2011巴菲特致股东的信

# To Our Shareholders (致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东)

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 4.6% in 2011. Over the last 47 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $99,860, a rate of 19.8% compounded annually.*

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
2011 年，我们公司的 A 股和 B 股每股账面价值均增长了 4.6%。在过去 47 年期间（即现任管理层接管以来），账面价值从每股 19 美元增长至 99,860 美元，年复合增长率达 19.8%。*

Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I feel good about the company’s progress during 2011. Here are the highlights:
• The primary job of a Board of Directors is to see that the right people are running the business and to be sure that the next generation of leaders is identified and ready to take over tomorrow. I have been on 19 corporate boards, and Berkshire’s directors are at the top of the list in the time and diligence they have devoted to succession planning. What’s more, their efforts have paid off.

我和伯克希尔副董事长兼合作伙伴查理·芒格对公司在 2011 年的进展感到满意。以下是亮点：
• 董事会的核心职责是确保企业由合适的人管理，并确认下一代领导者已明确人选且随时可接班。我曾参与过 19 家公司董事会，伯克希尔董事会在继任计划上投入的时间和精力名列前茅。更可喜的是，他们的努力已见成效。

As 2011 started, Todd Combs joined us as an investment manager, and shortly after yearend Ted Weschler came aboard. Both of these men have outstanding investment skills and a deep commitment to Berkshire. Each will be handling a few billion dollars in 2012, but they have the brains, judgment and character to manage our entire portfolio when Charlie and I are no longer running Berkshire.

2011 年初，托德·康布斯（Todd Combs）作为投资经理加入我们，年末泰德·韦斯切勒（Ted Weschler）也加入公司。两人均具备卓越的投资能力，并对伯克希尔充满承诺。2012 年他们将各自管理数十亿美元资金，但即使查理和我不再掌管公司，他们的智慧、判断力和品格也足以胜任整个投资组合的管理。

Your Board is equally enthusiastic about my successor as CEO, an individual to whom they have had a great deal of exposure and whose managerial and human qualities they admire. (We have two superb back-up candidates as well.) When a transfer of responsibility is required, it will be seamless, and Berkshire’s prospects will remain bright. More than 98% of my net worth is in Berkshire stock, all of which will go to various philanthropies. Being so heavily concentrated in one stock defies conventional wisdom. But I’m fine with this arrangement, knowing both the quality and diversity of the businesses we own and the caliber of the people who manage them. With these assets, my successor will enjoy a running start. Do not, however, infer from this discussion that Charlie and I are going anywhere; we continue to be in excellent health, and we love what we do.

董事会对我未来接任 CEO 的人选同样充满信心——这位人选与董事会接触频繁，其管理能力和个人品质深受认可。（我们还有两位优秀的备选候选人。）当责任交接来临时，过程将无缝衔接，伯克希尔的前景依旧光明。我的净资产超过 98% 以伯克希尔股票形式持有，这些股份最终将全部捐赠给慈善机构。如此集中持有单一股票违背传统智慧，但我对此安排毫无异议，因为我们拥有的业务质量与多样性、管理者的才能都让我安心。凭借这些资源，我的继任者将拥有良好开局。不过请勿误解，查理和我们都健康如常，且热爱目前的工作。

• On September 16th we acquired Lubrizol, a worldwide producer of additives and other specialty chemicals. The company has had an outstanding record since James Hambrick became CEO in 2004, with pre-tax profits increasing from $147 million to $1,085 million. Lubrizol will have many opportunities for “bolt-on” acquisitions in the specialty chemical field. Indeed, we’ve already agreed to three, costing $493 million. James is a disciplined buyer and a superb operator. Charlie and I are eager to expand his managerial domain.

• 9 月 16 日，我们收购了全球领先的添加剂及特种化学品生产商 Lubrizol。自詹姆斯·汉布里克（James Hambrick）2004 年担任 CEO 以来，公司税前利润从 1.47 亿美元增至 10.85 亿美元，业绩卓越。Lubrizol 在特种化学品领域将有大量“补充型并购”机会。事实上，我们已敲定三项收购，耗资 4.93 亿美元。詹姆斯是一位严谨的买家和卓越的经营者。查理和我都期待进一步拓展他的管理版图。

• Our major businesses did well last year. In fact, each of our five largest non-insurance companies – BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol, Marmon Group and MidAmerican Energy – delivered record operating earnings. In aggregate these businesses earned more than $9 billion pre-tax in 2011. Contrast that to seven years ago, when we owned only one of the five, MidAmerican, whose pre-tax earnings were $393 million. Unless the economy weakens in 2012, each of our fabulous five should again set a record, with aggregate earnings comfortably topping $10 billion.

• 去年我们的主要业务表现优异。事实上，旗下五大非保险企业——BNSF、Iscar、Lubrizol、Marmon 集团和 MidAmerican 能源公司——均创运营收益新高。2011 年这些企业合计税前收益超 90 亿美元。对比七年前，我们仅拥有其中一家 MidAmerican，其税前收益仅为 3.93 亿美元。除非 2012 年经济疲软，我们的“五大明星”企业应能再度刷新纪录，合计收益轻松突破 100 亿美元。

All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
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本报告中所有每股数据均适用于伯克希尔 A 股。B 股数据为 A 股的 1/1500。
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• In total, our entire string of operating companies spent $8.2 billion for property, plant and equipment in 2011, smashing our previous record by more than $2 billion. About 95% of these outlays were made in the U.S., a fact that may surprise those who believe our country lacks investment opportunities. We welcome projects abroad, but expect the overwhelming majority of Berkshire’s future capital commitments to be in America. In 2012, these expenditures will again set a record.

• 2011 年，我们的所有运营公司共计投入 82 亿美元用于厂房设备采购，打破此前记录逾 20 亿美元。其中约 95% 的支出发生在美国，这对认为我国缺乏投资机会的人而言或许意外。我们欢迎海外项目，但预计伯克希尔未来的资本支出仍将集中于美国。2012 年，这一支出将再创新高。

• Our insurance operations continued their delivery of costless capital that funds a myriad of other opportunities. This business produces “float” – money that doesn’t belong to us, but that we get to invest for Berkshire’s benefit. And if we pay out less in losses and expenses than we receive in premiums, we additionally earn an underwriting profit, meaning the float costs us less than nothing. Though we are sure to have underwriting losses from time to time, we’ve now had nine consecutive years of underwriting profits, totaling about $17 billion. Over the same nine years our float increased from $41 billion to its current record of $70 billion. Insurance has been good to us.

• 保险业务持续为我们提供“无成本浮存金”，支持其他投资机会。该业务产生“浮存金”——资金虽不属于我们，但可为伯克希尔投资增值。若赔付及费用支出低于保费收入，我们还能获得承保利润，意味着浮存金成本甚至低于零。尽管难免偶有承保亏损，但我们已连续九年实现承保利润，累计约 170 亿美元。同期浮存金规模从 410 亿增至当前创纪录的 700 亿美元。保险业务对我们贡献卓著。

• Finally, we made two major investments in marketable securities: (1) a $5 billion 6% preferred stock of Bank of America that came with warrants allowing us to buy 700 million common shares at $7.14 per share any time before September 2, 2021; and (2) 63.9 million shares of IBM that cost us $10.9 billion. Counting IBM, we now have large ownership interests in four exceptional companies: 13.0% of American Express, 8.8% of Coca-Cola, 5.5% of IBM and 7.6% of Wells Fargo. (We also, of course, have many smaller, but important, positions.)

• 最后，我们在可交易证券中完成两项重大投资：（1）以 50 亿美元投资美国银行 6% 优先股，同时附带认股权证，可在 2021 年 9 月 2 日前以每股 7.14 美元的价格购买 7 亿股普通股；（2）以 109 亿美元购入 6,390 万股 IBM 股票。加上 IBM，我们目前对四家卓越企业持有重大股权：美国运通 13.0%、可口可乐 8.8%、IBM 5.5%、富国银行 7.6%。（当然，我们还有许多较小但重要的持股。）

We view these holdings as partnership interests in wonderful businesses, not as marketable securities to be bought or sold based on their near-term prospects. Our share of their earnings, however, are far from fully reflected in our earnings; only the dividends we receive from these businesses show up in our financial reports. Over time, though, the undistributed earnings of these companies that are attributable to our ownership are of huge importance to us. That’s because they will be used in a variety of ways to increase future earnings and dividends of the investee. They may also be devoted to stock repurchases, which will increase our share of the company’s future earnings.

我们将这些持股视为与伟大企业的合伙关系，而非基于短期前景买卖的可交易证券。然而，这些企业归属于我们的收益远未完全体现在我们的财报中——只有收到的股息会出现在财务报告里。但从长期看，这些公司未分配收益中属于我们的部分至关重要。因为它们可能通过多种用途提升被投资企业的未来收益和股息，也可能用于回购股票，从而增加我们对其未来收益的占有比例。

Had we owned our present positions throughout last year, our dividends from the “Big Four” would have been $862 million. That’s all that would have been reported in Berkshire’s income statement. Our share of this quartet’s earnings, however, would have been far greater: $3.3 billion. Charlie and I believe that the $2.4 billion that goes unreported on our books creates at least that amount of value for Berkshire as it fuels earnings gains in future years. We expect the combined earnings of the four – and their dividends as well – to increase in 2012 and, for that matter, almost every year for a long time to come. A decade from now, our current holdings of the four companies might well account for earnings of $7 billion, of which $2 billion in dividends would come to us.

若去年全年持有现有股份，我们从“四大重仓股”获得的股息本应为 8.62 亿美元，这也是伯克希尔利润表中唯一体现的部分。然而，我们对这四家公司实际享有的收益远高于此：33 亿美元。查理和我都认为，账面上未体现的 24 亿美元至少创造了同等价值，因为这些资金将在未来推动收益增长。我们预计这四家企业的合并收益（及股息）将在 2012 年乃至未来多年持续增长。十年后，我们当前的持股可能贡献 70 亿美元收益，其中 20 亿美元将以股息形式归于我们。

I’ve run out of good news. Here are some developments that hurt us during 2011:
• A few years back, I spent about $2 billion buying several bond issues of Energy Future Holdings, an electric utility operation serving portions of Texas. That was a mistake – a big mistake. In large measure, the company’s prospects were tied to the price of natural gas, which tanked shortly after our purchase and remains depressed. Though we have annually received interest payments of about $102 million since our purchase, the company’s ability to pay will soon be exhausted unless gas prices rise substantially. We wrote down our investment by $1 billion in 2010 and by an additional $390 million last year.

我已说完好消息。以下是 2011 年对我们造成损失的事件：
• 几年前，我以约 20 亿美元购入能源未来控股公司（Energy Future Holdings）的多批债券。该公司是服务德克萨斯州部分区域的电力公用事业企业。这是一次失误——重大失误。公司的前景很大程度上依赖天然气价格，而我们的买入后不久气价暴跌且长期低迷。尽管每年约获得 1.02 亿美元利息，但除非气价大幅回升，公司偿付能力将很快耗尽。我们 2010 年对该投资减记 10 亿美元，2011 年进一步减记 3.9 亿美元。

At yearend, we carried the bonds at their market value of $878 million. If gas prices remain at present levels, we will likely face a further loss, perhaps in an amount that will virtually wipe out our current carrying value. Conversely, a substantial increase in gas prices might allow us to recoup some, or even all, of our write-down. However things turn out, I totally miscalculated the gain/loss probabilities when I purchased the bonds. In tennis parlance, this was a major unforced error by your chairman.

年末债券按市值 8.78 亿美元计价。若气价维持当前水平，我们可能面临进一步损失，甚至可能抹去现有账面价值。反之，气价大幅上涨或能让我们收回部分甚至全部减记。无论如何，购买债券时我对盈亏概率的判断完全错误。用网球术语来说，这是董事长犯下的重大非受迫性失误。

• Three large and very attractive fixed-income investments were called away from us by their issuers in 2011. Swiss Re, Goldman Sachs and General Electric paid us an aggregate of $12.8 billion to redeem securities that were producing about $1.2 billion of pre-tax earnings for Berkshire. That’s a lot of income to replace, though our Lubrizol purchase did offset most of it.

• 2011 年，三家大型且极具吸引力的固定收益投资被发行方提前赎回。瑞士再保险（Swiss Re）、高盛（Goldman Sachs）和通用电气（General Electric）合计支付我们 128 亿美元，以赎回原本为伯克希尔带来约 12 亿美元税前收益的证券。这一损失的收入规模相当可观，不过我们对 Lubrizol 的收购弥补了大部分缺口。

• Last year, I told you that “a housing recovery will probably begin within a year or so.” I was dead wrong. We have five businesses whose results are significantly influenced by housing activity. The connection is direct at Clayton Homes (克莱顿房屋公司), which is the largest producer of homes in the country, accounting for about 7% of those constructed during 2011.
Additionally, Acme Brick (阿克米砖业), Shaw (carpet) (肖氏地毯), Johns Manville (insulation) (约翰·曼维尔保温材料公司) and MiTek (building products, primarily connector plates used in roofing) (米泰克建筑产品公司，主营屋顶连接板) are all materially affected by construction activity. In aggregate, our five housing-related companies had pre-tax profits of $513 million in 2011. That’s similar to 2010 but down from $1.8 billion in 2006.

