2010巴菲特致股东的信

# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

（伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司）

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东：

The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 13% in 2010. Over the last 46 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $95,453, a rate of 20.2% compounded annually.*

我们A类和B类股票的每股账面价值在2010年增长了13%。在过去46年中（即现任管理层接管以来），账面价值从19美元增长到了95,453美元，年复合增长率达20.2%。*

The highlight of 2010 was our acquisition of Burlington Northern Santa Fe, a purchase that’s working out even better than I expected. It now appears that owning this railroad will increase Berkshire’s “normal” earning power by nearly 40% pre-tax and by well over 30% after-tax. Making this purchase increased our share count by 6% and used $22 billion of cash. Since we’ve quickly replenished the cash, the economics of this transaction have turned out very well.

2010年的亮点是我们收购了北伯灵顿铁路公司（Burlington Northern Santa Fe），这笔交易的结果甚至比我预期的还要好。现在看来，拥有这条铁路线将使伯克希尔的“正常”盈利能力在税前提高近40%，税后提高超过30%。此次收购使我们的股本增加了6%，并动用了220亿美元现金。由于我们迅速补充了现金储备，这项交易的经济效益非常理想。

A “normal year,” of course, is not something that either Charlie Munger, Vice Chairman of Berkshire and my partner, or I can define with anything like precision. But for the purpose of estimating our current earning power, we are envisioning a year free of a mega-catastrophe in insurance and possessing a general business climate somewhat better than that of 2010 but weaker than that of 2005 or 2006. Using these assumptions, and several others that I will explain in the “Investment” section, I can estimate that the normal earning power of the assets we currently own is about $17 billion pre-tax and $12 billion after-tax, excluding any capital gains or losses. Every day Charlie and I think about how we can build on this base.

当然，“正常年份”是查理·芒格（Charlie Munger）——伯克希尔副主席兼我的合伙人——和我都无法准确定义的东西。但为了估算我们当前的盈利能力，我们设想的是一个保险业务没有遭遇特大灾难、整体商业环境比2010年稍好、但弱于2005或2006年的年份。基于这些假设以及我将在“投资”部分解释的一些其他因素，我可以估计：目前我们所拥有的资产所产生的正常盈利能力大约为税前170亿美元、税后120亿美元（不包括任何资本利得或损失）。每一天，查理和我们都在思考如何在此基础上进一步提升。

Both of us are enthusiastic about BNSF’s future because railroads have major cost and environmental advantages over trucking, their main competitor. Last year BNSF moved each ton of freight it carried a record 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. That’s three times more fuel-efficient than trucking is, which means our railroad owns an important advantage in operating costs. Concurrently, our country gains because of reduced greenhouse emissions and a much smaller need for imported oil. When traffic travels by rail, society benefits.

我们都对BNSF的未来充满热情，因为铁路相比其主要竞争对手卡车运输，在成本和环保方面具有显著优势。去年，BNSF每加仑柴油运送每吨货物的距离创下了500英里的新纪录。这比卡车运输的燃油效率高出三倍，意味着我们的铁路在运营成本上具备重要优势。与此同时，国家也从中受益，温室气体排放减少，进口石油需求大幅下降。当交通通过铁路进行时，整个社会都获益。

Over time, the movement of goods in the United States will increase, and BNSF should get its full share of the gain. The railroad will need to invest massively to bring about this growth, but no one is better situated than Berkshire to supply the funds required. However slow the economy, or chaotic the markets, our checks will clear.

随着时间推移，美国的商品运输量将会增加，而BNSF应能获得应有的市场份额。为了实现这一增长，铁路将需要大量投资，但没有人比伯克希尔更适合提供所需资金。无论经济多么低迷，市场多么混乱，我们的支票都能兑现。

Last year – in the face of widespread pessimism about our economy – we demonstrated our enthusiasm for capital investment at Berkshire by spending $6 billion on property and equipment. Of this amount, $5.4 billion – or 90% of the total – was spent in the United States. Certainly our businesses will expand abroad in the future, but an overwhelming part of their future investments will be at home. In 2011, we will set a new record for capital spending – $8 billion – and spend all of the $2 billion increase in the United States.

去年，在人们对我国经济普遍悲观的背景下，我们通过投入60亿美元用于厂房与设备，展示了我们在伯克希尔进行资本投资的热情。其中54亿美元（占总额的90%）花在美国本土。当然，我们的业务将来也会向海外扩张，但绝大多数未来的投资仍将集中在国内。2011年，我们将创下新的资本支出纪录——80亿美元，并且新增的20亿美元支出都将用于美国本土。

Money will always flow toward opportunity, and there is an abundance of that in America. Commentators today often talk of “great uncertainty.” But think back, for example, to December 6, 1941, October 18, 1987 and September 10, 2001. No matter how serene today may be, tomorrow is always uncertain.

资金总会流向有机遇的地方，而美国正拥有大量的机会。如今评论员们经常谈论“巨大的不确定性”。但回想一下，例如1941年12月6日、1987年10月18日，以及2001年9月10日。无论今天多么平静，明天总是不确定的。

Don’t let that reality spook you. Throughout my lifetime, politicians and pundits have constantly moaned about terrifying problems facing America. Yet our citizens now live an astonishing six times better than when I was born. The prophets of doom have overlooked the all-important factor that is certain: Human potential is far from exhausted, and the American system for unleashing that potential – a system that has worked wonders for over two centuries despite frequent interruptions for recessions and even a Civil War – remains alive and effective.

不要被这种现实吓倒。在我一生中，政客和评论家不断抱怨美国面临的可怕问题。然而，我们的公民如今的生活水平是我出生时的六倍。那些末日预言者忽视了一个确定无疑的重要因素：人类的潜力远未耗尽，而释放这种潜力的美国体系——尽管经常因经济衰退甚至内战而中断——在过去两个多世纪里创造了奇迹，至今仍然活跃有效。

We are not natively smarter than we were when our country was founded nor do we work harder. But look around you and see a world beyond the dreams of any colonial citizen. Now, as in 1776, 1861, 1932 and 1941, America’s best days lie ahead.

我们并非天生就比建国时更聪明，也不一定工作更努力。但环顾四周，你会发现这个世界已经超越了殖民地时代任何一位公民的梦想。如今，正如1776年、1861年、1932年和1941年一样，美国最美好的日子仍在前方。

# Performance

# 业绩表现（Performance）

Charlie and I believe that those entrusted with handling the funds of others should establish performance goals at the onset of their stewardship. Lacking such standards, managements are tempted to shoot the arrow of performance and then paint the bull’s-eye around wherever it lands.

查理和我们认为，受托管理他人资金的人应在管理之初设立明确的绩效目标。缺乏这样的标准，管理层往往会先射出绩效之箭，再围绕箭落地的位置画上靶心。

In Berkshire’s case, we long ago told you that our job is to increase per-share intrinsic value at a rate greater than the increase (including dividends) of the S&P 500. In some years we succeed; in others we fail. But, if we are unable over time to reach that goal, we have done nothing for our investors, who by themselves could have realized an equal or better result by owning an index fund.

对于伯克希尔而言，我们早就告诉过你们，我们的任务是以高于标普500指数（包含股息）增长的速度提升每股内在价值。有些年份我们做到了，有些年份则失败了。但如果长期来看我们未能达成这个目标，那就意味着我们对投资者毫无贡献，他们自己购买一只指数基金就能获得相同甚至更好的回报。

The challenge, of course, is the calculation of intrinsic value. Present that task to Charlie and me separately, and you will get two different answers. Precision just isn’t possible.

当然，挑战在于如何计算内在价值。如果让查理和我分别来做这件事，你会得到两个不同的答案。精确计算是不可能做到的。

To eliminate subjectivity, we therefore use an understated proxy for intrinsic-value – book value – when measuring our performance. To be sure, some of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying value on our books. (Later in this report, we’ll present a case study.) But since that premium seldom swings wildly from year to year, book value can serve as a reasonable device for tracking how we are doing.

为了消除主观性，我们在衡量绩效时使用了一个保守的替代指标——账面价值，来代表内在价值。可以肯定的是，我们旗下一些企业的实际价值远高于账面上的记录价值。（本报告后面会有一个案例分析。）但由于这种溢价通常不会在年与年之间剧烈波动，账面价值可以作为一个合理的工具来追踪我们的表现。

The table on page 2 shows our 46-year record against the S&P, a performance quite good in the earlier years and now only satisfactory. The bountiful years, we want to emphasize, will never return. The huge sums of capital we currently manage eliminate any chance of exceptional performance. We will strive, however, for better-than-average results and feel it fair for you to hold us to that standard.

第2页的表格显示了我们过去46年相对于标普的表现，早期表现相当不错，但现在只是令人满意。我们要强调的是，那些丰收年景不会再回来了。我们现在管理着巨额资金，这使得我们不可能再取得非凡的业绩。不过我们会努力追求优于平均水平的表现，并认为你以此标准要求我们是公平的。

Yearly figures, it should be noted, are neither to be ignored nor viewed as all-important. The pace of the earth’s movement around the sun is not synchronized with the time required for either investment ideas or operating decisions to bear fruit. At GEICO, for example, we enthusiastically spent $900 million last year on advertising to obtain policyholders who deliver us no immediate profits. If we could spend twice that amount productively, we would happily do so though short-term results would be further penalized. Many large investments at our railroad and utility operations are also made with an eye to payoffs well down the road.

请注意，年度数据既不应被忽视，也不能被视为唯一重要的指标。地球绕太阳公转的速度，并不与投资理念或经营决策开花结果所需的时间同步。例如，在GEICO，我们去年投入了9亿美元广告费，用来吸引那些短期内不会带来利润的保单持有者。如果我们能找到更有成效的方式，愿意把金额翻倍投入，即使短期结果因此受到更大影响也在所不惜。我们铁路和公用事业部门的许多重大投资，也是着眼于遥远的未来收益。

To provide you a longer-term perspective on performance, we present on the facing page the yearly figures from page 2 recast into a series of five-year periods. Overall, there are 42 of these periods, and they tell an interesting story. On a comparative basis, our best years ended in the early 1980s. The market’s golden period, however, came in the 17 following years, with Berkshire achieving stellar absolute returns even as our relative advantage narrowed.

为了让你更好地了解长期绩效，我们在下一页将第2页的年度数据重新整理为一系列五年期的表现。总体来看，共有42个这样的五年期，它们讲述了一个有趣的故事。从相对表现来看，我们最好的年份结束于1980年代初。然而，市场的黄金时期出现在随后的17年中，在这段时间里，尽管我们的相对优势有所缩小，但伯克希尔依然取得了卓越的绝对回报。

After 1999, the market stalled (or have you already noticed that?). Consequently, the satisfactory performance relative to the S&P that Berkshire has achieved since then has delivered only moderate absolute results.

1999年之后，市场陷入了停滞（你是否已经注意到了这一点？）。因此，自那时起伯克希尔相对于标普取得的令人满意的表现，仅带来了中等程度的绝对回报。

Looking forward, we hope to average several points better than the S&P – though that result is, of course, far from a sure thing. If we succeed in that aim, we will almost certainly produce better relative results in bad years for the stock market and suffer poorer results in strong markets.

展望未来，我们希望平均每年跑赢标普几个百分点——虽然这个目标当然远非板上钉钉。如果我们实现了这个目标，几乎可以肯定的是，我们会在股市低迷年份取得较好的相对回报，而在股市强劲时则可能表现略差。

# Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 by Five-Year Periods

# 按五年期划分的伯克希尔公司业绩与标普500指数对比（Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 by Five-Year Periods）

Annual Percentage Change
（年度百分比变化）

Five-Year Period (五年期)	Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire (每股账面价值)	S&P 500 with Dividends Included (含股息的标普500指数)	Relative Results (1)-(2) (相对表现)
1965-1969	17.2	5.0	12.2
1966-1970	14.7	3.9	10.8
1967-1971	13.9	9.2	4.7
1968-1972	16.8	7.5	9.3
1969-1973	17.7	2.0	15.7
1970-1974	15.0	(2.4)	17.4
1971-1975	13.9	3.2	10.7
1972-1976	20.8	4.9	15.9
1973-1977	23.4	(0.2)	23.6
1974-1978	24.4	4.3	20.1
1975-1979	30.1	14.7	15.4
1976-1980	33.4	13.9	19.5
1977-1981	29.0	8.1	20.9
1978-1982	29.9	14.1	15.8
1979-1983	31.6	17.3	14.3
1980-1984	27.0	14.8	12.2
1981-1985	32.6	14.6	18.0
1982-1986	31.5	19.8	11.7
1983-1987	27.4	11.7	15.7
1984-1988	25.0	16.4	8.6
1985-1989	31.1	11.0	20.1
1986-1990	22.9	15.2	7.7
1987-1991	25.4	9.8	15.6
1988-1992	25.6	20.3	5.3
1989-1993	24.4	10.8	13.6
1990-1994	18.6	13.1	5.5
1991-1995	25.6	9.8	15.8
1992-1996	24.2	15.3	8.9
1993-1997	26.9	10.1	16.8
1994-1998	33.7	15.8	17.9
1995-1999	30.4	9.8	20.6
1996-2000	22.9	14.5	8.4
1997-2001	14.8	9.9	4.9
1998-2002	10.4	8.7	1.7
1999-2003	6.0	9.9	(3.9)
2000-2004	8.0	16.5	(8.5)
2001-2005	8.0	9.1	(1.1)
2002-2006	13.1	0.4	12.7
2003-2007	13.3	8.2	5.1
2004-2008	6.9	2.3	4.6
2005-2009	8.6	7.7	0.9
2006-2010	10.0	—	—

注释（Notes）：

前两个时期涵盖从上一年9月30日开始的五年。第三个时期涵盖从1966年9月30日至1971年12月31日的63个月。所有其他时期均涉及日历年。
第2页的其他注释也适用于此表。

# Intrinsic Value – Today and Tomorrow

# 内在价值——当下与未来（Intrinsic Value – Today and Tomorrow）

Though Berkshire’s intrinsic value cannot be precisely calculated, two of its three key pillars can be measured. Charlie and I rely heavily on these measurements when we make our own estimates of Berkshire’s value.

