1994巴菲特致股东的信
# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (致伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东们)
Our gain in net worth during 1994 was $1.45 billion or 13.9%. Over the last 30 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19 to $10,083, or at a rate of 23% compounded annually.
1994年，我们的净资产增长了14.5亿美元，即13.9%。在过去30年中（也就是从现任管理层接管以来），我们每股账面价值已从19美元增长到10,083美元，年复合增长率达23%。
Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I make few predictions. One we will confidently offer, however, is that the future performance of Berkshire won't come close to matching the performance of the past.
查理·芒格（Berkshire副主席及我的合伙人）和我都很少做预测。然而，我们可以信心十足地提出一个观点：伯克希尔未来的业绩将远不如过去那样出色。
The problem is not that what has worked in the past will cease to work in the future. To the contrary, we believe that our formula - the purchase at sensible prices of businesses that have good underlying economics and are run by honest and able people - is certain to produce reasonable success. We expect, therefore, to keep on doing well.
问题并不是说过去有效的策略未来就不再有效。恰恰相反，我们认为我们的方法——以合理价格收购那些具备良好基本面、由诚实能干的人管理的企业——肯定能够带来合理的成功。因此，我们预期仍将继续表现良好。
A fat wallet, however, is the enemy of superior investment results. And Berkshire now has a net worth of $11.9 billion compared to about $22 million when Charlie and I began to manage the company. Though there are as many good businesses as ever, it is useless for us to make purchases that are inconsequential in relation to Berkshire's capital. (As Charlie regularly reminds me, "If something is not worth doing at all, it's not worth doing well.") We now consider a security for purchase only if we believe we can deploy at least $100 million in it. Given that minimum, Berkshire's investment universe has shrunk dramatically.
然而，资金过于充裕是卓越投资成果的大敌。如今伯克希尔的净资产已达119亿美元，而当年我和查理接手公司时只有约2,200万美元。尽管目前仍有大量优质企业存在，但对我们而言，相对于伯克希尔的资本规模来说微不足道的投资已经毫无意义。（正如查理经常提醒我的：“如果某件事根本不值得做，那就没必要把它做得很好。”）我们现在只考虑那些我们相信至少可以投入1亿美元的投资标的。考虑到这一最低门槛，伯克希尔可投资的范围已经大幅缩小。
Nevertheless, we will stick with the approach that got us here and try not to relax our standards. Ted Williams, in The Story of My Life, explains why: "My argument is, to be a good hitter, you've got to get a good ball to hit. It's the first rule in the book. If I have to bite at stuff that is out of my happy zone, I'm not a .344 hitter. I might only be a .250 hitter." Charlie and I agree and will try to wait for opportunities that are well within our own "happy zone."
尽管如此，我们仍将坚持让我们走到今天的方法，并努力不降低标准。泰德·威廉姆斯在《我的人生故事》中解释了原因：“我认为，要成为一名优秀的击球手，你必须击打好球。这是书中的第一条规则。如果我不得不去击打那些远离我舒适区的球，我就不可能保持0.344的击球率，也许只能达到0.250。” 查理和我都同意这一点，我们将继续等待那些完全处于我们“舒适区”内的机会。
We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts, which are an expensive distraction for many investors and businessmen. Thirty years ago, no one could have foreseen the huge expansion of the Vietnam War, wage and price controls, two oil shocks, the resignation of a president, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a one-day drop in the Dow of 508 points, or treasury bill yields fluctuating between 2.8% and 17.4%.
我们将继续忽略政治和经济预测，这些对许多投资者和商人来说是一种昂贵的干扰。三十年前，没有人能预见到越南战争的巨大升级、工资与物价管制、两次石油危机、一位总统辞职、苏联解体、道琼斯指数单日暴跌508点，或者国库券收益率在2.8%至17.4%之间波动。
But, surprise - none of these blockbuster events made the slightest dent in Ben Graham's investment principles. Nor did they render unsound the negotiated purchases of fine businesses at sensible prices. Imagine the cost to us, then, if we had let a fear of unknowns cause us to defer or alter the deployment of capital. Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when apprehensions about some macro event were at a peak. Fear is the foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist.
但令人惊讶的是——这些重大事件并未动摇本杰明·格雷厄姆的投资原则，也未使我们以合理价格协商收购优质企业的做法失效。试想一下，如果我们因为对未知事件的恐惧而推迟或改变资本部署，那会给我们造成多大的损失。事实上，我们通常是在人们对某些宏观事件感到极度担忧时做出最佳投资决策的。恐惧是投机者的敌人，却是基本面投资者的朋友。
A different set of major shocks is sure to occur in the next 30 years. We will neither try to predict these nor to profit from them. If we can identify businesses similar to those we have purchased in the past, external surprises will have little effect on our long-term results.
未来30年必定会出现另一组重大的冲击事件。我们既不会试图预测这些事件，也不会试图从中获利。只要我们能找到类似于过去所收购的优质企业，外部的意外事件对我们的长期结果影响将非常有限。
What we promise you - along with more modest gains - is that during your ownership of Berkshire, you will fare just as Charlie and I do. If you suffer, we will suffer; if we prosper, so will you. And we will not break this bond by introducing compensation arrangements that give us a greater participation in the upside than the downside.
我们向你们承诺的是——除了收益可能更加温和之外——在你们持有伯克希尔期间，你们的命运将与我和查理完全一致。如果你们遭受损失，我们也将一同承受；如果我们在赚钱，你们也会分享。我们不会通过设定任何让管理层在上行中有更多分成而在下行中却不用承担相应风险的薪酬安排来破坏这种关系。
We further promise you that our personal fortunes will remain overwhelmingly concentrated in Berkshire shares: We will not ask you to invest with us and then put our own money elsewhere. In addition, Berkshire dominates both the investment portfolios of most members of our families and of a great many friends who belonged to partnerships that Charlie and I ran in the 1960's. We could not be more motivated to do our best.
我们进一步承诺，我们的个人财富仍将主要集中在伯克希尔的股票上：我们不会要求你们与我们一起投资后，自己却把钱投向别处。此外，无论是我们的大多数家庭成员，还是上世纪60年代曾参与过我和查理合伙基金的众多朋友，他们的投资组合中也几乎都是伯克希尔的资产。我们无法更有动力尽最大努力工作了。
Luckily, we have a good base from which to work. Ten years ago, in 1984, Berkshire's insurance companies held securities having a value of $1.7 billion, or about $1,500 per Berkshire share. Leaving aside all income and capital gains from those securities, Berkshire's pre-tax earnings that year were only about $6 million. We had earnings, yes, from our various manufacturing, retailing and service businesses, but they were almost entirely offset by the combination of underwriting losses in our insurance business, corporate overhead and interest expense.
幸运的是，我们有一个良好的基础可供发展。十年前，也就是1984年，伯克希尔旗下的保险公司持有的证券总价值为17亿美元，约合每股1,500美元。如果不计算这些证券带来的收入和资本收益，伯克希尔当年的税前利润仅为约600万美元。是的，我们的制造、零售和服务等各项业务确实产生了盈利，但这些盈利几乎全部被保险业务的承保亏损、公司日常开支以及利息支出所抵消。
Now we hold securities worth $18 billion, or over $15,000 per Berkshire share. If you again exclude all income from these securities, our pre-tax earnings in 1994 were about $384 million. During the decade, employment has grown from 5,000 to 22,000 (including eleven people at World Headquarters).
如今，我们持有的证券市值已达180亿美元，约合每股超过15,000美元。同样不计这些证券所带来的收入，1994年我们的税前利润约为3.84亿美元。在这十年间，员工人数也从5,000人增长到了22,000人（包括总部的11人）。
We achieved our gains through the efforts of a superb corps of operating managers who get extraordinary results from some ordinary-appearing businesses. Casey Stengel described managing a baseball team as "getting paid for home runs other fellows hit." That's my formula at Berkshire, also.
我们的成绩得益于一群杰出的运营经理人的努力，他们能让一些看似普通的业务产生非凡的成果。凯西·斯坦格尔曾将棒球队的管理描述为“因别人打出全垒打而获得报酬”。这也是我在伯克希尔所采用的方式。
The businesses in which we have partial interests are equally important to Berkshire's success. A few statistics will illustrate their significance: In 1994, Coca-Cola sold about 280 billion 8-ounce servings and earned a little less than a penny on each. But pennies add up. Through Berkshire's 7.8% ownership of Coke, we have an economic interest in 21 billion of its servings, which produce "soft-drink earnings" for us of nearly $200 million. Similarly, by way of its Gillette stock, Berkshire has a 7% share of the world's razor and blade market (measured by revenues, not by units), a proportion according us about $250 million of sales in 1994. And, at Wells Fargo, a $53 billion bank, our 13% ownership translates into a $7 billion "Berkshire Bank" that earned about $100 million during 1994.
我们拥有部分权益的公司对伯克希尔的成功同样至关重要。几个数据可以说明它们的重要性：1994年，可口可乐售出了约2,800亿份8盎司饮料，每份赚取不到1美分。但积少成多。通过伯克希尔持有的7.8%股份，我们相当于拥有其中210亿份饮料的经济利益，为我们带来了近2亿美元的“软饮收益”。同样地，通过持有吉列公司的股份，伯克希尔在全球剃须刀和刀片市场中占据7%的份额（按营收而非单位计算），这使我们在1994年获得了约2.5亿美元的销售额。至于拥有530亿美元资产的富国银行，我们持有其13%的股份，这意味着我们拥有一家价值70亿美元的“伯克希尔银行”，它在1994年为我们赚取了约1亿美元的利润。
It's far better to own a significant portion of the Hope diamond than 100% of a rhinestone, and the companies just mentioned easily qualify as rare gems. Best of all, we aren't limited to simply a few of this breed, but instead possess a growing collection.
