2013巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
伯克希尔哈撒韦公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东：
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2013 was $34.2 billion. That gain was after our deducting $1.8 billion of charges – meaningless economically, as I will explain later – that arose from our purchase of the minority interests in Marmon and Iscar. After those charges, the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 18.2%. Over the last 49 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $134,973, a rate of 19.7% compounded annually.*
2013年，伯克希尔净资产增长了342亿美元。这一增长是在扣除18亿美元费用后实现的——这些费用属于会计调整，经济意义不大（下文会解释）。扣除后，A/B类股每股账面价值增长18.2%。过去49年（即现任管理层接管以来），账面价值从19美元涨到134,973美元，年复合增长率达19.7%。*
- All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
- 本报告中所有每股数据均适用于A类股票。B类股票数据为A类的1/1500。
On the facing page, we show our long-standing performance measurement: The yearly change in Berkshire’s per-share book value versus the market performance of the S&P 500. What counts, of course, is per-share intrinsic value. But that’s a subjective figure, and book value is useful as a rough tracking indicator.
下一页展示了我们的传统业绩对比：伯克希尔每股账面价值年度变化 vs 标普500指数市场表现。当然，真正重要的是每股内在价值。但内在价值是主观判断，账面价值作为粗略跟踪指标更有实际意义。
(An extended discussion of intrinsic value is included in our Owner-Related Business Principles on pages 103-108. Those principles have been included in our reports for 30 years, and we urge new and prospective shareholders to read them.)
（关于内在价值的详细讨论见第103-108页的《所有者相关商业原则》。这些原则已持续写入年报30年，我们建议新股东及潜在投资者阅读。）
As I’ve long told you, Berkshire’s intrinsic value far exceeds its book value. Moreover, the difference has widened considerably in recent years. That’s why our 2012 decision to authorize the repurchase of shares at 120% of book value made sense. Purchases at that level benefit continuing shareholders because per-share intrinsic value exceeds that percentage of book value by a meaningful amount. We did not purchase shares during 2013, however, because the stock price did not descend to the 120% level. If it does, we will be aggressive.
正如我一直强调的，伯克希尔内在价值远超账面价值。近年来两者差距进一步扩大。这正是2012年我们批准以账面价值120%回购股份的合理性所在。当股价低于这一水平时，回购对长期股东有利，因为内在价值高于账面价值的120%。不过2013年股价未达该水平，我们未出手。若未来触及，我们将果断操作。
Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s vice chairman and my partner, and I believe both Berkshire’s book value and intrinsic value will outperform the S&P in years when the market is down or moderately up. We expect to fall short, though, in years when the market is strong – as we did in 2013. We have underperformed in ten of our 49 years, with all but one of our shortfalls occurring when the S&P gain exceeded 15%.
副董事长查理·芒格和我坚信，在熊市或温和上涨的年份，伯克希尔账面价值和内在价值都将跑赢标普500。但在大牛市年份（如2013年），我们预期会落后。过去49年中，我们在10个年份跑输市场，其中9次均发生在标普500涨幅超过15%的年份。
Over the stock market cycle between yearends 2007 and 2013, we overperformed the S&P. Through full cycles in future years, we expect to do that again. If we fail to do so, we will not have earned our pay. After all, you could always own an index fund and be assured of S&P results.
2007-2013年完整牛熊周期中，我们跑赢了标普500。未来完整周期中，我们预期仍将如此。若未能达成，我们便不配领取薪酬。毕竟，您大可直接持有指数基金获得标普收益。
# The Year at Berkshire
2013年伯克希尔年度回顾
Š We completed two large acquisitions, spending almost $18 billion to purchase all of NV Energy and a major interest in H. J. Heinz. Both companies fit us well and will be prospering a century from now.
我们完成了两笔重磅收购，耗资近180亿美元全资收购NV能源公司及亨氏集团控制权。这两家企业与伯克希尔文化高度契合，百年后仍会蓬勃发展。
With the Heinz purchase, moreover, we created a partnership template that may be used by Berkshire in future acquisitions of size. Here, we teamed up with investors at 3G Capital, a firm led by my friend, Jorge Paulo Lemann. His talented associates – Bernardo Hees, Heinz’s new CEO, and Alex Behring, its Chairman – are responsible for operations.
更重要的是，亨氏收购开创了“伯克希尔+3G资本合作模式”，未来或被沿用。3G资本由我的好友豪尔赫·保罗·莱曼领导，其团队成员包括亨氏新任CEO贝尔纳多·希斯和董事长亚历克斯·贝林，他们负责运营。
Berkshire is the financing partner. In that role, we purchased $8 billion of Heinz preferred stock that carries a 9% coupon but also possesses other features that should increase the preferred’s annual return to 12% or so. Berkshire and 3G each purchased half of the Heinz common stock for $4.25 billion.
伯克希尔担任融资方角色，购入80亿美元亨氏优先股（票息9%），附加条款使年化回报率有望升至12%左右。伯克希尔与3G各出资42.5亿美元购入亨氏普通股。
Though the Heinz acquisition has some similarities to a “private equity” transaction, there is a crucial difference: Berkshire never intends to sell a share of the company. What we would like, rather, is to buy more, and that could happen: Certain 3G investors may sell some or all of their shares in the future, and we might increase our ownership at such times. Berkshire and 3G could also decide at some point that it would be mutually beneficial if we were to exchange some of our preferred for common shares (at an equity valuation appropriate to the time).
尽管亨氏收购看似“私募股权交易”，但关键区别在于：伯克希尔从未打算出售哪怕一股。我们更愿增持——若3G资本部分投资者未来减持，我们可能接盘。伯克希尔与3G也可能协商将优先股换为普通股（按当时估值）。
Our partnership took control of Heinz in June, and operating results so far are encouraging. Only minor earnings from Heinz, however, are reflected in those we report for Berkshire this year: One-time charges incurred in the purchase and subsequent restructuring of operations totaled $1.3 billion. Earnings in 2014 will be substantial.
合伙人在6月完成亨氏接管，初期运营结果令人振奋。但2013年合并报表中仅体现少量收益，因收购及重组一次性费用达13亿美元。2014年亨氏贡献将大幅增长。
With Heinz, Berkshire now owns 8¹⁄₂ companies that, were they stand-alone businesses, would be in the Fortune 500. Only 491¹⁄₂ to go.
亨氏加入后，伯克希尔现拥有8.5家独立运营可达《财富》500强规模的企业（亨氏算0.5家）。距离500家目标，还有491.5家待收购。
NV Energy, purchased for $5.6 billion by MidAmerican Energy, our utility subsidiary, supplies electricity to about 88% of Nevada’s population. This acquisition fits nicely into our existing electric-utility operation and offers many possibilities for large investments in renewable energy. NV Energy will not be MidAmerican’s last major acquisition.
旗下公用事业子公司中美能源以56亿美元收购NV能源，服务内华达州88%人口。这笔收购完美契合现有能源布局，为大规模可再生能源投资打开空间。NV能源绝非中美能源最后一笔大收购。
# The Year at Berkshire
2013年伯克希尔年度回顾
Š We completed two large acquisitions, spending almost $18 billion to purchase all of NV Energy and a major interest in H. J. Heinz. Both companies fit us well and will be prospering a century from now.
我们完成了两笔重磅收购，耗资近180亿美元全资收购NV能源公司及亨氏集团控制权。这两家企业与伯克希尔文化高度契合，百年后仍会蓬勃发展。
With the Heinz purchase, moreover, we created a partnership template that may be used by Berkshire in future acquisitions of size. Here, we teamed up with investors at 3G Capital, a firm led by my friend, Jorge Paulo Lemann. His talented associates – Bernardo Hees, Heinz’s new CEO, and Alex Behring, its Chairman – are responsible for operations.
更重要的是，亨氏收购开创了“伯克希尔+3G资本合作模式”，未来或被沿用。3G资本由我的好友豪尔赫·保罗·莱曼领导，其团队成员包括亨氏新任CEO贝尔纳多·希斯和董事长亚历克斯·贝林负责运营。
Berkshire is the financing partner. In that role, we purchased $8 billion of Heinz preferred stock that carries a 9% coupon but also possesses other features that should increase the preferred’s annual return to 12% or so. Berkshire and 3G each purchased half of the Heinz common stock for $4.25 billion.
伯克希尔担任融资方角色，购入80亿美元亨氏优先股（票息9%），附加条款使年化回报率有望升至12%左右。伯克希尔与3G各出资42.5亿美元购入亨氏普通股。
Though the Heinz acquisition has some similarities to a “private equity” transaction, there is a crucial difference: Berkshire never intends to sell a share of the company. What we would like, rather, is to buy more, and that could happen: Certain 3G investors may sell some or all of their shares in the future, and we might increase our ownership at such times. Berkshire and 3G could also decide at some point that it would be mutually beneficial if we were to exchange some of our preferred for common shares (at an equity valuation appropriate to the time).
尽管亨氏收购看似“私募股权交易”，但关键区别在于：伯克希尔从未打算出售哪怕一股。我们更愿增持——若3G资本部分投资者未来减持，我们可能接盘。伯克希尔与3G也可能协商将优先股换为普通股（按当时估值）。
Our partnership took control of Heinz in June, and operating results so far are encouraging. Only minor earnings from Heinz, however, are reflected in those we report for Berkshire this year: One-time charges incurred in the purchase and subsequent restructuring of operations totaled $1.3 billion. Earnings in 2014 will be substantial.
合伙人在6月完成亨氏接管，初期运营结果令人振奋。但2013年合并报表中仅体现少量收益，因收购及重组一次性费用达13亿美元。2014年亨氏贡献将大幅增长。
With Heinz, Berkshire now owns 8¹⁄₂ companies that, were they stand-alone businesses, would be in the Fortune 500. Only 491¹⁄₂ to go.
亨氏加入后，伯克希尔现拥有8.5家独立运营可达《财富》500强规模的企业（亨氏算0.5家）。距离500家目标，还有491.5家待收购。
NV Energy, purchased for $5.6 billion by MidAmerican Energy, our utility subsidiary, supplies electricity to about 88% of Nevada’s population. This acquisition fits nicely into our existing electric-utility operation and offers many possibilities for large investments in renewable energy. NV Energy will not be MidAmerican’s last major acquisition.
旗下公用事业子公司中美能源以56亿美元收购NV能源，服务内华达州88%人口。这笔收购完美契合现有能源布局，为大规模可再生能源投资打开空间。NV能源绝非中美能源最后一笔大收购。
# Financial Performance and Strategic Moves
财务表现与战略举措
MidAmerican is one of our “Powerhouse Five” – a collection of large non-insurance businesses that, in aggregate, had a record $10.8 billion of pre-tax earnings in 2013, up $758 million from 2012. The other companies in this sainted group are BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol and Marmon.
中美能源是我们“五大核心企业”之一——这组非保险业务2013年税前收益创纪录达108亿美元（较2012年增7.58亿美元）。其他成员包括BNSF铁路、伊斯卡（Iscar）、路博润（Lubrizol）和马蒙集团（Marmon）。
Of the five, only MidAmerican, then earning $393 million pre-tax, was owned by Berkshire nine years ago. Subsequently, we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, BNSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash, and, for the remainder, issued shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $10.4 billion gain in annual earnings delivered by the five companies over the nine-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply growing, but rather increasing per-share results.
十年前我们仅拥有中美能源（当时年税前收益3.93亿美元）。此后以全现金收购三家，BNSF收购中支付70%现金及6.1%增发股份。九年间，五家企业贡献的104亿美元年收益增长仅伴随轻微股权稀释。这符合我们的目标：不仅总收益增长，更要提升每股收益。
If the U.S. economy continues to improve in 2014, we can expect earnings of our Powerhouse Five to improve also – perhaps by $1 billion or so pre-tax.
若美国经济在2014年持续改善，我们预计“五大核心企业”税前收益将增长约10亿美元。
Š Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $4.7 billion pre-tax last year, up from $3.9 billion in 2012. Here, too, we expect further gains in 2014.
我们的数十家小型非保险业务2013年税前收益达47亿美元（2012年为39亿美元），预计2014年将继续增长。
Š Berkshire’s extensive insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2013 – that makes 11 years in a row – and increased its float. During that 11-year stretch, our float – money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit – has grown from $41 billion to $77 billion. Concurrently, our underwriting profit has aggregated $22 billion pre-tax, including $3 billion realized in 2013. And all of this all began with our 1967 purchase of National Indemnity for $8.6 million.
