。

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And, you know, haven’t lost the option. And he said, you know, “Praise my name, criticize my category.” Well, what makes more sense than that? I mean, who do you like that criticizes you all the time? And you don’t need to vilify anybody to make your point on subjects of discussion.

你知道，并没有失去这个选择。他说，你知道，“赞美我的名字，批评我的类别。”嗯，还有什么比这更有道理的？我意思是，你喜欢那些一直批评你的人吗？你不需要诋毁任何人来表达你的观点。

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And then the other general piece of advice, I’ve never known anybody that was basically kind that died without friends. And I’ve known plenty of people with money that have died without friends, including their family. But I’ve never known anybody, and you know, I’ve seen a few people, including Tom Murphy Sr. and maybe Jr., who’s here, (LAUGH) but certainly his dad, I never saw him, I watched him for 50 years, I never saw him do an unkind act.

然后是另一条一般的建议，我从未见过一个基本上善良的人死时没有朋友。我认识很多有钱人死时没有朋友，包括他们的家人。但我从未见过一个，你知道，我见过一些人，包括老汤姆·墨菲，也许还有小墨菲，他在这里，（笑）但肯定是他的父亲，我观察了他50年，从未见过他做过不善良的事。

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I didn’t see him do very many stupid acts either. I mean, it wasn’t that he was non-discriminating, he just decided that there was no reason to do it. And wow, what a difference that makes in life. Charlie?

我也很少见他做蠢事。我的意思是，他并非没有辨别力，他只是决定没有理由去做。哇，这在生活中是多么大的不同。查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s so simple to spend less than you earn, and invest shrewdly, and avoid toxic people and toxic activities, and try and keep learning all your life, et cetera, et cetera, and do a lot of deferred gratification because you prefer life that way.

查理·芒格：嗯，花比你赚的少，谨慎投资，避免有毒的人和有毒的活动，终生不断学习，等等，等等，并且因为你喜欢那样的生活而做很多延迟满足。

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And if you do all those things, you are almost certain to succeed. And if you don’t, you’re going to need a lot of luck. And you don’t want to need a lot of luck. You want to go into a game where you’re very likely to win without having any unusual luck.

如果你做了所有这些事情，你几乎肯定会成功。如果你不做，你将需要很多运气。你不想需要很多运气。你想进入一个你很可能会赢的游戏，而不需要任何不寻常的运气。

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WARREN BUFFETT: I’d add one more thought too, you need to know how people can manipulate other people, and you need to resist the temptation to do it yourself.

沃伦·巴菲特：我还要补充一点，你需要知道人们如何操纵他人，你需要抵制自己这样做的诱惑。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yes, the toxic people who are trying to fool you or lie to you or aren’t reliable in meeting their commitments. A great lesson of life is get them the hell out of your life.

查理·芒格：哦，是的，那些试图欺骗你、撒谎或不履行承诺的有毒之人。人生的一大教训是把他们从你的生活中赶出去。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: And do it fast. (APPLAUSE) Do it fast.

查理·芒格：而且要快。（掌声）要快。

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WARREN BUFFETT: And I would add, Charlie would totally agree with me, do it tactfully, if possible, too. (LAUGH) But do get them out of your life.

沃伦·巴菲特：我要补充一点，查理完全同意我，如果可能的话，也要做得有技巧。（笑）但一定要把他们从你的生活中赶出去。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. Yeah, I don’t mind a little tact. (LAUGHTER) Or even a little financial cost. But the question is getting them the hell out of your life.

查理·芒格：是的。是的，我不介意一点技巧。（笑声）甚至一点经济成本。但问题是要把他们从你的生活中赶出去。

---

36. ‘Tough problem’ when family members are negative (当家庭成员是负面的时是个“棘手的问题”)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

---

BECKY QUICK: All right, this comes from Roger Lee Tan. He says, “My name is Roger from Hong Kong, a long-term shareholder of Berkshire, admirer and follower of Mr. Buffett’s and Munger’s wisdom and principle. Both of you have said before that the most difficult problems in life are always people problems.

贝基·奎克：好的，这个问题来自罗杰·李·谭。他说，“我叫罗杰，来自香港，是伯克希尔的长期股东，崇拜并追随巴菲特先生和芒格先生的智慧和原则。你们都说过，生活中最困难的问题总是人的问题。

---

“And one of the key lessons you have learned to be able to live a happy life and a successful life is to stay away from negative people. My question is what to do if those negative people are your families, the people (LAUGHTER) whom you can’t simply stay away from?”

“你们学到的一个关键教训是，要过上幸福和成功的生活，就要远离负面的人。我的问题是，如果那些负面的人是你的家人，那些你无法简单远离的人（笑声），该怎么办？”

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You minimize it. But you can’t, no, I mean, there’s no question about it. And Charlie gave an answer I thought was master of tact the other day when he says, “You always ought to interact with people who behave well.” He says, “Of course, you have to make some exceptions for your family.”

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你要尽量减少接触。但你不能，不，我的意思是，这毫无疑问。查理前几天给出了一个我认为非常有技巧的回答，他说，“你应该总是与行为良好的人交往。”他说，“当然，你必须为你的家人做一些例外。”

---

But (LAUGH) it’s true. And, you know, you really, I don’t know what it’s like to have, you know, a drunken, you know, bully-ish, probably father, but parent, just generally. I mean, you know, how do you handle it? It’s very interesting that the MacArthur family, the very famous John MacArthur, the man who set up the MacArthur Foundation, he had five kids.

但（笑）这是真的。你知道，你真的，我不知道有一个醉酒的、欺凌的、可能是父亲，但一般是父母是什么感觉。我的意思是，你知道，你怎么处理？很有趣的是，麦克阿瑟家族，非常著名的约翰·麦克阿瑟，设立了麦克阿瑟基金会的那个人，他有五个孩子。

---

And four of them turned out to be superstars of one sort or another, and then they had this crazy, itinerant, drunken father. But they all decided that the thing to do was to get the hell out of the house.

其中四个在某种程度上成为了超级明星，然后他们有一个疯狂的、流浪的、醉酒的父亲。但他们都决定要做的就是赶紧离开这个家。

---

And so, he had this, the father of the — of the MacArthur Foundation that did that along with three of the siblings out of five.

所以，他有这个，麦克阿瑟基金会的父亲，和五个兄弟姐妹中的三个一起这样做了。

---

So, you know, I was lucky, I mean, and Charlie was lucky that, you know, if you have, I mean, our fathers saw plenty of shortcomings in both of us, but, you know, they would still be there for us.

所以，你知道，我很幸运，我的意思是，查理也很幸运，你知道，如果你的，我们的父亲看到了我们俩的很多缺点，但，你知道，他们仍然会支持我们。

---

And if you have one that won’t be there for you, you know, it’s a very tough problem. And I think one way or another I probably would have gotten through with that, if I had that situation, but I think my life would’ve been a lot different. Charlie?

如果你有一个不支持你的，你知道，这是一个很棘手的问题。我认为无论如何，如果我遇到这种情况，我可能会挺过去，但我想我的生活会完全不同。查理？

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的。

---

37. Why are Garanimals only sold at Walmart? (为什么Garanimals只在沃尔玛销售？)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station five?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第五站？

---

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hey Warren and Charlie, good afternoon. My name is Sudakaredi Anapredi. I am from Bentonville, Arkansas, home of Walmart. I’m a shareholder since 2019, and my daughters are shareholders since 2020. My question is, this is my first time coming to shareholders, and my question is Walmart and Berkshire Hathaway has a very great relationship with BNSF, McLane, and consumer goods like Fruit of the Looms and Garanimals, and et cetera.

观众：嘿，沃伦和查理，下午好。我叫Sudakaredi Anapredi，来自阿肯色州本顿维尔，沃尔玛的所在地。我自2019年起是股东，我的女儿们自2020年起是股东。我的问题是，这是我第一次参加股东大会，我的问题是沃尔玛和伯克希尔哈撒韦在BNSF、McLane以及像Fruit of the Loom和Garanimals等消费品方面有着很好的关系，等等。

---

My question is Garanimals is exclusively sold at Walmart, and Fruit of the Loom is sold at many other retailers. How does Berkshire Hathaway decide some items are sold at some retailers exclusively, versus others are sold at many retailers?

我的问题是Garanimals只在沃尔玛独家销售，而Fruit of the Loom在许多其他零售商处销售。伯克希尔哈撒韦如何决定某些产品在某些零售商处独家销售，而其他产品在多家零售商处销售？

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. But obviously you’d love to control, if you have a product, you’d love to control the distribution. And you’re probably going to get better gross of margins if they ask for you by name. I mean, they just had an article about Bernard Arnault, who built LVMH, and you know, he’s got a blue box at Tiffany.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个好问题。但显然，如果你有一个产品，你会希望控制分销。如果他们指名要你的产品，你可能会获得更好的毛利率。我的意思是，他们刚写了一篇关于伯纳德·阿尔诺的文章，他建立了LVMH，你知道，他在蒂芙尼有一个蓝盒子。

---

And the blue box itself means something. And Coca-Cola, the bottle meant something. In the 1920s, I think, there was a study that kind of (UNINTEL) bottle and blindfolded, and a very high percentage of the population could recognize it was Coca-Cola.

蓝盒子本身就有意义。可口可乐的瓶子也有意义。我想在1920年代，有一项研究，蒙上眼睛，一种（听不清）瓶子，很大比例的人能认出那是可口可乐。

---

When they can recognize not only the product, but the container, you know, you’re going to have good gross margins. And if you’re just another cola, and there have been hundreds of them, and even if you have distribution through something like Walmart, who has Sam’s Cola, it just doesn’t, it’s not the same.

当他们不仅能认出产品，还能认出容器，你知道，你的毛利率会很好。如果只是另一种可乐，已经有几百种了，即使通过像沃尔玛这样的地方分销，他们有山姆可乐，也不行，不一样。

---

I mean, here I am, you know? And 1886 or so, John Pemberton in Atlanta created it, and they spent a very significant amount of money advertising. And on the other hand, Hershey’s didn’t spend any money on advertising. So, we have observed, Charlie and I both, have observed so many products, so many methods of retail.

我的意思是，我在这儿，你知道？大约1886年，亚特兰大的约翰·彭伯顿创造了它，他们花了很多钱做广告。另一方面，赫氏巧克力没花钱做广告。所以，我们，查理和我，都观察过很多产品，很多零售方式。

---

And we really think we know quite a bit about them, and we also know how much we don’t know about it at the same time. And it doesn’t mean that we want to go into retailing ourselves, but it does mean we’ve learned, to some extent, what to avoid.

我们真的认为我们了解很多，同时我们也知道我们有多少不知道。这并不意味着我们想自己做零售，但这确实意味着我们在某种程度上学会了避免什么。

---

And we’ve learned when somebody really has something. And Garanimals has something. It’s just that there’s only been, you know, Walmart does a great job of distribution for us. And it’s a good product for Walmart, it’s a good product for us.

我们学会了什么时候有人真正拥有一些东西。Garanimals有它的独特之处。只是，你知道，沃尔玛为我们做了很棒的分销工作。这对沃尔玛是个好产品，对我们也是。

---

And on Fruit of the Loom, they can sell lots of types of underwear, and they can do a big volume, but we’re not going to make as much money, as well as I believe the capital employed or anything, with a product that has a whole bunch of competitors.

至于Fruit of the Loom，他们可以卖很多种内衣，销量很大，但我们不会赚那么多钱，我相信投入的资本或任何东西，与一个有很多竞争者的产品相比。

---

And if the kid wants a Garanimals, well, pajamas or something, it’s not the sort of product that causes people to drive 20 miles out of their way to buy it, or anything of the sort. But if you’re in the Walmart and you’re picking out pajamas or something for the kid, and he or she wants a particular product, and it’s reasonably priced and everything, and wears well and everything, you know, we’re happy to have it distributed through somebody with the distribution power of Walmart.

如果孩子想要Garanimals，嗯，睡衣之类的东西，它不是那种让人特意开车20英里去买的产品，或诸如此类。但如果你在沃尔玛，给孩子挑睡衣或什么的，他或她想要某个特定产品，价格合理，穿着也好，你知道，我们很高兴通过像沃尔玛这样有分销能力的零售商来分销。

---

And they’re very happy to have the product. On balance it’s obviously better if you own See’s Candy than if you own the no-name candy company. You know, particularly when people buy it as gifts a couple times a year. I mean, they know that if they give their girlfriend, if they give somebody in the hospital, if they give a gift at Christmas or going to a dinner, they know if they hand the box of candy to somebody they don’t say at the same time, “Here, I got a wonderful deal on this candy.”

他们也很高兴有这个产品。总的来说，显然如果你拥有See’s Candy比拥有一个无名糖果公司好。你知道，特别是在人们一年几次买来送礼的时候。我的意思是，他们知道如果送给女朋友，送给医院里的某人，圣诞节或去吃饭时送礼，他们知道如果把一盒糖果递给别人，他们不会同时说，“看，我买这糖果得了个好价钱。”

---

I mean, that just kills the moment, right? What they really want to see is a smile on the other person’s face that they’re receiving it, and they get it. So, knowing what customers, and See’s boxed chocolates, A, are not remotely the market that soft drinks are.

我的意思是，那会毁了那个时刻，对吧？他们真正想看到的是对方收到礼物时脸上的微笑，他们明白了。所以，了解客户，See’s盒装巧克力，首先，完全不是软饮料的市场。

---

And the product does not travel particularly. Hershey’s chocolate didn’t travel. I mean, if you look at candy bars, what’s popular in the U.K. isn’t that popular in the U.S. and all kinds of things. Coca-Cola travels. There’s 200 countries, roughly, and probably 180 of them it’s the dominant product.

这个产品并不是特别能传播。赫氏巧克力也没传播。我的意思是，如果你看糖果棒，英国流行的在美国不那么流行，诸如此类。可口可乐能传播。大约有200个国家，大概180个国家它是主导产品。

---

And how do you do it? Well, it helps if you started in 1886 (LAUGH) and go from that point forward. So, we’ve learned a lot. We got lots to learn. But we did learn that something like Garanimals we understood. When it came around nobody had ever heard of it and we bought it for a very low price, as it turned out.

怎么做到的？嗯，如果你从1886年开始（笑）并从那以后继续前进会有帮助。所以，我们学到了很多。我们还有很多要学。但我们确实学到像Garanimals这样的东西我们理解。当它出现时没人听说过，结果我们以很低的价格买下了它。

---

And 20 years ago, and still nobody knows it, or that we own it, and that’s fine. But they know what Garanimals are, and it has legs. It just keeps going year after year. And some things are like pet rocks. And we’re learning all the time. Charlie? (LAUGHTER)

20年前，还是没人知道它，或者我们拥有它，这没关系。但他们知道Garanimals是什么，它有持久力。它年复一年地继续下去。有些东西就像宠物石。我们一直在学习。查理？（笑声）

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. You probably have never bought any Garanimals.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。你可能从未买过Garanimals。

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I never have. (LAUGH) I don’t even wear them. (LAUGHTER)

查理·芒格：没有。我从未买过。（笑）我甚至不穿。（笑声）

---

WARREN BUFFETT: You wouldn’t fit. (LAUGH)

沃伦·巴菲特：你穿不下。（笑）

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38. Paramount Global faces tough competition in streaming (派拉蒙全球在流媒体领域面临激烈竞争)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

---

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Barry Laffer in New York City. “Berkshire owns about 94 million shares of Paramount Global as of the last published data. This asset-rich company has disappointed on recent quarterly earnings reports, and just this week slashed its dividend by 80%.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自纽约市的巴里·拉弗。“根据最新公布的数据，伯克希尔拥有大约9400万股派拉蒙全球的股份。这家资产丰富的公司在最近的季度财报中表现令人失望，本周刚刚将其股息削减了80%。

---

“How do you see the streaming wars evolving? And do you still have conviction in your investment thesis? Is your investment thesis based on the company being an acquisition target, or based on its fundamentals?”

“您如何看待流媒体战争的演变？您对您的投资论点仍有信心吗？您的投资论点是基于公司成为收购目标，还是基于其基本面？”

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And how would you like to manage my money for nothing? (LAUGH) They, you know, we are not in the business of giving stock advice to people. And people who don’t know anything about stocks can make a lot of money doing that, and we don’t think it’s something we should give away.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你想免费帮我管理钱吗？（笑）他们，你知道，我们不做给别人股票建议的生意。那些对股票一无所知的人可以通过这样做赚很多钱，我们认为这不是我们应该免费给出的东西。

---

But I will say this, it’s not good news when any company passes its dividend or cuts its dividend dramatically.

但我要说的是，当任何公司取消股息或大幅削减股息时，这不是好消息。

---

And the streaming business is extremely interesting to watch, because there’s, people love to use their iPhones, watching, being entertained on a screen in front of them, or a phone, or whatever it may be.