拥有希望钻石的一大部分，远胜于拥有一堆廉价的仿制品。而前面提到的那些公司显然都属于稀有珍宝。更妙的是，我们并不局限于仅拥有这类企业的少数几个，而是正在积累一个不断增长的收藏组合。
Stock prices will continue to fluctuate - sometimes sharply - and the economy will have its ups and down. Over time, however, we believe it highly probable that the sort of businesses we own will continue to increase in value at a satisfactory rate.
股票价格将继续波动——有时甚至剧烈波动，经济也会有起有落。但从长期来看，我们相信我们所拥有的这类企业很可能会以令人满意的速度持续增值。
# Book Value and Intrinsic Value（账面价值与内在价值）
We regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. Just as regularly, we tell you that what counts is intrinsic value, a number that is impossible to pinpoint but essential to estimate.
我们定期公布每股账面价值，这是一个容易计算但用途有限的数字。我们也同样经常告诉各位：真正重要的是内在价值，这个数值无法精确确定，但必须进行估算。
For example, in 1964, we could state with certitude that Berkshire's per-share book value was $19.46. However, that figure considerably overstated the stock's intrinsic value since all of the company's resources were tied up in a sub-profitable textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. In 1964, then, anyone inquiring into the soundness of Berkshire's balance sheet might well have deserved the answer once offered up by a Hollywood mogul of dubious reputation: "Don't worry, the liabilities are solid."
例如，在1964年，我们可以确切地说伯克希尔的每股账面价值为19.46美元。然而，这一数字严重高估了股票的实际内在价值，因为当时公司所有资源都被困在一个盈利能力极低的纺织业务中。我们的纺织资产无论是持续经营价值还是清算价值，都无法达到其账面价值。因此在1964年，任何询问伯克希尔资产负债表是否稳健的人，或许会得到一句好莱坞某名声不佳的大亨曾说过的话作为回应：“别担心，负债是实在的。”
Today, Berkshire's situation has reversed: Many of the businesses we control are worth far more than their carrying value. (Those we don't control, such as Coca-Cola or Gillette, are carried at current market values.) We continue to give you book value figures, however, because they serve as a rough, albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire's intrinsic value. Last year, in fact, the two measures moved in concert: Book value gained 13.9%, and that was the approximate gain in intrinsic value also.
如今，伯克希尔的情况已完全逆转：我们控制的许多企业价值远远超过它们的账面价值。（我们不完全控制的企业，如可口可乐或吉列，则按当前市值入账。）不过我们仍继续提供账面价值数据，因为它们可以作为一种粗略、但显著低估的指标，用于追踪伯克希尔的内在价值。事实上，去年这两项指标同步上升：账面价值增长了13.9%，这也是内在价值的大致增幅。
We define intrinsic value as the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life. Anyone calculating intrinsic value necessarily comes up with a highly subjective figure that will change both as estimates of future cash flows are revised and as interest rates move. Despite its fuzziness, however, intrinsic value is all-important and is the only logical way to evaluate the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses.
我们将内在价值定义为企业在其剩余生命周期中能够提取出来的现金流的折现值。任何人计算内在价值时，都会得出一个高度主观的数字，该数字会随着对未来现金流预期的变化以及利率的变动而变化。尽管它具有模糊性，但内在价值至关重要，它是评估投资和企业相对吸引力的唯一合乎逻辑的方式。
To see how historical input (book value) and future output (intrinsic value) can diverge, let's look at another form of investment, a college education. Think of the education's cost as its "book value." If it is to be accurate, the cost should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job.
为了说明历史投入（账面价值）与未来产出（内在价值）之间可能存在的巨大差异，让我们看看另一种形式的投资：大学教育。把教育的成本视为它的“账面价值”。如果要准确计算，这个成本还应包括学生因选择上大学而非就业而放弃的收入。
For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education.
在这个练习中，我们将忽略教育的重要非经济利益，仅严格关注其经济价值。首先，我们必须估算毕业生一生中将获得的收入，并减去他若没有接受教育所能赚取的收入估计值。这给我们一个超额收入数字，然后必须以适当的利率将其折现回毕业那天。最终所得金额即为教育的内在经济价值。
Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid for the education didn't get his money's worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.
有些毕业生会发现他们的教育账面价值超过了内在价值，这意味着支付教育费用的人并没有获得物有所值的回报。而在其他情况下，教育的内在价值会远超其账面价值，这表明资本得到了明智的部署。无论如何，有一点是明确的：账面价值作为衡量内在价值的指标毫无意义。
Now let's get less academic and look at Scott Fetzer, an example from Berkshire's own experience. This account will not only illustrate how the relationship of book value and intrinsic value can change but also will provide an accounting lesson that I know you have been breathlessly awaiting. Naturally, I've chosen here to talk about an acquisition that has turned out to be a huge winner.
现在让我们脱离一点学术理论，来看看斯科特·费策尔（Scott Fetzer），这是来自伯克希尔自身经验的一个例子。这次回顾不仅将说明账面价值与内在价值之间的关系如何变化，还将提供一堂我知道你们翘首以待的会计课程。当然，我特意选择了这样一个最终大获成功的收购案例。
Berkshire purchased Scott Fetzer at the beginning of 1986. At the time, the company was a collection of 22 businesses, and today we have exactly the same line-up - no additions and no disposals. Scott Fetzer's main operations are World Book, Kirby, and Campbell Hausfeld, but many other units are important contributors to earnings as well.
伯克希尔于1986年初收购了斯科特·费策尔。当时该公司由22家子公司组成，至今我们仍然保持原班人马——既未增加也未出售任何业务。斯科特·费策尔的主要运营单位包括世界图书公司（World Book）、基比吸尘器公司（Kirby）和坎贝尔·豪斯菲尔德公司（Campbell Hausfeld），但还有许多其他部门也是盈利的重要贡献者。
Berkshire purchased Scott Fetzer at the beginning of 1986. At the time, the company was a collection of 22 businesses, and today we have exactly the same line-up - no additions and no disposals. Scott Fetzer's main operations are World Book, Kirby, and Campbell Hausfeld, but many other units are important contributors to earnings as well.
伯克希尔于1986年初收购了斯科特·费策尔。当时该公司由22家子公司组成，至今我们仍然保持原班人马——既未增加也未出售任何业务。斯科特·费策尔的主要运营单位包括世界图书公司（World Book）、基比吸尘器公司（Kirby）和坎贝尔·豪斯菲尔德公司（Campbell Hausfeld），但还有许多其他部门也是盈利的重要贡献者。
We paid $315.2 million for Scott Fetzer, which at the time had $172.6 million of book value. The $142.6 million premium we handed over indicated our belief that the company's intrinsic value was close to double its book value.
我们为收购斯科特·费策尔支付了3.152亿美元，而当时的账面价值为1.726亿美元。我们支付的1.426亿美元溢价表明我们相信这家公司的内在价值接近其账面价值的两倍。
In the table below we trace the book value of Scott Fetzer, as well as its earnings and dividends, since our purchase.
在下面的表格中，我们列出了自我们收购以来斯科特·费策尔的账面价值、收益和分红情况。
| Year | Beginning Book Value (期初账面价值) | Earnings (利润) | Dividends (股息) | Ending Book Value (期末账面价值) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (以百万美元计) | (1)+(2)-(3) | |||
| 1986 | $172.6 | $40.3 | $125.0 | $87.9 |
| 1987 | $87.9 | $48.6 | $41.0 | $95.5 |
| 1988 | $95.5 | $58.0 | $35.0 | $118.6 |
| 1989 | $118.6 | $58.5 | $71.5 | $105.5 |
| 1990 | $105.5 | $61.3 | $33.5 | $133.3 |
| 1991 | $133.3 | $61.4 | $74.0 | $120.7 |
| 1992 | $120.7 | $70.5 | $80.0 | $111.2 |
| 1993 | $111.2 | $77.5 | $98.0 | $90.7 |
| 1994 | $90.7 | $79.3 | $76.0 | $94.0 |
Because it had excess cash when our deal was made, Scott Fetzer was able to pay Berkshire dividends of $125 million in 1986, though it earned only $40.3 million. I should mention that we have not introduced leverage into Scott Fetzer's balance sheet. In fact, the company has gone from very modest debt when we purchased it to virtually no debt at all (except for debt used by its finance subsidiary). Similarly, we have not sold plants and leased them back, nor sold receivables, nor the like. Throughout our years of ownership, Scott Fetzer has operated as a conservatively-financed and liquid enterprise.
由于交易达成时公司手头有大量现金，尽管1986年只赚取了4,030万美元利润，斯科特·费策尔仍向伯克希尔支付了1.25亿美元的股息。我需要说明的是，我们并未通过举债来增强斯科特·费策尔的资产负债表。事实上，自我们收购以来，该公司的债务从原本少量到现在几乎完全没有负债（财务子公司除外）。同样地，我们没有出售厂房再回租，也没有出售应收账款或其他类似操作。在我们持有的这些年里，斯科特·费策尔一直是一家融资稳健且流动性充裕的企业。
As you can see, Scott Fetzer's earnings have increased steadily since we bought it, but book value has not grown commensurately. Consequently, return on equity, which was exceptional at the time of our purchase, has now become truly extraordinary. Just how extraordinary is illustrated by comparing Scott Fetzer's performance to that of the Fortune 500, a group it would qualify for if it were a stand-alone company.
正如你所见，自我们买入以来，斯科特·费策尔的利润稳步增长，但账面价值却没有同步增长。因此，当初购买时就已非常出色的净资产收益率现在变得更加非凡。这种非凡程度可以通过将斯科特·费策尔的表现与《财富》500强企业进行比较来体现——如果它是一家独立公司，它完全有资格入选这一榜单。
Had Scott Fetzer been on the 1993 500 list - the latest available for inspection - the company's return on equity would have ranked 4th. But that is far from the whole story. The top three companies in return on equity were Insilco, LTV and Gaylord Container, each of which emerged from bankruptcy in 1993 and none of which achieved meaningful earnings that year except for those they realized when they were accorded debt forgiveness in bankruptcy proceedings. Leaving aside such non-operating windfalls, Scott Fetzer's return on equity would have ranked it first on the Fortune 500, well ahead of number two. Indeed, Scott Fetzer's return on equity was double that of the company ranking tenth.