2013年，我们的保险业务连续11年承保盈利，浮存金增至770亿美元（1967年为410亿美元）。同期承保利润累计达220亿美元（含2013年30亿美元）。这一切始于1967年以860万美元收购国家赔偿保险公司。
We now own a wide variety of exceptional insurance operations. Best known is GEICO, the car insurer Berkshire acquired in full at yearend 1995 (having for many years prior owned a partial interest). GEICO in 1996 ranked number seven among U.S. auto insurers. Now, GEICO is number two, having recently passed Allstate. The reasons for this amazing growth are simple: low prices and reliable service. You can do yourself a favor by calling 1-800-847-7536 or checking Geico.com to see if you, too, can cut your insurance costs. Buy some of Berkshire’s other products with the savings.
我们现拥有多元化优质保险业务，最知名的是GEICO。伯克希尔于1995年底全资收购（此前多年持有部分股权）。GEICO在1996年美国汽车保险商中位列第七，如今已超越好事达（Allstate）跃居第二。其增长秘诀简单明了：低价与可靠服务。您可通过拨打1-800-847-7536或访问Geico.com查看是否能为您节省保费，省下的钱可用于购买伯克希尔其他产品。
Š While Charlie and I search for elephants, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year, we contracted for 25 of these, scheduled to cost $3.1 billion in aggregate. These transactions ranged from $1.9 million to $1.1 billion in size.
查理和我寻找“大象级收购”的同时，旗下子公司频繁进行补充性并购。2013年完成25项交易，总成本31亿美元，单笔金额从190万美元至11亿美元不等。
Charlie and I encourage these deals. They deploy capital in activities that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. The result is no more work for us and more earnings for you. Many more of these bolt-on deals will be made in future years. In aggregate, they will be meaningful.
查理和我支持合理定价的补充性并购。这些交易将资金投入与现有业务协同的领域，并由专业经理团队管理。这意味着无需我们额外操心，却为股东创造更多收益。未来数年，我们将完成更多此类交易，累积影响不容小觑。
Š Last year we invested $3.5 billion in the surest sort of bolt-on: the purchase of additional shares in two wonderful businesses that we already controlled. In one case – Marmon – our purchases brought us to the 100% ownership we had signed up for in 2008. In the other instance – Iscar – the Wertheimer family elected to exercise a put option it held, selling us the 20% of the business it retained when we bought control in 2006.
2013年，我们以35亿美元进行两项“最稳妥的补充性收购”——增持已控股的两家优质企业。在马蒙集团案例中，我们完成2008年设定的100%收购目标。而在伊斯卡（Iscar）案例中，沃尔特海默家族行使卖权，向我们出售保留的20%权益（2006年控股时未购入的部分）。
These purchases added about $300 million pre-tax to our current earning power and also delivered us $800 million of cash. Meanwhile, the same nonsensical accounting rule that I described in last year’s letter required that we enter these purchases on our books at $1.8 billion less than we paid, a process that reduced Berkshire’s book value. (The charge was made to “capital in excess of par value”; figure that one out.) This weird accounting, you should understand, instantly increased Berkshire’s excess of intrinsic value over book value by the same $1.8 billion.
这两笔收购使我们税前盈利增加约3亿美元，并获得8亿美元现金。但根据去年年报中提到的会计准则，我们需以18亿美元折价入账，导致账面价值下降（计入“股本溢价”科目）。请理解，这种奇怪的会计处理瞬间拉大了内在价值与账面价值的差距——这一差距正好是18亿美元。
Š Our subsidiaries spent a record $11 billion on plant and equipment during 2013, roughly twice our depreciation charge. About 89% of that money was spent in the United States. Though we invest abroad as well, the mother lode of opportunity resides in America.
我们的子公司2013年在厂房设备上投入110亿美元创纪录资金，约为当年折旧费用的两倍。其中89%资金用于美国本土。尽管我们也会投资海外，但真正的宝藏在美国。
Š In a year in which most equity managers found it impossible to outperform the S&P 500, both Todd Combs and Ted Weschler handily did so. Each now runs a portfolio exceeding $7 billion. They’ve earned it.
在多数基金经理无法跑赢标普500指数的2013年，托德·康布斯和泰德·韦施勒均实现超额收益。两人目前管理资产均超70亿美元，这是他们应得的回报。
I must again confess that their investments outperformed mine. (Charlie says I should add “by a lot.”) If such humiliating comparisons continue, I’ll have no choice but to cease talking about them.
必须再次承认他们的投资成绩优于我。（查理建议我加上“远超”二字。）若持续如此对比，我将不得不停止提及此事。
Todd and Ted have also created significant value for you in several matters unrelated to their portfolio activities. Their contributions are just beginning: Both men have Berkshire blood in their veins.
托德和泰德在投资组合外的事务上也为股东创造价值。他们的贡献才刚刚开始：两人血液中流淌着伯克希尔基因。
Š Berkshire’s yearend employment – counting Heinz – totaled a record 330,745, up 42,283 from last year. The increase, I must admit, included one person at our Omaha home office. (Don’t panic: The headquarters gang still fits comfortably on one floor.)
伯克希尔2013年末员工总数（含亨氏）创纪录达330,745人，较上年增加42,283人。总部新增1人（总计25人），但查理和我仍能在奥马哈总部同一楼层办公。
Š Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of Wells Fargo (increasing our ownership to 9.2% versus 8.7% at yearend 2012) and IBM (6.3% versus 6.0%). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola and American Express raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 8.9% to 9.1% and our interest in American Express from 13.7% to 14.2%. And, if you think tenths of a percent aren’t important, ponder this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one-tenth of a percent in our share of their equity raises Berkshire’s share of their annual earnings by $50 million.
我们在“四大持仓”——美国运通、可口可乐、IBM和富国银行**——的持股比例均提升。增持富国银行至9.2%（2012年末为8.7%）、IBM至6.3%（2012年末为6.0%）。可口可乐与运通因回购被动持股比例分别升至9.1%和14.2%。若您认为0.1%的变动无关紧要，请看数据：四家公司每增持0.1%，即可多享有5,000万美元年收益。
The four companies possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business; it’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
这四家被投企业拥有卓越业务，管理层兼具才华与股东导向。我们更偏好持有优质公司的非控股但可观股份，而非全资拥有平庸企业。正如我们更愿持有希望钻石的部分权益，而非拥有整颗人造钻石。
Going by our yearend holdings, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2013 earnings amounted to $4.4 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive – about $1.4 billion last year. But make no mistake: The $3 billion of their earnings we don’t report are every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.
按年末持股计算，我们在“四大持仓”2013年持续经营收益中应占44亿美元，但报告中仅体现14亿美元股息。请勿误解：未报告的30亿美元收益与账面记录部分同样重要。
The earnings that these four companies retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock – a move that enhances our share of future earnings – as well as for funding business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees will grow substantially over time. If they do, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, so will our unrealized capital gains. (For the four, unrealized gains already totaled $39 billion at yearend.)
这些被投企业留存的收益常用于回购自身股票及开拓业务机会，两者均提升我们未来收益占比。因此我们预计四家企业的每股收益将长期大幅增长。若实现，伯克希尔的股息与未实现资本收益将同步增长。（截至年末，未实现资本收益已累计达390亿美元。）
Our flexibility in capital allocation – our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses – gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they can operate. Woody Allen stated the general idea when he said: “The advantage of being bi-sexual is that it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night.” Similarly, our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for our endless gusher of cash.
我们在资本配置上的灵活性——愿意被动投资非控股企业——相较于仅限自营收购的公司，这是显著优势。正如伍迪·艾伦所言：“双性恋的好处是周六晚上约会对象翻倍。”类似地，我们对自营企业与被动投资的双重偏好，使找到明智现金用途的机会翻倍。
# BNSF Acquisition and Economic Outlook
BNSF收购与经济展望
Late in 2009, amidst the gloom of the Great Recession, we agreed to buy BNSF（伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路公司）, the largest purchase in Berkshire’s history. At the time, I called the transaction an “all-in wager on the economic future of the United States.”
2009年末，在大萧条的阴霾中，我们达成收购BNSF的协议——这是伯克希尔史上最大交易。当时我称此为“对美国经济未来的全力押注”。
That kind of commitment was nothing new for us: We’ve been making similar wagers ever since Buffett Partnership Ltd. acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. For good reason, too. Charlie and I have always considered a “bet” on ever-rising U.S. prosperity to be very close to a sure thing.
这种承诺对我们而言并非新鲜事。自1965年巴菲特合伙公司接管伯克希尔以来，我们始终如此下注。原因显而易见：查理和我始终坚信，押注美国持续繁荣几乎稳赢。
Indeed, who has ever benefited during the past 237 years by betting against America? If you compare our country’s present condition to that existing in 1776, you have to rub your eyes in wonder. And the dynamism embedded in our market economy will continue to work its magic. America’s best days lie ahead.
事实上，过去237年里，谁曾通过做空美国获利？若您将今日美国与1776年对比，您定会惊叹。美国市场机制的活力将持续创造奇迹。可以肯定的是，美国最辉煌的日子尚未到来。
With this tailwind working for us, Charlie and I hope to build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.
凭借这一有利风向，我们将通过以下五点提升每股内在价值：（1）持续增强旗下子公司基础盈利能力；（2）通过补充性并购进一步提升收益；（3）受益于被投企业增长；（4）当股价大幅低于内在价值时回购股份；（5）偶尔进行大型收购。此外，我们通过极少增发股份为您最大化收益。
Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy will still be playing major roles in our economy. Insurance will concomitantly be essential for both businesses and individuals – and no company brings greater human and financial resources to that business than Berkshire.
这些战略建立在坚实基础上。百年后，BNSF和中美能源仍将支撑美国经济。保险对企业和个人的重要性不变——而伯克希尔在人力与资金资源上的投入远超同行。
Moreover, we will always maintain supreme financial strength, operating with at least $20 billion of cash equivalents and never incurring material amounts of short-term obligations. As we view these and other strengths, Charlie and I like your company’s prospects. We feel fortunate to be entrusted with its management.
此外，我们始终保持顶尖财务实力：持有至少200亿美元现金等价物，且不承担重大短期债务。基于这些优势，查理和我对公司前景充满信心。我们深感幸运能肩负管理使命。
# Intrinsic Business Value Estimation
企业内在价值评估
Intrinsic Business Value
As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements – one of them qualitative – that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 109-110.
内在价值
尽管查理和我常谈论企业内在价值，但我们无法精确告知伯克希尔股票的这一数值（对任何股票均如此）。2010年年报中，我们列出了三个关键要素（含一项定性因素），用于合理估算伯克希尔内在价值。完整讨论见第109-110页。
Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2013 our per-share investments increased 13.6% to $129,253 and our pre-tax earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments increased 12.8% to $9,116 per share.
以下是两项定量要素的更新：2013年，我们每股投资组合增长13.6%至129,253美元；非保险及非投资业务的税前收益增长12.8%至9,116美元/股。
Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19.3% compounded annually, and our earnings figure has grown at a 20.6% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the 43-year period has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but we will most strongly focus on building operating earnings.
自1970年以来，我们的每股投资以19.3%的年复合增长率增长，收益（含非保险及非投资业务）增长率达20.6%。43年间，伯克希尔股价增长速度与这两项价值指标非常接近绝非偶然。我们乐见两者增长，但更专注运营收益。
# Four Major Operational Sectors
四大核心业务板块
Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring advantages to having them all under one roof). Our goal is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (But don’t get any ideas!)
现在让我们分析四大核心业务板块。每一块的资产负债表和利润表特征截然不同。因此我们将其视为四个独立业务呈现——这也是查理和我的视角（尽管统一管理具有长期优势）。我们的目标是提供您希望看到的信息，如同您作为管理者向我们汇报时所需的资料。（不过别真这么想！）
# Insurance Business and Float
保险业务与浮存金
“Our investment in the insurance companies reflects a first major step in our efforts to achieve a more diversified base of earning power.”
— 1967 Annual Report
“我们对保险公司的投资标志着我们在实现盈利基础多元化方面的第一步。”
——1967年年报
Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has consistently propelled our expansion since that 1967 report was published.