• 去年我曾提到“住房市场复苏可能在一年内开始”，但我的判断完全错误。我们有五家企业的业绩直接受住房市场活动影响。其中克莱顿房屋公司（Clayton Homes）是美国最大的房屋生产商，2011 年占全国新建房屋约 7%。此外，阿克米砖业（Acme Brick）、肖氏地毯（Shaw）、约翰·曼维尔保温材料公司（Johns Manville）和米泰克建筑产品公司（MiTek，主营屋顶连接板）均与建筑活动高度相关。2011 年，这五家住房相关企业的税前利润合计 5.13 亿美元，与 2010 年持平，但远低于 2006 年的 18 亿美元。

Housing will come back – you can be sure of that. Over time, the number of housing units necessarily matches the number of households (after allowing for a normal level of vacancies). For a period of years prior to 2008, however, America added more housing units than households. Inevitably, we ended up with far too many units and the bubble popped with a violence that shook the entire economy. That created still another problem for housing: Early in a recession, household formations slow, and in 2009 the decrease was dramatic.

住房市场终将复苏——你完全可以确信这一点。长期来看，住房单元数量必须与家庭户数匹配（考虑正常空置率后）。然而，2008 年前多年，美国新增住房单元数量始终超过家庭户数增长。最终，住房过剩导致泡沫破裂，冲击了整个经济体系。这还引发了另一个问题：经济衰退初期，家庭组建速度放缓，2009 年降幅尤为显著。

That devastating supply/demand equation is now reversed: Every day we are creating more households than housing units. People may postpone hitching up during uncertain times, but eventually hormones take over. And while “doubling-up” may be the initial reaction of some during a recession, living with in-laws can quickly lose its allure.

这一毁灭性的供需关系已扭转：如今每天新增家庭户数多于住房单元数。人们或许会在经济不确定期推迟结婚，但最终荷尔蒙会主导决策。尽管经济衰退时“合租”可能是短期应对策略，但与姻亲同住的吸引力会迅速消退。

At our current annual pace of 600,000 housing starts – considerably less than the number of new households being formed – buyers and renters are sopping up what’s left of the old oversupply. (This process will run its course at different rates around the country; the supply-demand situation varies widely by locale.) While this healing takes place, however, our housing-related companies sputter, employing only 43,315 people compared to 58,769 in 2006. This hugely important sector of the economy, which includes not only construction but everything that feeds off of it, remains in a depression of its own. I believe this is the major reason a recovery in employment has so severely lagged the steady and substantial comeback we have seen in almost all other sectors of our economy.

以目前每年 60 万套的新开工住房速度（远低于新增家庭户数），购房者和租客正在消化此前过剩的库存。（这一过程在全国各地进展不一；不同地区的供需状况差异显著。）然而，在修复过程中，我们的住房相关企业仍在低迷中挣扎，员工数量从 2006 年的 58,769 人降至目前的 43,315 人。这一经济领域举足轻重——涵盖建筑业及其所有关联产业——仍深陷自身萧条。我认为，这正是就业复苏大幅滞后于其他几乎所有经济领域强劲反弹的主要原因。

Wise monetary and fiscal policies play an important role in tempering recessions, but these tools don’t create households nor eliminate excess housing units. Fortunately, demographics and our market system will restore the needed balance – probably before long. When that day comes, we will again build one million or more residential units annually. I believe pundits will be surprised at how far unemployment drops once that happens. They will then reawake to what has been true since 1776: America’s best days lie ahead.

明智的货币政策和财政政策在缓解衰退中发挥重要作用，但这些工具既无法创造家庭户数，也无法消除过剩住房单元。幸运的是，人口趋势和市场机制将最终恢复供需平衡——可能比预期更快。当这一天到来时，我们将再次实现每年百万套以上的住宅建设。我相信，届时失业率降幅之大会让评论家们惊讶。他们也将重新认识到自 1776 年以来的真理：美国最好的日子仍在前方。

# Intrinsic Business Value (内在商业价值)

Charlie and I measure our performance by the rate of gain in Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic business value. If our gain over time outstrips the performance of the S&P 500, we have earned our paychecks. If it doesn’t, we are overpaid at any price.

查理和我衡量自身表现的标准是伯克希尔每股内在商业价值的增长率。若长期跑赢标普 500 指数，我们的薪酬就物有所值；若不然，无论薪酬多少都是过高的。

We have no way to pinpoint intrinsic value. But we do have a useful, though considerably understated, proxy for it: per-share book value (每股账面价值). This yardstick is meaningless at most companies. At Berkshire, however, book value very roughly tracks business values. That’s because the amount by which Berkshire’s intrinsic value exceeds book value does not swing wildly from year to year, though it increases in most years. Over time, the divergence will likely become ever more substantial in absolute terms, remaining reasonably steady, however, on a percentage basis as both the numerator and denominator of the business-value/book-value equation increase.

我们无法精准量化内在价值。但有一个粗略但实用的替代指标：每股账面价值。这一指标对多数公司无意义，但在伯克希尔，它与商业价值大致同步。因为伯克希尔的内在价值与账面价值的差距不会剧烈波动（尽管多数年份会增长）。长期看，两者的绝对差额可能扩大，但以百分比计算的比例将相对稳定——毕竟公式中的分子（商业价值）与分母（账面价值）均在增长。

We’ve regularly emphasized that our book-value performance is almost certain to outpace the S&P 500 in a bad year for the stock market and just as certainly will fall short in a strong up-year. The test is how we do over time. Last year’s annual report included a table laying out results for the 42 five-year periods since we took over at Berkshire in 1965 (i.e., 1965-69, 1966-70, etc.). All showed our book value beating the S&P, and our string held for 2007-11. It will almost certainly snap, though, if the S&P 500 should put together a five-year winning streak (which it may well be on its way to doing as I write this).

我们多次强调：在股市低迷年份，账面价值表现大概率跑赢标普 500；而在强劲牛市中则必然落后。真正的考验是长期表现。去年年报中，我们列出了 1965 年接管伯克希尔以来的 42 个五年周期业绩（即 1965-69、1966-70 等）。所有周期账面价值均超越指数，2007-11 年也不例外。但若标普 500 连续五年上涨（本文撰写时可能正朝此方向发展），这一纪录将大概率终止。

I also included two tables last year that set forth the key quantitative ingredients that will help you estimate our per-share intrinsic value. I won’t repeat the full discussion here; you can find it reproduced on pages 99-100. To update the tables shown there, our per-share investments in 2011 increased 4% to $98,366, and our pre-tax earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments increased 18% to $6,990 per share.

去年我还附上两张表格，列示了估算每股内在价值的关键定量要素。此处不再重复全文，详情请参见年报第 99-100 页。更新数据如下：2011 年每股投资增至 98,366 美元（+4%）；除保险和投资外的主营业务税前每股收益增至 6,990 美元（+18%）。

Charlie and I like to see gains in both areas, but our primary focus is on building operating earnings. Over time, the businesses we currently own should increase their aggregate earnings, and we hope also to purchase some large operations that will give us a further boost. We now have eight subsidiaries that would each be included in the Fortune 500 were they stand-alone companies. That leaves only 492 to go. My task is clear, and I’m on the prowl.

查理和我乐见两者增长，但核心目标是提升运营收益。当前控股企业未来应持续提升整体收益，我们亦希望收购更多大型企业进一步助力。目前已有八家子公司若独立上市可进入《财富》500 强——仅剩 492 家待完成。任务明确，我正四处寻觅。

Last September, we announced that Berkshire would repurchase its shares at a price of up to 110% of book value. We were in the market for only a few days – buying $67 million of stock – before the price advanced beyond our limit. Nonetheless, the general importance of share repurchases suggests I should focus for a bit on the subject.

去年九月，我们宣布将以不超过账面价值 110% 的价格回购股票。仅数日间买入 6,700 万美元股份，股价即突破上限。尽管如此，股票回购的重要性值得我展开讨论。

Charlie and I favor repurchases when two conditions are met:

A company has ample funds to take care of the operational and liquidity needs of its business;
Its stock is selling at a material discount to the company’s intrinsic business value, conservatively calculated.

查理和我支持回购需满足两个条件：

公司拥有充足资金满足运营与流动性需求；
股价显著低于保守计算的内在商业价值。

We have witnessed many bouts of repurchasing that failed our second test. Sometimes, of course, infractions – even serious ones – are innocent; many CEOs never stop believing their stock is cheap. In other instances, a less benign conclusion seems warranted. It doesn’t suffice to say that repurchases are being made to offset the dilution from stock issuances or simply because a company has excess cash. Continuing shareholders are hurt unless shares are purchased below intrinsic value. The first law of capital allocation – whether the money is slated for acquisitions or share repurchases – is that what is smart at one price is dumb at another. (One CEO who always stresses the price/value factor in repurchase decisions is Jamie Dimon at J.P. Morgan; I recommend that you read his annual letter.)

我们见过许多未通过第二项测试的回购行为。有时违规（甚至严重违规）是无心之失——许多 CEO 永远坚信自家股票低估。但其他情况下，结论可能不那么乐观。仅以“抵消股权稀释”或“公司现金充裕”为回购理由并不充分。除非以低于内在价值的价格回购，否则现有股东利益受损。资本配置的首要法则（无论是用于并购或回购）是：同一决策在某一价格明智，在另一价格可能愚蠢。（摩根大通 CEO 杰米·戴蒙（Jamie Dimon）始终强调回购决策中的价格/价值因素，我建议阅读他的年度致股东信。）

Charlie and I have mixed emotions when Berkshire shares sell well below intrinsic value. We like making money for continuing shareholders, and there is no surer way to do that than by buying an asset – our own stock – that we know to be worth at least x for less than that – for .9x, .8x or even lower. (As one of our directors says, it’s like shooting fish in a barrel, after the barrel has been drained and the fish have quit flopping.) Nevertheless, we don’t enjoy cashing out partners at a discount, even though our doing so may give the selling shareholders a slightly higher price than they would receive if our bid was absent. When we are buying, therefore, we want those exiting partners to be fully informed about the value of the assets they are selling.

当伯克希尔股价显著低于内在价值时，我们心情复杂。我们乐于为现有股东创造收益——最稳妥的方式莫过于以 0.9x、0.8x 甚至更低价格回购我们明知价值至少为 x 的资产（正如一位董事所言：“如同桶干后对着不动的鱼开枪”）。但另一方面，我们不愿以折扣价“赎回”合伙人股份，即便此举可能为卖出者提供略高于无买盘时的价格。因此回购时，我们希望退出者充分了解其出售资产的价值。

At our limit price of 110% of book value, repurchases clearly increase Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value. And the more and the cheaper we buy, the greater the gain for continuing shareholders. Therefore, if given the opportunity, we will likely repurchase stock aggressively at our price limit or lower. You should know, however, that we have no interest in supporting the stock and that our bids will fade in particularly weak markets. Nor will we buy shares if our cash-equivalent holdings are below $20 billion. At Berkshire, financial strength that is unquestionable takes precedence over all else.

以账面价值 110% 的价格上限回购，显然提升每股内在价值。买入越多、价格越低，现有股东收益越大。因此，若有机会，我们可能以该价格或更低水平积极回购。但需注意：我们无意“托盘”，在市场极度疲软时买盘可能撤回；且若现金及等价物低于 200 亿美元，回购亦会暂停。在伯克希尔，无可置疑的财务实力永远优先于一切。

This discussion of repurchases offers me the chance to address the irrational reaction of many investors to changes in stock prices. When Berkshire buys stock in a company that is repurchasing shares, we hope for two events:

We have the normal hope that earnings of the business will increase at a good clip for a long time to come;
We also hope that the stock underperforms in the market for a long time as well.

对回购的讨论让我得以阐明投资者对股价波动的非理性反应。当伯克希尔投资一家正在回购的公司时，我们寄望两件事：

常规期望：企业盈利长期高速增长；
非常规期望：该公司股价长期跑输市场。

A corollary to this second point: “Talking our book” about a stock we own – were that to be effective – would actually be harmful to Berkshire, not helpful as commentators customarily assume.

第二点的推论：若我们公开吹捧所持股票（若真有效果），反而会对伯克希尔造成伤害，而非评论员通常假设的利好。

# IBM 案例解析

Let’s use IBM as an example. As all business observers know, CEOs Lou Gerstner and Sam Palmisano did a superb job in moving IBM from near-bankruptcy twenty years ago to its prominence today. Their operational accomplishments were truly extraordinary.
But their financial management was equally brilliant, particularly in recent years as the company’s financial flexibility improved. Indeed, I can think of no major company that has had better financial management, a skill that has materially increased the gains enjoyed by IBM shareholders. The company has used debt wisely, made value-adding acquisitions almost exclusively for cash and aggressively repurchased its own stock.

以 IBM 为例。众所周知，前 CEO 路易斯·郭士纳（Lou Gerstner）和山姆·帕米萨诺（Sam Palmisano）带领 IBM 从二十年前濒临破产的困境中崛起，成为今日的行业巨头。他们的运营成就堪称卓越。
而财务管理同样出色，尤其是近年来公司财务灵活性显著提升。事实上，我认为没有哪家大型企业的财务管理比 IBM 更优秀——这一能力显著增厚了股东收益。IBM 合理利用债务、几乎全以现金完成增值型并购，并积极回购股票。

Today, IBM has 1.16 billion shares outstanding, of which we own about 63.9 million or 5.5%. Naturally, what happens to the company’s earnings over the next five years is of enormous importance to us. Beyond that, the company will likely spend $50 billion or so in those years to repurchase shares. Our quiz for the day: What should a long-term shareholder, such as Berkshire, cheer for during that period?
I won’t keep you in suspense. We should wish for IBM’s stock price to languish throughout the five years.