假如斯科特·费策尔出现在1993年的《财富》500强名单中——这是目前可查阅到的最新数据——它的净资产收益率将位列第4位。但这还远不是全部故事。前三位净资产收益率最高的公司分别是Insilco、LTV和Gaylord Container，它们都在1993年摆脱了破产保护，并且当年除了通过破产程序获得债务豁免所带来的收益外，并没有实现有意义的经营利润。如果我们剔除这些非经营性的意外之财，斯科特·费策尔的净资产收益率将在《财富》500强中排名第一，远远领先于排名第二的公司。事实上，斯科特·费策尔的净资产收益率是排名第10公司的两倍。
You might expect that Scott Fetzer's success could only be explained by a cyclical peak in earnings, a monopolistic position, or leverage. But no such circumstances apply. Rather, the company's success comes from the managerial expertise of CEO Ralph Schey, of whom I'll tell you more later.
你或许会认为斯科特·费策尔的成功只能用盈利周期性高峰、垄断地位或杠杆效应来解释。但实际情况并非如此。实际上，这家公司成功的关键在于CEO拉尔夫·谢伊（Ralph Schey）卓越的管理能力，稍后我会进一步介绍他。
The difference between Scott Fetzer's intrinsic value and its carrying value on Berkshire's books is now huge. As I mentioned earlier - but am delighted to mention again - credit for this agreeable mismatch goes to Ralph Schey, a focused, smart and high-grade manager.
斯科特·费策尔的内在价值与其在伯克希尔账面上的账面价值之间的差距现在已经非常巨大。正如我之前提到过的——而且我很乐意再次强调——这种令人欣喜的价值错配应归功于拉尔夫·谢伊（Ralph Schey），一位专注、聪明且品质优秀的管理者。
The reasons for Ralph's success are not complicated. Ben Graham taught me 45 years ago that in investing it is not necessary to do extraordinary things to get extraordinary results. In later life, I have been surprised to find that this statement holds true in business management as well. What a manager must do is handle the basics well and not get diverted. That's precisely Ralph's formula. He establishes the right goals and never forgets what he set out to do. On the personal side, Ralph is a joy to work with. He's forthright about problems and is self-confident without being self-important.
拉尔夫成功的理由并不复杂。本·格雷厄姆在45年前就告诉我：在投资中，不必做非凡之事也能取得非凡成果。后来我发现这句话同样适用于企业管理，这让我感到惊讶。一名管理者真正需要做的就是把基础工作做好，不被其他事情分心。这正是拉尔夫的做法。他设定了正确的目标，并从不会忘记自己最初的目标是什么。在个人层面，拉尔夫是一个合作起来令人愉快的人。他对问题坦率直言，自信而不自负。
He is also experienced. Though I don't know Ralph's age, I do know that, like many of our managers, he is over 65. At Berkshire, we look to performance, not to the calendar. Charlie and I, at 71 and 64 respectively, now keep George Foreman's picture on our desks. You can make book that our scorn for a mandatory retirement age will grow stronger every year.
他也很有经验。虽然我不知道拉尔夫的确切年龄，但我确实知道，像我们许多管理者一样，他已经年过六旬。在伯克希尔，我们看重的是业绩，而不是日历年龄。我和查理分别71岁和64岁，现在我们在办公桌上放着乔治·福尔曼的照片。你可以打赌，我们对强制退休年龄的鄙视每年都会更加强烈。
# Intrinsic Value and Capital Allocation（内在价值与资本配置）
Understanding intrinsic value is as important for managers as it is for investors. When managers are making capital allocation decisions - including decisions to repurchase shares - it's vital that they act in ways that increase per-share intrinsic value and avoid moves that decrease it. This principle may seem obvious but we constantly see it violated. And, when misallocations occur, shareholders are hurt.
理解内在价值对于管理者来说，就如同对投资者一样重要。当管理者做出资本配置决策时——包括回购股票的决定——至关重要的是，他们必须采取能提升每股内在价值的行动，避免那些会降低内在价值的举措。这一原则看似显而易见，但我们却经常看到它被违反。而一旦出现错误配置，股东就会受到伤害。
For example, in contemplating business mergers and acquisitions, many managers tend to focus on whether the transaction is immediately dilutive or anti-dilutive to earnings per share (or, at financial institutions, to per-share book value). An emphasis of this sort carries great dangers. Going back to our college-education example, imagine that a 25-year-old first-year MBA student is considering merging his future economic interests with those of a 25-year-old day laborer. The MBA student, a non-earner, would find that a "share-for-share" merger of his equity interest in himself with that of the day laborer would enhance his near-term earnings (in a big way!). But what could be sillier for the student than a deal of this kind?
例如，在考虑企业并购时，许多管理者倾向于关注交易是否会对每股收益造成稀释或反稀释作用（在金融机构则看是否影响每股账面价值）。这种思维方式潜藏着巨大的风险。回到我们之前的大学教育例子，想象一个25岁的第一年MBA学生正考虑将自己的未来经济利益与另一位同龄的日薪劳工合并。这位尚未收入的学生会发现，如果以“股权互换”的方式将自身经济利益与那位劳工合并，他的短期收入会大幅增加！但对学生而言，还有比这种交易更荒唐的事吗？
In corporate transactions, it's equally silly for the would-be purchaser to focus on current earnings when the prospective acquiree has either different prospects, different amounts of non-operating assets, or a different capital structure. At Berkshire, we have rejected many merger and purchase opportunities that would have boosted current and near-term earnings but that would have reduced per-share intrinsic value. Our approach, rather, has been to follow Wayne Gretzky's advice: "Go to where the puck is going to be, not to where it is." As a result, our shareholders are now many billions of dollars richer than they would have been if we had used the standard catechism.
在公司交易中，如果潜在收购对象拥有不同的前景、不同数量的非经营性资产，或者不同的资本结构，那么仅仅关注当前收益的做法同样愚蠢。在伯克希尔，我们曾拒绝了许多能够提升当前及短期内收益、但却会降低每股内在价值的并购机会。我们的做法是遵循韦恩·格雷茨基（Wayne Gretzky）的建议：“要滑向冰球即将到达的位置，而不是它现在所在的位置。”因此，我们的股东如今比如果我们采用传统思维模式所能达到的财富水平，已经多出了数千亿美元。
The sad fact is that most major acquisitions display an egregious imbalance: They are a bonanza for the shareholders of the acquiree; they increase the income and status of the acquirer's management; and they are a honey pot for the investment bankers and other professionals on both sides. But, alas, they usually reduce the wealth of the acquirer's shareholders, often to a substantial extent. That happens because the acquirer typically gives up more intrinsic value than it receives. Do that enough, says John Medlin, the retired head of Wachovia Corp., and "you are running a chain letter in reverse."
令人遗憾的事实是，大多数重大收购都存在明显的不平衡：它们给被收购方的股东带来了意外之财；提升了收购方管理层的收入和地位；也成为双方投行和其他专业人士的蜜罐。然而不幸的是，这类交易往往显著减少了收购方股东的财富。原因在于，收购方通常放弃的价值远大于其获得的价值。约翰·梅德林（John Medlin），前瓦乔维亚公司（Wachovia Corp.）负责人说，如果你反复这么做，“你就是在逆向操作一种连锁信骗局。”
Over time, the skill with which a company's managers allocate capital has an enormous impact on the enterprise's value. Almost by definition, a really good business generates far more money (at least after its early years) than it can use internally. The company could, of course, distribute the money to shareholders by way of dividends or share repurchases. But often the CEO asks a strategic planning staff, consultants or investment bankers whether an acquisition or two might make sense. That's like asking your interior decorator whether you need a $50,000 rug.
长期来看，一家公司管理者在资本配置方面的技巧对企业价值有着巨大影响。几乎可以肯定地说，一家真正优秀的企业在其早期之后会产生远远超过其内部使用需求的资金。当然，公司可以选择通过分红或回购股份的方式将这些资金返还给股东。但很多时候，CEO会向战略规划部门、顾问或投资银行咨询，是否值得进行一两次并购。这就像是去问你的室内设计师你是否需要一块价值五万美元的地毯。
The acquisition problem is often compounded by a biological bias: Many CEO's attain their positions in part because they possess an abundance of animal spirits and ego. If an executive is heavily endowed with these qualities - which, it should be acknowledged, sometimes have their advantages - they won't disappear when he reaches the top. When such a CEO is encouraged by his advisors to make deals, he responds much as would a teenage boy who is encouraged by his father to have a normal sex life. It's not a push he needs.
并购问题常常因人性偏见而加剧：许多CEO之所以能升至高位，部分原因是因为他们充满活力和自我意识。如果一个人具备这些特质——我们必须承认，有时它们确实有优势——那当他登上领导职位后，这些特质也不会消失。当这样一位CEO被他的顾问鼓励去做交易时，他的反应就像一个青少年被父亲鼓励去过正常的性生活一样。他并不需要这样的推动。
Some years back, a CEO friend of mine - in jest, it must be said - unintentionally described the pathology of many big deals. This friend, who ran a property-casualty insurer, was explaining to his directors why he wanted to acquire a certain life insurance company. After droning rather unpersuasively through the economics and strategic rationale for the acquisition, he abruptly abandoned the script. With an impish look, he simply said: "Aw, fellas, all the other kids have one."
