1993巴菲特致股东的信

# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (致伯克希尔·哈撒韦有限公司的股东)

Our per-share book value increased 14.3% during 1993. Over the last 29 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $8,854, or at a rate of 23.3% compounded annually.

我们的每股账面价值在 1993 年增长了 14.3%。在过去 29 年里（即现任管理层接管以来），账面价值从 19 美元增长到了 8,854 美元，复合年增长率达 23.3%。

During the year, Berkshire's net worth increased by $1.5 billion, a figure affected by two negative and two positive non-operating items. For the sake of completeness, I'll explain them here. If you aren't thrilled by accounting, however, feel free to fast-forward through this discussion:

这一年中，伯克希尔的净资产增加了 15 亿美元，这个数字受到了两个负面和两个正面的非经营性项目影响。为了完整起见，我将在下面解释它们。如果你对会计细节不感兴趣，也可以跳过这部分内容：

# 1. The first negative was produced by a change in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) having to do with the taxes we accrue against unrealized appreciation in the securities we carry at market value. The old rule said that the tax rate used should be the one in effect when the appreciation took place. Therefore, at the end of 1992, we were using a rate of 34% on the $6.4 billion of gains generated after 1986 and 28% on the $1.2 billion of gains generated before that. The new rule stipulates that the current tax rate should be applied to all gains. The rate in the first quarter of 1993, when this rule went into effect, was 34%. Applying that rate to our pre-1987 gains reduced net worth by $70 million.

第一个负面因素源于一项关于会计准则（GAAP）的变化，涉及我们对以市价计值的证券未实现增值所计提的税款。旧规则规定应使用增值发生时适用的税率。因此，在 1992 年底，我们对 1986 年后产生的 64 亿美元收益使用了 34% 的税率，而对此前产生的 12 亿美元收益则使用了 28% 的税率。新规则要求对所有收益使用当前税率。1993 年第一季度该规则生效时，适用税率为 34%。将这一税率应用于我们在 1987 年前获得的收益使净资产减少了 7,000 万美元。

第二个负面因素与第一个相关，因为 1993 年第三季度公司税率被提高至 35%。这一变化要求我们对所有未实现收益额外计提 1% 的税费，这使净资产进一步减少了 7,500 万美元。奇怪的是，GAAP 要求我们将这项费用以及上述费用从报告利润中扣除，尽管这些费用所基于的未实现增值从未计入利润，而是直接记入了净资产。

# 3. Another 1993 change in GAAP affects the value at which we carry the securities that we own. In recent years, both the common stocks and certain common-equivalent securities held by our insurance companies have been valued at market, whereas equities held by our non-insurance subsidiaries or by the parent company were carried at their aggregate cost or market, whichever was lower. Now GAAP says that all common stocks should be carried at market, a rule we began following in the fourth quarter of 1993. This change produced a gain in Berkshire's reported net worth of about $172 million.

第三个变化是另一项 1993 年实施的会计准则变更，它影响了我们持有的证券估值方式。近年来，我们保险公司的普通股及某些类似普通股的证券一直按市值计价，而由非保险公司或母公司持有的股票则按成本与市值中的较低者计价。现在 GAAP 规定所有普通股都必须按市值计价，我们自 1993 年第四季度开始执行这一规定。这项变化使伯克希尔报告的净资产增加了约 1.72 亿美元。

最后，我们去年发行了一些股票。如去年年报所述，我们在 1993 年初通过可转换债券赎回转换的方式发行了 3,944 股，对应 4,600 万美元的债券。此外，在收购 Dexter Shoe 公司时又发行了 25,203 股，该交易将在本报告后面详述。总体而言，流通股数量增加了 29,147 股，净资产也增加了约 4.78 亿美元。每股账面价值也因此增长，因为在这些交易中发行的股票价格高于账面价值。

Of course, it's per-share intrinsic value, not book value, that counts. Book value is an accounting term that measures the capital, including retained earnings, that has been put into a business. Intrinsic value is a present-value estimate of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life. At most companies, the two values are unrelated. Berkshire, however, is an exception: Our book value, though significantly below our intrinsic value, serves as a useful device for tracking that key figure. In 1993, each measure grew by roughly 14%, advances that I would call satisfactory but unexciting.

当然，真正重要的是每股内在价值，而非账面价值。账面价值是一个会计术语，用于衡量投入企业的资本，包括留存收益。内在价值则是对企业剩余生命周期内能提取现金的现值估算。对于大多数公司来说，这两个数值并无关联。但伯克希尔是个例外：虽然我们的账面价值远低于内在价值，但它仍然是跟踪关键指标的有效工具。1993 年，这两项指标均增长了约 14%，我认为这样的增幅令人满意但并不令人兴奋。

These gains, however, were outstripped by a much larger gain - 39% - in Berkshire's market price. Over time, of course, market price and intrinsic value will arrive at about the same destination. But in the short run the two often diverge in a major way, a phenomenon I've discussed in the past. Two years ago, Coca-Cola and Gillette, both large holdings of ours, enjoyed market price increases that dramatically outpaced their earnings gains. In the 1991 Annual Report, I said that the stocks of these companies could not continuously overperform their businesses.

然而，这些增长却被伯克希尔股价 39% 的大幅上涨所超越。长期来看，市场价格和内在价值终将趋于一致。但在短期内，两者常常出现显著偏离，这是我过去多次讨论的现象。两年前，可口可乐和吉列——我们的重要持股——的股价涨幅远超其盈利增长。在 1991 年的年报中，我曾指出，这些公司的股票不可能持续跑赢其业务表现。

From 1991 to 1993, Coke and Gillette increased their annual operating earnings per share by 38% and 37% respectively, but their market prices moved up only 11% and 6%. In other words, the companies overperformed their stocks, a result that no doubt partly reflects Wall Street's new apprehension about brand names. Whatever the reason, what will count over time is the earnings performance of these companies. If they prosper, Berkshire will also prosper, though not in a lock-step manner.

从 1991 到 1993 年，可口可乐和吉列的年度运营每股收益分别增长了 38% 和 37%，但它们的股价仅分别上涨了 11% 和 6%。换句话说，公司业绩跑赢了股价，这一结果无疑部分反映了华尔街对品牌名称的新担忧。无论原因如何，长远来看真正重要的是这些公司的盈利表现。如果它们成功，伯克希尔也将受益，尽管未必完全同步。

Let me add a lesson from history: Coke went public in 1919 at $40 per share. By the end of 1920 the market, coldly reevaluating Coke's future prospects, had battered the stock down by more than 50%, to $19.50. At yearend 1993, that single share, with dividends reinvested, was worth more than $2.1 million. As Ben Graham said: "In the short-run, the market is a voting machine - reflecting a voter-registration test that requires only money, not intelligence or emotional stability - but in the long-run, the market is a weighing machine."

再补充一个历史教训：可口可乐于 1919 年上市，每股 40 美元。到 1920 年底，市场冷静地重新评估其前景，股价暴跌超过 50%，跌至 19.50 美元。到 1993 年底，单股在分红再投资的情况下已价值超过 210 万美元。正如本杰明·格雷厄姆所说：“短期内，市场是一台投票机——反映的是一种只需金钱、不需要智慧或情绪稳定性的投票机制；但从长期来看，市场是一台称重机。”

So how should Berkshire's over-performance in the market last year be viewed? Clearly, Berkshire was selling at a higher percentage of intrinsic value at the end of 1993 than was the case at the beginning of the year. On the other hand, in a world of 6% or 7% long-term interest rates, Berkshire's market price was not inappropriate if - and you should understand that this is a huge if - Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I can attain our long-standing goal of increasing Berkshire's per-share intrinsic value at an average annual rate of 15%. We have not retreated from this goal. But we again emphasize, as we have for many years, that the growth in our capital base makes 15% an ever-more difficult target to hit.

那么，我们应该如何看待伯克希尔去年在市场上跑赢的表现呢？显然，1993 年底，伯克希尔的市场价格占其内在价值的比例要高于年初水平。另一方面，在长期利率为 6% 或 7% 的环境下，如果我们——伯克希尔副主席查理·芒格和我——能够实现每股内在价值年均增长 15% 的长期目标，那目前的市场价格并非不合理。（请注意，“如果”这个词在这里至关重要。）我们并未放弃这一目标。但我们再次强调多年来一贯的观点：随着资本基础的增长，实现 15% 的年增长目标变得越来越困难。

What we have going for us is a growing collection of good-sized operating businesses that possess economic characteristics ranging from good to terrific, run by managers whose performance ranges from terrific to terrific. You need have no worries about this group.

我们拥有一系列规模可观的运营企业，它们的经济特性从良好到极佳不等，由表现从极佳到更佳的经理人管理。你无需担心这一群体。

The capital-allocation work that Charlie and I do at the parent company, using the funds that our managers deliver to us, has a less certain outcome: It is not easy to find new businesses and managers comparable to those we have. Despite that difficulty, Charlie and I relish the search, and we are happy to report an important success in 1993.

查理和我在母公司进行的资本配置工作，利用经理人们交上来的资金进行投资，结果具有不确定性：找到像我们现有企业一样优秀的新企业和管理者并不容易。尽管如此，我们热衷于这种寻找，并很高兴地报告，我们在 1993 年取得了一项重要成功。

# Dexter Shoe (达克斯特鞋业)

What we did last year was build on our 1991 purchase of H. H. Brown, a superbly-run manufacturer of work shoes, boots and other footwear. Brown has been a real winner: Though we had high hopes to begin with, these expectations have been considerably exceeded thanks to Frank Rooney, Jim Issler and the talented managers who work with them. Because of our confidence in Frank's team, we next acquired Lowell Shoe, at the end of 1992. Lowell was a long-established manufacturer of women's and nurses' shoes, but its business needed some fixing. Again, results have surpassed our expectations. So we promptly jumped at the chance last year to acquire Dexter Shoe of Dexter, Maine, which manufactures popular-priced men's and women's shoes. Dexter, I can assure you, needs no fixing: It is one of the best-managed companies Charlie and I have seen in our business lifetimes.

我们去年所做的，是在 1991 年收购的 H.H. Brown 鞋业基础上进一步拓展。H.H. Brown 是一家运营出色的工装鞋、靴子及其他鞋类产品制造商。它确实非常成功：虽然我们一开始就有很高的期望，但在 Frank Rooney、Jim Issler 及其团队的出色管理下，这些预期被大大超越了。由于对 Frank 团队的信心，我们在 1992 年底又收购了 Lowell Shoe。Lowell 是一家历史悠久的女鞋和护士鞋制造商，但它的业务需要一些整顿。结果再次超出了我们的预期。因此，去年我们毫不犹豫地抓住机会收购了位于缅因州达克斯特镇的达克斯特鞋业（Dexter Shoe），这是一家生产大众价位男女鞋的企业。我可以向你们保证，Dexter 不需要任何整顿：这是查理和我在整个职业生涯中见过的管理最出色的公司之一。

# 达克斯特鞋业简介

Harold Alfond, who started working in a shoe factory at 25 cents an hour when he was 20, founded Dexter in 1956 with $10,000 of capital. He was joined in 1958 by Peter Lunder, his nephew. The two of them have since built a business that now produces over 7.5 million pairs of shoes annually, most of them made in Maine and the balance in Puerto Rico. As you probably know, the domestic shoe industry is generally thought to be unable to compete with imports from low-wage countries. But someone forgot to tell this to the ingenious managements of Dexter and H. H. Brown and to their skilled labor forces, which together make the U.S. plants of both companies highly competitive against all comers.