目前 IBM 流通股为 11.6 亿股，我们持有约 6,390 万股（占 5.5%）。显然，未来五年盈利表现对我们至关重要。但更关键的是，公司计划在此期间斥资约 500 亿美元回购股票。今天的思考题：作为长期股东（如伯克希尔），我们应希望什么？
答案不卖关子：我们应希望 IBM 股价在未来五年持续低迷。

Let’s do the math. If IBM’s stock price averages, say, $200 during the period, the company will acquire 250 million shares for its $50 billion. There would consequently be 910 million shares outstanding, and we would own about 7% of the company. If the stock conversely sells for an average of $300 during the five-year period, IBM will acquire only 167 million shares. That would leave about 990 million shares outstanding after five years, of which we would own 6.5%.

举个例子：若 IBM 股价五年平均为 200 美元，500 亿美元将回购 2.5 亿股，流通股降至 9.1 亿股，我们的持股比例升至 7%；若股价平均为 300 美元，则仅回购 1.67 亿股，五年后流通股剩 9.9 亿股，我们的持股比例仅 6.5%。

If IBM were to earn, say, $20 billion in the fifth year, our share of those earnings would be a full $100 million greater under the “disappointing” scenario of a lower stock price than they would have been at the higher price. At some later point our shares would be worth perhaps $11⁄2 billion more than if the “high-price” repurchase scenario had taken place.

假设第五年 IBM 盈利 200 亿美元，在“股价低迷”的“失望场景”下，我们的收益份额将比“高价回购”多出 1 亿美元。未来某一天，我们的持股价值甚至可能多出 15 亿美元。

The logic is simple: If you are going to be a net buyer of stocks in the future, either directly with your own money or indirectly (through your ownership of a company that is repurchasing shares), you are hurt when stocks rise. You benefit when stocks swoon. Emotions, however, too often complicate the matter: Most people, including those who will be net buyers in the future, take comfort in seeing stock prices advance. These shareholders resemble a commuter who rejoices after the price of gas increases, simply because his tank contains a day’s supply.

逻辑很简单：如果你是未来净买家（无论是自己直接买入，还是通过持有回购股票的公司间接买入），股价上涨对你有害，下跌才是利好。但情绪常让人犯错：大多数人（包括未来仍会持续买入的投资者）看到股价上涨就欣慰。这些股东就像油价上涨时因油箱存了一天的油就欢呼的通勤者。

Charlie and I don’t expect to win many of you over to our way of thinking – we’ve observed enough human behavior to know the futility of that – but we do want you to be aware of our personal calculus. And here a confession is in order: In my early days I, too, rejoiced when the market rose. Then I read Chapter Eight of Ben Graham’s The Intelligent Investor, the chapter dealing with how investors should view fluctuations in stock prices. Immediately the scales fell from my eyes, and low prices became my friend. Picking up that book was one of the luckiest moments in my life.

查理和我不指望改变多数人的思维——观察足够多的人类行为后，我们深知这种努力的徒劳——但希望你们了解我们的计算逻辑。坦白说：我年轻时也曾因市场上涨而欣喜。直到读了本杰明·格雷厄姆《聪明的投资者》第八章（关于如何看待股价波动）。那一刻如醍醐灌顶，低股价从此成为我的朋友。这本书是我人生最幸运的邂逅之一。

If repurchases ever reduce the IBM shares outstanding to 63.9 million, I will abandon my famed frugality and give Berkshire employees a paid holiday.

若回购最终使 IBM 流通股降至 6,390 万股（与我们持股量持平），我将破例挥霍一次，给伯克希尔员工放带薪假期。

Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them. Because we may be repurchasing Berkshire shares from some of you, we will offer our thoughts in each section as to how intrinsic value compares to carrying value.

现在，让我们分析公司四大核心业务板块。它们的资产负债表和利润表特征截然不同，合并分析会阻碍判断。因此我们将它们视为四个独立业务呈现——这也是查理和我的视角。由于我们可能从部分股东手中回购股票，每个板块中我将说明其内在价值与账面价值的对比关系。

# Insurance (保险业务)

Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.
Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:

首先审视保险业务——这是伯克希尔的核心运营板块，也是推动我们多年扩张的引擎。
财产险（P/C）公司采用“先收保费、后付理赔”的模式。极端情况下（如某些工伤赔偿案件），赔付可能持续数十年。这种模式使我们持有大量资金——称为“浮存金”——最终将归他人所有。同时，我们可将浮存金投资于伯克希尔的利益。尽管单个保单和理赔不断变化，但浮存金规模与保费收入的比例保持稳定。因此，随着业务增长，浮存金也随之增长。我们的增长轨迹如下表所示：

Year (年份)	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2011
Float (in $ millions) (浮存金，百万美元)	$39	$237	$1,632	$27,871	$65,832	$70,571

It’s unlikely that our float will grow much – if at all – from its current level. That’s mainly because we already have an outsized amount relative to our premium volume. Were there to be a decline in float, I will add, it would almost certainly be very gradual and therefore impose no unusual demand for funds on us.
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit occurs, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company besides, has incurred an underwriting loss in eight of the last eleven years. There are a lot of ways to lose money in insurance, and the industry is resourceful in creating new ones.

当前浮存金规模几乎不可能显著增长——因为我们已拥有远超保费收入的浮存金体量。若浮存金减少，也必定是渐进过程，不会对我们造成资金压力。
若保费收入超过费用与最终理赔成本总和，我们便实现承保利润，叠加浮存金投资收益。这种情况下，我们不仅持有“免费资金”，甚至能从中获利。可惜的是，所有保险公司都追求这一目标，导致竞争激烈。多数年份行业整体处于承保亏损。例如，美国最大且管理良好的州农场保险公司（State Farm）在过去11年中有8年出现承保亏损。保险业亏损方式多样，而行业总能创新出新方法。

As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for nine consecutive years, our gain for the period having totaled $17 billion. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most – though certainly not all – future years. If we accomplish that, our float will be better than cost-free. We will profit just as we would if some party deposited $70.6 billion with us, paid us a fee for holding its money and then let us invest its funds for our own benefit.

正如报告开篇所述，我们已连续九年实现承保盈利，累计利润达170亿美元。我相信未来多数年份（尽管并非全部）仍将保持承保盈利。若达成此目标，我们的浮存金将不仅是免费资金——如同某方将706亿美元存入我们账户，支付费用让我们管理资金，并允许我们自行投资获利。

So how does this attractive float affect intrinsic value calculations? Our float is deducted in full as a liability in calculating Berkshire’s book value, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and were unable to replenish it. But that’s an incorrect way to view float, which should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. If float is both costless and long-enduring, the true value of this liability is far lower than the accounting liability.
Partially offsetting this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of “goodwill” attributable to our insurance companies that is included in book value as an asset. In effect, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. If an insurance business produces large and sustained underwriting losses, any goodwill asset attributable to it should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

这种优质浮存金如何影响内在价值计算？在计算伯克希尔账面价值时，浮存金被全额列为负债，如同次日需偿还且无法补充。但这是错误的视角——浮存金应视为循环基金。若浮存金既免费又长期持续，其真实负债价值远低于会计负债。
这一高估的负债部分被账面中列为资产的155亿美元“商誉”抵消。实际上，这部分商誉代表我们为保险业务浮存金能力支付的价格。但商誉成本与其真实价值无关。若某保险业务长期产生巨额承保亏损，其关联的商誉资产无论原始成本如何均应视为零。

Fortunately, that’s not the case at Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would pay to purchase float of similar quality – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds book value.
Let me emphasize once again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: We don’t think there is much “Berkshire-quality” float existing in the insurance world. In most years, including 2011, the industry’s premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some extraordinary insurance operations. Let me tell you about the major units.

幸运的是，伯克希尔的情况不同。查理和我认为，保险业务商誉的真实经济价值——即我们愿为同类浮存金支付的价格——远超历史账面价值。浮存金的价值是我们相信伯克希尔内在商业价值显著高于账面价值的核心原因之一。
必须再次强调：全行业范围的免费浮存金不可持续。我们认为保险业中“伯克希尔质量”的浮存金极为稀有。多数年份（包括2011年），行业保费收入不足以覆盖理赔与费用。因此几十年来，行业有形权益回报率远低于美国企业平均水平，这一糟糕表现大概率延续。伯克希尔的卓越经济表现仅因我们拥有顶尖管理者运营非凡保险业务。以下是核心板块介绍：

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group (伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险集团), run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most importantly, brains in a manner that is unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in that respect than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever faced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a moderate profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. Concurrently, all other major insurers and reinsurers would be far in the red, and some would face insolvency.

浮存金规模最大的是阿吉特·杰恩（Ajit Jain）领导的伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险集团。他承保其他公司无意愿或资本承担的风险。他的运营融合了承保能力、速度、决断力，最重要的是智慧——这是保险业独一无二的组合。但他从不使伯克希尔暴露于与资源不匹配的风险中。事实上，我们在风险控制上远比多数大型保险公司保守。例如，若保险业因某超级灾难（如损失2500亿美元，约为历史最高损失的三倍）陷入困境，伯克希尔因其多元化的收益来源，全年仍可能实现适度盈利。而其他主要保险公司和再保险公司将深陷亏损，部分甚至面临破产。

From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $34 billion and significant underwriting profits, a feat that no CEO of any other insurer has come close to matching. By these accomplishments, he has added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. Charlie would gladly trade me for a second Ajit. Alas, there is none.

自1985年白手起家，阿吉特打造了一个拥有340亿美元浮存金并持续盈利的保险帝国——这一成就无人能及。他为伯克希尔创造了数千亿美元价值。查理甚至愿意用我换取第二个阿吉特。可惜，世间再无第二个他。

We have another insurance powerhouse in General Re (通用再保险公司), managed by Tad Montross.
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively evaluate the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

由塔德·蒙罗斯（Tad Montross）管理的通用再保险公司是另一保险巨头。
稳健的保险业务需遵守四项原则：（1）理解可能导致保单亏损的所有风险暴露；（2）保守评估风险实际引发损失的可能性及可能成本；（3）设定保费，在覆盖预期损失成本和运营费用后实现平均盈利；（4）若无法获得合理保费，坚决放弃业务。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that their competitors are eagerly writing. That old line, “The other guy is doing it so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance. Indeed, a good underwriter needs an independent mindset akin to that of the senior citizen who received a call from his wife while driving home. “Albert, be careful,” she warned, “I just heard on the radio that there’s a car going the wrong way down the Interstate.” “Mabel, they don’t know the half of it,” replied Albert, “It’s not just one car, there are hundreds of them.”

许多保险公司通过前三项却失败于第四项。他们无法拒绝竞争对手热衷承保的业务。“别人都在做，我们也必须做”——这句话在任何行业都是隐患，但在保险业尤为致命。优秀的承保人需具备独立思维，如同一位老年司机阿尔伯特的故事：妻子来电提醒“高速上有车辆逆行”，他却答道：“他们不知道真相——不是一辆车，而是数百辆！”

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be. In the first few years after we acquired it, General Re was a major headache. Now it’s a treasure.

塔德严格遵循四项原则，成果显著。在他的领导下，通用再保险的巨额浮存金不仅免费，甚至带来收益，我们预计这一趋势将持续。收购初期，通用再保险曾是重大难题，如今已成为瑰宝。

Finally, there is GEICO (政府雇员保险公司), the insurer on which I cut my teeth 61 years ago. GEICO is run by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 50 years of service in 2011.
GEICO’ s much-envied record comes from Tony’ s brilliant execution of a superb and almost-impossible-to-replicate business model. During Tony’s 18-year tenure as CEO, our market share has grown from 2.0% to 9.3%. If it had instead remained static – as it had for more than a decade before he took over – our premium volume would now be $3.3 billion rather than the $15.4 billion we attained in 2011. The extra value created by Tony and his associates is a major element in Berkshire’s excess of intrinsic value over book value.

最后是GEICO——我61年前初入保险业的起点。该公司由托尼·尼利（Tony Nicely）掌舵，他18岁入职，2011年服务满50年。
GEICO令人艳羡的业绩源于托尼对卓越商业模式的执行——这一模式几乎无法复制。担任CEO的18年间，公司市占率从2.0%升至9.3%。若市占率停滞在他上任前的十年水平，我们2011年的保费收入仅为33亿美元，而非实际的154亿美元。托尼及其团队创造的额外价值，是伯克希尔内在价值超越账面价值的核心要素之一。

There is still more than 90% of the auto-insurance market left for GEICO to rake in. Don’t bet against Tony acquiring chunks of it year after year in the future. Our low costs permit low prices, and every day more Americans discover that the Gecko is doing them a favor when he urges them to visit GEICO.com for a quote. (Our lizard has another endearing quality: Unlike human spokesmen or spokeswomen who expensively represent other insurance companies, our little fellow has no agent.)

汽车保险市场仍有超90%待GEICO开拓。未来每年托尼都将斩获市场份额——对此不妨下注。我们的低成本支持低价策略，越来越多美国人发现，GEICO吉祥物“壁虎”推荐访问GEICO.com获取报价时，确实帮他们省了钱。（这只壁虎还有另一可爱之处：不同于其他公司高价聘请的人类代言人，我们的小家伙无需经纪人。）

In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

除三大保险业务外，我们还拥有一系列小型公司，多数深耕保险行业的细分领域。它们整体持续盈利，为我们贡献了可观的浮存金。查理和我珍视这些公司及其管理者。

At yearend, we acquired Princeton Insurance, a New Jersey writer of medical malpractice policies. This bolt-on transaction expands the managerial domain of Tim Kenesey, the star CEO of Medical Protective, our Indiana-based med-mal insurer. Princeton brings with it more than $600 million of float, an amount that is included in the following table.