几年前，我的一位CEO朋友——虽然是在开玩笑的情况下——无意中描述了众多大交易背后的病态逻辑。这位朋友经营一家财产保险公司，当时正在向董事会解释为何要收购某家人寿保险公司。在他冗长而缺乏说服力地讲完收购的经济和战略理由后，他突然放弃了原稿，带着调皮的表情简单说道：“哎呀，伙计们，其他孩子都有啊。”
At Berkshire, our managers will continue to earn extraordinary returns from what appear to be ordinary businesses. As a first step, these managers will look for ways to deploy their earnings advantageously in their businesses. What's left, they will send to Charlie and me. We then will try to use those funds in ways that build per-share intrinsic value. Our goal will be to acquire either part or all of businesses that we believe we understand, that have good, sustainable underlying economics, and that are run by managers whom we like, admire and trust.
在伯克希尔，我们的管理者将继续从看似普通的业务中赚取非凡回报。第一步，他们会寻找将利润有效投入业务发展的方法。剩下的资金，他们会交给查理和我。我们将努力把这些资金用于提升每股内在价值的地方。我们的目标是收购我们相信自己了解、具有良好的可持续基本面、并由我们喜欢、尊敬和信任的管理者运营的企业，无论是部分还是全部收购。
# Compensation（薪酬）
At Berkshire, we try to be as logical about compensation as about capital allocation. For example, we compensate Ralph Schey based upon the results of Scott Fetzer rather than those of Berkshire. What could make more sense, since he's responsible for one operation but not the other? A cash bonus or a stock option tied to the fortunes of Berkshire would provide totally capricious rewards to Ralph. He could, for example, be hitting home runs at Scott Fetzer while Charlie and I rang up mistakes at Berkshire, thereby negating his efforts many times over. Conversely, why should option profits or bonuses be heaped upon Ralph if good things are occurring in other parts of Berkshire but Scott Fetzer is lagging?
在伯克希尔，我们对薪酬的态度与对资本配置一样讲求逻辑。例如，我们根据斯科特·费策尔的业绩来决定拉尔夫·谢伊的报酬，而不是依据整个伯克希尔的表现。这再合理不过了，因为他只负责一个业务单元，而不对另一个业务单元负责。如果他的奖金或股票期权与伯克希尔整体表现挂钩，那将是一种完全随意的奖励机制。举例来说，他可能在斯科特·费策尔取得巨大成功，而查理和我在伯克希尔犯下错误，从而多次抵消了他的努力成果。反之，如果伯克希尔其他部门表现良好、而斯科特·费策尔滞后，为什么还要给拉尔夫发放期权收益或奖金呢？
In setting compensation, we like to hold out the promise of large carrots, but make sure their delivery is tied directly to results in the area that a manager controls. When capital invested in an operation is significant, we also both charge managers a high rate for incremental capital they employ and credit them at an equally high rate for capital they release.
在设定薪酬时，我们喜欢承诺丰厚的回报作为激励，但确保这些回报必须与其所控制业务的实际成果直接挂钩。当某项业务需要大量资金投入时，我们会对管理者使用的新增资本收取高额费用，同时也会以同样高的标准对其释放出来的资本给予奖励。
The product of this money's-not-free approach is definitely visible at Scott Fetzer. If Ralph can employ incremental funds at good returns, it pays him to do so: His bonus increases when earnings on additional capital exceed a meaningful hurdle charge. But our bonus calculation is symmetrical: If incremental investment yields sub-standard returns, the shortfall is costly to Ralph as well as to Berkshire. The consequence of this two-way arrangement is that it pays Ralph - and pays him well - to send to Omaha any cash he can't advantageously use in his business.
这种“钱不是免费”的理念在斯科特·费策尔身上得到了充分体现。如果拉尔夫能有效地使用额外资金，他就能获得更高的回报：当他投入的新增资本带来的收益超过设定门槛时，他的奖金就会增加。但我们奖金计算是双向的：如果新增投资未能达到预期回报率，其损失不仅影响伯克希尔，也会影响拉尔夫本人。这种双向安排的结果是，拉尔夫会很乐意把他无法有效利用的资金送回奥马哈——而且这么做对他也有可观的回报。
It has become fashionable at public companies to describe almost every compensation plan as aligning the interests of management with those of shareholders. In our book, alignment means being a partner in both directions, not just on the upside. Many "alignment" plans flunk this basic test, being artful forms of "heads I win, tails you lose."
如今许多上市公司都习惯把几乎所有薪酬计划都说成是“让管理层利益与股东一致”。但在我们看来，“一致”意味着双方共享盈亏，而非仅分享上涨部分。很多所谓的“利益一致”计划实际上通不过这一基本测试，它们只是巧妙地设计成了“赢了我得利，输了你承担”的形式。
A common form of misalignment occurs in the typical stock option arrangement, which does not periodically increase the option price to compensate for the fact that retained earnings are building up the wealth of the company. Indeed, the combination of a ten-year option, a low dividend payout, and compound interest can provide lush gains to a manager who has done no more than tread water in his job. A cynic might even note that when payments to owners are held down, the profit to the option-holding manager increases. I have yet to see this vital point spelled out in a proxy statement asking shareholders to approve an option plan.
一种常见的错位发生在典型的股票期权安排中。这类期权的价格通常不会定期调整，以反映留存收益正在为公司积累财富的事实。事实上，十年期期权、低分红率与复利效应的结合，可以让一位在岗位上原地踏步的经理人获得丰厚收益。一位愤世嫉俗的人甚至可能会指出，当公司减少向股东分配利润时，持有期权的经理人反而获利更多。到目前为止，我还从未在一份要求股东批准期权计划的代理声明中看到过对这一关键点的明确说明。
I can't resist mentioning that our compensation arrangement with Ralph Schey was worked out in about five minutes, immediately upon our purchase of Scott Fetzer and without the "help" of lawyers or compensation consultants. This arrangement embodies a few very simple ideas - not the kind of terms favored by consultants who cannot easily send a large bill unless they have established that you have a large problem (and one, of course, that requires an annual review). Our agreement with Ralph has never been changed. It made sense to him and to me in 1986, and it makes sense now. Our compensation arrangements with the managers of all our other units are similarly simple, though the terms of each agreement vary to fit the economic characteristics of the business at issue, the existence in some cases of partial ownership of the unit by managers, etc.
我忍不住要提一下，我们与拉尔夫·谢伊的薪酬安排是在收购斯科特·费策尔后不到五分钟就敲定的，期间没有律师或薪酬顾问的“帮助”。这项安排体现了几个非常简单的理念——绝非那种只有当你被顾问们说服你有一个重大问题时（当然这个问题还需要每年审查）才会开出的大额账单式条款。我们与拉尔夫的协议从未更改过。1986年它对我们而言合理，今天依然如此。我们与其他所有子公司管理者的薪酬安排也都遵循同样的简洁原则，尽管每份协议的具体条款会根据相关企业的经济特性、某些情况下管理者是否拥有该单位的部分权益等进行调整。
In all instances, we pursue rationality. Arrangements that pay off in capricious ways, unrelated to a manager's personal accomplishments, may well be welcomed by certain managers. Who, after all, refuses a free lottery ticket? But such arrangements are wasteful to the company and cause the manager to lose focus on what should be his real areas of concern. Additionally, irrational behavior at the parent may well encourage imitative behavior at subsidiaries.
在所有情况下，我们都追求理性。那些脱离管理者个人实际成绩、随意给予回报的安排，也许会受到某些管理者的欢迎。毕竟，谁会拒绝一张免费的彩票呢？但这些安排对公司来说是浪费资源，并会导致管理者偏离他们真正应关注的核心事务。此外，母公司若采取不理性的行为，也很可能引发子公司效仿。
At Berkshire, only Charlie and I have the managerial responsibility for the entire business. Therefore, we are the only parties who should logically be compensated on the basis of what the enterprise does as a whole. Even so, that is not a compensation arrangement we desire. We have carefully designed both the company and our jobs so that we do things we enjoy with people we like. Equally important, we are forced to do very few boring or unpleasant tasks. We are the beneficiaries as well of the abundant array of material and psychic perks that flow to the heads of corporations. Under such idyllic conditions, we don't expect shareholders to ante up loads of compensation for which we have no possible need.
在伯克希尔，唯有查理和我对整个企业负有管理责任。因此，从逻辑上讲，也只有我们两人应该基于整个公司的表现获得报酬。即便如此，我们也并不希望采用这样的薪酬安排。我们精心构建了这家公司以及我们的工作内容，让我们能够与我们喜爱的人一起从事我们热爱的工作。同样重要的是，我们几乎不需要处理无聊或令人不快的任务。我们还享有大量来自企业领导地位所带来的物质和精神福利。在如此理想的情况下，我们并不期望股东为我们支付巨额薪酬，因为我们根本不需要这些东西。
Indeed, if we were not paid at all, Charlie and I would be delighted with the cushy jobs we hold. At bottom, we subscribe to Ronald Reagan's creed: "It's probably true that hard work never killed anyone, but I figure why take the chance."
事实上，即使我们分文不取，我和查理也会对自己目前舒适的工作感到满意。归根结底，我们信奉罗纳德·里根的一句格言：“努力工作大概确实不会杀死任何人，但我认为何必去冒这个险呢。”
# Insurance Operations（保险业务）
As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our insurance business is, first, the amount of "float" we develop and, second, its cost to us. Float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because most policies require that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve loss claims.
正如我们在以往报告中所解释的，我们保险业务的关键首先是“浮存金”（float）的规模，其次才是其成本。浮存金是指我们持有但不属于我们的资金。在保险业务中，浮存金产生的原因主要是大多数保单要求预付保费，更重要的是，通常需要一段时间保险公司才能得知并解决理赔请求。
Typically, the premiums that an insurer takes in do not cover the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss" - and that loss is the cost of float.
一般来说，保险公司收取的保费并不足以覆盖它必须支付的损失和费用。这就导致了“承保亏损”（underwriting loss）——而这就是浮存金的成本。
An insurance business is profitable over time if its cost of float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business has a negative value if the cost of its float is higher than market rates for money.