流媒体业务非常值得关注，因为人们喜欢用他们的iPhone，在他们面前的屏幕上观看、娱乐，或者手机，或者任何东西。

---

But there’s a lot of companies doing it. And you need fewer companies, or you need higher prices. And, well, you need higher prices, or it doesn’t work. And you don’t lock in people when you get them to join up for the streaming period when your serial runs.

但有很多公司在做这个。你需要更少的公司，或者你需要更高的价格。嗯，你需要更高的价格，否则它不起作用。当你的剧集播出时，你无法锁住加入流媒体的用户。

---

I mean, you know, you keep them on for a while, but you get them for, like, a month. And we’ll see what happens. I mean, I had a gasoline station when I was 21 or 22, and it’s about three or four, four or five miles from here. And we had one competitor.

我的意思是，你知道，你能留住他们一段时间，但你可能只得到他们一个月。我们会看到会发生什么。我的意思是，我21或22岁时有一家加油站，离这里大约三四英里，四五英里。我们有一个竞争对手。

---

And he determined our profit, because we looked at his price every day. And if we cut the price he’d match it, and we couldn’t raise the price. And he did twice the gallonage, so he won. And there’s just basic business problems that you see with certain industries that you don’t see with the other.

他决定了我们的利润，因为我们每天看他的价格。如果我们降价，他会跟着降，我们无法提价。他的销量是我们的两倍，所以他赢了。有些行业有基本的商业问题，你在其他行业看不到。

---

Disney was unique in its animated — what it offered, you know — in the ’30s and ’40s. And they wrote the stuff off at the first showing, and then they rejuvenated Snow White and all these other people every seven years, and that was fine.

迪士尼在30年代和40年代的动画片中是独一无二的——它提供的东西，你知道——他们在第一次放映时就注销了成本，然后每七年重新推出《白雪公主》和其他作品，这没问题。

---

But this is a different world. And the eyeballs aren’t going to increase dramatically in the time they can spend is not going to increase dramatically. And you’ve got a bunch of companies that don’t want to quit. And who knows what pricing does under that. But anybody who tells you that they know what pricing will do in the future is kidding themselves.

但这是一个不同的世界。人们的注意力不会大幅增加，他们能花的时间也不会大幅增加。你有一堆不想退出的公司。谁知道在这种情况下价格会怎样。但任何告诉你他们知道未来价格会怎样的人都是在自欺欺人。

---

Charlie? Charlie’s had a lot of experience, incidentally, with Hollywood. I mean, he used to, before I even met him —

查理？顺便说一句，查理在好莱坞有很多经验。我的意思是，在我认识他之前他就——

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think the movie business is one tough business.

查理·芒格：我认为电影行业是一个艰难的行业。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s my view.

查理·芒格：这是我的看法。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: The talent will make the money; the agents will make the money. And if you’ve got a theater, you know, the theaters are now doing 70% of the business that they did before the pandemic. And big hits, you know, have enormous grosses. But you can’t reduce the supply.

沃伦·巴菲特：人才会赚钱；经纪人会赚钱。如果你有剧院，你知道，剧院现在的生意是疫情前的70%。大片，你知道，票房收入巨大。但你无法减少供应。

---

People have only got so many hours in the day. They’ve only got two eyeballs. And they’ve got more choice than ever before, and they’ve got stuff that’s cheaper that offers them the same experience. And some of them like the experience, you know, particularly with the big hits of going.

人们一天只有那么多时间。他们只有两只眼睛。他们现在比以往任何时候都有更多选择，他们有更便宜的东西提供相同的体验。有些人喜欢这种体验，你知道，特别是去看大片。

---

But it isn’t like you can double the number of people or double the eyeballs or anything like that. And you’ve got a lot of people. The talent will always get paid. And when you essentially are packaging that talent one way or another, and you need to get higher prices, and you’ve got a lot of strong companies who don’t want to quit, that’s an interesting equation.

但你不可能把人数翻倍或把注意力翻倍或诸如此类。你有很多人才。人才总是会得到报酬。当你以某种方式打包这些人才时，你需要更高的价格，你有很多不想退出的强大公司，这是一个有趣的等式。

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: And if you think the movies are tough, try to invest in a New York show on a conventional stage. There they think it’s a breach of faith in that business to let the person who put up the money to ever get any money back. (LAUGHTER)

查理·芒格：如果你认为电影行业艰难，试试在纽约的传统舞台上投资一个节目。在那里，他们认为让出资的人拿回任何钱是违背行业信仰的。（笑声）

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah, well, Charlie saw a lot of that actually when —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的，嗯，查理其实看到过很多这种情况，当——

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I don’t like those businesses.

查理·芒格：是的。我不喜欢那些生意。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Tell them what happened on “Cleopatra, Charlie.” (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：告诉他们《埃及艳后》发生了什么，查理。（笑声）

---

It, no, it’s a business that everybody’s tempted. They love the idea of going in it, you know, and they get a certain amount of psychic income. But —

不，这是一个每个人都想尝试的生意。他们喜欢进入这个行业的想法，你知道，他们得到一定的精神收入。但——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: I never owned any racehorses, either.

查理·芒格：我也从未拥有过赛马。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, my father-in-law and I used to talk about claiming a horse at AK-SAR-BEN, but we never quite got around to it. And we had a lot of fun going to the track together. (LAUGH)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我的岳父和我过去常谈在AK-SAR-BEN认领一匹马，但我们从未真正去做。我们一起去赛马场玩得很开心。（笑）

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39. ‘Our record in wind and solar has not been topped by any utility’ (我们在风能和太阳能方面的记录无人能及)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, section six?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第六区？

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Hannah Hayes and I’m a high schooler from Iowa. You said earlier today that transitioning to renewable energy has the people and capital to support it.

观众：下午好。我叫汉娜·海斯，是来自爱荷华州的高中生。您今天早些时候说，向可再生能源过渡有人才和资本支持。

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So, with enough investment in renewables, the development of energy storage technology to soon meet Iowa’s energy needs, and support from the government system through Inflation Reduction Act funding, why hasn’t Berkshire Hathaway Energy truly invested in the future by accelerating retirement plans for the coal plants, which have high operating costs and are currently Iowa’s biggest carbon polluter, and will continue to be until they’re finally retired in 2049, which is too late to be curbing emissions, according to the IPCC?

所以，有了足够的可再生能源投资，能源储存技术的快速发展即将满足爱荷华州的能源需求，以及通过《通胀削减法案》资金的政府系统支持，为什么伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司没有真正投资于未来，加速退役煤电厂的计划，这些电厂运营成本高，目前是爱荷华州最大的碳污染源，并且将持续到2049年最终退役，根据IPCC的说法，这对于遏制排放来说太晚了？

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s very interesting. In Iowa, we have actually producedอง

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这很有趣。在爱荷华州，我们实际上生产的风能已经超过了我们客户使用的总能源量。但它不一定能24小时持续生产。所以，有一些问题。顺便说一句，在爱荷华州，绝大多数县欢迎我们来安装风力发电。

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And some don’t want it. I mean, you know, there’s a not-in-my-backyard someplace. There’s other places where they love the money they get from a small plot of ground. And people like the taxes that are paid. But I would say that if there’s one state in the Union that stands out in the development, it’s Iowa. But what’s also interesting in Iowa is that we have one other major company.

有些人不想要。你知道，有些地方有“不在我后院”的心态。其他地方他们喜欢从一小块地里得到的钱。人们喜欢缴纳的税收。但我要说，如果联邦有一个州在发展方面突出，那就是爱荷华州。但在爱荷华州还有一件有趣的事，我们有一个主要的竞争对手。

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There’s always loads of little co-ops and all kinds of things that sell electricity. But we have one major competitor. And our prices are significantly lower. And, as a matter of fact, we are now in the Omaha Public Power District. And three miles or four miles away, we’re selling the electricity in Iowa.

总是有很多小型合作社和各种卖电的东西。但我们有一个主要的竞争对手。我们的价格明显低得多。事实上，我们现在在奥马哈公共电力区。三四英里外，我们在爱荷华州卖电。

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And we are selling it cheaper, even though public power was invented in Nebraska, and has been — I think it’s going on — George Norris did it back in the 1930s. And, you know, Nebraska’s resisted, to some extent wind power, more than Iowa. But like I said, our competitor — alternate source — hasn’t really pursued it the way we have.

我们卖得更便宜，尽管公共电力是内布拉斯加州发明的，而且——我想这还在继续——乔治·诺里斯在1930年代做到了。你知道，内布拉斯加州在某种程度上比爱荷华州更抵制风力发电。但就像我说的，我们的竞争对手——替代能源——并没有像我们这样真正追求它。

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But I would say that our record in wind and solar has not been topped by any utility in the United States. And, of course, it’s been aided by the fact that most utilities pay out 70% or 80% of earnings and dividends. And we haven’t taken a common dividend, you know, for 20 years. We reinvested I don’t know how many billion.

但我要说，我们在风能和太阳能方面的记录在美国没有任何一家公用事业公司能超越。当然，这得益于大多数公用事业公司支付70%或80%的盈利和股息。而我们，你知道，20年来没有拿过普通股息。我们不知道重新投资了多少亿。

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That’s the reason why the earnings have gone from $200,000,000 to $4 billion, but we’re not earning a higher rate of return on capital than we were when we started. We just put way more capital into the business as we went along, kept reinvesting the capital.

这就是为什么盈利从2亿美元增长到40亿美元的原因，但我们的资本回报率并没有比我们开始时高。我们只是随着时间的推移投入了更多的资本，持续重新投资资本。

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So, I wish Greg were here to tell you more details about it. But I would say that we’d really put up Berkshire Hathaway Energy’s record against any utility in the United States. Charlie, you’ve watched it.

所以，我希望格雷格在这儿告诉你更多细节。但我要说，我们真的可以把伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的记录与美国的任何一家公用事业公司相比。查理，你一直在观察。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I have. And I’m not personally at all sure how bad the global warming is going to be. I don’t think anybody knows for sure whether the seas are going to rise two inches or 20 feet. And so, I think there’s a lot of false claims here in a world where much is not known.

查理·芒格：嗯，我有。而且我个人一点也不确定全球变暖会有多严重。我认为没人确切知道海平面会上升两英寸还是20英尺。所以，我认为在这个很多未知的世界里有很多虚假的说法。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (APPLAUSE) There is a lot of wind in Wyoming. And we are building transmission lines that extend out through the West. But it was World War II when they told us to do it. And we had a czar in Washington that could say, you know, “Just get it done,” like they said to said Henry Kaiser on building ships.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（掌声）怀俄明州有很多风。我们正在建设贯穿西部的输电线路。但那是二战时他们告诉我们要做的。我们在华盛顿有一个沙皇，可以说，你知道，“就把它做好，”就像他们对亨利·凯撒造船时说的。

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You know, you can’t believe how ahead we would be down from where we are. But we’ve got the money. We’ve got the know-how. This year our depreciation in our utility company is on the order of $4 billion. And we spend maybe $3 billion additional to that. So, maybe we spend $7 billion.

你无法相信我们会比现在领先多少。但我们有钱。我们有技术专长。今年我们公用事业公司的折旧大约是40亿美元。我们可能还额外花了30亿美元。所以，我们可能花了70亿美元。

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And there are very few companies in the utility industry that are spending, you know, that percentage of their depreciated money.

公用事业行业中很少有公司，你知道，花那么高比例的折旧资金。

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But we’d love to be spending more, but there are people all over that don’t want the pipeline to go through there. They don’t want the tower, whatever it may be.

但我们很想花更多，但各地都有人不想让管道经过那里。他们不想要塔，任何东西。

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And that is the problem of a democracy. And even, as I mentioned, within Iowa, you’ve got a great many counties that — majority, great majority of the counties I think would welcome the wind power.

这就是民主的问题。甚至，正如我提到的，在爱荷华州内，你有很多县——我想绝大多数县会欢迎风力发电。

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And you’ve got some counties that don’t like it. And we’re obviously going to work with the ones that want to work with us. We do not have the ability to go in and tell anybody what do on that.

有些县不喜欢。我们显然会与那些想与我们合作的人合作。我们没有能力进去告诉任何人该做什么。

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And there’s a public utility commission in every state that basically governs what we earn on it, what we do, and that’s the way the industry’s developed. And that’s not bad, unless you get into the things that in effect, you know, extend — they’re part of a country-wide system, rather than state-wide system.

每个州都有一个公共事业委员会，基本上管理我们的收益，我们做什么，这就是行业发展的方式。这并不坏，除非你涉及到实际上，你知道，扩展的事情——它们是全国系统的一部分，而不是州级系统。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: I think also that even if we weren’t worried about global warming, it would make sense to —

查理·芒格：我也认为，即使我们不担心全球变暖，也应该——

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WARREN BUFFETT: Sure.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: — shift to renewables to conserve our hydrocarbons. There’re certain things hydrocarbons can do that nothing else can do. And there’s only so much of them there. Why not be cautious in conserving them?

查理·芒格：——转向可再生能源以节约我们的碳氢化合物。有些事情碳氢化合物能做到，其他东西做不到。它们的数量只有那么多。为什么不谨慎地节约它们？

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WARREN BUFFETT: And the cost, they’ve gotten so much more efficient, too. I mean, the wind. I mean, if you look at what we’re doing now, those towers are way more efficient than —

沃伦·巴菲特：而且成本，它们也变得更加高效。我的意思是，风能。我的意思是，如果你看看我们现在做的，那些塔比以前高效得多——

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But there’s a lot of people that are talking about things that can’t be done. And then there’s —

但有很多人在谈论一些做不到的事情。然后有——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: There’s a lot of nonsense in this field. If you like nonsense, this is the field for you. (LAUGHTER)

查理·芒格：这个领域有很多胡说八道。如果你喜欢胡说八道，这就是你的领域。（笑声）

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WARREN BUFFETT: But we’re in the field, so. (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们在这个领域，所以。（笑声）

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CHARLIE MUNGER: I know. I know.

查理·芒格：我知道。我知道。

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40. ‘We will not be making any offer for control of Occidental’ (我们不会提出控制西方石油的要约)

WARREN BUFFETT: Ok, Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

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BECKY QUICK: This is a question from Monroe Richardson (PH). The Wall Street Journal reported in March that oil producers are producing less oil and may have reached their peak in the Permian Basin.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自门罗·理查森。《华尔街日报》在3月报道，石油生产商的石油产量正在减少，可能在二叠纪盆地达到了顶峰。

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Given the major positions of both Occidental Petroleum and Chevron in the Permian, which you please explain the rationale for Berkshire’s significant holdings of both those companies, considering that future outlook for oil there?

鉴于西方石油和雪佛龙在二叠纪盆地的主要地位，考虑到那里的石油未来展望，请您解释伯克希尔持有这两家公司大量股份的理由？

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there’s no question — it’s really interesting about oil, and Charlie knows way more about oil than I do, when did you buy that royalty in Bakersfield, or wherever it is? But that was before I met you, right?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，毫无疑问——关于石油真的很有趣，查理比我知道的多得多，你是在贝克斯菲尔德还是哪里买的那个版税？但那是在我认识你之前，对吧？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes — no, it wasn’t before — it was — yes, it was. It was just before. You’re right. And that goddamn royalty is still paying me $70,000 a year.

查理·芒格：是的——不，不是之前——是——是的，是之前。你是对的。那个该死的版税还在每年付我7万美元。

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WARREN BUFFETT: What’d you pay for the royalty?

沃伦·巴菲特：你为那个版税付了多少钱？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: A thousand dollars.

查理·芒格：一千美元。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. Now that’s the opposite of the Permian. My dad bought $1,000 or $1,500 worth of royalties before he died in 1964. He left them to my mother. My mother left them to her two daughters. And my older sister died. And my younger sister is here today.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的。那与二叠纪相反。我父亲在1964年去世前买了1000美元或1500美元的版税。他把它们留给了我母亲。我母亲把它们留给了她的两个女儿。我姐姐去世了。我妹妹今天在这里。

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And she gets these checks every month. And she knows about all these different fields, and what they’re producing. And that’s the reality of half of the oil production, or something around that, in the United States. And then the other half is shale.

她每个月都会收到这些支票。她知道所有这些不同的油田，以及它们的生产情况。这就是美国大约一半石油生产的现实。另一半是页岩油。

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And, you know, if you’ve gone to the movies, and ever watched oil, you’ve never watched the things that are pumping Charlie’s royalties in California. You’ll see these gushers of oil. Well, in the Permian, this should sink in on you, in the first day, the first day when you bring in a well, you know, it may be 12,000 barrels, or maybe 15,000 barrels.