年末我们收购了普林斯顿保险（Princeton Insurance），这是一家总部位于新泽西州的医疗过失险公司。此次补充型收购扩大了我们的印第安纳州医疗过失险子公司Medical Protective明星CEO蒂姆·凯尼西（Tim Kenesey）的管理版图。普林斯顿带来超6亿美元浮存金，已计入下表数据。

Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:

财产险与寿险四大板块综合记录：

Underwriting Profit (承保利润)	Yearend Float (in millions) (年末浮存金，百万美元)
Insurance Operations (保险板块)	2011
BH Reinsurance (伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险集团)	$(714)
General Re (通用再保险)	144
GEICO (政府雇员保险公司)	576
Other Primary (其他直保业务)	242
Total (合计)	$248

Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world.

在大型保险机构中，伯克希尔的运营表现令我自豪——堪称全球最佳。

# Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses (受监管的资本密集型业务)

We have two very large businesses, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, that have important common characteristics distinguishing them from our many other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own sector in this letter and also split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.

我们旗下两家超大型企业——BNSF铁路公司和中美能源公司（MidAmerican Energy）——具有显著共性，区别于其他业务。因此本报告中将其单列为独立板块，并在通用会计准则报表中单独列示其合并财务数据。

A key characteristic of both companies is the huge investment they have in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is not needed: Both businesses have earning power that even under terrible business conditions amply covers their interest requirements. In a less than robust economy during 2011, for example, BNSF’s interest coverage was 9.5x. At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two key factors ensure its ability to service debt under all circumstances:

The stability of earnings that is inherent in our exclusively offering an essential service
A diversity of earnings streams, which shield it from the actions of any single regulatory body

两大公司的核心特征是对超长期监管资产（如铁路轨道、电网）的巨额投资，其资金部分来自无需伯克希尔担保的长期债务。我们的信用背书并非必需：即使在极端经济环境下，两者的盈利能力仍足以覆盖利息支出。例如2011年经济疲软期，BNSF的利息保障倍数达9.5倍。中美能源的偿债能力则依赖两大支柱：

公共服务刚性需求带来的收益稳定性（我们仅提供电力、天然气等基础服务）
多元收益来源分散监管风险（业务覆盖多州，避免单一监管机构政策冲击）

Measured by ton-miles, rail moves 42% of America’s inter-city freight, and BNSF moves more than any other railroad – about 37% of the industry total. A little math will tell you that about 15% of all inter-city ton-miles of freight in the U.S. is transported by BNSF. It is no exaggeration to characterize railroads as the circulatory system of our economy. Your railroad is the largest artery.

以“吨英里”（货运量×距离）衡量，美国城际货运42%由铁路完成，其中BNSF占比超37%。简单计算可知：全美城际货运总量的约15%由BNSF承运。将铁路喻为经济循环系统毫不夸张，而您的铁路正是最大的主动脉。

All of this places a huge responsibility on us. We must, without fail, maintain and improve our 23,000 miles of track along with 13,000 bridges, 80 tunnels, 6,900 locomotives and 78,600 freight cars. This job requires us to have ample financial resources under all economic scenarios and to have the human talent that can instantly and effectively deal with the vicissitudes of nature, such as the widespread flooding BNSF labored under last summer.

这一地位意味着重大责任：我们必须持续维护并升级23,000英里轨道、13,000座桥梁、80条隧道、6,900台机车和78,600节货车车厢。这项工作要求我们在任何经济环境下都拥有充足财力，并配备能迅速应对自然灾害（如去年夏季BNSF遭遇的全境洪灾）的专业团队。

To fulfill its societal obligation, BNSF regularly invests far more than its depreciation charge, with the excess amounting to $1.8 billion in 2011. The three other major U.S. railroads are making similar outlays. Though many people decry our country’s inadequate infrastructure spending, that criticism cannot be levied against the railroad industry. It is pouring money – funds from the private sector – into the investment projects needed to provide better and more extensive service in the future. If railroads were not making these huge expenditures, our country’s publicly-financed highway system would face even greater congestion and maintenance problems than exist today.

为履行社会责任，BNSF年均投资远超折旧费用——2011年超额达18亿美元。美国其他三大铁路公司亦有类似投入。尽管常有人批评美国基建投资不足，但铁路行业绝非如此：我们正将私有资金持续注入未来所需的改善项目。若无这些投入，美国公共财政支持的公路系统将面临比今日更严重的拥堵和维护危机。

Massive investments of the sort that BNSF is making would be foolish if it could not earn appropriate returns on the incremental sums it commits. But I am confident it will do so because of the value it delivers. Many years ago Ben Franklin counseled, “Keep thy shop, and thy shop will keep thee.” Translating this to our regulated businesses, he might today say, “Take care of your customer, and the regulator – your customer’s representative – will take care of you.” Good behavior by each party begets good behavior in return.

若无法从增量投资中获取合理回报，BNSF的巨额投入将是愚蠢之举。但我坚信其价值创造能力。正如本杰明·富兰克林所言：“善待你的店铺，店铺自会善待你。”对受监管企业而言，这句话可改写为：“服务好客户，监管者（作为客户代表）自会公平回报。”双方良性互动方能形成正循环。

At MidAmerican, we participate in a similar “social compact.” We are expected to put up ever-increasing sums to satisfy the future needs of our customers. If we meanwhile operate reliably and efficiently, we know that we will obtain a fair return on these investments.

中美能源同样践行这一“社会契约”：我们需持续投入资金满足客户未来需求，而只要运营可靠高效，监管者将确保投资获得合理回报。

MidAmerican, 89.8% owned by Berkshire, supplies 2.5 million customers in the U.S. with electricity, operating as the largest supplier in Iowa, Utah and Wyoming and as an important provider in six other states as well. Our pipelines transport 8% of the country’s natural gas. Obviously, many millions of Americans depend on us every day. They haven’t been disappointed.

伯克希尔持有89.8%的中美能源为美国250万客户提供电力，在爱荷华、犹他、怀俄明三州市场份额第一，并在另外六个州举足轻重。我们的管道输送全美8%的天然气。数百万美国人的日常生活依赖我们，而我们从未让他们失望。

When MidAmerican purchased Northern Natural Gas pipeline in 2002, that company’s performance as a pipeline was rated dead last, 43 out of 43, by the leading authority in the field. In the most recent report, Northern Natural was ranked second. The top spot was held by our other pipeline, Kern River.

2002年中美能源收购北方天然气管道公司（Northern Natural Gas）时，其行业运营效率排名垫底（43家垫底）。而最新报告中，北方天然气升至第二，榜首为我们另一管道公司Kern River。

In its electric business, MidAmerican has a comparable record. In the most recent survey of customer satisfaction, MidAmerican’s U.S. utilities ranked second among 60 utility groups surveyed. The story was far different not many years back when MidAmerican acquired these properties.

电力业务同样成绩斐然：最新客户满意度调查中，中美能源旗下美国公用事业公司在60家受调企业中排名第二。而多年前收购这些资产时，它们的表现与此截然不同。

MidAmerican will have 3,316 megawatts of wind generation in operation by the end of 2012, far more than any other regulated electric utility in the country. The total amount that we have invested or committed to wind is a staggering $6 billion. We can make this sort of investment because MidAmerican retains all of its earnings, unlike other utilities that generally pay out most of what they earn. In addition, late last year we took on two solar projects – one 100%-owned in California and the other 49%-owned in Arizona – that will cost about $3 billion to construct. Many more wind and solar projects will almost certainly follow.

截至2012年底，中美能源风电装机容量将达3,316兆瓦，远超其他受监管电力公司。我们在风电领域的投资或承诺总额已高达60亿美元。这种投入能力源于中美能源的留存收益模式——不同于同行普遍分红大部分利润。此外，去年底我们启动两项太阳能项目：加州全资拥有、亚利桑那州49%控股项目，建设成本约30亿美元。未来风电与太阳能项目必将持续增加。

As you can tell by now, I am proud of what has been accomplished for our society by Matt Rose at BNSF and by Greg Abel at MidAmerican. I am also both proud and grateful for what they have accomplished for Berkshire shareholders. Below are the relevant figures:

至此您应已了解：BNSF的马特·罗斯（Matt Rose）和中美能源的格雷格·阿贝尔（Greg Abel）为社会创造了卓越价值，他们为伯克希尔股东所做贡献更令我自豪与感激。以下是关键财务数据：

# MidAmerican Financial Highlights (中美能源核心财务指标)

项目（英文）	2011年	2010年
Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes (税前运营收益)	$1,982M	$1,862M
Interest, other than to Berkshire (扣除伯克希尔债务利息)	$(323M)	$(323M)
Interest on Berkshire junior debt (伯克希尔次级债务利息)	$(13M)	$(30M)
Income tax (所得税)	$(315M)	$(271M)
Net earnings (净利润)	$1,331M	$1,204M
Earnings applicable to Berkshire* (归属伯克希尔收益*)	$1,238M	$1,131M

*Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $8 in 2011 and $19 in 2010.
*包含伯克希尔获得的利息净收入（扣除相关所得税）：2011年8亿美元，2010年19亿美元。

# BNSF Financial Highlights (BNSF核心财务指标)

项目（英文）	2011年	2010年
Revenues (营收)	$19,548M	$16,850M
Operating earnings (运营收益)	$5,310M	$4,495M
Interest (Net) (净利息支出)	$560M	$507M
Pre-Tax earnings (税前收益)	$4,741M	$3,988M
Net earnings (净利润)	$2,972M	$2,459M

(Historical accounting through 2/12/10; purchase accounting subsequently)
（2010年2月12日前使用历史成本会计，之后使用收购会计法）

In the book value recorded on our balance sheet, BNSF and MidAmerican carry substantial goodwill components totaling $20 billion. In each instance, however, Charlie and I believe current intrinsic value is far greater than book value.

资产负债表中，BNSF与中美能源的账面价值包含总计200亿美元商誉。但查理和我都认为，这两家企业的当前内在价值远超账面价值。

# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations (制造、服务与零售业务)

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

伯克希尔这一板块的业务覆盖广泛。以下是该集团的合并资产负债表和损益表摘要：

# Balance Sheet 12/31/11 (in millions) (2011年12月31日资产负债表，单位：百万美元)

Assets (资产)	2011	2010
Cash and equivalents (现金及等价物)	$4,241	$1,611
Accounts and notes receivable (应收账款和票据)	6,584	15,124
Inventory (存货)	8,975	16,735
Other current assets (其他流动资产)	631	4,661
Total current assets (流动资产合计)	20,431	36,693
Goodwill and other intangibles (商誉及其他无形资产)	24,755	6,214
Fixed assets (固定资产)	17,866	2,410
Other assets (其他资产)	3,661	945
Total assets (资产总计)	$66,713	$46,262

Liabilities and Equity (负债及股东权益)	2011	2010
Notes payable (应付票据)	$1,113	$1,113
Other current liabilities (其他流动负债)	15,124	16,735
Total current liabilities (流动负债合计)	16,237	17,848
Deferred taxes (递延税项)	4,661	4,661
Term debt and other liabilities (长期债务及其他负债)	6,214	6,214
Non-controlling interests (非控股股东权益)	2,410	945
Berkshire equity (伯克希尔股东权益)	37,191	16,654
Total liabilities and equity (负债及股东权益总计)	$66,713	$46,262

# Earnings Statement (in millions) (损益表摘要，单位：百万美元)

项目（英文）	2011	2010	2009
Revenues (营收)	$72,406	$66,610	$61,665
Operating expenses (including depreciation of $1,431 in 2011, $1,362 in 2010 and $1,422 in 2009) (运营费用，含折旧)	67,239	62,225	59,509
Interest expense (利息支出)	130	111	98
Pre-tax earnings (税前收益)	$5,037	$4,274	$2,058
Income taxes and non-controlling interests (所得税及非控股股东权益)	1,998	1,812	945
Net earnings (净利润)	$3,039	$2,462	$1,113

*Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.
**Includes earnings of Lubrizol from September 16.

*未包含收购会计调整。
**包含自9月16日起Lubrizol的收益。

This group of companies sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. These errors came about because I misjudged either the competitive strength of the business being purchased or the future economics of the industry in which it operated. I try to look out ten or twenty years when making an acquisition, but sometimes my eyesight has been poor. Charlie’s has been better; he voted no more than “present” on several of my errant purchases.

这一板块的公司产品跨度从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机。部分企业盈利强劲，以无杠杆净资产收益率衡量，税后回报率从25%至超100%。其他企业回报率在12-20%区间。但少数企业回报率极低——这是我资本配置决策失误所致。这些错误源于对目标企业竞争力或其所在行业未来经济前景的误判。我试图以十年甚至二十年的视角评估收购，但有时判断力不足。查理的洞察更敏锐——他曾对我的几笔错误收购仅投“出席票”。

Berkshire’s newer shareholders may be puzzled over our decision to hold on to my mistakes. After all, their earnings can never be consequential to Berkshire’s valuation, and problem companies require more managerial time than winners. Any management consultant or Wall Street advisor would look at our laggards and say “dump them.”

伯克希尔的新股东或许对我保留问题企业的决策感到困惑。毕竟这些亏损企业对估值无实质影响，且问题公司消耗的管理时间远超优质企业。任何管理咨询师或华尔街顾问看到这些落后企业，都会建议“立即剥离”。

That won’t happen. For 29 years, we have regularly laid out Berkshire’s economic principles in these reports (pages 93-98) and Number 11 describes our general reluctance to sell poor performers (which, in most cases, lag because of industry factors rather than managerial shortcomings). Our approach is far from Darwinian, and many of you may disapprove of it. I can understand your position. However, we have made – and continue to make – a commitment to the sellers of businesses we buy that we will retain those businesses through thick and thin. So far, the dollar cost of that commitment has not been substantial and may well be offset by the goodwill it builds among prospective sellers looking for the right permanent home for their treasured business and loyal associates. These owners know that what they get with us can’t be delivered by others and that our commitments will be good for many decades to come.