如果浮存金的成本低于公司通过其他方式融资所需支付的市场利率，那么从长期来看这项保险业务就是盈利的。但如果浮存金的成本高于市场资金成本，这项业务则具有负价值。
As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's insurance business has been an enormous winner. For the table, we have compiled our float - which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last two, our cost of float has been negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by adding underwriting profit to float income.
如下表所示的数据表明，伯克希尔的保险业务取得了巨大成功。我们计算浮存金的方式是：将损失准备金、理赔调整准备金、再保险承担下的资金以及未赚取保费准备金加总，然后减去代理人账户余额、预付承保成本、预付税款及适用于再保险的递延费用。我们的浮存金成本由承保盈亏决定。在有承保利润的年份（如最近两年），我们的浮存金成本为负值，我们将承保利润加上浮存金收益来确定保险业务的总体收益。
| 年份 | 承保损益 | 平均浮存金（百万美元） | 浮存金成本（承保损益 / 平均浮存金） | 长期国债收益率 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| （承保利润或亏损） | （1 除以 2） | |||
| 1967 | 利润 | $17.3 | 小于零 | 5.50% |
| 1968 | 利润 | $19.9 | 小于零 | 5.90% |
| 1969 | 利润 | $23.4 | 小于零 | 6.79% |
| 1970 | $0.37 | $32.4 | 1.14% | 6.25% |
| 1971 | 利润 | $52.5 | 小于零 | 5.81% |
| 1972 | 利润 | $69.5 | 小于零 | 5.82% |
| 1973 | 利润 | $73.3 | 小于零 | 7.27% |
| 1974 | $7.36 | $79.1 | 9.30% | 8.13% |
| 1975 | $11.35 | $87.6 | 12.96% | 8.03% |
| 1976 | 利润 | $102.6 | 小于零 | 7.30% |
| 1977 | 利润 | $139.0 | 小于零 | 7.97% |
| 1978 | 利润 | $190.4 | 小于零 | 8.93% |
| 1979 | 利润 | $227.3 | 小于零 | 10.08% |
| 1980 | 利润 | $237.0 | 小于零 | 11.94% |
| 1981 | 利润 | $228.4 | 小于零 | 13.61% |
| 1982 | $21.56 | $220.6 | 9.77% | 10.64% |
| 1983 | $33.87 | $231.3 | 14.64% | 11.84% |
| 1984 | $48.06 | $253.2 | 18.98% | 11.58% |
| 1985 | $44.23 | $390.2 | 11.34% | 9.34% |
| 1986 | $55.84 | $797.5 | 7.00% | 7.60% |
| 1987 | $55.43 | $1,266.7 | 4.38% | 8.95% |
| 1988 | $11.08 | $1,497.7 | 0.74% | 9.00% |
| 1989 | $24.40 | $1,541.3 | 1.58% | 7.97% |
| 1990 | $26.65 | $1,637.3 | 1.63% | 8.24% |
| 1991 | $119.59 | $1,895.0 | 6.31% | 7.40% |
| 1992 | $108.96 | $2,290.4 | 4.76% | 7.39% |
| 1993 | 利润 | $2,624.7 | 小于零 | 6.35% |
| 1994 | 利润 | $3,056.6 | 小于零 | 7.88% |
Charlie and I are delighted that our float grew in 1994 and are even more pleased that it proved to be cost-free. But our message this year echoes the one we delivered in 1993: Though we have a fine insurance business, it is not as good as it currently looks.
我和查理都对1994年浮存金的增长感到高兴，更令人欣慰的是它的成本几乎为零。但我们今年要传达的信息与1993年一致：尽管我们的保险业务非常出色，但它目前的表现并不代表常态。
The reason we must repeat this caution is that our "super-cat" business (which sells policies that insurance and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of mega-catastrophes) was again highly profitable. Since truly major catastrophes occur infrequently, our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits in most years but occasionally to record a huge loss. In other words, the attractiveness of our super-cat business will take many years to measure. Certainly 1994 should be regarded as close to a best-case. Our only significant losses arose from the California earthquake in January. I will add that we do not expect to suffer a major loss from the early-1995 Kobe earthquake.
我们必须重复这一警告的原因在于我们的“超级巨灾保险”业务（即向保险公司和再保险公司出售用于防范重大灾难影响的保单）再次表现异常出色。由于真正重大的灾难极为罕见，因此我们的超级巨灾保险业务大多数年份都会带来可观利润，但偶尔也可能遭遇巨额亏损。换句话说，评估这项业务的吸引力需要多年观察。可以肯定地说，1994年接近于最佳情形。我们当年唯一一次重大损失来自1月的加州地震。我还要补充一点：我们预计不会因1995年初日本神户地震遭受重大损失。
Super-cat policies are small in number, large in size and non-standardized. Therefore, the underwriting of this business requires far more judgment than, say, the underwriting of auto policies, for which a mass of data is available. Here Berkshire has a major advantage: Ajit Jain, our super-cat manager, whose underwriting skills are the finest. His value to us is simply enormous.
超级巨灾保险保单数量少、金额大且非标准化。因此，这类业务的承保比汽车保险等数据丰富的常规险种更依赖判断力。在这方面，伯克希尔拥有显著优势：我们的超级巨灾保险经理阿吉特·杰恩（Ajit Jain）具备顶尖的承保能力。他对我们的价值极其巨大。
In addition, Berkshire has a special advantage in the super-cat business because of our towering financial strength, which helps us in two ways. First, a prudent insurer will want its protection against true mega-catastrophes - such as a $50 billion windstorm loss on Long Island or an earthquake of similar cost in California - to be absolutely certain. But that same insurer knows that the disaster making it dependent on a large super-cat recovery is also the disaster that could cause many reinsurers to default. There's not much sense in paying premiums for coverage that will evaporate precisely when it is needed. So the certainty that Berkshire will be both solvent and liquid after a catastrophe of unthinkable proportions is a major competitive advantage for us.
此外，伯克希尔在超级巨灾保险领域还有一项特殊优势，那就是我们雄厚的财务实力，这为我们带来了两方面的好处。首先，一家谨慎的保险公司会希望其针对真正意义上的超级灾难（例如长岛500亿美元级别的风暴损失，或加州类似规模的地震）的保障是绝对可靠的。但同一家保险公司也清楚，一旦灾难发生，使其依赖巨额再保险赔付的同时，也可能导致许多再保险公司无力偿付。为一项在最需要时反而失效的保障支付保费并无意义。因此，在面对难以想象的巨大灾难后仍能保持偿付能力和流动性的确定性，是我们巨大的竞争优势。
The second benefit of our capital strength is that we can write policies for amounts that no one else can even consider. For example, during 1994, a primary insurer wished to buy a short-term policy for $400 million of California earthquake coverage and we wrote the policy immediately. We know of no one else in the world who would take a $400 million risk, or anything close to it, for their own account.
我们资本实力带来的第二个好处是，我们可以承保别人根本无法考虑的大额保单。例如，在1994年，一家原保险公司希望购买一份短期加州地震保险，保额高达4亿美元，我们立刻出具了保单。据我们所知，世界上没有其他任何公司愿意自行承担4亿美元的风险，或接近这个金额的风险。
Generally, brokers attempt to place coverage for large amounts by spreading the burden over a number of small policies. But, at best, coverage of that sort takes considerable time to arrange. In the meantime, the company desiring reinsurance is left holding a risk it doesn't want and that may seriously threaten its well-being. At Berkshire, on the other hand, we will quote prices for coverage as great as $500 million on the same day that we are asked to bid. No one else in the industry will do the same.
通常情况下，经纪人为了安排大额保障，会将其分散到多个小保单中。但即使是最理想的情况，这种安排也需要大量时间。在此期间，寻求再保险的公司不得不承担自己不愿承担、甚至可能严重威胁自身安全的风险。而在伯克希尔，只要有人邀请我们投标，我们可以在当天就为高达5亿美元的保障提供报价。行业内没有其他公司能做到这一点。
By writing coverages in large lumps, we obviously expose Berkshire to lumpy financial results. That's totally acceptable to us: Too often, insurers (as well as other businesses) follow sub-optimum strategies in order to "smooth" their reported earnings. By accepting the prospect of volatility, we expect to earn higher long-term returns than we would by pursuing predictability.
通过大额承保，我们显然使伯克希尔面临财务结果波动的风险。但我们完全接受这一点：保险公司（以及其他企业）常常为了“平滑”财报而采取次优策略。正因如此，我们认为与其追求可预测性，不如接受波动性的存在，并借此获取更高的长期回报。
Given the risks we accept, Ajit and I constantly focus on our "worst case," knowing, of course, that it is difficult to judge what this is, since you could conceivably have a Long Island hurricane, a California earthquake, and Super Cat X all in the same year. Additionally, insurance losses could be accompanied by non-insurance troubles. For example, were we to have super-cat losses from a large Southern California earthquake, they might well be accompanied by a major drop in the value of our holdings in See's, Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac.
鉴于我们承担的风险，阿吉特和我始终关注最坏情况的可能影响。当然，这种判断并不容易，因为你完全可以设想——长岛遭遇飓风、加州发生地震，以及“超级灾难X”同时出现的情况。此外，保险损失还可能伴随非保险业务的问题。例如，如果南加州发生大规模地震导致超级巨灾损失，那么我们持有的希氏糖果（See’s）、富国银行（Wells Fargo）和房地美（Freddie Mac）的资产价值也可能大幅下跌。
All things considered, we believe our worst-case insurance loss from a super-cat is now about $600 million after-tax, an amount that would slightly exceed Berkshire's annual earnings from other sources. If you are not comfortable with this level of exposure, the time to sell your Berkshire stock is now, not after the inevitable mega-catastrophe.
综合来看，我们认为目前超级巨灾带来的最坏保险损失约为税后6亿美元，这一金额略高于伯克希尔其他来源的年收益。如果你无法接受这种风险敞口，现在就是卖出你手中伯克希尔股票的时候，而不是等到不可避免的大灾难发生之后。
Our super-cat volume will probably be down in 1995. Prices for garden-variety policies have fallen somewhat, and the torrent of capital that was committed to the reinsurance business a few years ago will be inclined to chase premiums, irrespective of their adequacy. Nevertheless, we have strong relations with an important group of clients who will provide us with a substantial amount of business in 1995.