让我们首先聚焦伯克希尔的核心业务——保险。自1967年年报发布以来，这一板块始终是推动我们扩张的核心引擎。
Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
财产险（P/C）公司先收取保费，后支付理赔。极端情况下（如某些工伤赔偿事故），支付可能持续数十年。这种“先收后付”模式使保险公司持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——最终流向索赔者。而在此期间，保险公司可利用这些资金进行投资。尽管具体保单和理赔不断变化，但浮存金规模通常与保费收入保持稳定比例。因此，随着业务增长，我们的浮存金也随之增长。以下数据展示了我们的成长历程：
# Float Growth (in millions)
浮存金增长（百万美元）
| Year（年份） | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Float（浮存金） | $39 | $237 | $1,632 | $27,871 | $65,832 | $77,240 |
Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO’s float will almost certainly grow.
未来浮存金的增长将面临挑战。积极的一面是，GEICO的浮存金规模必然持续增长。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
若保费收入超过费用和最终损失总额，我们将实现承保利润——叠加到浮存金带来的投资收益中。当实现承保利润时，我们相当于免费使用资金——甚至还能因持有这些资金而获得报酬。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company besides, incurred an underwriting loss in nine of the twelve years ending in 2012 (the latest year for which their financials are available, as I write this). Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry – despite the float income all companies enjoy – will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns as compared to other businesses.
不幸的是，所有保险公司追求这一理想结果导致激烈竞争，使财产险行业整体长期承保亏损。这种亏损本质上是行业为持有浮存金支付的代价。例如，美国最大且管理良好的保险公司State Farm在截至2012年的十二年中有九年承保亏损（最新数据截止至2012年，撰写本报告时仍可获取）。竞争格局几乎注定保险行业将继续表现低迷：尽管享受浮存金收益，但其有形净资产回报率仍将低于其他企业。
As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for eleven consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $22 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. Doing so is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers who know that while float is valuable, it can be drowned by poor underwriting results.
如本报告首节所述，伯克希尔已连续11年实现承保利润，税前总收益达220亿美元。展望未来，我相信多数年份仍将盈利。所有保险经理每日的核心任务是避免亏损——他们深知浮存金虽有价值，但糟糕的承保结果会吞噬其收益。
# Float and Intrinsic Value
浮存金与内在价值
So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect; it should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims – some $17 billion to more than five million claimants in 2013 – and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business and thereby generate new claims that add to float. If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability.
浮存金如何影响内在价值？计算伯克希尔账面价值时，浮存金全额作为负债扣除，仿佛我们必须立即支付且无法补充。但这将浮存金视为纯粹负债是错误的，应被看作循环基金。2013年，我们向超五百万索赔人支付了170亿美元旧理赔，这减少了浮存金。但每天也承保新业务，产生新理赔并增加浮存金。若循环浮存金既无成本又长期存在，其真实负债价值将远低于会计负债。
A counterpart to this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of “goodwill” that is attributable to our insurance companies and included in book value as an asset. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance business sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
与高估负债对应的是一项价值155亿美元的“商誉”资产，计入保险公司的收购成本中并提升账面价值。在很大程度上，这一商誉代表了我们为保险业务浮存金生成能力支付的价格。但商誉的成本与其真实价值无关。例如，若保险公司长期承受巨额承保亏损，无论原始成本如何，其账面商誉均应视为毫无价值。
Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay to purchase an insurance operation possessing float of similar quality to that we have – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.
幸运的是，伯克希尔并非如此。查理和我认为，我们的保险商誉真实经济价值远高于历史账面价值——这是我们认为伯克希尔内在价值远超账面价值的关键原因之一。
# Berkshire’s Insurance Managers and Operations
伯克希尔保险管理者与运营
Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess strong, hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.
伯克希尔保险业务的吸引力源于我们拥有一批卓越的管理者，他们以严明纪律运营着难以复制的商业模式。以下是核心单元介绍：
First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.
按浮存金规模最大的单元是伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险集团，由阿吉特·杰恩（Ajit Jain）管理。他承担的都是其他机构不愿或无力承担的风险。他的运营模式在业内独树一帜：兼具资本实力、决策速度、决断力以及最关键的智慧，但从未让伯克希尔承担与其资源不匹配的风险。
Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. And we would remain awash in cash, looking for large opportunities if the catastrophe caused markets to go into shock. All other major insurers and reinsurers would meanwhile be far in the red, with some facing insolvency.
事实上，伯克希尔在风险规避上的保守程度远超大多数大型保险公司。例如，若行业因超级巨灾遭遇2500亿美元损失（约为历史最高损失的三倍），伯克希尔整体仍可能实现可观盈利，因为我们有多元化收益来源。我们还将保持充沛的现金储备，并在可能陷入混乱的保险市场中寻找机会。而其他大型保险公司可能深陷赤字，甚至面临破产风险。
From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $37 billion and a large cumulative underwriting profit, a feat no other insurance CEO has come close to matching. Ajit’s mind is an idea factory that is always looking for more lines of business he can add to his current assortment.
自1985年从零起步以来，阿吉特通过持续承保利润及370亿美元浮存金打造了一家保险公司。这一成就无人能及。他的思维更是创意工厂，不断探索新业务线。
# Berkshire’s Insurance Ecosystem
伯克希尔保险生态
One venture materialized last June when he formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”). This initiative took us into commercial insurance, where we were instantly accepted by both major insurance brokers and corporate risk managers throughout America. These professionals recognize that no other insurer can match the financial strength of Berkshire, which guarantees that legitimate claims arising many years in the future will be paid promptly and fully.
2013年6月，阿吉特创立了伯克希尔哈撒韦专业保险公司（BHSI）。这一举措使我们进入商业保险领域，即刻赢得美国大型保险经纪公司与企业风险管理者的欢迎。他们深知唯有伯克希尔具备财务实力，能确保未来数十年的理赔及时全额兑付。
BHSI is led by Peter Eastwood, an experienced underwriter who is widely respected in the insurance world. Peter has assembled a spectacular team that is already writing a substantial amount of business with many Fortune 500 companies and with smaller operations as well. BHSI will be a major asset for Berkshire, one that will generate volume in the billions within a few years. Give Peter a Berkshire greeting when you see him at the annual meeting.
BHSI由经验丰富的承保人彼得·伊斯伍德（Peter Eastwood）领导，他在保险界广受尊敬。他带领的团队已与多家财富500强企业及中小客户开展业务。BHSI将成为伯克希尔的重要资产，预计几年内保费规模将达数十亿美元。股东大会上见到他时，请送上伯克希尔式问候。
# General Reinsurance: Tad Montross’ Discipline
通用再保险：泰德·蒙特罗斯的纪律性
We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
我们的另一大再保险力量是通用再保险（General Re），由泰德·蒙特罗斯（Tad Montross）管理。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
稳健的保险运营需遵循四大原则：必须（1）理解可能导致保单亏损的所有风险敞口；（2）保守评估任一风险实际引发亏损的概率及可能成本；（3）设定平均而言能在覆盖预期损失和运营成本后产生利润的保费；（4）若无法获得合理保费，必须愿意放弃业务。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.
许多保险公司能通过前三项考验，但第四个失败。他们无法拒绝竞争对手热衷的业务。“别人这么做，我们也得做”的老话在任何行业都危险，但在保险业尤为致命。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.
泰德严格遵守了这四大原则，其成果可见于业绩：通用再保险庞大的浮存金成本远低于零成本，且这一趋势预计将持续。我们尤其看好其国际人寿再保险业务——自1998年收购以来，该业务持续增长并盈利。
It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, the company was beset by problems that caused commentators – and me as well, briefly – to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.
当然，收购通用再保险初期，它曾因问题频发导致评论家（甚至我也短暂地）认为我犯下重大错误。那段时期早已过去，如今通用再保险已成为一颗明珠。
# GEICO: Tony Nicely’s Enduring Success
GEICO：托尼·尼利的长胜之道
Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 63 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 52 years of service in 2013. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying.
最后是GEICO，这是我63年前初入保险业时接触的公司。GEICO由托尼·尼利（Tony Nicely）管理，他18岁加入公司，在2013年完成52年职业生涯。自1993年担任CEO以来，公司进入腾飞期。
When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. That operational efficiency continues today and is an all-important asset. No one likes to buy auto insurance. But almost everyone likes to drive. The insurance needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them – and only a low-cost operation can deliver these.
1951年1月首次接触GEICO时，我被其远超行业巨头的成本优势震撼。这种运营效率延续至今，成为核心资产。没人喜欢购买汽车保险，但几乎人人都爱开车。因此所需的保险是多数家庭的重大支出，节省费用至关重要——而这只有低成本运营才能实现。
GEICO’s cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. Its low costs create a moat – an enduring one – that competitors are unable to cross. Meanwhile, our little gecko continues to tell Americans how GEICO can save them important money. With our latest reduction in operating costs, his story has become even more compelling.
GEICO的成本优势使其年年攻城略地。它的低成本构建了持久护城河，竞争对手难以跨越。我们的小壁虎仍在向美国人讲述如何省下大笔保费的故事。随着运营成本进一步下降，它的吸引力更强。
In 1995, we purchased the half of GEICO that we didn’t already own, paying $1.4 billion more than the net tangible assets we acquired. That’s “goodwill,” and it will forever remain unchanged on our books. As GEICO’s business grows, however, so does its true economic goodwill. I believe that figure to be approaching $20 billion.
1995年，我们收购GEICO剩余股权，支付溢价14亿美元（高于收购的有形净资产）。这一溢价计入“商誉”，账面价值固定不变。但GEICO业务增长时，其真实的经济商誉也在扩大。我认为这一隐性价值已接近200亿美元。
# Smaller Insurance Units: Hidden Gems
小型保险公司：隐藏瑰宝
In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, these companies are a growing operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit. Moreover, as the table below shows, they also provide us with substantial float. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.
除三大核心保险业务外，我们还拥有一组小型保险公司，多数在保险业冷门领域运营。整体而言，这一组合是规模庞大、持续增长且盈利丰厚的业务。以下数据展示了它们的浮存金贡献：
# Underwriting Profit and Float by Division
按部门划分的承保利润与浮存金
| Insurance Operations（保险业务） | Underwriting Profit 2013 | 2012 | Yearend Float (in millions) 2013 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BH Reinsurance（伯克希尔再保险） | $1,294 | $304 | $37,231 | $34,821 |
| General Re（通用再保险） | $283 | $355 | $20,013 | $20,128 |
| GEICO（政府雇员保险公司） | $1,127 | $680 | $12,566 | $11,578 |
| Other Primary（其他基础业务） | $385 | $286 | $7,430 | $6,598 |
| Total（总计） | $3,089 | $1,625 | $77,240 | $73,125 |
Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.
查理和我珍视这些企业及其管理者。
# The Economic Power of Insurance Promises
保险承诺的经济力量
Simply put, insurance is the sale of promises. The “customer” pays money now; the insurer promises to pay money in the future if certain events occur.
简单来说，保险就是出售承诺。客户现在付钱，保险公司承诺若特定事件发生则支付赔偿。
Sometimes, the promise will not be tested for decades. (Think of life insurance bought by those in their 20s.) Therefore, both the ability and willingness of the insurer to pay – even if economic chaos prevails when payment time arrives – is all-important.
某些承诺可能数十年后才兑现（如年轻人购买的寿险）。因此，即使未来经济动荡，保险公司的偿付能力与意愿至关重要。
Berkshire’s promises have no equal, a fact affirmed in recent years by the actions of the world’s largest and most sophisticated insurers, some of which have wanted to shed themselves of huge and exceptionally long-lived liabilities, particularly those involving asbestos claims. That is, these insurers wished to “cede” their liabilities to a reinsurer. Choosing the wrong reinsurer, however – one that down the road proved to be financially strapped or a bad actor – would put the original insurer in danger of getting the liabilities right back in its lap.
伯克希尔的承诺无与伦比。近年来，全球最大、最成熟的保险公司将巨额且长期负债（尤其是石棉索赔）转移给再保险商。选择错误的再保险商（财务吃紧或声誉不佳）等于将原始保单风险重新推回原保险公司。
Almost without exception, the largest insurers seeking aid came to Berkshire. Indeed, in the largest such transaction ever recorded, Lloyd’s in 2007 turned over to us both many thousands of known claims arising from policies written before 1993 and an unknown but huge number of claims from that same period sure to materialize in the future. (Yes, we will be receiving claims decades from now that apply to events taking place prior to 1993.)