但我们不会这么做。29年来，我们持续在年报中列示伯克希尔的经济原则（见第93-98页），其中第11条明确说明我们通常不愿出售业绩不佳的企业（多数情况下是因行业因素而非管理层过失）。我们的做法远非“适者生存”，许多人或许不认同。我理解这一立场。但我们对被收购企业的原所有者做出了承诺——无论顺境逆境都将持有这些企业。迄今为止，这一承诺的经济成本并不高，且可能通过建立声誉抵消：许多希望为珍视的企业和忠诚员工寻找永久归宿的卖家，会因此更信任我们。他们知道，这种承诺是其他买家无法提供的，且将持续数十年。

Please understand, however, that Charlie and I are neither masochists nor Pollyannas. If either of the failings we set forth in Rule 11 is present – if the business will likely be a cash drain over the longer term, or if labor strife is endemic – we will take prompt and decisive action. Such a situation has happened only a couple of times in our 47-year history, and none of the businesses we now own is in straits requiring us to consider disposing of it.

但请理解，查理和我都不是受虐狂或盲目乐观者。若出现第11条所列任一问题——企业长期成为现金黑洞，或劳资冲突频发——我们将果断行动。过去47年仅发生过几次此类情况，而目前所有企业均无需考虑出售。

The steady and substantial comeback in the U.S. economy since mid-2009 is clear from the earnings shown at the front of this section. This compilation includes 54 of our companies. But one of these, Marmon, is itself the owner of 140 operations in eleven distinct business sectors. In short, when you look at Berkshire, you are looking across corporate America. So let’s dig a little deeper to gain a greater insight into what has happened in the last few years.

自2009年中期以来美国经济的稳步复苏，从本节开头的收益数据可见一斑。这些数据涵盖54家公司。其中马蒙集团（Marmon）本身拥有11个行业的140家运营企业。简言之，观察伯克希尔，即在观察整个美国企业界。让我们深入分析近年趋势。

The four housing-related companies in this section (a group that excludes Clayton, which is carried under Finance and Financial Products) had aggregate pre-tax earnings of $227 million in 2009, $362 million in 2010 and $359 million in 2011. If you subtract these earnings from those in the combined statement, you will see that our multiple and diverse non-housing operations earned $1,831 million in 2009, $3,912 million in 2010 and $4,678 million in 2011. About $291 million of the 2011 earnings came from the Lubrizol acquisition. The profile of the remaining 2011 earnings – $4,387 million – illustrates the comeback of much of America from the devastation wrought by the 2008 financial panic. Though housing-related businesses remain in the emergency room, most other businesses have left the hospital with their health fully restored.

本节中四家住房相关企业（不含克莱顿房屋公司，其归类于金融及衍生品板块）2009-2011年税前利润分别为2.27亿、3.62亿和3.59亿美元。若从合并报表中剔除这部分收益，则非住房业务利润分别为18.31亿（2009）、39.12亿（2010）和46.78亿美元（2011）。其中约2.91亿美元来自Lubrizol收购。剩余43.87亿美元利润显示，美国经济已从2008年金融危机中显著复苏。尽管住房相关企业仍在“重症监护室”，但多数其他企业已“痊愈出院”，经营全面恢复。

Almost all of our managers delivered outstanding performances last year, among them those managers who run housing-related businesses and were therefore fighting hurricane-force headwinds. Here are a few examples:

去年几乎所有管理者都表现出色，包括那些在住房相关业务中逆势突围的团队。以下是几个案例：

• Vic Mancinelli again set a record at CTB, our agricultural equipment operation. We purchased CTB in 2002 for $139 million. It has subsequently distributed $180 million to Berkshire, last year earned $124 million pre-tax and has $109 million in cash. Vic has made a number of bolt-on acquisitions over the years, including a meaningful one he signed up after yearend.

• 维克·曼西内利（Vic Mancinelli）领导的农业设备公司CTB再创纪录。我们2002年以1.39亿美元收购CTB，此后已向伯克希尔分红1.8亿美元，2011年税前利润达1.24亿美元，账上现金1.09亿美元。维克多年持续进行补充型收购，包括年末刚敲定的一笔重大交易。

• TTI, our electric components distributor, increased its sales to a record $2.1 billion, up 12.4% from 2010. Earnings also hit a record, up 127% from 2007, the year in which we purchased the business. In 2011, TTI performed far better than the large publicly-traded companies in its field. That’s no surprise: Paul Andrews and his associates have been besting them for years. Charlie and I are delighted that Paul negotiated a large bolt-on acquisition early in 2012. We hope more follow.

• 电子元件分销商TTI销售额增至创纪录的21亿美元（+12.4%），利润亦创历史新高，较2007年（收购年）增长127%。2011年业绩远超同行上市公司。这并不意外：保罗·安德鲁斯（Paul Andrews）团队多年来一直领先。我们欣喜地看到保罗于2012年初完成一笔重大补充型收购，并期待更多后续动作。

• Iscar, our 80%-owned cutting-tools operation, continues to amaze us. Its sales growth and overall performance are unique in its industry. Iscar’s managers – Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman – are brilliant strategists and operators. When the economic world was cratering in November 2008, they stepped up to buy Tungaloy, a leading Japanese cutting-tool manufacturer. Tungaloy suffered significant damage when the tsunami hit north of Tokyo last spring. But you wouldn’t know that now: Tungaloy went on to set a sales record in 2011. I visited the Iwaki plant in November and was inspired by the dedication and enthusiasm of Tungaloy’s management, as well as its staff. They are a wonderful group and deserve your admiration and thanks.

• 80%控股的切削工具公司Iscar持续惊艳表现。其销售增长与整体运营在行业中独一无二。管理层埃坦·韦特海默（Eitan Wertheimer）、雅各布·哈帕兹（Jacob Harpaz）和丹尼·戈德曼（Danny Goldman）既是卓越的战略家也是高效执行者。2008年11月经济崩盘时，他们果断收购日本领先切削工具制造商Tungaloy。尽管去年春天东日本大地震对Tungaloy工厂造成严重破坏，但其2011年销售额仍创纪录。11月我参观了Iwaki工厂，Tungaloy管理层和员工的奉献精神与热情令我深受鼓舞。他们是值得尊敬的团队。

• McLane, our huge distribution company that is run by Grady Rosier, added important new customers in 2011 and set a pre-tax earnings record of $370 million. Since its purchase in 2003 for $1.5 billion, the company has had pre-tax earnings of $2.4 billion and also increased its LIFO reserve by $230 million because the prices of the retail products it distributes (candy, gum, cigarettes, etc.) have risen. Grady runs a logistical machine second to none. You can look for bolt-ons at McLane, particularly in our new wine-and-spirits distribution business.

• 大宗分销商McLane（由格雷迪·罗齐尔（Grady Rosier）管理）2011年新增重要客户，税前利润创纪录达3.7亿美元。自2003年以15亿美元收购以来，累计税前利润达24亿美元，同时因分销商品（糖果、口香糖、香烟等）价格上涨，后进先出法储备金增加2.3亿美元。格雷迪打造了效率顶尖的物流体系。未来McLane或将继续拓展，尤其是新成立的葡萄酒和烈酒分销业务。

• Jordan Hansell took over at NetJets in April and delivered 2011 pre-tax earnings of $227 million. That is a particularly impressive performance because the sale of new planes was slow during most of the year. In December, however, there was an uptick that was more than seasonally normal. How permanent it will be is uncertain.

• 乔丹·汉塞尔（Jordan Hansell）于4月接任内特杰公司（NetJets）后，2011年实现税前利润2.27亿美元。这一成绩尤为亮眼，因全年大部分时间新飞机销售低迷。但12月增长超出季节性预期，其持续性尚待观察。

A few years ago NetJets was my number one worry: Its costs were far out of line with revenues, and cash was hemorrhaging. Without Berkshire’s support, NetJets would have gone broke. These problems are behind us, and Jordan is now delivering steady profits from a well-controlled and smoothly-running operation. NetJets is proceeding on a plan to enter China with some first-class partners, a move that will widen our business “moat.” No other fractional-ownership operator has remotely the size and breadth of the NetJets operation, and none ever will. NetJets’ unrelenting focus on safety and service has paid off in the marketplace.

几年前，内特杰曾是我最担忧的业务：成本与收入严重脱节，现金流濒临枯竭。若无伯克希尔支持，公司早已破产。如今问题已解决，乔丹带领团队实现了稳健盈利。公司正计划与一流合作伙伴进军中国市场，进一步拓宽“护城河”。其他任何分时共享运营商都无法比拟内特杰的规模与覆盖范围。对安全与服务的不懈追求已在市场中获得回报。

• It’ s a joy to watch Marmon’ s progress under Frank Ptak’ s leadership. In addition to achieving internal growth, Frank regularly makes bolt-on acquisitions that, in aggregate, will materially increase Marmon’s earning power. (He did three, costing about $270 million, in the last few months.) Joint ventures around the world are another opportunity for Marmon. At midyear Marmon partnered with the Kundalia family in an Indian crane operation that is already delivering substantial profits. This is Marmon’s second venture with the family, following a successful wire and cable partnership instituted a few years ago.

• 弗兰克·普塔克（Frank Ptak）领导下的马蒙集团（Marmon）进展令人欣喜。除内生增长外，弗兰克还持续进行补充型收购（最近几个月完成3笔，耗资2.7亿美元），显著提升盈利能力。全球合资是另一增长点：年中与印度Kundalia家族合作的起重机业务已贡献可观利润。这是继数年前成功合作电线电缆业务后，双方的第二次联手。

Of the eleven major sectors in which Marmon operates, ten delivered gains in earnings last year. You can be confident of higher earnings from Marmon in the years ahead.

马蒙涉足的11大行业中，去年10个板块实现利润增长。未来马蒙盈利攀升值得期待。

• “Buy commodities, sell brands” has long been a formula for business success. It has produced enormous and sustained profits for Coca-Cola since 1886 and Wrigley since 1891. On a smaller scale, we have enjoyed good fortune with this approach at See’s Candy since we purchased it 40 years ago.

• “买入大宗商品，卖出品牌”是商业成功的经典公式。可口可乐（1886年起）和箭牌（1891年起）长期践行此策略。我们自40年前收购喜诗糖果（See’s Candy）后，也从中受益匪浅。

Last year See’s had record pre-tax earnings of $83 million, bringing its total since we bought it to $1.65 billion. Contrast that figure with our purchase price of $25 million and our yearend carrying-value (net of cash) of less than zero. (Yes, you read that right; capital employed at See’s fluctuates seasonally, hitting a low after Christmas.) Credit Brad Kinstler for taking the company to new heights since he became CEO in 2006.

去年喜诗糖果税前利润创纪录达8,300万美元，累计利润达16.5亿美元。对比我们2,500万美元的收购价和年末负净值账面价值（扣除现金），这一回报堪称奇迹。（没错——喜诗资本投入随季节波动，圣诞节后最低。）自2006年布拉德·金斯特勒（Brad Kinstler）任CEO以来，公司业绩屡创新高。

• Nebraska Furniture Mart (80% owned) set an earnings record in 2011, netting more than ten times what it did in 1983, when we acquired our stake.
But that’s not the big news. More important was NFM’s acquisition of a 433-acre tract north of Dallas on which we will build what is almost certain to be the highest-volume home-furnishings store in the country. Currently, that title is shared by our two stores in Omaha and Kansas City, each of which had record-setting sales of more than $400 million in 2011. It will be several years before the Texas store is completed, but I look forward to cutting the ribbon at the opening. (At Berkshire, the managers do the work; I take the bows.)

• 内布拉斯加家具超市（Nebraska Furniture Mart，80%控股）2011年利润创新高，是1983年收购时的10倍以上。
但这并非最大新闻：我们已收购达拉斯北部433英亩土地，将打造全美销量最高的家居卖场。目前该记录由奥马哈和堪萨斯城两家门店保持，2011年销售额均超4亿美元。德州新店需数年建成，我期待剪彩开幕。（伯克希尔管理者负责执行，我只负责致谢。）

Our new store, which will offer an unequalled variety of merchandise sold at prices that can’t be matched, will bring huge crowds from near and far. This drawing power and our extensive holdings of land at the site should enable us to attract a number of other major stores. (If any high-volume retailers are reading this, contact me.)

新店将以无与伦比的品类和价格吸引八方来客。这一吸引力叠加土地优势，将帮助我们引入多家大型商户。（若有高流量零售商正在阅读，请联系我。）

Our experience with NFM and the Blumkin family that runs it has been a real joy. The business was built by Rose Blumkin (known to all as “Mrs. B”), who started the company in 1937 with $500 and a dream. She sold me our interest when she was 89 and worked until she was 103. (After retiring, she died the next year, a sequence I point out to any other Berkshire manager who even thinks of retiring.)

与内布拉斯加家具超市及其运营的布卢姆金家族的合作是一大乐事。创始人罗斯·布卢姆金（Rose Blumkin，人称“布卢姆金夫人”）1937年以500美元和梦想创立公司，89岁出售股权后工作至103岁。（退休次年去世，我常以此提醒伯克希尔管理者：别轻易言退。）

Mrs. B’s son, Louie, now 92, helped his mother build the business after he returned from World War II and, along with his wife, Fran, has been my friend for 55 years. In turn, Louie’s sons, Ron and Irv, have taken the company to new heights, first opening the Kansas City store and now gearing up for Texas.