Harold Alfond 在 20 岁时以每小时 25 美分的工资在鞋厂打工起步，于 1956 年用 1 万美元创立了达克斯特鞋业。1958 年，他的侄子 Peter Lunder 加入了他的事业。两人共同打造了一家年产量超过 750 万双鞋的公司，其中大部分产品在美国缅因州制造，其余在波多黎各生产。正如你所知，美国本土鞋类产业通常被认为无法与来自低薪国家的进口产品竞争。但似乎没人告诉达克斯特和 H.H. Brown 的精明管理层以及他们训练有素的员工这一点，正是他们的努力使这两家公司在美国的工厂具备了极强的竞争力。

# 业务结构与市场表现

Dexter's business includes 77 retail outlets, located primarily in the Northeast. The company is also a major manufacturer of golf shoes, producing about 15% of U.S. output. Its bread and butter, though, is the manufacture of traditional shoes for traditional retailers, a job at which it excels: Last year both Nordstrom and J.C. Penney bestowed special awards upon Dexter for its performance as a supplier during 1992.

达克斯特拥有 77 家零售店，主要分布在东北部地区。此外，它还是美国高尔夫球鞋的主要生产商，占全国产量的约 15%。不过，达克斯特的核心业务仍是为传统零售商制造传统鞋类产品，这项工作它做得非常出色：去年，Nordstrom 和 J.C. Penney 都授予达克斯特特别奖项，表彰其在 1992 年作为供应商的卓越表现。

# 收购后的业绩展望

Our 1993 results include Dexter only from our date of merger, November 7th. In 1994, we expect Berkshire's shoe operations to have more than $550 million in sales, and we would not be surprised if the combined pre-tax earnings of these businesses topped $85 million. Five years ago we had no thought of getting into shoes. Now we have 7,200 employees in that industry, and I sing "There's No Business Like Shoe Business" as I drive to work. So much for strategic plans.

我们 1993 年的财务报表仅包含从合并日（11 月 7 日）起的达克斯特业绩。预计 1994 年伯克希尔的鞋类业务销售额将超过 5.5 亿美元，税前利润合计超过 8,500 万美元也不令人意外。五年前我们从未想过会进入制鞋行业。如今，我们在该行业已有 7,200 名员工，我甚至开车上班时都在哼“没有哪个行业比得上制鞋业”。这就是所谓的战略规划。

# 我们的投资哲学

At Berkshire, we have no view of the future that dictates what businesses or industries we will enter. Indeed, we think it's usually poison for a corporate giant's shareholders if it embarks upon new ventures pursuant to some grand vision. We prefer instead to focus on the economic characteristics of businesses that we wish to own and the personal characteristics of managers with whom we wish to associate - and then to hope we get lucky in finding the two in combination. At Dexter, we did.

在伯克希尔，我们对未来没有任何先入为主的设想来决定我们将进入哪些行业或企业。事实上，我们认为如果一家大型企业的股东依据某种宏伟蓝图来开展新业务，通常是危险的。我们更倾向于关注我们希望拥有的企业的经济特征，以及我们希望合作的管理者个人特质——然后希望我们能幸运地同时找到两者。而在达克斯特，我们做到了这一点。

# 附注：关于交易的税务优势与灵活性

And now we pause for a short commercial: Though they owned a business jewel, we believe that Harold and Peter (who were not interested in cash) made a sound decision in exchanging their Dexter stock for shares of Berkshire. What they did, in effect, was trade a 100% interest in a single terrific business for a smaller interest in a large group of terrific businesses. They incurred no tax on this exchange and now own a security that can be easily used for charitable or personal gifts, or that can be converted to cash in amounts, and at times, of their own choosing. Should members of their families desire to, they can pursue varying financial paths without running into the complications that often arise when assets are concentrated in a private business.

在此插入一段简短说明：尽管他们拥有一个极其优质的企业，但我们认为 Harold 和 Peter（他们并不热衷现金）做出用达克斯特股票换取伯克希尔股票的决定是明智的。实际上，他们是以 100%控股一家极为优秀的企业，换成了持有多个优秀企业组合中的一部分权益。这次交易无需缴纳所得税，现在他们持有的是一种可以轻松用于慈善捐赠或个人赠与的证券，也可以根据自己的意愿随时按需变现。如果他们的家庭成员希望如此，他们可以追求不同的财务路径，而不会遇到资产集中于私人企业时常见的复杂问题。

# 多元化与传承优势

For tax and other reasons, private companies also often find it difficult to diversify outside their industries. Berkshire, in contrast, can diversify with ease. So in shifting their ownership to Berkshire, Dexter's shareholders solved a reinvestment problem. Moreover, though Harold and Peter now have non-controlling shares in Berkshire, rather than controlling shares in Dexter, they know they will be treated as partners and that we will follow owner-oriented practices. If they elect to retain their Berkshire shares, their investment result from the merger date forward will exactly parallel my own result. Since I have a huge percentage of my net worth committed for life to Berkshire shares - and since the company will issue me neither restricted shares nor stock options - my gain-loss equation will always match that of all other owners.

出于税务及其他原因，私人企业往往难以实现跨行业的多元化投资。而伯克希尔则可以轻松实现多元化。因此，通过将股权转移至伯克希尔，达克斯特的股东解决了再投资难题。此外，尽管 Harold 和 Peter 现在持有的是伯克希尔的非控股权益，而非达克斯特的控制权股份，但他们知道他们会像合伙人一样受到对待，并且我们会坚持以股东利益为导向的做法。如果他们选择继续持有伯克希尔股票，自合并日起，他们的投资回报将完全与我的一致。由于我将自己绝大部分净资产长期投入伯克希尔股票，并且公司不会授予我限制性股票或股票期权，我的盈亏结构始终与其他所有股东保持一致。

# 持续承诺与文化稳定性

Additionally, Harold and Peter know that at Berkshire we can keep our promises: There will be no changes of control or culture at Berkshire for many decades to come. Finally, and of paramount importance, Harold and Peter can be sure that they will get to run their business - an activity they dearly love - exactly as they did before the merger. At Berkshire, we do not tell .400 hitters how to swing.

此外，Harold 和 Peter 还清楚一点，在伯克希尔我们可以兑现承诺：未来几十年内，伯克希尔的所有权和企业文化都不会发生变化。最后也是最重要的一点是，他们可以确信将继续经营他们热爱的业务，就像合并前一样。在伯克希尔，我们从不教那些打击率达到 .400 的人如何挥棒。

# 对其他企业家的邀请

What made sense for Harold and Peter probably makes sense for a few other owners of large private businesses. So, if you have a business that might fit, let me hear from you. Our acquisition criteria are set forth in the appendix on page 22.

对于 Harold 和 Peter 来说合理的选择，可能也适用于其他一些大型私营企业的所有者。所以，如果你拥有一家可能符合我们标准的企业，请联系我。我们的收购标准详见第 22 页附录。

# Sources of Reported Earnings (报告收益的来源)

The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing GAAP, which requires purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表显示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在本报告中，商誉摊销及其他主要收购价格会计调整并未直接计入对应的具体业务，而是汇总并单独列示。这种方法使你能看到我们的各项业务在未被我们收购前原本的盈利情况。我在以往的报告中解释过为何我们认为这种呈现方式比采用 GAAP 的方法（即按每项业务进行收购价格调整）对投资者和管理者更有用。当然，我们在表中展示的总净利润与经审计财务报表中的 GAAP 总利润完全一致。

# 收益来源表（单位：千美元）

来源类别	1993 年税前收益	1992 年税前收益	1993 年税后净收益（含少数股东权益）	1992 年税后净收益（含少数股东权益）
运营业务收益：
- 保险集团：
- 承保业务	$30,876	$(108,961)	$20,156	$(71,141)
- 净投资收益	375,946	355,067	321,321	305,763
- H.H. Brown、Lowell 和 Dexter	44,025*	27,883	28,829	17,340
- 巴法罗新闻报	50,962	47,863	29,696	28,163
- 商业及消费金融	22,695	19,836	14,161	12,664
- Fechheimer	13,442	13,698	6,931	7,267
- Kirby	39,147	35,653	25,056	22,795
- 内布拉斯加家具市场	21,540	17,110	10,398	8,072
- Scott Fetzer 制造集团	38,196	31,954	23,809	19,883
- See's Candies	41,150	42,357	24,367	25,501
- World Book	19,915	29,044	13,537	19,503
- 收购会计调整及商誉摊销	(17,033)	(12,087)	(13,996)	(13,070)
- 利息支出**	(56,545)	(98,643)	(35,614)	(62,899)
- 股东指定捐赠	(9,448)	(7,634)	(5,994)	(4,913)
- 其他	28,428	67,540	15,094	32,798
运营收益总计	$643,296	$460,680	$477,751	$347,726
- 证券销售收益	546,422	89,937	356,702	59,559
- 新会计规则导致的税费计提	---	---	(146,332)	---
所有实体总收益	$1,189,718	$550,617	$688,121	$407,285

包括达克斯特鞋业自 1993 年 11 月 7 日收购日起的收益。

** 不包括商业及消费金融业务的利息支出。1992 年包含债务提前赎回时支付的 2,250 万美元溢价。

A large amount of information about these businesses is given on pages 38-49, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 52-59, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the financial information that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed.

关于这些企业的大量信息见第 38 至 49 页，在那里你也可以找到我们以 GAAP 基础报告的分部收益。此外，第 52 至 59 页中，我们将伯克希尔的财务数据重新整理为四个非 GAAP 分部，这种呈现方式反映了查理和我对公司思考的方式。我们的目的是提供我们认为如果角色互换，你们也会希望我们提供的财务信息。

# "Look-Through" Earnings ("透视"收益)

We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which we believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire than does our GAAP result. As we calculate them, look-through earnings consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. The "operating earnings" of which we speak here exclude capital gains, special accounting items and major restructuring charges.

我们此前曾讨论过“透视”收益（look-through earnings），我们认为它比 GAAP 报告更能准确反映伯克希尔的真实收益。按照我们的计算，“透视”收益由以下三部分组成：(1) 上一节报告的运营收益；(2) 主要被投资公司的留存运营收益（根据 GAAP 会计准则，这部分收益未体现在我们的利润中）；减去 (3) 若这些留存收益分配给我们所需缴纳的税款。此处所说的“运营收益”不包括资本利得、特殊会计项目和重大重组费用。

Over time, our look-through earnings need to increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic value is to grow at that rate. Last year, I explained that we had to increase these earnings to about $1.8 billion in the year 2000, were we to meet the 15% goal. Because we issued additional shares in 1993, the amount needed has risen to about $1.85 billion.

从长远来看，如果我们希望内在价值以每年约 15% 的速度增长，那么我们的“透视”收益也必须保持这一增速。去年我曾指出，为了达到 15% 的目标，到 2000 年我们必须将这项收益提高到约 18 亿美元。由于我们在 1993 年增发了股票，所需金额已上升至约 18.5 亿美元。

That is a tough goal, but one that we expect you to hold us to. In the past, we've criticized the managerial practice of shooting the arrow of performance and then painting the target, centering it on whatever point the arrow happened to hit. We will instead risk embarrassment by painting first and shooting later.

这是一个具有挑战性的目标，但我们希望你们以此来衡量我们的表现。过去我们批评过一些管理者的做法：先射出业绩之箭，再画上靶心——把目标定在箭头落点上。而我们愿意冒尴尬的风险，选择先画好靶心，再瞄准射击。

If we are to hit the bull's-eye, we will need markets that allow the purchase of businesses and securities on sensible terms. Right now, markets are difficult, but they can - and will - change in unexpected ways and at unexpected times. In the meantime, we'll try to resist the temptation to do something marginal simply because we are long on cash. There's no use running if you're on the wrong road.