尽管伯克希尔的内在价值无法精确计算，但其三个关键支柱中的两个是可以量化的。查理和我在评估伯克希尔价值时，严重依赖这些量化指标。

The first component of value is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend these totaled $158 billion at market value.

价值的第一个组成部分是我们的投资：股票、债券和现金等价物。年末这些资产的市值总计为1580亿美元。

Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $66 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, underwriting results are volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, though, we’ve been significantly profitable, and I also expect us to average breakeven results or better in the future. If we do that, all of our investments – those funded both by float and by retained earnings – can be viewed as an element of value for Berkshire shareholders.

保险浮存金——我们在保险业务中暂时持有但不属于我们的资金——为660亿美元的投资提供了资金。只要保险承保业务达到盈亏平衡（即我们收取的保费等于产生的损失和费用），这种浮存金就是“免费的”。当然，承保结果具有波动性，利润和损失会剧烈波动。然而，从整个历史来看，我们的承保业务显著盈利，我也预计未来平均而言至少能达到盈亏平衡或更好。如果做到这一点，所有投资（无论是由浮存金还是留存收益资助）都可以被视为伯克希尔股东的价值组成部分。

Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance underwriting. These earnings are delivered by our 68 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 106. In Berkshire’s early years, we focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we’ve increasingly emphasized the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses, a practice that will continue.

伯克希尔价值的第二个组成部分是来自投资和保险承保之外的收益。这些收益来自我们的68家非保险企业，详见第106页。在伯克希尔早期，我们专注于投资端。然而，在过去二十年中，我们越来越重视开发非保险业务的收益，并将继续这一做法。

# Shift in Value Composition

# 价值构成的转变

The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first table, we present per-share investments at decade intervals beginning in 1970, three years after we entered the insurance business. We exclude those investments applicable to minority interests.

下表展示了这一转变。第一张表显示了自1970年起按十年为间隔的每股投资数据（我们进入保险业务三年后）。我们排除了适用于少数权益的投资。

Per-Share Investments (每股投资)

Yearend (年末)	Per-Share Investments (每股投资)	Compounded Annual Increase (年复合增长率)
1970	$66	—
1980	$754	27.5%
1990	$7,798	26.3%
2000	$50,229	20.5%
2010	$94,730	6.6%

Though our compounded annual increase in per-share investments was a healthy 19.9% over the 40-year period, our rate of increase has slowed sharply as we have focused on using funds to buy operating businesses.

尽管在过去40年中，我们的每股投资年复合增长率达到健康的19.9%，但随着我们将资金更多用于收购运营企业，增长速度已显著放缓。

# Growth in Non-Insurance Earnings

# 非保险业务收益的增长

The payoff from this shift is shown in the following table, which illustrates how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have increased, again on a per-share basis and after applicable minority interests.

这一转变的成果体现在下表中，展示了我们的非保险业务收益如何增长（同样基于每股和扣除少数权益后）。

Per-Share Pre-Tax Earnings (每股税前收益)

Year (年份)	Pre-Tax Earnings (税前收益)	Compounded Annual Increase (年复合增长率)
1970	$2.87	—
1980	$19.01	20.8%
1990	$102.58	18.4%
2000	$918.66	24.5%
2010	$5,926.04	20.5%

尽管在过去40年中，我们的每股投资年复合增长率达到健康的19.9%，但随着我们将资金更多用于收购运营企业，增长速度已显著放缓。

For the forty years, our compounded annual gain in pre-tax, non-insurance earnings per share is 21.0%. During the same period, Berkshire’s stock price increased at a rate of 22.1% annually. Over time, you can expect our stock price to move in rough tandem with Berkshire’s investments and earnings. Market price and intrinsic value often follow very different paths – sometimes for extended periods – but eventually they meet.

在过去四十年中，我们的每股税前非保险收益年复合增长率达21.0%。同期，伯克希尔股价以年均22.1%的速度增长。从长期来看，你可以预期我们的股价会大致与伯克希尔的投资和收益同步波动。市场价格与内在价值经常沿着截然不同的路径运行——有时甚至持续多年——但最终它们终将交汇。

There is a third, more subjective, element to an intrinsic value calculation that can be either positive or negative: the efficacy with which retained earnings will be deployed in the future. We, as well as many other businesses, are likely to retain earnings over the next decade that will equal, or even exceed, the capital we presently employ. Some companies will turn these retained dollars into fifty-cent pieces, others into two-dollar bills.

内在价值计算中还有一个更为主观的第三要素，它可能带来正面或负面影响：即留存收益未来运用的有效性。我们以及其他许多企业，在未来十年内留存的收益很可能会等于甚至超过目前所运用的资本。有些公司将这些留存资金转化为仅值五毛钱的价值，而另一些公司则能将其变为两美元的价值。

This “what-will-they-do-with-the-money” factor must always be evaluated along with the “what-do-we-have-now” calculation in order for us, or anybody, to arrive at a sensible estimate of a company’s intrinsic value. That’s because an outside investor stands by helplessly as management reinvests his share of the company’s earnings. If a CEO can be expected to do this job well, the reinvestment prospects add to the company’s current value; if the CEO’s talents or motives are suspect, today’s value must be discounted. The difference in outcome can be huge. A dollar of then-value in the hands of Sears Roebuck’s or Montgomery Ward’s CEOs in the late 1960s had a far different destiny than did a dollar entrusted to Sam Walton.

这种“他们拿钱干什么”的因素必须始终与“我们现在拥有什么”的计算结合起来，才能让我们（或其他任何人）对一家公司的内在价值做出合理估计。这是因为外部投资者只能无奈地看着管理层重新投资他们应得的公司收益。如果CEO能被预期很好地完成这项工作，再投资前景就会增加公司的当前价值；如果CEO的能力或动机令人怀疑，当前价值就必须打折。结果差异可能巨大：1960年代末，西尔斯百货或蒙哥马利·沃德公司CEO手中的1美元价值命运，与萨姆·沃尔顿手中的1美元截然不同。

Charlie and I hope that the per-share earnings of our non-insurance businesses continue to increase at a decent rate. But the job gets tougher as the numbers get larger. We will need both good performance from our current businesses and more major acquisitions. We’re prepared. Our elephant gun has been reloaded, and my trigger finger is itchy.

查理和我都希望我们的非保险业务每股收益能以合理的速度持续增长。但随着基数增大，这项工作变得愈发困难。我们需要既有业务的良好表现，也需要更多重大收购。我们已做好准备。我们的“大象枪”已重新装弹，我的手指早已跃跃欲试。

Partially offsetting our anchor of size are several important advantages we have. First, we possess a cadre of truly skilled managers who have an unusual commitment to their own operations and to Berkshire. Many of our CEOs are independently wealthy and work only because they love what they do. They are volunteers, not mercenaries. Because no one can offer them a job they would enjoy more, they can’t be lured away.

我们的规模优势部分被几个重要优势所抵消。首先，我们拥有一支真正技艺高超的管理团队，他们对自己的业务和伯克希尔怀有非凡的承诺。许多CEO本身已富有独立财富，他们工作仅仅是因为热爱自己所做的事。他们是志愿者而非雇佣兵。因为无人能提供让他们更享受的工作，他们无法被挖走。

At Berkshire, managers can focus on running their businesses: They are not subjected to meetings at headquarters nor financing worries nor Wall Street harassment. They simply get a letter from me every two years (it’s reproduced on pages 104-105) and call me when they wish. And their wishes do differ: There are managers to whom I have not talked in the last year, while there is one with whom I talk almost daily. Our trust is in people rather than process. A “hire well, manage little” code suits both them and me.

在伯克希尔，管理者可以专注于经营业务：他们无需参加总部会议，无需担忧融资问题，也无需面对华尔街骚扰。他们只需每两年收到我一封信（第104-105页有完整内容），并在需要时致电我即可。他们的沟通需求各不相同：有些管理者过去一年我从未联系，而有一位则几乎每天交流。我们的信任建立在人而非流程之上。“择优聘用，适度管理”的准则适合我们双方。

Berkshire’s CEOs come in many forms. Some have MBAs; others never finished college. Some use budgets and are by-the-book types; others operate by the seat of their pants. Our team resembles a baseball squad composed of all-stars having vastly different batting styles. Changes in our line-up are seldom required.

伯克希尔的CEO们形态各异：有些拥有MBA学位，有些甚至未完成大学学业；有些依赖预算并严格按规章行事，有些则凭直觉灵活应对。我们的团队就像一支由全明星球员组成的棒球队，每位成员的击球风格迥异。阵容调整极少必要。

Our second advantage relates to the allocation of the money our businesses earn. After meeting the needs of those businesses, we have very substantial sums left over. Most companies limit themselves to reinvesting funds within the industry in which they have been operating. That often restricts them, however, to a “universe” for capital allocation that is both tiny and quite inferior to what is available in the wider world. Competition for the few opportunities that are available tends to become fierce. The seller has the upper hand, as a girl might if she were the only female at a party attended by many boys. That lopsided situation would be great for the girl, but terrible for the boys.

我们的第二个优势涉及业务收益的分配。满足业务需求后，我们仍掌握大量剩余资金。多数公司局限于将资金重新投入其现有行业，这往往使它们的资本配置范围局限于一个狭小且远逊于外部世界的“宇宙”。对有限机会的竞争往往异常激烈。卖方占据主导地位，就像一个聚会上唯一女孩面对众多男孩的情形。这种失衡对女孩有利，却让男孩们陷入困境。

At Berkshire we face no institutional restraints when we deploy capital. Charlie and I are limited only by our ability to understand the likely future of a possible acquisition. If we clear that hurdle – and frequently we can’t – we are then able to compare any one opportunity against a host of others.

在伯克希尔，资本配置不受制度限制。查理和我的局限仅在于理解潜在收购未来的能力。若能跨越这一障碍（我们常无法做到），我们便能将任一机会与大量其他选择进行比较。

When I took control of Berkshire in 1965, I didn’t exploit this advantage. Berkshire was then only in textiles, where it had in the previous decade lost significant money. The dumbest thing I could have done was to pursue “opportunities” to improve and expand the existing textile operation – so for years that’s exactly what I did. And then, in a final burst of brilliance, I went out and bought another textile company. Aaaaaaargh! Eventually I came to my senses, heading first into insurance and then into other industries.

1965年接管伯克希尔时，我未能善用这一优势。彼时公司仅涉足纺织业，而过去十年该业务已亏损严重。我本应避免的最愚蠢行为，恰恰是追求“机会”去改善和扩张现有纺织业务——但我却持续多年如此操作。最终甚至“灵光一闪”收购了另一家纺织公司。啊啊啊！最终我幡然醒悟，转向保险业及其他产业。

There is even a supplement to this world-is-our-oyster advantage: In addition to evaluating the attractions of one business against a host of others, we also measure businesses against opportunities available in marketable securities, a comparison most managements don’t make. Often, businesses are priced ridiculously high against what can likely be earned from investments in stocks or bonds. At such moments, we buy securities and bide our time.

这一“世界任我驰骋”优势甚至还有附加价值：除了将一项业务与其他众多业务比较外，我们还将业务与可交易证券的机会进行对比——多数管理层从不这么做。当企业估值远高于股票或债券投资可能产生的收益时，我们便买入证券静待时机。

Our flexibility in respect to capital allocation has accounted for much of our progress to date. We have been able to take money we earn from, say, See’s Candies or Business Wire (two of our best-run businesses, but also two offering limited reinvestment opportunities) and use it as part of the stake we needed to buy BNSF.

资本配置的灵活性贡献了我们迄今为止的大部分进展。我们能将来自See’s Candies或Business Wire（两家运营优秀但再投资机会有限的企业）的收益，作为收购BNSF所需资金的一部分。

Our final advantage is the hard-to-duplicate culture that permeates Berkshire. And in businesses, culture counts.

我们的最后一项优势是难以复制的伯克希尔文化。在商业中，文化至关重要。

To start with, the directors who represent you think and act like owners. They receive token compensation: no options, no restricted stock and, for that matter, virtually no cash. We do not provide them directors and officers liability insurance, a given at almost every other large public company. If they mess up with your money, they will lose their money as well. Leaving my holdings aside, directors and their families own Berkshire shares worth more than $3 billion. Our directors, therefore, monitor Berkshire’s actions and results with keen interest and an owner’s eye. You and I are lucky to have them as stewards.