你知道，如果你去看过电影，见过石油，你从未见过在加州抽取查理版税的东西。你会看到这些喷涌的石油。嗯，在二叠纪，这应该让你明白，第一天，当你开一口井时，你知道，可能是12000桶，或者15000桶。

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And it’s dangerous. Occidental had one come in at I think at 19,000 barrels or something like that in one day. And in a year, year and a half, it becomes partly nothing. It’s a different business in effect. In the United States, it’s interesting. We use maybe 11 and a fraction — well, we produce 11 and a fraction million barrels of oil equivalent a day.

这很危险。西方石油有一口井一天我想是19000桶或类似的数量。一年后，一年半后，它几乎什么都不是。这实际上是一个不同的生意。在美国，这很有趣。我们可能使用11又几分之一——嗯，我们每天生产11又几分之一百万桶的石油当量。

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But if shale stopped, I mean, it would drop to six million very fast. Well, just imagine taking five million barrels a day out of production in the world. And then we’re also taking down our strategic petroleum reserve. Strategic petroleum reserve is the ultimate oilfield. You don’t have to drill. It’s just we’ve got them.

但如果页岩油停产，我的意思是，它会很快下降到600万桶。嗯，想象一下每天从世界上减产500万桶。然后我们还在减少我们的战略石油储备。战略石油储备是终极油田。你不需要钻井。我们已经有了。

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And it was supposed to be strategic, but it gets involved in politics. And so, there’s all — when you talk about the oil business, you’re talking about different kinds of businesses, basically. And we like Occidental’s position in the Permian. And we wouldn’t like that position — well, it got to minus one day. It got to minus $30 a barrel.

它应该是战略性的，但它卷入了政治。所以，当你谈论石油生意时，你基本上在谈论不同的生意。我们喜欢西方石油在二叠纪的地位。我们不会喜欢那个地位——嗯，有一天跌到负值。跌到了每桶负30美元。

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That was crazy, of course. But if oil sells at X, you know, you do very well. And if it sells at half of X, you know, your costs are the same, and it doesn’t change the production. And it doesn’t work as well, but it also brings down the oil production of the United States very fast.

那当然是疯狂的。但如果石油卖X美元，你知道，你会做得很好。如果它卖X的一半，你知道，你的成本是一样的，它不会改变生产。它效果不如以前，但它也很快降低了美国的石油生产。

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So, we don’t know what oil prices will be. But we do very much like the Occidental position they have. And that’s why we financed them a few years ago, when it looked like it was a terrible mistake. Then the oil market just totally collapsed. And then it changed around. And we bought a lot of the common stock.

所以，我们不知道油价会是多少。但我们非常喜欢西方石油的地位。这就是为什么几年前我们为他们融资，当时看起来是个糟糕的错误。然后石油市场完全崩溃。然后情况改变了。我们买了很多普通股。

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In the last few months, they’ve reduced our preferred, which we don’t like, obviously. But we’d be disappointed in them if they didn’t reduce it. It’s intelligent from their standpoint. So, we’ve taken — of the $10 billion preferred, we’ve gotten maybe $400,000,000 or $500,000,000 of it, retired at 110% of par.

在过去几个月，他们减少了我们的优先股，我们显然不喜欢这样。但如果他们不减少，我们会对他们失望。从他们的角度看，这是明智的。所以，我们已经拿回了——100亿美元的优先股中，我们可能拿回了4亿或5亿美元，以110%的面值退市。

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But, Vicki Hollub, she’s an extraordinary manager of Occidental. Her first job was with Cities Service. That was the first stock I bought in 1942. She knows what happens beneath the surface. I know the math of it. But I wouldn’t have the faintest idea what to do if I was in an oil field.

但是，维基·霍卢布，她是西方石油的杰出管理者。她的第一份工作是在城市服务公司。那是我在1942年买的第一只股票。她知道地表下发生的事情。我知道它的数学。但如果我在油田，我一点也不知道该做什么。

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I mean, I can dig two feet down in my backyard. And that’s my understanding of subsoil in the world. I can’t picture the field that Charlie has been collecting that monthly check from, from 50-plus years, 60 years roughly, or my sister, getting at various fields, where they just keep pumping, and pumping, and pumping.

我的意思是，我可以在我后院挖两英尺。那就是我对世界地下土壤的理解。我无法想象查理50多年，大约60年来一直从中收取月度支票的那个油田，或者我妹妹，从各个油田中得到，那里他们只是不停地抽，抽，抽。

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And we, in the United States, we’re lucky to have the absolutely to produce the kind of oil we’ve got from shale. But it is not a long-term source, like you might think, by watching movies about oil, or something of the sort. Charlie, do you have anything to add?

我们，在美国，我们很幸运能绝对生产出我们从页岩中得到的这种石油。但它不是长期来源，就像你看关于石油的电影或其他东西可能想的那样。查理，你有什么要补充的？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It really dies fast, those shale wells. If you like quick death in your oil wells, we have them for you.

查理·芒格：是的。那些页岩井死得真快。如果你喜欢你的油井快速死亡，我们有给你准备。

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WARREN BUFFETT: But Occidental, they’re doing a lot of good things.

沃伦·巴菲特：但西方石油，他们在做很多好事。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. They drill a lot of new wells. And they’re doing it at a profit, but it’s a different kind of oil than this.

查理·芒格：是的。他们钻了很多新井。他们在盈利，但这是与众不同的石油。

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WARREN BUFFETT: It’s just different. Yeah. Yeah. And that’s true of almost half the oil produced in the United States. And there’s times —

沃伦·巴菲特：就是不同。是的。是的。这几乎适用于美国生产的近一半石油。有时候——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: There’s a lot of oil down there that nobody knows how to produce. And they’ve been working at it for, like, 50 years. But they worked at the existing shale production for about 50 years before they figured it out. And it was weirdly complicated when they finally were able to do it. There’s only one type of sand that works.

查理·芒格：那里有很多石油，没人知道怎么生产。他们已经研究了大约50年。但他们在现有页岩生产上工作了大约50年才弄明白。当他们最终能做到时，它复杂得离奇。只有一种沙子有效。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Can you imagine a horizontal pipe, you know, maybe a mile and a half or something? It’s just so different than what you think about.

沃伦·巴菲特：你能想象一根水平管道，你知道，大约一英里半或什么的？它与你想的完全不同。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: It goes laterally for three miles, two miles down. How in the hell do you drill two or three miles laterally, when you’re already two or three miles under the Earth? They have mastered a lot of very tricky technology to be able to get any oil out of these wells at all.

查理·芒格：它横向延伸三英里，地下两英里。你怎么能在地下两三英里的时候横向钻两三英里？他们掌握了很多非常棘手的技术，才能从这些井中提取任何石油。

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WARREN BUFFETT: And we love the position with Occidental. And we love having Vicki run it. And they’ve been —

沃伦·巴菲特：我们爱西方石油的地位。我们爱让维基管理它。他们一直在——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: And there’s a lot more oil down there, if anybody can figure out another magic trick. That’s all we need is another magic trick.

查理·芒格：如果有人能再想出一个魔法，那里还有很多石油。我们需要的只是另一个魔法。

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WARREN BUFFETT: But Occidental has some other things too.

沃伦·巴菲特：但西方石油还有其他东西。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. Yes. But —

查理·芒格：是的。是的。但是——

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WARREN BUFFETT: But the price of oil still is incredibly important in terms of the economics of short-lived oil. I mean, no question about that.

沃伦·巴菲特：但油价在短期石油的经济性方面仍然非常重要。我的意思是，这毫无疑问。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if it’s —

查理·芒格：嗯，如果是——

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WARREN BUFFETT: And we will incidentally — you know — There’s speculation about us buying control. We’re not going to buy control. (Laughs) We don’t want to run — We’ve got the right management running it. We can’t — we wouldn’t know what to do with it. And (UNINTELLIGLE) wouldn’t know what to do with an oil field.

沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一句——你知道——有人猜测我们会购买控制权。我们不会购买控制权。（笑）我们不想管理——我们有合适的管理者在管理它。我们不能——我们不知道该怎么处理它。（听不清）也不知道怎么处理油田。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Admitting you’re buying coal would be like going out and seeking to acquire cancer or something. You can’t even borrow to expand a coal mine now. It got very unfashionable.

查理·芒格：承认你在买煤就像出去寻找癌症或什么的。现在你甚至无法借钱来扩展煤矿。它变得非常不流行。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we think, frankly, some of the things said are ridiculous.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。坦白说，我们认为有些说法很荒谬。

---

And on both sides. In both extremes.

而且在两边。两个极端。

---

I mean, you’re dealing with physics. You’re dealing with — the politicization of positions on something that’s enormously important in terms of energy just lends itself to demagogues, and fundraisers, and advisory organizations, and everybody in sight. And we will make rational decisions. And we do not think it’s un-American to be producing oil.

我的意思是，你在处理物理学。你在处理——在能源方面极其重要的事情上的立场政治化，只是让蛊惑民心的政客、筹款人、顾问组织和所有人都趋之若鹜。我们会做出理性的决定。我们不认为生产石油是不爱国的。

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: And there is no oil basin in the United States that compares to the Permian, in terms of promise.

查理·芒格：在美国，没有哪个油盆地能在前景上与二叠纪相比。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We were lucky.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们很幸运。

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t —

查理·芒格：嗯，我不——

---

WARREN BUFFETT: We didn’t know it was there until –

沃伦·巴菲特：我们直到不久前才知道它在那里——

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.

查理·芒格：是的。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: — not that many years ago.

沃伦·巴菲特：——没多少年前。

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: It had sort of been used up. And then they always knew the shale oil was there. But they thought it was going to stay unrecoverable forever.

查理·芒格：它有点被用尽了。然后他们一直知道那里有页岩油。但他们认为它将永远无法回收。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: The second or third stock I bought was Texas Pacific Land Trust. And they owned 3,000,000 acres down there. And they were raising revenues of $10,000 a year or something like that. And they were sitting on this incredible amount of oil. And basically, that company is now actually part of Chevron.

沃伦·巴菲特：我买的第二或第三只股票是德克萨斯太平洋土地信托。他们在那里拥有300万英亩的土地。他们的年收入大约是1万美元或类似。他们坐在这个惊人的石油量上。基本上，那家公司现在实际上是雪佛龙的一部分。

---

And it went through Texaco and did all kinds of things. And there’s still a Texas Pacific Land Trust. But a lot of that property is fee owned by — the minerals are owned by Chevron, which is some advantage. But it’s an interesting subject, I’ll put it that way.

它经历了德士古，做了各种事情。现在还有一个德克萨斯太平洋土地信托。但那里的很多财产是费用所有的——矿产归雪佛龙所有，这有一些优势。但这是一个有趣的主题，我只能这么说。

---

And we will not be making any offer for control of Occidental. But we love the shares we have. And we may or may not own more in the future. But we certainly have warrants, which we got as part of the original deal, on a very sustainable amount of stock, at around $59 a share. And those warrants last a long time. I’m glad we have them.

我们不会提出控制西方石油的要约。但我们爱我们持有的股份。未来我们可能会或可能不会拥有更多。但我们肯定有认股权证，这是我们作为原始交易的一部分获得的，涉及相当可观的股票，价格大约是每股59美元。那些认股权证持续时间很长。我很高兴我们有它们。

---

41. Elon Musk is a ‘brilliant, brilliant guy’ who ‘likes taking on the impossible job’ (埃隆·马斯克是一个“非常非常聪明的人”，喜欢“挑战不可能的任务”)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station seven.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第七站。

---

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Max Joa (PH). I’m from Toronto, Canada. I have a question for Charlie regarding a statement you made in the past.

观众：我叫Max Joa，来自加拿大多伦多。我有一个关于查理过去发表的言论的问题。

---

You once mentioned that you’d prefer to hire someone with an IQ of 130 who believes it’s 120, over someone with the IQ of 150 who thinks it’s 170.

您曾经提到，您更愿意雇用一个智商130但认为自己智商120的人，而不是一个智商150但认为自己智商170的人。

---

I understand that you are referring to Elon Musk. (LAUGHTER)

我理解您指的是埃隆·马斯克。（笑声）

---

Given the recent success of his ventures, such as Tesla, SpaceX, and Starlink, I’m curious to know if you still hold the view that Elon Musk overestimates himself. Thank you so much. (APPLAUSE)

鉴于他最近在特斯拉、SpaceX和Starlink等事业上的成功，我想知道您是否仍然认为埃隆·马斯克高估了自己。非常感谢。（掌声）

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yes. I think Elon Musk overestimates himself. But he has a — he is very talented. So, he’s overestimating somebody who doesn’t need to overestimate to be very talented.

查理·芒格：嗯，是的。我认为埃隆·马斯克高估了自己。但他非常有才华。所以，他是在高估一个不需要高估就非常有才华的人。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s a Bill Maher program, about a week old, maybe two weeks old.

沃伦·巴菲特：有一个比尔·马赫的节目，大约一周前，也许两周前。

---

But he interviews Elon. And Elon does a terrific job toe-to-toe with Bill Maher. It’s worth watching.

他采访了埃隆。埃隆与比尔·马赫面对面表现得很出色，值得一看。

---

And Elon is — he’s a brilliant, brilliant guy. And I would say that, you know, he might score over 170.

埃隆——他是一个非常非常聪明的人。我会说，你知道，他的智商可能超过170。

---

But he — you know, it’s — he dreams about things. And his dreams have got a foundation.

但他——你知道，他有梦想。他的梦想有基础。

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: He would not have achieved what he has in life if he hadn’t tried for unreasonably extreme objectives.

查理·芒格：如果他没有尝试不合理极端的目標，他就不会取得人生中的这些成就。

---

He likes taking on the impossible job and doing it. We’re different, Warren and I. Warren and I are looking for the easy job that we can identify. (LAUGHTER)

他喜欢接受不可能的任务并完成它。我们不同，沃伦和我。沃伦和我寻找我们可以识别的简单工作。（笑声）

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. If we can do it playing tic-tac-toe, we’ll do it, you know? (LAUGHS)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。如果我们可以通过玩井字游戏做到，我们就去做，你知道吗？（笑）

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: We have a totally different way of going about it.

查理·芒格：我们的做事方式完全不同。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: But we don’t want to compete with Elon in a lot of things.

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们不想在很多事情上与埃隆竞争。

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: We don’t want that much failure.

查理·芒格：我们不想有那么多失败。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (LAUGHTER) Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）是的。

---

And it takes over your life in a way that it just doesn’t fit us. But there are going to be — well, there have been important things done by Elon already. And it requires — fanaticism isn’t the word.

它会以一种不适合我们的方式占据你的生活。但会有——嗯，埃隆已经完成了一些重要的事情。这需要——狂热不是那个词。

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It is the word.

查理·芒格：是的，就是这个词。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）

---

Well, it isn’t quite the word. But it’s a dedication to solving the impossible. And every now and then, he’ll do it. But it would be torturous to me or Charlie. And I like the way I’m living. And I wouldn’t enjoy being in his — but he wouldn’t enjoy being in my shoes, either.

嗯，不完全是这个词。但这是一种致力于解决不可能问题的奉献精神。偶尔，他会做到。但这对我或查理来说会很痛苦。我喜欢我现在的生活方式。我不会喜欢站在他的位置上——但他也不会喜欢站在我的位置上。

---

Watch the Bill Maher interview.

去看比尔·马赫的采访。

---

42. We want to save Berkshire’s cash to buy businesses (我们想保留伯克希尔的现金来购买企业)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

---

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Foster Taylor (PH).

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自福斯特·泰勒。

---

“At the 2010 Berkshire annual meeting, you said the one question that you would ask of the Berkshire CEO would be about the distribution of cash to shareholders, as the Berkshire cash pile grows larger and larger.

“在2010年伯克希尔年度股东大会上，您说您会问伯克希尔首席执行官的一个问题是关于向股东分配现金，因为伯克希尔的现金储备越来越大。

---

“So, let me ask that question. Do you still feel confident of the future prospects for our over $100 billion in cash on hand, or are we getting closer to cash distributions?”

“所以，让我问这个问题。您对我们手中超过1000亿美元的现金的未来前景仍然有信心吗，还是我们正在接近现金分配？”

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the one thing, if Berkshire shares are selling for less than we think they’re worth, that could be a pretty big way to distribute cash. But what we would really like to do is buy great businesses. If we could buy a company for $50 billion, or $75 billion, $100 billion, we could do it.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，有一件事，如果伯克希尔的股价低于我们认为的价值，那可能是分配现金的一个很大方式。但我们真正想做的是购买优秀的企业。如果我们能以500亿、750亿或1000亿美元买下一家公司，我们可以做到。

---

And we could do it. And our word’s good. It’s difficult with a public company, because in effect, if you bid on a company, you make the bid, and their shareholders vote months later. And you’re giving out an option. If we’re good for it, and the other guy has a way to —

我们能做到。我们的承诺是可靠的。对于上市公司来说这很难，因为实际上，如果你对一家公司出价，你提出了报价，他们的股东几个月后投票。你相当于给出了一个期权。如果我们能做到，而另一个人有办法——

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: Top you.

