2007巴菲特致股东的信

# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. (伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司)

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our gain in net worth during 2007 was $12.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 11%. Over the last 43 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $78,008, a rate of 21.1% compounded annually.*

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们：
我们在2007年净资产价值的增长为123亿美元，这使得我们的A类和B类股票每股账面价值都增长了11%。在过去43年里（即现任管理层接管以来），账面价值从每股19美元增长到78,008美元，年复合增长率达到了21.1%。

Overall, our 76 operating businesses did well last year. The few that had problems were primarily those linked to housing, among them our brick, carpet and real estate brokerage operations. Their setbacks are minor and temporary. Our competitive position in these businesses remains strong, and we have first- class CEOs who run them right, in good times or bad.

总体而言，我们旗下76家运营企业去年表现良好。少数出现问题的企业主要与住房市场相关，包括我们的砖厂、地毯和房地产经纪业务。这些挫折是轻微且暂时的。我们在这些行业的竞争优势依然强劲，而且我们拥有出色的CEO，无论在顺境还是逆境中都能妥善经营。

Some major financial institutions have, however, experienced staggering problems because they engaged in the “weakened lending practices” I described in last year’s letter. John Stumpf, CEO of Wells Fargo, aptly dissected the recent behavior of many lenders: “It is interesting that the industry has invented new ways to lose money when the old ways seemed to work just fine.”

然而，一些大型金融机构却遭遇了严重的问题，原因在于它们采用了我在去年信中提到的“弱化借贷标准”。富国银行首席执行官约翰·斯坦普夫对许多放贷机构最近的行为做出了精辟分析：“令人惊讶的是，行业居然发明出了新的亏钱方式，而老的方式明明已经运作得很好。”

You may recall a 2003 Silicon Valley bumper sticker that implored, “Please, God, Just One More Bubble.” Unfortunately, this wish was promptly granted, as just about all Americans came to believe that house prices would forever rise. That conviction made a borrower’s income and cash equity seem unimportant to lenders, who shoveled out money, confident that HPA – house price appreciation – would cure all problems. Today, our country is experiencing widespread pain because of that erroneous belief. As house prices fall, a huge amount of financial folly is being exposed. You only learn who has been swimming naked when the tide goes out – and what we are witnessing at some of our largest financial institutions is an ugly sight.

你或许还记得2003年硅谷的一张汽车贴纸所写的：“上帝啊，请再给我们一个泡沫吧。”不幸的是，这个愿望迅速实现了，因为几乎所有美国人都开始相信房价会永远上涨。这种信念让贷款人认为借款人的收入和自有资金变得不再重要，他们不断发放贷款，坚信HPA（房价上涨）能解决所有问题。如今，由于这一错误信念，我们的国家正经历着广泛的痛苦。随着房价下跌，大量金融愚蠢行为正在被暴露出来。“只有当潮水退去，才知道谁在裸泳”——而我们在一些最大的金融机构身上看到的情景相当难看。

Turning to happier thoughts, we can report that Berkshire’s newest acquisitions of size, TTI and Iscar, led by their CEOs, Paul Andrews and Jacob Harpaz respectively, performed magnificently in 2007. Iscar is as impressive a manufacturing operation as I’ve seen, a view I reported last year and that was confirmed by a visit I made in the fall to its extraordinary plant in Korea.

转向更积极的一面，我们可以报告说，伯克希尔最新收购的两家大企业TTI和Iscar，在各自CEO保罗·安德鲁斯和雅各布·哈帕兹的带领下，2007年的表现非常出色。Iscar是我见过最令人印象深刻的制造企业之一，我去年就曾这样评价，而去年秋天参观其位于韩国的非凡工厂后，进一步印证了这一点。

Finally, our insurance business – the cornerstone of Berkshire – had an excellent year. Part of the reason is that we have the best collection of insurance managers in the business – more about them later. But we also were very lucky in 2007, the second year in a row free of major insured catastrophes.

最后，我们的保险业务——伯克希尔的基石——这一年表现优异。部分原因是我们拥有业内最优秀的保险经理团队——稍后详述。但我们在2007年也非常幸运，这是连续第二年没有发生重大承保灾害。

That party is over. It’s a certainty that insurance-industry profit margins, including ours, will fall significantly in 2008. Prices are down, and exposures inexorably rise. Even if the U.S. has its third consecutive catastrophe-light year, industry profit margins will probably shrink by four percentage points or so. If the winds roar or the earth trembles, results could be far worse. So be prepared for lower insurance earnings during the next few years.

这场盛宴已经结束。可以肯定的是，2008年保险业的利润率（包括我们的）将大幅下降。保费价格下滑，风险敞口却不可避免地增加。即使美国迎来连续第三个无重大灾害年份，行业利润率也可能缩水约四个百分点。如果风暴来袭或地震发生，结果可能更加糟糕。因此，请做好准备，未来几年保险业务的盈利将有所下降。

# Yardsticks (衡量标准)

Berkshire has two major areas of value. The first is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend these totaled $141 billion (not counting those in our finance or utility operations, which we assign to our second bucket of value).

伯克希尔有两个主要的价值来源。第一个是我们的投资组合：股票、债券和现金等价物。年末时，这部分总额为1,410亿美元（不包括我们金融和公用事业运营中的资产，我们将这些归入第二个价值来源）。

All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/30th of those shown for the A.
Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $59 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, insurance underwriting is volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, however, we’ve been profitable, and I expect we will average breakeven results or better in the future. If we do that, our investments can be viewed as an unencumbered source of value for Berkshire shareholders.

本报告中所有每股数据均适用于伯克希尔的A股；B股的数据为A股的1/30。
保险浮存金（Float）——我们在保险业务中临时持有、并不属于我们的资金——为我们的投资提供了590亿美元的资金支持。只要保险承保收支平衡（即收取的保费等于产生的损失和费用），这笔浮存金就是“免费”的。当然，保险承保具有波动性，利润和亏损之间会出现剧烈波动。但从整个历史来看，我们一直是盈利的，我预计未来平均来看至少能达到盈亏平衡或更好。如果我们能做到这一点，那么我们的投资就可以被视为伯克希尔股东的一项无负担价值来源。

Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance. These earnings are delivered by our 66 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 76. In our early years, we focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we have put ever more emphasis on the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses.

伯克希尔的第二个价值来源是非投资和非保险业务所带来的收益。这些收益来自我们旗下的66家非保险公司，详细列示于第76页。在早期阶段，我们专注于投资端。但在过去二十年里，我们越来越重视发展非保险业务带来的收益。

The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first we tabulate per-share investments at 14-year intervals. We exclude those applicable to minority interests.

下表展示了这一转变。第一张表按每14年为间隔列示了每股投资金额。我们排除了适用于少数权益的部分。

Year	Per-Share Investments (每股投资金额)
1965	$4
1979	$5,771
1993	$13,961
2007	$90,343

Periods (时间段)	Compounded Annual Gain in Per-Share Investments (每股投资年复合增长率)
1965–1979	42.8%
1979–1993	25.6%
1993–2007	14.3%

For the entire 42 years, our compounded annual gain in per-share investments was 27.1%. But the trend has been downward as we increasingly used our available funds to buy operating businesses.

在过去42年里，我们的每股投资年复合增长率为27.1%。但这一增长率呈下降趋势，因为我们越来越多地将可用资金用于购买运营企业。

Here’s the record on how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have grown, again on a per-share basis and after applicable minority interests.

以下是关于非保险业务收益增长的记录，同样以每股为基础并扣除适用的少数权益影响。

Year	Per Share Pre-Tax Earnings (每股税前收益)
1965	$4
1979	$18
1993	$212
2007	$4,093

Periods (时间段)	Compounded Annual Gain in Per-Share Pre-Tax Earnings (每股税前收益年复合增长率)
1965–1979	11.1%
1979–1993	19.1%
1993–2007	23.5%

For the entire period, the compounded annual gain was 17.8%, with gains accelerating as our focus shifted.

在整个期间内，每股税前收益的年复合增长率为17.8%，随着我们战略重心的转移，增长率也在加快。

Though these tables may help you gain historical perspective and be useful in valuation, they are completely misleading in predicting future possibilities. Berkshire’s past record can’t be duplicated or even approached. Our base of assets and earnings is now far too large for us to make outsized gains in the future.

虽然这些表格有助于你获得历史视角，并在估值中有所帮助，但它们在预测未来可能性方面完全具有误导性。伯克希尔过去的纪录无法复制，甚至难以接近。我们的资产和盈利基础现在已经太大，未来不可能再实现超常增长。

Charlie Munger, my partner at Berkshire, and I will continue to measure our progress by the two yardsticks I have just described and will regularly update you on the results. Though we can’t come close to duplicating the past, we will do our best to make sure the future is not disappointing.

我的合作伙伴查理·芒格和我将继续用刚才描述的两个衡量标准来评估我们的进展，并定期向你们汇报成果。尽管我们无法接近过去的成就，但我们仍将尽最大努力确保未来不会令人失望。

In our efforts, we will be aided enormously by the managers who have joined Berkshire. This is an unusual group in several ways. First, most of them have no financial need to work. Many sold us their businesses for large sums and run them because they love doing so, not because they need the money. Naturally they wish to be paid fairly, but money alone is not the reason they work hard and productively.

在我们的努力中，加入伯克希尔的管理者们将给予我们巨大的帮助。这群人在多个方面都很特别。首先，他们中的大多数人并没有经济上的工作需求。许多人将他们的企业以巨额资金卖给了我们，但他们仍然继续经营，是因为热爱这份工作，而不是因为他们需要钱。当然，他们希望得到公平的报酬，但金钱并不是他们努力高效工作的唯一动力。

A second, somewhat related, point about these managers is that they have exactly the job they want for the rest of their working years. At almost any other company, key managers below the top aspire to keep climbing the pyramid. For them, the subsidiary or division they manage today is a way station – or so they hope. Indeed, if they are in their present positions five years from now, they may well feel like failures.

关于这些管理者的第二点，也是稍微相关的一点是，他们目前所从事的工作正是他们在余下的职业生涯中所想要的。在几乎所有其他公司，处于高层之下的关键管理者们都渴望继续向上攀登金字塔式的晋升结构。对他们来说，今天所管理的子公司或部门只是一个中途站——他们希望如此。事实上，如果五年后他们仍然坐在现在的职位上，他们很可能会觉得自己是个失败者。

Conversely, our CEOs’ scorecards for success are not whether they obtain my job but instead are the long-term performances of their businesses. Their decisions flow from a here-today, here-forever mindset. I think our rare and hard-to-replicate managerial structure gives Berkshire a real advantage.

相反，我们CEO们衡量成功的标准，并不是他们是否能获得我的职位，而是他们所经营企业的长期表现。他们的决策源自一种“今天在这儿，永远在这儿”的心态。我认为我们这种罕见且难以复制的管理结构为伯克希尔带来了真正的优势。

# Acquisitions (收购)

Though our managers may be the best, we will need large and sensible acquisitions to get the growth in operating earnings we wish. Here, we made little progress in 2007 until very late in the year. Then, on Christmas day, Charlie and I finally earned our paychecks by contracting for the largest cash purchase in Berkshire’s history.

尽管我们的管理者可能是最出色的，但我们仍需进行大规模而理性的收购，以实现我们期望的运营收益增长。在这方面，我们在2007年大部分时间进展甚微，直到年底才有了突破。圣诞节当天，查理和我终于通过签订伯克希尔历史上最大一笔现金收购协议，真正“赚到了工资”。

The seeds of this transaction were planted in 1954. That fall, only three months into a new job, I was sent by my employers, Ben Graham and Jerry Newman, to a shareholders’ meeting of Rockwood Chocolate in Brooklyn. A young fellow had recently taken control of this company, a manufacturer of assorted cocoa-based items. He had then initiated a one-of-a-kind tender, offering 80 pounds of cocoa beans for each share of Rockwood stock. I described this transaction in a section of the 1988 annual report that explained arbitrage. I also told you that Jay Pritzker – the young fellow mentioned above – was the business genius behind this tax-efficient idea, the possibilities for which had escaped all the other experts who had thought about buying Rockwood, including my bosses, Ben and Jerry.

这笔交易的种子其实早在1954年就已埋下。那年秋天，我刚加入本杰明·格雷厄姆和杰里·纽曼两位老板的公司三个月，就被派往布鲁克林参加Rockwood巧克力公司的股东大会。当时一位年轻人刚刚接管了这家生产各种可可制品的企业。他发起了一项前所未有的要约，用每股东持有的每一股Rockwood股票换取80磅可可豆。我在1988年年报中有关套利的部分曾描述过这笔交易。我还告诉过你们，上述提到的这位年轻人Jay Pritzker正是这一节税妙招背后的商业奇才，这一创意连其他考虑收购Rockwood的专家都未曾想到，包括我的老板Ben和Jerry。

At the meeting, Jay was friendly and gave me an education on the 1954 tax code. I came away very impressed. Thereafter, I avidly followed Jay’s business dealings, which were many and brilliant. His valued partner was his brother, Bob, who for nearly 50 years ran Marmon Group, the home for most of the Pritzker businesses.