首先，代表您的董事们像所有者般思考与行动。他们仅获得象征性报酬：无期权、无限制股票，甚至几乎没有现金。我们不向他们提供董责险——这在几乎所有其他大型上市公司中都是标配。若他们因失误动用您的资金，自身也将蒙受损失。除去我的持股，董事及其家族持有市值超30亿美元的伯克希尔股票。因此，他们以所有者视角密切监督伯克希尔的行动与结果。你我皆因他们作为受托人而幸运。

This same owner-orientation prevails among our managers. In many cases, these are people who have sought out Berkshire as an acquirer for a business that they and their families have long owned. They came to us with an owner’s mindset, and we provide an environment that encourages them to retain it. Having managers who love their businesses is no small advantage.

同样的所有者导向也贯穿于我们的管理者中。许多情况下，这些人主动寻求伯克希尔作为收购方，以出售其家族长期持有的企业。他们带着所有者心态加入我们，而我们提供了鼓励他们保持这一心态的环境。管理者热爱自身业务是一项不可小觑的优势。

Cultures self-propagate. Winston Churchill once said, “You shape your houses and then they shape you.” That wisdom applies to businesses as well. Bureaucratic procedures beget more bureaucracy, and imperial corporate palaces induce imperious behavior. (As one wag put it, “You know you’re no longer CEO when you get in the back seat of your car and it doesn’t move.”) At Berkshire’s “World Headquarters” our annual rent is $270,212. Moreover, the home-office investment in furniture, art, Coke dispenser, lunch room, high-tech equipment – you name it – totals $301,363. As long as Charlie and I treat your money as if it were our own, Berkshire’s managers are likely to be careful with it as well.

文化具有自我延续性。温斯顿·丘吉尔曾言：“你塑造房屋，然后房屋塑造你。”这一智慧同样适用于企业。官僚流程滋生更多官僚，帝王式办公楼催生专横行为。（正如某位幽默人士所言：“当你坐进汽车后座而车未动时，你就不再是CEO了。”）伯克希尔“全球总部”的年租金仅为270,212美元。此外，总部在家具、艺术品、可乐机、午餐室、高科技设备等方面的总投资总计仅301,363美元。只要查理和我视您的资金如己出，伯克希尔的管理者也会谨慎对待。

Our compensation programs, our annual meeting and even our annual reports are all designed with an eye to reinforcing the Berkshire culture, and making it one that will repel and expel managers of a different bent. This culture grows stronger every year, and it will remain intact long after Charlie and I have left the scene.

我们的薪酬计划、年度会议甚至年报设计，皆旨在强化伯克希尔文化，并排斥与之理念不合的管理者。这一文化每年愈发坚固，即使查理和我离场后也将长存。

We will need all of the strengths I’ve just described to do reasonably well. Our managers will deliver; you can count on that. But whether Charlie and I can hold up our end in capital allocation depends in part on the competitive environment for acquisitions. You will get our best efforts.

要实现良好表现，我们需要上述所有优势。我们的管理者必将兑现承诺，这点毋庸置疑。而查理和我在资本配置上的表现，部分取决于并购竞争环境。您将看到我们的全力以赴。

Our final advantage is the hard-to-duplicate culture that permeates Berkshire. And in businesses, culture counts.

我们的最后一项优势是难以复制的伯克希尔文化。在商业中，文化至关重要。

# GEICO

# 政府雇员保险公司（Government Employees Insurance Company）

Now let me tell you a story that will help you understand how the intrinsic value of a business can far exceed its book value. Relating this tale also gives me a chance to relive some great memories.

让我讲一个故事，帮助你理解一家企业的内在价值如何远超其账面价值。讲述这个故事也让我有机会重温一些珍贵回忆。

Sixty years ago last month, GEICO entered my life, destined to shape it in a huge way. I was then a 20-year-old graduate student at Columbia, having elected to go there because my hero, Ben Graham, taught a once-a-week class at the school.

就在上个月，60年前的GEICO进入我的生命，注定以巨大的方式塑造它。当时我是哥伦比亚大学的一名20岁研究生，选择这所学校是因为我的偶像本杰明·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）每周在此开设一门课程。

One day at the library, I checked out Ben’s entry in Who’s Who in America and found he was chairman of Government Employees Insurance Co. (now called GEICO). I knew nothing of insurance and had never heard of the company. The librarian, however, steered me to a large compendium of insurers and, after reading the page on GEICO, I decided to visit the company. The following Saturday, I boarded an early train for Washington.

一天在图书馆，我查阅了《美国名人录》中的本杰明条目，发现他是政府雇员保险公司（现称GEICO）的董事长。我对保险一无所知，甚至从未听说过这家公司。不过，图书管理员指引我查看一本大型保险公司汇编，阅读了GEICO的页面后，我决定亲自拜访这家公司。次周六，我搭乘早班火车前往华盛顿。

Alas, when I arrived at the company’s headquarters, the building was closed. I then rather frantically started pounding on a door, until finally a janitor appeared. I asked him if there was anyone in the office I could talk to, and he steered me to the only person around, Lorimer Davidson.

然而，抵达公司总部时，大楼已关闭。我焦急地敲打大门，直到一名清洁工出现。我问他办公室里是否有人可以交谈，他带我找到了唯一在场的人——洛里默·戴维森（Lorimer Davidson）。

That was my lucky moment. During the next four hours, “Davy” gave me an education about both insurance and GEICO. It was the beginning of a wonderful friendship. Soon thereafter, I graduated from Columbia and became a stock salesman in Omaha. GEICO, of course, was my prime recommendation, which got me off to a great start with dozens of customers. GEICO also jump-started my net worth because, soon after meeting Davy, I made the stock 75% of my $9,800 investment portfolio. (Even so, I felt over-diversified.)

那是我的幸运时刻。接下来的四小时里，“戴维”（Davy）向我深入讲解了保险与GEICO。这段友谊从此开启。不久后，我从哥伦比亚毕业，成为奥马哈的证券推销员。GEICO自然是我力推的股票，这让我迅速获得数十位客户。GEICO也加速了我的财富积累：结识戴维后不久，我将9800美元投资组合的75%投入该股。（即便如此，我仍觉得自己过度分散了投资。）

Subsequently, Davy became CEO of GEICO, taking the company to undreamed-of heights before it got into trouble in the mid-1970s, a few years after his retirement. When that happened – with the stock falling by more than 95% – Berkshire bought about one-third of the company in the market, a position that over the years increased to 50% because of GEICO’s repurchases of its own shares. Berkshire’s cost for this half of the business was $46 million. (Despite the size of our position, we exercised no control over operations.)

之后，戴维成为GEICO首席执行官，在他退休数年后，公司于1970年代中期陷入困境（股价暴跌逾95%）。当时伯克希尔在市场上买入约三分之一的公司股份，随着GEICO回购自身股票，这一持仓比例最终增至50%。伯克希尔对这部分股权的成本为4600万美元。（尽管持仓量大，但我们并未参与运营决策。）

We then purchased the remaining 50% of GEICO at the beginning of 1996, which spurred Davy, at 95, to make a video tape saying how happy he was that his beloved GEICO would permanently reside with Berkshire. (He also playfully concluded with, “Next time, Warren, please make an appointment.”)

1996年初，我们收购了剩余50%的GEICO股权，这促使95岁的戴维录制了一段视频，表达对自己挚爱的GEICO永久归属伯克希尔的喜悦。（他幽默地补充道：“下次，沃伦，请提前预约。”）

A lot has happened at GEICO during the last 60 years, but its core goal – saving Americans substantial money on their purchase of auto insurance – remains unchanged. (Try us at 1-800-847-7536 or www.GEICO.com.) In other words, get the policyholder’s business by deserving his business. Focusing on this objective, the company has grown to be America’s third-largest auto insurer, with a market share of 8.8%.

过去60年GEICO经历诸多变迁，但其核心目标始终未变：为美国人在购买汽车保险时节省巨额开支。（请致电1-800-847-7536或访问www.GEICO.com体验。）换言之，通过值得客户信任来赢得业务。聚焦这一目标，公司已成长为美国第三大汽车保险公司，市场份额达8.8%。

When Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, took over in 1993, that share was 2.0%, a level at which it had been stuck for more than a decade. GEICO became a different company under Tony, finding a path to consistent growth while simultaneously maintaining underwriting discipline and keeping its costs low.

1993年托尼·尼利（Tony Nicely）接任GEICO首席执行官时，市场份额仅为2.0%——这一水平已停滞十余年。在托尼的领导下，GEICO焕然一新，在保持承保纪律和低成本的同时，找到了持续增长的路径。

Let me quantify Tony’s achievement. When, in 1996, we bought the 50% of GEICO we didn’t already own, it cost us about $2.3 billion. That price implied a value of $4.6 billion for 100%. GEICO then had tangible net worth of $1.9 billion.

让我用数据量化托尼的成就。1996年我们收购剩余50%股权时耗资约23亿美元，对应公司整体估值46亿美元。当时GEICO的有形净资产为19亿美元。

The excess over tangible net worth of the implied value – $2.7 billion – was what we estimated GEICO’s “goodwill” to be worth at that time. That goodwill represented the economic value of the policyholders who were then doing business with GEICO. In 1995, those customers had paid the company $2.8 billion in premiums. Consequently, we were valuing GEICO’s customers at about 97% (2.7/2.8) of what they were annually paying the company. By industry standards, that was a very high price. But GEICO was no ordinary insurer: Because of the company’s low costs, its policyholders were consistently profitable and unusually loyal.

隐含估值超出有形净资产的27亿美元，即我们当时对GEICO“商誉”的估值。这笔商誉代表了当时与GEICO合作保单持有者的经济价值。1995年，这些客户向公司支付了28亿美元保费。因此，我们将GEICO客户的价值定为其年付费的约97%（2.7/2.8）。按行业标准衡量，这已是极高的溢价。但GEICO绝非普通保险公司：由于成本极低，其保单持有者始终盈利且异常忠诚。

Today, premium volume is $14.3 billion and growing. Yet we carry the goodwill of GEICO on our books at only $1.4 billion, an amount that will remain unchanged no matter how much the value of GEICO increases. (Under accounting rules, you write down the carrying value of goodwill if its economic value decreases, but leave it unchanged if economic value increases.) Using the 97%-of-premium-volume yardstick we applied to our 1996 purchase, the real value today of GEICO’s economic goodwill is about $14 billion. And this value is likely to be much higher ten and twenty years from now. GEICO – off to a strong start in 2011 – is the gift that keeps giving.

如今，GEICO的保费规模已达143亿美元且持续增长。然而，我们在账面上仅以14亿美元记录其商誉价值，无论GEICO价值如何上升，这一数字将保持不变。（根据会计规则，商誉经济价值下降需减值，但上升时不作调整。）若沿用1996年收购时“商誉价值=保费规模97%”的标准，GEICO当前的商誉真实价值约140亿美元。未来十年或二十年，这一价值可能更高。GEICO——2011年开局强劲——是一个持续创造价值的礼物。

One not-so-small footnote: Under Tony, GEICO has developed one of the country’s largest personal-lines insurance agencies, which primarily sells homeowners policies to our GEICO auto insurance customers. In this business, we represent a number of insurers that are not affiliated with us. They take the risk; we simply sign up the customers. Last year we sold 769,898 new policies at this agency operation, up 34% from the year before. The obvious way this activity aids us is that it produces commission revenue; equally important is the fact that it further strengthens our relationship with our policyholders, helping us retain them.

一个不容忽视的注脚：在托尼的领导下，GEICO已发展成美国最大的个人险代理机构之一，主要向GEICO汽车保险客户销售房屋保险。在这项业务中，我们代表多家非关联保险公司承保风险，我们仅负责签约客户。去年该代理业务售出769,898份新保单，同比增长34%。这项业务的直接益处是佣金收入，更重要的是它强化了与保单持有者的关系，提升客户留存率。

I owe an enormous debt to Tony and Davy (and, come to think of it, to that janitor as well).

我要深深感谢托尼和戴维（说起来，那位清洁工也值得感激）。

# The Four Major Sectors of Berkshire

# 伯克希尔的四大核心业务板块

Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of Berkshire. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.

现在，让我们审视伯克希尔的四大核心业务板块。每个板块在资产负债表和收入结构上都截然不同，合并分析会阻碍理解。因此，我们将它们作为四家独立企业分别呈现——这也是查理和我的视角。

We will look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.

我们首先聚焦于保险业务——伯克希尔的核心运营板块，也是推动我们多年扩张的主要引擎。

# Insurance

# 保险业务（Insurance）

Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown: Just take a look at the following table:

财产与意外险（“P/C”）保险公司通常先收取保费，随后支付理赔。在极端情况下（如某些工伤赔偿事故），赔付可能持续数十年。这种“先收钱、后付钱”的模式使我们持有大额资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——最终这些资金将流向他人。与此同时，我们可将这些浮存金用于伯克希尔的投资收益。尽管单个保单和理赔不断变化，但浮存金规模与保费总量的关系始终保持稳定。因此，随着业务增长，我们的浮存金也随之增长。我们的成长轨迹如下表所示：

Yearend (年末)	Float (in $ millions) (浮存金（百万美元）)
1970	$39
1980	$237
1990	$1,632
2000	$27,871
2010	$65,832

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income that our float produces. When such a profit occurs, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company, has incurred an underwriting loss in seven of the last ten years. During that period, its aggregate underwriting loss was more than $20 billion.