查理·芒格：超过你。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: —top you, or all kinds of things, they can get out of it. And then you get paid 2% for that, or 1% that, that is not an appropriate price. And on the other hand, Delaware will decide whether they should do it or not. And that’s the way the world is. I mean, that’s the law. So, it’d be easier to do with a private company.

沃伦·巴菲特：——超过你，或者各种事情，他们可以退出。然后你为此得到2%或1%的回报，那不是合适的价格。另一方面，特拉华州将决定他们是否应该这样做。这就是世界的运作方式。我的意思是，这是法律。所以，对私营公司来说会更容易。

---

And there aren’t very many that are big. On the other hand, there’s nobody else that can quite make a deal like we can, under the right circumstances. And there could be a situation where a number of very decent companies have got a very uncomfortable borrowing structure, and money comes due to them at the exact wrong time.

而且大的私营公司不多。另一方面，在适当的情况下，没有人能像我们这样达成交易。可能会有一种情况，一些非常优秀的公司有非常不舒服的借款结构，而且资金在最错误的时候到期。

---

And that’s when they pick up a phone, as did Tiffany, and Harley-Davidson, and you name it. I mean, a whole bunch of companies in 2008. That sort of thing will happen again, whether it results in us getting the calls, or what the world is exactly at that time.

那就是他们拿起电话的时候，就像蒂芙尼、哈雷戴维森，你随便说。我的意思是，2008年有一大堆公司。这种事情会再次发生，无论我们是否会接到电话，或者当时世界到底是什么样子。

---

But the one thing we know is that the number of phone calls that you can make at a time like that is very, very limited. And there can be good companies, they don’t want to sell the company necessarily, but they just may need $5 billion, or $10 billion, or $20 billion, depending on what company you’re talking about.

但我们知道的一件事是，在那样的时刻，你能打的电话数量非常非常有限。有些好公司，他们不一定想卖公司，但他们可能只需要50亿、100亿或200亿美元，具体取决于你说的是哪家公司。

---

And that can happen. And our own shareholders can be selling the stock too cheap. And we’ll never do anything to make them sell it cheap. And we’ll tell them the truth about what the business is. But if market circumstances result in us being able to buy in $50 billion of our own stock, we’ll buy it.

这可能会发生。我们自己的股东可能会以太低的价格卖股票。我们永远不会做任何让他们贱卖的事情。我们会告诉他们关于业务的真相。但如果市场情况导致我们能够买回500亿美元的自己的股票，我们会买。

---

So, we’ll see what the world holds. But we don’t have the opportunities we used to have. But we’ve got enough. And we’re making money with the things we have. It isn’t killing us to hold $130 billion of bills at 5% plus bond equivalent yields.

所以，我们会看看世界会怎样。但我们没有过去那样的机会。但我们有足够的。我们用我们有的东西赚钱。持有1300亿美元的票据，收益率超过5%，相当于债券收益率，这并没有让我们痛苦。

---

And everybody says, “Well, yields are going to go down in the future.” I don’t have the faintest idea what yields are going to do in the future.

每个人都说，“嗯，未来收益率会下降。”我一点也不知道未来收益率会怎样。

---

And, you know, the prime rate was 21.5% in 1981 or ’2. And people were worried that it was going to go totally out and spin out of control. And [Federal Reserve Chairman Paul] Volcker kept it from happening.

你知道，1981年或1982年的最优惠利率是21.5%。人们担心它会完全失控，螺旋上升。[美联储主席保罗]沃尔克阻止了这种情况发生。

---

But if Volcker hadn’t been in there, who the hell knows what would’ve happened.

但如果没有沃尔克，谁知道会发生什么。

---

So, we’re running Berkshire so that we’ll do OK. And maybe we’ll do a little bit better than OK. Charlie?

所以，我们在运营伯克希尔，确保我们会没事。也许我们会比没事做得稍微好一点。查理？

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: OK. Maybe. Fine.

查理·芒格：好的。也许。很好。

---

43. Munger: ‘Life is too short’ to be an ambitious lawyer (芒格：“人生太短”不能做野心勃勃的律师)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station eight.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第八站。

---

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Carlos Sanchez (PH). And I am honored to be here from Guadalajara, Mexico. Mr. Munger, as a fellow lawyer, I have a question regarding corporate law.

观众：您好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫卡洛斯·桑切斯，来自墨西哥瓜达拉哈拉。能在这里我感到很荣幸。芒格先生，作为一名同行律师，我有一个关于公司法的问题。

---

Considering your experience and success, if you were to offer guidance to someone like Ralph Tortorella when he was at the beginning of his career, and before becoming Berkshire Hathaway Company’s lawyer, what key principles or lessons would you suggest to help him excel in his profession?

考虑到您的经验和成功，如果您要为像拉尔夫·托托雷拉这样的人提供指导，在他职业生涯开始时，在成为伯克希尔哈撒韦公司律师之前，您会建议哪些关键原则或经验教训来帮助他在职业上脱颖而出？

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m not sure I quite caught all of that. But I don’t think I have a lot of advice about how to succeed as a lawyer. I have a son-in-law who describes modern law practice in a big firm.

查理·芒格：嗯，我不确定我是否完全听懂了。但我认为我没有太多关于如何成为一名成功律师的建议。我有一个女婿，他描述了大公司中的现代法律实践。

---

He says, “It’s like a pie-eating contest where if you win you get to eat more pie.” (LAUGHTER) And I advise you to avoid that kind of a law firm. Life is too short to just do nothing but eat pie.

他说，“这就像一个吃馅饼比赛，如果你赢了，你得吃更多的馅饼。”（笑声）我建议你避免那种律师事务所。人生太短，不能只做吃馅饼的事。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Charlie has not practiced law since what 1964 maybe, whatever it was.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。查理大概从1964年起就没有从事法律工作了，也许是那时候。

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: 1962.

查理·芒格：1962年。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: ’62. And Charlie has given me four or five pieces of advice that don’t really come from his legal background, but because he knows the system so well, and, you know, really did do quite well at Harvard Law School, despite his taunting of teachers in a few things.

沃伦·巴菲特：1962年。查理给了我四五条建议，这些建议并不真正来自他的法律背景，而是因为他非常了解这个体系，你知道，尽管他在哈佛法学院偶尔嘲笑老师，但他确实表现得很出色。

---

He has given me four of five solutions on things that nobody else in the world would’ve given me, law firm or otherwise. And it’s been within a nanosecond of when I described the problem to him. And he just gave me the answer that nobody else would’ve come up with.

他给了我四五个解决方案，这些是世界上其他人，无论是律师事务所还是其他地方，都不会给我的。几乎在我向他描述问题的瞬间，他就给出了别人想不到的答案。

---

And I told you one of them last year. So, I won’t repeat it at this meeting. But we’ve got the best lawyer in the world in Charlie, if it’s something that really matters. And there’ve been times when I’ve taken advantage of that. And Charlie didn’t want to be a lawyer.

我去年告诉了你们其中一个。所以，我不会在这场会议上重复。但如果是很重要的事情，我们有世界上最好的律师查理。有几次我利用了这一点。查理不想做律师。

---

He didn’t want to sell his time, maybe at 20 bucks an hour or something, to people he thought were making the wrong decisions. And he knew more about it than they did. And that just did not strike him as a good way to go through life. And I think he’s probably right on that.

他不想以每小时20美元或类似的价格卖时间给那些他认为在做错误决定的人。他比他们知道得更多。这对他来说不是一种好的生活方式。我认为他可能是对的。

---

I think he’d have really gotten to be miserable if he had to keep doing that. It’s just no fun. It’d be like me giving investment advice to somebody that — or taking it from somebody. I just wouldn’t want to do it. And Charlie figured that out. And so, we decided to work for ourselves. And this worked. Been happy, happily ever after.

我想如果他不得不继续那样做，他会真的很痛苦。这一点乐趣都没有。就像我给某人投资建议——或者从某人那里接受建议。我就是不想做。查理明白了这一点。所以，我们决定为自己工作。这很有效。从此幸福快乐。

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: We have no complaints.

查理·芒格：我们没有任何抱怨。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. None.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。没有。

44. New minimum 15% corporate tax ‘doesn’t bother me in the least’ (新的15%最低企业税“对我一点也不困扰”)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’re at Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

---

BECKY QUICK: This question come from Ryan Harding (PH). And it’s about the new 15% corporate minimum tax rate. As he sees it, its implementation is currently understood, he thinks as he understands it, to apply over rolling three-year periods, and to be based on reported earnings.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自瑞安·哈丁。关于新的15%最低企业税率。据他所知，其执行方式目前被理解为基于连续三年的期间，并基于报告的盈利。

---

First, does the inclusion of unrealized gains and losses in reported earnings under the current financial reporting standards contribute to the calculation for corporate minimum tax rate purposes?

首先，根据现行财务报告标准，报告盈利中包含的未实现收益和损失是否用于计算最低企业税率？

---

And could it potentially convert some of those notional deferred taxes into cash taxes, even if a rise in the market price of a major holding is only temporary, but rather extreme? And then second, could it reduce the effect of some of the renewable energy tax incentives, and others?

这可能会将一些名义上的递延税款转换为现金税款，即使主要持股的市场价格上涨只是暂时的，但幅度相当大吗？其次，这会否降低一些可再生能源税收优惠及其他优惠的效果？

---

WARREN BUFFETT: I think the answer on the second part, probably, is no. But I don’t want to say it is for sure, because he’s asking the same questions I ask of Marc Hamburg, who’s the smartest guy on combining understanding a business, understanding the tax code, understanding SEC rules, and everything else, that you’ll find in corporate America.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想第二个问题的答案可能是否定的。但我不想肯定地说，因为他问的问题和我问马克·汉堡的问题一样，马克是美国企业中最聪明的人，集理解业务、税法、SEC规则等一切于一身。

---

And these questions — the particular question on marginable securities — I don’t think has been answered yet. And I think that there are a number of things about the new tax act that were not enacted yet. But I would say this. We have said ourselves what we think the proper approach to operating income.

这些问题——特别是关于可抵押证券的问题——我认为还没有答案。我认为新税法还有很多事情尚未制定。但我要说的是，我们自己已经说过我们认为正确的营业收入处理方式。

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We didn’t design that because this tax law came along, we did some years back. So, we would think that you wouldn’t include capital gains, unrealized capital gains in. But we’ve got enough, I think no matter how things turn out. The 15% tax doesn’t bother me in the least.

我们不是因为这部税法而设计的，我们几年前就这么做了。所以，我们认为不应该包括资本收益，未实现的资本收益。但我们有足够的资源，我想无论结果如何。15%的税对我一点也不困扰。

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And we can figure ways, once we know the rules, where we will pay the 15% tax. And, you know, we were paying 52% tax as federal income taxes when I bought control in the partnership of Berkshire Hathaway. I mean, the tax rate has come down dramatically.

一旦我们知道规则，我们就能找到方法支付15%的税。你知道，当我在伯克希尔哈撒韦合伙企业中取得控制权时，我们支付了52%的联邦所得税。我的意思是，税率已经大幅下降。

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And the deferred tax that was embodied, for example, at Sanborn MAT, when it was involved in a system that was allowed under the tax law to avoid that tax. But that was a huge tax, 52%. So, we will live with this tax code. And we do not think corporations are overtaxed in the United States.

例如，Sanborn MAT体现的递延税款，当时它参与了一个税法允许的系统来避免那种税。但那是52%的巨额税款。所以，我们会适应这部税法。我们不认为美国的企业的税收过重。

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And, you know, I think that the conversation about how we’d lose out to the world, and all that sort of thing is really nonsense. But we’ve got a new law that the regulations haven’t been written on. And when we know what the game is, we will absolutely figure out a way to pay 15% every year, which generally, we’ve been paying anyway.

你知道，我认为关于我们如何在世界上失去竞争力之类的讨论完全是无稽之谈。但我们有一部新法律，相关规定尚未制定。一旦我们知道游戏规则，我们绝对会找到方法每年支付15%的税，通常我们本来就在支付。

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And as I pointed out, if there were a thousand corporations in the United States that paid what Berkshire has been paying, nobody else in the United States, no individual, no corporation, would ever pay any income tax, social security tax, gift tax, estate tax, anything else.

正如我指出的，如果美国有一千家像伯克希尔这样纳税的公司，美国的其他任何人，无论是个人还是公司，都永远不需要支付任何所得税、社会保障税、赠与税、遗产税或其他任何税。

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A thousand like Berkshire Hathaway would produce the revenue that’s being derived under the present tax code from everybody in the United States. And I don’t feel badly about that. And I love to get it to one five-hundreth, or something of the sort. But I’d like to do it — we can do it at this rate. I’m happy to do it.

一千家像伯克希尔哈撒韦这样的公司就能产生当前税法下美国所有人产生的税收。我对此感觉良好。我希望能达到五百分之一或类似的比例。但我想这样做——我们能以这个税率做到。我很乐意这样做。

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I think we are privileged to live in the United States. But we also have to control spending. And that’s something that Congress doesn’t quite like to do. And they didn’t like to do it when my dad went to Congress. But they’ve dug in more, as the years have gone by. Charlie?

我认为我们生活在美国是特权。但我们也必须控制开支。这是国会不太喜欢做的事情。在我父亲进入国会时他们就不喜欢这样做。但随着时间推移，他们更加固执。查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we covered this subject earlier.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们之前已经讨论过这个话题了。

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WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）

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45. We are in ‘the perfect sort of game’ (我们在“完美的游戏”中)

WARREN BUFFETT: Station nine.

沃伦·巴菲特：第九站。

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Am I right on this? Yeah.

我没弄错吧？是的。

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Avlon Gross (PH). And I am from Los Angeles, California. I am a shareholder. And it’s my fourth year coming to the “Woodstock of Capitalism.” (LAUGHTER)

观众：我叫阿夫隆·格罗斯，来自加利福尼亚州洛杉矶。我是股东。这是第四年参加“资本主义伍德斯托克”。（笑声）

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WARREN BUFFETT: We’re glad you came.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们很高兴你来了。

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you so much for everything Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger.

观众：非常感谢沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格所做的一切。

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What is the funniest story that you have never told about each other? And also, what is the hardest part of your business? (APPLAUSE)

你们从未讲过的关于彼此的最有趣的故事是什么？另外，你们生意中最困难的部分是什么？（掌声）

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WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll answer the second. The second part of your question is that we don’t have a hard business. We love our business. Every morning, when I get up, I feel good. I don’t know what’s going to happen that day. Maybe nothing will happen. But maybe something will happen.

沃伦·巴菲特：我会回答第二个问题。你问题的第二部分是，我们没有困难的生意。我们爱我们的生意。每天早上起床，我感觉很好。我不知道那天会发生什么。也许什么也不会发生。但也许会发生些什么。

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And if nothing else, I’ll roll some T-bills or something. But I work with the greatest group of people you can imagine. I mean, we like each other. And nobody is after anybody else’s job, or anything of the sort. It’s ideal working conditions. And it’s five minutes from my home, or thereabouts. So, I haven’t spent my life commuting. I just can’t imagine having anything better.

如果什么也没发生，我就滚动一些短期国债或类似的东西。但我与一群你能想象的最棒的人一起工作。我的意思是，我们彼此喜欢。没有人觊觎别人的工作，或诸如此类。这是理想的工作环境。离我家只有五分钟左右。所以，我没有把人生花在通勤上。我无法想象有什么比这更好的。

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And Charlie’s got a lot of funny stories you haven’t heard. But we’ll see which one he comes up with.

查理有很多你没听过的有趣故事。但我们看看他会讲哪一个。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think Warren and I are naturally so ridiculous that we don’t need very many funny stories. We each do things that are peculiar enough so that we can keep one another amused.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为沃伦和我天生就很可笑，我们不需要太多有趣的故事。我们各自做的事情都足够怪异，足以让彼此逗乐。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Tell them what you told the lawyer when we were buying Hochschild Kohn.

沃伦·巴菲特：告诉他们我们在买Hochschild Kohn时你对律师说了什么。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t remember. You tell them.

查理·芒格：我不记得了。你来告诉他们。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you remember? (LAUGHTER) It was 1966, and we were down in Baltimore, buying a department store. And we needed a lawyer. And we needed a lawyer who was nearby and would do exactly as told. And Charlie came up with a very good lawyer from Wilmer Cutler’s, I believe. And I don’t know whether Charlie remembers the instructions he gave the lawyer or not.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你记得吗？（笑声）那是1966年，我们在巴尔的摩，买一家百货商店。我们需要一个律师。我们需要一个附近的、会完全按照指示做的律师。查理找了一个很棒的律师，我相信是来自Wilmer Cutler的。我不知道查理是否记得他给律师的指示。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I don’t.