在那次会上，Jay非常友好，并向我讲解了1954年的税法知识。我对此印象深刻。此后，我热切地关注着Jay的商业动向，他的每一次操作都既频繁又精彩。他重要的合作伙伴是他的哥哥Bob，后者近50年来一直掌管着Marmon集团，那是Pritzker家族大多数业务的归属地。

Jay died in 1999, and Bob retired early in 2002. Around then, the Pritzker family decided to gradually sell or reorganize certain of its holdings, including Marmon, a company operating 125 businesses, managed through nine sectors. Marmon’s largest operation is Union Tank Car, which together with a Canadian counterpart owns 94,000 rail cars that are leased to various shippers. The original cost of this fleet is $5.1 billion. All told, Marmon has $7 billion in sales and about 20,000 employees.

Jay于1999年去世，Bob则于2002年初退休。大约就在那时，Pritzker家族决定逐步出售或重组部分资产，其中包括Marmon公司。该公司旗下运营着125家业务，分为九大板块进行管理。Marmon最大的业务是Union Tank Car（联合罐车公司），它与一家加拿大公司共同拥有94,000辆铁路油罐车，出租给各类运输商。这支车队的原始成本为51亿美元。总计来看，Marmon年销售额达70亿美元，员工人数约为2万人。

We will soon purchase 60% of Marmon and will acquire virtually all of the balance within six years. Our initial outlay will be $4.5 billion, and the price of our later purchases will be based on a formula tied to earnings. Prior to our entry into the picture, the Pritzker family received substantial consideration from Marmon’s distribution of cash, investments and certain businesses.

我们将很快收购Marmon的60%股权，并将在六年内购入其余几乎全部股份。我们最初的投资为45亿美元，后续购买的价格将依据一个与盈利挂钩的公式确定。在我们介入之前，Pritzker家族已从Marmon分发的现金、投资以及某些业务中获得了大量回报。

This deal was done in the way Jay would have liked. We arrived at a price using only Marmon’s financial statements, employing no advisors and engaging in no nit-picking. I knew that the business would be exactly as the Pritzkers represented, and they knew that we would close on the dot, however chaotic financial markets might be. During the past year, many large deals have been renegotiated or killed entirely. With the Pritzkers, as with Berkshire, a deal is a deal.

这桩交易是以Jay会喜欢的方式完成的。我们仅凭Marmon的财务报表定出价格，没有聘请任何顾问，也没有纠缠于细节。我知道这家公司的情况正如Pritzker家族所描述的那样真实可靠，而他们也知道无论金融市场多么混乱，我们都会准时成交。过去一年中，许多大型交易被重新谈判甚至彻底取消。但对Pritzker家族和伯克希尔而言，达成的协议就是协议。

Marmon’s CEO, Frank Ptak, works closely with a long-time associate, John Nichols. John was formerly the highly successful CEO of Illinois Tool Works (ITW), where he teamed with Frank to run a mix of industrial businesses. Take a look at their ITW record; you’ll be impressed.

Marmon的首席执行官Frank Ptak与其长期合作伙伴John Nichols密切合作。John此前曾担任Illinois Tool Works（ITW）的成功CEO，在任期间与Frank一起管理多种工业业务。看看他们两人在ITW的业绩，你一定会感到印象深刻。

Byron Trott of Goldman Sachs – whose praises I sang in the 2003 report – facilitated the Marmon transaction. Byron is the rare investment banker who puts himself in his client’s shoes. Charlie and I trust him completely.

高盛的Byron Trott促成了此次Marmon交易。他在2003年年报中曾受到我的高度赞扬。Byron是一位罕见的投资银行家，他总能站在客户的角度思考问题。查理和我都完全信任他。

You’ll like the code name that Goldman Sachs assigned the deal. Marmon entered the auto business in 1902 and exited it in 1933. Along the way it manufactured the Wasp, a car that won the first Indianapolis 500 race, held in 1911. So this deal was labeled “Indy 500.”

你们还会喜欢高盛为这项交易起的代号。“Indy 500”是印第安纳波利斯500英里大赛的简称。Marmon于1902年进入汽车业，1933年退出。其间它制造了名为“黄蜂”（Wasp）的赛车，该车赢得了1911年首届印第安纳波利斯500赛事冠军。因此，这项交易被命名为“Indy 500”。

In May 2006, I spoke at a lunch at Ben Bridge, our Seattle-based jewelry chain. The audience was a number of its vendors, among them Dennis Ulrich, owner of a company that manufactured gold jewelry.

2006年5月，我在我们位于西雅图的珠宝连锁店Ben Bridge的一次午餐会上发表了讲话。听众中有它的多家供应商，其中包括Dennis Ulrich，他是一家黄金珠宝制造商的老板。

In January 2007, Dennis called me, suggesting that with Berkshire’s support he could build a large jewelry supplier. We soon made a deal for his business, simultaneously purchasing a supplier of about equal size. The new company, Richline Group, has since made two smaller acquisitions. Even with those, Richline is far below the earnings threshold we normally require for purchases. I’m willing to bet, however, that Dennis – with the help of his partner, Dave Meleski – will build a large operation, earning good returns on capital employed.

2007年1月，Dennis给我打了电话，建议借助伯克希尔的支持，他可以打造一家大型珠宝供应商。我们很快就收购了他的公司，并同时买下了一家规模相当的供应商。新成立的公司名为Richline Group，此后又进行了两次较小的并购。即便如此，Richline目前的盈利水平仍远低于我们通常对收购标的的要求。但我愿意打赌，Dennis在他合伙人Dave Meleski的帮助下，一定能打造出一家大型企业，并在资本运用上取得良好的回报。

# Businesses – The Great, the Good and the Gruesome (伟大的、良好的与糟糕的企业)

Let’s take a look at what kind of businesses turn us on. And while we’re at it, let’s also discuss what we wish to avoid.

让我们来看看哪些类型的企业会吸引我们。同时，我们也来谈谈哪些是我们希望避开的。

Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag. We like to buy the whole business or, if management is our partner, at least 80%. When control-type purchases of quality aren’t available, though, we are also happy to simply buy small portions of great businesses by way of stock-market purchases. It’s better to have a part interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.

查理和我寻找的公司具备以下四个特征：a）我们理解其业务；b）具有有利的长期经济前景；c）有能力和值得信赖的管理层；d）价格合理。我们喜欢全资收购整个企业，或者，如果管理层成为我们的合作伙伴，则至少持有80%的股份。然而，当优质企业控股权不可得时，我们也很乐意通过股市购买一些伟大企业的少量股份。拥有一颗“希望钻石”的一部分，也比拥有一整颗人造宝石更好。

A truly great business must have an enduring “moat” that protects excellent returns on invested capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault any business “castle” that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company’s being the low-cost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for sustained success. Business history is filled with “Roman Candles,” companies whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed.

真正伟大的企业必须拥有持久的“护城河”，以保护其资本的良好回报。资本主义的动态机制决定了，任何带来高额回报的企业“城堡”都将不断遭受竞争者的攻击。因此，像低成本生产商（如GEICO、Costco）或拥有强大全球品牌（如可口可乐、吉列、美国运通）这样的坚固壁垒，对于持续成功至关重要。商业史上充满了“罗马焰火筒”式的企业，它们看似拥有护城河，实则虚幻，很快就被竞争对手跨越。

Our criterion of “enduring” causes us to rule out companies in industries prone to rapid and continuous change. Though capitalism’s “creative destruction” is highly beneficial for society, it precludes investment certainty. A moat that must be continuously rebuilt will eventually be no moat at all.

我们对“持久性”的要求使我们排除那些身处快速且持续变化行业中的企业。虽然资本主义的“创造性破坏”对社会极为有益，但它却排除了投资的确定性。一道需要不断重建的护城河，最终将不复存在。

Additionally, this criterion eliminates the business whose success depends on having a great manager. Of course, a terrific CEO is a huge asset for any enterprise, and at Berkshire we have an abundance of these managers. Their abilities have created billions of dollars of value that would never have materialized if typical CEOs had been running their businesses.

此外，这一标准也排除了那种依赖杰出管理者才能成功的企业。当然，一位卓越的CEO对企业来说是一笔巨大财富，而在伯克希尔，我们拥有众多这样的管理者。他们的能力创造了数十亿美元的价值，这些价值若由普通CEO来经营是不可能实现的。

But if a business requires a superstar to produce great results, the business itself cannot be deemed great. A medical partnership led by your area’s premier brain surgeon may enjoy outsized and growing earnings, but that tells little about its future. The partnership’s moat will go when the surgeon goes. You can count, though, on the moat of the Mayo Clinic to endure, even though you can’t name its CEO.

但如果一家企业只有依靠明星人物才能取得优异成果，那么这家企业本身就不能称为伟大。一个由你所在地区顶尖脑外科医生领导的医疗合伙机构可能享受着不断增长的巨额利润，但这并不能说明其未来前景如何。一旦这位医生离开，这家机构的护城河也将随之消失。你可以相信的是，梅奥诊所（Mayo Clinic）的护城河即使在你不知道其CEO是谁的情况下也能持久存在。

Long-term competitive advantage in a stable industry is what we seek in a business. If that comes with rapid organic growth, great. But even without organic growth, such a business is rewarding. We will simply take the lush earnings of the business and use them to buy similar businesses elsewhere. There’s no rule that you have to invest money where you’ve earned it. Indeed, it’s often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses, earning huge returns on tangible assets, can’t for any extended period reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return.

我们所寻求的企业，是在稳定行业中具备长期竞争优势的。如果这种企业还能伴随有机增长，那当然更好。但即使没有增长，这类企业依然具有回报价值。我们可以将它丰厚的利润用于在其他地方收购类似的企业。并没有规定要求你必须把赚来的钱投资在原来的地方。事实上，这样做往往是一种错误：真正伟大的企业，其有形资产带来的回报率极高，无法长时间以高回报率将大部分利润持续内部再投资。

Let’s look at the prototype of a dream business, our own See’s Candy. The boxed-chocolates industry in which it operates is unexciting: Per-capita consumption in the U.S. is extremely low and doesn’t grow. Many once-important brands have disappeared, and only three companies have earned more than token profits over the last forty years. Indeed, I believe that See’s, though it obtains the bulk of its revenues from only a few states, accounts for nearly half of the entire industry’s earnings.

让我们来看看理想企业的典范——我们自己的See’s Candy（喜诗糖果）。它所在的礼盒巧克力行业并不令人兴奋：美国人均消费量非常低，而且几乎没有增长。许多曾经重要的品牌已经消失，过去四十年里只有三家企业实现了显著盈利。实际上，我相信尽管See’s的收入主要来自少数几个州，但它几乎占据了整个行业近一半的利润。

At See’s, annual sales were 16 million pounds of candy when Blue Chip Stamps purchased the company in 1972. (Charlie and I controlled Blue Chip at the time and later merged it into Berkshire.) Last year See’s sold 31 million pounds, a growth rate of only 2% annually. Yet its durable competitive advantage, built by the See’s family over a 50-year period, and strengthened subsequently by Chuck Huggins and Brad Kinstler, has produced extraordinary results for Berkshire.

1972年蓝筹印花公司（Blue Chip Stamps）收购See’s时，其年销售量为1,600万磅糖果。（当时查理和我控制着蓝筹印花公司，之后将其并入伯克希尔。）去年，See’s售出了3,100万磅糖果，年均增长率仅为2%。然而，See’s家族在过去50年中建立、随后由Chuck Huggins和Brad Kinstler进一步强化的持久竞争优势，为伯克希尔带来了非凡的成果。

We bought See’s for $25 million when its sales were $30 million and pre-tax earnings were less than $5 million. The capital then required to conduct the business was $8 million. (Modest seasonal debt was also needed for a few months each year.) Consequently, the company was earning 60% pre-tax on invested capital. Two factors helped to minimize the funds required for operations. First, the product was sold for cash, and that eliminated accounts receivable. Second, the production and distribution cycle was short, which minimized inventories.

我们在其销售额为3,000万美元、税前利润不足500万美元时以2,500万美元买下了See’s。当时经营这家公司所需资本仅为800万美元（每年还需几个月少量季节性债务）。因此，公司的税前资本回报率达到60%。有两个因素帮助大幅降低了运营所需资金。首先，产品是以现金出售的，这消除了应收账款；其次，生产与分销周期很短，从而减少了库存需求。

Last year See’s sales were $383 million, and pre-tax profits were $82 million. The capital now required to run the business is $40 million. This means we have had to reinvest only $32 million since 1972 to handle the modest physical growth – and somewhat immodest financial growth – of the business. In the meantime pre-tax earnings have totaled $1.35 billion. All of that, except for the $32 million, has been sent to Berkshire (or, in the early years, to Blue Chip). After paying corporate taxes on the profits, we have used the rest to buy other attractive businesses. Just as Adam and Eve kick-started an activity that led to six billion humans, See’s has given birth to multiple new streams of cash for us. (The biblical command to “be fruitful and multiply” is one we take seriously at Berkshire.)