几乎所有的求助再保险商均选择伯克希尔。2007年劳合社（Lloyd’s）与我们达成史上最大交易：将1993年前签发的数千项已知索赔及大量未来可能出现的同类负债转移给我们。（是的，几十年后我们仍将收到1993年前事件的理赔。）
Berkshire’s ultimate payments arising from the Lloyd’s transaction are today unknowable. What is certain, however, is that Berkshire will pay all valid claims up to the $15 billion limit of our policy. No other insurer’s promise would have given Lloyd’s the comfort provided by its agreement with Berkshire. The CEO of the entity then handling Lloyd’s claims said it best:
劳合社交易的最终赔付金额尚无法预判。但伯克希尔承诺在150亿美元保额上限内兑付所有有效理赔。没有其他保险商的承诺能给予劳合社同样的安心。当时负责劳合社索赔的机构CEO总结道：
“Names [the original insurers at Lloyd’s] wanted to sleep easy at night, and we think we’ve just bought them the world’s best mattress.”
“劳合社的原始保险公司希望安心入眠，我们提供的是全球最佳床垫。”
# Berkshire’s Insurance Ecosystem
伯克希尔保险生态
Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models possessing wide moats form something unique in the insurance world. The combination is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.
伯克希尔卓越的管理者、顶尖财务实力以及护城河保护的多元商业模式，在保险业内独一无二。这一组合是股东的巨大资产，且价值将随时间推移持续增长。
# Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受监管的重资本业务
“Though there are many regulatory restraints in the utility industry, it’s possible that we will make additional commitments in the field. If we do, the amounts involved could be large.”
— 1999 Annual Report
“尽管公用事业受监管限制，但我们可能继续加码投资。若成行，金额可能庞大。”
——1999年年报
We have two major operations, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, that share important characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.
我们有两个核心业务——BNSF铁路与中美能源——它们具备与其他业务显著不同的特征。因此，我们在年报中为其单独设节，并在通用会计准则（GAAP）的资产负债表和利润表中单独列示其合并财务数据。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions will far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, BNSF’s interest coverage was 9:1. (Our definition of coverage is pre-tax earnings/interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
两家公司的关键特征是对长期受监管资产的巨大投资，其中部分资金来自无需伯克希尔担保的长期债务。我们的信用背书并非必要，因为它们的盈利能力即使在极端经济环境下也远超利息需求。例如，BNSF去年的利息保障倍数达9:1。（我们定义的保障倍数为税前收益/利息，而非行业常用的EBITDA/利息，后者存在严重缺陷。）
At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service on an exclusive basis. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: a great diversity of earnings streams, which shield us from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. Now, with the acquisition of NV Energy, MidAmerican’s earnings base has further broadened. This particular strength, supplemented by Berkshire’s ownership, has enabled MidAmerican and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This advantage benefits both us and our customers.
中美能源方面，两大因素确保其偿债能力：第一是公用事业共性——因提供独家基础服务具备抗衰退盈利；第二是其盈利来源的多样性（收购NV能源后进一步扩大），使我们免受单一监管机构重大影响。这一优势叠加伯克希尔的信用支持，使中美能源及子公司大幅降低债务成本。这一优势对股东与客户均有益处。
Every day, our two subsidiaries power the American economy in major ways:
我们的两家子公司每日以重大方式支撑美国经济运行：
Š BNSF carries about 15% (measured by ton-miles) of all inter-city freight, whether it is transported by truck, rail, water, air, or pipeline. Indeed, we move more ton-miles of goods than anyone else, a fact establishing BNSF as the most important artery in our economy’s circulatory system. Its hold on the number-one position strengthened in 2013.
Š BNSF铁路运输美国城际货运量的约15%（按吨英里计算），无论运输方式为何。事实上，我们运输的货物吨英里量超过任何其他企业，这使得BNSF成为美国经济循环系统中最关键的动脉。其行业龙头地位在2013年进一步巩固。
BNSF, like all railroads, also moves its cargo in an extraordinarily fuel-efficient and environmentally friendly way, carrying a ton of freight about 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. Trucks taking on the same job guzzle about four times as much fuel.
BNSF与所有铁路一样，以极高的燃油效率和环保方式运输货物。一加仑柴油可运送一吨货物约500英里，而卡车完成同样工作需消耗四倍燃料。
Š MidAmerican’s utilities serve regulated retail customers in eleven states. No utility company stretches further. In addition, we are the leader in renewables: From a standing start nine years ago, MidAmerican now accounts for 7% of the country’s wind generation capacity, with more on the way. Our share in solar – most of which is still in construction – is even larger.
Š 中美能源的公用事业覆盖美国11个州的受监管零售客户，业务地域跨度无人能及。此外，我们是可再生能源领域的领军者：九年前从零起步，现拥有全国7%的风电产能，且仍在扩张。太阳能领域份额（多数项目在建）甚至更大。
MidAmerican can make these investments because it retains all of its earnings. Here’s a little known fact: Last year MidAmerican retained more dollars of earnings – by far – than any other American electric utility. We and our regulators see this as an important advantage – one almost certain to exist five, ten and twenty years from now.
中美能源能持续投资因其保留全部收益。鲜为人知的是：2013年它保留的盈利远超美国其他电力公司。我们与监管机构均认为这一优势具有长期性——未来五、十、二十年仍将存在。
When our current projects are completed, MidAmerican’s renewables portfolio will have cost $15 billion. We relish making such commitments as long as they promise reasonable returns. And, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.
当现有可再生能源项目完成后，投资总额将达150亿美元。我们乐于持续投入，只要能带来合理回报。而这一点，我们对未来的监管环境抱有充分信任。
# Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受监管的重资本业务
Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need massive investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is meanwhile in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.
我们的信心既有历史经验支撑，也源于对社会将永续需要交通与能源巨额投资的认知。政府有义务以合理方式对待资本提供者，确保资金流向关键项目；而我们也有责任以赢得监管者及民众支持的方式运营。
Tangible proof of our dedication to that duty was delivered last year in a poll of customer satisfaction covering 52 holding companies and their 101 operating electric utilities. Our MidAmerican group ranked number one, with 95.3% of respondents giving us a “very satisfied” vote and not a single customer rating us “dissatisfied.” The bottom score in the survey, incidentally, was a dismal 34.5%.
去年一项覆盖52家控股公司及101家电力运营商的客户满意度调查中，中美能源集团以95.3%的“非常满意”率高居榜首，无任何客户评价“不满意”。调查垫底者仅34.5%满意率。
All three of our companies were ranked far lower by this measure before they were acquired by MidAmerican. The extraordinary customer satisfaction we have achieved is of great importance as we expand: Regulators in states we hope to enter are glad to see us, knowing we will be responsible operators.
被中美能源收购前，这三家企业在此项指标上的排名远低于当前水平。随着业务扩张，这一成就意义重大：我们希望进入的州监管机构乐见我们作为负责任的运营商参与。
Our railroad has been diligent as well in anticipating the needs of its customers. Whatever you may have heard about our country’s crumbling infrastructure in no way applies to BNSF or railroads generally. America’s rail system has never been in better shape, a consequence of huge investments by the industry. We are not, however, resting: BNSF spent $4 billion on the railroad in 2013, double its depreciation charge and a single-year record for any railroad. And we will spend considerably more in 2014. Like Noah, who foresaw early on the need for dependable transportation, we know it’s our job to plan ahead.
BNSF铁路亦高度重视客户需求。尽管外界常担忧美国基础设施老化，但BNSF及整个铁路行业已通过巨额投资达到历史最佳状态。我们并未止步：2013年BNSF投入40亿美元（为折旧费用两倍），创单年铁路业最高纪录。2014年投入将进一步增加。如同诺亚方舟般，我们深知需提前布局可靠交通系统。
# Key Figures for MidAmerican and BNSF
中美能源与BNSF核心财务数据
# MidAmerican (89.8% owned)
中美能源（持有89.8%）
| 项目（英文｜中文） | 2013年（百万美元） | 2012年（百万美元） | 2011年（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities（英国公用事业） | $362 | $429 | $469 |
| Iowa utility（爱荷华州公用事业） | $230 | $236 | $279 |
| Western utilities（西部公用事业） | $982 | $737 | $771 |
| Pipelines（管道运输） | $385 | $383 | $388 |
| Home Services（房屋服务） | $139 | $82 | $39 |
| Other (net)（其他净项） | $4 | $91 | $36 |
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes（税息前运营利润） | $2,102 | $1,958 | $1,982 |
| Interest（利息） | $296 | $314 | $336 |
| Income taxes（所得税） | $170 | $172 | $315 |
| Net earnings（净利润） | $1,636 | $1,472 | $1,331 |
| Earnings applicable to Berkshire（归属伯克希尔收益） | $1,470 | $1,323 | $1,204 |
# BNSF
BNSF铁路公司
| 项目（英文｜中文） | 2013 | 2012 | 2011 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues（收入） | $22,014 | $20,835 | $19,548 |
| Operating expenses（运营费用） | $15,357 | $14,835 | $14,247 |
| Operating earnings before interest and taxes（税息前运营利润） | $6,657 | $6,000 | $5,301 |
| Interest (net)（净利息） | $729 | $623 | $560 |
| Income taxes（所得税） | $2,135 | $2,005 | $1,769 |
| Net earnings（净利润） | $3,793 | $3,372 | $2,972 |
Ron Peltier continues to build HomeServices, MidAmerican’s real estate brokerage subsidiary. Last year his operation made four acquisitions, the most significant being Fox & Roach, a Philadelphia-based company that is the largest single-market realtor in the country.
罗恩·佩尔蒂埃（Ron Peltier）持续扩张中美能源旗下房地产经纪子公司HomeServices。去年完成四项收购，其中最具意义的是总部位于费城的Fox & Roach——美国单一市场最大地产中介。
HomeServices now has 22,114 agents (listed by geography on page 112), up 38% from 2012. HomeServices also owns 67% of the Prudential and Real Living franchise operations, which are in the process of rebranding their franchisees as Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices. If you haven’t yet, many of you will soon be seeing our name on “for sale” signs.
HomeServices现拥有22,114名经纪人（按地域分布见第112页），较2012年增长38%。此外，它持有67%的Prudential与Real Living特许经营权，正逐步更名为伯克希尔哈撒韦地产（Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices）。若您尚未注意，很快将在房产出售标识上看到我们的品牌。
# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
制造、服务与零售业务
“See that store,” Warren says, pointing at Nebraska Furniture Mart. “That’s a really good business.” “Why don’t you buy it?” I said.
沃伦指着内布拉斯加家具商城说：“看那家店，这是家好企业。”
“为什么不买下它？”
“It’s privately held,” Warren said.
“它属于私人持股。”
“Oh,” I said.
“哦。”
“I might buy it anyway,” Warren said. “Someday.”
“不管怎样，我可能会买下它——总有一天。”
— Supermoney by Adam Smith (1972)
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
我们在这个板块的业务覆盖范围广泛。以下是对该集团合并资产负债表和利润表的摘要：
# Balance Sheet 12/31/13 (in millions)
资产负债表（百万美元）
| Assets（资产） | 2013年 |
|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents（现金及等价物） | $6,625 |
| Accounts and notes receivable（应收账款和票据） | $7,749 |
| Inventory（存货） | $9,945 |
| Other current assets（其他流动资产） | $716 |
| Total current assets（流动资产合计） | $25,035 |
| Goodwill and other intangibles（商誉及其他无形资产） | $25,617 |
| Fixed assets（固定资产） | $19,389 |
| Other assets（其他资产） | $4,274 |
| Total assets（资产总计） | $74,315 |
| Liabilities and Equity（负债及权益） | 2013年 |
|---|---|
| Notes payable（应付票据） | $1,615 |
| Other current liabilities（其他流动负债） | $8,965 |
| Total current liabilities（流动负债合计） | $10,580 |
| Deferred taxes（递延税项） | $5,184 |
| Term debt and other liabilities（长期债务及其他负债） | $4,405 |
| Non-controlling interests（非控股权益） | $456 |
| Berkshire equity（伯克希尔权益） | $53,690 |
| Total liabilities and equity（负债及权益总计） | $74,315 |
# Earnings Statement (in millions)
利润表（百万美元）
| 项目（英文｜中文） | 2013 | 2012 | 2011 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues（收入） | $95,291 | $83,255 | $72,406 |
| Operating expenses（运营费用） | $88,414 | $76,978 | $67,239 |
| Interest expense（利息支出） | $135 | $146 | $130 |
| Pre-tax earnings（税前收益） | $6,742 | $6,131 | $5,037 |
| Income taxes and non-controlling interests（所得税及非控股权益） | $2,512 | $2,432 | $1,998 |
| Net earnings（净利润） | $4,230 | $3,699 | $3,039 |
Our income and expense data conforming to GAAP is on page 29. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP and exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.