查理·芒格：不，我不记得。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie told the lawyer, who we never met before. And he said, “Treat Warren like” — I was 36 at the time or 35. He said, “Treat Warren like any other 90-year-old client.” (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，查理对这个我们从未见过的律师说，他说，“对待沃伦就像”——我当时36岁或35岁。他说，“对待沃伦就像对待其他90岁的客户一样。”（笑声）

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This guy knew exactly what he meant. And we made the deal in a hurry. And then we went to the bank, First National Bank, I believe it was — or Maryland National Bank, actually. And there was a fellow named Cammy Slack there, wasn’t there, Charlie?

这个家伙完全明白他的意思。我们很快达成了交易。然后我们去了银行，我想是第一国民银行——实际上是马里兰国民银行。那里有个人叫卡米·斯莱克，对吧，查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.

查理·芒格：是的。

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WARREN BUFFETT: We wanted to borrow $6,000,000 bucks against a $12,000,000 purchase. And Cammy looked at us with bewilderment. And he says, “You want you borrow $6,000,000 for this little old Hochschild-Kohn?” And Charlie and I said something to the effect, “Well, the Maryland National was our first call. And if they didn’t want to do it, we had another bank we’d go to.”

沃伦·巴菲特：我们想为1200万美元的购买借600万美元。卡米一脸困惑地看着我们。他说，“你们想为这个小小的Hochschild-Kohn借600万美元？”查理和我说了一些话，大意是，“嗯，马里兰国民银行是我们的首选。如果他们不想做，我们还有另一家银行可以去。”

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And, anyway, they lent us the money. But when he said little old Hochschild-Kohn, we immediately started thinking, “Maybe this isn’t the best deal we’ve ever seen in our lives.” And from that point on, we were trying to figure out how to sell it. Sandy Gottesman was involved with us then too.

总之，他们借给了我们钱。但当他说小小的Hochschild-Kohn时，我们立刻开始想，“也许这不是我们见过的最好的交易。”从那时起，我们就在考虑如何卖掉它。桑迪·戈特斯曼当时也和我们一起。

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And we had as much fun out of deals that didn’t work in a certain sense as the ones that did work. I mean, if you knew you were going to play golf and you were going to hit a hole in one on every hole, you just hit the ball, and it went in the hole that was 300 yards away, or 400 yards away, nobody would play golf.

我们在某种意义上失败的交易中得到的乐趣和成功的交易一样多。我的意思是，如果你知道你打高尔夫球每洞都能一杆进洞，你只是击球，球就进了300码或400码外的洞，没人会玩高尔夫。

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I mean, part of the fun of the game is the fact that you hit them to the woods. And sometimes you get them out, and sometimes you don’t.

我的意思是，游戏的乐趣部分在于你把球打到树林里。有时你能救回来，有时不能。

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So, we are in the perfect sort of game. And we both enjoy it. And we have a lot of fun together. And we don’t have to do anything we don’t really believe in doing.

所以，我们在一种完美的游戏中。我们都享受它。我们一起有很多乐趣。我们不必做任何我们不真正相信的事情。

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I mean, we are not dictated to by any group. And so, we get to forge our own destiny. And in a sense, forge the principle by which we can run the company. And that’s a huge luxury in life.

我的意思是，我们不受任何团体的支配。所以，我们可以塑造自己的命运。在某种意义上，塑造我们运营公司的原则。这是人生中巨大的奢侈。

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And we don’t want to be president of any other company in the world, or CEO, or anything else. We’d have to conform to certain things that we really don’t want to conform to.

我们不想做世界上任何其他公司的总裁、首席执行官或其他任何职位。我们将不得不遵循一些我们真的不想遵循的事情。

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Is that a fair description, Charlie?

这个描述公平吗，查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it is.

查理·芒格：是的，很公平。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

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46. Arbitrage bet on Activision isn’t looking good (对动视暴雪的套利押注看起来不太好)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

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BECKY QUICK: This question comes from David Kass, who is a professor at the business school at University of Maryland.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自马里兰大学商学院教授大卫·卡斯。

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He says, “At last year’s annual meeting, Warren mentioned that Berkshire had taken a large stake in Activision Blizzard as a merger arbitrage play. Since the U.K. regulator has blocked its acquisition by Microsoft, has Berkshire reduced or sold its stake?”

他说，“在去年的股东大会上，沃伦提到伯克希尔在动视暴雪上持有大量股份，作为并购套利操作。由于英国监管机构阻止了微软的收购，伯克希尔是否减少或卖掉了其股份？”

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think in terms of what we do with stocks, we don’t give information except when required to, which is in the 13F, or whatever we file. And there’s certain things you can actually figure out by looking at our 10-Q, which we filed this morning.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，关于我们对股票的处理，我想我们只在必须披露时提供信息，比如13F或其他我们提交的文件。你可以通过查看我们今天早上提交的10-Q来推测一些事情。

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But you have to look pretty hard. But I would say this. I think Microsoft has been remarkably, what’s the word, willing to cooperate with governing bodies. I mean, they want to do the deal. And they’ve met the opposition, it seems to me, more than halfway.

但你得仔细看。但我要说的是，我认为微软非常，嗯，愿意与监管机构合作。我的意思是，他们想完成这笔交易。在我看来，他们已经对反对意见妥协了不止一半。

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But that doesn’t mean that it gets done if a given country, in this case the U.K., wants to block it. They’re in a better position to block it than the United States, by just the way the world works. And that doesn’t get solved by offering more money.

但这并不意味着如果某个国家，在这个案例中是英国，想阻止它，交易就能完成。他们的阻止能力比美国强，这就是世界的运作方式。这不是通过出更多钱就能解决的。

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So, I don’t know how it turns out. But if it doesn’t go through, I don’t think it’s through any shortcoming by either Microsoft or Activision. But not everything that should happen does happen. And, well, we ran into it when we made the deal with Dominion Energy 18 months ago. And they let us buy a good bit of what we wanted to buy.

所以，我不知道结果会怎样。但如果交易没有通过，我认为不是微软或动视暴雪的任何不足。但并非所有应该发生的事情都会发生。嗯，18个月前我们与Dominion Energy的交易就遇到了这种情况。他们让我们买了我们想买的很大一部分。

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And then the government in effect said, “You can’t buy something else,” which I think we would’ve done a better job with than anybody else did, and which the states involved did not object to it, which the customers didn’t object to it. But you don’t take on the United States government, you know?

然后政府实际上说，“你不能买其他东西，”我认为我们会比任何人都做得更好，相关州没有反对，客户也没有反对。但你不能与美国政府对抗，你知道吗？

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And you try and figure out things that you won’t have a problem with. And I think in that case, the U.S. government made a mistake. I think the British government’s making a mistake in this case.

你试图找出不会有问题的事情。我认为在那种情况下，美国政府犯了错误。我认为英国政府在这个案例中正在犯错误。

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But that’s life in the big city, as Charlie would say.

但这就是大城市的生活，正如查理会说的。

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And what we do will depend on a lot of things. Charlie?

我们的行动将取决于很多事情。查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think — well, we do — yeah — you kissed that one off beautifully. (LAUGHTER)

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为——嗯，我们确实——是的——你把这个回答得很漂亮。（笑声）

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47. If you can’t work for yourself, working for Berkshire is almost as good (如果你不能为自己工作，为伯克希尔工作几乎一样好)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 10. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第十站。（笑声）

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. My name’s Anderson Fuller (PH). And I’m from Avonport, Nova Scotia in Canada.

观众：嗨，沃伦。嗨，查理。我叫安德森·富勒，来自加拿大新斯科舍省的阿冯波特。

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And before I ask my question, I just want to thank you for all you’ve done to give us insight into your minds as investors.

在提问之前，我想感谢你们为我们提供了作为投资者的思想洞见。

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So, for me, the most compelling takeaway from Berkshire is your guys’ emphasis on and successful use of properly aligned incentives.

对我来说，伯克希尔最引人注目的经验是你们强调并成功运用了适当对齐的激励机制。

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In my view, owning and leading a business has two central benefits. First, you directly benefit as the company grows, through your equity in it, and second, you have autonomy. Incentives for employees are a bit easier to understand, such as offering benefits, fair pay, and creating a strong culture.

在我看来，拥有并领导一家企业有两个核心好处。首先，随着公司增长，你通过股权直接受益；其次，你有自主权。员工的激励机制更容易理解，比如提供福利、公平薪酬和创造强大的文化。

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But I’ve always struggled to understand them at the highest level. Even though you say Berkshire gives its managers significant flexibility, it must be less than what they had when they were independent.

但我一直难以理解最高层面的激励机制。尽管你们说伯克希尔给经理人很大的灵活性，但这肯定比他们独立时少。

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Additionally, you would think passion and a willingness to sell would be inversely correlated. So, how exactly does Berkshire bridge this gap and incentivize owners of its subsidiaries to give up these benefits to Berkshire? Thank you.

此外，你会认为热情和出售意愿是负相关的。那么，伯克希尔究竟如何弥合这一差距，激励其子公司的所有者放弃这些好处给伯克希尔？谢谢。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, what we really hope to find is managers who love their business, but don’t like a lot of what comes with it as a public company. I mean, if they have to spend a lot of time listening to people tell them what to do about this or that, and they can’t afford to irritate them, or they have to go along with their trade association, or whatever they may call it, because you don’t want to look like a free rider.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们真正希望找到的是那些热爱自己生意但不喜欢作为上市公司带来的很多事情的经理人。我的意思是，如果他们必须花很多时间听别人告诉他们该做什么，不能惹恼他们，或者必须跟随他们的行业协会，或不管叫什么，因为你不想看起来像个搭便车的人。

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There’s all kinds of things, compromises that people have to make in most jobs. And Charlie and I solved that problem. I had five bosses in my life. And I liked all five of them. And two of them were just huge factors in making my life better. But I liked all five of them.

在大多数工作中，人们必须做出各种妥协。查理和我解决了这个问题。我一生中有五个老板。我喜欢他们五个。其中两个对改善我的人生有巨大影响。但我喜欢他们五个。

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A couple of them were, you know, some people hear JCPenney, Cooper Smith, you know, I worked for 75 cents an hour and I loved working at Penny’s. Well, I didn’t love working at Penney’s. But I loved working for Cooper Smith. And, you know, it was 75 cents an hour.

其中几个，你知道，有些人听说JCPenney，库珀·史密斯，你知道，我每小时75美分，我爱在Penney工作。嗯，我不爱在Penney工作。但我爱为库珀·史密斯工作。你知道，那是每小时75美分。

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But I had to do what they told me to do, which was to sell men’s shirts first, and then men’s clothing, and then children’s clothing, and so on. And I loved working for the newspaper. And I had a great manager when I was at the University of Nebraska. I got to work for Ben Graham. I mean, everything worked out.

但我必须按他们说的做，先卖男士衬衫，然后是男士服装，然后是童装，等等。我爱为报社工作。在内布拉斯加大学时我有一个很棒的经理。我为本·格雷厄姆工作。我的意思是，一切都顺利。

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But there’s nothing like working for yourself. And if you can’t own a big company, working at Berkshire Hathaway, from running a company is the closest thing you will get. You don’t have to spend time courting analysts who you’ll probably have contempt for in many cases.

但没有什么比为自己工作更好。如果不能拥有大公司，在伯克希尔哈撒韦工作，管理一家公司是你能得到的最接近的事情。你不必花时间讨好分析师，在很多情况下你可能对他们嗤之以鼻。

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You don’t have to spend time with banks, you know, getting money, and particularly in terrible times.

你不必花时间与银行打交道，你知道，筹钱，特别是在糟糕的时候。

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There’s all kinds of — you get a lot in the way of freedom that I would think would be meaningful to me. And it might be better if you own the whole place yourself.

有很多——你会得到很多自由，我认为这对我来说很有意义。如果你自己完全拥有这个地方可能会更好。

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But maybe you’ve got siblings that want out. Maybe — there’s a million reasons why you may not be able to achieve that unless you sell to Berkshire. And that’s easier, probably, if you have a family business, where people want to go in different directions, than it is with a public company. But there’s still possibilities there.

但也许你有想退出的兄弟姐妹。也许——有无数理由让你无法实现，除非你卖给伯克希尔。如果是家族企业，人们想走不同方向，这可能比上市公司更容易。但那里仍然有可能性。

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So, that’s why I think if I owned a public company, and it was worth a great many billions of dollars, and Berkshire Hathaway wanted to buy it, and the shareholders were willing to vote it, I would consider the way I would feel about life, for one thing, I wouldn’t want to retire at 65. I’d want to keep working.

所以，这就是为什么如果我拥有一家价值数十亿美元的上市公司，伯克希尔哈撒韦想买它，股东愿意投票，我会考虑我的生活感受，一方面，我不想在65岁退休。我想继续工作。

---

And there are reasons to sell to Berkshire, which Charlie and I, in certain positions, if we were on the other side, would take the deal. But it isn’t for everybody. Charlie?

卖给伯克希尔有其理由，查理和我，在某些情况下，如果我们站在另一边，会接受这笔交易。但这并不适合所有人。查理？

---

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think we have a pretty good one. We’ve been very lucky. And I don’t know. It seems to me that most of the people who are going to end up the way we did, they almost already know how to do it.

查理·芒格：我认为我们的方式很好。我们很幸运。我不知道。对我来说，那些最终会像我们这样的人，他们几乎已经知道怎么做了。

---

WARREN BUFFETT: But the most important purchase, in retrospect, that we may have made was National Indemnity. Now because specifically what it did, but what it led to. And Jack Ringwalt controlled the company. And I knew him and liked him. And he knew me. And once a year, he’d get irritated when the Nebraska Department of Insurance, or somebody would come around.

沃伦·巴菲特：但回顾起来，我们可能做的最重要的购买是National Indemnity。不是因为它具体做了什么，而是因为它带来了什么。杰克·林沃尔特控制着公司。我认识他，喜欢他。他也认识我。每年一次，当内布拉斯加保险部门或某人来检查时，他会很烦躁。

---

And he said they always came around when the AK-SAR-BEN racetrack was open. I mean, he had all these theories about why it was a pain in the neck to be regulated. And I told Charlie Heider, “Next time Jack is in that mood, where he’s ready to sell, just because he’s tired of fooling around with all these guys, be sure and find him.”

他说他们总是在AK-SAR-BEN赛马场开放时来检查。我的意思是，他有各种理论解释为什么被监管很烦人。我告诉查理·海德，“下次杰克心情不好，准备卖公司时，因为他厌倦了和这些人周旋，一定要找到他。”

---

And so, Charlie called me one day. And he says, “Jack is in heat.” And I said, “Bring him over.” And we made a deal. But that’s why Jack sold. And he was happy after he made the deal. And I was happy after we made the deal. So, there’s a man that controlled a business, but just decided these people didn’t seem to bother him as much once they were my problem and not his.

于是，有一天查理打电话给我。他说，“杰克现在很激动。”我说，“带他过来。”我们达成了交易。这就是杰克卖公司的原因。交易完成后他很高兴。我也很高兴。所以，这个人控制了一家公司，但决定一旦这些问题成了我的问题而不是他的，这些人似乎就没那么烦他了。

---

And you just can’t tell when lightening will strike. And that didn’t do magnificent things for us initially. But just look at what it led to, you know?

你无法预测何时会灵光一闪。最初这对我们没有带来巨大的回报。但看看它带来了什么，你知道吗？

---

So, you never — you know, if you knew how you were going to shoot all 18 holes, it wouldn’t be any fun playing. You wouldn’t get out on the first tee. I mean, it’s the uncertainty, the fun of playing the game, the opponents, all kinds of things that make a game interesting. And I think Charlie and I are in the most interesting game in the world.

所以，你永远——你知道，如果你在高尔夫球场上知道你会如何打完18洞，就不会有乐趣了。你不会站到第一个发球台上。我的意思是，不确定性、游戏的乐趣、对手，各种事情让游戏变得有趣。我认为查理和我在世界上最有趣的游戏中。

---

48. See’s Candies is a ‘wonderful brand that doesn’t travel’ (See’s Candies是一个“很棒但无法传播”的品牌)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

---

BECKY QUICK: Here’s a question from Simon Withers (PH), in Perth, in Western Australia.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自西澳大利亚珀斯的西蒙·威瑟斯。

---

“It’s been a long time since we’ve heard about See’s Candy and NetJets. Could you please give us an update on See’s performance, and when you project it will run out of places to open stores in the United States?

“很久没有听到关于See’s Candies和NetJets的消息了。请更新一下See’s的表现，以及您预计它何时会在美国开完所有可能的店铺？

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“And could you also give us an overview of how NetJets has performed since its acquisition, and whether it’s achieved the potential you saw at the time of that acquisition?”