若我们的保费收入超过支出及最终理赔总额，即可实现承保利润——这一利润叠加浮存金带来的投资收益。当实现承保利润时，我们便能使用“免费资金”——甚至更理想的是，还能因持有资金获得报酬。然而，所有保险公司都渴望这一结果，导致竞争激烈。多数年份中，这种竞争使得P/C行业整体处于承保亏损状态。这种亏损实质上是行业为持有浮存金所支付的成本。例如，全美最大的保险公司州农场保险（State Farm）在过去十年中有七年出现承保亏损，期间累计亏损超200亿美元。

At Berkshire, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for eight consecutive years, our total underwriting gain for the period having been $17 billion. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most – though certainly not all – future years. If we accomplish that, our float will be better than cost-free. We will benefit just as we would if some party deposited $66 billion with us, paid us a fee for holding its money and then let us invest its funds for our own benefit.

在伯克希尔，我们已连续八年实现承保利润，期间累计承保收益达170亿美元。我认为未来多数年份（尽管并非全部）我们仍能保持承保盈利。若能实现这一目标，我们的浮存金将优于“零成本”。其效果如同某方将660亿美元存入我们账户，支付费用让我们保管资金，并允许我们以自身利益进行投资。

Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, industry premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some unusual businesses. We’ve already told you about GEICO, but we have two other very large operations, and a bevy of smaller ones as well, each a star in its own way.

我必须再次强调：整个P/C行业无法普遍实现“零成本浮存金”。多数年份中，行业保费收入不足以覆盖理赔与支出。因此，过去数十年该行业有形权益回报率远低于美国企业平均水平，这一糟糕表现几乎注定持续。伯克希尔的卓越经济成就仅因我们拥有顶尖管理者运营非凡业务。我们已介绍了GEICO，但还有两家大型机构及众多小型公司，各自在其领域独占鳌头。

First off is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most importantly, brains in a manner that is unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative than most large insurers in that respect. In the past year, Ajit has significantly increased his life reinsurance operation, developing annual premium volume of about $2 billion that will repeat for decades.

首先，伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险集团由阿吉特·杰恩（Ajit Jain）领导。他承保其他公司不愿或无力承担的风险。他的业务在能力、速度、决断力和最重要的“智慧”上结合独特，在保险业中独树一帜。但他从不让伯克希尔承担与其资源不匹配的风险。事实上，我们在这一方面远比多数大型保险公司保守。过去一年，阿吉特大幅扩展寿险再保险业务，年保费规模达约20亿美元，并可持续数十年。

From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $30 billion and significant underwriting profits, a feat that no CEO of any other insurer has come close to matching. By his accomplishments, he has added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. Even kryptonite bounces off Ajit.

自1985年白手起家，阿吉特打造了一家浮存金达300亿美元且承保利润丰厚的保险业务——这一成就是任何其他保险公司CEO都无法企及的。他的贡献为伯克希尔价值增加了数千亿美元。甚至“氪石”都无法击倒他。

We have another insurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

我们另一家保险巨头是通用再保险公司（General Re），由塔德·蒙特罗斯（Tad Montross）管理。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation requires four disciplines: (1) An understanding of all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) A conservative evaluation of the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) The setting of a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) The willingness to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

稳健的保险业务需遵循四项原则：

全面理解可能导致保单亏损的风险敞口；
保守评估风险实际导致亏损的可能性及潜在成本；
设定保费，确保在覆盖预期损失及运营成本后平均而言实现盈利；
若无法获得合理保费，坚决放弃交易。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. The urgings of Wall Street, pressures from the agency force and brokers, or simply a refusal by a testosterone-driven CEO to accept shrinking volumes has led too many insurers to write business at inadequate prices. “The other guy is doing it so we must as well” spells trouble in any business, but none more so than insurance.

许多保险公司通过了前三项测试，却在第四项失败。华尔街的催促、代理机构与经纪人的压力，或单纯因雄心勃勃的CEO不愿接受业务萎缩，导致大量保险公司以不合理价格承保。“别人这么做，我们也必须跟上”的思维在任何行业都是隐患，但在保险业尤为致命。

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be.

塔德严格遵守全部四项原则，其成果也印证于此。在他的领导下，通用再保险的巨额浮存金已实现“优于零成本”，我们预计未来平均而言仍将持续如此。

Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

最后，我们拥有一系列小型保险公司，多数专注于保险领域的冷门细分市场。总体而言，它们始终实现盈利，如下表所示，它们提供的浮存金规模亦相当可观。查理和我珍视这些公司及其管理者。

# Combined Results of All Four Insurance Segments

# 四大保险业务板块综合表现

Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:

以下是我们财产与意外险及寿险业务四大板块的综合表现记录：

Underwriting Profit (承保利润)

Insurance Operations (保险业务)	2010	2009
General Re (通用再保险)	$452	$477
BH Reinsurance (伯克希尔再保险)	$176	$250
GEICO	$1,117	$649
Other Primary (其他直保业务)	$268	$84
Total (合计)	$2,013	$1,460

Float (浮存金)

Yearend (年末)	2010 (in millions)	2009 (in millions)
General Re	$20,049	$21,014
BH Reinsurance	$30,370	$27,753
GEICO	$10,272	$9,613
Other Primary	$5,141	$5,061
Total (合计)	$65,832	$63,441

Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world.

在大型保险机构中，伯克希尔的表现堪称全球最佳。

# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

# 制造、服务与零售运营（Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations）

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

伯克希尔这一板块的业务涵盖广泛领域。以下是该板块整体的资产负债表和利润表摘要。

# Balance Sheet (12/31/10)

# 资产负债表（2010年12月31日）

Assets (资产)	Amount (in millions) (金额，百万美元)	Liabilities and Equity (负债及权益)	Amount (in millions) (金额，百万美元)
现金及等价物（Cash and equivalents）	$2,673	应付账款及票据（Notes payable）	$1,805
应收账款（Accounts and notes receivable）	$5,396	其他流动负债（Other current liabilities）	$8,169
存货（Inventory）	$7,101	流动负债合计（Total current liabilities）	$9,974
其他流动资产（Other current assets）	$550	递延税负债（Deferred taxes）	$3,001
流动资产合计（Total current assets）	$15,720	长期债务及其他负债（Term debt and other liabilities）	$6,621
商誉及其他无形资产（Goodwill and other intangibles）	$16,976	权益（Equity）	$31,550
固定资产（Fixed assets）	$15,421
其他资产（Other assets）	$3,029
总资产（Total Assets）	$51,146	总负债及权益（Total Liabilities and Equity）	$51,146

# Earnings Statement

# 利润表（2008-2010年）

项目（Item）	2010年（百万美元）	2009年（百万美元）	2008年（百万美元）
营业收入（Revenues）	$66,610	$61,665	—
营业支出（含折旧：2010年13.62亿，2009年14.22亿，2008年12.8亿）（Operating expenses, including depreciation）	$62,225	$59,509	$—
利息支出（Interest expense）	$111	$98	$139
税前利润（Pre-tax earnings）	$4,274*	$2,058*	$4,023*
所得税及非控股股东权益（Income taxes and non-controlling interests）	$1,812	$945	$1,740
净利润（Net earnings）	$2,462	$1,113	$2,283

*注：不含购买会计调整（*Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments）。

This group of companies sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. Unfortunately, a few have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I have made in my job of capital allocation. These errors came about because I misjudged either the competitive strength of the business I was purchasing or the future economics of the industry in which it operated. I try to look out ten or twenty years when making an acquisition, but sometimes my eyesight has been poor.

这一板块的公司销售的产品从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机不等。部分企业经济表现极佳，以无杠杆有形资产税后回报率衡量，可达25%至100%以上；其他企业的回报率也稳定在12-20%区间。遗憾的是，少数企业回报率极低——这是我资本配置中的重大失误所致。这些错误源于我对目标企业竞争力或所在行业未来经济前景的误判。收购时我会展望未来十年甚至二十年，但有时判断力确实不足。

Most of the companies in this section improved their earnings last year and four set records. Let’s look first at the record-breakers.

该板块多数公司在去年提升了盈利，其中四家创下新纪录。我们先聚焦这些破纪录者：

• TTI（电子元件分销商）
TTI had sales 21% above its previous high (recorded in 2008) and pre-tax earnings that topped its earlier record by 58%. Its sales gains spanned three continents, with North America at 16%, Europe at 26%, and Asia at 50%. The thousands of items TTI distributes are pedestrian, many selling for less than a dollar. The magic of TTI’s exceptional performance is created by Paul Andrews, its CEO, and his associates.

TTI的销售额较此前高点（2008年）增长21%，税前利润超历史纪录58%。其销售增长覆盖三大洲：北美16%、欧洲26%、亚洲50%。TTI分销的数千种产品看似普通，许多单价不足1美元。其卓越表现源于CEO保罗·安德鲁斯（Paul Andrews）及其团队的卓越运营。

• Forest River（房车与船艇制造商）
Forest River had record sales of nearly $2 billion and record earnings as well. Forest River has 82 plants, and I have yet to visit one (or the home office, for that matter). There’s no need; Pete Liegl, the company’s CEO, runs a terrific operation. Come view his products at the annual meeting. Better yet, buy one.

Forest River销售额达近20亿美元，创历史新高。该公司拥有82家工厂，我至今未参观过任何一家（总部也未去）。这并不必要——CEO皮特·利格尔（Pete Liegl）管理卓越。欢迎在年会上查看其产品，更建议购买一辆。

• CTB（农业设备公司）
CTB again set an earnings record. I told you in the 2008 Annual Report about Vic Mancinelli, the company’s CEO. He just keeps getting better. Berkshire paid $140 million for CTB in 2002. It has since paid us dividends of $160 million and eliminated $40 million of debt. Last year it earned $106 million pre-tax. Productivity gains have produced much of this increase. When we bought CTB, sales per employee were $189,365; now they are $405,878.

CTB再次刷新盈利纪录。我在2008年年报中曾介绍其CEO维克·曼奇内利（Vic Mancinelli），他的表现持续提升。伯克希尔2002年以1.4亿美元收购CTB，后者已支付股息1.6亿美元，并偿还债务4000万美元。去年税前利润达1.06亿美元。大部分增长来自生产效率提升：收购时人均销售额为189,365美元，现为405,878美元。

• H. H. Brown（鞋业公司）
Would you believe shoes? H. H. Brown, run by Jim Issler and best known for its Born brand, set a new record for sales and earnings (helped by its selling 1,110 pairs of shoes at our annual meeting). Jim has brilliantly adapted to major industry changes. His work, I should mention, is overseen by Frank Rooney, 89, a superb businessman and still a dangerous fellow with whom to have a bet on the golf course.

鞋业也能创纪录？由吉姆·伊什勒（Jim Issler）管理的H. H. Brown（以Born品牌闻名）销售额与利润均创新高（年会期间售出1,110双鞋助力显著）。吉姆对行业巨变的应对堪称典范。值得一提的是，其工作由89岁的弗兰克·鲁尼（Frank Rooney）监督——这位卓越商人至今仍是高尔夫赌局中的危险对手。

A huge story in this sector’s year-to-year improvement occurred at NetJets. I can’t overstate the breadth and importance of Dave Sokol’s achievements at this company, the leading provider of fractional ownership of jet airplanes. NetJets has long been an operational success, owning a 2010 market share five times that of its nearest competitor. Our overwhelming leadership stems from a wonderful team of pilots, mechanics and service personnel. This crew again did its job in 2010, with customer satisfaction, as delineated in our regular surveys, hitting new highs.

该板块年度改善的最大亮点来自NetJets。戴夫·索科尔（Dave Sokol）在此公司成就之广、意义之深难以言表——它是喷气式飞机分时所有权的全球领军者。NetJets长期运营成功，2010年市场份额为第二名的五倍。我们的绝对领导地位得益于卓越的飞行员、机械师及服务团队。2010年，客户满意度（基于定期调查）再创新高。

Even though NetJets was consistently a runaway winner with customers, our financial results, since its acquisition in 1998, were a failure. In the 11 years through 2009, the company reported an aggregate pre-tax loss of $157 million, a figure that was far understated since borrowing costs at NetJets were heavily subsidized by its free use of Berkshire’s credit. Had NetJets been operating on a stand-alone basis, its loss over the years would have been several hundreds of millions greater.

尽管NetJets在客户中始终遥遥领先，自1998年收购以来财务表现却持续失败。截至2009年的11年间，公司累计税前亏损1.57亿美元——这一数字被严重低估，因其借款成本因免费使用伯克希尔信用而大幅补贴。若NetJets独立运营，历史亏损将多出数亿美元。

We are now charging NetJets an appropriate fee for Berkshire’s guarantee. Despite this fee (which came to $38 million in 2010), NetJets earned $207 million pre-tax in 2010, a swing of $918 million from 2009. Dave’s quick restructuring of management and the company’s rationalization of its purchasing and spending policies has ended the hemorrhaging of cash and turned what was Berkshire’s only major business problem into a solidly profitable operation.

如今我们对NetJets使用伯克希尔担保收取合理费用。尽管此项费用2010年达3800万美元，NetJets当年税前利润仍达2.07亿美元，较2009年扭亏为盈（差额9.18亿美元）。戴夫迅速重组管理层，优化采购与支出政策，终结了现金流失，将伯克希尔唯一重大亏损业务转为稳定盈利。

Dave has meanwhile maintained NetJets’ industry-leading reputation for safety and service. In many important ways, our training and operational standards are considerably stronger than those required by the FAA. Maintaining top-of-the-line standards is the right thing to do, but I also have a selfish reason for championing this policy. My family and I have flown more than 5,000 hours on NetJets (that’s equal to being airborne 24 hours a day for seven months) and will fly thousands of hours more in the future. We receive no special treatment and have used a random mix of at least 100 planes and 300 crews. Whichever the plane or crew, we always know we are flying with the best-trained pilots in private aviation.