我们的超级巨灾保险业务量在1995年可能会下降。普通险种的价格有所下降，而且几年前涌入再保险行业的大量资金仍将追逐保费收入，无论这些保费是否合理。尽管如此，我们与一批重要客户保持着良好关系，他们在1995年仍会为我们带来可观的业务量。
Berkshire's other insurance operations had excellent results in 1994. Our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers' compensation business, headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit card operation, managed by the Kizer family; National Indemnity's traditional auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster - all of these generated significant underwriting profits accompanied by substantial float.
1994年，伯克希尔其他保险业务也表现出色。由罗德·埃尔德雷德（Rod Eldred）领导的本州业务；布拉德·金斯特勒（Brad Kinstler）主管的工人赔偿保险业务；基泽家族（Kizer family）管理的信用卡业务；以及唐·沃斯特（Don Wurster）领导下的国家保障公司（National Indemnity）的传统汽车及一般责任保险业务——所有这些都带来了显著的承保利润，并伴随着大量的浮存金。
We can conclude this section as we did last year: All in all, we have a first-class insurance business. Though its results will be highly volatile, this operation possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a large amount - larger, in fact, than is the case at any other Berkshire business.
我们可以像去年一样总结这一部分：总的来说，我们拥有一流的保险业务。虽然其业绩会有很大波动，但这项业务的内在价值远高于账面价值——事实上，它比伯克希尔旗下任何其他业务的溢价幅度都要大。
# Common Stock Investments（普通股投资）
Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over $300 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
以下是我们持有市值超过3亿美元的普通股投资列表。其中一小部分属于伯克希尔持股不足100%的子公司所持股份。
| 股数 | 公司名称 | 成本（千美元） | 市值（千美��） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 27,759,941 | 美国运通公司（American Express Company） | $723,919 | $818,918 |
| 20,000,000 | 资本城/美国广播公司（Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.） | $345,000 | $1,705,000 |
| 100,000,000 | 可口可乐公司（The Coca-Cola Company） | $1,298,888 | $5,150,000 |
| 12,761,200 | 联邦住房贷款抵押公司（Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.，“房地美”） | $270,468 | $644,441 |
| 6,854,500 | 甘尼特公司（Gannett Co., Inc.） | $335,216 | $365,002 |
| 34,250,000 | GEICO公司（GEICO Corp.） | $45,713 | $1,678,250 |
| 24,000,000 | 吉列公司（The Gillette Company） | $600,000 | $1,797,000 |
| 19,453,300 | PNC银行公司（PNC Bank Corporation） | $503,046 | $410,951 |
| 1,727,765 | 华盛顿邮报公司（The Washington Post Company） | $9,731 | $418,983 |
| 6,791,218 | 富国银行（Wells Fargo & Company） | $423,680 | $984,727 |
Our investments continue to be few in number and simple in concept: The truly big investment idea can usually be explained in a short paragraph. We like a business with enduring competitive advantages that is run by able and owner-oriented people. When these attributes exist, and when we can make purchases at sensible prices, it is hard to go wrong (a challenge we periodically manage to overcome).
我们的投资数量仍然不多，理念也非常简单：真正伟大的投资想法通常只需用一段话就能讲清楚。我们偏爱那些拥有持久竞争优势、并由有能力且以股东为导向的人士经营的企业。当这些条件具备，且我们能以合理价格买入时，犯错的机会其实很小（但我们偶尔还是能做到这点）。
Investors should remember that their scorecard is not computed using Olympic-diving methods: Degree-of-difficulty doesn't count. If you are right about a business whose value is largely dependent on a single key factor that is both easy to understand and enduring, the payoff is the same as if you had correctly analyzed an investment alternative characterized by many constantly shifting and complex variables.
投资者应记住，你的成绩并不是按奥运会跳水评分方式计算的：“难度系数”并不计入得分。如果你对一家企业的判断是正确的，而这家企业的价值主要依赖于一个既易理解又持久的关键因素，那么你获得的回报将等同于你正确分析了一个涉及许多不断变化且复杂变量的投资对象。
We try to price, rather than time, purchases. In our view, it is folly to forego buying shares in an outstanding business whose long-term future is predictable, because of short-term worries about an economy or a stock market that we know to be unpredictable. Why scrap an informed decision because of an uninformed guess?
我们努力根据价格而非时机做出买入决策。我们认为，仅仅因为短期担忧经济或股市——而我们知道这些是不可预测的——就放弃买入一家长期前景明确的优秀企业，是一种愚蠢的做法。为什么要因为一个未经深思熟虑的猜测，放弃一个经过理性判断的决定？
We purchased National Indemnity in 1967, See's in 1972, Buffalo News in 1977, Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983, and Scott Fetzer in 1986 because those are the years they became available and because we thought the prices they carried were acceptable. In each case, we pondered what the business was likely to do, not what the Dow, the Fed, or the economy might do. If we see this approach as making sense in the purchase of businesses in their entirety, why should we change tack when we are purchasing small pieces of wonderful businesses in the stock market?
我们在1967年买入国家保障公司（National Indemnity），1972年买入希氏糖果（See's），1977年买入布法罗新闻（Buffalo News），1983年买入内布拉斯加家具卖场（Nebraska Furniture Mart），1986年买入斯科特·费策尔（Scott Fetzer），是因为它们那几年正好可供出售，而且我们认为价格可以接受。每次我们思考的是企业本身未来的可能性，而不是道琼斯指数、美联储或经济可能如何变化。如果我们认为这种思路适用于整家企业收购，那么当我们只是在股市中购买这些伟大企业的部分股权时，为何要改变策略呢？
Before looking at new investments, we consider adding to old ones. If a business is attractive enough to buy once, it may well pay to repeat the process. We would love to increase our economic interest in See's or Scott Fetzer, but we haven't found a way to add to a 100% holding. In the stock market, however, an investor frequently gets the chance to increase his economic interest in businesses he knows and likes. Last year we went that direction by enlarging our holdings in Coca-Cola and American Express.
在寻找新投资之前，我们总是先考虑是否增持已有的持仓。如果一家企业足够吸引人而值得买入一次，那么重复买入可能也是明智之举。我们非常愿意增加对希氏糖果（See’s）或斯科特·费策尔（Scott Fetzer）的经济权益，但毕竟我们已经拥有它们100%的股份，无法再继续加仓。但在股市中，投资者常常有机会对自己熟悉和喜爱的企业进一步加码。去年我们就这么做了，增加了对可口可乐和美国运通的投资。
Our history with American Express goes way back and, in fact, fits the pattern of my pulling current investment decisions out of past associations. In 1951, for example, GEICO shares comprised 70% of my personal portfolio and GEICO was also the first stock I sold - I was then 20 - as a security salesman (the sale was 100 shares to my Aunt Alice who, bless her, would have bought anything I suggested). Twenty-five years later, Berkshire purchased a major stake in GEICO at the time it was threatened with insolvency. In another instance, that of the Washington Post, about half of my initial investment funds came from delivering the paper in the 1940's. Three decades later Berkshire purchased a large position in the company two years after it went public. As for Coca-Cola, my first business venture - this was in the 1930's - was buying a six-pack of Coke for 25 cents and selling each bottle for 5 cents. It took only fifty years before I finally got it: The real money was in the syrup.
我与美国运通之间的渊源可以追溯到很久以前，事实上，这也符合我从过去的经历中汲取灵感来做当前投资决策的习惯。例如，在1951年，GEICO的股票占了我个人投资组合的70%，而且它也是我在20岁时作为证券销售员卖出的第一只股票（当时我卖了100股给我亲爱的艾丽丝姑妈，她几乎会买下我推荐的任何东西）。二十五年后，伯克希尔在GEICO面临破产威胁时购入了大量股份。再比如《华盛顿邮报》，我最初的投资资金有一半来自上世纪40年代送报纸的收入。三十年后，伯克希尔在其上市两年后买入了大量股份。至于可口可乐，我的第一次商业尝试是在1930年代，用25美分买一包六瓶装可乐，然后每瓶以5美分卖出。直到五十年后我才终于明白：真正的利润来自于糖浆本身。
My American Express history includes a couple of episodes: In the mid-1960's, just after the stock was battered by the company's infamous salad-oil scandal, we put about 40% of Buffett Partnership Ltd.'s capital into the stock - the largest investment the partnership had ever made. I should add that this commitment gave us over 5% ownership in Amex at a cost of $13 million. As I write this, we own just under 10%, which has cost us $1.36 billion. (Amex earned $12.5 million in 1964 and $1.4 billion in 1994.)
我与美国运通的历史还包括一些有趣的片段：1960年代中期，公司因“色拉油丑闻”导致股价大跌，我们那时将巴菲特合伙公司约40%的资金投入该公司股票——这是合伙公司成立以来最大的一笔投资。值得一提的是，这笔投资让我们以1,300万美元的成本获得了超过5%的股权。如今我们持有的股份略低于10%，成本已达13.6亿美元。（美国运通1964年盈利1,250万美元，1994年则达到14亿美元。）
My history with Amex's IDS unit, which today contributes about a third of the earnings of the company, goes back even further. I first purchased stock in IDS in 1953 when it was growing rapidly and selling at a price-earnings ratio of only 3. (There was a lot of low-hanging fruit in those days.) I even produced a long report - do I ever write a short one? - on the company that I sold for $1 through an ad in the Wall Street Journal.
我和美国运通旗下IDS部门（如今贡献公司约三分之一的盈利）的历史甚至更久远。早在1953年我就首次买入IDS的股票，当时它正处于快速增长期，市盈率仅为3倍。（那时候真是有很多唾手可得的机会。）我还曾撰写过一份很长的报告——我什么时候写过短的呢？——并通过《华尔街日报》刊登广告，以1美元的价格出售该报告。
Obviously American Express and IDS (recently renamed American Express Financial Advisors) are far different operations today from what they were then. Nevertheless, I find that a long-term familiarity with a company and its products is often helpful in evaluating it.