“您还能否概述一下NetJets自收购以来的表现，以及它是否实现了您在收购时看到的潜力？”

---

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, with See’s it hasn’t been a question of opening stores. We found out that we have this wonderful brand that doesn’t travel. You know? The mystique, the actual product, the feelings people have about some things, as we said before, I mean, it sometimes it’s limited to given markets.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，对于See’s来说，问题不在于开店。我们发现我们有一个很棒的品牌，但它无法传播。你知道？它的神秘感、实际产品、人们对某些东西的感受，正如我们之前说的，有时候它局限于特定市场。

---

Dr. Pepper sells at a huge rate in Dallas-Fort Worth, and maybe at 10 times the percentage per capita, maybe that it has in Detroit, or Boston. And you say, “Well, how can that be with a product that’s been around for a century?” And people travel. You have national advertising.

Dr. Pepper在达拉斯-沃斯堡的销量巨大，可能人均消费量是底特律或波士顿的10倍。你会说，“一个存在了一个世纪的产品怎么会这样？”人们旅行。有全国性的广告。

---

And I’m not sure. But I keep learning more, as I watch different brands. And Charlie and I, our economics were so good in California, that we tried in many cases the same experiment over and over again. It doesn’t cost much to experiment. And we’ve tried everything in the world to cause a brand to travel.

我不确定。但我通过观察不同品牌学到了更多。查理和我，在加州的经济效益很好，我们多次尝试同样的实验。实验成本不高。我们尝试了世界上所有方法让品牌传播。

---

And we always think we were right for the first week. And then we find out that the magic — we can beat any other candy store, pretty much. But there aren’t any candy stores anymore to speak of, as the world has changed. So, See’s is 101 years now. It has magic.

我们总是认为第一周是对的。然后我们发现那种魔力——我们几乎可以击败任何其他糖果店。但现在几乎没有糖果店了，世界已经变了。所以，See’s现在101年了。它有魔力。

---

And it has limited magic in sort of the adjacent West. It’s gravitational, almost. And then you get to the East. And incidentally, in the East, people prefer dark chocolate to milk chocolate. In the West, people prefer milk chocolate to dark. In the East, you can sell miniatures, and dark — in the West —

它的魔力在西部邻近地区有限，差不多是引力作用。到了东部，顺便说一句，东部的人更喜欢黑巧克力而不是牛奶巧克力。西部的人更喜欢牛奶巧克力而不是黑巧克力。在东部，你可以卖迷你装和黑巧克力——在西部——

---

I mean, there’s all kinds of crazy things in the world that consumers do. But you want to keep observing it, because you do learn a little. And with Charlie and I, the temptation to keep trying things, because the economics were so good if we succeeded, so we tried various things. And, of course, every manager wants to try that comes along.

我的意思是，消费者做的各种疯狂的事情。但你要持续观察，因为你确实会学到一点。查理和我，总是想尝试，因为如果成功，经济效益很好，所以我们尝试了各种东西。当然，每个经理都想尝试。

---

Because they’ve learned that it should work. But it doesn’t work. So, but that’s what makes it very interesting.

因为他们学到它应该有效。但它没效。所以，这让它很有趣。

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49. NetJets is a ‘marvelous’ company (NetJets是一家“了不起”的公司)

WARREN BUFFETT: And NetJets, we have really learned how to distinguish, and justifiably distinguish a service to people that you have to be very well to do to use it.

沃伦·巴菲特：至于NetJets，我们真的学会了如何区分，并合理地区分一项服务，这项服务需要非常富裕才能使用。

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But if you’re very well to do, in effect, you’re spending your heir’s money. I mean, it’s what I told my Aunt Alice after she went from teaching to be worth millions and millions of dollars. And she came to see me. She’d never been married. And she said, “Can I afford to buy this fur coat?” in 1968 or ’69. And I said, “Alice, you aren’t buying it. Your nieces and nephews are buying it, because that’s who you’re leaving your money to.”

但如果你非常富裕，实际上，你在花你继承人的钱。我的意思是，我姑姑爱丽丝从教书到身价数百万美元后，我对她说了这个。她来看我。她从未结过婚。她说，“我能负担得起买这件皮大衣吗？”那是1968年或1969年。我说，“爱丽丝，你不是在买。你的侄女侄子在买，因为你会把钱留给他们。”

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“Speaking on behalf of your nieces and nephews I would say we want you to buy it.” And it’s the same way. Do your heirs want you to fly around in that jet? Or do they want you to leave a little more money to your foundation or your kids? And the way to solve that one is to offer your kids a few hours themselves.

“代表你的侄女侄子，我会说我们希望你买。”道理是一样的。你的继承人希望你坐着那架飞机到处飞吗？还是希望你多留点钱给你的基金会或孩子？解决这个问题的方法是给你的孩子自己几小时的飞行时间。

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Then their attitude can change. So, it’s in a class by itself. It’s done what Ferrari has done in a different sort of way in cars. Ferrari sells 11,000 cars a year. I mean, maybe 12,000. And they’re known throughout the world. And we’ll have a Chevy dealership in Boston or something. We’ll sell as many cars. But we’re not Ferrari.

然后他们的态度可能会改变。所以，它独一无二。它以不同方式做了法拉利在汽车领域做的事。法拉利每年卖11000辆车。我的意思是，也许12000辆。它们在全球知名。我们在波士顿或某地会有一个雪佛兰经销商。我们会卖同样多的车。但我们不是法拉利。

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And NetJets has 600 — well, counting Europe, I mean, it’s maybe 650, but we’re going to buy 100 planes this year. And we won’t sell any, because we’ve got a backlog. And we took a NetJet flight over to Tokyo. And we arrived in good shape. And we spent a couple days there. And we flew back.

NetJets有600架——嗯，算上欧洲，我的意思是，可能有650架，但我们今年会买100架飞机。我们不会卖任何一架，因为我们有积压订单。我们乘坐NetJets飞到东京。我们状态很好地到达。住了几天。然后飞回来。

---

And there’s just nothing to it. Now, you can say, “Well, you’re getting sort of decadent and all that in your old age.” But the money will go to philanthropy. And the money will probably be a hundred billion or more. And I figured the philanthropies want me to spend a few bucks on myself.

这没什么。你可以说，“嗯，你老了有点堕落之类。”但钱会用于慈善。钱可能会有一千亿或更多。我想慈善机构希望我为自己花点钱。

---

All it has to do is be better than the last dollars that are spent by various philanthropies, which have plenty of problems finding things to do that make lots of sense. So, NetJets, there isn’t any competitor. We had looked the other day at Wheels Up.

只需要比各种慈善机构花的最后几美元更好，这些机构有很多问题找不到很多有意义的事情做。所以，NetJets，没有竞争者。我们前几天看了Wheels Up。

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Stock came out at $10 a couple years ago. It was selling at 48 cents the other day. And they’ve got 12,600 people that have given a billion dollars, a little over a billion dollars on prepaid cards where they’ve given them money, and they get a certain number of hours later on.

几年前股票发行价是10美元。前几天卖到48美分。他们有12600人给了10亿多美元的预付卡，他们给了钱，之后可以得到一定小时数的飞行。

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And they don’t — I think there’s a good chance that some people are going to be very disappointed later on.

他们不——我认为有些人之后很可能会非常失望。

---

When they have money to do the NetJets, they know they’ll get on the same planes, with the same pilots as I and my family have flown on since before we bought the company. So, the decision wasn’t shaped by some commercial objective.

当他们有钱用NetJets时，他们知道他们会乘坐我和我的家人自我们买下公司前就乘坐的同样飞机，同样的飞行员。所以，这个决定不是由某些商业目标塑造的。

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A couple years before, I’d never heard of NetJets. And Frank Rooney mentioned it to me. And I bought share immediately. And we bought the company. And, well, my kids have to fly commercial sometimes. But sometimes they get to use ours, too.

几年前，我从未听说过NetJets。弗兰克·鲁尼向我提到它。我立刻买了股份。我们买下了公司。嗯，我的孩子有时得坐商业航班。但有时他们也能用我们的。

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But I’ve never flown anything else. And why would I? I mean, it’s the gold standard. And nobody will match our fleet. I mean, if you got 600 planes, you’ve got them a lot more places in the United States than anybody else will have theirs. I think we’re the second largest fleet (UNINTEL) commercial airliners.

但我从未坐过其他任何飞机。为什么我要坐别的？我的意思是，这是金标准。没人能匹敌我们的机队。我意思是，如果你有600架飞机，你在美国的覆盖范围比任何人都多。我想我们是第二大机队（听不清）商业航空公司。

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And our fleet’s growing, like I said, at the rate of a hundred planes a year. So, it’s a marvelous company.

我们的机队在增长，如我所说，每年100架。所以，这是一家了不起的公司。

---

And Adam Johnson has performed. You just can’t believe what he’s done with the business. It was a tough model for a long time. But he’s brought it where it is. And we should have a wonderful company forever. Charlie?

亚当·约翰逊表现得太好了。你无法相信他对这家公司的贡献。很长一段时间这都是一个艰难的模式。但他把它带到了现在的位置。我们应该永远拥有一家很棒的公司。查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, NetJets has been remarkable. You can argue that it’s worth as much as any airline now.

查理·芒格：嗯，NetJets非常了不起。你可以说它现在和任何航空公司一样有价值。

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WARREN BUFFETT: It’s so different. And Charlie — we had a hard time selling Charlie a NetJets membership. And then we figured the way to get him to buy a membership was to put a coach seat in the fuselage. (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：它太不一样了。查理——我们很难说服查理买NetJets会员。然后我们想到了让他买会员的办法，就是在机身里放一个经济舱座位。（笑声）

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And that really knocked him off. I think he’s the only one we sold on the basis of that.

这真的让他动心了。我想他是唯一一个因为这个买会员的人。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: I used to come to the Berkshire annual meetings on coach from Los Angeles. And it was full of rich stockholders. And they would clap when I came into the coach section. I really liked that. (LAUGHTER) (APPLAUSE)

查理·芒格：我过去从洛杉矶坐经济舱来参加伯克希尔股东大会。机舱里满是富裕的股东。我走进经济舱时他们会鼓掌。我真的很喜欢那样。（笑声）（掌声）

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WARREN BUFFETT: But I’ve got to tell you, we semi-corrupted him. He feels he kind of has to explain it, but he still flies in NetJet himself, so. And it’d be crazy not to. You know, your heirs are paying for it. I mean, find me anybody whose estate came in at less than zero because of what they spend on NetJets, threw them into that position, let me know.

沃伦·巴菲特：但我得告诉你，我们半腐化了他。他觉得自己得解释一下，但他还是自己坐NetJets。所以，不这样做才疯了。你知道，你的继承人在付钱。我的意思是，给我找一个因为花钱在NetJets上导致遗产低于零的人，告诉我。

---

But I’ve never seen a case yet. And it won’t be the case for the Buffett family. And it’s the residual bottom beneficiary that’s paying for your membership.

但我还没见过这样的案例。巴菲特家族也不会这样。是最终的受益人在为你的会员资格买单。

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And it’s a little hard to get used to paying that much money though, when you’ve lived like Charlie and I have most of our lives.

不过，当你像查理和我这样生活了大半辈子，习惯花那么多钱有点难。

50. Auto industry is fascinating but hard to predict (汽车行业引人入胜但难以预测)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We will go to section 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们去第十一站。

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Humphrey Liu, I’m from Charlottesville, Virginia.

观众：您好，我的名字是Humphrey Liu，来自弗吉尼亚州夏洛茨维尔。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Ah!

沃伦·巴菲特：啊！

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: First, I wanted to add my thanks to you and Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett, and all of Berkshire, for throwing this grand event each year.

观众：首先，我想感谢您、芒格先生、巴菲特先生以及伯克希尔全体，为每年举办这场盛大活动。

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Looking at the global trends, it increasingly does seem that zero-emission vehicles may have finally reached the cusp of mass adoption. Do you see any opportunities in this space, either in specific vehicle manufacturers or in related technologies?

从全球趋势来看，零排放汽车似乎终于到了大规模采用的临界点。您在这个领域看到任何机会吗，无论是特定汽车制造商还是相关技术？

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that Charlie and I, we long have felt that the auto industry is just too tough. You know, the Ford Motor Company, I mean, Henry Ford, looked like he owned the world with the Model T. And he brought down the price dramatically, he took up wages dramatically. He might have been, with a different personality, or some different views, elected President of the United States.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想说，查理和我一直觉得汽车行业太难了。你知道，福特汽车公司，我的意思是，亨利·福特，凭借T型车看起来像是拥有了全世界。他大幅降低了价格，大幅提高了工资。如果他有不同的个性或观点，他可能会被选为美国总统。

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I mean, there’s a good book that came out on that recently that told about the story — it tells a little about Nebraska in terms of it, but Henry Ford and Thomas Edison joining up, maybe a year or two it was. If you’re interested in autos, you ought to read that book.

我的意思是，最近出版了一本好书，讲述了这个故事——它提到了一点关于内布拉斯加的事情，但主要是亨利·福特和托马斯·爱迪生合作的故事，大概是一两年前的事。如果你对汽车感兴趣，你应该读那本书。

---

But Henry Ford did that, you know, and 20 years later they were losing money. And the other guy, with a gun in his pocket, I think Harry Bennett, you know, was running the Ford Motor Company. It was on its way to the junk heap when the whiz kids came in.

但亨利·福特做到了，你知道，20年后他们开始亏钱。另一个家伙，我想是哈里·贝内特，口袋里揣着枪，你知道，他在管理福特汽车公司。当那些神童进来时，公司已经快要破产了。

---

And Henry Ford II, “Hank the Deuce,” as they called him, brought in Tex Thornton, and my friend RJ Miller, and a few people. I was reading the other day, actually, the 1932 Annual Report of General Motors. And it’s one of the best annual reports I’ve read. It’s a totally honest, you know, assessment of exactly where they were: They had 19,000 dealers then, and the population, as I mentioned earlier, was about 120 million or so.

亨利·福特二世，他们叫他“二世汉克”，引进了特克斯·桑顿，我的朋友RJ·米勒，还有几个人。我前几天还在读，实际上是1932年通用汽车的年度报告。这是我读过的最好的年度报告之一。完全诚实，你知道，准确评估了他们的处境：当时他们有19000个经销商，我之前提到过，人口大约是1.2亿左右。

---

And now, with 330 million people, all brands in the United States have, like, 18,000 dealers or something. It’s just a business where you’ve got a lot of worldwide competitors, they’re not going to go away. And it looks like there are winners in any given time, but it doesn’t get you a permanent place. Although, as I mentioned, I would say Ferrari is in a special place.

现在，人口有3.3亿，美国所有品牌加起来大约有18000个经销商。这是一个有很多全球竞争者的行业，他们不会消失。看起来在任何特定时间都有赢家，但这并不能保证你永久的位置。虽然，正如我提到的，我会说法拉利处于一个特殊的位置。

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But they only sell 11,000 or 12,000 cars a year. In the U.S. last year, I think there were 14 million-something. And it’s not a business where we find it fascinating to be in. We like our dealership operation, but I don’t think I can tell you what the auto industry will look like five or ten years from now.

但他们每年只卖11000或12000辆车。去年在美国，我想有1400多万辆。这不是一个我们觉得引人入胜的行业。我们喜欢我们的经销商业务，但我认为我无法告诉你汽车行业在五到十年后会是什么样子。

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I do think that you’re right that, you know, you will see a change in the vehicles. But you won’t see anybody that owns the market because they changed the vehicle. Charlie?

我认为你是对的，你知道，你会看到车辆的变化。但你不会看到有人因为改变了车辆就拥有市场。查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the electric vehicle is coming big time, and that’s a very interesting development. At the moment, it’s imposing huge capital costs and huge risks. And I don’t like huge capital costs and huge risks.

查理·芒格：嗯，电动车正在大规模到来，这是一个非常有趣的发展。目前，它带来了巨大的资本成本和巨大的风险。我不喜欢巨大的资本成本和巨大的风险。

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WARREN BUFFETT: And we’re subsidizing it in the United States, and we’re actually doing it — tried putting in a pro-labor-type — I mean, it is subject to politics like you can’t believe, too. But it’s going to be with us, we’re not going to quit driving cars, and — the American public has love affair with them.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在美国补贴它，我们实际上在做——试图加入一些亲劳工的政策——我的意思是，它也受到你无法想象的政治影响。但它会一直存在，我们不会停止开车，美国公众对它们有种爱恋。

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But I think I know where Apple’s going to be in five or ten years, and I don’t know where the car companies are going to be in five or ten years. And I may be wrong. But Charlie and I follow the auto business with intense interest. Charlie’s firm was the specialist at General Motors on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange, and that was a franchise, wasn’t it, Charlie?