戴夫同时保持了NetJets在安全与服务领域的行业领先地位。我们的培训与运营标准远高于联邦航空管理局（FAA）要求。坚持顶级标准是正确选择，但我也有一个私心：我与家人已在NetJets飞行超5000小时（相当于每天飞行24小时、连续7个月），未来还将飞行数千小时。我们未获特殊待遇，随机使用至少100架飞机与300个机组。无论哪架飞机或机组，我们都确信自己正与私人航空领域培训最严格的飞行员同行。

The largest earner in our manufacturing, service and retailing sector is Marmon（a collection of 130 businesses）. We will soon increase our ownership in this company to 80% by carrying out our scheduled purchase of 17% of its stock from the Pritzker family. The cost will be about $1.5 billion. We will then purchase the remaining Pritzker holdings in 2013 or 2014, whichever date is selected by the family. Frank Ptak runs Marmon wonderfully, and we look forward to 100% ownership.

该板块最大盈利来源是Marmon集团（由130家企业组成）。我们即将按计划从普利兹克家族（Pritzker family）购入17%股份，持股比例将提至80%，耗资约15亿美元。随后将在2013或2014年（由家族选定）收购剩余股份。弗兰克·普塔克（Frank Ptak）管理卓越，我们期待实现全资控股。

# Next to Marmon, the Two Largest Earners

# 紧随Marmon的两大盈利引擎

Next to Marmon, the two largest earners in this sector are Iscar and McLane. Both had excellent years. In 2010, Grady Rosier’s McLane entered the wine and spirits distribution business to supplement its $32 billion operation as a distributor of food products, cigarettes, candy and sundries. In purchasing Empire Distributors, an operator in Georgia and North Carolina, we teamed up with David Kahn, the company’s dynamic CEO. David is leading our efforts to expand geographically. By yearend he had already made his first acquisition, Horizon Wine and Spirits in Tennessee.

紧随Marmon之后，该板块的两大盈利主力是Iscar和McLane。两者均表现优异。2010年，格雷迪·罗西尔（Grady Rosier）领导的McLane进军葡萄酒与烈酒分销领域，以补充其320亿美元的核心业务（食品、香烟、糖果及杂货分销）。通过收购佐治亚州与北卡罗来纳州的运营商Empire Distributors，我们与活力四射的CEO大卫·卡恩（David Kahn）合作，由他主导地域扩张。截至年底，他已率先完成首笔收购——田纳西州的Horizon Wine and Spirits。

At Iscar, profits were up 159% in 2010, and we may well surpass pre-recession levels in 2011. Sales are improving throughout the world, particularly in Asia. Credit Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman for an exceptional performance, one far superior to that of Iscar’s main competitors.

Iscar在2010年利润增长159%，2011年有望超越衰退前水平。全球销售持续复苏，尤以亚洲最为显著。这一卓越表现归功于伊坦·维尔特海默（Eitan Wertheimer）、雅各布·哈帕兹（Jacob Harpaz）及丹尼·戈德曼（Danny Goldman），其业绩远超主要竞争对手。

# Challenges in Home Construction

# 住宅建筑业务的困境

All that is good news. Our businesses related to home construction, however, continue to struggle. Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and Acme Brick have maintained their competitive positions, but their profits are far below the levels of a few years ago. Combined, these operations earned $362 million pre-tax in 2010 compared to $1.3 billion in 2006, and their employment has fallen by about 9,400.

以上皆为利好，但住宅建筑相关业务仍面临挑战。Johns Manville、MiTek、Shaw和Acme Brick虽保持竞争地位，但利润远低于数年前水平。2010年这四家合计税前利润为3.62亿美元，而2006年为13亿美元，员工总数减少约9,400人。

A housing recovery will probably begin within a year or so. In any event, it is certain to occur at some point. Consequently:
住宅市场复苏可能在一两年内启动，最终必将发生。因此：

At MiTek, we have made, or committed to, five bolt-on acquisitions during the past eleven months;
- MiTek过去11个月已完成或承诺五项协同收购；
At Acme, we just recently acquired the leading manufacturer of brick in Alabama for $50 million;
- Acme近期以5,000万美元收购阿拉巴马州最大砖块制造商；
Johns Manville is building a $55 million roofing membrane plant in Ohio, to be completed next year;
- Johns Manville正在俄亥俄州投资5,500万美元建设屋顶防水膜工厂，预计明年完工；
Shaw will spend $200 million in 2011 on plant and equipment, all of it situated in America.
- Shaw计划2011年投入2亿美元升级美国本土工厂设备。

These businesses entered the recession strong and will exit it stronger. At Berkshire, our time horizon is forever.
这些企业以强劲实力进入衰退期，将以更强姿态走出困境。在伯克希尔，我们的视野是永恒的。

# Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

# 受监管资本密集型业务

We have two very large businesses, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, with important common characteristics that distinguish them from our many others. Consequently, we give them their own sector in this letter and split out their financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.

我们旗下两家超大型企业BNSF和MidAmerican Energy具备显著共性，与其他业务截然不同。因此，我们在年报中单独划分板块，并在其GAAP资产负债表及利润表中单独列示财务数据。

# Key Characteristics

# 核心特征

A key characteristic of both companies is the huge investment they have in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is not needed: Both businesses have earning power that, even under very adverse business conditions, amply covers their interest requirements. For example, in recessionary 2010 with BNSF’s car loadings far off peak levels, the company’s interest coverage was 6:1.

两家企业的核心特征是对长期受监管资产的巨额投资，其融资依赖大量非伯克希尔担保的长期债务。我们的信用背书并非必需：即使在极端不利条件下，两者盈利能力足以覆盖利息支出。例如，2010年经济低迷期，BNSF货运量远低于峰值，但利息保障倍数仍达6:1。

Both companies are heavily regulated, and both will have a never-ending need to make major investments in plant and equipment. Both also need to provide efficient, customer-satisfying service to earn the respect of their communities and regulators. In return, both need to be assured that they will be allowed to earn reasonable earnings on future capital investments.

两家公司均受严格监管，且需持续进行重大资本支出。同时，必须提供高效优质服务以赢得社区与监管机构认可。作为回报，需确保未来资本投资可获得合理回报。

# BNSF: The Lifeblood of America’s Freight

# BNSF：美国货运的命脉

Earlier I explained just how important railroads are to our country’s future. Rail moves 42% of America’s inter-city freight, measured by ton-miles, and BNSF moves more than any other railroad – about 28% of the industry total. A little math will tell you that more than 11% of all inter-city ton-miles of freight in the U.S. is transported by BNSF. Given the shift of population to the West, our share may well inch higher.

此前我已阐述铁路对美国未来的重要性。按吨英里计算，铁路承担美国城际货运的42%，而BNSF运量占全美铁路货运的28%——即全美城际货运的11%以上由BNSF完成。随着人口向西部迁移，市场份额有望进一步提升。

All of this adds up to a huge responsibility. We are a major and essential part of the American economy’s circulatory system, obliged to constantly maintain and improve our 23,000 miles of track along with its ancillary bridges, tunnels, engines and cars. In carrying out this job, we must anticipate society’s needs, not merely react to them. Fulfilling our societal obligation, we will regularly spend far more than our depreciation, with this excess amounting to $2 billion in 2011. I’m confident we will earn appropriate returns on our huge incremental investments. Wise regulation and wise investment are two sides of the same coin.

这一地位意味着巨大责任。我们是美国经济循环系统的重要且必要组成部分，必须持续维护并升级23,000英里轨道及附属桥梁、隧道、机车与车厢。执行这一使命时，我们必须前瞻性地预判社会需求，而非被动响应。为履行社会责任，我们的年支出将远超折旧费用，2011年超额部分达20亿美元。我坚信这些增量投资将获得合理回报。明智的监管与明智的投资实为同一枚硬币的两面。

# MidAmerican Energy：与社会的契约

At MidAmerican, we participate in a similar “social compact.” We are expected to put up ever-increasing sums to satisfy the future needs of our customers. If we meanwhile operate reliably and efficiently, we know that we will obtain a fair return on these investments.

MidAmerican Energy同样遵循这一“社会契约”。我们需持续投入资金以满足客户未来需求，只要保持可靠高效的运营，即可获得合理投资回报。

MidAmerican supplies 2.4 million customers in the U.S. with electricity, operating as the largest supplier in Iowa, Wyoming and Utah and as an important provider in other states as well. Our pipelines transport 8% of the country’s natural gas. Obviously, many millions of Americans depend on us every day.

MidAmerican为美国240万客户提供电力，在爱荷华州、怀俄明州和犹他州为最大供应商，在其他州亦具重要地位。我们的管道运输占全美天然气输送量的8%。显然，数百万美国民众每日依赖我们的服务。

MidAmerican has delivered outstanding results for both its owners (Berkshire’s interest is 89.8%) and its customers. Shortly after MidAmerican purchased Northern Natural Gas pipeline in 2002, that company’s performance as a pipeline was rated dead last, 43 out of 43, by the leading authority in the field. In the most recent report published, Northern Natural was ranked second. The top spot was held by our other pipeline, Kern River.

MidAmerican为股东（伯克希尔持股89.8%）和客户均创造卓越价值。2002年收购Northern Natural Gas管道后，其运营效率曾被行业权威评为最末（43家中垫底），但最新报告中已跃升至第二名。榜首为我们的另一管道Kern River。

In its electric business, MidAmerican has a comparable record. Iowa rates have not increased since we purchased our operation there in 1999. During the same period, the other major electric utility in the state has raised prices more than 70% and now has rates far above ours. In certain metropolitan areas in which the two utilities operate side by side, electric bills of our customers run far below those of their neighbors. I am told that comparable houses sell at higher prices in these cities if they are located in our service area.

电力业务同样成绩斐然。自1999年收购爱荷华州业务以来，电价未涨分文。同期，该州另一主要电力公司涨价逾70%，现电价远高于我们。在两者并行服务的都市区，我们客户的电费显著低于邻居。据悉，同类房屋若位于我们服务区内，售价更高。

MidAmerican will have 2,909 megawatts of wind generation in operation by the end of 2011, more than any other regulated electric utility in the country. The total amount that MidAmerican has invested or committed to wind is a staggering $5.4 billion. We can make this sort of investment because MidAmerican retains all of its earnings, unlike other utilities that generally pay out most of what they earn.

MidAmerican到2011年底风电装机容量将达2,909兆瓦，居全美受监管电力公司之首。累计风电投资或承诺额高达54亿美元。这一投资规模得以实现，因MidAmerican留存全部利润，而其他电力公司通常将利润大比例派发。

As you can tell by now, I am proud of what has been accomplished for our society by Matt Rose at BNSF and by David Sokol and Greg Abel at MidAmerican. I am also both proud and grateful for what they have accomplished for Berkshire shareholders. Below are the relevant figures:

显而易见，我为BNSF的马特·罗斯（Matt Rose）及MidAmerican的戴夫·索科尔（David Sokol）和格雷格·阿贝尔（Greg Abel）为社会及伯克希尔股东创造的成就感到自豪与感激。以下是关键财务数据：

# MidAmerican Energy: Financial Highlights

# MidAmerican Energy：财务亮点（百万美元）

Category (项目)	2010	2009
U.K. utilities (英国公用事业)	$333	$248
Iowa utility (爱荷华州电力)	$279	$285
Western utilities (西部电力)	$783	$788
Pipelines (管道运输)	$378	$457
Home Services (家庭服务)	$42	$43
Other (net) (其他净项)	$47	$25
Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes (税息前运营利润**)	$1,862	$1,846
Interest, other than to Berkshire (非伯克希尔利息支出)	($323)	($318)
Interest on Berkshire junior debt (伯克希尔次级债利息)	($30)	($58)
Income tax (所得税)	($271)	($313)
Net earnings (净利润**)	$1,238	$1,157
*Earnings applicable to Berkshire (归属伯克希尔收益)	$1,131	$1,071

*Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $19 in 2010 and $38 in 2009.
*含伯克希尔利息收入（扣除相关税款后）：2010年1900万美元，2009年3800万美元。

# BNSF Railway: Financial Performance

# BNSF铁路：财务表现（百万美元）

Category (项目)	2010	2009
Revenues (营收)	$16,850	$14,016
Operating earnings (运营利润)	$4,495	$3,254
Interest (Net) (净利息)	$507	$613
Pre-Tax earnings (税前利润)	$3,988	$2,641
Net earnings (净利润)	$2,459	$1,721

Note: Historical accounting through 2/12/10; purchase accounting subsequently.
注：2010年2月12日前采用历史会计法，之后采用购买法核算。

# Finance and Financial Products

# 金融与金融产品业务（Finance and Financial Products）

This, our smallest sector, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), and Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes.

这是我们最小的业务板块，包含两家租赁公司：XTRA（拖车） 和 CORT（家具），以及美国最大的预制房屋生产商兼融资商 Clayton Homes。

Both of our leasing businesses improved their performances last year, albeit from a very low base. XTRA increased the utilization of its equipment from 63% in 2009 to 75% in 2010, thereby raising pre-tax earnings to $35 million from $17 million in 2009. CORT experienced a pickup in business as the year progressed and also significantly tightened its operations. The combination increased its pre-tax results from a loss of $3 million in 2009 to $18 million of profit in 2010.