如果我们想击中目标，我们需要一个允许我们以合理条件购买企业和证券的市场环境。目前市场形势困难，但它们会以意想不到的方式和时间发生变化。在此期间，我们会努力抵制仅仅因为手中现金充裕就做出边缘性决策的诱惑。如果你走在错误的路上，跑得再快也没有意义。

The following table shows how we calculate look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 8, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")

下表展示了我们如何计算“透视”收益，但我提醒你这些数字只能是粗略估算。（这些被投资公司支付给我们的股息已被列入第 8 页详细列出的运营收益中，大部分归入“保险集团：净投资收益”。）

# “透视”收益计算表

伯克希尔主要被投公司	1993 年底持股比例	1992 年底持股比例	1993 年未分配运营收益（百万美元）	1992 年未分配运营收益（百万美元）
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.	13.0%	18.2%	$83 (注2)	$70
可口可乐公司	7.2%	7.1%	94	82
联邦住房贷款抵押公司	6.8% (注1)	8.2% (注1)	41 (注2)	29 (注2)
GEICO 公司	48.4%	48.1%	76 (注3)	34 (注3)
通用动力公司	13.9%	14.1%	25	11 (注2)
吉列公司	10.9%	10.9%	44	38
Guinness PLC	1.9%	2.0%	8	7
华盛顿邮报公司	14.8%	14.6%	15	11
富国银行	12.2%	11.5%	53 (注2)	16 (注2)
伯克希尔主要被投公司未分配收益合计			$439	$298
- 假设税负（注4）			$(61)	$(42)
- 伯克希尔报告运营收益			478	348
伯克希尔总“透视”收益			$856	$604

注释：

不包括 Wesco 持有的少数股权。
按全年平均持股比例计算。
不包括已实现的资本利得（该数值持续且显著）。
使用的税率是 14%，这是伯克希尔收到股息时所适用的税率。

We have told you that we expect the undistributed, hypothetically-taxed earnings of our investees to produce at least equivalent gains in Berkshire's intrinsic value. To date, we have far exceeded that expectation. For example, in 1986 we bought three million shares of Capital Cities/ABC for $172.50 per share and late last year sold one-third of that holding for $630 per share. After paying 35% capital gains taxes, we realized a $297 million profit from the sale. In contrast, during the eight years we held these shares, the retained earnings of Cap Cities attributable to them - hypothetically taxed at a lower 14% in accordance with our look-through method - were only $152 million. In other words, we paid a much larger tax bill than our look-through presentations to you have assumed and nonetheless realized a gain that far exceeded the undistributed earnings allocable to these shares.

我们曾告诉你们，我们预计被投资公司未分配且假设征税后的收益至少能带来伯克希尔内在价值等额的增长。迄今为止，我们远超这一预期。例如，1986 年我们以每股 172.50 美元的价格买入了 Capital Cities/ABC 的 300 万股股票，并于去年年底以每股 630 美元出售了其中的三分之一。扣除 35% 的资本利得税后，我们实现了 2.97 亿美元的利润。相比之下，在我们持有这些股票的八年里，Cap Cities 归属于这些股份的留存收益——按我们“透视”方法假设征收较低的 14% 税率——仅为 1.52 亿美元。换句话说，我们实际缴纳的税款远高于我们向你们报告中假设的数额，但即便如此，我们获得的收益仍远远超过了这些股份对应的未分配收益。

We expect such pleasant outcomes to recur often in the future and therefore believe our look-through earnings to be a conservative representation of Berkshire's true economic earnings.

我们预计未来这类令人满意的结果将经常出现，因此我们认为我们的“透视”收益是对伯克希尔真实经济收益的一种保守估计。

# Taxes (税收)

As our Cap Cities sale emphasizes, Berkshire is a substantial payer of federal income taxes. In aggregate, we will pay 1993 federal income taxes of $390 million, about $200 million of that attributable to operating earnings and $190 million to realized capital gains. Furthermore, our share of the 1993 federal and foreign income taxes paid by our investees is well over $400 million, a figure you don't see on our financial statements but that is nonetheless real. Directly and indirectly, Berkshire's 1993 federal income tax payments will be about 1/2 of 1% of the total paid last year by all American corporations.

正如我们出售 Capital Cities 的交易所强调的那样，伯克希尔是美国联邦所得税的重要纳税人。总体而言，我们将为 1993 年缴纳约 3.9 亿美元的联邦所得税，其中约 2 亿美元来自运营利润，约 1.9 亿美元来自已实现的资本利得。此外，我们应占的被投资公司在 1993 年所缴的联邦及外国所得税也超过 4 亿美元，这一数字并未出现在我们的财务报表中，但它确实存在。直接和间接地看，伯克希尔在 1993 年所缴纳的联邦所得税将约占全美所有企业去年所缴总额的千分之五。

Speaking for our own shares, Charlie and I have absolutely no complaint about these taxes. We know we work in a market-based economy that rewards our efforts far more bountifully than it does the efforts of others whose output is of equal or greater benefit to society. Taxation should, and does, partially redress this inequity. But we still remain extraordinarily well-treated.

就我们个人持股而言，查理和我对这些税款毫无怨言。我们知道我们生活在一个基于市场的经济体系中，这种体系对我们努力的回报远远超过了对其他一些人——他们的产出对社会的价值可能相等甚至更大——的回报。税收应该、并且确实在一定程度上纠正了这种不平等。但即便如此，我们依然受到了极其优厚的待遇。

Berkshire and its shareholders, in combination, would pay a much smaller tax if Berkshire operated as a partnership or "S" corporation, two structures often used for business activities. For a variety of reasons, that's not feasible for Berkshire to do. However, the penalty our corporate form imposes is mitigated - though far from eliminated - by our strategy of investing for the long term. Charlie and I would follow a buy-and-hold policy even if we ran a tax-exempt institution. We think it the soundest way to invest, and it also goes down the grain of our personalities. A third reason to favor this policy, however, is the fact that taxes are due only when gains are realized.

如果伯克希尔采用合伙制或“S”型公司结构（这两种结构常用于商业活动），那么伯克希尔及其股东整体所需缴纳的税款会少得多。但由于种种原因，这对伯克希尔来说并不现实。不过，我们通过长期投资的战略，在一定程度上减轻了公司制带来的税务负担（尽管远未完全消除）。即使我们管理的是免税机构，查理和我也会坚持买入并长期持有的策略。我们认为这是最稳健的投资方式，也符合我们的个性。选择这一策略的第三个原因是：只有在收益实现时才需要缴税。

Through my favorite comic strip, Li'l Abner, I got a chance during my youth to see the benefits of delayed taxes, though I missed the lesson at the time. Making his readers feel superior, Li'l Abner bungled happily, but moronically, through life in Dogpatch. At one point he became infatuated with a New York temptress, Appassionatta Van Climax, but despaired of marrying her because he had only a single silver dollar and she was interested solely in millionaires. Dejected, Abner took his problem to Old Man Mose, the font of all knowledge in Dogpatch. Said the sage: Double your money 20 times and Appassionatta will be yours (1, 2, 4, 8 . . . . 1,048,576).

年轻时，我从最爱的连环画《小阿纳》中学到了延迟纳税的好处，尽管当时我并未意识到这一点。这部漫画让读者感到优越感：主角小阿纳笨拙而愚蠢地在生活中跌跌撞撞。他曾一度迷恋纽约的一位迷人女子 Appassionatta Van Climax，但却因只有一美元银币而无法娶她——她只对百万富翁感兴趣。沮丧之下，阿纳向 Dogpatch 村里的智者老摩西求助。这位智者说：“你的钱翻倍二十次，Appassionatta 就是你的了。”（1, 2, 4, 8……1,048,576）

My last memory of the strip is Abner entering a roadhouse, dropping his dollar into a slot machine, and hitting a jackpot that spilled money all over the floor. Meticulously following Mose's advice, Abner picked up two dollars and went off to find his next double. Whereupon I dumped Abner and began reading Ben Graham.

我记忆中最深的画面是阿纳走进一家路边酒馆，把那一美元投进老虎机后赢了一大笔奖金，撒得满地都是。他一丝不苟地遵循摩西的建议，捡起两美元继续寻找下一次翻倍的机会。从此以后我就不再看《小阿纳》，转而开始阅读本·格雷厄姆的著作。

Mose clearly was overrated as a guru: Besides failing to anticipate Abner's slavish obedience to instructions, he also forgot about taxes. Had Abner been subject, say, to the 35% federal tax rate that Berkshire pays, and had he managed one double annually, he would after 20 years only have accumulated $22,370. Indeed, had he kept on both getting his annual doubles and paying a 35% tax on each, he would have needed 7 1/2 years more to reach the $1 million required to win Appassionatta.

显然，摩西作为导师是被高估了的：他不仅没有预料到阿纳会如此机械地照做，还忽略了税收因素。假如阿纳每年都要按伯克希尔所适用的 35% 联邦税率纳税，并且每年都成功实现一次资金翻倍，那么 20 年后他只能积累到 22,370 美元。事实上，如果他每年都要为每次翻倍所得支付 35% 的税款，他还需要再花 7.5 年才能达到赢得 Appassionatta 所需的 100 万美元。

But what if Abner had instead put his dollar in a single investment and held it until it doubled the same 27 1/2 times? In that case, he would have realized about $200 million pre-tax or, after paying a $70 million tax in the final year, about $130 million after-tax. For that, Appassionatta would have crawled to Dogpatch. Of course, with 27 1/2 years having passed, how Appassionatta would have looked to a fellow sitting on $130 million is another question.

但如果阿纳一开始就将那美元投入一项资产，并一直持有直到它翻倍了 27.5 次呢？在这种情况下，他的税前资产将达到约 2 亿美元，扣除最后一年缴纳的 7,000 万美元税款后，他仍将拥有约 1.3 亿美元。为了这笔财富，Appassionatta 可能会亲自爬到 Dogpatch 来找他。当然，过了 27.5 年后，一个坐拥 1.3 亿美元的人看到 Appassionatta 会作何感想，这又是另一个问题。

What this little tale tells us is that tax-paying investors will realize a far, far greater sum from a single investment that compounds internally at a given rate than from a succession of investments compounding at the same rate. But I suspect many Berkshire shareholders figured that out long ago.

这个小小的故事告诉我们：对于需要缴税的投资者来说，一笔持续复利增长的单一投资所带来的收益，要远远高于一系列同样增长率但不断实现收益的投资。我相信许多伯克希尔的股东早已明白这一点。

# Insurance Operations (保险业务)

At this point in the report we've customarily provided you with a table showing the annual "combined ratio" of the insurance industry for the preceding decade. This ratio compares total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) to revenue from premiums. For many years, the ratio has been above 100, a level indicating an underwriting loss. That is, the industry has taken in less money each year from its policyholders than it has had to pay for operating expenses and for loss events that occurred during the year.

按照惯例，我们在报告此处通常会提供一张表格，展示过去十年保险行业的年度“综合比率”。该比率比较了总保险成本（包括损失支出与运营费用）与保费收入之间的关系。多年来，这一比率一直高于 100，表明行业处于承保亏损状态。也就是说，保险公司每年从保单持有人那里收取的保费收入低于其为运营费用和当年发生的损失事件所支付的金额。

Offsetting this grim equation is a happier fact: Insurers get to hold on to their policyholders' money for a time before paying it out. This happens because most policies require that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it often takes time to resolve loss claims. Indeed, in the case of certain lines of insurance, such as product liability or professional malpractice, many years may elapse between the loss event and payment.

然而，这一严峻的公式背后也有一个更乐观的事实：保险公司可以在赔付之前暂时持有保单持有人的资金。这是因为大多数保单要求预付保费，更重要的是，理赔往往需要较长时间来解决。事实上，在某些险种如产品责任险或职业过失责任险中，损失发生与实际赔付之间可能间隔多年。

To oversimplify the matter somewhat, the total of the funds prepaid by policyholders and the funds earmarked for incurred-but-not-yet-paid claims is called "the float." In the past, the industry was able to suffer a combined ratio of 107 to 111 and still break even from its insurance writings because of the earnings derived from investing this float.

简单地说，由保单持有人预付款项以及尚未赔付的已发生索赔所构成的资金总和被称为“浮存金”（Float）。在过去，即使综合比率高达 107 到 111（即每收到 100 美元保费，就要支付 107 到 111 美元的成本），保险公司仍能通过浮存金的投资收益达到收支平衡。

As interest rates have fallen, however, the value of float has substantially declined. Therefore, the data that we have provided in the past are no longer useful for year-to-year comparisons of industry profitability. A company writing at the same combined ratio now as in the 1980's today has a far less attractive business than it did then.