但我想我知道苹果在五到十年后会怎样，但我不知道汽车公司在五到十年后会怎样。我可能会错。但查理和我对汽车行业抱有浓厚的兴趣。查理的公司在太平洋海岸证券交易所是通用汽车的专家，那是特许经营权，对吧，查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. By working very hard, we could make a minor amount of money.

查理·芒格：是的。通过非常努力，我们能赚一点小钱。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. Wasn’t “minor” at the time, though. Come on — (LAUGH) but —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的。不过当时不算“小”，来吧——（笑）但是——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it was. It was —

查理·芒格：是的，算是。算是——

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WARREN BUFFETT: Was it?

沃伦·巴菲特：是吗？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: — pretty minor at the time even.

查理·芒格：——即使当时也相当小。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah? Well, it was pretty minor.

沃伦·巴菲特：是吗？嗯，确实挺小的。

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51. Buffett isn’t worried about the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet (巴菲特不担心美联储的资产负债表)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

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BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Lindsay Peter Schumacher in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自爱荷华州锡达拉皮兹的林赛·彼得·舒马赫。

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“Does the current size of the Federal Reserve balance sheet concern you? In particular, the result of quantitative easing — the Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet out of nothing. The net effect in essence is a form of single-entry accounting creating something of value out of nothing other than a series of book entries. And wondering what Mr. Munger thinks about this as well.”

“美联储资产负债表的当前规模让您担忧吗？特别是量化宽松的结果——美联储凭空扩大了资产负债表。其净效应本质上是一种单式记账法，仅通过一系列账面记录就创造了有价值的东西。还想知道芒格先生对此的看法。”

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t think the Federal Reserve is the problem, and I think they can’t solve the fiscal problem. I do not worry about the Federal Reserve. I think it’s fulfilling the functions for which it was established. They have two objectives, and I would not have been one probably that would have changed the inflation objective: to 2% a year from 0.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不认为美联储是问题，我认为他们无法解决财政问题。我不担心美联储。我认为它正在履行其设立时的职能。他们有两个目标，我可能不会是那个改变通胀目标的人：从0%改为每年2%。

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You know, I think that if you tell people that you’re shooting to depreciate your currency at 2% a year, that has a lot of implications. Although it feels good to a (LAUGH) lot of people. A lot of people want a little inflation, but nobody wants a lot of inflation except somebody’s that got a lot of debts.

你知道，我认为如果你告诉人们你打算让货币每年贬值2%，这有很多影响。虽然这对（笑）很多人来说感觉不错。很多人想要一点通胀，但没人想要很多通胀，除非是那些有很多债务的人。

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And I do not worry about the Federal Reserve balance sheet. I enjoy looking at it, and the numbers are big — I always like big numbers. But it’s interesting: One of the most interesting figures, to me, is currency in circulation. I mean, it has gone — they were saying, “Cash is trash,” back in 2007 and ’08, “and all that cash is going to disappear.”

我不担心美联储的资产负债表。我喜欢看它，数字很大——我总是喜欢大数字。但有趣的是：对我来说，最有趣的数字之一是流通中的货币。我的意思是，它已经——他们在2007年和2008年说，“现金是垃圾”，“所有现金都会消失。”

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Well, if you look at the Federal Reserve balance sheet, it’s gone from $800 billion to $2.2 trillion, and most of that’s in hundred-dollar bills, overwhelmingly. And I figured out I think there’s about 50 $100 bills per person — babies, everybody, in the United States, and I would really like to know where all of that is.

嗯，如果你看看美联储的资产负债表，它从8000亿美元增加到2.2万亿美元，其中大部分是百元钞票，占绝对多数。我算了一下，我认为在美国，每人——包括婴儿，每个人——大约有50张100美元的钞票，我真的很想知道这些钱都在哪里。

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I mean, nobody’s hoarding eurodollars, you know, in South America, or Africa, or wherever. And the demand for currency now — you know, some of it may be subtle drug dealers’ activities and of that. But anybody who thinks “cash is trash” ought to look at the Federal Reserve balance sheet. And, actually, you can look at how many $5 bills and $2 bills, and ones and all that, and the action has been in $100 bills.

我的意思是，没人在南美、非洲或任何地方囤积欧元，你知道。现在对货币的需求——你知道，有些可能是隐秘的毒贩活动之类。但任何认为“现金是垃圾”的人都应该看看美联储的资产负债表。实际上，你可以看看有多少5美元、2美元和1美元的钞票，所有的活动都在100美元钞票上。

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I mean, it is just astounding the way that hundred-dollar bills have spread. And, of course, I don’t know where they are, and I don’t think the Fed can know exactly, but they’d probably make a lot better guess than I could. But I do it’s happened, and you can watch it every week, and you’ll watch currency in circulation probably grow a little bit. And, believe me, “cash” is not trash. Charlie?

我的意思是，百元钞票的传播方式真是令人震惊。当然，我不知道它们在哪里，我认为美联储也不可能完全知道，但他们可能比我猜得更好。但我知道这是发生了，你可以每周观察，你会看到流通中的货币可能会略有增长。相信我，“现金”不是垃圾。查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t know where we’re headed with all of this. It’s been very extreme. I think you could be pretty extreme in fighting it: depressions and so forth, if you reverted afterwards to a period of some discipline. But if you just —

查理·芒格：嗯，我不知道这一切会走向何方。情况已经非常极端。我认为你可以非常极端地对抗它：经济萧条等等，如果你之后恢复到一些纪律时期。但如果你只是——

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But if you’re going to just keep printing money and spending it, I think eventually it causes bad trouble. And you can see it Latin America. Latin America let its currency get out of control all the time, and, of course, it lagged the United States in economic achievement greatly. So, I think we pay a price if we ever give up our old ways entirely and go into a new world where we just try and print money, just make it easier to get through the year.

但如果你只是不停地印钱和花钱，我认为最终会造成大麻烦。你可以在拉丁美洲看到。拉丁美洲总是让其货币失控，当然，它在经济成就上大大落后于美国。所以，我认为如果我们完全放弃旧的方式，进入一个我们只是试图印钱、让一年过得更容易的新世界，我们会付出代价。

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WARREN BUFFETT: We paid a price in World War II, I mean, everybody: school kids and everybody else, myself included. And we bought what were originally called “War Bonds,” and “Defense Bonds,” and “Savings Bonds,” and all that. But from 1942 to 1944 or ’45, you paid out $18.75 and you got $25.00 back, and every kid saved savings stamps and all that.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在二战中付出了代价，我的意思是，每个人：学童和其他人，包括我自己。我们买了最初称为“战争债券”、“国防债券”和“储蓄债券”之类的东西。从1942年到1944或1945年，你支付18.75美元，得到25美元的回报，每个孩子都攒储蓄邮票之类。

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But when you got all through, you know, you had 120% of GDP in the national debt instead of 30% or 40%. And we had a lot of inflation subsequently, a lot. So, the people that really bought those bonds and supported the war had a portion of their purchasing power taken away from them.

但当这一切结束，你知道，国债占GDP的120%，而不是30%或40%。随后我们有很多通胀，很多。所以，那些真正购买债券支持战争的人，他们的购买力被剥夺了一部分。

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Well, there wasn’t anything wrong with that, particularly. But when the country gets in the habit of doing that, I think it’s tough to figure out where the breaking point is with society. But I don’t think you want to come anywhere close to it.

嗯，这本身没什么大问题，特别是。但当国家养成这样做的习惯，我认为很难弄清楚社会的临界点在哪里。但我认为你不想靠近它。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but it’s also tough to have a mass of people unemployed. That’s the tension.

查理·芒格：是的，但让一大群人失业也很艰难。这就是矛盾。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yep. Well, that’s why the Fed has two objectives, in terms of employment and inflation. But they are not the ones that could create the deficits. And so far, the system has worked pretty well, although, like I say, it’s been —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这就是为什么美联储有两个目标，关于就业和通胀。但他们不是造成赤字的人。到目前为止，这个系统运行得还不错，尽管，如我所说，它已经——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: So, far, the man who just jumped off a tall building —

查理·芒格：到目前为止，那个刚从高楼跳下的人——

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, right.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，没错。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: — is all right until he hits the ground.

查理·芒格：——在落地前都还好。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (LAUGHTER) Well, but there could be ways we can stop now at the third floor, or the sixth floor. We don’t know what floor it is, but we know it hasn’t hit the ground. But, you know, politically it’s very, very, very tempting to vote appropriations, and it’s not fun to vote taxes.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）嗯，但现在可能有办法让我们在第三层或第六层停下来。我们不知道是第几层，但我们知道还没落地。但，你知道，政治上投票拨款非常非常非常诱人，投票税收就不好玩了。

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And Russell Long, head of the Senate Finance Committee, they’ve got a building named after him now, he said, “You know, don’t tax you, don’t tax me, tax that guy behind the tree.” And (LAUGH) basically that is the attitude — I mean, it’s the reality of what is useful in politics.

参议院财政委员会主席拉塞尔·朗，现在有一栋楼以他命名，他说，“你知道，别向你征税，别向我征税，向树后面的那个人征税。”（笑）基本上这就是态度——我的意思是，这是政治上有用的现实。

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And so far, this country’s managed to work very well with lot of things that could theoretically cause a lot of problems. But it doesn’t guarantee us the future on it and being the reserve currency lets us do a lot of things, but it also creates a lot of consequences if we screw it up. Charlie?

到目前为止，这个国家在很多理论上可能造成很多问题的事情上管理得很好。但这并不能保证我们的未来，作为储备货币让我们能做很多事情，但如果我们搞砸了，也会带来很多后果。查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we’re beating a subject to death, but it is a problem. I wish we had a solution.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们把这个话题谈得太多了，但它确实是个问题。我希望我们有解决方案。

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52. We need to take care of people displaced by capitalism (我们需要照顾被资本主义取代的人)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. With that we’ll go to station one and see if we —

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，接下来我们去第一站，看看——

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name’s Connor, I’m an economics student at the University of Nottingham.

观众：您好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫康纳，是诺丁汉大学的经济系学生。

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My question for you today is during the pandemic we witnessed supply chain shortages, especially from Asia. As a result, companies have chosen, with political intentions, to move production away.

我今天的问题是，在疫情期间我们见证了供应链短缺，尤其是来自亚洲。因此，公司出于政治意图选择了转移生产。

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Should companies make these decisions? And should the government support them?

公司应该做这些决定吗？政府应该支持他们吗？

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WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s a good question.

查理·芒格：嗯，这是个好问题。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yep.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Obviously, it’s logical — if you’re in business and you can make the thing in Mexico way cheaper, it’s natural to open a factory in Mexico and get your parts cheaper. And a lot of the auto manufacturers have done exactly that.

查理·芒格：显然，这是合乎逻辑的——如果你在做生意，你可以在墨西哥以更低的成本制造东西，自然会在墨西哥开工厂，获得更便宜的零件。很多汽车制造商正是这么做的。

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On the other hand, nobody wants to hollow out the whole country, so all the manufacturing jobs are elsewhere and we’re all living like a bunch of farmers: You know, like English colonies in 1820 or something. And these ideas are, of course, in big tension. We don’t have that much foreign production, right, Warren?

另一方面，没人想让整个国家空心化，所有制造工作都在其他地方，我们都像一群农民一样生活：你知道，就像1820年的英国殖民地之类。这些想法当然存在很大矛盾。我们没有那么多海外生产，对吧，沃伦？

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, but we’ve lost — well, originally Berkshire Hathaway, as a textile manufacturer, lost because the South became feasible versus the North. And, of course, then eventually —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，但我们失去了——嗯，最初伯克希尔哈撒韦，作为一家纺织制造商，失败了，因为南方相对于北方变得可行。当然，后来——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: The South got expensive —

查理·芒格：南方变得昂贵——

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WARREN BUFFETT: South got —

沃伦·巴菲特：南方变得——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: — and moved to China.

查理·芒格：——然后搬到中国。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. And society benefits and some people get killed in that sort of a situation. And a rich society should take care, one way or another, of people that worked in our shoe factories, people who worked in our textile companies. I mean, if you worked in our textile operation, in 1964 when we took it over, half our workers only spoke Portuguese.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。社会受益，但有些人在这种情况下受到重创。一个富裕的社会应该以某种方式照顾那些在我们鞋厂工作、在我们纺织公司工作的人。我的意思是，如果你在1964年我们接管时在我们的纺织厂工作，一半的工人只会说葡萄牙语。

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And, you know, they weren’t getting great wages at all. But now you could do it in the South, and we were doomed to go out of business. And it wasn’t the fault of the worker in any way, shape, or form. It wasn’t our fault: We kept trying to compete.

你知道，他们的工资一点也不高。但现在你可以在南方做，我们注定要倒闭。这不是工人的错，任何方式、形状或形式都不是我们的错：我们一直在努力竞争。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, TVA had cheap power down there.

查理·芒格：嗯，田纳西河流域管理局在那儿有便宜的电力。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Sure.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: And tax dollars really can yield power.

查理·芒格：税收美元确实能产生电力。

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WARREN BUFFETT: And air conditioning changed everything because the heat in those damn places was impossible. And so, a lot of things. But then it moves offshore in many ways, and net the country is better off because of it.

沃伦·巴菲特：空调改变了一切，因为那些该死的地方的酷热无法忍受。所以，很多事情。但后来很多转移到海外，总体上国家因此变得更好。

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But it displaces a lot of people who really can’t do something else in life. You can’t talk about “retraining” somebody that’s 55 or 60, and speaks only Portuguese, and really tell them they’re going to have “a great future” in New Bedford, Mass.

但它取代了很多在生活中真的无法做其他事情的人。你不能谈论“再培训”一个55或60岁、只会说葡萄牙语的人，真的告诉他们在马萨诸塞州新贝德福德会有“美好的未来”。

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You know, and so you don’t want to be glib about it. And we can afford to take care of those people. And we’ve got some systems that work reasonably well, but there’s a tension between — you know, what about the person that doesn’t do anything and all that kind of stuff. So, these are not easy problems to solve.

你知道，所以你不想对此轻率。我们有能力照顾这些人。我们有一些系统运作得还不错，但有一个矛盾——你知道，那些什么也不做的人之类的问题。所以，这些不是容易解决的问题。

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But I would say that, by and large, we want the whole world to prosper, we do not want the United States to be a country of extraordinary prosperity, and have the rest of the world —

但我认为，总的来说，我们希望全世界都繁荣，我们不希望美国是一个极度繁荣的国家，而世界其他地方——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: — starving.

查理·芒格：——挨饿。

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WARREN BUFFETT: No. It isn’t going to work. And it particularly isn’t going to work in a nuclear world. So — and you can have your own feelings about it as a humane person, but it can be done better. And we’ve got the resources to do it. I mean, the output of this country, one, can be done with a lot fewer people, and doing more specialized things.

沃伦·巴菲特：不。那行不通。尤其是在一个核世界中行不通。所以——作为一个有同情心的人，你可以有自己的感受，但可以做得更好。我们有资源做到。我的意思是，这个国家的产出，可以用更少的人，做的更专业。

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And, of course, it has been. The workweek in the United States, you know, in my lifetime, has dropped dramatically. And people still feel busy. And it will be the human lot to say, you know, “How can I get all these things done?” But my mother didn’t drive three kids anyplace, I mean, if you wanted to go anyplace, if you were lucky and you got old enough, you had a bicycle.

当然，已经是这样了。美国的工作周，你知道，在我一生中，已经大幅减少。人们仍然觉得忙碌。人类的命运会说，你知道，“我怎么能把这些事情都做完？”但我妈妈不会开车送三个孩子去任何地方，我的意思是，如果你想去哪里，如果你幸运并且长大了，你有一辆自行车。

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And the world just keeps looking at everything moving up as becoming sort of a base that leaves them somewhat dissatisfied. And with our prosperity, we can do a lot of things we couldn’t do in 1930, including taking care of people that got displaced by the fact that somebody else can do that work and improve their lot in life.

世界只是不断把一切提升看作一种基础，让他们有些不满。凭借我们的繁荣，我们可以做很多1930年做不到的事情，包括照顾那些因为别人能做那份工作而被取代、改善他们生活的人。

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And we’ve got to make sure that we have the best system that takes care of the people who get displaced by that. But doing that in the political system we have and everything, we’ll make a lot of mistakes along the way. But we’ve got to keep moving in that direction. And I’d say —

我们必须确保我们有最好的系统来照顾那些被取代的人。但在我们的政治系统和其他一切中这样做，我们会犯很多错误。但我们必须继续朝那个方向前进。我会说——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: The really interesting thing about it is that Adam Smith was right: that free market capitalism automatically leaves a property in private hands. And free trade and all that automatically creates GDP per capita that grows and helps everybody, including the people at the bottom: helps everybody a lot.