两大租赁业务去年业绩均有改善，尽管起点极低。XTRA设备利用率从2009年的63%提升至2010年的75%，税前利润从1700万美元增至3500万美元。CORT全年业务逐步复苏，运营效率显著提升，税前利润从2009年亏损300万美元转为2010年盈利1800万美元。

At Clayton, we produced 23,343 homes, 47% of the industry’s total of 50,046. Contrast this to the peak year of 1998, when 372,843 homes were manufactured. (We then had an industry share of 8%.) Sales would have been terrible last year under any circumstances, but the financing problems I commented upon in the 2009 report continue to exacerbate the distress. To explain: Home-financing policies of our government, expressed through the loans found acceptable by FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, favor site-built homes and work to negate the price advantage that manufactured homes offer.

Clayton全年生产23,343套房屋，占行业总产量50,046套的47%。对比1998年行业巅峰产量372,843套（当时我们市场份额为8%）。无论何种经济环境，去年销售本应更糟，但2009年报提及的融资问题持续加剧困境。原因在于：政府通过FHA、房利美和房地美认可的贷款政策，偏向传统建筑房屋，削弱了预制房屋的价格优势。

We finance more manufactured-home buyers than any other company. Our experience, therefore, should be instructive to those parties preparing to overhaul our country’s home-loan practices. Let’s take a look.

我们是美国最大的预制房屋贷款方，因此我们的经验对改革国家房贷政策具有参考价值。以下为具体数据：

Clayton owns 200,804 mortgages that it originated. (It also has some mortgage portfolios that it purchased.) At the origination of these contracts, the average FICO score of our borrowers was 648, and 47% were 640 or below. Your banker will tell you that people with such scores are generally regarded as questionable credits.

Clayton持有自主发放的200,804份抵押贷款（另含部分收购的贷款组合）。这些贷款发放时，借款人的平均FICO信用评分为648分，47%的借款人评分低于640分。你的银行家会告诉你，这类评分通常被视为高风险客户。

Nevertheless, our portfolio has performed well during conditions of stress. Here’s our loss experience during the last five years for originated loans:

尽管如此，我们的贷款组合在压力环境下表现优异。以下是自主发放贷款的五年损失率：

Year (年份)	Net Losses as a Percentage of Average Loans (净损失占平均贷款比例)
2006	1.53%
2007	1.27%
2008	1.17%
2009	1.86%
2010	1.72%

Our borrowers get in trouble when they lose their jobs, have health problems, get divorced, etc. The recession has hit them hard. But they want to stay in their homes, and generally they borrowed sensible amounts in relation to their income. In addition, we were keeping the originated mortgages for our own account, which means we were not securitizing or otherwise reselling them. If we were stupid in our lending, we were going to pay the price. That concentrates the mind.

借款人失业、健康问题或离婚时会面临困境。经济衰退加剧了这一状况，但他们普遍希望保住房屋，且贷款额度与收入比例合理。此外，我们始终自持贷款，未进行证券化或转售。若我们放贷决策失误，损失需自行承担——这种风险机制让我们保持谨慎。

If home buyers throughout the country had behaved like our buyers, America would not have had the crisis that it did. Our approach was simply to get a meaningful down-payment and gear fixed monthly payments to a sensible percentage of income. This policy kept Clayton solvent and also kept buyers in their homes.

如果全美购房者均如我们的客户般理性，美国本不会爆发次贷危机。我们的策略很简单：收取合理首付，并将月供控制在收入的合理比例内。这一政策使Clayton保持稳健，也帮助购房者保有住房。

Home ownership makes sense for most Americans, particularly at today’s lower prices and bargain interest rates. All things considered, the third best investment I ever made was the purchase of my home, though I would have made far more money had I instead rented and used the purchase money to buy stocks. (The two best investments were wedding rings.) For the $31,500 I paid for our house, my family and I gained 52 years of terrific memories with more to come.

对多数美国人而言，拥有住房仍具意义，尤其在当前低价与低利率环境下。综合来看，我人生第三佳投资是购置住房，尽管若选择租房并将资金投入股市，收益可能更高。（前两大投资是婚戒。）我们仅花费31,500美元购入房产，过去52年已收获无数珍贵回忆，未来还将继续。

But a house can be a nightmare if the buyer’s eyes are bigger than his wallet and if a lender – often protected by a government guarantee – facilitates his fantasy. Our country’s social goal should not be to put families into the house of their dreams, but rather to put them into a house they can afford.

但如果买家超出支付能力购房，且贷款方（常受政府担保保护）助长这种幻想，住房反成噩梦。国家的社会目标不应是让家庭住进梦想豪宅，而是帮他们负担得起的房屋。

# Investments

# 投资组合（Investments）

Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.

以下为截至年末市值超10亿美元的普通股投资组合：

Shares (持股数)	Company (公司)	Cost (成本，百万美元)	Market (市值，百万美元)	12/31/10 Percentage of Total Common Stocks Carried at Market (按市值占比)
151,610,700	American Express Company（美国运通公司）	$1,287	$6,507	12.6%
12,600,000	BYD Company, Ltd.（比亚迪股份有限公司）	$232	$1,182	9.9%
225,000,000	The Coca-Cola Company（可口可乐公司）	$1,299	$13,154	8.6%
200,000,000	ConocoPhillips（康菲石油公司）	$2,028	$1,982	2.0%
29,109,637	Johnson & Johnson（强生公司）	$2,749	$2,785	1.6%
45,022,563	Kraft Foods Inc.（卡夫食品公司）	$3,207	$3,063	5.6%
97,214,584	Munich Re（慕尼黑再保险公司）	$2,896	$2,924	10.5%
19,259,600	POSCO（韩国浦项制铁公司）	$768	$1,706	4.6%
3,947,555	The Procter & Gamble Company（宝洁公司）	$464	$4,657	2.6%
72,391,036	Sanofi-Aventis（赛诺菲安万特公司）	$2,060	$1,656	2.0%
25,848,838	Tesco plc（英国乐购公司）	$1,414	$1,608	3.0%
242,163,773	U.S. Bancorp（美国合众银行）	$2,401	$2,105	4.1%
78,060,769	Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.（沃尔玛公司）	$1,893	$2,105	1.1%
39,037,142	Wells Fargo & Company（富国银行）	$8,015	$11,123	6.8%
Others（其他）	—	$3,020	$4,956	—
Total Common Stocks Carried at Market（按市值计算的总普通股）	—	$33,733	$61,513	100%

*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
*此为实际购买成本及税务基础；GAAP会计准则下的“成本”因重估调整存在个别差异。

In our reported earnings we reflect only the dividends our portfolio companies pay us. Our share of the undistributed earnings of these investees, however, was more than $2 billion last year. These retained earnings are important. In our experience – and, for that matter, in the experience of investors over the past century – undistributed earnings have been either matched or exceeded by market gains, albeit in a highly irregular manner. (Indeed, sometimes the correlation goes in reverse. As one investor said in 2009: “This is worse than divorce. I’ve lost half my net worth – and I still have my wife.”) In the future, we expect our market gains to eventually at least equal the earnings our investees retain.

财报中仅体现被投公司支付的股息。然而，2010年我们应享的未分配利润超20亿美元。留存收益至关重要。根据我们的经验（亦是百年来投资者的共同经验），未分配利润通常会被市场收益匹配甚至超越，尽管波动性极高。（事实上，有时相关性甚至相反。正如一位投资者2009年所言：“这比离婚还糟，我净资产亏了一半——但老婆还在。”）未来，我们预期市场收益最终至少能覆盖被投公司的留存利润。

In our earlier estimate of Berkshire’s normal earning power, we made three adjustments that relate to future investment income (but did not include anything for the undistributed earnings factor I have just described).

此前估算伯克希尔“正常盈利能力”时，我们针对未来投资收益做了三项调整（但未包含上述未分配利润因素）。

The first adjustment was decidedly negative. Last year, we discussed five large fixed-income investments that have been contributing substantial sums to our reported earnings. One of these – our Swiss Re note – was redeemed in the early days of 2011, and two others – our Goldman Sachs and General Electric preferred stocks – are likely to be gone by yearend. General Electric is entitled to call our preferred in October and has stated its intention to do so. Goldman Sachs has the right to call our preferred on 30 days notice, but has been held back by the Federal Reserve (bless it!), which unfortunately will likely give Goldman the green light before long.

第一项调整明显为负。去年我们讨论的五大固定收益投资曾贡献可观利润，但其中一项（瑞士再保险票据）已于2011年初被赎回，另两项（高盛与通用电气优先股）预计年底退出。通用电气有权于10月赎回优先股，并已声明意向；高盛可在30天内赎回，但美联储（感谢其干预！）尚未批准，但预计不久将放行。

# Derivatives

# 衍生品（Derivatives）

Two years ago, in the 2008 Annual Report, I told you that Berkshire was a party to 251 derivatives contracts (other than those used for operations at our subsidiaries, such as MidAmerican, and the few left over at Gen Re). Today, the comparable number is 203, a figure reflecting both a few additions to our portfolio and the unwinding or expiration of some contracts.

两年前的2008年报中，我曾透露伯克希尔持有251份衍生品合约（不含子公司如MidAmerican的运营合约及Gen Re的少量遗留合约）。如今这一数字为203份，反映了少量新增头寸及部分合约到期或平仓。

Our continuing positions, all of which I am personally responsible for, fall largely into two categories. We view both categories as engaging in insurance-like activities in which we receive premiums for assuming risks others wish to shed. Indeed, the thought processes we employ in these derivatives transactions are identical to those we use in our insurance business. You should also understand that we get paid up-front when we enter into the contracts and therefore run no counterparty risk. That’s important.

目前持续持有的头寸（均由我亲自负责）主要分为两类。我们将这两类视为类保险业务：通过承担他人希望转移的风险收取保费。事实上，衍生品交易的决策逻辑与保险业务完全一致。请特别注意：我们签订合约时即获得保费收入，因此不存在交易对手风险——这一点至关重要。

# First Category: High-Yield Bond Default Contracts

# 第一类：高收益债券违约合约

Our first category of derivatives consists of a number of contracts, written in 2004-2008, that required payments by us if there were bond defaults by companies included in certain high-yield indices. With minor exceptions, we were exposed to these risks for five years, with each contract covering 100 companies.

第一类衍生品为2004-2008年间签署的多份合约：若某些高收益指数成分公司的债券发生违约，我们需要支付赔偿。除个别例外，我们对此类风险的敞口期限均为五年，每份合约覆盖100家公司。

In aggregate, we received premiums of $3.4 billion for these contracts. When I originally told you in our 2007 Annual Report about them, I said that I expected the contracts would deliver us an “underwriting profit,” meaning that our losses would be less than the premiums we received. In addition, I said we would benefit from the use of float.

总计，我们通过这些合约获得34亿美元保费收入。2007年报首次披露时，我曾预测这些合约将带来“承保利润”——即赔付损失低于保费收入。此外，浮存金的使用将进一步增厚收益。

This expectation has been realized. To date, we have paid out about $1.2 billion on these contracts, and we expect only minimal further losses. This means we have achieved a large underwriting profit and will also realize a significant investment return from the float.

这一预期已实现。截至目前，我们为此类合约赔付约12亿美元，预计未来仅存微量损失。这意味着我们已实现可观承保利润，同时浮存金带来的投资收益亦显著。

Our second category of derivatives involves long-term contracts requiring us to make payments if certain foreign currencies strengthen against the dollar. These are essentially forward contracts on currencies of Japan, Europe and Australia. We received $4.8 billion in premiums for these contracts.

第二类衍生品为长期外汇远期合约：若日元、欧元等外币相对美元升值，我们需要支付差额。此类合约实质上为日元、欧元及澳元的远期交易，我们为此类合约收取48亿美元保费。

We are likely to lose money on these contracts if currency values remain stable or decline. However, we will profit handsomely if a major revaluation of the dollar occurs. The contracts extend through 2021 and 2022. At this point, we can’t predict whether they will produce a net gain or loss. But we do know that they carry no credit risk for Berkshire: We have already collected the premiums and will not be called upon to post collateral.

若汇率稳定或下跌，此类合约可能亏损；但若美元大幅贬值（如2021-2022年期间），我们将获得可观收益。目前无法预判最终盈亏，但明确无信用风险：保费已全额收取，且无需追加保证金。

# Key Principles of Our Derivatives Strategy

# 衍生品策略的核心原则

There are several important points to understand about these contracts:
关于这些衍生品，需把握以下核心要点：

No Counterparty Risk
无交易对手风险
Unlike banks and other institutions that swap obligations with multiple counterparties, we only transact with two: Goldman Sachs and UBS. Both have strong credit ratings, and we require them to post collateral whenever they are in a position that could harm us.

与银行等机构频繁与多方互换义务不同，我们仅与两家对手方（高盛与瑞银）交易，并要求对方在不利变动时提供保证金担保。两家机构信用评级优异，风险可控。
Transparency in Risk
风险透明化
The terms of these contracts are straightforward and easily modeled. We avoid complex instruments that are opaque or depend on extreme assumptions.