去年，See’s的销售额达到3.83亿美元，税前利润为8,200万美元。如今经营这家企业所需的资本是4,000万美元。这意味着自1972年以来，我们仅需再投入3,200万美元来应对业务适度的实体增长——以及相当可观的财务增长。在此期间，税前利润总计达13.5亿美元。除最初的3,200万美元外，其余利润都已汇往伯克希尔（早期则汇往蓝筹印花公司）。在支付企业所得税后，我们将剩余资金用于收购其他具有吸引力的企业。就像亚当和夏娃开启了一场最终繁衍出六十亿人类的事业一样，See’s也为我们孕育了多个新的现金流来源。（《圣经》中“生养众多，遍满地面”的训诫，在伯克希尔是被认真对待的。）

There aren’t many See’s in Corporate America. Typically, companies that increase their earnings from $5 million to $82 million require, say, $400 million or so of capital investment to finance their growth. That’s because growing businesses have both working capital needs that increase in proportion to sales growth and significant requirements for fixed asset investments.

在美国企业界，像See’s这样的企业并不多见。通常来说，一家企业若想将利润从500万美元增长到8,200万美元，可能需要大约4亿美元的资本投入来支持其增长。这是因为成长型企业既有随销售收入增长而同比增加的营运资金需求，也有大量固定资产投资需求。

A company that needs large increases in capital to engender its growth may well prove to be a satisfactory investment. There is, to follow through on our example, nothing shabby about earning $82 million pre-tax on $400 million of net tangible assets. But that equation for the owner is vastly different from the See’s situation. It’s far better to have an ever-increasing stream of earnings with virtually no major capital requirements. Ask Microsoft or Google.

一家为了实现增长而需要大量资本投入的企业，也可能是一项令人满意的投资。继续用上面的例子来说，4亿美元净有形资产带来8,200万美元的税前利润，并不算差。但对于所有者而言，这种回报结构与See’s的情况大相径庭。相比之下，拥有几乎无需重大资本投入却能持续增长的利润流要好得多。问问微软或谷歌就知道了。

One example of good, but far from sensational, business economics is our own FlightSafety. This company delivers benefits to its customers that are the equal of those delivered by any business that I know of. It also possesses a durable competitive advantage: Going to any other flight-training provider than the best is like taking the low bid on a surgical procedure.

一个良好但远非卓越的商业模式例子是我们自己的FlightSafety（飞行安全公司）。该公司为客户提供的价值不逊于任何我所知的企业。它也拥有持久的竞争优势：选择次优的飞行训练机构，就好比在手术时选择报价最低的医生。

Nevertheless, this business requires a significant reinvestment of earnings if it is to grow. When we purchased FlightSafety in 1996, its pre-tax operating earnings were $111 million, and its net investment in fixed assets was $570 million. Since our purchase, depreciation charges have totaled $923 million. But capital expenditures have totaled $1.635 billion, most of that for simulators to match the new airplane models that are constantly being introduced. (A simulator can cost us more than $12 million, and we have 273 of them.) Our fixed assets, after depreciation, now amount to $1.079 billion. Pre-tax operating earnings in 2007 were $270 million, a gain of $159 million since 1996. That gain gave us a good, but far from See’s-like, return on our incremental investment of $509 million.

不过，如果想要增长，这家公司仍需大量利润再投资。我们在1996年收购FlightSafety时，其税前营业利润为1.11亿美元，固定资产管理净值为5.7亿美元。自收购以来，累计折旧费用已达9.23亿美元，而资本支出总额高达16.35亿美元，其中大部分用于购买匹配不断推出的新飞机型号的模拟器。（每台模拟器成本超过1,200万美元，我们共有273台。）扣除折旧后的固定资产现值为10.79亿美元。2007年的税前营业利润为2.7亿美元，相比1996年增长了1.59亿美元。这项增长为我们5.09亿美元的增量投资带来了不错的回报，但远不及See’s那样的水平。

Consequently, if measured only by economic returns, FlightSafety is an excellent but not extraordinary business. Its put-up-more-to-earn-more experience is that faced by most corporations. For example, our large investment in regulated utilities falls squarely in this category. We will earn considerably more money in this business ten years from now, but we will invest many billions to make it.

因此，仅从经济回报角度来看，FlightSafety是一家优秀但并非卓越的企业。它那种“投入更多才能赚更多”的经历，正是大多数公司都会面对的。例如，我们在受监管公用事业上的巨额投资就属于这一类。十年后我们在这项业务上会赚得更多，但我们也需要投入数千亿美元才能做到这一点。

Now let’s move to the gruesome. The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down.

现在我们转向最糟糕的那一类企业。最糟糕的企业是那些快速增长、需要大量资本推动增长、却几乎赚不到钱的企业。比如航空业。自从莱特兄弟时代以来，这个行业始终未能建立起持久的竞争优势。事实上，如果一位有远见的资本家当时在基蒂霍克（Kitty Hawk）现场，他本可以通过击落奥维尔·莱特（Orville Wright），为他的后代子孙做一件天大的好事。

The airline industry’s demand for capital ever since that first flight has been insatiable. Investors have poured money into a bottomless pit, attracted by growth when they should have been repelled by it. And I, to my shame, participated in this foolishness when I had Berkshire buy U.S. Air preferred stock in 1989. As the ink was drying on our check, the company went into a tailspin, and before long our preferred dividend was no longer being paid. But we then got very lucky. In one of the recurrent, but always misguided, bursts of optimism for airlines, we were actually able to sell our shares in 1998 for a hefty gain. In the decade following our sale, the company went bankrupt. Twice.

自那次首飞以来，航空业对资本的需求便永无止境。投资者不断向这个无底洞投钱，被增长吸引，而他们本应因增长而退避三舍。我自己也曾参与过这种愚蠢行为——1989年，我让伯克希尔买入了US Air的优先股。就在支票刚开出不久，公司便陷入困境，没过多久我们的优先股分红也不再支付。但我们后来非常幸运。在又一次反复出现但总是误判的航空业乐观情绪中，我们于1998年以相当可观的收益卖出了这些股份。而在我们卖出之后的十年里，这家公司破产了两次。

To sum up, think of three types of “savings accounts.” The great one pays an extraordinarily high interest rate that will rise as the years pass. The good one pays an attractive rate of interest that will be earned also on deposits that are added. Finally, the gruesome account both pays an inadequate interest rate and requires you to keep adding money at those disappointing returns.

总结一下，可以把企业想象成三种类型的“储蓄账户”。第一种伟大的账户提供极高的利率，而且利率还会逐年上升。第二种良好的账户提供有吸引力的利率，新增存款也能获得同样回报。第三种可怕的账户不仅利率低下，还要求你不断追加资金，接受这些令人失望的回报。

And now it’s confession time. It should be noted that no consultant, board of directors or investment banker pushed me into the mistakes I will describe. In tennis parlance, they were all unforced errors.

现在该坦白一些事了。需要说明的是，我接下来要说的这些错误，没有任何顾问、董事会或投行人士施压导致。用网球术语来说，它们都是“非受迫性失误”。

To begin with, I almost blew the See’s purchase. The seller was asking $30 million, and I was adamant about not going above $25 million. Fortunately, he caved. Otherwise I would have balked, and that $1.35 billion would have gone to somebody else.

首先，我差点搞砸了See’s的收购。卖家开价3,000万美元，我坚持最多只出2,500万。幸运的是，对方最后让步了。否则我会放弃这笔交易，那13.5亿美元也就归别人所有了。

About the time of the See’s purchase, Tom Murphy, then running Capital Cities Broadcasting, called and offered me the Dallas-Fort Worth NBC station for $35 million. The station came with the Fort Worth paper that Capital Cities was buying, and under the “cross-ownership” rules Murph had to divest it. I knew that TV stations were See’s-like businesses that required virtually no capital investment and had excellent prospects for growth. They were simple to run and showered cash on their owners.

在收购See’s前后，Tom Murphy（当时掌管Capital Cities广播公司）打电话给我，提出以3,500万美元出售达拉斯-沃斯堡的NBC电视台。该电视台附带Capital Cities正在收购的Fort Worth报纸，根据当时的“交叉所有权”规定，Murph必须剥离电视台。我知道电视台是像See’s一样的企业，几乎不需要资本投入，且增长前景极佳。它们易于管理，而且能为业主带来大量现金。

Moreover, Murph, then as now, was a close friend, a man I admired as an extraordinary manager and outstanding human being. He knew the television business forward and backward and would not have called me unless he felt a purchase was certain to work. In effect Murph whispered “buy” into my ear. But I didn’t listen.

此外，Murph过去和现在都是我的密友，我一直钦佩他是位杰出的管理者和优秀的人。他对电视行业了如指掌，如果不是确信这笔交易稳操胜券，他根本不会打这个电话。实际上，Murph是在我耳边低声说：“买下它。”但我没听进去。

In 2006, the station earned $73 million pre-tax, bringing its total earnings since I turned down the deal to at least $1 billion – almost all available to its owner for other purposes. Moreover, the property now has a capital value of about $800 million. Why did I say “no”? The only explanation is that my brain had gone on vacation and forgot to notify me. (My behavior resembled that of a politician Molly Ivins once described: “If his I.Q. was any lower, you would have to water him twice a day.”)

2006年，该电视台实现了7,300万美元的税前利润，自当年我拒绝这笔交易以来，其累计利润至少已达10亿美元——几乎全部可供业主用于其他用途。此外，这项资产目前的资本价值约为8亿美元。那我为什么说“不”？唯一的解释是，我的大脑去度假了，却忘了通知我。（我的行为类似于莫莉·伊文斯曾描述的一位政客：“如果他的智商再低一点，你每天都得给他浇水。”）

Finally, I made an even worse mistake when I said “yes” to Dexter, a shoe business I bought in 1993 for $433 million in Berkshire stock (25,203 shares of A). What I had assessed as durable competitive advantage vanished within a few years. But that’s just the beginning: By using Berkshire stock, I compounded this error hugely. That move made the cost to Berkshire shareholders not $400 million, but rather $3.5 billion. In essence, I gave away 1.6% of a wonderful business – one now valued at $220 billion – to buy a worthless business.

最后，我还犯了一个更严重的错误：我同意收购Dexter，一家制鞋公司。我在1993年用伯克希尔股票（相当于25,203股A类股）花费4.33亿美元买下了它。我当时认为它具备持久的竞争优势，但几年之内这种优势就消失了。但这只是开始：由于我使用的是伯克希尔的股票，这一错误被大幅放大。这使得对伯克希尔股东的实际成本不是4亿美元，而是高达35亿美元。本质上，我拿走了这家当时价值2,200亿美元的优秀企业中的1.6%，换来的却是一家毫无价值的企业。

To date, Dexter is the worst deal that I’ve made. But I’ll make more mistakes in the future – you can bet on that. A line from Bobby Bare’s country song explains what too often happens with acquisitions: “I’ve never gone to bed with an ugly woman, but I’ve sure woke up with a few.”

迄今为止，Dexter是我做过的最糟糕的一笔交易。但我未来还会犯更多错误——你可以对此下注。鲍比·贝尔的一句乡村歌曲歌词很好地形容了并购中常发生的事：“我从没主动上过丑女人的床，但我确实醒来时身边躺过几个。”

Now, let’s examine the four major operating sectors of Berkshire. Each sector has vastly different balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.

现在，让我们来看看伯克希尔的四大主要运营板块。每个板块在资产负债表和损益表上的特征都有显著不同。因此，将它们合并分析会妨碍理解。我们将它们分别作为四家独立企业来呈现，这也是查理和我对它们的看法。

# Insurance (保险业务)

The best anecdote I’ve heard during the current presidential campaign came from Mitt Romney, who asked his wife, Ann, “When we were young, did you ever in your wildest dreams think I might be president?” To which she replied, “Honey, you weren’t in my wildest dreams.”