查理·芒格：真正有趣的是亚当·斯密是对的：自由市场资本主义自动将财产留在私人手中。自由贸易和所有这些自动创造了人均GDP的增长，帮助每个人，包括最底层的人：帮助每个人很多。

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But inherent in the process, there’s a lot of pain in that free market capitalism: for instance, for the Portuguese workers in a textile company in New Bedford. And nobody’s ever figured out how to take all the pain out of it. We do have government safety nets that take some of the pain out, and we make those safety nets a little bigger as time goes by.

但在这个过程中，自由市场资本主义有很多痛苦：例如，新贝德福德纺织公司的葡萄牙工人。没人想出如何完全消除这种痛苦。我们有政府安全网，消除了一些痛苦，随着时间推移，我们让这些安全网更大一点。

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But, apart from that, if you try to take all the pain out, you’ll also take all the gains out of it. We won’t have a growing GDP per capita. You’ll have an economy like Russia’s, which has been characterized as saying: “They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work.” (LAUGHTER)

但除此之外，如果你试图消除所有痛苦，你也会消除所有收益。我们不会有人均GDP的增长。你会得到像俄罗斯那样的经济，被形容为：“他们假装付我们钱，我们假装工作。”（笑声）

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The other systems haven’t worked better, but it also produces more and more disparities in wealth. And people that do nothing but get assets under management without actually performing anything extra make fortunes. And, I mean, it’s a job of government to keep the best aspects of capitalism, while not causing people that only speak Portuguese to suffer in the process.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。其他系统并没有做得更好，但它也产生了越来越多的财富差距。那些什么也不做，只是管理资产而没有额外表现的人赚了大钱。我的意思是，政府的职责是保留资本主义的最佳方面，同时不让只会说葡萄牙语的人在过程中受苦。

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I mean, the two aren’t compatible politically over time. And we stumble along making progress on things like Social Security and all that. And we are a lot better off than we are when I was born.

我的意思是，长期来看这两者在政治上不兼容。我们在社会保障等领域跌跌撞撞地取得进步。我们比我出生时好多了。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Net, the United States has done a very good job of this tension between capitalistic growth and a growing social safety net. We can be pretty proud of our country, looking backward.

查理·芒格：总体来看，美国在资本主义增长和不断扩大的社会安全网之间的矛盾上做得很好。回顾过去，我们可以为我们的国家感到非常骄傲。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That may be why we have 25% of the world’s GDP starting with a half-a-percent of the population and did it in a few centuries. I mean, it’s a miracle. And it wasn’t because we’re smarter, but we’ve got to say there must be something to the system that’s worked pretty well even though it’s produced a civil war and all kinds of things, you know?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这可能是为什么我们从占世界人口0.5%开始，在几个世纪内拥有了世界25%的GDP。我的意思是，这是个奇迹。不是因为我们更聪明，但我们得说这个系统一定有其优点，尽管它引发了内战和各种事情，你知道？

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And women, you know, not getting a shot at anything, you know, even after they passed the 19th Amendment. But it’s a work in progress. I think actually there’s been progress, but it’s mankind’s nature to see the things wrong with it if you —

你知道，女性，甚至在通过第十九修正案后，也没有任何机会。但这是一个正在进行的工作。我认为实际上已经有了进步，但如果人类的本性是看到其中的错误——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s even worse: It’s man’s nature to take the progress as a right. Not something to be earned or strive for, but something that should automatically just flow in over the transom. And that attitude is poison. It doesn’t do anybody any good.

查理·芒格：更糟的是：人类的本性是将进步视为理所当然。不是需要努力或争取的东西，而是应该自动从窗口流进来的东西。这种态度是毒药。对任何人都不好。

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53. When it comes to accounting, ‘We’ll consistently do what is legal, and we’ll consistently say what we think is right’ (在会计方面，“我们将始终做合法的事，我们将始终说出我们认为正确的事”)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Now ask us an easy question, Becky. (LAUGH) (APPLAUSE)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，现在问我们一个简单的问题，贝基。（笑）（掌声）

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BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Doug DeShiel (PH). “Since the accounting rules changed requiring Berkshire to report the change in fair value of its equity investments through the income statement, Mr. Buffett has repeatedly told shareholders to ignore those changes as they’re not reflective of the long-term returns that those investments will produce.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自Doug DeShiel。“自从会计规则改变，要求伯克希尔将其股权投资的公允价值变动通过损益表报告，巴菲特先生多次告诉股东忽略这些变动，因为它们不能反映这些投资将产生的长期回报。

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“Recently, Mr. Buffett has argued that hold-to-maturity accounting used by the banks to avoid reflecting the changes in fair value of bank investment portfolios in the income statement and the shareholder equity account do a disservice to its various stakeholders. Can Mr. Buffett elaborate on why he views mark-to-market accounting differently for banks in comparison to Berkshire?”

“最近，巴菲特先生认为银行使用的持有至到期会计方法，避免将银行投资组合公允价值变动反映在损益表和股东权益账户中，对其各种利益相关者不利。巴菲特先生能否详细说明为什么他对银行和伯克希尔的按市值计价会计看法不同？”

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I believe, in both cases, in doing it on the balance sheet and not in the income statement. And it’s a very tough problem the auditors face is that obviously the income statement feeds into the balance sheet. But the balance sheet tells you whether deposits can be paid, it tells you a lot of things.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为，在这两种情况下，都应该在资产负债表上做，而不是在损益表上。审计师面临的一个非常棘手的问题是，显然损益表会影响资产负债表。但资产负债表告诉你存款是否能支付，它告诉你很多事情。

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And we show it on our balance sheet. We believe in showing market values on our balance sheet. We just don’t believe in running it through the income account. And in getting there we would put in “other comprehensive income,” like it was for a long time.

我们在资产负债表上显示。我们相信在资产负债表上显示市场价值。我们只是不相信通过损益账户来处理。在这过程中，我们会将其放入“其他综合收益”，就像过去很长一段时间那样。

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So, I sympathize, to some extent — a far extent, with the audit group. But they have to really decide whether they want the balance sheet to represent values — except it doesn’t reflect them on the upside if we buy a See’s Candy and it’s worth way more money, so it’s conservative in that sense; or whether they want to have an income account that becomes meaningless to people. Because it really changes every five seconds, you know?

所以，我在某种程度上——很大程度上，同情审计团队。但他们必须真正决定是希望资产负债表反映价值——除非我们买了See’s Candies，它价值高得多，所以在这方面是保守的；还是希望有一个对人们来说变得毫无意义的损益账户。因为它真的每五秒钟都在变，你知道？

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I mean — well, the market’s closed today, but, you know, I guess Apple was up, what, seven or eight points or something on Friday. I mean, that’s $7 billion: I mean, that’s a crazy income account. It is a reflection of where we stand at that point.

我的意思是——嗯，今天市场休市，但，你知道，我想苹果周五涨了，嗯，七或八个点。我的意思是，那是70亿美元：我的意思是，那是疯狂的损益账户。它反映了我们当时的处境。

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And, of course, if you’re a bank, where you’re putting out money really at things — mortgages, I mean, primarily, that are terrible instruments for a bank to own, but a great instrument for a consumer to buy; and built-in to the whole society now in a way that is entirely different than in the past, you’ve got to pay attention to whether they’ve gotten out of whack in terms of the value of what they own and what can be demanded of them tomorrow morning. (LAUGH)

当然，如果你是银行，你把钱投在——抵押贷款，我的意思是，主要是，银行持有这些是糟糕的工具，但对消费者来说是很好的购买工具；现在以一种与过去完全不同的方式融入整个社会，你必须注意它们是否在他们拥有的价值和明天早上可能被要求的事情上失衡。（笑）

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And if we had all of our money that could be demanded from us tomorrow morning, we’d have to behave a lot differently than Berkshire does. So, I really think the way to do it is the way we recommend doing. Which is exactly what was being done until a few years ago. I recommend the shareholders look at it that way, but we’re going to follow the rules, obviously that the SEC, you know, the state authorities and everybody require of us.

如果我们所有的钱明天早上都能被要求，我们的行为必须与伯克希尔现在的做法大不相同。所以，我真的认为应该按照我们推荐的方式去做。这正是几年前一直在做的方式。我建议股东这样看，但我们显然会遵循SEC、州当局和所有人要求我们的规则。

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But I’ll still explain to the shareholders exactly what I would explain to my sister about what really counts at Berkshire. And I think every management actually has an obligation to that, and instead of it, they go in the other direction and give them a lot of figures that are total nonsense.

但我仍然会向股东解释我会对我的妹妹解释的关于伯克希尔真正重要的东西。我认为每个管理层实际上都有这种义务，但相反，他们走向另一个方向，给他们很多完全是胡扯的数字。

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You can’t imagine some of the — you know, EBITDA, I thought, was about as bad as you could get. But they’ve kept going. You know, earnings before everything: EBE. (LAUGHTER) But that doesn’t change what I would tell my sister, who’s here in the audience, I hope. And I should tell this to all the shareholders: “We’ll consistently do what is legal, and we’ll consistently say what we think is right.” Charlie?

你无法想象一些——你知道，EBITDA，我认为，已经是糟糕透顶了。但他们还在继续。你知道，排除一切的收益：EBE。（笑声）但这不会改变我会对我妹妹说的话，她在观众席中，我希望。我应该对所有股东说：“我们将始终做合法的事，我们将始终说出我们认为正确的事。”查理？

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. (APPLAUSE)

查理·芒格：是的。（掌声）

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WARREN BUFFETT: We want owners who understand what they own. You know? That doesn’t mean they have to understand the detail of it. But that’s why we have people that have been around 50 or 60 years. That doesn’t mean they read the 10-Qs or anything like that. But they feel we’re telling it to them like, you know, they lived next door to us.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们希望股东了解他们拥有什么。你知道？这不意味着他们必须了解细节。这就是为什么我们有50或60年的人。他们不一定读10-Q之类的东西。但他们觉得我们像对住在隔壁的人一样对他们说实话。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I don’t know what the accountants were thinking when they made that change. It strikes me as bonkers, absolutely bonkers. I don’t see how anybody who understands how businesses really operated, and should be operated by owning managers, would have made that accounting change. The accountants did it just because they had a wild moment.

查理·芒格：是的，我不知道会计师们在做那个改变时是怎么想的。我觉得这太离谱了，绝对离谱。我不明白任何真正了解企业如何运作、应该由拥有管理者如何运作的人会做出这种会计改变。会计师们只是因为一时的疯狂才这么做。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Twenty-five years ago, I suggested to the audit profession that the audit committee ask auditors four questions, and the shareholders would know a lot more about the company if those questions were asked. But it wasn’t good for the auditors to be asked those questions because it might increase their liability if they answered them. And the client didn’t want them to answer them because the management didn’t want them to.

沃伦·巴菲特：二十五年前，我向审计行业建议，审计委员会应该向审计师提四个问题，如果这些问题被问到，股东会对公司了解更多。但对审计师来说被问这些问题不好，因为如果他们回答了，可能会增加他们的责任。客户不希望他们回答，因为管理层不希望他们回答。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: No, they want a system where, if they follow certain rules, they’re safe. And that’s understandable. But I don’t think the past year, this rule requiring changes in marketable securities to go through the income account quarterly, they didn’t do that to protect themselves from —

查理·芒格：不，他们想要一个系统，如果他们遵循某些规则，他们就是安全的。这是可以理解的。但我认为过去一年，这个要求可交易证券变动每季通过损益账户的规则，他们不是为了保护自己免受——

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WARREN BUFFETT: No.

沃伦·巴菲特：不。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: — liability. They just did that for some crazy reason of their own.

查理·芒格：——责任。他们只是出于自己的某种疯狂原因才这么做。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: You get a bunch of people who will all be drawing a lot of pay out of a big, complicated system, and rising in it like so many of our officers in the Army, God knows what they’ll do if you put them in a little room by themselves and tell them to invent new accounting standards.

查理·芒格：你有一群人，他们都在一个庞大复杂的系统中拿高薪，在其中晋升，就像我们军队里的许多军官，天知道如果你把他们单独放在一个小房间里，告诉他们发明新的会计标准，他们会做什么。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, to our auditor, remember that’s Charlie talking, and he doesn’t really — (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，对我们的审计师来说，记住那是查理在说话，他其实并不——（笑声）

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But I agree with him, (LAUGH) 100%. He’s 99, he can get away with more than I can get away with. (LAUGHTER)

但我100%同意他，（笑）他99岁了，他能比我更放肆。（笑声）

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OK. Station two —

好的，第二站——

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But what he said is enormously important. I mean, you’ve got to have some insights into what the hell really goes on.

但他说的非常重要。我的意思是，你得对到底发生了什么有一些洞察。

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Even if you’re (inaudible) accountant.

查理·芒格：即使你是（听不清）会计师。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

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54. Munger: I’m ‘philosophical about my grandchildren not thinking exactly the way I do’ (芒格：我对“孙辈不完全按我的方式思考”持哲学态度)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Station two.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第二站。

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dear Warren, dear Charlie. My name is Victoria Winthrop, I am 22 years old, and I study in Munich at the CDTM, the Center of Digital Technology and Management.

观众：亲爱的沃伦，亲爱的查理。我叫维多利亚·温斯洛普，22岁，在慕尼黑的CDTM，数字技术与管理中心学习。

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As your grandchildren are more in my age group, let me ask you: How do you transfer your wisdom to your grandchildren and heirs? How do you lead them to investing? Do you see value in investing as a family, or individually? Thank you.

由于您的孙辈和我年龄相近，我想问：您如何将您的智慧传给您的孙辈和继承人？您如何引导他们投资？您认为家庭投资还是个人投资更有价值？谢谢。

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WARREN BUFFETT: I’m going to let Charlie do the answer now. He’s got more —

沃伦·巴菲特：我让查理来回答。他有更多的——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I have more grandchildren. But (LAUGH) I am quite philosophical about my grandchildren not thinking exactly the way I do.

查理·芒格：嗯，我的孙辈更多。（笑）但我对我的孙辈不完全按我的方式思考持相当哲学的态度。

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It seems to me that’s almost the natural course of life. And I just live my life my own way, and they can observe it as an example if they want to. And if they don’t, they can try some other way.

在我看来，这几乎是生活的自然进程。我只是按自己的方式生活，他们如果愿意，可以把它当作榜样。如果不愿意，他们可以尝试其他方式。

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I don’t like it when they try some other way. (LAUGHTER)

我不喜欢他们尝试其他方式。（笑声）

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And I have to pretend that I like some of the boyfriends and girlfriends I don’t like, (LAUGHTER) but I just struggle through like everybody else. (LAUGHTER)

我得假装喜欢一些我不喜欢的男朋友和女朋友，（笑声）但我只是像其他人一样挣扎着。（笑声）

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And usually, I just bite my tongue and keep silent. That’s my way of handling it.

通常，我只是咬紧牙关保持沉默。那是我的处理方式。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that I think, in my case, my three children have grown a lot smarter in the last 30 years, and I think I’ve grown smarter. (LAUGH) And —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想说，在我的情况下，我的三个孩子在过去30年里变得聪明了很多，我想我也变得更聪明了。（笑）而且——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I know, but you needed a lot of help.

查理·芒格：嗯，我知道，但你需要很多帮助。

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WARREN BUFFETT: That is for sure — (LAUGHTER) no, I would totally acknowledge that. That’s why I have the room to grow. I mean, I have plenty of room for improvement. But —

沃伦·巴菲特：那是肯定的——（笑声）不，我完全承认。这就是为什么我有成长的空间。我的意思是，我有很多改进的空间。但是——

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CHARLIE MUNGER: We all had a lot to grow. I worked a year for US Steel, which was in their fabrication department in Los Angeles, a big operation. The thing was utterly doomed, and three years later it went back to greenfields. The whole thing was razed to the ground.

查理·芒格：我们都有很多成长空间。我在美国钢铁公司工作了一年，在洛杉矶的制造部门，那是一个大业务。那东西完全无望，三年后它回到了绿地。整个东西被夷为平地。

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I did not see it coming. Now, to be that ignorant as I was at that age, it was a sin. And my professors by and large were even more ignorant than I was. Nobody had observed the basic economics of business in a scientific way at all when I was young.

我没有预见到。现在，回想我那个年龄那么无知，是一种罪过。我的教授们大体上比我还无知。我年轻时，根本没人以科学的方式观察过基本的商业经济学。

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WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if we’re getting into confession time, I have to tell you: It’s 3:30. So, (LAUGH) we don’t want to keep going on: Who knows what we’ll be saying in another half-hour. So, (LAUGHTER) I thank you all very much for coming. At 4:30 we will have the shareholders meeting here.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果我们要进入忏悔时间，我得告诉你：现在是3:30。所以，（笑）我们不想继续下去：谁知道再过半小时我们会说些什么。所以，（笑声）我非常感谢大家到来。下午4:30我们将在这里举行股东大会。