我们的GAAP合规数据见第29页。上述运营费用为非GAAP口径，排除了部分并购会计项目（主要是特定无形资产的摊销）。我们采用此方式呈现，因为查理和我认为调整后的数据更能准确反映表中聚合企业的实际经济成本和利润。
I won’t explain all of the adjustments – some are tiny and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets: Some truly deplete over time while others in no way lose value. With software, for example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Charges against other intangibles such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arise through purchase-accounting rules and are clearly not real costs. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated – even though from an investor’s viewpoint they could not be more different.
无需详述所有调整（部分金额微小且复杂），但严肃投资者应理解无形资产的差异：某些资产价值随时间消耗（如软件摊销为真实成本），而其他（如客户关系）则不会贬值。GAAP准则未区分两者，均计入费用——但从投资者视角，二者本质截然不同。
In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 29, amortization charges of $648 million for the companies included in this section are deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. This difference has become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. It will almost certainly rise further as we acquire more companies.
在第29页的GAAP合规数据中，本板块公司摊销费用6.48亿美元已被扣除。其中约20%为“真实费用”，其余为会计调整。这一差异因频繁并购变得显著，未来收购更多企业时将进一步扩大。
Eventually, of course, the non-real charges disappear when the assets to which they’re related become fully amortized. But this usually takes 15 years and – alas – it will be my successor whose reported earnings get the benefit of their expiration.
当然，非真实摊销费用将在相关资产完全摊销后消失。但通常需15年时间——遗憾的是，享受这一收益的将是我的继任者。
Every dime of depreciation expense we report, however, is a real cost. And that’s true at almost all other companies as well. When Wall Streeters tout EBITDA as a valuation guide, button your wallet.
我们报告的每一分折旧费用都是真实成本。这一点在多数公司同样适用。当华尔街推荐以EBITDA作为估值指引时，请捂紧钱包。
Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report.
我们的公开盈利报告当然将继续符合GAAP准则。但为贴近真实，建议您加回大部分我们报告的摊销费用。
# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
制造、服务与零售业务
The crowd of companies in this part of Berkshire covers the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
我们在这个板块的业务覆盖范围广泛。以下是对该集团合并资产负债表和利润表的摘要：
# Balance Sheet 12/31/13 (in millions)
资产负债表（百万美元）
| Assets（资产） | 2013年 |
|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents（现金及等价物） | $6,625 |
| Accounts and notes receivable（应收账款和票据） | $7,749 |
| Inventory（存货） | $9,945 |
| Other current assets（其他流动资产） | $716 |
| Total current assets（流动资产合计） | $25,035 |
| Goodwill and other intangibles（商誉及其他无形资产） | $25,617 |
| Fixed assets（固定资产） | $19,389 |
| Other assets（其他资产） | $4,274 |
| Total assets（资产总计） | $74,315 |
| Liabilities and Equity（负债及权益） | 2013年 |
|---|---|
| Notes payable（应付票据） | $1,615 |
| Other current liabilities（其他流动负债） | $8,965 |
| Total current liabilities（流动负债合计） | $10,580 |
| Deferred taxes（递延税项） | $5,184 |
| Term debt and other liabilities（长期债务及其他负债） | $4,405 |
| Non-controlling interests（非控股权益） | $456 |
| Berkshire equity（伯克希尔权益） | $53,690 |
| Total liabilities and equity（负债及权益总计） | $74,315 |
# Earnings Statement (in millions)
利润表（百万美元）
| 项目（英文｜中文） | 2013 | 2012 | 2011 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues（收入） | $95,291 | $83,255 | $72,406 |
| Operating expenses（运营费用） | $88,414 | $76,978 | $67,239 |
| Interest expense（利息支出） | $135 | $146 | $130 |
| Pre-tax earnings（税前收益） | $6,742 | $6,131 | $5,037 |
| Income taxes and non-controlling interests（所得税及非控股权益） | $2,512 | $2,432 | $1,998 |
| Net earnings（净利润） | $4,230 | $3,699 | $3,039 |
Our income and expense data conforming to GAAP is on page 29. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP and exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.
我们的GAAP合规数据见第29页。上述运营费用为非GAAP口径，排除了部分并购会计项目（主要是特定无形资产的摊销）。我们采用此方式呈现，因查理和我认为调整后的数据更能准确反映表中聚合企业的实际经济成本和利润。
I won’t explain all of the adjustments – some are tiny and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets: Some truly deplete over time while others in no way lose value. With software, for example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Charges against other intangibles such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arise through purchase-accounting rules and are clearly not real costs. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated – even though from an investor’s viewpoint they could not be more different.
无需详述所有调整（部分金额微小且复杂），但严肃投资者应理解无形资产的差异：某些资产价值随时间消耗（如软件摊销为真实成本），而其他（如客户关系）则不会贬值。GAAP准则未区分两者，均计入费用——但从投资者视角，二者本质截然不同。
In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 29, amortization charges of $648 million for the companies included in this section are deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. This difference has become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. It will almost certainly rise further as we acquire more companies.
在第29页的GAAP合规数据中，本板块企业摊销费用6.48亿美元已被扣除。其中约20%为“真实费用”，其余为会计调整。这一差异因频繁并购变得显著，未来收购更多企业时将进一步扩大。
Eventually, of course, the non-real charges disappear when the assets to which they’re related become fully amortized. But this usually takes 15 years and – alas – it will be my successor whose reported earnings get the benefit of their expiration.
当然，非真实摊销费用将在相关资产完全摊销后消失。但通常需15年时间——遗憾的是，享受这一收益的将是我的继任者。
Every dime of depreciation expense we report, however, is a real cost. And that’s true at almost all other companies as well. When Wall Streeters tout EBITDA as a valuation guide, button your wallet.
我们报告的每一分折旧费用都是真实成本。这一点在多数公司同样适用。当华尔街推荐以EBITDA作为估值指引时，请捂紧钱包。
Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report.
我们的公开盈利报告当然将继续符合GAAP准则。但为贴近真实，建议您加回大部分我们报告的摊销费用。
# Performance and Mistakes
业务表现与错误
The companies in this section sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of these businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. I was not misled: I simply was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operated.
这一板块企业产品从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机无所不包。部分企业基于无杠杆有形净资产的收益率极佳（税后25%-100%以上），另一些回报率在12%-20%之间。少数企业回报率极低，这是我在资本配置上的重大失误。我并非受误导，而是对公司或行业经济特性的判断错误。
Fortunately, my blunders usually involved relatively small acquisitions. Our large buys have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well. I have not, however, made my last mistake in purchasing either businesses or stocks. Not everything works out as planned.
幸运的是，我的错误多集中在小型收购上。我们的大型收购通常表现良好，部分甚至超出预期。但未来仍会犯错——并非所有投资都能按计划推进。
Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $25 billion of net tangible assets during 2013 and, with large quantities of excess cash and little leverage, earned 16.7% after-tax on that capital.
整体而言，这一板块企业表现优异。2013年平均使用250亿美元有形净资产，尽管持有大量现金且杠杆极低，仍实现16.7%的税后回报率。
Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if the purchase price is excessive. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill. Overall, we are getting a decent return on this sector’s capital. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of these businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in the insurance and regulated-industry segments is far greater. It is there that the truly big winners reside.
当然，若收购价格过高，即使优质企业也可能成为糟糕投资。我们为多数业务支付了大幅溢价（体现在巨额商誉中），但整体回报率合理。此外，这些企业的内在价值已显著高于账面价值，且溢价可能进一步扩大。然而，保险及受监管行业板块的内在价值与账面价值差异更大。真正的赢家藏身于此。
# Nebraska Furniture Mart: A Texas Expansion
内布拉斯加家具商城：德克萨斯扩张
I can’t resist giving you an update on Nebraska Furniture Mart’s expansion into Texas. I’m not covering this event because of its economic importance to Berkshire – it takes more than a new store to move the needle on Berkshire’s $225 billion equity base. But I’ve worked 30 years with the Blumkin family, and I’m excited about the Texas-sized store they are building in The Colony, Dallas.
忍不住向您更新内布拉斯加家具商城进军德克萨斯的进展。此举并非因其对伯克希尔2250亿美元权益影响显著——新店无法撬动如此庞大资本。但我与卓越的布卢姆金家族合作30年，对他们在达拉斯北部The Colony打造的德州规模旗舰店感到兴奋。
When completed next year, NFM will have 1.8 million sq. ft. of retail and warehouse space on a 433-acre site. View the project’s progress at www.nfm.com/texas (opens new window).
明年完工后，NFM将拥有占地433英亩、180万平方英尺的零售与仓储空间。可通过www.nfm.com/texas (opens new window)查看工程进展。
NFM already owns the two highest-volume home furnishings stores in the country (Omaha and Kansas City), each doing about $450 million annually. I predict the Texas store will blow these records away.
NFM现拥有美国销量最高的两家家居卖场（奥马哈与堪萨斯城），年销售额各约4.5亿美元。我预测德州新店将打破这一纪录。
I think back to August 30, 1983 – my birthday – when I visited Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin) with a 1¹⁄₄-page purchase proposal. She accepted my offer without a word changed, and we completed the deal without bankers or lawyers.
回忆1983年8月30日（我的生日），我带着1¼页收购提案拜访布卢姆金夫人（Mrs. B）。她一字未改便接受报价，且交易全程未涉及投行或律师（堪称天堂般的体验）。
Though the company’s financial statements were unaudited, I had no worries. Mrs. B told me what was what, and her word was good enough.
即便财报未经审计，我也毫无顾虑。布卢姆金夫人直接告诉我真实情况，她的承诺足以信任。
Mrs. B was 89 at the time and worked until 103 – definitely my kind of woman. Take a look at NFM’s financials from 1946 on pages 116-117. Everything NFM now owns comes from (a) that $72,264 of net worth and $50 cash in 1946, and (b) the incredible talents of Mrs. B, her son Louie, and his sons Ron and Irv.
当时她已89岁，工作至103岁——这正是我欣赏的女性。请查看第116-117页1946年以来的NFM财报。如今NFM的成就源自（a）1946年仅72,264美元净值与50美元现金；（b）布卢姆金夫人及其子孙的非凡才能。
The punch line to this story is that Mrs. B never spent a day in school. Moreover, she emigrated from Russia to America knowing not a word of English. But she loved her adopted country: At her request, the family always sang God Bless America at gatherings.
故事的精髓在于：布卢姆金夫人从未上过学，移民美国时一句英语都不会。但她深爱这片土地：家庭聚会时她坚持合唱《上帝保佑美国》。
Aspiring business managers should look hard at the plain, but rare, attributes that produced Mrs. B’s incredible success. Students from 40 universities visit me every year, and I have them start the day with a visit to NFM. If they absorb Mrs. B’s lessons, they need none from me.
志向远大的管理者应深入学习布卢姆金夫人的朴素却罕见的成功要素。每年40所高校学生来访时，我都会带他们参观NFM。若他们能领悟夫人之道，我的教诲便不再必要。
# Key Takeaways for Investors
投资者的核心启示
Costly Accounting Adjustments: Non-real amortization charges (e.g., customer relationship write-offs) will eventually vanish, but they currently reduce reported earnings.
非真实会计调整：客户关系等无形资产摊销费用虽非真实成本，但会降低报告收益。Real Costs: Depreciation and EBITDA limitations –折旧费用是真实成本，EBITDA（税息折旧及摊销前利润）作为估值指引存在严重缺陷。
Intrinsic Value vs. Book Value: Our manufacturing & retail businesses’ intrinsic value significantly exceeds book value, but less so than in insurance and regulated sectors.
内在价值与账面价值差异：该板块企业内在价值远超账面价值，但保险与受监管业务的差距更大。Growth through Autonomy: We allow subsidiary managers full autonomy to compound value.
自主权驱动增长：我们赋予子公司管理者充分自主权以创造复利价值。
# Finance and Financial Products
金融及金融产品
“Clayton’s loan portfolio will likely grow to at least $5 billion in not too many years and, with sensible credit standards in place, should deliver significant earnings.”