显然，今天的美国运通和IDS（最近更名为美国运通金融顾问公司）与当年已有天壤之别。不过我发现，长期对公司及其产品保持了解，往往有助于对其做出准确评估。
# Mistake Du Jour（今日之错）
Mistakes occur at the time of decision. We can only make our mistake-du-jour award, however, when the foolishness of the decision becomes obvious. By this measure, 1994 was a vintage year with keen competition for the gold medal. Here, I would like to tell you that the mistakes I will describe originated with Charlie. But whenever I try to explain things that way, my nose begins to grow.
错误发生在做决定的那一刻。但我们只有在事后明显看出某项决定愚蠢时，才能颁发“当日之错”奖。按这个标准来看，1994年堪称经典之年，竞争激烈，多个候选都具备夺金实力。在此我想告诉你，我即将描述的这些错误都是查理干的。但每当我试图这样解释时，我的鼻子就开始变长了。
And the nominees are . . .
入围的“选手”有……
Late in 1993 I sold 10 million shares of Cap Cities at $63; at year-end 1994, the price was $85.25. (The difference is $222.5 million for those of you who wish to avoid the pain of calculating the damage yourself.) When we purchased the stock at $17.25 in 1986, I told you that I had previously sold our Cap Cities holdings at $4.30 per share during 1978-80, and added that I was at a loss to explain my earlier behavior. Now I've become a repeat offender. Maybe it's time to get a guardian appointed.
1993年底我以每股63美元的价格卖出了1,000万股资本城公司（Cap Cities）股票；到1994年底，股价涨至85.25美元。（对于不愿自己计算损失的朋友来说，差价是2.225亿美元。）我们在1986年以17.25美元买入该股时，我曾告诉各位，我曾在1978至1980年间以每股4.30美元的价格卖出过我们的持股，并坦言我实在想不通当初为何那样做。现在我又重蹈覆辙，成了惯犯。也许我真该给自己找个监护人了。
Egregious as it is, the Cap Cities decision earns only a silver medal. Top honors go to a mistake I made five years ago that fully ripened in 1994: Our $358 million purchase of USAir preferred stock, on which the dividend was suspended in September. In the 1990 Annual Report I correctly described this deal as an "unforced error," meaning that I was neither pushed into the investment nor misled by anyone when making it. Rather, this was a case of sloppy analysis, a lapse that may have been caused by the fact that we were buying a senior security or by hubris. Whatever the reason, the mistake was large.
虽然资本城的错误相当严重，也只能拿银牌。金奖属于我在五年前犯下的、直到1994年才完全暴露的错误：我们以3.58亿美元购买了美西航空（USAir）的优先股，而该股在9月暂停派息。在1990年的年报中，我正确地将这笔交易称为“非受迫性失误”，意思是没有人逼我投资，也没有人误导我。这纯粹是分析草率所致，可能是由于我们购买的是高级证券，或是出于某种自负。无论原因是什么，这次失误规模巨大。
Before this purchase, I simply failed to focus on the problems that would inevitably beset a carrier whose costs were both high and extremely difficult to lower. In earlier years, these life-threatening costs posed few problems. Airlines were then protected from competition by regulation, and carriers could absorb high costs because they could pass them along by way of fares that were also high.
在这笔投资前，我根本没有关注到一个现实问题：一家成本高且极难降低的航空公司终将面临的困境。早些年，这种致命的成本结构并未造成太大麻烦。当时航空业受到监管保护，航空公司可以通过高票价来覆盖高昂的成本。
When deregulation came along, it did not immediately change the picture: The capacity of low-cost carriers was so small that the high-cost lines could, in large part, maintain their existing fare structures. During this period, with the longer-term problems largely invisible but slowly metastasizing, the costs that were non-sustainable became further embedded.
放松管制初期并未立刻改变局面：低成本航空公司的运力还很小，高成本航线仍能在很大程度上维持原有的票价结构。这一时期，长期问题虽尚未显现却在悄然恶化，不可持续的成本结构进一步固化。
As the seat capacity of the low-cost operators expanded, their fares began to force the old-line, high-cost airlines to cut their own. The day of reckoning for these airlines could be delayed by infusions of capital (such as ours into USAir), but eventually a fundamental rule of economics prevailed: In an unregulated commodity business, a company must lower its costs to competitive levels or face extinction. This principle should have been obvious to your Chairman, but I missed it.
随着低成本航空公司的座位容量扩大，他们的低价迫使传统高成本航空公司也纷纷降价。虽然资本注入（如我们对美西航空的投资）可以延缓清算日的到来，但最终一条基本经济学原理发挥了作用：在一个没有监管的商品化行业中，公司要么降低成本达到竞争力水平，要么就只能走向灭亡。这一原则本应显而易见，但我却忽略了。
Seth Schofield, CEO of USAir, has worked diligently to correct the company's historical cost problems but, to date, has not managed to do so. In part, this is because he has had to deal with a moving target, the result of certain major carriers having obtained labor concessions and other carriers having benefitted from "fresh-start" costs that came out of bankruptcy proceedings. (As Herb Kelleher, CEO of Southwest Airlines, has said: "Bankruptcy court for airlines has become a health spa.") Additionally, it should be no surprise to anyone that those airline employees who contractually receive above-market salaries will resist any reduction in these as long as their checks continue to clear.
美西航空CEO塞思·斯科菲尔德（Seth Schofield）一直在努力纠正公司历史上的成本问题，但截至目前仍未成功。部分原因是，他面对的目标不断变化：某些大型航空公司通过谈判获得劳工让步，另一些则通过破产重整实现了“全新起点”的低成本结构。（正如西南航空CEO赫布·凯莱赫所言：“对航空公司来说，破产法庭就像是健康疗养院。”）此外，也不必惊讶于那些合同约定工资高于市场水平的员工会在支票照常兑现的前提下拒绝降薪。
Despite this difficult situation, USAir may yet achieve the cost reductions it needs to maintain its viability long-term. But it is far from sure that will happen.
尽管处境艰难，美西航空或许仍有希望实现所需的成本削减，从而维持其长期生存能力。但这远非确定之事。
Accordingly, we wrote our USAir investment down to $89.5 million, 25 cents on the dollar at yearend 1994. This valuation reflects both a possibility that our preferred will have its value fully or largely restored and an opposite possibility that the stock will eventually become worthless. Whatever the outcome, we will heed a prime rule of investing: You don't have to make it back the way that you lost it.
因此，我们将对美西航空的投资价值减记至8,950万美元，相当于1994年底每美元仅保留25美分的价值。这一估值既考虑了优先股未来可能完全或大部分恢复价值的可能性，也考虑了其最终变得一文不值的可能性。无论结果如何，我们都会遵循投资的一项核心原则：你不必以当初亏损的方式把钱赚回来。
The accounting effects of our USAir writedown are complicated. Under GAAP accounting, insurance companies are required to carry all stocks on their balance sheets at estimated market value. Therefore, at the end of last year's third quarter, we were carrying our USAir preferred at $89.5 million, or 25% of cost. In other words, our net worth was at that time reflecting a value for USAir that was far below our $358 million cost.
我们对美西航空的减记在会计处理上较为复杂。根据GAAP（通用会计准则），保险公司必须将其持有的所有股票按估算市值列示于资产负债表中。因此，在去年第三季度末，我们已将美西航空优先股的价值调整为8,950万美元，仅为成本的25%。换句话说，当时我们的净资产价值反映的是远低于我们最初3.58亿美元投资成本的价值。
But in the fourth quarter, we concluded that the decline in value was, in accounting terms, "other than temporary," and that judgment required us to send the writedown of $269 million through our income statement. The amount will have no other fourth-quarter effect. That is, it will not reduce our net worth, because the diminution of value had already been reflected.
但在第四季度，我们判断这种价值下跌从会计角度属于“非暂时性”下跌，因此我们必须将这2.69亿美元的减值计入损益表。这笔金额不会对第四季度产生其他影响，也就是说，它不会进一步减少我们的净资产，因为该价值下降已在之前反映在账面净值中。
Charlie and I will not stand for reelection to USAir's board at the upcoming annual meeting. Should Seth wish to consult with us, however, we will be pleased to be of any help that we can.
我和查理将不再参加美西航空即将举行的年度股东大会选举董事。不过如果塞思（Seth）希望咨询我们任何事项，我们很乐意提供力所能及的帮助。
# Miscellaneous（杂项）
Two CEO's who have done great things for Berkshire shareholders retired last year: Dan Burke of Capital Cities/ABC and Carl Reichardt of Wells Fargo. Dan and Carl encountered very tough industry conditions in recent years. But their skill as managers allowed the businesses they ran to emerge from these periods with record earnings, added luster, and bright prospects. Additionally, Dan and Carl prepared well for their departure and left their companies in outstanding hands. We owe them our gratitude.
去年，两位为伯克希尔股东做出巨大贡献的CEO退休了：资本城/美国广播公司（Capital Cities/ABC）的丹·伯克（Dan Burke）和富国银行（Wells Fargo）的卡尔·雷查德（Carl Reichardt）。近年来，他们面对着极其艰难的行业环境。但他们卓越的管理能力使各自领导的企业不仅渡过难关，还实现了创纪录的盈利、获得了更高声誉，并拥有光明前景。此外，他们在离职前做了充分准备，确保企业交接到优秀管理者手中。我们对他们心怀感激。
About 95.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1994 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $10.4 million and 3,300 charities were recipients.