在当前总统竞选期间，我听到的最佳轶事来自米特·罗姆尼。他问妻子安：“我们年轻的时候，你有没有在梦里想过我可能会当上总统？”她回答说：“亲爱的，你连我的疯狂梦境都没进去过。”

When we first entered the property/casualty insurance business in 1967, my wildest dreams did not envision our current operation. Here’s how we did in the first five years after purchasing National Indemnity:

当我们于1967年首次进入财险/责任险业务时，我做梦也没想到今天这样的规模。以下是我们收购National Indemnity之后最初五年的表现：

Year	Underwriting Profit (Loss) (承保利润或亏损，单位：百万美元)	Float (浮存金，单位：百万美元)
1967	$0.4	$18.5
1968	$0.6	$21.3
1969	$0.1	$25.4
1970	$(0.4)	$39.4
1971	$1.4	$65.6

坦率地说，我们起步缓慢。但后来情况发生了变化。以下是最近五年的记录：

Year	Underwriting Profit (Loss) (承保利润或亏损，单位：百万美元)	Float (浮存金，单位：百万美元)
2003	$1,718	$44,220
2004	$1,551	$46,094
2005	$53	$49,287
2006	$3,838	$50,887
2007	$3,374	$58,698

这一转变是由一些非凡的管理者实现的。让我们看看他们各自取得的成就。

• GEICO 拥有我们所有保险公司中最宽的护城河，这得益于其CEO Tony Nicely的精心守护与拓展。去年——再次——GEICO在主要汽车保险公司中拥有最好的增长记录，市场份额上升至7.2%。当伯克希尔于1995年控股时，这一份额仅为2.5%。并非巧合的是，在此期间GEICO的年度广告支出也从3,100万美元增长到了7.51亿美元。

Tony现年64岁，18岁时加入GEICO。从那时起，他每天都在为这家公司倾注热情——为它既能为客户省钱，又能为其员工提供成长机会而自豪。即使如今销售额已达到120亿美元，Tony仍觉得GEICO才刚刚起步。我也这么认为。

有一些证据可以支持这一点。在过去三年中，GEICO在摩托车市场的份额从2.1%增长到6%。我们最近也开始承保全地形车（ATV）和房车（RV）保险。2007年11月，我们签发了第一份商业汽车保单。GEICO和National Indemnity正在商业保险领域合作，初步结果非常令人鼓舞。

尽管这些新业务加起来仍只占我们个人汽车保险业务的一小部分，但它们应能带来不断增长的承保利润和浮存金。

• General Re 是我们的国际再保险公司，也是我们“本土”浮存金的最大来源——年末达230亿美元。这项业务现在已成为伯克希尔的一项巨大资产。然而，我们对其的收购起初并不顺利。

几十年来，General Re一直是再保险界的“蒂芙尼”，因其出色的承保能力和纪律性而广受尊敬。不幸的是，这种声誉并未反映其实际经营状况，而我在1998年决定与General Re合并时完全忽视了这一点。1998年的General Re已经不再是1968年或1978年那个样子了。

不过，现在在CEO Joe Brandon及其合伙人Tad Montross的努力下，公司的光辉得以恢复。Joe和Tad已管理公司六年，并以摩根大通所言“一流的方式开展一流的业务”。他们重新建立了承保、准备金和客户选择方面的纪律性。

他们的工作因美国及海外遗留下来的昂贵且耗时的问题变得更加困难。尽管如此，Joe和Tad仍然取得了优异的承保成果，并巧妙地为公司未来的定位进行了调整。

• 自1986年加入伯克希尔以来，Ajit Jain 从零开始建立了一个真正伟大的专业再保险业务。对于那些独一无二、规模巨大的交易，全世界如今都转向他寻求解决方案。

去年我详细告诉你们有关Equitas将巨额但有限额的责任转移给伯克希尔，仅收取一笔71亿美元保费的情况。截至目前，我们的经验良好。但这并不能说明太多问题，因为这只是长达五十年甚至更久的风险周期中的一根稻草。但我们确知的是，由Scott Moser领导的伦敦团队是一流的，并已成为我们保险业务的重要资产。

• 最后，我们还有一些规模较小的保险业务，服务于保险市场的一些细分领域。总体而言，这些公司表现出色，实现了高于平均水平的承保利润，并提供了可用于投资的宝贵浮存金。

去年，Bill Oakerson领导的BoatU.S. 加入了这个集团。该公司管理着一个约65万名船主组成的协会，向他们提供类似于AAA汽车俱乐部为司机提供的服务。其中一项服务就是船用保险。欲了解更多关于这项业务的信息，请参观股东大会上的展位。

# 下表展示了伯克希尔旗下四大财产/责任险业务类别的情况：

Insurance Operations (保险业务)	Underwriting Profit (承保利润，单位：百万美元)	Yearend Float (年末浮存金，单位：百万美元)
General Re .......................	$555 (2007) / $526 (2006)	$23,009
BH Reinsurance ...............	$ (数据未完整显示)	$22,827
GEICO .............................	$1,427 (2007) / $1,658 (2006)	$23,692
Other Primary...................	$1,113 (2007) / $7,171 (2006)	$7,768
总计	$3,374 (2007)	$58,698

注：* 包括 Applied Underwriters 的数据。
数据截止日期：2006年5月19日。

# Regulated Utility Business (受监管公用事业业务)

Berkshire has an 87.4% (diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 720,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.

伯克希尔持有MidAmerican Energy Holdings公司87.4%（稀释后）的权益，该公司拥有多种类型的公用事业运营资产。其中最大的包括：(1) Yorkshire Electricity和Northern Electric两家公司，共服务380万电力用户，是英国第三大电力分销商；(2) MidAmerican Energy公司，主要为爱荷华州约72万电力用户提供服务；(3) Pacific Power和Rocky Mountain Power公司，在美国西部六个州服务约170万电力用户；(4) Kern River和Northern Natural天然气管道公司，承担了美国约8%的天然气输送。

Our partners in ownership of MidAmerican are Walter Scott, and its two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. It’s unimportant how many votes each party has; we make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise. Eight years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have underscored my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.

MidAmerican的共同所有者还包括Walter Scott，以及两位出色的管理者Dave Sokol和Greg Abel。我们各自持有的投票权并不重要；只有在我们认为某项重大决策明智时才会采取行动。与Dave、Greg和Walter合作八年以来，更加坚定了我最初的信念：伯克希尔不可能拥有比他们更好的合作伙伴。

Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 20 locally-branded firms with 18,800 agents. Last year was a slow year for residential sales, and 2008 will probably be slower. We will continue, however, to acquire quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices.

有些出人意料的是，MidAmerican还拥有美国第二大房地产经纪公司HomeServices of America。这家公司通过20家本地品牌公司运营，拥有18,800名经纪人。去年住宅销售市场低迷，2008年可能更慢。但我们仍将继续在合理价格下收购优质的经纪公司。

Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operation:

以下是MidAmerican的一些关键运营数据：

运营项目（英文）	2007年（百万美元）	2006年（百万美元）
英国公用事业（U.K. utilities）	$337	$338
爱荷华州公用事业（Iowa utility）	$412	$348
西部公用事业（Western utilities，2006年3月21日收购）	$692	$356
天然气管道（Pipelines）	$473	$376
房地产经纪（HomeServices）	$42	$74
其他净收入（Other (net)）	$130	$245
息税前利润（Earnings before corporate interest and taxes）	$2,086	$1,737
非伯克希尔利息支出（Interest, other than to Berkshire）	$(312)	$(261)
伯克希尔次级债务利息支出（Interest on Berkshire junior debt）	$(108)	$(134)
所得税（Income tax）	$(477)	$(426)
净利润（Net earnings）	$1,189	$916

数据项目（英文）	2007年（百万美元）	2006年（百万美元）
归属于伯克希尔的收益（Earnings applicable to Berkshire*）	$1,114	$885
欠第三方债务（Debt owed to others）	$19,002	$16,946
欠伯克希尔债务（Debt owed to Berkshire）	$821	$1,055

包括伯克希尔获得的利息收入（扣除相关所得税），2007年为7,000万美元，2006年为8,700万美元。

We agreed to purchase 35,464,337 shares of MidAmerican at $35.05 per share in 1999, a year in which its per-share earnings were $2.59. Why the odd figure of $35.05? I originally decided the business was worth $35.00 per share to Berkshire. Now, I’m a “one-price” guy (remember See’s?) and for several days the investment bankers representing MidAmerican had no luck in getting me to increase Berkshire’s offer. But, finally, they caught me in a moment of weakness, and I caved, telling them I would go to $35.05. With that, I explained, they could tell their client they had wrung the last nickel out of me. At the time, it hurt.

1999年，我们以每股35.05美元的价格购买了MidAmerican共计35,464,337股股票，那一年它的每股收益为2.59美元。为什么是35.05美元这个奇怪的数字？最初我认为这家企业对伯克希尔的价值就是每股35美元。我一直是个“一口价”的人（还记得See’s吗？）代表MidAmerican的投行人士连续几天试图说服我提高报价，但都无果。最终，他们在我的一个软弱时刻抓住了机会，我让步了，并告诉他们我可以接受35.05美元。我还解释说，这样他们就可以告诉客户已经从我这里榨出了最后一分钱。当时，我心里是真的疼。

Later on, in 2002, Berkshire purchased 6,700,000 shares at $60 to help finance the acquisition of one of our pipelines. Lastly, in 2006, when MidAmerican bought PacifiCorp, we purchased 23,268,793 shares at $145 per share.

之后在2002年，伯克希尔又以每股60美元的价格购买了670万股，用于支持我们一条天然气管道的收购。最后，在2006年MidAmerican收购PacifiCorp时，我们又以每股145美元的价格购买了23,268,793股。

In 2007, MidAmerican earned $15.78 per share. However, 77¢ of that was non-recurring – a reduction in deferred tax at our British utility, resulting from a lowering of the U.K. corporate tax rate. So call normalized earnings $15.01 per share. And yes, I’m glad I wilted and offered the extra nickel.

2007年，MidAmerican每股盈利为15.78美元。但其中77美分是非经常性收益——来自英国子公司递延税项的减少，原因是英国公司税率下调。因此我们可以认为正常化每股收益为15.01美元。没错，我很高兴当初心软了一下，多出了那一毛钱。

# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations (制造、服务及零售业务)

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

伯克希尔在这部分的业务涵盖范围极其广泛。尽管如此，我们还是先来看看这一整组业务的合并资产负债表和损益表概览。

# Balance Sheet 截至2007年12月31日（单位：百万美元）

资产项目（Assets）	金额
现金及等价物（Cash and equivalents）	$1,278
应收账款（Accounts and notes receivable）	$7,652
存货（Inventory）	$8,930
其他流动资产（Other current assets）	$828
流动资产合计（Total current assets）	$18,688
商誉及其他无形资产（Goodwill and other intangibles）	$14,201
固定资产（Fixed assets）	$12,831
其他资产（Other assets）	$4,605
总资产（Total Assets）	$38,322

负债与权益项目（Liabilities and Equity）	金额
应付票据（Notes payable）	$2,080
其他流动负债（Other current liabilities）	$4,488
流动负债合计（Total current liabilities）	$5,793
递延税项（Deferred taxes）	$470
长期债务及其他负债（Term debt and other liabilities）	$9,605
权益（Equity）	$1,685
总负债与权益（Total Liabilities and Equity）	$38,322

# Earnings Statement（损益表，单位：百万美元）

项目（Earnings Statement）	2007年	2006年	2005年
收入（Revenues）	$59,100	$52,660	$46,896
营业成本（Operating expenses），包括折旧费用（2007年为$955，2006年为$823，2005年为$699）	$55,026	$49,002	$44,190
利息支出（Interest expense）	$127	$132	$83
税前利润（Pre-tax earnings）	$3,947	$3,526	$2,623*
所得税及少数股东权益（Income taxes and minority interests）	$1,594	$1,395	$977
净利润（Net income）	$2,353	$2,131	$1,646

不包括购买会计调整（purchase-accounting adjustments）

This motley group, which sells products ranging from candy to carpeting, earned 23% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s noteworthy also that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth – a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet – and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 9.8%.

这个种类繁多的业务群，从糖果到地毯无所不卖，去年平均在有形净资产上实现了23%的回报率。值得注意的是，这些企业在实现这一回报时几乎未使用财务杠杆。显然，我们拥有不少非常优秀的企业。然而，其中许多企业是以远高于账面价值的价格收购的——这反映在资产负债表上的“商誉”科目中——因此，按我们的平均账面投入资本计算，实际回报率为9.8%。

Here are a few newsworthy items about companies in this sector:
以下是关于这一板块中一些公司的新闻亮点：

• ---

• Shaw, Acme Brick, Johns Manville 和 MiTek 都在2007年因房地产市场急剧下滑而受到影响，它们的税前利润分别下降了27%、41%、38%和9%。总体来看，这些公司去年实现税前利润为9.41亿美元，低于2006年的12.96亿美元。

去年，Shaw、MiTek 和 Acme 进行了一些“补充性”收购（tuck-in acquisitions），有助于未来盈利增长。可以肯定的是，它们还将继续寻找更多类似的机会。

• In a tough year for retailing, our standouts were See’s, Borsheims and Nebraska Furniture Mart.
Two years ago Brad Kinstler was made CEO of See’s. We very seldom move managers from one industry to another at Berkshire. But we made an exception with Brad, who had previously run our uniform company, Fechheimer, and Cypress Insurance. The move could not have worked out better. In his two years, profits at See’s have increased more than 50%.

• 在零售业整体艰难的一年里，我们的亮点企业是 See’s、Borsheims 和 Nebraska Furniture Mart。
两年前，Brad Kinstler 被任命为 See’s 的 CEO。伯克希尔很少让管理者跨行业调动，但这次我们破例了——Brad 此前曾管理我们的制服公司 Fechheimer 和保险业务 Cypress Insurance。这一决定非常成功。在他任职的两年内，See’s 的利润增长了超过50%。

At Borsheims, sales increased 15.1%, helped by a 27% gain during Shareholder Weekend. Two years ago, Susan Jacques suggested that we remodel and expand the store. I was skeptical, but Susan was right.

在 Borsheims，销售额同比增长了15.1%，其中股东周末期间增长了27%。两年前，Susan Jacques 建议我们对店铺进行翻新和扩建。我当时持怀疑态度，但事实证明 Susan 是对的。

Susan came to Borsheims 25 years ago as a $4-an-hour saleswoman. Though she lacked a managerial background, I did not hesitate to make her CEO in 1994. She’s smart, she loves the business, and she loves her associates. That beats having an MBA degree any time.