— 2003 Annual Report
“克莱顿贷款组合预计将在数年内增长至至少50亿美元，且在审慎信贷标准下将贡献可观收益。”
——2003年年报
This sector, our smallest, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), as well as Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes. Aside from these 100%-owned subsidiaries, we also include in this category a collection of financial assets and our 50% interest in Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.
该板块为伯克希尔最小业务单元，包含两家租赁公司——XTRA（半挂车）与CORT（家具），以及克莱顿房屋公司（美国最大预制房屋制造商与融资商）。除全资子公司外，该板块还包括金融资产及对伯克迪亚商业抵押公司（Berkadia Commercial Mortgage）的50%权益。
Clayton is placed in this section because it owns and services 326,569 mortgages, totaling $13.6 billion. In recent years, as manufactured home sales plummeted, a high percentage of Clayton’s earnings came from this mortgage business.
克莱顿归入此板块因其持有并管理326,569笔抵押贷款，总额136亿美元。近年因预制房屋销量下滑，其收益中抵押贷款业务占比显著。
In 2013, however, the sale of new homes began to pick up and earnings from both manufacturing and retailing are again becoming significant. Clayton remains America’s number one homebuilder: Its 2013 output of 29,547 homes accounted for about 4.7% of all single-family residences built in the country. Kevin Clayton, Clayton’s CEO, has done a magnificent job of guiding the company through the severe housing depression. Now, his job – definitely more fun these days – includes the prospect of another earnings gain in 2014.
但2013年新屋销售复苏，制造与零售收益重新成为重要来源。克莱顿仍为美国最大房屋制造商：29,547套年度销量占全美独户住宅建造量的4.7%。CEO凯文·克莱顿在房地产萧条中展现卓越领导力，如今业务回暖，2014年盈利增长前景可期。
# Sector Earnings Recap
板块收益概览
Here’s the pre-tax earnings recap for this sector:
以下是该板块税前收益数据：
| 项目（英文｜中文） | 2013 | 2012 | 2011 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Berkadia（伯克迪亚） | $80 | $35 | $25 |
| Clayton（克莱顿房屋） | $416 | $255 | $154 |
| CORT（家具租赁） | $40 | $42 | $29 |
| XTRA（半挂车租赁） | $125 | $106 | $126 |
| Net financial income*（净金融收入*） | $324 | $410 | $440 |
| 总计 | $985 | $848 | $774 |
- Excludes capital gains or losses
- 排除资本损益
CORT and XTRA are leaders in their industries as well. And Jeff Pederson and Bill Franz will keep them on top. We are backing their plans through purchases of equipment that enlarge their rental potential.
CORT与XTRA亦是行业领军者，杰夫·佩德森（Jeff Pederson）与比尔·弗兰兹（Bill Franz）将维持其优势。我们通过设备采购增强其租赁能力以支持发展。
# Investments
投资组合
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value.
以下列出我们截至年末市值最大的15项普通股投资：
# Berkshire’s Top Equity Investments
伯克希尔前十大股票持仓
| Shares（持股数） | Percentage of Company Owned（持股比例） | Company（公司） | Cost（成本，百万美元） | Market (12/31/13)（市值，百万美元） |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | 14.2% | American Express Company（美国运通） | $1,287 | $13,756 |
| 400,000,000 | 9.1% | The Coca-Cola Company（可口可乐） | $1,299 | $16,524 |
| 22,238,900 | 4.2% | DIRECTV（达美航空） | $1,017 | $1,536 |
| 41,129,643 | 0.9% | ExxonMobil Corp.（埃克森美孚） | $3,737 | $4,162 |
| 13,062,594 | 2.8% | The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.（高盛集团） | $750 | $12,778 |
| 68,121,984 | 6.3% | International Business Machines Corp.（IBM） | $11,681 | $12,778 |
| 24,669,778 | 11.5% | Moody’s Corporation（穆迪公司） | $248 | $1,936 |
| 20,060,390 | 11.2% | Munich Re（慕尼黑再保险） | $2,990 | $4,415 |
| 20,668,118 | 3.4% | Phillips 66（菲利普66） | $660 | $3,883 |
| 52,477,678 | 1.9% | The Procter & Gamble Company（宝洁公司） | $336 | $4,272 |
| 22,169,930 | 1.7% | Sanofi（赛诺菲制药） | $1,747 | $2,354 |
| 301,046,076 | 3.7% | Tesco plc（特易购） | $1,666 | $1,699 |
| 96,117,069 | 5.3% | U.S. Bancorp（美国合众银行） | $3,002 | $4,470 |
| 56,805,984 | 1.8% | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.（沃尔玛） | $2,976 | $4,470 |
| 483,470,853 | 9.2% | Wells Fargo & Company（富国银行） | $3,883 | $21,950 |
| Others（其他） | — | — | — | $19,894 |
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market（按市值计价的普通股总值） | — | — | — | $56,581 |
*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required under its rules.
**Excludes shares held by Berkshire subsidiary pension funds.
- 成本为实际购买价格及税务基础；少数情况下，GAAP准则下的“成本”因需按规则调整而不同。
** 排除伯克希尔子公司养老金持有的股份。
“Our stock portfolio . . . was worth approximately $17 million less than its carrying value [cost] . . . it is our belief that, over a period of years, the overall portfolio will prove to be worth more than its cost.”
— 1974 Annual Report
“我们的股票组合……按成本计价时价值约低1,700万美元……我们相信，长期来看整体组合的价值将超过成本。”
——1974年年报
Berkshire has one major equity position not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At yearend 2013, these shares were worth $12.5 billion. We are likely to purchase the shares just before expiration of our option. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fourth largest equity investment – and one we value highly.
伯克希尔有一项重大权益投资未列入上表：我们有权在2021年9月前以50亿美元购买美国银行7亿股普通股。2013年底该股份市值为125亿美元。我们可能在认股权证到期前行权。在此提醒您：美国银行实质上是伯克希尔第四大投资，且我们高度看重其价值。
# Finance and Financial Products
金融及金融产品
Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At yearend these shares were worth $10.9 billion. We are likely to purchase the shares just before expiration of our option. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fifth largest equity investment and one we value highly.
伯克希尔有一项重大权益投资未列入上表：我们有权在2021年9月前以50亿美元购买美国银行7亿股普通股。截至年末，这些股份市值为109亿美元。我们可能在认股权证到期前行权。在此提醒您：美国银行实质上是伯克希尔第五大投资，且我们高度看重其价值。
In addition to our equity holdings, we also invest substantial sums in bonds. Usually, we’ve done well in these. But not always.
除股票持仓外，我们还大量投资债券。这些投资通常表现良好，但并非总是如此。
Most of you have never heard of Energy Future Holdings. Consider yourselves lucky; I certainly wish I hadn’t. The company was formed in 2007 to effect a giant leveraged buyout of electric utility assets in Texas. The equity owners put up $8 billion and borrowed a massive amount in addition. About $2 billion of the debt was purchased by Berkshire, pursuant to a decision I made without consulting with Charlie. That was a big mistake.
多数人可能从未听说过能源未来控股公司（Energy Future Holdings）。请庆幸这一点；我也希望自己从未参与。该公司于2007年成立，以80亿美元自有资金及巨额债务完成德州公用事业资产的杠杆收购。伯克希尔按我个人决定购入约20亿美元债务——这是个重大错误。
Unless natural gas prices soar, EFH will almost certainly file for bankruptcy in 2014. Last year, we sold our holdings for $259 million. While owning the bonds, we received $837 million in cash interest. Overall, therefore, we suffered a pre-tax loss of $873 million. Next time I’ll call Charlie.
除非天然气价格飙升，否则EFH几乎必然于2014年破产。去年我们以2.59亿美元出售持仓，持有期间获得8.37亿美元利息收入。总体税前亏损8.73亿美元。下次决策前，我会咨询查理。
A few of our subsidiaries – primarily electric and gas utilities – use derivatives in their operations. Otherwise, we have not entered into any derivative contracts for some years, and our existing positions continue to run off. The contracts that have expired have delivered large profits as well as several billion dollars of medium-term float. Though there are no guarantees, we expect a similar result from those remaining on our books.
我们的一些子公司——主要是电力与燃气公用事业——使用衍生品管理运营。除此之外，过去数年未新增衍生品合约，现有头寸正逐步退出。已到期的衍生品贡献了巨额利润及数十亿美元中期浮存金。尽管无绝对保证，但我们预期剩余头寸也将产生类似效果。
# Some Thoughts About Investing
投资哲学思考
"Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike."
— The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham
“投资最明智的时候是其最像商业经营的时候。”
——本杰明·格雷厄姆《聪明的投资者》
It is fitting to have a Ben Graham quote open this discussion because I owe so much of what I know about investing to him. I will talk more about Ben a bit later, and I will even sooner talk about common stocks. But let me first tell you about two small non-stock investments that I made long ago. Though neither changed my net worth by much, they are instructive.
以格雷厄姆的名言开启本节讨论再合适不过，因我的投资理念深受其影响。稍后我会更多谈及格雷厄姆，但更急于先讨论股票投资。不过让我先分享两个早年小型非股票投资案例——它们虽未大幅改变我的净值，却极具启发性。
This tale begins in Nebraska. From 1973 to 1981, the Midwest experienced an explosion in farm prices, caused by a widespread belief that runaway inflation was coming and fueled by the lending policies of small rural banks. Then the bubble burst, bringing price declines of 50% or more that devastated both leveraged farmers and their lenders. Five times as many Iowa and Nebraska banks failed in that bubble’s aftermath than in our recent Great Recession.
故事始于内布拉斯加。1973-1981年间，中西部农场价格暴涨，因市场普遍相信恶性通胀将至，叠加小型农村银行的宽松贷款政策。随后泡沫破裂，价格下跌超50%，杠杆农户与放贷机构均遭重创。爱荷华州和内布拉斯加州的银行倒闭数量在泡沫破裂后达到近年大萧条期间的五倍。
In 1986, I purchased a 400-acre farm, located 50 miles north of Omaha, from the FDIC. It cost me $280,000, considerably less than what a failed bank had lent against the farm a few years earlier. I knew nothing about operating a farm. But I have a son who loves farming and I learned from him both how many bushels of corn and soybeans the farm would produce and what the operating expenses would be. From these estimates, I calculated the normalized return from the farm to then be about 10%. I also thought it was likely that productivity would improve over time and that crop prices would move higher as well. Both expectations proved out.
1986年，我以28万美元从联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）购入一块400英亩的农场，位置距奥马哈以北50英里。当时我对农场运营一无所知，但我儿子热爱农业。他教我计算农场的玉米与大豆产量及运营成本。基于这些数据，我估算农场的长期回报率约为10%，并预期生产效率与农产品价格将随时间推移上升。两项预测最终均实现。
I needed no unusual knowledge or intelligence to conclude that the investment had no downside and potentially had substantial upside. There would, of course, be the occasional bad crop and prices would sometimes disappoint. But so what? There would be some unusually good years as well, and I would never be under any pressure to sell the property. Now, 28 years later, the farm has tripled its earnings and is worth five times or more what I paid. I still know nothing about farming and recently made just my second visit to the farm.
无需特殊知识或智慧即可判断：这项投资下行风险有限，潜在回报巨大。当然，偶有歉收或价格波动，但这无关紧要。总会有丰收年份，且我永远无需被迫出售资产。28年后，农场收益增长三倍，价值是我支付价格的五倍以上。我至今仍不懂农业，仅第二次实地考察农场。
In 1993, I made another small investment. Larry Silverstein, Salomon’s landlord when I was the company’s CEO, told me about a New York retail property adjacent to NYU that the Resolution Trust Corp. was selling. Again, a bubble had popped – this one involving commercial real estate – and the RTC had been created to dispose of the assets of failed savings institutions whose optimistic lending practices had fueled the folly.
1993年，我做出另一笔小型投资。所罗门公司任CEO期间，房东拉里·席尔弗斯坦（Larry Silverstein）向我推荐了纽约大学旁一处由重组信托公司（RTC）出售的零售物业。又一次泡沫破裂——这次是商业地产——RTC成立的目的正是处置因乐观放贷政策而倒闭的储贷机构资产。
Here, too, the analysis was simple. As had been the case with the farm, the unleveraged current yield from the property was about 10%. But the property had been undermanaged by the RTC, and its income would increase when several vacant stores were leased. Even more important, the largest tenant – who occupied around 20% of the project’s space – was paying rent of about $5 per foot, whereas other tenants averaged $70. The expiration of this bargain lease in nine years was certain to provide a major boost to earnings. The property’s location was also superb: NYU wasn’t going anywhere.