然而，随着利率下降，浮存金的价值大幅缩水。因此，我们过去提供的数据已不再适用于年度间行业盈利性的对比。今天一家公司的综合比率若与上世纪 80 年代相同，其业务吸引力已远不如当年。

Only by making an analysis that incorporates both underwriting results and the current risk-free earnings obtainable from float can one evaluate the true economics of the business that a property-casualty insurer writes. Of course, the actual investment results that an insurer achieves from the use of both float and stockholders' funds is also of major importance and should be carefully examined when an investor is assessing managerial performance. But that should be a separate analysis from the one we are discussing here. The value of float funds - in effect, their transfer price as they move from the insurance operation to the investment operation - should be determined simply by the risk-free, long-term rate of interest.

要真正评估一家财产与意外险公司的业务经济学意义，必须同时考虑承保结果与当前从浮存金中可获得的无风险收益。当然，保险公司使用浮存金和股东资金所取得的实际投资成果也很重要，投资者在评估管理层表现时应仔细审视这部分内容。但这应属于另一项独立分析。浮存金的价值——实质上是它们从保险业务转移到投资业务时的转移价格——应仅以无风险的长期利率为准进行计算。

# Insurance Operations (保险业务运营)

As you can see, in our insurance operation last year we had the use of $2.6 billion at no cost; in fact we were paid $31 million, our underwriting profit, to hold these funds. This sounds good – is good – but is far from as good as it sounds.

如你所见，去年我们在保险业务中使用了 26 亿美元的资金而无需支付成本；事实上，我们还获得了 3,100 万美元的承保利润来持有这些资金。这听起来很好——也确实不错——但实际并不像表面看起来那么理想。

We temper our enthusiasm because we write a large volume of "super-cat" policies (which other insurance and reinsurance companies buy to recover part of the losses they suffer from mega-catastrophes) and because last year we had no losses of consequence from this activity. As that suggests, the truly catastrophic Midwestern floods of 1993 did not trigger super-cat losses, the reason being that very few flood policies are purchased from private insurers.

我们之所以保持谨慎，是因为我们签发了大量“超级巨灾”（super-cat）保单（其他保险公司和再保险公司购买此类保单以弥补其在重大灾难中的部分损失），而去年我们在这项业务上没有发生重大损失。正如这一点所暗示的那样，1993 年美国中西部地区真正具有破坏性的洪水并未引发巨灾再保险赔付，原因在于私人保险公司很少出售洪水险。

It would be fallacious, however, to conclude from this single-year result that the super-cat business is a wonderful one, or even a satisfactory one. A simple example will illustrate the fallacy: Suppose there is an event that occurs 25 times in every century. If you annually give 5-for-1 odds against its occurrence that year, you will have many more winning years than losers. Indeed, you may go a straight six, seven or more years without loss. You also will eventually go broke.

然而，仅凭这一年的结果就得出“超级巨灾”业务是极好甚至令人满意的想法是错误的。一个简单的例子可以说明这种误解：假设某事件在一个世纪内会发生 25 次。如果你每年以 5:1 的赔率押注它当年不会发生，你将有更多盈利年份而不是亏损年份。实际上，你可能会连续六、七年甚至更长时间都无损失。但最终你仍会破产。

At Berkshire, we naturally believe we are obtaining adequate premiums and giving more like 3 1/2-for-1 odds. But there is no way for us – or anyone else – to calculate the true odds on super-cat coverages. In fact, it will take decades for us to find out whether our underwriting judgment has been sound.

当然，在伯克希尔，我们认为我们收取的保费足够合理，提供的赔率更像是 3.5:1。但我们——或任何人——都无法准确计算出“超级巨灾”保险的真实赔率。事实上，我们需要几十年才能判断我们的承保判断是否正确。

What we do know is that when a loss comes, it's likely to be a lulu. There may well be years when Berkshire will suffer losses from the super-cat business equal to three or four times what we earned from it in 1993. When Hurricane Andrew blew in 1992, we paid out about $125 million. Because we've since expanded our super-cat business, a similar storm today could cost us $600 million.

我们唯一能确定的是，一旦发生损失，那将是巨大的。未来很可能出现某些年份，伯克希尔因“超级巨灾”业务遭受的损失达到 1993 年收益的三到四倍。例如，1992 年安德鲁飓风来袭时，我们赔付了约 1.25 亿美元。由于此后我们扩大了巨灾再保险业务，如今类似的风暴可能使我们损失高达 6 亿美元。

So far, we have been lucky in 1994. As I write this letter, we are estimating that our losses from the Los Angeles earthquake will be nominal. But if the quake had been a 7.5 instead of a 6.8, it would have been a different story.

截至目前，1994 年对我们来说还算幸运。写这封信时，我们估计洛杉矶地震带来的损失微乎其微。但如果这次地震是里氏 7.5 级而非 6.8 级，情况将会大不相同。

Berkshire is ideally positioned to write super-cat policies. In Ajit Jain, we have by far the best manager in this business. Additionally, companies writing these policies need enormous capital, and our net worth is ten to twenty times larger than that of our main competitors. In most lines of insurance, huge resources aren't that important: An insurer can diversify the risks it writes and, if necessary, can lay off risks to reduce concentration in its portfolio. That isn't possible in the super-cat business. So these competitors are forced into offering far smaller limits than those we can provide. Were they bolder, they would run the risk that a mega-catastrophe – or a confluence of smaller catastrophes – would wipe them out.

伯克希尔在“超级巨灾”保单业务方面具备独特优势。Ajit Jain 是该领域最出色的管理者。此外，从事这类业务需要庞大的资本金，而我们的净资产是主要竞争对手的十到二十倍。在大多数保险业务中，巨额资源并不是特别重要：保险公司可以通过分散风险或转嫁风险来控制风险集中度。但在“超级巨灾”业务中却无法做到。因此，竞争对手只能提供远小于我们的保障额度。如果它们胆子更大一些，一场特大自然灾害或多个小灾害叠加就可能导致它们破产。

One indication of our premier strength and reputation is that each of the four largest reinsurance companies in the world buys very significant reinsurance coverage from Berkshire. Better than anyone else, these giants understand that the test of a reinsurer is its ability and willingness to pay losses under trying circumstances, not its readiness to accept premiums when things look rosy.

我们实力与声誉的一个显著标志是，全球四大再保险公司都在伯克希尔购买了大量再保险保障。这些巨头比任何人都清楚，衡量一家再保险公司真正的标准，是在艰难时刻它是否有能力并愿意履行赔付责任，而不是在市场景气时是否愿意接受保费。

One caution: There has recently been a substantial increase in reinsurance capacity. Close to $5 billion of equity capital has been raised by reinsurers, almost all of them newly-formed entities. Naturally these new entrants are hungry to write business so that they can justify the projections they utilized in attracting capital. This new competition won't affect our 1994 operations; we're filled up there, primarily with business written in 1993. But we are now seeing signs of price deterioration. If this trend continues, we will resign ourselves to much-reduced volume, keeping ourselves available, though, for the large, sophisticated buyer who requires a super-cat insurer with large capacity and a sure ability to pay losses.

但有一点要提醒大家：最近再保险行业的承保能力大幅增加。多家新成立的再保险公司共筹集了近 50 亿美元的股本资本。这些新进入者急于开展业务，以证明当初吸引资本时所做的预测合理性。这场新竞争对 1994 年的业务影响不大，因为我们已经在 1993 年满负荷运作。但我们已经看到价格下降的迹象。如果趋势持续，我们将不得不接受业务量大幅减少的局面，但仍会为那些需要大型、专业且具备强大赔付能力的“超级巨灾”保险买家保留服务窗口。

In other areas of our insurance business, our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers' compensation business, headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit-card operation, managed by the Kizer family; and National Indemnity's traditional auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster, all achieved excellent results. In combination, these four units produced a significant underwriting profit and substantial float.

在保险业务的其他领域，我们也取得了优异成绩。Rod Eldred 领导的州内保险业务、Brad Kinstler 主导的工伤赔偿业务、Kizer 家族管理的信用卡业务，以及由 Don Wurster 带领的国家保障公司传统汽车和一般责任险业务，均表现卓越。这四个单位共同实现了可观的承保利润和大量浮存金。

All in all, we have a first-class insurance business. Though its results will be highly volatile, this operation possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a large amount – larger, in fact, than is the case at any other Berkshire business.

总的来说，我们拥有一流的保险业务。尽管其业绩波动性较大，这项业务的内在价值远远超过账面价值——而且超出幅度甚至大于伯克希尔旗下任何其他业务板块。

# Common Stock Investments (普通股投资)

Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over $250 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

以下是我们持有的市值超过 2.5 亿美元的普通股投资。其中一小部分属于伯克希尔持股比例低于 100% 的子公司。

# 普通股投资组合（截至 1993 年 12 月 31 日）

股数	公司名称	成本（千美元）	市值（千美元）
2,000,000	Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.（资本城/美国广播公司）	$345,000	$1,239,000
93,400,000	The Coca-Cola Company（可口可乐公司）	$1,023,920	$4,167,975
13,654,600	Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. ("Freddie Mac")（联邦住房贷款抵押公司，即房地美）	$307,505	$681,023
34,250,000	GEICO Corp.（GEICO 公司）	$45,713	$1,759,594
4,350,000	General Dynamics Corp.（通用动力公司）	$94,938	$401,287
24,000,000	The Gillette Company（吉列公司）	$600,000	$1,431,000
38,335,000	Guinness PLC（健力士公司）	$333,019	$270,822
1,727,765	The Washington Post Company（华盛顿邮报公司）	$9,731	$440,148
6,791,218	Wells Fargo & Company（富国银行）	$423,680	$878,614

Considering the similarity of this year's list and the last, you may decide your management is hopelessly comatose. But we continue to think that it is usually foolish to part with an interest in a business that is both understandable and durably wonderful. Business interests of that kind are simply too hard to replace.

考虑到今年与去年的投资组合高度相似，你可能会认为我们的管理层陷入了某种停滞状态。但我们仍然坚信，通常来说，放弃一家既容易理解又具备持久优势的企业是愚蠢的行为。这种优质资产实在难以替代。

Interestingly, corporate managers have no trouble understanding that point when they are focusing on a business they operate: A parent company that owns a subsidiary with superb long-term economics is not likely to sell that entity regardless of price. "Why," the CEO would ask, "should I part with my crown jewel?" Yet that same CEO, when it comes to running his personal investment portfolio, will offhandedly - and even impetuously - move from business to business when presented with no more than superficial arguments by his broker for doing so. The worst of these is perhaps, "You can't go broke taking a profit." Can you imagine a CEO using this line to urge his board to sell a star subsidiary? In our view, what makes sense in business also makes sense in stocks: An investor should ordinarily hold a small piece of an outstanding business with the same tenacity that an owner would exhibit if he owned all of that business.

有趣的是，当企业管理者面对自己运营的业务时，他们很容易理解这一点：一家母公司若拥有一个具备卓越长期经济特性的子公司，无论价格如何，都不会轻易出售该资产。“为什么，”CEO 会问，“我要卖掉我的皇冠明珠？”但同样是这位 CEO，在管理自己的个人投资组合时，却可能仅凭经纪人提供的表面理由就轻率地在不同股票之间来回切换。最糟糕的说法也许是：“你不会因为获利了结而破产。”你能想象一位 CEO 用这句话来劝董事会出售明星子公司吗？我们认为，适用于企业经营的原则同样适用于股票投资：投资者应像完全拥有某家优秀企业的所有者一样，坚定地持有这家公司的少量股份。

Earlier I mentioned the financial results that could have been achieved by investing $40 in The Coca-Cola Co. in 1919. In 1938, more than 50 years after the introduction of Coke, and long after the drink was firmly established as an American icon, Fortune did an excellent story on the company. In the second paragraph the writer reported: "Several times every year a weighty and serious investor looks long and with profound respect at Coca-Cola's record, but comes regretfully to the conclusion that he is looking too late. The specters of saturation and competition rise before him."