Susan 25年前以每小时4美元的薪资加入 Borsheims。尽管她没有管理背景，我在1994年毫不犹豫地任命她为CEO。她聪明、热爱这份事业，并深爱她的同事们。这远比一个MBA学位重要得多。

(An aside: Charlie and I are not big fans of resumes. Instead, we focus on brains, passion and integrity. Another of our great managers is Cathy Baron Tamraz, who has significantly increased Business Wire’s earnings since we purchased it early in 2006. She is an owner’s dream. It is positively dangerous to stand between Cathy and a business prospect. Cathy, it should be noted, began her career as a cab driver.)

（旁注：查理和我都不是简历的狂热支持者。我们更看重智慧、热情和正直。另一位我们出色的管理者是 Cathy Baron Tamraz，自我们在2006年初收购 Business Wire 以来，她显著提升了该公司的盈利能力。她是所有者的梦想人选。你绝不能挡在Cathy和商业机会之间。值得一提的是，Cathy 的职业生涯是从出租车司机开始的。）

Finally, at Nebraska Furniture Mart, earnings hit a record as our Omaha and Kansas City stores each had sales of about $400 million. These, by some margin, are the two top home furnishings stores in the country. In a disastrous year for many furniture retailers, sales at Kansas City increased 8%, while in Omaha the gain was 6%.
Credit the remarkable Blumkin brothers, Ron and Irv, for this performance. Both are close personal friends of mine and great businessmen.

最后，在 Nebraska Furniture Mart，奥马哈和堪萨斯城门店的销售额均接近4亿美元，双双创下历史新高。这两个门店无疑是美国最顶尖的家居用品商店。在许多家具零售商遭遇灾难性一年的情况下，堪萨斯城门店销售额增长了8%，奥马哈门店增长了6%。这一切都要归功于杰出的布卢姆金兄弟 Ron 和 Irv。他们是我个人的好朋友，也是伟大的企业家。

• Iscar continues its wondrous ways. Its products are small carbide cutting tools that make large and very expensive machine tools more productive. The raw material for carbide is tungsten, mined in China. For many decades, Iscar moved tungsten to Israel, where brains turned it into something far more valuable. Late in 2007, Iscar opened a large plant in Dalian, China. In effect, we’ve now moved the brains to the tungsten. Major opportunities for growth await Iscar. Its management team, led by Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz, and Danny Goldman, is certain to make the most of them.

• Iscar 继续表现出色。其产品是小型碳化钨切削工具，用于提高大型且昂贵的机床效率。碳化钨的原材料钨来自中国。几十年来，Iscar 将钨运往以色列，通过技术手段将其转化为更高价值的产品。2007年底，Iscar 在中国大连开设了一家大型工厂。可以说，我们现在把“智慧”带到了“钨”的身边。

Iscar 拥有巨大的增长机会。由 Eitan Wertheimer、Jacob Harpaz 和 Danny Goldman 领导的管理团队一定会充分利用这些机会。

• Flight services set a record in 2007 with pre-tax earnings increasing 49% to $547 million. Corporate aviation had an extraordinary year worldwide, and both of our companies – as runaway leaders in their fields – fully participated.

• 我们的飞行服务业务在2007年创下了纪录，税前利润增长49%，达到5.47亿美元。全球商务航空业表现异常强劲，我们两家相关公司也在各自领域继续保持领先地位。

FlightSafety, our pilot training business, gained 14% in revenues and 20% in pre-tax earnings. We estimate that we train about 58% of U.S. corporate pilots. Bruce Whitman, the company’s CEO, inherited this leadership position in 2003 from Al Ueltschi, the father of advanced flight training, and has proved to be a worthy successor.

在 FlightSafety（飞行员培训业务）方面，收入增长14%，税前利润增长20%。我们估计在美国约有58%的企业飞行员接受过我们的培训。2003年，公司CEO Bruce Whitman 从高级飞行训练之父 Al Ueltschi 手中接棒，并已证明自己是一位称职的继任者。

At NetJets, the inventor of fractional-ownership of jets, we also remain the unchallenged leader. We now operate 487 planes in the U.S. and 135 in Europe, a fleet more than twice the size of that operated by our three major competitors combined. Because our share of the large-cabin market is near 90%, our lead in value terms is far greater.

在 NetJets（私人飞机分时共享模式的发明者）方面，我们仍然是无可争议的领导者。目前我们在美国运营487架飞机，在欧洲运营135架，机队规模是三大竞争对手总和的两倍以上。由于我们在大型客舱市场的份额接近90%，因此按价值计算，我们的领先优势更加明显。

The NetJets brand – with its promise of safety, service and security – grows stronger every year. Behind this is the passion of one man, Richard Santulli. If you were to pick someone to join you in a foxhole, you couldn’t do better than Rich. No matter what the obstacles, he just doesn’t stop.

NetJets 品牌以其安全、服务和保障承诺而日益强大。背后推动这一切的是一位人物——Richard Santulli。如果你要选一个人与你并肩作战，没人比 Rich 更合适。无论遇到什么障碍，他都不会停下脚步。

Europe is the best example of how Rich’s tenacity leads to success. For the first ten years we made little financial progress there, actually running up cumulative losses of $212 million. After Rich brought Mark Booth on board to run Europe, however, we began to gain traction. Now we have real momentum, and last year earnings tripled.

欧洲是我们展现 Rich 坚韧精神的最佳例子。在最初十年间，我们在欧洲几乎没有什么财务进展，实际上还累积亏损了2.12亿美元。然而当 Rich 让 Mark Booth 接手欧洲业务后，我们开始取得突破。如今我们已经真正建立起势头，去年利润更是实现了三倍增长。

In November, our directors met at NetJets headquarters in Columbus and got a look at the sophisticated operation there. It is responsible for 1,000 or so flights a day in all kinds of weather, with customers expecting top-notch service. Our directors came away impressed by the facility and its capabilities – but even more impressed by Rich and his associates.

11月，我们的董事会成员在哥伦布市的 NetJets 总部参观了其复杂的运营系统。每天要执行约1,000次飞行任务，面对各种天气条件，客户期望获得顶级服务。董事们离开时不仅对设施和能力印象深刻，更被 Rich 及其团队所折服。

# Finance and Finance Products（金融与金融产品）

Our major operation in this category is Clayton Homes, the largest U.S. manufacturer and marketer of manufactured homes. Clayton’s market share hit a record 31% last year. But industry volume continues to shrink: Last year, manufactured home sales were 96,000, down from 131,000 in 2003, the year we bought Clayton. (At the time, it should be remembered, some commentators criticized its directors for selling at a cyclical bottom.)

我们这一类别中的主要业务是Clayton Homes，这是美国最大的预制房屋制造商和销售商。Clayton去年的市场份额达到了创纪录的31%。但整个行业销量仍在持续下滑：去年预制房屋销量为96,000套，低于2003年我们收购Clayton时的131,000套。（需要指出的是，当时一些评论人士还曾批评其董事会在周期低点出售公司。）

Though Clayton earns money from both manufacturing and retailing its homes, most of its earnings come from an $11 billion loan portfolio, covering 300,000 borrowers. That’s why we include Clayton’s operation in this finance section. Despite the many problems that surfaced during 2007 in real estate finance, the Clayton portfolio is performing well. Delinquencies, foreclosures and losses during the year were at rates similar to those we experienced in our previous years of ownership.

尽管Clayton通过制造和零售房屋盈利，但其大部分利润来自一个规模达110亿美元的贷款组合，覆盖了30万名借款人。这正是我们将Clayton归入金融板块的原因。尽管2007年房地产金融领域出现了许多问题，Clayton的贷款组合表现依然良好。今年的逾期还款、止赎和损失率与我们过去几年所经历的情况相当。

Clayton’s loan portfolio is financed by Berkshire. For this funding, we charge Clayton one percentage point over Berkshire’s borrowing cost – a fee that amounted to $85 million last year. Clayton’s 2007 pre-tax earnings of $526 million are after its paying this fee. The flip side of this transaction is that Berkshire recorded $85 million as income, which is included in “other” in the following table.

Clayton的贷款组合由伯克希尔提供资金支持。为此，我们向Clayton收取比伯克希尔融资成本高1个百分点的费用——去年这项费用达到8,500万美元。Clayton在2007年的税前利润为5.26亿美元，是在支付完该费用之后实现的。从伯克希尔的角度来看，这笔交易也带来了8,500万美元的收入，并被计入下表中的“其他”项目中。

# Pre-Tax Earnings (税前利润，单位：百万美元)

收益来源	2007年	2006年
普通交易收益（Trading – ordinary income）	$272	$274
寿险与年金业务（Life and annuity operation）	$(60)	$29
租赁业务（Leasing operations）	$111	$182
预制房金融（Clayton）	$526	$513
其他（Other）	$157	$159
扣除资本利得前的总收益（Income before capital gains）	$1,006	$1,157
资本利得交易（Trading – capital gains）	$105	$938
总计（Total）	$1,111	$2,095

The leasing operations tabulated are XTRA, which rents trailers, and CORT, which rents furniture. Utilization of trailers was down considerably in 2007 and that led to a drop in earnings at XTRA. That company also borrowed $400 million last year and distributed the proceeds to Berkshire. The resulting higher interest it is now paying further reduced XTRA’s earnings.

上表中的租赁业务包括XTRA（拖车租赁）和CORT（家具租赁）。2007年，拖车利用率大幅下降，导致XTRA盈利能力下降。此外，该公司去年借款4亿美元并将资金分配给伯克希尔，由此产生的更高利息支出进一步压缩了XTRA的利润。

Clayton, XTRA and CORT are all good businesses, very ably run by Kevin Clayton, Bill Franz and Paul Arnold. Each has made tuck-in acquisitions during Berkshire’s ownership. More will come.

Clayton、XTRA 和 CORT 都是非常优秀的企业，分别由 Kevin Clayton、Bill Franz 和 Paul Arnold 精心管理。它们都在伯克希尔控股期间进行了补充性并购。未来还将继续如此。

# Investments（投资组合）

We show below our common stock investments at yearend, itemizing those with a market value of at least $600 million.

以下是我们截至年底的普通股投资组合，列出市值至少为6亿美元的持仓：

公司名称（Company）	持股数量（Shares）	成本（Cost，百万美元）	市值（Market Value，百万美元）	占公司总股本比例（Percentage of Company Owned）
American Express Company	151,610,700	$1,287	$7,887	13.1%
Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc.	35,563,200	$1,718	$1,861	4.8%
Burlington Northern Santa Fe	60,828,818	$4,731	$5,063	17.5%
The Coca-Cola Company	200,000,000	$1,299	$12,274	8.6%
Conoco Phillips	17,508,700	$1,039	$1,546	1.1%
Johnson & Johnson	64,271,948	$3,943	$4,287	2.2%
Kraft Foods Inc.	124,393,800	$4,152	$4,059	8.1%
Moody’s Corporation	48,000,000	$1,030	$7,450	19.1%
POSCO	3,486,006	$749	$1,714	4.5%
The Procter & Gamble Company	101,472,000	$572	$2,136	3.3%
Sanofi-Aventis	17,170,953	$2,156	$2,417	1.3%
Tesco plc	227,307,000	$1,326	$2,386	2.9%
U.S. Bancorp	75,176,026	$1,466	$1,575	4.4%
USG Corp	17,072,192	$1,367	$942	17.2%
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.	19,944,300	$611	$948	0.5%
The Washington Post Company	1,727,765	$11	$369	18.2%
Wells Fargo & Company	303,407,068	$536	$886	9.2%
White Mountains Insurance Group Ltd.	1,724,200	$5,238	$7,633	16.3%
Others（其他）	—	$6,677	$9,160	—
总计（Total Common Stocks）	—	$39,252	$74,999	—

成本为我们实际购买价格及税务基础；由于某些资产已被重估或减值，GAAP下的“成本”在个别情况下有所不同。

Overall, we are delighted by the business performance of our investees. In 2007, American Express, Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble, three of our four largest holdings, increased per-share earnings by 12%, 14% and 14%. The fourth, Wells Fargo, had a small decline in earnings because of the popping of the real estate bubble. Nevertheless, I believe its intrinsic value increased, even if only by a minor amount.

总体而言，我们对这些被投资公司的经营表现非常满意。2007年，我们四大持仓中的三家——美国运通、可口可乐和宝洁公司——每股收益分别增长了12%、14%和14%。第四家富国银行因房地产泡沫破裂而略有盈利下滑。但我相信它的内在价值仍然有所提升，即使幅度不大。

In the strange world department, note that American Express and Wells Fargo were both organized by Henry Wells and William Fargo, Amex in 1850 and Wells in 1852. P&G and Coke began business in 1837 and 1886 respectively. Start-ups are not our game.