分析同样简单：该物业的无杠杆当前收益率约10%。但RTC管理不善导致多个商铺空置，租约到期后收入将提升。更关键的是，最大租户（占20%面积）的租金仅每平方英尺5美元，远低于其他租户的每平方英尺70美元。九年后低价租约到期，收益必然大幅提升。物业位置亦极佳：纽约大学（NYU）不会搬迁。
I joined a small group, including Larry and my friend Fred Rose, that purchased the parcel. Fred was an experienced, high-grade real estate investor who, with his family, would manage the property. And manage it they did. As old leases expired, earnings tripled. Annual distributions now exceed 35% of our original equity investment. Moreover, our original mortgage was refinanced in 1996 and again in 1999, moves that allowed several special distributions totaling more than 150% of what we had invested. I’ve yet to view the property.
我与拉里及好友弗雷德·罗斯（Fred Rose）共同购入该物业。弗雷德是经验丰富的优质地产投资者，由其家族管理资产。他们确实管理得当：旧租约到期后，收益增长三倍。年度分红超过原始股权投资的35%。1996年与1999年两次重新融资，使特别分红总额达原始投资的**150%**以上。而我至今未曾亲自踏足该物业。
# Some Thoughts About Investing
投资哲学思考
Income from both the farm and the NYU real estate will probably increase in the decades to come. Though the gains won’t be dramatic, the two investments will be solid and satisfactory holdings for my lifetime and, subsequently, for my children and grandchildren.
农场与纽约地产的收益在未来几十年大概率增长。尽管回报不会惊天动地，但这两项投资将伴随我的一生，并惠及子孙后代。
I tell these tales to illustrate certain fundamentals of investing:
分享这些故事是为了阐明投资的几个核心原则：
You don’t need expertise to achieve satisfactory returns – but recognize limitations and avoid swinging for high-risk gains. Keep it simple and reject promises of quick profits.
无需专家级知识即可获得满意回报——但需认清能力边界，拒绝复杂投机。保持简单，对“快速致富”说“不”。Focus on asset productivity – if you can’t estimate future earnings, move on. You only need to understand what you own.
专注资产未来产出——若无法估算未来收益，立即放弃。你只需理解自己持有的资产。Speculation vs. Investment: If you focus on price changes rather than business value, you’re speculating. Half of coin-flippers win the first toss, but none profit long-term. Past price gains are never a reason to buy.
投机与投资：若聚焦价格波动而非企业价值，便是投机。抛硬币者半数首胜，但长期无赢家。过去的价格上涨绝非买入理由。Ignore daily valuations – like a farmer ignoring scoreboard, focus on the field. If you can enjoy weekends without checking stock prices, try weekdays too.
忽视短期报价——如同农民不看比分牌，专注耕耘。若您周末能不查股价，请尝试工作日也如此。Macro predictions are useless – they blur vision of real facts. TV pundits’ glib forecasts are akin to Mickey Mantle’s broadcasting booth: “You don’t know how easy this game is until you get into that booth.”
宏观经济预测无用——它们会模糊对真实数据的认知。电视评论员的轻率预测让我想起米奇·曼特尔（Mickey Mantle）的讽刺：“你只有进入广播间才知道这游戏多简单。”Time horizon irrelevant – 1986 farm and 1993 NYU property were bought without macro analysis. Corn grows in Nebraska, students flock to NYU – that’s all that matters.
时间窗口无关紧要——1986年农场与1993年纽约地产的决策完全未参考宏观经济。只要内布拉斯加的玉米持续生长，纽约大学学生稳定增长，投资便有意义。
There is one major difference between my two small investments and an investment in stocks. Stocks provide minute-to-minute valuations, whereas I’ve yet to see a quote for my farm or real estate.
这两项小型投资与股票投资的关键区别在于：股票有即时报价，而农场与地产从未给我报价。
It should be an enormous advantage for stock investors to have wild price swings – and for some, it is. After all, if a moody neighbor shouted daily prices to buy/sell your farm – varying wildly based on his mood – wouldn’t his erratic behavior benefit you? If he offered absurdly low prices, you’d buy more with spare cash. If he screamed absurdly high prices, you could sell or keep farming.
股票的剧烈波动本应是投资者的巨大优势——对部分人确实如此。想象有个情绪化的邻居每天向你喊价买卖农场，价格随其心情剧烈波动。他的疯狂行为难道不是你的机会？若他低价叫卖，你可加仓；若他高价叫买，你可兑现或继续持有。
Owners of stocks, however, too often let the capricious behavior of fellow investors affect them irrationally. Because there is so much chatter about markets, economy, interest rates, etc., some investors believe it’s important to listen to pundits – and, worse, act on their comments.
但股票投资者常因他人行为失去理智。市场评论、经济预测、利率变动充斥耳际，部分人甚至据此行动。
Those who hold real estate calmly for decades often become frenetic when exposed to stock quotes and commentators urging, “Don’t just sit there, do something!” For these investors, liquidity transforms from a benefit to a curse.
持有地产数十年的人，在面对股票报价与“别坐着，快行动”的鼓噪时，常变得焦躁。流动性本是优势，却成了诅咒。
A “flash crash” or market fluctuation can’t hurt you more than an erratic neighbor can hurt my farm. Indeed, tumbling markets help true investors with cash. A climate of fear is your friend; euphoria is your enemy.
“闪崩”或市场波动对投资者的伤害，远不如那个疯狂邻居对我农场的影响大。事实上，暴跌市场反而是机会，只要您有现金。恐惧是朋友，狂热是敌人。
During the 2008 panic, I never considered selling my farm or real estate, even with recession brewing. If I owned 100% of a business with great long-term prospects, selling would be foolish. So why sell stocks representing small stakes in wonderful businesses? True, any one might disappoint, but collectively they’ll thrive. Could anyone really believe America’s productive assets and human ingenuity would vanish?
2008年金融危机时，我从未考虑出售农场或地产，尽管衰退已来。若全资拥有一家前景良好的企业，抛售将是愚蠢行为。那为何要卖出优质企业的股份？单个企业可能出错，但整体必然成功。谁会相信美国的生产资产与人类创造力会被地球吞噬？
When Charlie and I buy stocks – which we view as small portions of businesses – our analysis mirrors whole-business acquisitions. We first estimate a 5-year+ earnings range. If we can’t estimate future earnings – usually the case – we move on. In 54 years together, we’ve never skipped an opportunity due to macro or political views. These topics never arise in our decisions.
查理和我购买股票时（视同企业碎片），分析方式与收购整家企业一致：先估算五年以上的收益区间。若无法合理预测（多数情况下），立即放弃。54年来，我们从未因宏观环境或政治观点错过机会。这些话题在我们决策中从不出现。
It’s vital to recognize the perimeter of our “circle of competence” and stay inside it. Even then, we’ll make mistakes – but not disasters like those caused by chasing price trends or herd mentality.
必须清楚自己的“能力圈”边界并坚守其中。即使如此，我们也会犯错——但绝不会重蹈追逐价格趋势或盲目跟风的灾难。
Most investors have not made studying business prospects a priority. If wise, they’ll admit they lack the skill to predict future earning power of specific businesses.
多数投资者从未将研究企业作为优先事项。明智者会承认自己无法预判特定企业的未来收益。
I have good news for these non-professionals: The typical investor doesn’t need this skill. In aggregate, American business has done wonderfully over time and will continue to do so (though, most assuredly, in unpredictable fits and starts). In the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrials index advanced from 66 to 11,497, paying a rising stream of dividends to boot. The 21st Century will witness further gains, almost certain to be substantial. The goal of the non-professional should not be to pick winners – neither he nor his “helpers” can do that – but should rather be to own a cross-section of businesses that in aggregate are bound to do well. A low-cost S&P 500 index fund will achieve this goal. That’s the “what” of investing for the non-professional. The “when” is also important. The main danger is that the timid or beginning investor will enter the market at a time of extreme exuberance and then become disillusioned when paper losses occur. (Remember the late Barton Biggs’ observation: “A bull market is like sex. It feels best just before it ends.”) The antidote to that kind of mistiming is for an investor to accumulate shares over a long period and never to sell when the news is bad and stocks are well off their highs. Following those rules, the “know-nothing” investor who both diversifies and keeps his costs minimal is virtually certain to get satisfactory results. Indeed, the unsophisticated investor who is realistic about his shortcomings is likely to obtain better long- term results than the knowledgeable professional who is blind to even a single weakness. If “investors” frenetically bought and sold farmland to each other, neither the yields nor prices of their crops would be increased. The only consequence of such behavior would be decreases in the overall earnings realized by the farm-owning population because of the substantial costs it would incur as it sought advice and switched properties. Nevertheless, both individuals and institutions will constantly be urged to be active by those who profit from giving advice or effecting transactions. The resulting frictional costs can be huge and, for investors in aggregate, devoid of benefit. So ignore the chatter, keep your costs minimal, and invest in stocks as you would in a farm. My money, I should add, is where my mouth is: What I advise here is essentially identical to certain instructions I’ve laid out in my will. One bequest provides that cash will be delivered to a trustee for my wife’s benefit. (I have to use cash for individual bequests, because all of my Berkshire shares will be fully distributed to certain philanthropic organizations over the ten years following the closing of my estate.) My advice to the trustee could not be more simple: Put 10% of the cash in short-term government bonds and 90% in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund. (I suggest Vanguard’s.) I believe the trust’s long-term results from this policy will be superior to those attained by most investors – whether pension funds, institutions or individuals – who employ high-fee managers.
And now back to Ben Graham. I learned most of the thoughts in this investment discussion from Ben’s book The Intelligent Investor, which I bought in 1949. My financial life changed with that purchase. Before reading Ben’s book, I had wandered around the investing landscape, devouring everything written on the subject. Much of what I read fascinated me: I tried my hand at charting and at using market indicia to predict stock movements. I sat in brokerage offices watching the tape roll by, and I listened to commentators. All of this was fun, but I couldn’t shake the feeling that I wasn’t getting anywhere. In contrast, Ben’s ideas were explained logically in elegant, easy-to-understand prose (without Greek letters or complicated formulas). For me, the key points were laid out in what later editions labeled Chapters 8 and 20. (The original 1949 edition numbered its chapters differently.) These points guide my investing decisions today. 20 A couple of interesting sidelights about the book: Later editions included a postscript describing an unnamed investment that was a bonanza for Ben. Ben made the purchase in 1948 when he was writing the first edition and – brace yourself – the mystery company was GEICO. If Ben had not recognized the special qualities of GEICO when it was still in its infancy, my future and Berkshire’s would have been far different. The 1949 edition of the book also recommended a railroad stock that was then selling for $17 and earning about $10 per share. (One of the reasons I admired Ben was that he had the guts to use current examples, leaving himself open to sneers if he stumbled.) In part, that low valuation resulted from an accounting rule of the time that required the railroad to exclude from its reported earnings the substantial retained earnings of affiliates. The recommended stock was Northern Pacific, and its most important affiliate was Chicago, Burlington and Quincy. These railroads are now important parts of BNSF (Burlington Northern Santa Fe), which is today fully owned by Berkshire. When I read the book, Northern Pacific had a market value of about $40 million. Now its successor (having added a great many properties, to be sure) earns that amount every four days. I can’t remember what I paid for that first copy of The Intelligent Investor. Whatever the cost, it would underscore the truth of Ben’s adage: Price is what you pay, value is what you get. Of all the investments I ever made, buying Ben’s book was the best (except for my purchase of two marriage licenses).
Local and state financial problems are accelerating, in large part because public entities promised pensions they couldn’t afford. Citizens and public officials typically under-appreciated the gigantic financial tapeworm that was born when promises were made that conflicted with a willingness to fund them. Unfortunately, pension mathematics today remain a mystery to most Americans. Investment policies, as well, play an important role in these problems. In 1975, I wrote a memo to Katharine Graham, then chairman of The Washington Post Company, about the pitfalls of pension promises and the importance of investment policy. That memo is reproduced on pages 118 - 136. During the next decade, you will read a lot of news – bad news – about public pension plans. I hope my memo is helpful to you in understanding the necessity for prompt remedial action where problems exist.