早些时候我提到过，如果在 1919 年投资 40 美元买入可口可乐公司股票，最终能获得怎样的财务回报。1938 年，在可口可乐推出 50 多年后，这款饮料早已成为美国文化的象征，福布斯杂志对这家公司做了一篇精彩报道。文章第二段写道：“每年都有几次，一位严肃的投资者会长时间认真审视可口可乐的记录，但最终遗憾地得出结论：他入场太晚了。饱和和竞争的幽灵浮现在他面前。”

Yes, competition there was in 1938 and in 1993 as well. But it's worth noting that in 1938 The Coca-Cola Co. sold 207 million cases of soft drinks (if its gallonage then is converted into the 192-ounce cases used for measurement today) and in 1993 it sold about 10.7 billion cases, a 50-fold increase in physical volume from a company that in 1938 was already dominant in its very major industry. Nor was the party over in 1938 for an investor: Though the $40 invested in 1919 in one share had (with dividends reinvested) turned into $3,277 by the end of 1938, a fresh $40 then invested in Coca-Cola stock would have grown to $25,000 by yearend 1993.

没错，1938 年有竞争，1993 年也一样。但值得注意的是，1938 年可口可乐销售了 2.07 亿箱软饮料（按今天的每箱 192 盎司换算），而到 1993 年已增长至约 107 亿箱——比 1938 年增长了 50 倍，而当时它已经在其所属的重大行业中占据主导地位。对于投资者而言，1938 年也不是终点：1919 年以 40 美元投资的一股股票（含再投资分红）到 1938 年底已增值至 3,277 美元；而在 1938 年追加投资的 40 美元，到 1993 年底则已增至 25,000 美元。

I can't resist one more quote from that 1938 Fortune story: "It would be hard to name any company comparable in size to Coca-Cola and selling, as Coca-Cola does, an unchanged product that can point to a ten-year record anything like Coca-Cola's." In the 55 years that have since passed, Coke's product line has broadened somewhat, but it's remarkable how well that description still fits.

我忍不住再引用一段 1938 年《福布斯》的报道原文：“很难再找到一家规模可比、产品未变且拥有十年如可口可乐般辉煌业绩的公司。”在此之后的 55 年里，可口可乐的产品线有所扩展，但令人惊讶的是，这段描述依然十分贴切。

Charlie and I decided long ago that in an investment lifetime it's just too hard to make hundreds of smart decisions. That judgment became ever more compelling as Berkshire's capital mushroomed and the universe of investments that could significantly affect our results shrank dramatically. Therefore, we adopted a strategy that required our being smart - and not too smart at that - only a very few times. Indeed, we'll now settle for one good idea a year. (Charlie says it's my turn.)

查理和我很早就决定，在一生的投资生涯中，做出几百个聪明决策实在太难了。随着伯克希尔资本的迅速增长，能够对我们结果产生重大影响的投资机会大幅减少。因此我们采取了一种策略，只需在极少数情况下做出明智判断即可。事实上，我们现在一年只要有 1 个好主意就满足了。（查理说轮到我了。）

The strategy we've adopted precludes our following standard diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore say the strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define risk, using dictionary terms, as "the possibility of loss or injury."

我们所采用的策略不支持传统的分散投资教条。许多评论人士会因此认为我们的策略比传统投资者的风险更大。但我们并不认同。我们认为，如果集中投资提高了投资者对企业深入思考的程度，并增强了其在买入前对该公司经济特性的信心，那么集中投资实际上可能降低风险。在这里，我们按照词典定义来理解“风险”，即“损失或损害的可能性”。

Academics, however, like to define investment "risk" differently, averring that it is the relative volatility of a stock or portfolio of stocks—that is, their volatility as compared to that of a large universe of stocks. Employing data bases and statistical skills, these academics compute with precision the "beta" of a stock—its relative volatility in the past—and then build arcane investment and capital-allocation theories around this calculation. In their hunger for a single statistic to measure risk, however, they forget a fundamental principle: It is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong.

然而，学术界喜欢给“风险”下不同的定义，他们倾向于将风险视为一只股票或投资组合相对于整个股市波动性的相对波动程度。通过数据库和统计工具，他们可以精确计算出股票的“贝塔系数”（即过去的价格波动性），并围绕这一数据构建复杂的投资与资本配置理论。但在追求单一风险指标的过程中，他们忽略了基本原理：模糊的正确远胜于精确的错误。

For owners of a business—and that's the way we think of shareholders—the academics' definition of risk is far off the mark, so much so that it produces absurdities. For example, under beta-based theory, a stock that has dropped very sharply compared to the market—as had Washington Post when we bought it in 1973—becomes "riskier" at the lower price than it was at the higher price. Would that description have then made any sense to someone who was offered the entire company at a vastly reduced price?

对于企业真正的所有者——也就是我们眼中的股东而言——学术界的“风险”定义严重偏离实际，甚至产生了荒谬的结果。例如，根据贝塔系数理论，一只股价相比市场大幅下跌的股票（比如我们在 1973 年低价买入的华盛顿邮报），在较低价位反而被定义为“更具风险”。那么，如果有人愿意以极低价格购买整家公司，这样的说法还有任何意义吗？

In fact, the true investor welcomes volatility. Ben Graham explained why in Chapter 8 of The Intelligent Investor. There he introduced "Mr. Market," an obliging fellow who shows up every day to either buy from you or sell to you, whichever you wish. The more manic-depressive this chap is, the greater the opportunities available to the investor. That's true because a wildly fluctuating market means that irrationally low prices will periodically be attached to solid businesses. It is impossible to see how the availability of such prices can be thought of as increasing the hazards for an investor who is totally free to either ignore the market or exploit its folly.

事实上，真正懂得投资的人欢迎市场的波动。本·格雷厄姆在《聪明的投资者》第八章中对此作出了解释。他引入了“市场先生”的概念——一个每天都会出现、愿意买进或卖出股票的好心人。这个家伙越是情绪化，投资者的机会就越大。这是因为剧烈波动的市场意味着优质企业会周期性地出现非理性低估的情况。很难理解为何这些便宜价格反而会增加投资者的风险，尤其当投资者可以自由选择忽略市场或利用它的愚蠢行为时。

In assessing risk, a beta purist will disdain examining what a company produces, what its competitors are doing, or how much borrowed money the business employs. He may even prefer not to know the company's name. What he treasures is the price history of its stock. In contrast, we'll happily forgo knowing the price history and instead will seek whatever information will further our understanding of the company's business. After we buy a stock, consequently, we would not be disturbed if markets closed for a year or two. We don't need a daily quote on our 100% position in See's or H.H. Brown to validate our well-being. Why, then, should we need a quote on our 7% interest in Coke?

在评估风险时，一个只看贝塔系数的学者往往不屑于研究公司生产什么、竞争对手做了什么、或者公司使用了多少借贷资金。他甚至可能宁愿不知道公司名字，他最看重的是股价的历史走势。相比之下，我们更愿意放弃查看股价历史，转而去获取有助于我们理解企业经营的信息。因此，一旦我们买入一支股票，即便市场关闭一两年也不会困扰我们。我们不需要每天查看我们全资拥有的 See’s 或 H.H. Brown 的股价来确认我们的财富状况，那为何需要查看我们持有 7% 的可口可乐每日报价呢？

In our opinion, the real risk that an investor must assess is whether his aggregate after-tax receipts from an investment (including those he receives on sale) will, over his prospective holding period, give him at least as much purchasing power as he had to begin with, plus a modest rate of interest on that initial stake. Though this risk cannot be calculated with engineering precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree of accuracy that is useful. The primary factors bearing upon this evaluation are:

我们认为，投资者真正应评估的风险是：在其持有期间内，税后总收益（包括出售所得）是否至少维持原始购买力，并带来合理的利息回报。虽然这种风险无法像工程学那样精准计算，但在某些情况下可以做出有一定准确度的判断。主要考量因素如下：

The certainty with which the long-term economic characteristics of the business can be evaluated
对企业长期经济特征评估的确定性
The certainty with which management can be evaluated, both as to its ability to realize the full potential of the business and to wisely employ its cash flows
对管理层能力评估的确定性——是否能充分挖掘企业潜力并合理运用现金流
The certainty with which management can be counted on to channel the rewards from the business to the shareholders rather than to itself
对管理层是否会把企业收益分配给股东而非据为己有的确定性
The purchase price of the business
投资标的的买入价格
The levels of taxation and inflation that will be experienced and that will determine the degree by which an investor's purchasing-power return is reduced from his gross return
预期税率和通胀水平，它们决定了投资者的实际购买力回报与其名义回报之间的差距

These factors will probably strike many analysts as unbearably fuzzy, since they cannot be extracted from a data base of any kind. But the difficulty of precisely quantifying these matters does not negate their importance nor is it insuperable. Just as Justice Stewart found it impossible to formulate a test for obscenity but nevertheless asserted, "I know it when I see it," so also can investors—in an inexact but useful way—"see" the risks inherent in certain investments without reference to complex equations or price histories.

这些因素对于许多分析师而言可能显得过于模糊，因为它们无法从任何数据库中提取。但难以量化并不等于无关紧要或不可判断。正如法官斯图尔特虽无法明确定义何为“色情内容”，却仍能说出那句经典名言“我看到就知道了”，投资者也可以通过一种不够精确但有效的方式，“识别”某些投资中隐含的风险，而无需依赖复杂公式或股价波动历史。

# Coca-Cola and Gillette: Low Business Risk over the Long Term

Is it really so difficult to conclude that Coca-Cola and Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term than, say, any computer company or retailer? Worldwide, Coke sells about 44% of all soft drinks, and Gillette has more than a 60% share (in value) of the blade market. Leaving aside chewing gum, in which Wrigley is dominant, I know of no other significant businesses in which the leading company has long enjoyed such global power.

难道真的很难得出这样一个结论：从长期来看，可口可乐和吉列的业务风险远远低于任何一家计算机公司或零售商？在全球范围内，可口可乐占据了约 44% 的软饮料市场份额，而吉列则拥有超过 60%（以价值计）的刀片市场。除了在口香糖领域占据主导地位的箭牌（Wrigley），我找不到其他哪家领先企业能在全球市场上长期享有如此显著的优势。

Moreover, both Coke and Gillette have actually increased their worldwide shares of market in recent years. The might of their brand names, the attributes of their products, and the strength of their distribution systems give them an enormous competitive advantage, setting up a protective moat around their economic castles. The average company, in contrast, does battle daily without any such means of protection. As Peter Lynch says, stocks of companies selling commodity-like products should come with a warning label: "Competition may prove hazardous to human wealth."

而且近年来，可口可乐和吉列的全球市场份额实际上还在增长。它们强大的品牌、优质的产品属性以及高效的分销系统为它们带来了巨大的竞争优势，在它们的经济“城堡”周围筑起了坚固的护城河。相比之下，大多数普通企业每天都在毫无保护的情况下参与竞争。正如彼得·林奇所说，那些销售大宗商品式产品的企业股票应该附带一个警告标签：“竞争可能严重损害财富。”

The competitive strengths of a Coke or Gillette are obvious to even the casual observer of business. Yet the beta of their stocks is similar to that of a great many run-of-the-mill companies who possess little or no competitive advantage. Should we conclude from this similarity that the competitive strength of Coke and Gillette gains them nothing when business risk is being measured? Or should we conclude that the risk in owning a piece of a company — its stock — is somehow divorced from the long-term risk inherent in its business operations? We believe neither conclusion makes sense and that equating beta with investment risk also makes no sense.

即使是对商业略知一二的人也能看出可口可乐和吉列的竞争优势。然而它们的贝塔系数却与许多缺乏竞争优势的普通公司相似。我们是否应据此认为，在衡量商业风险时，这些公司的竞争优势毫无作用？还是说，持有公司股票的风险与企业的长期经营风险无关？我们认为这两种结论都不成立，将贝塔系数等同于投资风险的观点也站不住脚。

# Understanding Real Investment Risk

The theoretician bred on beta has no mechanism for differentiating the risk inherent in, say, a single-product toy company selling pet rocks or hula hoops from that of another toy company whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie. But it's quite possible for ordinary investors to make such distinctions if they have a reasonable understanding of consumer behavior and the factors that create long-term competitive strength or weakness.