值得一提的是，在这个略显奇特的历史巧合中，美国运通和富国银行都由Henry Wells和William Fargo创立，前者成立于1850年，后者于1852年成立。宝洁和可口可乐则分别始于1837年和1886年。初创企业从来不是我们的游戏。

I should emphasize that we do not measure the progress of our investments by what their market prices do during any given year. Rather, we evaluate their performance by the two methods we apply to the businesses we own. The first test is improvement in earnings, with our making due allowance for industry conditions. The second test, more subjective, is whether their “moats” – a metaphor for the superiorities they possess that make life difficult for their competitors – have widened during the year. All of the “big four” scored positively on that test.

我必须强调，我们不会根据市场股价在某一年的表现来衡量投资的进展。我们评估投资的方式与评估我们拥有的企业一致，主要有两项标准：第一项是盈利是否改善，同时我们会充分考虑行业环境的影响；第二项更为主观的标准是，它们的“护城河”——即让竞争对手难以逾越的竞争优势——是否在今年得到了拓宽。我们持有的“四大重仓股”在这项测试中全部达标。

We made one large sale last year. In 2002 and 2003 Berkshire bought 1.3% of PetroChina for $488 million, a price that valued the entire business at about $37 billion. Charlie and I then felt that the company was worth about $100 billion. By 2007, two factors had materially increased its value: the price of oil had climbed significantly, and PetroChina’s management had done a great job in building oil and gas reserves. In the second half of last year, the market value of the company rose to $275 billion, about what we thought it was worth compared to other giant oil companies. So we sold our holdings for $4 billion.

去年我们完成了一笔大额出售。2002年和2003年，伯克希尔以4.88亿美元购入中石油（PetroChina）1.3%的股份，当时公司整体估值约370亿美元。查理和我当时认为其价值约1,000亿美元。到2007年，两个因素显著提升了其价值：油价大幅上涨，以及中石油管理层在油气储备建设上的出色表现。去年下半年，该公司市值升至2,750亿美元，与我们对其他大型石油公司的估值基本一致。因此，我们以40亿美元的价格卖出了持仓。

A footnote: We paid the IRS tax of $1.2 billion on our PetroChina gain. This sum paid all costs of the U.S. government – defense, social security, you name it – for about four hours.

注脚：我们为中石油投资收益支付了12亿美元的联邦所得税。这笔金额足以覆盖美国政府——包括国防、社会保障等——约四小时的开支。

Last year I told you that Berkshire had 62 derivative contracts that I manage. (We also have a few left in the General Re runoff book.) Today, we have 94 of these, and they fall into two categories.

去年我曾提到，由我管理的伯克希尔衍生品合约有62份（另有一些仍在通用再保险的清算组合中）。如今，这类合约已增至94份，分为两类：

First, we have written 54 contracts that require us to make payments if certain bonds that are included in various high-yield indices default. These contracts expire at various times from 2009 to 2013. At yearend we had received $3.2 billion in premiums on these contracts; had paid $472 million in losses; and in the worst case (though it is extremely unlikely to occur) could be required to pay an additional $4.7 billion.

第一类是我们签署的54份合约，要求我们在某些纳入不同高收益指数的债券发生违约时支付款项。这些合约的到期日从2009年至2013年不等。年末时，我们已收取32亿美元保费，累计赔付损失4.72亿美元；最坏情况下（尽管极不可能），可能需额外支付47亿美元。

We are certain to make many more payments. But I believe that on premium revenues alone, these contracts will prove profitable, leaving aside what we can earn on the large sums we hold. Our yearend liability for this exposure was recorded at $1.8 billion and is included in “Derivative Contract Liabilities” on our balance sheet.

未来肯定会发生更多赔付。但我相信仅凭保费收入，这些合约最终将盈利，更不用说我们持有大额资金期间的潜在收益。年末时，我们为此类风险计提的负债为18亿美元，计入资产负债表的“衍生品合约负债”科目。

The second category of contracts involves various put options we have sold on four stock indices (the S&P 500 plus three foreign indices). These puts had original terms of either 15 or 20 years and were struck at the market. We have received premiums of $4.5 billion, and we recorded a liability at yearend of $4.6 billion. The puts in these contracts are exercisable only at their expiration dates, which occur between 2019 and 2027, and Berkshire will then need to make a payment only if the index in question is quoted at a level below that existing on the day that the put was written. Again, I believe these contracts, in aggregate, will be profitable and that we will, in addition, receive substantial income from our investment of the premiums we hold during the 15- or 20-year period.

第二类合约是我们对四个股票指数（标普500指数及三个境外指数）出售的看跌期权。这些期权原始期限为15或20年，行权价为签约时的市场价格。我们已收取45亿美元保费，年末计提负债46亿美元。此类期权仅可在到期日（2019-2027年间）行权，且只有当标的指数收盘价低于签约日价格时，伯克希尔才需支付差额。我仍坚信这些合约整体将盈利，且我们持有的大额保费在15-20年期间将产生可观收益。

Two aspects of our derivative contracts are particularly important. First, in all cases we hold the money, which means that we have no counterparty risk.
Second, accounting rules for our derivative contracts differ from those applying to our investment portfolio. In that portfolio, changes in value are applied to the net worth shown on Berkshire’s balance sheet, but do not affect earnings unless we sell (or write down) a holding. Changes in the value of a derivative contract, however, must be applied each quarter to earnings.

伯克希尔衍生品合约的两个特点尤其重要：
第一，我们始终持有现金，这意味着不存在交易对手风险；
第二，衍生品合约的会计处理与投资组合不同。投资组合价值变动计入伯克希尔资产负债表中的净资产，仅在卖出（或计提减值）时影响利润；而衍生品合约价值变动需按季度计入当期收益。

Thus, our derivative positions will sometimes cause large swings in reported earnings, even though Charlie and I might believe the intrinsic value of these positions has changed little. He and I will not be bothered by these swings – even though they could easily amount to $1 billion or more in a quarter – and we hope you won’t be either. You will recall that in our catastrophe insurance business, we are always ready to trade increased volatility in reported earnings in the short run for greater gains in net worth in the long run. That is our philosophy in derivatives as well.

因此，我们的衍生品头寸可能导致报告利润出现大幅波动，即使查理和我认为这些头寸的内在价值变化不大。我们不会受此类波动困扰——即使单季波动可能超过10亿美元，也希望您同样如此。您会记得在巨灾保险业务中，我们始终愿意以短期利润波动换取长期净资产的更大收益。这也是我们在衍生品领域的核心理念。

The U.S. dollar weakened further in 2007 against major currencies, and it’s no mystery why: Americans like buying products made elsewhere more than the rest of the world likes buying products made in the U.S. Inevitably, that causes America to ship about $2 billion of IOUs and assets daily to the rest of the world. And over time, that puts pressure on the dollar.

2007年美元对主要货币进一步贬值，原因显而易见：美国人更青睐进口商品，而世界其他国家对美国产品的购买欲相对较低。这种失衡必然导致美国每日向海外输出约20亿美元的债务和资产，长期来看对美元构成压力。

When the dollar falls, it both makes our products cheaper for foreigners to buy and their products more expensive for U.S. citizens. That’s why a falling currency is supposed to cure a trade deficit. Indeed, the U.S. deficit has undoubtedly been tempered by the large drop in the dollar. But ponder this: In 2002 when the Euro averaged 94.6¢, our trade deficit with Germany (the fifth largest of our trading partners) was $36 billion, whereas in 2007, with the Euro averaging $1.37, our deficit with Germany was up to $45 billion. Similarly, the Canadian dollar averaged 64¢ in 2002 and 93¢ in 2007. Yet our trade deficit with Canada rose as well, from $50 billion in 2002 to $64 billion in 2007. So far, at least, a plunging dollar has not done much to bring our trade activity into balance.

美元贬值使美国产品更便宜（促进出口），外国商品更贵（抑制进口），理论上应能缓解贸易逆差。事实上，美元大幅贬值确实对逆差有所抑制。但请注意：2002年欧元均价为0.946美元时，美国对德国（第五大贸易伙伴）的逆差为360亿美元；而2007年欧元均价升至1.37美元时，对德逆差却扩大至450亿美元。类似地，加元从2002年的0.64美元升至2007年的0.93美元，美加逆差也从500亿美元增至640亿美元。至少目前来看，美元暴跌并未有效平衡贸易活动。

There’s been much talk recently of sovereign wealth funds and how they are buying large pieces of American businesses. This is our doing, not some nefarious plot by foreign governments. Our trade equation guarantees massive foreign investment in the U.S. When we force-feed $2 billion daily to the rest of the world, they must invest in something here. Why should we complain when they choose stocks over bonds?

近期关于主权财富基金大举收购美国企业的讨论不断。这种现象源于美国自身的贸易失衡，并非外国政府的阴谋。我们的贸易赤字必然导致海外资金大规模流入美国。当我们每日向全球输出20亿美元时，海外资金必须在美国寻找投资标的。如果他们选择股票而非债券，我们又何必抱怨？

Our country’s weakening currency is not the fault of OPEC, China, etc. Other developed countries rely on imported oil and compete against Chinese imports just as we do. In developing a sensible trade policy, the U.S. should not single out countries to punish or industries to protect. Nor should we take actions likely to evoke retaliatory behavior that will reduce America’s exports, true trade that benefits both our country and the rest of the world.

美元疲软不应归咎于OPEC或中国等国。其他发达国家同样依赖石油进口并面临中国商品竞争。制定合理贸易政策时，美国不应针对特定国家或产业采取惩罚性措施，也不应采取可能引发报复、削弱美国出口的行动——因为真正的贸易（如美国出口）能同时惠及本国与世界。

Our legislators should recognize, however, that the current imbalances are unsustainable and should therefore adopt policies that will materially reduce them sooner rather than later. Otherwise our $2 billion daily of force-fed dollars to the rest of the world may produce global indigestion of an unpleasant sort. (For other comments about the unsustainability of our trade deficits, see Alan Greenspan’s comments on November 19, 2004, the Federal Open Market Committee’s minutes of June 29, 2004, and Ben Bernanke’s statement on September 11, 2007.)

但立法者应认识到当前失衡不可持续，应尽早采取措施实质性缓解。否则，每日向海外输出20亿美元终将引发全球经济的不适反应。（关于贸易逆差不可持续性的观点，亦可参见2004年11月19日格林斯潘讲话、2004年6月29日美联储会议纪要及2007年9月11日伯南克声明。）

At Berkshire we held only one direct currency position during 2007. That was in – hold your breath – the Brazilian real. Not long ago, swapping dollars for reals would have been unthinkable. After all, during the past century five versions of Brazilian currency have, in effect, turned into confetti. As has been true in many countries whose currencies have periodically withered and died, wealthy Brazilians sometimes stashed large sums in the U.S. to preserve their wealth.

2007年伯克希尔仅持有一项直接货币头寸——请屏息——是巴西雷亚尔（real）。就在不久前，美元换雷亚尔还被视为疯狂之举。毕竟过去百年间，巴西货币历经五次更迭，最终形同废纸。如同许多货币周期性崩溃的国家，巴西富裕阶层常将大笔资金存入美国以保值。

But any Brazilian who followed this apparently prudent course would have lost half his net worth over the past five years. Here’s the year-by-year record (indexed) of the real versus the dollar from the end of 2002 to yearend 2007: 100; 122; 133; 152; 166; 199. Every year the real went up and the dollar fell. Moreover, during much of this period the Brazilian government was actually holding down the value of the real and supporting our currency by buying dollars in the market.

然而若巴西人延续这种“保守”策略，过去五年将损失一半净资产。2002年底至2007年底，雷亚尔对美元汇率（以指数形式）按年份记录为：100；122；133；152；166；199。每年雷亚尔升值，美元贬值。更值得注意的是，巴西政府在这一时期多次通过购买美元人为压低雷亚尔汇率。

Our direct currency positions have yielded $2.3 billion of pre-tax profits over the past five years, and in addition we have profited by holding bonds of U.S. companies that are denominated in other currencies. For example, in 2001 and 2002 we purchased €310 million Amazon.com, Inc. 6 7/8 of 2010 at 57% of par. At the time, Amazon bonds were priced as “junk” credits, though they were anything but. (Yes, Virginia, you can occasionally find markets that are ridiculously inefficient – or at least you can find them anywhere except at the finance departments of some leading business schools.)

过去五年，我们的直接货币头寸贡献了23亿美元税前利润。此外，持有外币计价的美国企业债券也带来收益。例如2001-2002年间，我们以面值57%的价格购入亚马逊（Amazon.com Inc.）2010年到期的6 7/8债券，当时市场将其视为“垃圾债”，但实际并非如此。（是的，弗吉尼亚，市场偶尔会极度低效——至少在顶尖商学院的金融系以外可以找到此类机会。）

The Euro denomination of the Amazon bonds was a further, and important, attraction for us. The Euro was at 95¢ when we bought in 2002. Therefore, our cost in dollars came to only $169 million. Now the bonds sell at 102% of par and the Euro is worth $1.47. In 2005 and 2006 some of our bonds were called and we received $253 million for them. Our remaining bonds were valued at $162 million at yearend. Of our $246 million of realized and unrealized gain, about $118 million is attributable to the fall in the dollar. Currencies do matter.