# The Annual Meeting
股东大会
The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 3rd at the CenturyLink Center. Carrie Sova, our talented ringmaster, will be in charge, and all of our headquarters group will pitch in to help her. Our gang both does a better job than professional event planners would and – yes – saves us money.
伯克希尔年度股东大会将于5月3日（周六）在CenturyLink中心举行。才华横溢的策划人卡莉·索瓦（Carrie Sova）将主导活动，总部团队将全力协助。我们的团队不仅比专业活动策划更高效，还能节省开支。
CenturyLink’s doors will open at 7 a.m., and at 7:30 we will have our third International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will be a Clayton Home porch, precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. I tossed about 500,000 papers when I was a teenager, so I think I’m pretty good. Challenge me: I’ll buy a Dilly Bar for anyone who lands his or her throw closer to the doorstep than I do. The papers will be 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed).
CenturyLink中心将在早上7点开放，7:30举行第三届国际报纸投掷挑战赛。目标是Clayton房屋的门廊，距离投掷线35英尺。我少年时曾投递过50万份报纸，自认技巧娴熟。若您投得比我更接近门廊，我请您吃Dilly Bar冰淇淋。参赛报纸厚度为36-42页，且需自行折叠（禁止使用橡皮筋）。
At 8:30, a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
8:30播放全新伯克希尔纪录片。9:30开始问答环节（含世纪链接中心午餐休息），持续至15:30。短暂休会后，查理和我将在15:45召开正式股东大会。若您需中途离场，请在查理回答问题时离开。
# Shopping Bonanza at the Meeting
会议期间的购物狂欢
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We’ll assist you by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall adjoining the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold:
当然，最佳离场理由是购物！我们将用194,300平方英尺的展厅陈列数十家子公司商品。去年您们表现出色，多个展位刷新销售纪录。仅九小时内便售出：
- 1,062双Justin靴子（每32秒售出一双）
- 12,792磅See’s糖果
- 11,162把Quikut刀具（每分钟售出21把）
- 6,344双Wells Lamont手套（常年热销商品）
This year, Charlie and I will have competing ketchup bottles for sale. Naturally, the one with Charlie’s picture will be heavily discounted. But, if you help, my bottle will outsell his. This is important, so don’t let me down.
今年我和查理推出“巴菲特vs查理番茄酱瓶”促销。查理的瓶子因印有其头像而大幅打折，但若您们支持，我的销量定能超越他。成败在此一举，请勿让我失望。
# Berkshire 5K Run and GEICO Discounts
伯克希尔5K跑及GEICO折扣
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them the next day at our second annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that you will receive with your meeting tickets. Entrants will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates.
我们的跑鞋公司Brooks将推出纪念版跑鞋。购买后可参加次日清晨8点举行的第二届“伯克希尔5K跑”，起点为CenturyLink中心。参与详情见随会议门票附赠的《访客指南》。参赛者将与伯克希尔管理层、董事及高管并肩奔跑。
GEICO will have a booth in the shopping area, staffed by top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given to certain groups.) Bring your existing insurance details to see if we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.
GEICO将在购物区设展台，由全国顶级顾问驻守。现场获取报价，多数情况下可享股东专属折扣（通常8%）。此优惠已在44个司法管辖区获批。（补充说明：若您符合其他折扣条件——如特定群体折扣——本优惠不可叠加。）携带现有保单前来比价，我敢说至少半数与会者能省下保费。
# Special Events and Discounts
特别活动与折扣
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. One is Max Olson’s compilation of Berkshire letters going back to 1965. The book includes an index I find particularly useful, specifying page numbers for individuals, companies and subject matter. I also recommend Forty Chances by my son, Howard. You’ll enjoy it.
务必参观书虫展台，展出约35本书籍与DVD，包括新书《巴菲特致股东信全集》（Max Olson编辑），内含人名、公司与主题索引。强烈推荐我儿子霍华德的著作《四十次机会》（Forty Chances），读后必有所得。
If you are a big spender – or aspire to become one – visit Signature Flight Support on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5 p.m. on Saturday. There, we will have a fleet of NetJets飞机供您体验。Come by bus; leave by private jet. Live a little.
若您是高净值客户或有志于此，请于周六中午12点至下午5点前往奥马哈机场东侧的Signature Flight Support，亲临NetJets机队展示现场。来时乘大巴，归时乘私人飞机——放纵一次吧。
An attachment to the proxy material explains how to obtain the meeting credential. Airlines sometimes jack up prices for Berkshire weekend. Compare flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is 2.5 hours; Kansas City may save you significant money, especially if renting a car in Omaha. Spend the savings with us.
代理材料附录说明如何获取入场凭证。伯克希尔周末期间航空票价可能飙升。建议对比飞往堪萨斯城与奥马哈的成本，两城车程仅2.5小时，堪城可能更省钱（尤其是计划在奥马哈租车者）。省下的钱请继续消费！
At Nebraska Furniture Mart (NFM), located on a 77-acre site at 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again offer “Berkshire Weekend” discounts. Last year during the meeting week, the store did $40.2 million in business, breaking its previous record by 12%. It also set a single-day record of $8.2 million on Saturday, selling nearly $1 million of mattresses alone.
内布拉斯加家具商城（NFM）将在Dodge与Pacific大道之间的72街77英亩场地推出“伯克希尔周末”折扣。去年会议周销量达4,020万美元（破此前纪录12%），周六单日销售额创820万美元新高，仅床垫一项便售出近100万美元。
To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make purchases between April 29th (Tuesday) and May 5th (Monday) and present your meeting credential. Special pricing applies to products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad no-discount rules but made an exception for shareholders. We appreciate their cooperation.
NFM购物优惠适用日期为4月29日（周二）至5月5日（周一），需出示会议凭证。多家高端制造商破例参与优惠（平日折扣规则严格），我们感谢其支持。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events:
在博世珠宝（Borsheims），将举办两场股东专属活动：
A cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 2nd.
5月2日周五18:00-21:00鸡尾酒会；The main gala on Sunday, May 4th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.
5月4日周日9:00-16:00主庆典；
On Saturday, Borsheims will be open until 6 p.m.
周六营业至18:00。近年三日销量远超12月珠宝行业传统旺季。
# The Annual Meeting
股东大会
About 1:15 p.m. on Sunday, I will begin clerking at Borsheims. Ask for my “Crazy Warren” quote on the item of your choice. As I get older, my pricing gets ever more ridiculous. Come take advantage of me.
周日下午1:15起，我将在博世珠宝（Borsheims）当柜员。您可要求我对您挑选的商品进行“疯狂巴菲特报价”。随着年岁增长，我的报价愈发离谱。快来占便宜吧！
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 28th through Saturday, May 10th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
周末期间博世珠宝将人潮汹涌。为方便您购物，4月28日周一至5月10日周六均可享股东专属价格。请出示会议凭证或券商持股证明（显示您持有伯克希尔股份）。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff (twice U.S. chess champion) will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don’t play them for money.
周日在博世珠宝外的商场，蒙眼挑战赛将上演：两届美国国际象棋冠军帕特里克·沃尔夫（Patrick Wolff）将接受六人一组的挑战者（睁眼参赛）。附近，来自达拉斯的魔术大师诺曼·贝克（Norman Beck）将表演迷幻魔术。此外，世界顶级桥牌专家鲍勃·汉曼（Bob Hamman）与莎伦·奥伯格（Sharon Osberg）将在周日下午与股东对弈桥牌。切勿下注赌钱。
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. Last year, she made Americans – and especially me – proud with her performance at the Olympics.
我的朋友、奥运乒乓球选手艾瑞尔·星（Ariel Hsing）将现身商场挑战乒乓球。去年她在奥运会上的表现让美国人民——尤其是我——倍感自豪。
I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she’s a freshman at Princeton and the U.S. Women’s Champion. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.
九岁时我便与艾瑞尔交手，当时便一局未胜。如今她是普林斯顿大学新生及美国女子冠军。若您不介意被碾压，请于下午1点起挑战她。比尔·盖茨和我将率先上阵，尝试消耗她的体力。
Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 4th. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and for Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038. At Piccolo’s order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one.
周日5月4日，Gorat’s牛排馆与Piccolo’s意大利餐厅仅对伯克希尔股东开放，营业至晚上10点。Gorat’s于下午1点开业，Piccolo’s于下午4点。这两家是我最爱餐厅，当晚我将光顾。预订提醒：Gorat’s于4月1日（仅限当天及之后）致电402-551-3733；Piccolo’s致电402-342-9038。在Piccolo’s请点超大根汁汽水冰淇淋（小份是娘炮的选择）。
The journalists and their e-mail addresses are:
记者与邮箱：
- Carol Loomis (Fortune) – cloomis@fortunemail.com
- Becky Quick (CNBC) – BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com
- Andrew Ross Sorkin (The New York Times) – arsorkin@nytimes.com
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
每位记者将从投稿中精选六个最有趣、最重要的问题。他们建议：简洁提问、避免最后一刻提交、聚焦伯克希尔相关话题、每封邮件仅提两个问题，并注明“若问题入选是否希望署名”。
We will also have a panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Jay Gelb of Barclays. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb. And we will again have a credentialed bear on Berkshire. We would like to hear from applicants who are short Berkshire (please include evidence of your position).
今年分析师问答环节嘉宾如下：
- 保险业专家：巴克莱银行的杰·盖尔布（Jay Gelb）
- 非保险业务专家：鲁安基金的乔纳森·布兰特（Jonathan Brandt）
- 空头代表：我们将邀请一位做空伯克希尔的分析师参与。申请者请附证明文件。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists and analysts will come up with some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it. All told, we expect at least 54 questions: six from each analyst and journalist, and 18 from the audience. If there is extra time, we will take more from the audience. Audience questioners will be determined by drawings at 8:15 a.m. at each of the 15 microphones in the arena and main overflow room.
查理和我不会提前获知问题内容。我们期待记者与分析师抛出尖锐问题——这正是我们想要的。预计问答总数将达54个问题（分析师与记者各6个，观众18个），若时间允许将继续增加观众提问。现场提问者通过8:15 a.m.在15个麦克风处抽签决定。
# The Secret Behind Berkshire’s Success
伯克希尔成功的秘密
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars, who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most have no financial need to work; the joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
我们的运营经理堪称全明星。他们管理企业如同经营家族唯一资产。我相信他们的股东导向思维在上市公司中无出其右。多数人无需为生计工作，企业“本垒打”的快感与薪酬同样重要。
Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with:
同等重要的是总部24名同事，他们高效完成以下工作：
- A multitude of SEC and regulatory requirements（SEC及监管文件）
- Filing a 23,000-page Federal income tax return（23,000页联邦税表）
- Responding to countless shareholder and media inquiries（股东与媒体问答）
- Getting out the annual report（年报发布）
- Preparing for the country’s largest annual meeting（全球最大股东大会筹备）
- Coordinating the Board’s activities（董事会协调）
They handle these tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond Berkshire: Last year they dealt with 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also manage all kinds of requests I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and French fries (smothered in ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly feel like tap-dancing to work every day.
他们以极大热情和超凡效率完成任务，使我生活轻松愉快。他们的工作甚至延伸至伯克希尔之外：去年协助40所大学（从200所申请中甄选）安排学生与我对话。他们还处理我收到的各种请求、安排出行，甚至为我准备午餐汉堡与薯条（当然淋满番茄酱）。没有哪位CEO比我更幸运，我每天上班都像跳踢踏舞般快乐。
In closing, I think it’s become appropriate to ignore our “no pictures” policy and let you view our remarkable home-office crew. Below is a photo from our Christmas lunch. Two people couldn’t make it; otherwise, you are looking at all of those who staff Berkshire’s headquarters. They are truly miracle-workers.
最后，我认为可以破例展示总部团队。以下是我们的圣诞午餐照片（两人因故缺席）。您现在看到的是伯克希尔总部的全部成员——真正的奇迹创造者。
Next year’s letter will review our 50 years at Berkshire and speculate a bit about the next 50. In the meantime, come to Omaha on May 3rd and enjoy our Woodstock for Capitalists.
明年信件将回顾伯克希尔50年历程并展望未来50年。在此之前，请于5月3日亲临奥马哈，体验我们的“资本主义伍德斯托克音乐节”。
February 28, 2014
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
2014年2月28日