一个只看贝塔系数的理论家无法区分一家卖宠物石或呼啦圈的单一产品玩具公司，和另一家只生产大富翁或芭比娃娃的玩具公司之间的风险差异。但只要投资者具备对消费者行为的基本理解，以及对造成长期竞争优势或劣势因素的认知能力，他们完全有可能做出这样的判断。

Obviously, every investor will make mistakes. But by confining himself to a relatively few, easy-to-understand cases, a reasonably intelligent, informed and diligent person can judge investment risks with a useful degree of accuracy.

显然，每个投资者都会犯错。但如果一个人专注于少数易于理解的投资对象，那么一位聪明、信息充分且勤奋的投资者就能够在一定程度上准确评估投资风险。

In many industries, of course, Charlie and I can't determine whether we are dealing with a "pet rock" or a "Barbie." We couldn't solve this problem, moreover, even if we were to spend years intensely studying those industries. Sometimes our own intellectual shortcomings would stand in the way of understanding, and in other cases the nature of the industry would be the roadblock. For example, a business that must deal with fast-moving technology is not going to lend itself to reliable evaluations of its long-term economics. Did we foresee thirty years ago what would transpire in the television-manufacturing or computer industries? Of course not. (Nor did most of the investors and corporate managers who enthusiastically entered those industries.) Why, then, should Charlie and I now think we can predict the future of other rapidly-evolving businesses? We'll stick instead with the easy cases. Why search for a needle buried in a haystack when one is sitting in plain sight?

当然，在很多行业中，我和查理根本无法判断我们面对的是“宠物石”还是“芭比娃娃”。即使花上数年深入研究这些行业，我们也未必能解决这个问题。有时是我们自身知识上的局限阻碍了判断；有时则是行业的本质决定了它难以预测。例如，一个必须应对快速技术变革的企业，其长期经济状况是很难可靠评估的。三十年前，我们预见到电视制造或计算机行业的未来了吗？当然没有。（当时热情进入这些行业的投资者和企业管理者们大多也没能预见。）那我们为什么还要自以为能够预测其他快速变化行业的未来呢？我们宁愿坚持简单明了的投资案例。既然有一根针就在眼前，何必去稻草堆里翻找？

# Diversification vs. Concentration

Of course, some investment strategies — for instance, our efforts in arbitrage over the years — require wide diversification. If significant risk exists in a single transaction, overall risk should be reduced by making that purchase one of many mutually-independent commitments. Thus, you may consciously purchase a risky investment — one that indeed has a significant possibility of causing loss or injury — if you believe that your gain, weighted for probabilities, considerably exceeds your loss, comparably weighted, and if you can commit to a number of similar, but unrelated opportunities. Most venture capitalists employ this strategy. Should you choose to pursue this course, you should adopt the outlook of the casino that owns a roulette wheel, which will want to see lots of action because it is favored by probabilities, but will refuse to accept a single, huge bet.

当然，有些投资策略——比如我们多年来从事的套利交易——需要广泛分散投资。如果某笔交易存在较高风险，通过将其纳入多个相互独立的投资组合中，可以降低整体风险。因此，如果你相信一笔高风险投资在概率加权后的潜在收益远大于损失，并且你能参与多个类似但不相关的投资机会，你就可以主动承担这笔风险。大多数风险投资家正是采用这种策略。若选择这一路径，你就应该像拥有一台轮盘赌桌的赌场一样，希望看到大量下注（因为胜率对你有利），但拒绝接受单笔巨额投注。

Another situation requiring wide diversification occurs when an investor who does not understand the economics of specific businesses nevertheless believes it in his interest to be a long-term owner of American industry. That investor should both own a large number of equities and space out his purchases. By periodically investing in an index fund, for example, the know-nothing investor can actually out-perform most investment professionals. Paradoxically, when "dumb" money acknowledges its limitations, it ceases to be dumb.

另一种需要广泛分散的情况是：当一名投资者并不真正理解具体企业的经济特性，但仍希望成为美国产业的长期所有者时。这类投资者应当持有大量股票，并分散买入时机。例如，定期投资指数基金，“无知型”投资者其实可以跑赢大多数专业投资者。讽刺的是，当“傻钱”承认自己的局限性后，它就不再是傻钱了。

On the other hand, if you are a know-something investor, able to understand business economics and to find five to ten sensibly-priced companies that possess important long-term competitive advantages, conventional diversification makes no sense for you. It is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your risk. I cannot understand why an investor of that sort elects to put money into a business that is his 20th favorite rather than simply adding that money to his top choices — the businesses he understands best and that present the least risk, along with the greatest profit potential. In the words of the prophet Mae West: "Too much of a good thing can be wonderful."

另一方面，如果你是一位“有所了解”的投资者，能够理解企业经济特性和找出五到十家价格合理的、具备重要长期竞争优势的企业，那么传统的分散投资策略就不适合你了。盲目分散只会拖累你的回报并增加风险。我不明白为何这样一位投资者会把资金投入到他排名第 20 的公司，而不是追加投资到他最熟悉的、风险最低、利润潜力最高的首选企业中。正如预言家梅·韦斯特所说：“好东西再多也不嫌多。”

# Corporate Governance (公司治理)

At our annual meetings, someone usually asks “What happens to this place if you get hit by a truck?” I'm glad they are still asking the question in this form. It won't be too long before the query becomes: “What happens to this place if you don't get hit by a truck?”

在我们的年度股东大会上，总有人会问：“如果你被卡车撞了怎么办？”我很高兴问题仍是这个提法。要不了多久，人们就会换成更令人担忧的问题：“如果你没被撞呢？”

Such questions, in any event, raise a reason for me to discuss corporate governance, a hot topic during the past year. In general, I believe that directors have stiffened their spines recently and that shareholders are now being treated somewhat more like true owners than was the case not long ago. Commentators on corporate governance, however, seldom make any distinction among three fundamentally different manager/owner situations that exist in publicly-held companies. Though the legal responsibility of directors is identical throughout, their ability to effect change differs in each of the cases. Attention usually falls on the first case, because it prevails on the corporate scene. Since Berkshire falls into the second category, however, and will someday fall into the third, we will discuss all three variations.

无论如何，这些问题促使我来谈谈公司治理这一热门话题。总体而言，我认为董事们近年来变得更加强硬，股东也比以前更像是真正的公司所有者。然而，关于公司治理的评论者很少区分公众公司中存在的三种截然不同的管理层/所有者结构。虽然董事们的法律责任是一致的，但他们推动变革的能力却因具体情况而异。通常讨论集中在第一种情况，因为它在上市公司中最为普遍。由于伯克希尔属于第二种情形，并终将进入第三种，我们将分别探讨这三种情况。

# 第一种情形：无控股股东的董事会

The first, and by far most common, board situation is one in which a corporation has no controlling shareholder. In that case, I believe directors should behave as if there is a single absentee owner, whose long-term interest they should try to further in all proper ways. Unfortunately, “long-term” gives directors a lot of wiggle room. If they lack either integrity or the ability to think independently, directors can do great violence to shareholders while still claiming to be acting in their long-term interest. But assume the board is functioning well and must deal with a management that is mediocre or worse. Directors then have the responsibility for changing that management, just as an intelligent owner would do if he were present. And if able but greedy managers over-reach and try to dip too deeply into the shareholders' pockets, directors must slap their hands.

第一种也是最常见的董事会情形是：公司没有控股股东。在这种情况下，我认为董事们应视自己是在代表一位不在场的所有者行事，尽一切合理方式维护其长期利益。不幸的是，“长期”这个词给董事留下了太多操作空间。如果董事既缺乏诚信又缺乏独立思考能力，他们完全可以在损害股东利益的同时声称这是为了长远考虑。假设董事会运作良好，而管理层平庸甚至糟糕，董事就有责任更换管理层，就像一位理智的所有者所做的那样。如果管理层有能力但贪婪，试图过度榨取股东利益，董事就必须及时制止。

In this plain-vanilla case, a director who sees something he doesn’t like should attempt to persuade the other directors of his views. If he is successful, the board will have the muscle to make the appropriate change. Suppose, though, that the unhappy director can't get other directors to agree with him. He should then feel free to make his views known to the absentee owners. Directors seldom do that, of course. The temperament of many directors would in fact be incompatible with critical behavior of that sort. But I see nothing improper in such actions, assuming the issues are serious. Naturally, the complaining director can expect a vigorous rebuttal from the unpersuaded directors, a prospect that should discourage the dissenter from pursuing trivial or non-rational causes.

在这种标准模式下，如果某位董事发现某些做法令他不满，他应尝试说服其他董事认同他的观点。如果成功，董事会就有足够的力量推动改变。但如果这位董事未能获得支持，他应有权向缺席的所有者披露自己的看法。尽管现实中这种情况极少发生，因为许多董事的性格并不适合提出质疑，但我认为只要议题足够重大，这种做法并无不当之处。当然，持异议的董事可能会遭到反对者的激烈反驳，这也自然会阻止他们纠缠于琐碎或非理性的问题。

For the boards just discussed, I believe the directors ought to be relatively few in number — say, ten or less — and ought to come mostly from the outside. The outside board members should establish standards for the CEO’s performance and should also periodically meet, without his being present, to evaluate his performance against those standards.

对于上述类型的董事会，我认为成员数量应相对较少（比如说不超过十人），并且多数应来自外部。外部董事应设立 CEO 绩效的标准，并应定期在 CEO 不在场的情况下开会，对照这些标准进行评估。

The requisites for board membership should be business savvy, interest in the job, and owner-orientation. Too often, directors are selected simply because they are prominent or add diversity to the board. That practice is a mistake. Furthermore, mistakes in selecting directors are particularly serious because appointments are so hard to undo: The pleasant but vacuous director need never worry about job security.

董事会成员应具备商业头脑、对职责的兴趣以及以股东利益为导向的态度。然而现实中，很多人是因为知名度或多样性原因被选中的，这种做法是个错误。此外，挑选董事的失误尤其严重，因为一旦任命，几乎不可能撤换：一个和气但空洞的董事永远不用担心失去职位。

# 第二种情形：控股型经理人 + 董事会

The second case is that existing at Berkshire, where the controlling owner is also the manager. At some companies, this arrangement is facilitated by the existence of two classes of stock endowed with disproportionate voting power. In these situations, it's obvious that the board does not act as an agent between owners and management and that the directors cannot effect change except through persuasion. Therefore, if the owner/manager is mediocre or worse — or is over-reaching — there is little a director can do about it except object. If the directors having no connections to the owner/manager make a unified argument, it may well have some effect. More likely it will not.

第二种情况存在于伯克希尔，即公司的大股东同时也是管理者。在一些公司中，这种情况通过不同投票权的双层股权结构得到强化。在这些情况下，董事会显然不是股东与管理层之间的代理机构，也无法通过强制手段推动变革，只能依靠劝说。因此，如果大股东兼管理者表现平庸甚至更糟，或者越界谋私，董事所能做的非常有限，最多只能表达异议。如果无关联董事达成一致意见，或许能产生一定影响，但可能性很低。

# Corporate Governance (公司治理) — 第三种情形：非管理层的控股股东

If change does not come, and the matter is sufficiently serious, the outside directors should resign. Their resignation will signal their doubts about management, and it will emphasize that no outsider is in a position to correct the owner/manager's shortcomings.

如果变革迟迟不来，且问题足够严重，外部董事应选择辞职。他们的辞职将表明他们对管理层的质疑，并强调没有任何外部人士能够纠正股东兼经理人的缺陷。

The third governance case occurs when there is a controlling owner who is not involved in management. This case, examples of which are Hershey Foods and Dow Jones, puts the outside directors in a potentially useful position. If they become unhappy with either the competence or integrity of the manager, they can go directly to the owner (who may also be on the board) and report their dissatisfaction. This situation is ideal for an outside director, since he need make his case only to a single, presumably interested owner, who can forthwith effect change if the argument is persuasive.