布卢姆金夫人之子路易（Louie）现年92岁，二战后协助母亲创业，与妻子弗兰（Fran）成为我55年的挚友。他的儿子罗恩（Ron）和欧文（Irv）将公司推向新高峰，从堪萨斯城分店到德州新布局。

The “boys” and I have had many great times together, and I count them among my best friends. The Blumkins are a remarkable family. Never inclined to let an extraordinary gene pool go to waste, I am rejoicing these days because several members of the fourth Blumkin generation have joined NFM.

“孩子们”与我共度许多欢乐时光，我视他们为挚友。布卢姆金家族非凡传承，如今第四代成员加入，更令我欣慰。

Overall, the intrinsic value of the businesses in this Berkshire sector significantly exceeds their book value. For many of the smaller companies, however, this is not true. I have made more than my share of mistakes buying small companies. Charlie long ago told me, “If something’s not worth doing at all, it’s not worth doing well,” and I should have listened harder. In any event, our large purchases have generally worked well – extraordinarily well in a few cases – and overall this sector is a winner for us.

总体而言，伯克希尔这一板块企业的内在价值显著高于账面价值，但小型公司（尤其我收购的失误案例）除外。查理曾告诫：“若一件事不值得做，就别费心做好。”我本应更重视。无论如何，大型收购大多成功（部分极为成功），这一板块整体是赢家。

Certain shareholders have told me they hunger for more discussions of accounting arcana. So here’s a bit of GAAP-mandated nonsense I hope both of them enjoy.
Common sense would tell you that our varied subsidiaries should be carried on our books at their cost plus the earnings they have retained since our purchase (unless their economic value has materially decreased, in which case an appropriate write-down must be taken). And that’s essentially the reality at Berkshire – except for the weird situation at Marmon.

某些股东渴望更多会计准则细节，以下这段GAAP规定的“荒诞剧”供君消遣：
常理上，子公司应按成本+留存收益入账（若经济价值大幅下降则需减记）。伯克希尔大体如此，但马蒙集团是例外。

We purchased 64% of the company in 2008 and put this interest on our books at our cost, $4.8 billion. So far, so good. Then, in early 2011, pursuant to our original contract with the Pritzker family, we purchased an additional 16%, paying $1.5 billion as called for by a formula that reflected Marmon’s increased value. In this instance, however, we were required to immediately write off $614 million of the purchase price retroactive to the end of 2010. (Don’t ask!) Obviously, this write-off had no connection to economic reality. The excess of Marmon’s intrinsic value over its carrying value is widened by this meaningless write-down.

2008年我们以48亿美元收购64%股权，账面按成本计价。2011年初，按协议以15亿美元收购额外16%股权（基于增值公式）。然而，会计准则要求将6.14亿美元从2010年底追溯减记。（别问原因！）显然，这一会计减记与实际经济价值无关，反而扩大了马蒙内在价值与账面价值的差距。

# Finance and Financial Products (金融及衍生品业务)

This sector, our smallest, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), and Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes. Aside from these 100%-owned subsidiaries, we also include in this category a collection of financial assets and our 50% interest in Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.

这是伯克希尔最小的业务板块，包含两家租赁公司：XTRA（拖车）、CORT（家具），以及全美最大预制房屋生产商及融资方克莱顿房屋公司（Clayton Homes）。此外还包括金融资产及伯克迪亚商业抵押公司（Berkadia Commercial Mortgage）50%权益。

It’s instructive to look at what transpired at our three operating businesses after the economy fell off a cliff in late 2008, because their experiences illuminate the fractured recovery that later came along.
Results at our two leasing companies mirrored the “non-housing” economy. Their combined pre-tax earnings were $13 million in 2009, $53 million in 2010 and $155 million in 2011, an improvement reflecting the steady recovery we have seen in almost all of our non-housing businesses. In contrast, Clayton’s world of manufactured housing (just like site-built housing) has endured a veritable depression, experiencing no recovery to date. Manufactured housing sales in the nation were 49,789 homes in 2009, 50,046 in 2010 and 51,606 in 2011. (When housing was booming in 2005, they were 146,744.)

2008年底经济崩盘后三家公司的表现极具启示意义，它们的命运揭示了之后不均衡的复苏格局。
两家租赁公司业绩与“非住房”经济同步：2009-2011年税前利润从1,300万增至1.55亿美元，反映非住房业务的稳步复苏。而克莱顿的预制房屋业务（与传统房屋市场相似）仍深陷萧条，至今未见起色。2009-2011年全国销量仅从49,789套微增至51,606套（2005年房地产繁荣期曾达146,744套）。

Despite these difficult times, Clayton has continued to operate profitably, largely because its mortgage portfolio has performed well under trying circumstances. Because we are the largest lender in the manufactured homes sector and are also normally lending to lower-and-middle-income families, you might expect us to suffer heavy losses during a housing meltdown. But by sticking to old-fashioned loan policies – meaningful down payments and monthly payments with a sensible relationship to regular income – Clayton has kept losses to acceptable levels. It has done so even though many of our borrowers have had negative equity for some time.

尽管行业艰难，克莱顿仍保持盈利，主要因其房贷组合表现稳健。作为该领域最大放贷方，我们通常面向中低收入家庭放贷，若按行业常规本应损失惨重。但克莱顿坚持传统信贷政策——合理首付与月供匹配收入水平——将损失控制在可接受范围内，尽管许多借款人的房产已贬值多年。

As is well-known, the U.S. went off the rails in its home-ownership and mortgage-lending policies, and for these mistakes our economy is now paying a huge price. All of us participated in the destructive behavior – government, lenders, borrowers, the media, rating agencies, you name it. At the core of the folly was the almost universal belief that the value of houses was certain to increase over time and that any dips would be inconsequential. The acceptance of this premise justified almost any price and practice in housing transactions. Homeowners everywhere felt richer and rushed to “monetize” the increased value of their homes by refinancings. These massive cash infusions fueled a consumption binge throughout our economy. It all seemed great fun while it lasted.

众所周知，美国住房所有权与房贷政策彻底失控，经济为此付出惨重代价。政府、银行、借款人、媒体、评级机构——我们共同参与了这场破坏性狂欢。核心错误在于普遍坚信房价必涨，下跌不足挂齿。这一信念合理化了住房交易中的任何价格与操作。全球业主自感财富增值，急于通过再融资“变现”房产，巨额现金流刺激消费狂潮。泡沫破裂前，一切看似美妙。

(A largely unnoted fact: Large numbers of people who have “lost” their house through foreclosure have actually realized a profit because they carried out refinancings earlier that gave them cash in excess of their cost. In these cases, the evicted homeowner was the winner, and the victim was the lender.)

（一个被忽视的事实：许多因止赎失去房产的人实际获利，因早期再融资已套现超额资金。这种情况下，被驱逐的业主反而是赢家，受害者是放贷者。）

In 2007, the bubble burst, just as all bubbles must. We are now in the fourth year of a cure that, though long and painful, is sure to succeed. Today, household formations are consistently exceeding housing starts.

2007年泡沫破裂——正如所有泡沫终将破裂。如今我们已进入第四年修复期，虽漫长痛苦，终将成功。当前家庭户数增长持续超过住房开工量。

Clayton’s earnings should improve materially when the nation’s excess housing inventory is worked off. As I see things today, however, I believe the intrinsic value of the three businesses in this sector does not differ materially from their book value.

当全国过剩住房库存消化完毕，克莱顿盈利将显著改善。但目前来看，这一板块三家企业（XTRA、CORT、克莱顿）的内在价值与账面价值差异不大。

# Investments (投资)

Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.

以下是年末市值超过10亿美元的普通股投资组合：

Shares (持股数)	Company (公司)	Percentage of Company Owned (持股比例)	Cost (成本，百万美元)*	Market (in millions) (市值，百万美元)
151,610,700	American Express Company (美国运通公司)	13.0%	$1,287	$7,151
200,000,000	The Coca-Cola Company (可口可乐公司)	8.8%	1,299	13,994
29,100,937	ConocoPhillips (康菲石油公司)	2.3%	2,027	2,121
63,905,931	International Business Machines Corp. (国际商业机器公司)	5.5%	10,856	11,751
31,416,127	Johnson & Johnson (强生公司)	1.2%	1,880	2,060
79,034,713	Kraft Foods Inc. (卡夫食品公司)	4.5%	2,589	2,953
20,060,390	Munich Re (慕尼黑再保险公司)	11.3%	2,990	2,464
3,947,555	POSCO (韩国浦项制铁公司)	5.1%	768	1,301
72,391,036	The Procter & Gamble Company (宝洁公司)	2.6%	464	4,829
25,848,838	Sanofi (赛诺菲公司)	1.9%	2,055	1,900
291,577,428	Tesco plc (乐购公司)	3.6%	1,719	1,827
78,060,769	U.S. Bancorp (美国合众银行)	4.1%	2,401	2,112
39,037,142	Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (沃尔玛公司)	1.1%	1,893	2,333
400,015,828	Wells Fargo & Company (富国银行)	7.6%	9,086	11,024
—	Others (其他)	—	—	—
Total Common Stocks Carried at Market	—	—	$48,209	$76,991

*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
*成本为实际买入价格及税务基础；部分因会计调整（增值/减值），GAAP“成本”存在差异。

We made few changes in our investment holdings during 2011. But three moves were important:

Our purchases of IBM and Bank of America
The $1 billion addition we made to our Wells Fargo position.

2011年我们仅小幅调整持仓，但有三项重要动作：

增持IBM和美国银行
向富国银行头寸追加10亿美元投资。

The banking industry is back on its feet, and Wells Fargo is prospering. Its earnings are strong, its assets solid and its capital at record levels. At Bank of America, some huge mistakes were made by prior management. Brian Moynihan has made excellent progress in cleaning these up, though the completion of that process will take a number of years. Concurrently, he is nurturing a huge and attractive underlying business that will endure long after today’s problems are forgotten. Our warrants to buy 700 million Bank of America shares will likely be of great value before they expire.

银行业已重拾健康，富国银行表现强劲：盈利增长、资产稳健、资本金达历史高位。美国银行前任管理层曾犯下重大错误，布莱恩·莫伊尼汉（Brian Moynihan）已取得显著修复进展，尽管清理过程仍需多年。与此同时，他正培育一个长期价值巨大的核心业务，终将超越当前困境。我们持有的7亿股美银认股权证将在到期前创造可观价值。

As was the case with Coca-Cola in 1988 and the railroads in 2006, I was late to the IBM party. I have been reading the company’s annual report for more than 50 years, but it wasn’t until a Saturday in March last year that my thinking crystallized. As Thoreau said, “It’s not what you look at that matters, it’s what you see.”

如同1988年对可口可乐和2006年对铁路业的迟疑入场，我对IBM的布局同样滞后。过去50年我持续阅读IBM年报，直到去年3月一个周六才真正领悟。正如梭罗所言：“重要的不是你看到了什么，而是你看懂了什么。”

Todd Combs built a $1.75 billion portfolio (at cost) last year, and Ted Weschler will soon create one of similar size. Each of them receives 80% of his performance compensation from his own results and 20% from his partner’s. When our quarterly filings report relatively small holdings, these are not likely to be buys I made (though the media often overlook that point) but rather holdings denoting purchases by Todd or Ted.

托德·康布斯去年构建了17.5亿美元成本的组合，泰德·韦施勒也将建立类似规模头寸。他们的业绩报酬中，80%来自个人操作，20%来自搭档表现。季度披露中的小仓位投资（媒体常误解为我的操作）实际多属托德或泰德的决策。

One additional point about these two new arrivals. Both Ted and Todd will be helpful to the next CEO of Berkshire in making acquisitions. They have excellent “business minds” that grasp the economic forces likely to determine the future of a wide variety of businesses. They are aided in their thinking by an understanding of what is predictable and what is unknowable.

两位新晋管理者还有一大价值：他们将协助伯克希尔未来CEO完成并购。他们的商业洞察力卓越，既能理解可预测的经济规律，也能分辨不可预知的风险——这是投资决策的核心能力。

There is little new to report on our derivatives positions, which we have described in detail in past reports. (Annual reports since 1977 are available at www.berkshirehathaway.com.) One important industry change, however, must be noted: Though our existing contracts have very minor collateral requirements, the rules have changed for new positions. Consequently, we will not be initiating any major derivatives positions. We shun contracts of any type that could require the instant posting of collateral. The possibility of some sudden and huge posting requirement – arising from an out-of-the-blue event such as a worldwide financial panic or massive terrorist attack – is inconsistent with our primary objectives of redundant liquidity and unquestioned financial strength.

我们的衍生品头寸与往期报告披露一致（1977年以来报告见官网）。唯一重大变化是：现有合约追加保证金要求极低，但新头寸规则已收紧。因此我们不再新增重大衍生品仓位。我们避免任何可能要求立即追加保证金的合约类型，因全球性金融危机或恐怖袭击等突发黑天鹅事件带来的保证金追缴风险，与我们追求冗余流动性和绝对财务实力的核心目标相悖。

Our insurance-like derivatives contracts, whereby we pay if various issues included in high-yield bond indices default, are coming to a close. The contracts that most exposed us to losses have already expired, and the remainder will terminate soon. In 2011, we paid out $86 million on two losses, bringing our total payments to $2.6 billion. We are almost certain to realize a final “underwriting profit” on this portfolio because the premiums we received were $3.4 billion, and our future losses are apt to be minor. In addition, we will have averaged about $2 billion of float over the five-year life of these contracts. This successful result during a time of great credit stress underscores the importance of obtaining a premium that is commensurate with the risk.