合约条款清晰易懂，可量化建模。我们规避结构复杂、透明度低或依赖极端假设的衍生品。
No Leverage
零杠杆风险
We never use borrowed money to fund our derivatives positions. All contracts are funded by our own capital.

我们绝不会借贷资金进行衍生品操作，所有头寸均以自有资本支持。
Long-Term Perspective
长期视角
These contracts are evaluated on a decades-long horizon, not quarter-to-quarter. Short-term volatility is irrelevant to our strategy.

评估周期以十年计，短期波动无关紧要。

# Lessons from the Financial Crisis

# 金融危机的教训

During the 2008-2009 crisis, many institutions suffered catastrophic losses from derivatives. Why? Because they treated these instruments as profit centers rather than risk-transfer mechanisms. They took on massive leverage, used opaque pricing models, and ignored tail risks.

2008-2009年金融危机中，许多机构因衍生品巨亏。原因在于：将衍生品视为利润中心而非风险转移工具，使用高杠杆、依赖不透明定价模型，并忽视尾部风险。

Berkshire’s approach is the antithesis: We are sellers of risk, not buyers. We accept risks that can be modeled with reasonable confidence and avoid situations where the mathematics is speculative or the economic scenarios untested.

伯克希尔采取截然相反的策略：我们是风险卖方而非买方。仅承担可合理建模的风险，规避数学模型存疑或经济情景未经验证的情形。

# Final Thoughts on Derivatives

# 对衍生品的最终思考

Derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction. When misused, they can cause chain reactions that bring down entire institutions. However, when approached with caution and simplicity—as we do—they can be valuable tools for transferring risk and earning premiums.

衍生品是金融界的“大规模杀伤性武器”。滥用时会引发系统性风险，导致机构崩盘。但若以审慎与简明的方式使用——正如我们所做——它们可成为转移风险与获取保费的有力工具。

Charlie and I will never enter into derivatives that could create a liquidity problem for Berkshire. If a 1929-1932 depression were to occur, we would still meet every obligation, and our operations would not be disrupted.

查理和我绝不会涉足可能造成伯克希尔流动性风险的衍生品。即便1929-1932年大萧条重演，我们也有能力履行所有义务，且运营不受影响。

# Summary of Berkshire’s Derivatives Positions

# 伯克希尔衍生品头寸概览

Contract Type (合约类型)	Number of Contracts (合约数量)	Premiums Received (已收保费)	Potential Loss Scenario (潜在亏损情景)
High-Yield Bond Default (高收益债违约)	251 → 203 (截至当前)	$3.4 billion	若经济危机导致批量违约
Foreign Exchange Forwards (外汇远期)	N/A	$4.8 billion	若美元大幅贬值（2021-2022年）

注：2008年报披露251份合约，现剩余203份。

# Academics’ Approach to Derivatives

# 学术界对衍生品的认知误区

Academics’ current practice of teaching Black-Scholes as revealed truth needs re-examination. For that matter, so does the academic’s inclination to dwell on the valuation of options. You can be highly successful as an investor without having the slightest ability to value an option. What students should be learning is how to value a business. That’s what investing is all about.

学术界将Black-Scholes模型奉为真理并过度强调期权定价的教学亟需反思。事实上，投资者即便完全不懂期权估值也能取得巨大成功。学生真正应学习的是如何评估企业价值——这才是投资的核心所在。

# Life and Debt

# 生存与债务（Life and Debt）

The fundamental principle of auto racing is that to finish first, you must first finish. That dictum is equally applicable to business and guides our every action at Berkshire.

赛车运动的基本原则是：要赢得比赛，首先要完成比赛。这一信条同样适用于商业，也是伯克希尔一切行动的准则。

Unquestionably, some people have become very rich through the use of borrowed money. However, that’s also been a way to get very poor. When leverage works, it magnifies your gains. Your spouse thinks you’re clever, and your neighbors get envious. But leverage is addictive. Once having profited from its wonders, very few people retreat to more conservative practices. And as we all learned in third grade – and some relearned in 2008 – any series of positive numbers, however impressive the numbers may be, evaporates when multiplied by a single zero. History tells us that leverage all too often produces zeroes, even when it is employed by very smart people.

毫无疑问，利用杠杆致富者有之，但破产者更多。杠杆放大收益时，配偶夸你聪明，邻居对你艳羡。但杠杆具有成瘾性，一旦尝到甜头，极少有人回归保守。正如三年级学的数学常识（2008年再次印证）：无论正数多壮观，乘以零即归零。历史证明，即使最聪明的人使用杠杆，也常以零收场。

Leverage, of course, can be lethal to businesses as well. Companies with large debts often assume that these obligations can be refinanced as they mature. That assumption is usually valid. Occasionally, though, either because of company-specific problems or a worldwide shortage of credit, maturities must actually be met by payment. For that, only cash will do the job.

杠杆对企业同样致命。负债公司常假设债务到期时能再融资。这一假设通常成立，但偶尔因企业问题或全球信贷紧缩，必须用现金偿债——唯有现金能解决问题。

Borrowers then learn that credit is like oxygen. When either is abundant, its presence goes unnoticed. When either is missing, that’s all that is noticed. Even a short absence of credit can bring a company to its knees. In September 2008, in fact, its overnight disappearance in many sectors of the economy came dangerously close to bringing our entire country to its knees.

此时借款人才明白：信贷如氧气，充裕时无人注意，短缺时则成为唯一焦点。信贷短暂消失即可令企业崩溃。2008年9月，经济多领域的信贷瞬间蒸发，几乎令整个国家陷入瘫痪。

Charlie and I have no interest in any activity that could pose the slightest threat to Berkshire’s well-being. (With our having a combined age of 167, starting over is not on our bucket list.) We are forever conscious of the fact that you, our partners, have entrusted us with what in many cases is a major portion of your savings. In addition, important philanthropy is dependent on our prudence. Finally, many disabled victims of accidents caused by our insureds are counting on us to deliver sums payable decades from now. It would be irresponsible for us to risk what all these constituencies need just to pursue a few points of extra return.

查理和我绝不涉足任何可能威胁伯克希尔安全的冒险（我们合计年龄167岁，重启人生不在遗愿清单）。我们始终铭记：各位合伙人将毕生积蓄托付于我们；重大慈善事业依赖我们的审慎；无数因被保险人事故致残的受害者指望我们兑现数十年后的赔款。为追求额外几个百分点的回报而危及这些群体的需求，是极不负责任的行为。

# Personal History: Lessons from My Grandfather

# 家族往事：祖父的教训

A little personal history may partially explain our extreme aversion to financial adventurism. I didn’t meet Charlie until he was 35, though he grew up within 100 yards of where I have lived for 52 years and also attended the same inner-city public high school in Omaha from which my father, wife, children and two grandchildren graduated. Charlie and I did, however, both work as young boys at my grandfather’s grocery store, though our periods of employment were separated by about five years. My grandfather’s name was Ernest, and perhaps no man was more aptly named. No one worked for Ernest, even as a stock boy, without being shaped by the experience.

一段家族往事或许能解释我们为何极端厌恶金融冒险。查理35岁前我并不认识他——尽管他成长于距我住所仅百码的街区，就读的奥马哈公立高中也正是我父亲、妻子、子女及两个孙辈的母校。但我们都曾在少年时祖父的杂货店工作，虽间隔约五年。祖父名唤Ernest（意为“认真”），其名与其人完美契合。在他手下工作过的人（即便是仓库搬运工），都会被他的处世哲学深刻影响。

On the facing page you can read a letter sent in 1939 by Ernest to his youngest son, my Uncle Fred. Similar letters went to his other four children. I still have the letter sent to my Aunt Alice, which I found – along with $1,000 of cash – when, as executor of her estate, I opened her safe deposit box in 1970.

下一页附有1939年祖父写给最小儿子（我的弗雷德叔叔）的信件，其他四个子女均收到类似内容。我至今保留着寄给我爱丽丝姑妈的信，1970年作为遗产执行人开启她的保险箱时，这封信与1,000美元现金一同被发现。

Ernest never went to business school – he never in fact finished high school – but he understood the importance of liquidity as a condition for assured survival. At Berkshire, we have taken his $1,000 solution a bit further and have pledged that we will hold at least $10 billion of cash, excluding that held at our regulated utility and railroad businesses. Because of that commitment, we customarily keep at least $20 billion on hand so that we can both withstand unprecedented insurance losses (our largest to date having been about $3 billion from Katrina, the insurance industry’s most expensive catastrophe) and quickly seize acquisition or investment opportunities, even during times of financial turmoil.

祖父从未上过商学院（甚至未完成高中学业），但他深知流动性是生存的基石。伯克希尔继承了他的1,000美元精神，并进一步承诺：除受监管的公用事业与铁路业务外，始终持有至少100亿美元现金。正因如此，我们惯常保留200亿美元流动性，既能抵御史上最大保险损失（卡特里娜飓风造成约30亿美元赔付，为行业之最），也能在金融动荡中迅速把握并购与投资机遇。

# Ernest Buffett’s 1939 Letter to Fred & Catherine

# 沃伦·巴菲特祖父欧内斯特致弗雷德与凯瑟琳的信（1939年）

Note: This letter was written in 1939 by Warren Buffett’s grandfather, Ernest Buffett, to his youngest son Fred and his new bride Catherine. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining liquidity and avoiding financial overextension — principles that still guide Berkshire’s capital management today.

Dear Fred & Catherine,
亲爱的弗雷德与凯瑟琳：

Over a period of a good many years I have known a great many people who at some time or another have suffered in various ways simply because they did not have ready cash and had to sacrifice some of their holdings in order to have money that was necessary at that time.

多年来，我目睹许多人因缺乏现金而陷入困境——他们不得不变卖资产以换取急需的资金。

For a good many years your grandfather kept a certain amount of money where he could put his hands on it in very short notice. For a number of years I have made it a point to keep a reserve should some occasion come up where I would need money quickly, without disturbing the money that I have in my business. There have been a couple of occasions when I found it very convenient to go to this fund.

你们的祖父多年坚持保留一笔随时可用的现金储备。我自己也多年遵循这一原则：预留一笔应急资金，即使需紧急动用，也不会影响主营业务资金。曾有几次，这笔储备让我从容度过难关。

Thus, I feel that everyone should have a reserve. I hope it never happens to you, but the chances are that some day you will need money, and need it badly. With this thought in view, I started a fund by placing $200.00 in an envelope with your name on it when you were married. Each year I added something to it, until there is now $1,000.00 in the fund.

因此，我认为每个人都应建立应急储备。愿你们永不需动用它，但现实是：总有一天你们会迫切需要现金。为此，你们结婚时，我在写有你们名字的信封里放入200美元作为起点，每年追加一些，如今已累积至1,000美元。

Ten years have elapsed since you were married, and this fund is now completed. It is my wish that you place this envelope in your safety deposit box and keep it for the purpose that it was created for. Should the time come when you need part of it, I would suggest that you use as little as possible and replace it as soon as possible.

从你们结婚至今已过十年，这笔基金业已完成。我希望你们将此信封存入保险箱，专款专用。若真需动用，我建议尽量少用，并尽快补回。

You might feel that this should be invested and bring you an income. Forget it! The mental satisfaction of having $1,000 laid away where you can put your hands on it is worth more than what interest it might bring — especially if you have the investment in something that you could not realize on quickly.

或许你们会想：这笔钱为何不投资生息？请打消这个念头！拥有1,000美元随时可得的安心感，远胜微薄利息——尤其当投资标的难以快速变现时。

If in after years you feel this has been a good idea, you might repeat it with your own children.

若未来你们意识到这一做法的价值，不妨效仿，为自己的子女设立类似储备。

For your information, I might mention that there has never been a Buffett who ever left a very large estate, but there has never been one that did not leave something. They never spent all they made, but always saved part of what they made, and it has all worked out pretty well.

最后请记住：巴菲特家族从未有人留下巨额遗产，但每个人都会留下一些积蓄。我们始终遵循“量入为出、未雨绸缪”的原则，结果证明这条路走得通。

This letter is being written at the expiration of ten years after you were married.
此信写于你们结婚十周年之际。

# Lessons from Ernest Buffett

# 欧内斯特·巴菲特的启示

This letter encapsulates the financial philosophy that shaped Warren Buffett’s approach to money:
这封信浓缩了影响沃伦·巴菲特一生的财务理念：

Liquidity as a Survival Tool
流动性是生存保障
Ernest’s $1,000 reserve (equivalent to ~$20,000 today) was not about wealth creation, but about ensuring stability during unforeseen crises.
Prudence Over Speculation
审慎优于投机
He explicitly warns against investing this emergency fund in anything illiquid, prioritizing access over return.
Multi-Generational Wisdom
跨代际的智慧传承
The advice to “repeat it with your own children” mirrors how Warren later instilled these principles at Berkshire, ensuring the company’s resilience for future generations.
Consistency Over Time
时间维度上的持续性
The fund took ten years to build — $200/year additions — reflecting the power of steady, patient capital allocation.