亚马逊债券的欧元计价对我们而言是另一重要吸引力。2002年买入时，欧元兑美元为0.95。因此，我们的美元成本仅1.69亿美元。如今债券价格升至面值的102%，欧元兑美元升至1.47。2005-2006年间部分债券被赎回，我们获得2.53亿美元，剩余债券年末估值1.62亿美元。在2.46亿美元已实现和未实现收益中，约1.18亿美元源于美元贬值。货币汇率的影响不容忽视。

At Berkshire, we will attempt to further increase our stream of direct and indirect foreign earnings. Even if we are successful, however, our assets and earnings will always be concentrated in the U.S. Despite our country’s many imperfections and unrelenting problems of one sort or another, America’s rule of law, market-responsive economic system, and belief in meritocracy are almost certain to produce ever- growing prosperity for its citizens.

在伯克希尔，我们将努力进一步提升直接和间接的海外收益。然而，即使我们取得成功，我们的资产和盈利仍将主要集中于美国本土。尽管我国存在诸多缺陷和持续不断的各类问题，但美国的法治体系、市场导向的经济制度以及对英才制度的信念，几乎必然为其公民创造日益增长的繁荣。

As I have told you before, we have for some time been well-prepared for CEO succession because we have three outstanding internal candidates. The board knows exactly whom it would pick if I were to become unavailable, either because of death or diminishing abilities. And that would still leave the board with two backups.

正如我之前所言，我们早已为CEO继任做好充分准备，目前有三位杰出的内部候选人。董事会清楚若我因故无法履职（无论是死亡或能力衰退），会优先选择谁。此外，董事会仍保有两位备选人选。

Last year I told you that we would also promptly complete a succession plan for the investment job at Berkshire, and we have indeed now identified four candidates who could succeed me in managing investments. All manage substantial sums currently, and all have indicated a strong interest in coming to Berkshire if called. The board knows the strengths of the four and would expect to hire one or more if the need arises. The candidates are young to middle-aged, well-to-do to rich, and all wish to work for Berkshire for reasons that go beyond compensation.

去年我曾承诺我们会尽快完成伯克希尔投资岗位的继任计划。如今我们已确定四位潜在接班人，他们目前均管理着巨额资金，且均明确表示愿意在需要时加入伯克希尔。董事会了解这四人的优势，并预期在必要时聘请其中一人或多人。这些候选人年龄在青年至中年之间，财富状况从富裕到富有，他们希望加入伯克希尔的原因远超薪酬考量。

(I’ve reluctantly discarded the notion of my continuing to manage the portfolio after my death – abandoning my hope to give new meaning to the term “thinking outside the box.”)

（我不得不放弃在死后继续管理投资组合的想法——也终结了我对“打破常规思考”这一概念赋予新意义的希望。）

# Fanciful Figures – How Public Companies Juice Earnings (幻想的数字——公众公司如何粉饰盈利)

Former Senator Alan Simpson famously said: “Those who travel the high road in Washington need not fear heavy traffic.” If he had sought truly deserted streets, however, the Senator should have looked to Corporate America’s accounting.

前参议员艾伦·辛普森曾有名言：“在华盛顿走正道的人，无需担心拥堵。”但如果他想寻找真正荒无人烟的道路，应去审视美国企业的会计实践。

An important referendum on which road businesses prefer occurred in 1994. America’s CEOs had just strong-armed the U.S. Senate into ordering the Financial Accounting Standards Board to shut up, by a vote that was 88-9. Before that rebuke the FASB had shown the audacity – by unanimous agreement, no less – to tell corporate chieftains that the stock options they were being awarded represented a form of compensation and that their value should be recorded as an expense.

1994年，企业偏好的道路迎来关键投票。美国企业CEO们强行推动参议院以88比9的投票结果，迫使财务会计准则委员会（FASB）闭嘴。此前，FASB曾大胆（且全体一致）地告知企业高管：他们获得的股票期权属于一种薪酬形式，其价值应计入费用。

After the senators voted, the FASB – now educated on accounting principles by the Senate’s 88 closet CPAs – decreed that companies could choose between two methods of reporting on options. The preferred treatment would be to expense their value, but it would also be allowable for companies to ignore the expense as long as their options were issued at market value.

参议院投票后，FASB（现被参议院88位“隐藏的注册会计师”教育）裁定企业可自行选择期权会计方法。首选方法是将期权价值计入费用，但若期权行权价与市场价一致，企业也可选择忽略该费用。

A moment of truth had now arrived for America’s CEOs, and their reaction was not a pretty sight. During the next six years, exactly two of the 500 companies in the S&P chose the preferred route. CEOs of the rest opted for the low road, thereby ignoring a large and obvious expense in order to report higher “earnings.” I’m sure some of them also felt that if they opted for expensing, their directors might in future years think twice before approving the mega-grants the managers longed for.

美国企业CEO们迎来了真相时刻，但他们的反应并不光彩。在接下来的六年里，标普500中仅两家公司选择首选方法。其余CEO走上了低俗之路，故意忽略一项重大且显而易见的支出，以虚报更高的“盈利”。我确信，有些CEO认为若选择计入费用，董事会在未来可能三思是否批准管理层渴望的巨额期权。

It turned out that for many CEOs even the low road wasn’t good enough. Under the weakened rule, there remained earnings consequences if options were issued with a strike price below market value. No problem. To avoid that bothersome rule, a number of companies surreptitiously backdated options to falsely indicate that they were granted at current market prices, when in fact they were dished out at prices well below market.

事实证明，对许多CEO而言，连这条低俗之路仍不够“完美”。根据削弱后的规则，若期权行权价低于市价，仍需承担盈利影响。但这难不倒他们。为规避这一麻烦，多家公司秘密倒签期权授予日期，虚假显示其按市价授予，实则以远低于市价的价格发放。

Decades of option-accounting nonsense have now been put to rest, but other accounting choices remain – important among these the investment-return assumption a company uses in calculating pension expense. It will come as no surprise that many companies continue to choose an assumption that allows them to report less-than-solid “earnings.” For the 363 companies in the S&P that have pension plans, this assumption in 2006 averaged 8%. Let’s look at the chances of that being achieved.

数十年的期权会计闹剧已告一段落，但其他会计选择仍存争议——其中重要的是公司在计算养老金支出时采用的投资回报假设。许多公司继续选择乐观假设以报告不稳固的“盈利”，这并不令人意外。标普500中拥有养老金计划的363家公司，2006年该假设的平均值为8%。让我们分析这一目标的实现概率。

The average holdings of bonds and cash for all pension funds is about 28%, and on these assets returns can be expected to be no more than 5%. Higher yields, of course, are obtainable but they carry with them a risk of commensurate (or greater) loss.

所有养老金基金的债券和现金平均持仓约为28%，这些资产的预期回报率不超过5%。当然，更高收益可以实现，但伴随的是相称（或更高）的风险。

This means that the remaining 72% of assets – which are mostly in equities, either held directly or through vehicles such as hedge funds or private-equity investments – must earn 9.2% in order for the fund overall to achieve the postulated 8%. And that return must be delivered after all fees, which are now far higher than they have ever been.

这意味着剩余72%的资产（主要为股票，直接持有或通过对冲基金、私募股权等工具）需实现9.2%的回报率，才能使整体基金达到预设的8%。而这一回报需在扣除所有费用后实现，如今费用远高于历史水平。

How realistic is this expectation? Let’s revisit some data I mentioned two years ago: During the 20th Century, the Dow advanced from 66 to 11,497. This gain, though it appears huge, shrinks to 5.3% when compounded annually. An investor who owned the Dow throughout the century would also have received generous dividends for much of the period, but only about 2% or so in the final years. It was a wonderful century.

这一预期现实吗？回顾两年前的数据：20世纪道指从66涨至11,497点。看似巨大，但年复合增长率仅为5.3%。整个世纪持有道指的投资者，期间大部分年份能获得丰厚股息，但末期仅约2%。这是美好的一个世纪。

Think now about this century. For investors to merely match that 5.3% market-value gain, the Dow – recently below 13,000 – would need to close at about 2,000,000 on December 31, 2099. We are now eight years into this century, and we have racked up less than 2,000 of the 1,988,000 Dow points the market needed to travel in this hundred years to equal the 5.3% of the last.

设想本世纪的情形：若投资者仅想匹配上个世纪5.3%的市值增长，道指（当前低于13,000点）需在2099年底达到约200万点。我们已走过本世纪前8年，仅累计不到2,000点涨幅，而要达到上个世纪的5.3%复合增长率，需在未来百年内累计198.8万点涨幅。

It’s amusing that commentators regularly hyperventilate at the prospect of the Dow crossing an even number of thousands, such as 14,000 or 15,000. If they keep reacting that way, a 5.3% annual gain for the century will mean they experience at least 1,986 seizures during the next 92 years. While anything is possible, does anyone really believe this is the most likely outcome?

评论员们常因道指突破14,000或15,000等整数千点而过度兴奋，这令人发笑。若他们持续如此反应，本世纪年均5.3%的增长意味着未来92年他们将至少经历1,986次“窒息式狂欢”。虽然一切皆有可能，但真有人相信这是最可能的结果吗？

Dividends continue to run about 2%. Even if stocks were to average the 5.3% annual appreciation of the 1900s, the equity portion of plan assets – allowing for expenses of .5% – would produce no more than 7% or so. And .5% may well understate costs, given the presence of layers of consultants and high-priced managers (“helpers”).

股息率维持在约2%。即使股票能实现1900年代的年均5.3%增值，扣除0.5%费用后，养老金资产的股票部分回报率将不超过7%。而0.5%的费用率可能低估了成本，毕竟存在多层顾问和高薪经理人（“帮手”）。

Naturally, everyone expects to be above average. And those helpers – bless their hearts – will certainly encourage their clients in this belief. But, as a class, the helper-aided group must be below average. The reason is simple:

Investors, overall, will necessarily earn an average return, minus costs they incur;
Passive and index investors, through their very inactivity, will earn that average minus costs that are very low;
With that group earning average returns, so must the remaining group – the active investors. But this group will incur high transaction, management, and advisory costs. Therefore, the active investors will have their returns diminished by a far greater percentage than will their inactive brethren. That means that the passive group – the “know-nothings” – must win.

显然，每个人都自认高于平均。而那些“帮手们”——愿上帝祝福他们的心肠——必然鼓励客户抱持这一信念。但从整体来看，依赖帮手的群体必然低于平均。原因如下：

所有投资者整体必获平均回报，但需扣除各自成本；
被动型投资者因其不作为，只需支付极低成本，故可获得平均回报；
若被动群体获得平均回报，剩余主动投资者群体也必须接受平均回报。但他们需承担高额交易、管理和咨询成本。因此，主动投资者的回报率将比被动者低得多。这意味着被动群体——“一无所知者”——必胜。

I should mention that people who expect to earn 10% annually from equities during this century – envisioning that 2% of that will come from dividends and 8% from price appreciation – are implicitly forecasting a level of about 24,000,000 on the Dow by 2100. If your adviser talks to you about double-digit returns from equities, explain this math to him – not that it will faze him. Many helpers are apparently direct descendants of the queen in Alice in Wonderland, who said: “Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.” Beware the glib helper who fills your head with fantasies while he fills his pockets with fees.

我必须指出：若有人预计本世纪股票年回报率达10%（其中2%来自股息，8%来自股价增值），这意味着道指将在2100年达到2,400万点。若你的顾问谈论双位数回报，请向他解释这一数学逻辑——虽然他未必在意。许多“帮手”显然是《爱丽丝梦游仙境》中红心皇后（Queen of Hearts）的直系后代，她说过：“哦，有时我在早餐前能相信六件不可能的事。”警惕那些用幻想填满你脑袋、用费用填满自己口袋的油滑帮手吧。

Some companies have pension plans in Europe as well as in the U.S. and, in their accounting, almost all assume that the U.S. plans will earn more than the non-U.S. plans. This discrepancy is puzzling: Why should these companies not put their U.S. managers in charge of the non-U.S. pension assets and let them work their magic on these assets as well? I’ve never seen this puzzle explained. But the auditors and actuaries who are charged with vetting the return assumptions seem to have no problem with it.

一些公司在美国和欧洲均设有养老金计划，但几乎所有公司在会计处理上假设美国计划的回报率高于非美国计划。这一矛盾令人费解：为何这些公司不让美国经理人管理非美资产并施展其魔法？我从未见过对此问题的解释。但审计师和精算师似乎对这一假设毫无异议。

(I’ve reluctantly discarded the notion of my continuing to manage the portfolio after my death – abandoning my hope to give new meaning to the term “thinking outside the box.”)

（我不得不放弃在死后继续管理投资组合的想法——也终结了我对“打破常规思考”这一概念赋予新意义的希望。）

# Fanciful Figures – How Public Companies Juice Earnings (幻想的数字——公众公司如何粉饰盈利)

前参议员艾伦·辛普森曾有名言：“在华盛顿走正道的人，无需担心拥堵。”但如果他想寻找真正荒无人烟的道路，应去审视美国企业的会计实践。

所有养老金基金的债券和现金平均持仓约为28%，这些资产的预期回报率不超过5%。当然，更高收益可以实现，但伴随的是相称（或更高）的风险。

Investors, overall, will necessarily earn an average return, minus costs they incur;
Passive and index investors, through their very inactivity, will earn that average minus costs that are very low;
With that group earning average returns, so must the remaining group – the active investors. But this group will incur high transaction, management, and advisory costs. Therefore, the active investors will have their returns diminished by a far greater percentage than will their inactive brethren. That means that the passive group – the “know-nothings” – must win.