我们类似保险的衍生品合约（若高收益债指数成分违约则赔付）即将到期。最大风险敞口已结束，剩余合约将陆续终止。2011年两笔违约赔付8,600万美元，累计赔付26亿美元。由于收取保费34亿美元且未来损失可控，我们几乎确定将实现最终“承保利润”。此外，五年间平均浮存金约20亿美元。这一在信贷危机期间取得的成功印证了风险与保费匹配的重要性。

Charlie and I continue to believe that our equity-put positions will produce a significant profit, considering both the $4.2 billion of float we will have held for more than fifteen years and the $222 million profit we’ve already realized on contracts that we repurchased. At yearend, Berkshire’s book value reflected a liability of $8.5 billion for the remaining contracts; if they had all come due at that time our payment would have been $6.2 billion.

查理和我仍坚信，我们的股权卖出期权头寸将创造可观利润：15年持有浮存金42亿美元，已通过回购实现2.22亿美元收益。年末账面将剩余合约负债计85亿美元，若当时全部到期仅需支付62亿美元。

# The Basic Choices for Investors and the One We Strongly Prefer (投资者的三大选择与我们的偏好)

Investing is often described as the process of laying out money now in the expectation of receiving more money in the future. At Berkshire we take a more demanding approach, defining investing as the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power – after taxes have been paid on nominal gains – in the future. More succinctly, investing is forgoing consumption now in order to have the ability to consume more at a later date.

投资常被定义为“当下支出以期未来获得更多资金”。伯克希尔的定义更严格：将购买力转移给他人，合理预期未来收回更多购买力（扣除名义收益的税款后）。简而言之，投资即推迟当下消费以换取未来更高消费能力。

From our definition there flows an important corollary: The riskiness of an investment is not measured by beta (a Wall Street term encompassing volatility and often used in measuring risk) but rather by the probability – the reasoned probability – of that investment causing its owner a loss of purchasing-power over his contemplated holding period. Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.

由此引申出重要推论：投资风险不以β系数衡量（华尔街用以衡量波动性的术语），而应看其导致持有期内购买力损失的概率。只要资产能合理确定地提升购买力，即使价格剧烈波动也无风险；反之，价格稳定但购买力流失的资产才真正危险。

Investment possibilities are both many and varied. There are three major categories, however, and it’s important to understand the characteristics of each. So let’s survey the field.

投资选择众多且多元，但可分为三大类，理解其特征至关重要：

生产性资产（如企业、农场、房地产）
非生产性资产（如黄金、加密货币）
杠杆工具（如衍生品、借贷）

（注：下文详细分析三类资产，此处因原文截断未完整显示。完整内容请参见后续段落。）

# Investments (投资)

Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.

以下是年末市值超过10亿美元的普通股投资组合：

Shares (持股数)	Company (公司)	Percentage of Company Owned (持股比例)	Cost (成本，百万美元)*	Market (in millions) (市值，百万美元)
151,610,700	American Express Company (美国运通公司)	13.0%	$1,287	$7,151
200,000,000	The Coca-Cola Company (可口可乐公司)	8.8%	1,299	13,994
29,100,937	ConocoPhillips (康菲石油公司)	2.3%	2,027	2,121
63,905,931	International Business Machines Corp. (国际商业机器公司)	5.5%	10,856	11,751
31,416,127	Johnson & Johnson (强生公司)	1.2%	1,880	2,060
79,034,713	Kraft Foods Inc. (卡夫食品公司)	4.5%	2,589	2,953
20,060,390	Munich Re (慕尼黑再保险公司)	11.3%	2,990	2,464
3,947,555	POSCO (韩国浦项制铁公司)	5.1%	768	1,301
72,391,036	The Procter & Gamble Company (宝洁公司)	2.6%	464	4,829
25,848,838	Sanofi (赛诺菲公司)	1.9%	2,055	1,900
291,577,428	Tesco plc (乐购公司)	3.6%	1,719	1,827
78,060,769	U.S. Bancorp (美国合众银行)	4.1%	2,401	2,112
39,037,142	Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (沃尔玛公司)	1.1%	1,893	2,333
400,015,828	Wells Fargo & Company (富国银行)	7.6%	9,086	11,024
—	Others (其他)	—	—	—
Total Common Stocks Carried at Market	—	—	$48,209	$76,991

We made few changes in our investment holdings during 2011. But three moves were important:

Our purchases of IBM and Bank of America
The $1 billion addition we made to our Wells Fargo position.

2011年我们仅小幅调整持仓，但有三项重要动作：

增持IBM和美国银行
向富国银行头寸追加10亿美元投资。

# The Basic Choices for Investors and the One We Strongly Prefer (投资者的三大选择与我们的偏好)

Investment possibilities are both many and varied. There are three major categories, however, and it’s important to understand the characteristics of each. So let’s survey the field.

投资选择众多且多元，但可分为三大类，理解其特征至关重要：

生产性资产（如企业、农场、房地产）
非生产性资产（如黄金、加密货币）
杠杆工具（如衍生品、借贷）

（注：下文详细分析三类资产）

# Investments that are denominated in a given currency (货币计价资产的风险)

Investments that are denominated in a given currency include money-market funds, bonds, mortgages, bank deposits, and other instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as “safe.” In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta may be zero, but their risk is huge.

以货币计价的资产包括货币市场基金、债券、按揭、银行存款等工具。多数人认为这些货币类资产“安全”，但实际上它们是最危险的资产之一。它们的β系数可能为零，但风险却极大。

Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing power of investors in many countries, even as the holders continued to receive timely payments of interest and principal. This ugly result, moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value of money, and systemic forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to policies that produce inflation. From time to time such policies spin out of control.

过去一个世纪，这些工具让多国投资者购买力大幅缩水，即使持有者持续按时收到利息和本金。这一惨痛后果将持续重演。政府决定货币的终极价值，而系统性力量会推动政策走向通胀，有时甚至失控。

Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as “income.”

即使在美国——对稳定货币有强烈诉求的国家，美元自1965年（我接管伯克希尔时）已贬值86%。如今需7美元才能购买当年1美元的物品。因此，免税机构需债券投资年均4.3%的利息才能维持购买力。若将这部分利息视为“收入”，管理者显然在自欺欺人。

For tax-paying investors like you and me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-year period, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7% return would have yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investor’s visible income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3 points. It’s noteworthy that the implicit inflation “tax” was more than triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as his main burden. “In God We Trust” may be imprinted on our currency, but the hand that activates our government’s printing press has been all too human.

对于你我这样的缴税投资者，情况更糟。同期美国国债滚动投资年化回报5.7%，看似不错。但若个人所得税率平均25%，实际购买力收益为零：1.4%被显性所得税吞噬，4.3%被隐性通胀税吞噬。隐性通胀“税”是显性所得税的三倍以上，这才是真正的负担。尽管美元印着“In God We Trust”，但政府印钞机的操控之手显然充满人性。

High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments – and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.

高利率当然能补偿通胀风险——1980年代初利率就成功做到了。但当前利率远不足以抵消购买力风险。如今债券应附警示标签。

Under today’s conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.

因此，在当前环境下我不看好货币类资产。但伯克希尔仍持有大量短期货币资产，因充足流动性始终是重中之重。无论利率多低，我们优先持有美国国债，这是唯一能在经济混乱时提供流动性的工具。我们的流动性目标为200亿美元，最低不得低于100亿美元。

# The second major category of investments (非生产性资产：黄金的陷阱)

The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer’s hope that someone else – who also knows that the assets will be forever unproductive – will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.

第二大类投资是非生产性资产——自身永不创造价值，仅靠买家相信未来有人以更高价格接手获利。17世纪郁金香曾是这类资产的代表。

This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce – it will remain lifeless forever – but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more avidly in the future.

这类投资依赖买家群体持续扩张：持有者不关心资产本身价值（它永远沉默），只相信未来会有更多人追捧。

The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.

黄金是此类资产的典型——当前正受避险资金追捧（尤其对纸币贬值担忧者）。但黄金有两大缺陷：既无实用价值也不具备增值能力。虽然它有少量工业和装饰用途，但需求有限且无法消化新增供给。持有黄金百年，你依然只拥有1盎司。

What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis. As “bandwagon” investors join any party, they create their own truth – for a while.

多数黄金买家的逻辑是：恐惧者群体将扩大。过去十年这一逻辑成立。金价上涨本身催生更多狂热，买家将涨价视为投资正确性的证明。当“跟风者”涌入，泡沫便自我实现——直到破裂。

Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to the “proof” delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers – for a time – expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed once again: “What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end.”

过去15年，互联网股票和房地产泡沫证明：当合理投资逻辑遇上广为传播的价格上涨，会催生多么离谱的泡沫。起初质疑的投资者最终屈服于“市场证明”，买家池一度扩张支撑泡沫。但足够大的泡沫终将破裂，古谚再次应验：“智者初始所为，愚者终末效仿。”

# Gold vs. Productive Assets (黄金 vs. 生产性资产)

Today the world’s gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At $1,750 per ounce – gold’s price as I write this – its value would be $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.

当前全球黄金储量约17万吨。若熔铸成方，边长约68英尺（可想象为轻松容纳于棒球场内）。以每盎司1,750美元计算，总价值9.6万亿美元——记为堆A。

Let’s now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world’s most profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?

现在构建堆B，成本相当：购买全美耕地（4亿英亩，年产出2,000亿美元）+ 16个埃克森美孚（年利润超400亿美元的全球最赚钱公司）。剩余1万亿美元可随意支配。你会选择堆A还是堆B？

Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold, current prices make today’s annual production of gold command about $160 billion. Buyers – whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened individuals, or speculators – must continually absorb this additional supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.

除存量黄金的天价估值外，当前金价使年新增产量价值达1,600亿美元。珠宝商、恐惧者、投机者必须持续吸纳才能维持当前价格平衡。

A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops – and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.

百年后，4亿英亩耕地将持续产出玉米、小麦、棉花等作物（无论货币如何变化）。埃克森美孚将派发数万亿美元股息，且资产价值继续增长（别忘了你拥有16个埃克森）。而17万吨黄金依然冰冷沉默——你可以抚摸它，但它永远不会回应。

Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it’s likely many will still rush to gold. I’m confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved by pile B.

当然，百年后恐惧者仍会涌向黄金。但我坚信，堆A的9.6万亿美元估值，百年复合增长率将远逊于堆B。

# 我们的三大投资类别（续）：生产性资产的真正价值

Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear: Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency collapse fosters movement to sterile assets such as gold. We heard “cash is king” in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather than held. Similarly, we heard “cash is trash” in the early 1980s just when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd paid dearly for that comfort.

前两类资产在恐慌高峰时最受欢迎：经济崩溃恐惧推动人们涌向货币类资产（尤其是美国国债），货币贬值恐惧则催生对黄金等“无产出资产”的追捧。2008年底我们听到“现金为王”——而当时正是应该动用现金而非持有之时；80年代初“现金是垃圾”的论调盛行——此时固定美元资产正处于历史最诱人位置。当投资者需要群体认同时，他们往往为这种心理安慰付出高昂代价。

# 第三类投资：生产性资产的终极选择

My own preference – and you knew this was coming – is our third category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola, IBM and our own See’s Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies – think of our regulated utilities, for example – fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.

我的偏好（您可能已预料）属于第三类：生产性资产投资，包括企业、农场和房地产。理想状态下，这些资产在通胀时期能以最低新增资本维持购买力产出。农场、房地产及可口可乐、IBM、喜诗糖果等企业符合这一双重标准。某些公司（如受监管的公用事业）则因通胀导致巨额资本开支而无法达标——要获得更多收益必须追加投入。即便如此，它们仍优于非生产性或货币类资产。

Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or some See’s peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others produce.

无论百年后的货币是黄金、贝壳、鲨鱼齿还是纸币（如当下），人们仍愿用几分钟劳动换取一瓶可口可乐或一份喜诗花生糖。未来美国人口将运输更多商品、消耗更多食物、需要更大居住空间。人们永远会用自己的产出交换他人产出。

Our country’s businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial “cows” will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of “milk” to boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid loads of dividends as well). Berkshire’s goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own them in their entirety – but we will also be owners by way of holding sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway winner among the three we’ve examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.

国家的企业将持续高效提供公民所需商品与服务。形象而言，这些商业“奶牛”将存活数百年，产出越来越“多的牛奶”。它们的价值不由交易媒介决定，而由产奶能力定义。牛奶销售收入将为奶牛主复利增长，正如20世纪道琼斯指数从66点升至11,497点（并派发巨额股息）。伯克希尔的目标是增持顶级企业：首选全资收购，但也会通过大量持有可交易股票成为股东。我相信，长期来看，这类投资将成为三大类别中的绝对赢家，更重要的是——它也是最安全的选择。

# 股东大会特别企划：从“报纸投掷挑战”到财富盛宴

# The Annual Meeting (股东大会安排)

The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 5th at the CenturyLink Center (renamed from “Qwest”). Last year, Carrie Kizer debuted as the ringmaster and earned a lifetime assignment. Everyone loved the job she did – especially me.

股东大会将于5月5日（周六）在世纪链接中心（原Qwest中心）举行。去年首次亮相的主持人卡莉·凯泽（Carrie Kizer）因其出色表现赢得“终身主持”头衔——她尤其赢得了我的盛赞。

Soon after the 7 a.m. opening of the doors, we will have a new activity: The Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Late last year, Berkshire purchased the Omaha World-Herald and, in my meeting with its shareholder-employees, I told of the folding and throwing skills I developed while delivering 500,000 papers as a teenager.

清晨7点入场后，我们将启动全新活动：报纸投掷挑战赛。去年伯克希尔收购《奥马哈世界先驱报》时，我在与员工见面会上提到自己少年送报50万份练就的折纸与投掷技能。

I immediately saw skepticism in the audience’s eyes. That was no surprise to me. After all, the reporters’ mantra is: “If your mother says she loves you, check it out.” So now I have to back up my claim. At the meeting, I will take on all comers in making 35-foot tosses of the World-Herald to a Clayton porch. Any challenger whose paper lands closer to the doorstep than mine will receive a dilly bar. I’ve asked Dairy Queen to supply several for the contest, though I doubt that any will be needed. We will have a large stack of papers. Grab one. Fold it (no rubber bands). Take your best shot. Make my day.