第三种情况是存在一位不参与管理的控股股东。这种情形的例子包括好时食品（Hershey Foods）和道琼斯公司（Dow Jones）。在这种情况下，外部董事处于一个可能有用的位置。如果他们对经理的能力或诚信感到不满，可以直接向控股股东（他可能也在董事会中）反映问题。这对外部董事来说是最理想的情况，因为他只需说服一位有兴趣的股东，而这位股东一旦被说服，就能立即推动改变。

Even so, the dissatisfied director has only that single course of action. If he remains unsatisfied about a critical matter, he has no choice but to resign.

即便如此，不满的董事也只有这一条出路。如果他对某个关键问题仍然不满，就只能选择辞职。

Logically, the third case should be the most effective in insuring first-class management. In the second case the owner is not going to fire himself, and in the first case, directors often find it very difficult to deal with mediocrity or mild over-reaching. Unless the unhappy directors can win over a majority of the board - an awkward social and logistical task, particularly if management's behavior is merely odious, not egregious - their hands are effectively tied. In practice, directors trapped in situations of this kind usually convince themselves that by staying around they can do at least some good. Meanwhile, management proceeds unfettered.

从逻辑上讲，第三种情形最有可能确保一流的管理层。在第二种情形中，控股股东不会炒掉自己；而在第一种情形中，董事们往往很难处理平庸或轻微越权的管理层。除非不满的董事能赢得董事会多数支持——这本身是一个尴尬的社会与执行难题，尤其是当管理层的行为只是令人反感而非违法时——否则他们几乎无能为力。现实中，陷入这类困境的董事通常会说服自己留下总比离开好，于是管理层得以继续我行我素。

In the third case, the owner is neither judging himself nor burdened with the problem of garnering a majority. He can also insure that outside directors are selected who will bring useful qualities to the board. These directors, in turn, will know that the good advice they give will reach the right ears, rather than being stifled by a recalcitrant management. If the controlling owner is intelligent and self-confident, he will make decisions in respect to management that are meritocratic and pro-shareholder. Moreover - and this is critically important - he can readily correct any mistake he makes.

在第三种情形下，控股股东既不会自我评判，也不会面临必须获得董事会多数支持的负担。他还可以确保选出具备实用品质的外部董事。反过来，这些董事也知道自己的建议会被认真听取，而不是被顽固的管理层压制。如果控股股东聪明且自信，他会做出基于能力和股东利益的决策。更重要的是——这一点至关重要——他也能轻易纠正自己的错误。

At Berkshire we operate in the second mode now and will for as long as I remain functional. My health, let me add, is excellent. For better or worse, you are likely to have me as an owner/manager for some time.

目前伯克希尔属于第二种情形，只要我还健康在世，就会一直如此。顺便说一句，我的身体状况非常好。无论好坏，在未来一段时间里，你们都将继续拥有我作为控股型管理者。

After my death, all of my stock will go to my wife, Susie, should she survive me, or to a foundation if she dies before I do. In neither case will taxes and bequests require the sale of consequential amounts of stock.

在我去世后，我所有的股票将归我的妻子苏茜所有（如果她还健在），否则将捐赠给基金会。在这两种情况下，遗产税和其他安排都不会要求出售大量股份。

When my stock is transferred to either my wife or the foundation, Berkshire will enter the third governance mode, going forward with a vitally interested, but non-management, owner and with a management that must perform for that owner. In preparation for that time, Susie was elected to the board a few years ago, and in 1993 our son, Howard, joined the board. These family members will not be managers of the company in the future, but they will represent the controlling interest should anything happen to me. Most of our other directors are also significant owners of Berkshire stock, and each has a strong owner-orientation. All in all, we're prepared for "the truck."

当我所持股份转移至妻子或基金会之后，伯克希尔将进入第三种治理模式：由一位高度关注但不参与管理的所有者来监督，管理层则必须为其负责。为了应对那一天，苏茜几年前已当选董事，我们的儿子霍华德也在 1993 年加入了董事会。这些家庭成员将来不会参与公司管理，但在我不在的情况下，他们将代表控股股东的利益。我们大多数其他董事也都是伯克希尔的重要股东，每个人都有很强的“股东导向”。总而言之，我们已经为“卡车事件”做好了准备。

# Shareholder-Designated Contributions (股东指定捐款)

About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1993 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $9.4 million and 3,110 charities were recipients.

大约 97% 的可投票股份参与了伯克希尔 1993 年的股东指定捐款计划。通过该计划发放的捐款总额为 940 万美元，惠及了 3,110 家慈善机构。

Berkshire's practice in respect to discretionary philanthropy - as contrasted to its policies regarding contributions that are clearly related to the company's business activities - differs significantly from that of other publicly-held corporations. There, most corporate contributions are made pursuant to the wishes of the CEO (who often will be responding to social pressures), employees (through matching gifts), or directors (through matching gifts or requests they make of the CEO).

伯克希尔在自由裁量的慈善捐助方面（区别于那些明显与公司业务相关的捐赠政策）的做法与其他上市公司有显著不同。在大多数上市公司中，捐款通常出于 CEO 的意愿（他往往会回应社会压力）、员工（通过匹配赠款）或董事（通过匹配赠款或向 CEO 提出请求）。

At Berkshire, we believe that the company's money is the owners' money, just as it would be in a closely-held corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship. Therefore, if funds are to be given to causes unrelated to Berkshire's business activities, it is the charities favored by our owners that should receive them. We've yet to find a CEO who believes he should personally fund the charities favored by his shareholders. Why, then, should they foot the bill for his picks?

在伯克希尔，我们认为公司的钱就是股东的钱，就像私人公司、合伙企业或个体经营者一样。因此，如果资金要用于与伯克希尔业务无关的公益事业，那应该由股东指定受益对象。我们还没见过哪位 CEO 愿意用自己的钱去资助股东喜欢的慈善项目，那为何要让股东为他的偏好买单？

Let me add that our program is easy to administer. Last fall, for two months, we borrowed one person from National Indemnity to help us implement the instructions that came from our 7,500 registered shareholders. I'd guess that the average corporate program in which employee gifts are matched incurs far greater administrative costs. Indeed, our entire corporate overhead is less than half the size of our charitable contributions. (Charlie, however, insists that I tell you that $1.4 million of our $4.9 million overhead is attributable to our corporate jet, The Indefensible.)

此外，我要说的是我们的程序非常容易执行。去年秋天，我们从国家保障公司借调了一名人员，仅用了两个月时间就完成了来自 7,500 名注册股东的指令执行。我认为一般企业在员工捐款匹配计划上的行政成本远高于我们。事实上，我们整个公司总部的运营费用甚至不到我们慈善支出的一半。（不过查理坚持让我说明，我们在 490 万美元的运营费用中，有 140 万美元是用于公司公务飞机“不可原谅号”的。）

Below is a list showing the largest categories to which our shareholders have steered their contributions.

以下是股东们指定其捐款流向的最大类别清单：

(a) 347 churches and synagogues received 569 gifts
347 座教堂和犹太教会堂收到了 569 笔捐款。

(b) 283 colleges and universities received 670 gifts
283 所学院和大学收到了 670 笔捐款。

(c) 244 K-12 schools (about two-thirds secular, one-third religious) received 525 gifts
244 所 K-12 学校（约三分之二为世俗学校，三分之一具有宗教背景）收到了 525 笔捐款。

(d) 288 institutions dedicated to art, culture or the humanities received 447 gifts
288 家致力于艺术、文化或人文学科的机构收到了 447 笔捐款。

(e) 180 religious social-service organizations (split about equally between Christian and Jewish) received 411 gifts
180 家宗教性质的社会服务机构（基督教与犹太教组织各占一半）收到了 411 笔捐款。

(f) 445 secular social-service organizations (about 40% youth-related) received 759 gifts
445 家非宗教性质的社会服务机构（约 40% 与青少年相关）收到了 759 笔捐款。

(g) 153 hospitals received 261 gifts
153 家医院收到了 261 笔捐款。

(h) 186 health-related organizations (American Heart Association, American Cancer Society, etc.) received 320 gifts
186 家与健康有关的组织（如美国心脏协会、美国癌症协会等）收到了 320 笔捐款。

Three things about this list seem particularly interesting to me. First, to some degree it indicates what people choose to give money to when they are acting of their own accord, free of pressure from solicitors or emotional appeals from charities. Second, the contributions programs of publicly-held companies almost never allow gifts to churches and synagogues, yet clearly these institutions are what many shareholders would like to support. Third, the gifts made by our shareholders display conflicting philosophies: 130 gifts were directed to organizations that believe in making abortions readily available for women and 30 gifts were directed to organizations (other than churches) that discourage or are opposed to abortion.

我对这份清单有三点特别感兴趣的看法。第一，它在一定程度上反映了人们在没有募捐者施压、也没有慈善机构情感诉求的情况下，会主动选择资助哪些对象。第二，公众持股公司的捐款计划几乎从不允许捐款给教堂和犹太教会堂，但显然许多股东希望支持这些机构。第三，股东们的捐款显示出相互冲突的理念：130 笔捐款投给了支持女性享有便捷堕胎权的组织，而另有 30 笔捐款（不包括教堂）投给了反对或限制堕胎的组织。

# Shareholder-Designated Contributions (股东指定捐款计划)

Last year I told you that I was thinking of raising the amount that Berkshire shareholders can give under our designated-contributions program and asked for your comments. We received a few well-written letters opposing the entire idea, on the grounds that it was our job to run the business and not our job to force shareholders into making charitable gifts. Most of the shareholders responding, however, noted the tax efficiency of the plan and urged us to increase the designated amount. Several shareholders who have given stock to their children or grandchildren told me that they consider the program a particularly good way to get youngsters thinking at an early age about the subject of giving. These people, in other words, perceive the program to be an educational, as well as philanthropic, tool. The bottom line is that we did raise the amount in 1993, from $8 per share to $10.

去年我曾告诉你们，我正在考虑提高伯克希尔股东在我们指定捐款计划下的捐款额度，并征求了大家的意见。我们收到了几封措辞严谨的反对信件，认为公司不应插手慈善事务或迫使股东进行捐赠。但大多数回复者指出该计划具有税务效率优势，并敦促我们提高限额。一些将股票赠予子女或孙辈的股东告诉我，他们认为这一计划是让年轻人从小就思考“给予”这一理念的绝佳方式。换句话说，他们将这项计划视为兼具教育意义和慈善价值的工具。最终我们在 1993 年将每位股东可捐款金额从每股 8 美元提高到了 10 美元。

In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that Berkshire distributes, our operating businesses make contributions, including merchandise, averaging about $2.5 million annually. These contributions support local charities, such as The United Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.

除了由股东指定的捐款外，我们的运营企业每年还平均投入约 250 万美元用于本地慈善事业，包括实物捐赠。这些活动支持如“联合之路”（The United Way）等地方性慈善组织，并为我们的业务带来了大致相称的社会效益。

We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 50–51. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1994 will be ineligible for the 1994 program.

我们建议新股东阅读年报第 50 至 51 页关于股东指定捐款计划的详细说明。要参与未来的计划，请确保您的股份是以实际所有人的名义注册，而非以经纪人、银行或托管机构的名义登记。若股份未在 1994 年 8 月 31 日前完成实名登记，则无法参与 1994 年度计划。

# A Few Personal Items (一些个人轶事)

Mrs. B - Rose Blumkin - had her 100th birthday on December 3, 1993. (The candles cost more than the cake.) That was a day on which the store was scheduled to be open in the evening. Mrs. B, who works seven days a week, for however many hours the store operates, found the proper decision quite obvious: She simply postponed her party until an evening when the store was closed.