所有投资者整体必获平均回报，但需扣除各自成本；
被动型投资者因其不作为，只需支付极低成本，故可获得平均回报；
若被动群体获得平均回报，主动投资者群体也必须接受平均回报。但他们需承担高额交易、管理和咨询成本。因此，主动投资者的回报率将比被动者低得多。这意味着被动群体——“一无所知者”——必胜。

一些公司在美国和欧洲均设有养老金计划，但几乎所有公司在会计处理上假设美国计划的回报率高于非美国计划。这一矛盾令人费解：为何不让美国经理人管理非美资产并施展其魔法？我从未见过对此问题的解释。但审计师和精算师似乎对这一假设毫无异议。

What is no puzzle, however, is why CEOs opt for a high investment assumption: It lets them report higher earnings. And if they are wrong, as I believe they are, the chickens won’t come home to roost until long after they retire.

然而，CEO们为何选择高回报假设却并不难理解：这能让他们报告更高的盈利。即使他们判断错误（我认为多数情况如此），恶果也会在他们退休多年后才显现。

After decades of pushing the envelope – or worse – in its attempt to report the highest number possible for current earnings, Corporate America should ease up. It should listen to my partner, Charlie: “If you’ve hit three balls out of bounds to the left, aim a little to the right on the next swing.”

数十年来，美国企业不断突破底线——甚至更糟——只为粉饰当期盈利。如今它们该适可而止了。请听我的合伙人查理的建议：“如果你前三杆都打偏到左侧界外，下一杆就该稍微向右调整方向。”

Whatever pension-cost surprises are in store for shareholders down the road, these jolts will be surpassed many times over by those experienced by taxpayers. Public pension promises are huge and, in many cases, funding is woefully inadequate. Because the fuse on this time bomb is long, politicians flinch from inflicting tax pain, given that problems will only become apparent long after these officials have departed. Promises involving very early retirement – sometimes to those in their low 40s – and generous cost-of-living adjustments are easy for these officials to make. In a world where people are living longer and inflation is certain, those promises will be anything but easy to keep.

无论未来股东会面临多少养老金成本的意外冲击，纳税人的困境都将被放大数十倍。公共养老金承诺规模巨大，但多数情况下资金严重不足。由于这一“定时炸弹”的引信很长，政客们不愿增加税收，因为问题爆发时他们早已离任。他们轻易许诺超早退休（有时对象仅40岁出头）和慷慨的生活成本调整条款。在一个寿命延长且通胀必然的世界里，这些承诺终将难以兑现。

Having laid out the failures of an “honor system” in American accounting, I need to point out that this is exactly the system existing at Berkshire for a truly huge balance-sheet item. In every report we make to you, we must guesstimate the loss reserves for our insurance units. If our estimate is wrong, it means that both our balance sheet and our earnings statement will be wrong. So naturally we do our best to make these guesses accurate. Nevertheless, in every report our estimate is sure to be wrong.

在揭示美国会计体系“自律机制”的失败后，我必须指出，伯克希尔对一项重大资产负债表项目也采用这种“自律系统”。每份报告中，我们都要估算保险业务的损失准备金。若估算错误，我们的资产负债表和利润表都将失真。因此我们竭力确保准确性，但每次估算必然存在偏差。

At yearend 2007, we show an insurance liability of $56 billion that represents our guess as to what we will eventually pay for all loss events that occurred before yearend (except for about $3 billion of the reserve that has been discounted to present value). We know of many thousands of events and have put a dollar value on each that reflects what we believe we will pay, including the associated costs (such as attorney’s fees) that we will incur in the payment process. In some cases, among them claims for certain serious injuries covered by worker’s compensation, payments will be made for 50 years or more.

2007年末，我们列示了560亿美元的保险负债，这是对截至年末所有已发生损失事件（除约30亿美元已折现的准备金外）最终赔付金额的估算。我们掌握数千起事件的具体信息，并为每起事件标注了预计赔付金额（含相关费用如律师费）。某些案件（如工伤赔偿中的严重伤害索赔），赔付周期可能长达50年以上。

We also include a large reserve for losses that occurred before yearend but that we have yet to hear about. Sometimes, the insured itself does not know that a loss has occurred. (Think of an embezzlement that remains undiscovered for years.) We sometimes hear about losses from policies that covered our insured many decades ago.

我们还为未报告的已发生损失计提了大额准备金。有时，被保险人自己都不知晓损失存在（设想一笔潜伏多年的贪污案）。我们偶尔会收到数十年前保单的理赔通知。

A story I told you some years back illustrates our problem in accurately estimating our loss liability: A fellow was on an important business trip in Europe when his sister called to tell him that their dad had died. Her brother explained that he couldn’t get back but said to spare nothing on the funeral, whose cost he would cover. When he returned, his sister told him that the service had been beautiful and presented him with bills totaling $8,000. He paid up but a month later received a bill from the mortuary for $10. He paid that, too – and still another $10 charge he received a month later. When a third $10 invoice was sent to him the following month, the perplexed man called his sister to ask what was going on. “Oh,” she replied, “I forgot to tell you. We buried Dad in a rented suit.”

多年前讲过一个故事说明准备金估算的难题：一位先生在欧洲出差时接到妹妹电话，父亲去世了。他因无法赶回叮嘱“葬礼不必节省”。返程后，他支付了8,000美元账单，一个月后殡仪馆又送来10美元账单，他照付。次月再收10美元账单时，他终于困惑致电妹妹。对方轻描淡写：“忘了告诉你，爸爸是穿着租来的西装下葬的。”

At our insurance companies we have an unknown, but most certainly large, number of “rented suits” buried around the world. We try to estimate the bill for them accurately. In ten or twenty years, we will even be able to make a good guess as to how inaccurate our present guess is. But even that guess will be subject to surprises. I personally believe our stated reserves are adequate, but I’ve been wrong several times in the past.

在伯克希尔保险业务中，全球范围内存在大量未知但必然存在的“租来的西装”式隐性成本。我们试图精准估算这些费用，但即便十年后也只能模糊修正当前的估算。我本人相信现有准备金充足，但过去我已犯过数次错误。

# The Annual Meeting（股东大会）

Our meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 3rd. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.

今年股东大会将于5月3日（星期六）举行。与往年一样，Qwest会展中心将于早上7点开门，8:30播放伯克希尔最新影片。9:30进入问答环节（中午可在展位用餐），持续至下午3点。短暂休息后，查理和我将于3:15正式召开年度会议。若您需提前离场，请在查理发言时悄悄离开。

The best reason to exit, of course is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, the 27,000 people who came to the meeting did their part, and almost every location racked up record sales. But you can do better. (If necessary, I’ll lock the doors.)

当然，离场的最佳理由是购物。我们将用194,300平方英尺的展厅陈列伯克希尔子公司的产品。去年27,000名参会者贡献了破纪录的销售业绩。今年你们可以做得更好。（必要时，我会亲自锁门确保购物时间。）

This year we will again showcase a Clayton home (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings and NFM furniture). You will find that this 1,550-square-foot home, priced at $69,500, delivers exceptional value. And after you purchase the house, consider also acquiring the Forest River RV and pontoon boat on display nearby.

今年我们将再次展示一套克莱顿住宅（配备阿克米砖块、邵氏地毯、约翰曼维尔隔热材料、MiTek紧固件、Carefree遮阳篷和内布拉斯加家具商城家具）。这套1,550平方英尺的住宅售价仅69,500美元，性价比极高。购买房屋后，不妨顺带看看现场展出的Forest River房车和浮筒船。

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 45 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.

GEICO将在展位安排全国顶尖顾问团队，为您现场提供汽车保险报价。绝大多数地区（50个司法管辖区中的45个）的股东可享8%专属折扣（若符合其他折扣条件，如特定团体优惠，则不可叠加）。请携带现有保单详情前来比价，我相信至少半数股东能通过GEICO节省开支。

On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane. And take all the hair gel and scissors that you wish on board with you.

星期六，奥马哈机场将照例陈列NetJets机队供您参观。请到Qwest展馆展位咨询看机事宜。来时坐大巴，离场时开着新飞机走。随身携带护发胶和剪刀也不成问题。

Next, if you have any money left, visit the Bookworm, where you will find about 25 books and DVDs – all discounted – led again by Poor Charlie’s Almanack. Without any advertising or bookstore placement, Charlie’s book has now remarkably sold nearly 50,000 copies. For those of you who can’t make the meeting, go to poorcharliesalmanack.com to order a copy.

最后，若还有闲钱，可到Bookworm展台选购约25种折扣书籍和DVD，其中查理的《穷查理宝典》仍居首位。在未做广告、未进书店的情况下，该书销量已近5万册。若无法参会，请访问poorcharliesalmanack.com订购。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.

随本报告附寄的代理材料中包含一份附件，说明您如何获得参会及参与其他活动所需的入场凭证。关于机票、酒店和租车预订，我们再次委托美国运通（800-799-6634）为您提供专属协助。负责此事的Carol Pedersen每年为我们高效处理此类事务，我在此表示感谢。酒店房间紧张时，只要与Carol合作，您一定能订到房。

# At Nebraska Furniture Mart（内布拉斯加家具商城特别活动）

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM eleven years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $30.9 million in 2007. This is more volume than most furniture stores register in a year.

位于多奇大道与太平洋大道之间的第72街占地77英亩的内布拉斯加家具商城（NFM），将再次推出“伯克希尔周末”折扣价。这项活动始于1996年，当时“伯克希尔周末”销售额为530万美元，2007年已增长至3,090万美元，远超多数家具店的全年销售额。

To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, May 1st and Monday, May 5th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a Baja Beach Bash featuring beef and chicken tacos.

要享受伯克希尔折扣，请于5月1日（星期四）至5月5日（星期一）期间购物并出示会议入场凭证。此次特惠甚至适用于多家通常严禁打折的顶级制造商产品——他们为我们的股东周末破例支持。我们对此深表感谢。NFM营业时间为周一至周六上午10点至晚上9点，周日为上午10点至下午6点。今年周六（5月3日）下午5:30至8点，NFM还将举办巴哈海滩派对（Baja Beach Bash），提供牛肉和鸡肉塔可（Tacos）。

# At Borsheims（波仙珠宝行特别活动）

We will again have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 28th through Saturday, May 10th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.

预计整个周末波仙珠宝行（Borsheims）将人流如潮。为方便您购物，股东专属折扣将从4月28日（周一）延续至5月10日（周六）。购物时请出示会议凭证或显示您持有伯克希尔股份的券商证明。

The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 2nd.
The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 4th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.

2008年波仙珠宝行活动安排如下：

5月2日（星期五）下午6点至10点：鸡尾酒招待会；
5月4日（星期日）上午9点至下午4点：主会庆典。

On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.
Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 4th, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Last year Gorat’s, which seats 240, served 915 dinners on Shareholder Sunday. The three-day total was 2,487 including 656 T-bone steaks, the entrée preferred by the cognoscenti. Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on that day, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before).

周六营业至下午6点。
Gorat’s牛排馆将于5月4日（周日）仅对伯克希尔股东开放，营业时间从下午4点至10点。去年股东周日当天，仅240个座位的Gorat’s供应了915份晚餐，三天总计2,487份（含656份股东们钟爱的T骨牛排）。请务必记住：当天用餐需提前预订，4月1日当天（不得提前）拨打402-551-3733预约。

We will again have a reception at 4 p.m. on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside of North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far. Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 400 of you from many dozens of countries. Any shareholder who comes from other than the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.

周六下午4点将举办国际股东欢迎会，专为来自北美以外地区的股东而设。每年都有来自数十个国家的数百位股东参与，查理和我都亲自到场致意。去年我们与400多位国际股东亲切交流。凡来自美国和加拿大以外的股东将获发特别凭证及活动指引。

At 84 and 77, Charlie and I remain lucky beyond our dreams. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a “business” gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to that experienced by many people who contribute as much or more to our society’s well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. Every day is exciting to us; no wonder we tap-dance to work. But nothing is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting. So join us on May 3rd at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We’ll see you there.
February 2008
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

查理84岁，我77岁，仍感幸运远超所求。我们生于美国，父母卓越，为我们提供良好教育，家庭幸福、健康无忧；更难得的是天生具备“商业基因”，使我们比许多对社会贡献相当甚至更多的人获得远超比例的财富。更值得感恩的是，我们拥有热爱的工作，身边有才华横溢的伙伴鼎力相助。每天对我们而言都充满激情，难怪我们“踢踏舞着上班”。而最令我们期待的，是与全球股东伙伴在伯克希尔年度聚会重逢。5月3日，Qwest中心，与我们共赴“资本主义者伍德斯托克音乐节”。我们不见不散。

2008年2月
沃伦·巴菲特
董事会主席

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上次更新: 2025/07/14, 21:42:27

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