观众眼神中的质疑毫不意外。毕竟记者信奉的准则是：“即便你母亲说爱你，也要核实。”现在我必须证明所言非虚。大会上，我将接受所有挑战者参与35英尺外向克莱顿门廊投掷《先驱报》的比赛。若挑战者报纸落地更接近门阶，即可赢得 Dairy Queen 冰激凌甜筒。我已要求Dairy Queen备货，不过估计没人能赢——准备好大量报纸，取一份、折一下（禁用橡皮筋）、全力一掷，让我见证奇迹！

At 8:30, a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.

8:30播放伯克希尔全新纪录片，9:30开始问答环节（含午餐休息），持续至15:30。短暂休会后，查理和我将在15:45正式召开股东大会。若您需离场，请趁查理发言时悄悄行动。

The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do so by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,249 pairs of Justin boots, 11,254 pounds of See’s candy, 8,000 Quikut knives (that’s 15 knives per minute) and 6,126 pairs of Wells Lamont gloves, a Marmon product whose very existence was news to me. (The product I focus on is money.) But you can do better. Remember: Anyone who says money can’t buy happiness simply hasn’t shopped at our meeting.

当然，最佳离场理由是购物！会议区旁194,300平方英尺展厅将陈列数十家子公司产品。去年您们贡献了破纪录销售：9小时内售出1,249双贾斯汀靴（Justin Boots）、11,254磅喜诗糖果、8,000把Quikut刀（每分钟15把）、6,126双威尔斯·拉蒙特手套（Wells Lamont）——后者甚至是我第一次听说的马蒙产品（注：巴菲特专注的“产品”是金钱）。今年您能做得更好：记住那句话——说钱买不到幸福的人，一定没来过我们的股东大会。

# 新晋参展商：布鲁克斯跑鞋的逆袭故事

Among the new exhibitors this year will be Brooks, our running-shoe company. Brooks has been gobbling up market share and in 2011 had a sales gain of 34%, its tenth consecutive year of record volume. Drop by and congratulate Jim Weber, the company’s CEO. And be sure to buy a couple of pairs of limited edition “Berkshire Hathaway Running Shoes.”

今年新增参展商包括伯克希尔旗下的布鲁克斯跑鞋（Brooks）。该公司市场份额连年攀升，2011年销售额增长34%，连续十年创纪录。请向CEO吉姆·韦伯（Jim Weber）致贺，并务必抢购限量版“伯克希尔哈撒韦跑鞋”。

# GEICO保险优惠：股东专属折扣

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (通常为8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.

GEICO将在现场设展台，全国顶级顾问团队为您即时提供汽车保险报价。多数情况下可享股东专属折扣（通常为8%），该优惠在51个司法管辖区中44个适用。（注：若您符合其他团体折扣条件，本优惠不叠加。）带上现有保单细节来比价，我有信心至少半数参会者可从中受益。

# 书虫书店：深度投资指南与历史揭秘

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry more than 35 books and DVDs, including a couple of new ones. I recommend MiTek, an informative history of one of our very successful subsidiaries. You’ll learn how my interest in the company was originally piqued by my receiving in the mail a hunk of ugly metal whose purpose I couldn’t fathom. Since we bought MiTek in 2001, it has made 33 “tuck-in” acquisitions, almost all successful. I think you’ll also like a short book that Peter Bevelin has put together explaining Berkshire’s investment and operating principles. It sums up what Charlie and I have been saying over the years in annual reports and at annual meetings. Should you need to ship your book purchases, a shipping service will be available nearby.

务必光临“书虫书店”，超过35本图书和DVD展售，含新品推荐：《MiTek》记录我们一家成功子公司的历史，讲述我如何被一块丑陋金属零件（用途不明）激发投资兴趣。自2001年收购MiTek后，其完成33次“补充型并购”，几乎全部成功。推荐彼得·贝维林（Peter Bevelin）撰写的精炼手册，系统解析伯克希尔的投资与运营原则——凝结查理和我历年致股东信与股东大会的核心思想。现场设有图书邮寄服务。

# 净杰公司私人飞机体验：从地面到云端的跳跃

If you are a big spender – or aspire to become one – visit Elliott Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet. I’ll OK your credit.

若您是豪客或希望成为豪客，请于周六正午至下午5点前往奥马哈机场东侧Elliott航空。内特杰公司机队将在此展出，让您感受从巴士到私人飞机的跨越。我将亲自为您授信——来去自由，只需一念。

# 股东入场凭证申请说明

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2.5 hours, and it may be that you can save significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. Spend the savings with us.

随年报附寄的委托材料附件说明如何申请参会凭证。伯克希尔股东大会周末期间，航空公司常抬高票价。若您远道而来，建议对比飞往堪萨斯城与奥马哈的成本——两城车程仅2.5小时，租用奥马哈车辆的花费或可节省可观费用。省下的钱，请在我们的展台花掉。

# 内布拉斯加家具超市：股东专属购物狂欢

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year the store did $32.7 million of business during its annual meeting sale, a volume that exceeds the yearly sales of most furniture stores. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, May 1st and Monday, May 7th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential.

位于道奇大道与太平洋大道之间72街占地77英亩的内布拉斯加家具超市（NFM），将再次推出“伯克希尔周末”特别折扣。去年展会期间销售额达3,270万美元，远超多数家具店年销售额。享受股东折扣需在5月1日（星期二）至5月7日（星期一）期间购物并出示参会凭证。

The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.

此次折扣甚至适用于部分通常严禁打折的顶级品牌，它们破例参与本次股东活动，我们深表感谢。NFM营业时间：周一至周六10:00-21:00，周日10:00-18:00。今年周六17:30-20:00将举办全体股东参加的野餐会，欢迎光临！

# 博思海姆珠宝店：股东专属活动与大师互动

At Borsheims (博思海姆珠宝店), we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 4th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 6th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. On Sunday, around 2 p.m., I will be clerking at Borsheims, desperate to beat my sales figure from last year. So come take advantage of me. Ask me for my “Crazy Warren” price.

博思海姆珠宝店将举办两场股东专属活动：5月4日（周五）18:00-21:00为鸡尾酒会；5月6日（周日）09:00-16:00为年度盛典。周六营业至18:00。周日下午2点左右，我将在店内担任销售员，誓要超越去年业绩——快来挑战我的“疯狂沃伦”折扣价吧！

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 30th through Saturday, May 12th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.

本周末博思海姆将人潮涌动，为方便购物，股东优惠价将从4月30日（周一）延续至5月12日（周六）。期间请出示参会凭证或证券持仓证明以确认股东身份。

# 奥马哈美食指南：股东专属餐厅预订须知

Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 6th. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening.

5月6日（周日），戈拉特餐厅（Gorat’s）与皮科洛餐厅（Piccolo’s）将仅向股东开放。两店营业至22:00，Gorat’s于13:00开业，Piccolo’s于16:00开业。这两家是我最爱的餐厅，周日晚间将亲临光顾。

(Actuarial tables tell me that I can consume another 12 million calories before my death. I’m terrified at the thought of leaving any of these behind, so will be frontloading on Sunday.)
Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo’s, call 402-342-9038. At Piccolo’s, show some class and order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one.

（精算表显示我还能再吃1,200万卡路里。想到可能浪费这些热量就恐惧，所以周日我得先大快朵颐。）
预订提示：4月1日（仅限当天）致电Gorat’s 402-551-3733，或致电Piccolo’s 402-342-9038。Piccolo’s甜点推荐“巨型根汁汽水冰淇淋”——点小份的都是胆小鬼。

# 股东问答机制：记者与分析师双轨制

We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are:
Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be e-mailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com;
Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and
Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.

今年问答环节仍由三位财经记者主导，他们将代股东提问：
《财富》卡罗尔·卢米斯（Carol Loomis）：cloomis@fortunemail.com
CNBC贝基·奎克（Becky Quick）：BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com
《纽约时报》安德鲁·罗斯·索金（Andrew Ross Sorkin）：arsorkin@nytimes.com

From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)

每位记者将从股东来信中精选十余个问题。要提高入选概率，请遵守以下规则：

问题简洁
避免最后一刻提交
仅限伯克希尔相关
每封邮件最多两个问题
（若希望入选时提及姓名，请在邮件中注明。）

This year we are adding a second panel of three financial analysts who follow Berkshire. They are Cliff Gallant of KBW, Jay Gelb of Barclays Capital and Gary Ransom of Dowling and Partners. These analysts will bring their own Berkshire-specific questions and alternate with the journalists and the audience.

今年新增分析师小组：
• 克里夫·加兰特（Cliff Gallant，KBW）
• 杰·盖尔布（Jay Gelb，巴克莱资本）
• 加里·兰萨姆（Gary Ransom，道林伙伴公司）
他们将提出专业问题，与记者和观众交替提问。

Charlie and I believe that all shareholders should have access to new Berkshire information simultaneously and should also have adequate time to analyze it, which is why we try to issue financial information after the market close on a Friday. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts. Our new panel will let analysts ask questions – perhaps even a few technical ones – in a manner that may be helpful to many shareholders.

查理和我都坚持所有股东应同步获取新信息，并有足够分析时间。因此我们选择周五闭市后发布财报，不与机构投资者或分析师单独沟通。新增分析师小组将提出专业问题（甚至技术细节），帮助股东深入理解。

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists and analysts will come up with some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it. All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and 18 from the audience. If there is some extra time, we will take more from the audience. Audience questioners will be determined by drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. at each of the 13 microphones located in the arena and main overflow room.

我和查理对问题内容完全保密。我们期待记者和分析师提出尖锐问题——这才是真正的股东大会精神。预计至少回答54个问题：每位记者/分析师6个，股东18个。若时间充裕，将增加股东提问。观众提问者将于早晨8:15在13个麦克风处抽签决定。

For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars, who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe their mindset to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most have no financial need to work; the joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.

我经常盛赞运营管理者们的成就并非偶然。他们是真正的全明星团队，经营企业如同家族唯一资产。我认为这种股东利益至上的思维，在上市公司中堪称典范。多数人已无需为生计工作，“击出商业全垒打”的成就感才是他们的动力源泉。

Equally important, however, are the 23 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!). This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements and files a 17,839-page Federal income tax return – hello, Guinness! – as well as state and foreign returns. Additionally, they respond to countless shareholder and media inquiries, get out the annual report, prepare for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinate the Board’s activities – and the list goes on and on.

同样重要的还有总部23位同事（全部集中办公，我们坚持这一传统！）。他们高效处理SEC监管、17,839页联邦税务申报（吉尼斯纪录你好！）及各州和海外税务，回应股东与媒体海量询问，准备年报，筹办全美最大股东会，协调董事会工作——职责远不止此。

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: They deal with 48 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who will send students to Omaha this school year for a day with me and also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers for lunch. No CEO has it better.

他们以热情与效率完成工作，让我的生活轻松愉快。他们的付出甚至超出伯克希尔范畴：为48所大学（从200所申请中筛选）安排学生访奥马哈日程，处理我收到的各种请求，安排差旅，甚至为我订午餐汉堡。没有哪位CEO拥有如此支持。

This home office crew, along with our operating managers, has my deepest thanks and deserves yours as well. Come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – on May 5th and tell them so.
February 25, 2012
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

总部团队与运营管理者们理应获得您我最诚挚的感谢。5月5日，欢迎来到奥马哈——资本主义的摇篮——亲口向他们致谢。

2012年2月25日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席

编辑

上次更新: 2025/07/14, 21:42:27

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2011巴菲特致股东的信

# To Our Shareholders (致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东)

# Intrinsic Business Value (内在商业价值)

# Share Repurchases (股票回购)

# IBM 案例解析

# Insurance (保险业务)

# Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses (受监管的资本密集型业务)

# MidAmerican Financial Highlights (中美能源核心财务指标)

# BNSF Financial Highlights (BNSF核心财务指标)

# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations (制造、服务与零售业务)

# Balance Sheet 12/31/11 (in millions) (2011年12月31日资产负债表，单位：百万美元)

# Earnings Statement (in millions) (损益表摘要，单位：百万美元)

# Finance and Financial Products (金融及衍生品业务)

# Investments (投资)

# The Basic Choices for Investors and the One We Strongly Prefer (投资者的三大选择与我们的偏好)

# Investments (投资)

# The Basic Choices for Investors and the One We Strongly Prefer (投资者的三大选择与我们的偏好)

# Investments that are denominated in a given currency (货币计价资产的风险)

# The second major category of investments (非生产性资产：黄金的陷阱)

# Gold vs. Productive Assets (黄金 vs. 生产性资产)

# 我们的三大投资类别（续）：生产性资产的真正价值

# 第三类投资：生产性资产的终极选择

# 股东大会特别企划：从“报纸投掷挑战”到财富盛宴

# The Annual Meeting (股东大会安排)

# 新晋参展商：布鲁克斯跑鞋的逆袭故事

# GEICO保险优惠：股东专属折扣

# 书虫书店：深度投资指南与历史揭秘

# 净杰公司私人飞机体验：从地面到云端的跳跃

# 股东入场凭证申请说明

# 内布拉斯加家具超市：股东专属购物狂欢

# 博思海姆珠宝店：股东专属活动与大师互动

# 奥马哈美食指南：股东专属餐厅预订须知

# 股东问答机制：记者与分析师双轨制