在伯克希尔1994年的股东指定捐赠计划中，约有95.7%符合资格的股份参与其中。通过该项目作出的捐款总额为1,040万美元，共有3,300家慈善机构受益。
Every year a few shareholders miss participating in the program because they either do not have their shares registered in their own names on the prescribed record date or because they fail to get the designation form back to us within the 60-day period allowed for its return. Since we don't make exceptions when requirements aren't met, we urge that both new shareholders and old read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 50-51.
每年都有少数股东因未能在规定登记日将股份登记在自己名下，或未能在60天内返回指定表格而错失参与机会。由于我们在合规方面不会做例外处理，我们敦促新老股东都认真阅读年报第50至51页有关股东指定捐赠计划的说明。
To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1995 will be ineligible for the 1995 program.
如欲参与今后的项目，请务必确保您的股份是以实际持有人名义登记，而非以经纪人、银行或托管机构的名义。若在1995年8月31日前未完成此类登记，则无法参与2015年度计划。
We made only one minor acquisition during 1994 - a small retail shoe chain - but our interest in finding good candidates remains as keen as ever. The criteria we employ for purchases or mergers is detailed in the appendix on page 21.
1994年我们仅完成了一笔小型收购——一家小型零售鞋业连锁店。但我们寻找优质标的的兴趣丝毫未减。我们用于并购的标准详见第21页附录中的详细说明。
Last spring, we offered to merge with a large, family-controlled business on terms that included a Berkshire convertible preferred stock. Though we failed to reach an agreement, this episode made me realize that we needed to ask our shareholders to authorize preferred shares in case we wanted in the future to move quickly if a similar acquisition opportunity were to appear. Accordingly, our proxy presents a proposal that you authorize a large amount of preferred stock, which will be issuable on terms set by the Board of Directors. You can be sure that Charlie and I will not use these shares without being completely satisfied that we are receiving as much in intrinsic value as we are giving.
去年春天，我们曾提议与一家大型家族控制企业合并，交易方案包括发行伯克希尔可转换优先股。虽然最终未能达成协议，但这次经历让我意识到有必要请求股东授权一定数量的优先股，以便未来遇到类似并购机会时能迅速行动。因此，本次委托书中提出了相关提案，提请各位批准大量优先股的授权，这些优先股将由董事会决定其发行条款。我可以向你保证，查理和我只有在确信所获得的内在价值不低于所付出的成本时，才会动用这些股份。
Charlie and I hope you can come to the Annual Meeting - at a new site. Last year, we slightly overran the Orpheum Theater's seating capacity of 2,750, and therefore we will assemble at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, May 1, 1995, at the Holiday Convention Centre. The main ballroom at the Centre can handle 3,300, and if need be, we will have audio and video equipment in an adjacent room capable of handling another 1,000 people.
查理和我诚挚地邀请您出席今年的年度股东大会——这次换到了一个新场地。去年我们在俄尔甫姆剧院（Orpheum Theater）的会议略超其2,750人的容量限制，因此今年我们将于1995年5月1日星期一上午9:30，在假日会议中心（Holiday Convention Centre）举行大会。主宴会厅最多可容纳3,300人，如有需要，相邻房间还将配备音视频设备，额外容纳1,000人。
Last year we displayed some of Berkshire's products at the meeting, and as a result sold about 800 pounds of candy, 507 pairs of shoes, and over $12,000 of World Books and related publications. All these goods will be available again this year. Though we like to think of the meeting as a spiritual experience, we must remember that even the least secular of religions includes the ritual of the collection plate.
去年大会上我们展出了部分伯克希尔旗下产品，结果售出了大约800磅糖果、507双鞋子，以及超过12,000美元的世界图书及相关出版物。今年这些商品也将再次展出。尽管我们愿意把这场大会视为一次精神洗礼，但我们也不应忘记，即使最虔诚的宗教活动也有奉献仪式。
Of course, what you really should be purchasing is a video tape of the 1995 Orange Bowl. Your Chairman views this classic nightly, switching to slow motion for the fourth quarter. Our cover color this year is a salute to Nebraska's football coach, Tom Osborne, and his Cornhuskers, the country's top college team. I urge you to wear Husker red to the annual meeting and promise you that at least 50% of your managerial duo will be in appropriate attire.
当然，你真正应该购买的是一件1995年橘子碗比赛录像带。本人每天都要看一遍，尤其是第四节还会切换成慢动作回放。今年年报封面颜色是我们对内布拉斯加大学橄榄球队主教练汤姆·奥斯本（Tom Osborne）和他的“玉米农夫队”（Cornhuskers）——全美顶尖大学球队——致敬。我建议大家穿着“玉米农夫红”来参加年度大会，并承诺至少我们管理层两人中的一半会穿得与之相配。
We recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations for the meeting, as we expect a large crowd. Those of you who like to be downtown (about six miles from the Centre) may wish to stay at the Radisson Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel or at the much larger Red Lion Hotel a few blocks away. In the vicinity of the Centre are the Holiday Inn (403 rooms), Homewood Suites (118 rooms) and Hampton Inn (136 rooms). Another recommended spot is the Marriott, whose west Omaha location is about 100 yards from Borsheim's and a ten-minute drive from the Centre. There will be buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:45 and 9:00 for the meeting and return after it ends.
我们建议您尽快预订会议期间的酒店住宿，因为我们预计参会人数将非常可观。若您希望住在市中心（距离会议中心约6英里），您可以考虑入住规模较小但舒适的Radisson Redick Tower酒店（88间客房），或稍远几个街区、规模更大的Red Lion酒店。会议中心附近有Holiday Inn（403间客房）、Homewood Suites（118间客房）和Hampton Inn（136间客房）。另一个推荐地点是万豪酒店（Marriott），其位于奥马哈西部的位置距离伯克希尔旗下的Borsheim珠宝店仅100码，距会议中心也仅有十分钟车程。万豪酒店将在会议当天安排班车于早上8:45和9:00发车前往会场，并在会议结束后返回。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. A good-sized parking area is available at the Centre, while those who stay at the Holiday Inn, Homewood Suites and Hampton Inn will be able to walk to the meeting.
我们的委托书材料中附有一份说明，解释了您如何获取参加股东大会所需的入场卡。会议中心设有充足的停车位；此外，入住Holiday Inn、Homewood Suites和Hampton Inn的参会者还可以步行前往会场。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to the Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to hotels or the airport later. I hope you make a special effort to visit the Nebraska Furniture Mart because it has opened the Mega Mart, a true retailing marvel that sells electronics, appliances, computers, CD's, cameras and audio equipment. Sales have been sensational since the opening, and you will be amazed by both the variety of products available and their display on the floor.
与往年一样，我们将安排巴士在会议结束后送您前往内布拉斯加家具卖场（Nebraska Furniture Mart）和Borsheim珠宝店，之后再从那里送您回酒店或机场。我诚挚地希望您能特别抽出时间参观内布拉斯加家具卖场，因为它最近开设了“Mega Mart”分店——这是一家真正的零售奇迹商店，主营电子产品、家用电器、电脑、光盘、相机和音响设备。开业以来销售异常火爆，您一定会为店内商品种类之丰富以及陈列方式之壮观而感到惊叹。
The Mega Mart, adjacent to NFM's main store, is on our 64-acre site about two miles north of the Centre. The stores are open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on Fridays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. When you're there be sure to say hello to Mrs. B, who, at 101, will be hard at work in our Mrs. B's Warehouse. She never misses a day at the store - or, for that matter, an hour.
Mega Mart紧邻NFM主店，位于我们占地64英亩的园区内，位置大约在会议中心以北约两英里处。该商场营业时间为：周五上午10点至晚上9点，周六上午10点至下午6点，周日中午12点至下午6点。到访时请务必向今年已年满101岁的B夫人（Mrs. B）致意，她仍每天坚守岗位，在她的仓库里忙碌不停——她从未错过一天，甚至可以说从未错过一个小时。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday. This is always a special day, and we will try to have a few surprises. Usually this is the biggest sales day of the year, so for more reasons than one Charlie and I hope to see you there.
Borsheim珠宝店通常周日不营业，但在股东周年大会当周的周日（股东专属日）将对股东及嘉宾开放，营业时间为中午12点至下午6点。这一天总是特别，我们也准备了一些惊喜。通常这是全年销售额最高的一天，因此查理和我都非常希望届时见到您的到来。
On Saturday evening, April 29, there will be a baseball game at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and the Buffalo Bisons. The Buffalo team is owned by my friends, Mindy and Bob Rich, Jr., and I'm hoping they will attend. If so, I will try to entice Bob into a one-pitch duel on the mound. Bob is a capitalist's Randy Johnson - young, strong and athletic - and not the sort of fellow you want to face early in the season. So I will need plenty of vocal support.
4月29日星期六晚间，罗森布拉特体育场（Rosenblatt Stadium）将举行一场棒球比赛，对阵双方为Omaha Royals队和Buffalo Bisons队。后者由我的朋友明蒂（Mindy）和小鲍勃·里奇（Bob Rich, Jr.）夫妇拥有，我也希望他们届时出席。如果他们到场，我会邀请鲍勃与我来一场“投手对决”，只投一球决胜负。鲍勃是个现实版的兰迪·约翰逊（Randy Johnson）——年轻、强壮且运动天赋出众，绝不是赛季初期你想面对的那种对手。所以我届时将需要你们大声加油助威。
The proxy statement will include information about obtaining tickets to the game. About 1,400 shareholders attended the event last year. Opening the game that night, I had my stuff and threw a strike that the scoreboard reported at eight miles per hour. What many fans missed was that I shook off the catcher's call for my fast ball and instead delivered my change-up. This year it will be all smoke.
有关这场比赛门票的领取信息，请参见委托书说明。去年约有1,400名股东参加了这项活动。当晚我担任开球嘉宾，投出了一记时速8英里的好球。许多球迷没注意到的是，其实我拒绝了捕手要求我投快球的信号，而是改投了一记变速球。今年，我保证会让大家看到真正的“烟雾效果”。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 7, 1995
（沃伦·巴菲特）
董事会主席
1995年3月7日