B 太太——Rose Blumkin——于 1993 年 12 月 3 日迎来了她的百岁生日。（蜡烛价格比蛋糕还贵。）那天晚上本应是内布拉斯加家具商场的营业时间。这位每周工作七天、每天与商场营业时间同步的老人果断决定：把庆祝活动推迟到商场不营业的晚上举行。

Mrs. B's story is well-known but worth telling again. She came to the United States 77 years ago, unable to speak English and devoid of formal schooling. In 1937, she founded the Nebraska Furniture Mart with $500. Last year the store had sales of $200 million, a larger amount by far than that recorded by any other home furnishings store in the United States. Our part in all of this began ten years ago when Mrs. B sold control of the business to Berkshire Hathaway, a deal we completed without obtaining audited financial statements, checking real estate records, or getting any warranties. In short, her word was good enough for us.

B 太太的故事广为人知，但值得再次讲述。77 年前她来到美国时不会说英语，也从未接受过正规教育。1937 年，她用 500 美元创立了内布拉斯加家具市场。去年这家店的销售额达到 2 亿美元，远远超过全美其他任何一家家居用品商店。十年前，B 太太将公司控制权出售给伯克希尔·哈撒韦，当时我们甚至没有要求审计财务报表、查验地产记录或获得任何形式担保。简而言之，她的承诺就足以让我们信任。

Naturally, I was delighted to attend Mrs. B's birthday party. After all, she's promised to attend my 100th.

我很高兴参加 B 太太的生日聚会。毕竟她已经答应会来参加我的百岁庆典。

Katharine Graham retired last year as the chairman of The Washington Post Company, having relinquished the CEO title three years ago. In 1973, we purchased our stock in her company for about $10 million. Our holding now garners $7 million a year in dividends and is worth over $400 million. At the time of our purchase, we knew that the economic prospects of the company were good. But equally important, Charlie and I concluded that Kay would prove to be an outstanding manager and would treat all shareholders honorably. That latter consideration was particularly important because The Washington Post Company has two classes of stock, a structure that we've seen some managers abuse.

凯瑟琳·格雷厄姆去年辞去了《华盛顿邮报》公司董事长一职，此前三年她已卸任首席执行官。1973 年，我们以约 1,000 万美元买入该公司股票。如今这笔投资每年带来 700 万美元股息收入，市值超过 4 亿美元。当年我们买入时就知道这家公司经济前景良好，但我们更看重的是查理和我都相信凯瑟琳是一位杰出的管理者，并且会公平对待所有股东。这一点尤其重要，因为《华盛顿邮报》公司拥有两类股份结构，而这种结构常被某些管理层滥用。

All of our judgments about this investment have been validated by events. Kay's skills as a manager were underscored this past year when she was elected by Fortune's Board of Editors to the Business Hall of Fame. On behalf of our shareholders, Charlie and I had long ago put her in Berkshire's Hall of Fame.

事实证明我们的判断完全正确。今年她被《财富》杂志编辑委员会选入商业名人堂，进一步印证了她作为管理者的非凡能力。代表我们的股东，查理和我早已把她列入伯克希尔的名人堂。

Another of last year's retirees was Don Keough of Coca-Cola, although, as he puts it, his retirement lasted "about 14 hours." Don is one of the most extraordinary human beings I've ever known — a man of enormous business talent, but, even more important, a man who brings out the absolute best in everyone lucky enough to associate with him. Coca-Cola wants its product to be present at the happy times of a person's life. Don Keough, as an individual, invariably increases the happiness of those around him. It's impossible to think about Don without feeling good.

另一位退休的企业领袖是可口可乐公司的唐·基奥（Don Keough），尽管他开玩笑说自己退休只持续了“14 小时”。他是我认识的最非凡人物之一：不仅具备卓越的商业才能，更重要的是他能激发每个有幸与他共事的人发挥出最佳状态。可口可乐希望其产品出现在人们人生的快乐时刻；而唐·基奥本人就是那个总能让身边人更加快乐的人。想起他就让人感到温暖。

I will edge up to how I met Don by slipping in a plug for my neighborhood in Omaha: Though Charlie has lived in California for 45 years, his home as a boy was about 200 feet away from the house where I now live; my wife, Susie, grew up 1 1/2 blocks away; and we have about 125 Berkshire shareholders in the zip code. As for Don, in 1958 he bought the house directly across the street from mine. He was then a coffee salesman with a big family and a small income.

借此机会我也想谈谈我们如何相识。让我先夸一下我在奥马哈的社区：虽然查理已在加州生活了 45 年，但他小时候的房子离我现在住的地方只有大约 60 米远；我妻子苏茜也在一个街区外长大；而且我们这个邮政编码区域里竟然有 125 位伯克希尔股东。至于唐·基奥，他在 1958 年买下了我家正对面的房子。那时他是一名咖啡销售员，家庭负担重，收入却不高。

The impressions I formed in those days about Don were a factor in my decision to have Berkshire make a record $1 billion investment in Coca-Cola in 1988–89. Roberto Goizueta had become CEO of Coke in 1981, with Don alongside as his partner. The two of them took hold of a company that had stagnated during the previous decade and moved it from $4.4 billion of market value to $58 billion in less than 13 years. What a difference a pair of managers like this makes, even when their product has been around for 100 years.

那些年我对唐留下的印象，成为我在 1988–89 年做出伯克希尔史上最大一笔投资（10 亿美元）的关键因素之一。1981 年，Roberto Goizueta 成为可口可乐 CEO，唐则是他的得力搭档。两人接手了一个停滞十年的公司，仅用了不到 13 年时间，便将其市值从 44 亿美元推升至 580 亿美元。即使是一项已有百年历史的产品，在这样的管理层手中也能焕发生机。

Frank Rooney did double duty last year. In addition to leading H.H. Brown to record profits – 35% above the 1992 high – he also was key to our merger with Dexter.

Frank Rooney 去年身兼两职。他不仅带领 H.H. Brown 创下利润新高——较 1992 年增长 35%——还在促成我们与达克斯特鞋业的合并中发挥了关键作用。

Frank has known Harold Alfond and Peter Lunder for decades, and shortly after our purchase of H.H. Brown, told me what a wonderful operation they managed. He encouraged us to get together and in due course we made a deal. Frank told Harold and Peter that Berkshire would provide an ideal corporate "home" for Dexter, and that assurance undoubtedly contributed to their decision to join with us.

Frank 与 Harold Alfond 和 Peter Lunder 已相识数十年，早在我们收购 H.H. Brown 不久后，他就向我推荐这两位企业家经营的公司非常出色。他鼓励我们合作，并最终促成了交易。Frank 向 Harold 和 Peter 承诺伯克希尔将是达克斯特的理想归属，这份保证无疑促成了他们的决定。

I've told you in the past of Frank's extraordinary record in building Melville Corp. during his 23-year tenure as CEO. Now, at 72, he's setting an even faster pace at Berkshire. Frank has a low-key, relaxed style, but don't let that fool you. When he swings, the ball disappears far over the fence.

过去我曾多次提到 Frank 在担任 Melville 公司 CEO 的 23 年间创造了非凡业绩。现在他已经 72 岁，在伯克希尔又设立了更快的步伐。Frank 的风格低调随和，但这并不意味着他不够犀利。当他挥棒时，球总是飞得很远很远。

# The Annual Meeting (年度股东大会)

This year the Annual Meeting will be held at the Orpheum Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 25, 1994. A record 2,200 people turned up for the meeting last year, but the theater can handle many more. We will have a display in the lobby featuring many of our consumer products - candy, spray guns, shoes, cutlery, encyclopedias, and the like. Among my favorites slated to be there is a See's candy assortment that commemorates Mrs. B's 100th birthday and that features her picture, rather than Mrs. See's, on the package.

今年的年度股东大会将于 1994 年 4 月 25 日周一上午 9:30 在奥马哈市中心的 Orpheum 剧院举行。去年我们吸引了创纪录的 2,200 名参会者，而今年这座剧院可以容纳更多观众。大会当天大堂将设有展示区，展出我们的消费品，包括糖果、喷枪、鞋子、餐具、百科全书等。我个人最喜欢的展品之一是一款纪念 B 太太百岁诞辰的 See’s 糖果礼盒，包装上印着她的照片，而不是传统的 See 夫人头像。

We recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations at one of these hotels: (1) The Radisson–Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2) the much larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk from the Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about 100 yards from Borsheim's, which is a twenty-minute drive from downtown. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting and return after it ends.

我们建议您尽早预订以下酒店之一：(1) Radisson–Redick Tower，位于剧院街对面的一家小型精品酒店（88 间客房）；(2) 规模更大的 Red Lion 酒店，步行约五分钟可达；(3) 距市中心约二十分钟车程的西奥马哈万豪酒店（Marriott），距离 Borsheim's 仅 100 码。我们将安排从万豪出发的大巴于会议日上午 8:30 和 8:45 出发前往会场，并在结束后返回。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With the admission card, we will enclose information about parking facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have to walk a few blocks.

代理投票材料附录中详细说明了您如何获取入场所需的门票卡。持卡人还将收到一份关于剧院附近停车场的信息。如果您自驾前来，请尽量早到，附近的车位很快就会满员，您可能需要步行几个街区。

# The Annual Meeting (年度股东大会) — 后续安排与活动

As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to downtown hotels or the airport later. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays. Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 24.

和往年一样，会议结束后我们会安排巴士送各位前往内布拉斯加家具市场（Nebraska Furniture Mart）和波仙珠宝店（Borsheim's），之后再从那里接送至市中心酒店或机场。提前到达的朋友可以在任何工作日参观家具市场；周六开放时间为上午 10 点至下午 5:30，周日则为中午 12 点至下午 5:30。Borsheim’s 周日通常不营业，但在 4 月 24 日周日将为股东及其客人特别开放，时间是中午 12 点至下午 6 点。

In past trips to Borsheim's, many of you have met Susan Jacques. Early in 1994, Susan was made President and CEO of the company, having risen in 11 years from a $4-an-hour job that she took at the store when she was 23. Susan will be joined at Borsheim's on Sunday by many of the managers of our other businesses, and Charlie and I will be there as well.

许多曾到访 Borsheim’s 的朋友可能已经认识 Susan Jacques。1994 年初，Susan 被任命为公司总裁兼首席执行官。她从 23 岁时在店里每小时 4 美元的普通员工做起，仅用 11 年便晋升至此高位。周日当天，她将在 Borsheim’s 与其他伯克希尔旗下企业的经理人一起迎接大家。查理和我也将到场。

On the previous evening, Saturday, April 23, there will be a baseball game at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and the Nashville Sounds (which could turn out to be Michael Jordan's team). As you may know, a few years ago I bought 25% of the Royals (a capital-allocation decision for which I will not become famous) and this year the league has cooperatively scheduled a home stand at Annual Meeting time.

前一天晚上——4 月 23 日星期六——在 Rosenblatt 体育场将有一场棒球赛，对阵双方是奥马哈皇家队（Omaha Royals）与纳什维尔声音队（Nashville Sounds）（后者有可能成为迈克尔·乔丹的球队）。你们或许知道，几年前我购买了皇家队 25% 的股份（这项资本配置决定不会让我成名）。今年联盟也特意配合我们的年会时间安排了主场赛事。

I will throw the first pitch on the 23rd, and it's a certainty that I will improve on last year's humiliating performance. On that occasion, the catcher inexplicably called for my "sinker" and I dutifully delivered a pitch that barely missed my foot. This year, I will go with my high hard one regardless of what the catcher signals, so bring your speed-timing devices. The proxy statement will include information about obtaining tickets to the game. I regret to report that you won't have to buy them from scalpers.

4 月 23 日我将为比赛开球，并且我可以肯定地说这次表现一定会比去年那场丢脸的表现要好得多。去年接球手莫名其妙地要求我投“下沉球”，结果我一出手差点砸到自己的脚。今年不管接球手怎么示意，我会坚持使用我的高速直球，请带上测速仪器来见证。代理投票声明中将附有获取比赛门票的信息。令人遗憾的是——但也是好消息——你们不需要从黄牛手中购票。

Warren E. Buffett
March 1, 1994
Chairman of the Board

编辑

上次更新: 2025/07/14, 21:42:27

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