Warren Buffett often references this letter as the origin of Berkshire’s “never bet the company” ethos. The pledge to maintain at least $10 billion in cash (excluding regulated businesses) is a direct descendant of Ernest’s $1,000 envelope.
沃伦·巴菲特常将此信视为伯克希尔“永不孤注一掷”理念的起源。公司承诺持有至少100亿美元现金（不含受监管业务），正是对祖父1,000美元信封精神的传承。

# Financial Strength and Liquidity

# 财务实力与流动性

We keep our cash largely in U.S. Treasury bills and avoid other short-term securities yielding a few more basis points, a policy we adhered to long before the frailties of commercial paper and money market funds became apparent in September 2008. We agree with investment writer Ray DeVoe’s observation, “More money has been lost reaching for yield than at the point of a gun.” At Berkshire, we don’t rely on bank lines, and we don’t enter into contracts that could require postings of collateral except for amounts that are tiny in relation to our liquid assets.

我们的现金大部分投资于美国国债，避免追逐高收益的短期证券（即使仅高出几个基点）。这一策略在2008年9月商业票据与货币基金风险暴露前就已执行。我们认同投资作家雷·德沃（Ray DeVoe）的观点：“因追逐收益而亏损的金钱远多于枪口威胁下的损失。”伯克希尔不依赖银行信贷，也绝不签订可能要求追加保证金的合约——除非金额远低于我们的流动资产规模。

Furthermore, not a dime of cash has left Berkshire for dividends or share repurchases during the past 40 years. Instead, we have retained all of our earnings to strengthen our business, a reinforcement now running about $1 billion per month. Our net worth has thus increased from $48 million to $157 billion during those four decades and our intrinsic value has grown far more. No other American corporation has come close to building up its financial strength in this unrelenting way.

过去四十年，伯克希尔未动用一分钱用于分红或股票回购。我们选择将所有利润再投资以增强业务实力，每月新增留存收益约10亿美元。这使得净资产从4800万美元增长至1570亿美元，内在价值增幅更远超这一数字。美国没有任何一家企业能以如此持续的方式构建财务优势。

By being so cautious in respect to leverage, we penalize our returns by a minor amount. Having loads of liquidity, though, lets us sleep well. Moreover, during the episodes of financial chaos that occasionally erupt in our economy, we will be equipped both financially and emotionally to play offense while others scramble for survival. That’s what allowed us to invest $15.6 billion in 25 days of panic following the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008.

对杠杆的极度审慎虽略微降低了回报率，但充沛的流动性让我们安枕无忧。更重要的是，在经济偶发的金融混乱中，我们既能从容出手，也能在他人自顾不暇时逆势投资。这正是2008年雷曼兄弟破产后，我们在25天内果断投入156亿美元的关键所在。

# The Annual Meeting

# 年度股东大会（The Annual Meeting）

The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, April 30th. Carrie Kizer from our home office will be the ringmaster, and her theme this year is Planes, Trains and Automobiles. This gives NetJets, BNSF and BYD a chance to show off.

年度股东大会将于4月30日（星期六）举行。总部的卡莉·凯泽（Carrie Kizer）将担任主持人，今年的主题为《飞机、火车与汽车》（Planes, Trains and Automobiles），为NetJets、BNSF和比亚迪（BYD）提供展示舞台。

# Meeting Schedule

# 会议日程

Time (时间)	Event (活动)
7:00 a.m.	会场开放，播放伯克希尔主题短片（Doors open; Berkshire movie shown）
8:30 a.m.	新增：问答环节开始（Question-and-Answer session starts）
9:30 a.m.	继续问答环节（Continues Q&A）
12:00 p.m.	午休（Lunch break at Qwest Center）
3:00 p.m.	问答环节结束（Q&A concludes）
3:45 p.m.	年度股东大会正式召开（Annual Meeting begins）

As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking. (Act fast; he can be terse.)

一如既往，Qwest中心将于早上7点开放，8:30播放伯克希尔主题短片。9:30直接进入问答环节（中午在Qwest展位午餐休息），持续至下午3:30。短暂休会后，查理和我将于3:45召开年度股东大会。若您需提前离场，请在查理发言时悄悄离开（动作要快，他说话向来简短）。

# Shopping Extravaganza

# 购物狂欢（Shopping Extravaganza）

The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold:

当然，离席的最佳理由是购物。我们将在紧邻会场的194,300平方英尺展厅布置数十家伯克希尔子公司产品展销。去年各位不负众望，多个展位创下销售纪录：仅9小时内售出：

Product (商品)	Quantity Sold (销量)	Rate (销售速度)
Justin Boots (贾斯汀靴)	1,053双	—
See’s Candy (喜诗糖果)	12,416磅	—
Dairy Queen Blizzards® (黛比皇后暴风雪甜筒)	8,000份	—
Quikut Knives (Quickut刀具)	8,800把	16把/分钟

But you can do better. Remember: Anyone who says money can’t buy happiness simply hasn’t learned where to shop.
但你们还能做得更好。请记住：“声称金钱买不到快乐的人，只是还没学会去哪购物。”

# GEICO Insurance Booth

# GEICO保险展位

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.

GEICO将在现场设立展位，由全国顶尖保险顾问驻场提供报价。大多数情况下可享股东专属折扣（通常为8%），该优惠已获51个司法管辖区中44个批准。（注：若您符合其他折扣条件，如特定团体优惠，不可叠加。）请携带现有保单详情前来比价，我敢说至少半数股东能在此省更多钱。

# Bookworm Corner

# 书虫专区

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry more than 60 books and DVDs, including the Chinese language edition of Poor Charlie’s Almanack, the ever-popular book about my partner. So what if you can’t read Chinese? Just buy a copy and carry it around; it will make you look urbane and erudite. Should you need to ship your book purchases, a shipping service will be available nearby.

务必光临“书虫专区”，提供60余种书籍与DVD，含查理·芒格经典《穷查理宝典》中文版。不会中文？买一本装点门面吧——它会让你显得文雅博学。如需邮寄书籍，现场将提供邮寄服务。

# NetJets Aircraft Display

# NetJets私人飞机展

If you are a big spender – or merely a gawker – visit Elliott Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet.

若您是消费达人或单纯好奇，周六中午至下午5点请前往奥马哈机场东侧的Elliott航空。我们将展示NetJets机队，让您的心跳加速。建议乘大巴来，乘私人飞机走！

# Travel and Accommodation

# 出行与住宿

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.

随年报附上的委托材料附件将说明如何获取参会凭证。关于机票、酒店与租车预订，请联系美国运通（800-799-6634）享受专属服务。卡罗尔·佩德森（Carol Pedersen）每年为此尽心尽力，特此感谢。酒店房源紧张？找卡罗尔准有房。

Airlines have often jacked up prices – sometimes dramatically so – for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive is about 2.5 hours and it may be that you can save significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha.

伯克希尔股东大会周末常导致机票价格飞涨。若您远道而来，对比飞往堪萨斯城与奥马哈的成本。两城车程仅2.5小时，若原计划在奥马哈租车，此举可能节省大笔费用。

# Special Events

# 特别活动

# Nebraska Furniture Mart (NFM)

# 内布拉斯加家具商城（Nebraska Furniture Mart）

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year the store did $33.3 million of business during its annual meeting sale, a volume that – as far as I know – exceeds the one-week total of any retail store anywhere. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 26th and Monday, May 2nd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential.

位于Dodge与Pacific大道间72街占地77英亩的内布拉斯加家具商城（NFM）将再次推出“伯克希尔周末”折扣。去年股东大会期间一周销售额达3,330万美元——据我所知，这是全球单店周零售额之最。欲享折扣，请于4月26日（星期二）至5月2日（星期一）凭参会凭证购买。

The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation.
NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.

多家高端制造商破例参与此次折扣——这些品牌通常严禁打折，但为支持股东周末活动特批优惠。感谢他们的合作。
NFM营业时间：周一至周六10:00-21:00，周日10:00-18:00。今年周六17:30-20:00将举办股东专属野餐会，欢迎光临。

# Borsheims Jewelry

# 波仙珠宝（Borsheims Jewelry）

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, April 29th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 1st, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.

波仙珠宝将为股东举办两场专属活动：

4月29日（周五）18:00-21:00：鸡尾酒会
5月1日（周日）9:00-16:00：主宴会（可全天购物）
周六营业至18:00。

On Sunday, around 1 p.m., I will be at Borsheims with a smile and a shoeshine, selling jewelry just as I sold men’s shirts at J.C. Penney’s 63 years ago. I’ve told Susan Jacques, Borsheims’ CEO, that I’m still a hotshot salesman. But I see doubt in her eyes. So cut loose and buy something from me for your wife or sweetheart (presumably the same person). Make me look good.

周日13:00前后，我将出现在波仙珠宝，像63年前在彭尼百货卖男装衬衫一样兜售珠宝。我对CEO苏珊·雅各布斯（Susan Jacques）称自己仍是销售高手，但她眼神满是怀疑。请为夫人或恋人（姑且算同一人）买件珠宝，让我证明给她看！

For your convenience, shareholder prices will be available from April 25th (Monday) through May 7th (Saturday). During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement showing you are a Berkshire shareholder.

为便利购物，股东专属价格将延续至4月25日（星期一）至5月7日（星期六）。期间请出示参会凭证或持股证明（如券商对账单）以享折扣。

# Chess & Bridge Masters

# 国际象棋与桥牌大师

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.

周日，波仙珠宝外的商场将上演：

盲棋挑战：两度全美国际象棋冠军帕特里克·沃尔夫（Patrick Wolff）蒙眼接受六人一组挑战（对手睁眼）。
魔术表演：达拉斯魔术师诺曼·贝克（Norman Beck）现场揭秘。
桥牌对决：世界顶级桥牌大师鲍勃·哈曼（Bob Hamman）与莎伦·奥斯伯格（Sharon Osberg）将在下午与股东切磋牌艺。

# Reservations & Restaurants

# 餐厅预订

Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 1st. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites and – still being a growing boy – I will eat at both on Sunday evening.

5月1日（周日）当日，Gorat’s牛排馆与Piccolo’s意餐馆仅对伯克希尔股东开放。营业至22:00，Gorat’s 13:00营业，Piccolo’s 16:00营业。这两家是我最爱餐厅——虽然年事已高，周日晚仍将光临。

To make a reservation (仅限4月1日起预约，不可提前)：

Gorat’s: 402-551-3733
Piccolo’s: 402-342-9038

# Q&A Session with Financial Journalists

# 与财经记者问答环节

We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted via e-mail.

今年仍由三位财经记者主导问答环节，问题来自股东通过电子邮件提交的提问。

Journalists & Submission E-mails：

Carol Loomis (《财富》杂志)：cloomis@fortunemail.com
Becky Quick (CNBC)：BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com
Andrew Ross Sorkin (《纽约时报》)：arsorkin@nytimes.com

Each journalist will choose a dozen or so questions they deem most interesting and important. For the best chance of selection, keep your questions concise, avoid last-minute submissions, focus on Berkshire-related topics, and limit to two questions per e-mail.

每位记者将精选约12个最具吸引力的问题。提高入选几率的技巧：

问题简洁明了
避免最后一刻提交
聚焦伯克希尔相关话题
每封邮件限提两个问题
可注明是否允许提及提问者姓名

Neither Charlie nor I will get any advance clues about the questions. We expect the journalists to ask tough ones – and we welcome that.

查理和我不会提前获知任何问题。期待记者们抛出尖锐问题——这正是我们乐见的。

# Shareholder Q&A Drawing

# 股东提问抽奖环节

We will again have a drawing at 8:15 a.m. on Saturday at each of 13 microphones for those shareholders wishing to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. We hope to answer at least 60 questions. From our standpoint, the more the better. Our goal, which we pursue both through these annual letters and by our meeting discussions, is to give you a better understanding of the business that you own.

周六早上8:15，我们将在13个麦克风位置举行股东提问抽奖，欢迎希望亲自提问的股东参与。会议期间，我会交替回答记者与获奖股东的问题。我们希望至少回答60个问题——对我们而言，问题越多越好。通过年报与会议讨论，我们的目标始终是帮助您更深入理解您所拥有的企业。

# Appreciation for Corporate Office Team

# 致公司总部团队的感谢

For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. Equally important, however, are the 20 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!).

我经常赞扬运营经理们的卓越成就，但同样重要的是与我在总部共事的20名同事（所有人集中在同一楼层办公，这一传统我们会坚持）。

This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 14,097-page Federal income tax return along with state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities – and the list goes on and on.

他们高效处理证券交易委员会（SEC）及其他监管要求，完成长达14,097页的联邦所得税申报表及州和国外税表，回应数以千计的股东与媒体咨询，发布年报，筹备全美最大规模的年度股东大会，协调董事会工作——其职责远不止这些。

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and joyful. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: They deal with 48 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who will send students to Omaha this school year for a day with me and also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers for lunch. No CEO has it better.

他们以乐观态度与超凡效率完成这些任务，让我的工作轻松愉快。他们的贡献远超伯克希尔本职：今年从200所申请高校中选出48所，安排师生与我共度一天；处理我收到的各类请求，安排差旅，甚至为我准备午餐汉堡。没有哪位CEO享有如此支持。

This home office crew has my deepest thanks and deserves yours as well. Come to our Woodstock for Capitalism on April 30th and tell them so.

我向这支总部团队致以最深谢意，您也应向他们表达感激。4月30日请亲临我们的“资本主义伍德斯托克音乐节”，当面致谢。

# Letter from the Chairman

# 董事长信函（Letter from the Chairman）

February 26, 2011
2011年2月26日

Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·E·巴菲特
Chairman of the Board
董事会主席

编辑

上次更新: 2025/07/14, 21:42:27

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