2019巴菲特致股东的信
# BERK希尔·哈撒韦公司
# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our gain in net worth during 2009 was $21.8 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 19.8%. Over the last 45 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $84,487, a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.*
在2009年，我们的净资产价值增长了218亿美元，这使得我们A类和B类股票的每股账面价值均增长了19.8%。在过去45年中（也就是自现任管理层接管以来），账面价值已从每股19美元增长到84,487美元，年复合增长率达20.3%。
Berkshire’s recent acquisition of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) has added at least 65,000 shareholders to the 500,000 or so already on our books. It’s important to Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and me that all of our owners understand Berkshire’s operations, goals, limitations and culture. In each annual report, consequently, we restate the economic principles that guide us. This year these principles appear on pages 89-94 and I urge all of you – but particularly our new shareholders – to read them. Berkshire has adhered to these principles for decades and will continue to do so long after I’m gone.
伯克希尔最近收购了伯灵顿北方圣太菲铁路公司（BNSF），这至少为我们新增了65,000名股东，使我们原本约50万名股东的队伍更加庞大。对我长期的合作伙伴查理·芒格和我来说，所有我们的股东都能理解伯克希尔的运营、目标、限制与文化至关重要。因此，在每份年度报告中，我们都会重申指导我们的经济原则。今年这些原则列于第89至94页，我敦促各位——尤其是新加入的股东们——务必阅读它们。几十年来，伯克希尔一直坚持这些原则，并将在我不在之后继续遵守下去。
In this letter we will also review some of the basics of our business, hoping to provide both a freshman orientation session for our BNSF newcomers and a refresher course for Berkshire veterans.
在这封信中，我们也将回顾一些业务的基本内容，希望为BNSF的新股东提供入门指南，也为伯克希尔的老股东温故知新。
# 我们如何衡量自身表现
# How We Measure Ourselves
Our metrics for evaluating our managerial performance are displayed on the facing page. From the start, Charlie and I have believed in having a rational and unbending standard for measuring what we have – or have not – accomplished. That keeps us from the temptation of seeing where the arrow of performance lands and then painting the bull’s eye around it.
用于评估我们管理绩效的指标展示在下一页。从一开始，查理和我都坚信必须有一个理性且坚定不移的标准来衡量我们已经取得（或尚未取得）的成果。这使我们免于看到业绩箭头落在哪里后才临时画上靶心的诱惑。
Selecting the S&P 500 as our bogey was an easy choice because our shareholders, at virtually no cost, can match its performance by holding an index fund. Why should they pay us for merely duplicating that result?
将标普500指数作为比较基准是一个很容易的选择，因为我们的股东几乎无需任何成本，只需持有指数基金就能复制该指数的表现。如果只是重复这一结果，他们又何必付钱给我们？
A more difficult decision for us was how to measure the progress of Berkshire versus the S&P. There are good arguments for simply using the change in our stock price. Over an extended period of time, in fact, that is the best test. But year-to-year market prices can be extraordinarily erratic. Even evaluations covering as long as a decade can be greatly distorted by foolishly high or low prices at the beginning or end of the measurement period. Steve Ballmer, of Microsoft, and Jeff Immelt, of GE, can tell you about that problem, suffering as they do from the nosebleed prices at which their stocks traded when they were handed the managerial baton.
对我们来说更难的一个决定是如何衡量伯克希尔相对于标普500指数的进步。有人认为直接使用股价变动来衡量是合理的。事实上，从长期来看，这是最好的测试方法。但年复一年的市场价格可能极其不稳定。即使是覆盖十年时间的评估，也可能因测量期开始或结束时过高或过低的价格而严重失真。微软的史蒂夫·鲍尔默和通用电气的杰夫·伊梅尔特对此深有体会，因为他们接手公司时股价正处于高得离谱的水平。
The ideal standard for measuring our yearly progress would be the change in Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value. Alas, that value cannot be calculated with anything close to precision, so we instead use a crude proxy for it: per-share book value. Relying on this yardstick has its shortcomings, which we discuss on pages 92 and 93. Additionally, book value at most companies understates intrinsic value, and that is certainly the case at Berkshire. In aggregate, our businesses are worth considerably more than the values at which they are carried on our books. In our all-important insurance business, moreover, the difference is huge. Even so, Charlie and I believe that our book value – understated though it is – supplies the most useful tracking device for changes in intrinsic value. By this measurement, as the opening paragraph of this letter states, our book value since the start of fiscal 1965 has grown at a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.
衡量我们每年进步的理想标准应是伯克希尔每股内在价值的变化。遗憾的是，这个价值无法精确计算，因此我们采用了一个粗略的替代指标：每股账面价值。依赖这个标准确实存在缺陷，我们在第92和93页会加以讨论。此外，大多数公司的账面价值都低于其内在价值，伯克希尔也不例外。总体而言，我们的企业实际价值远高于账面上所记录的价值。尤其在我们最重要的保险业务方面，这种差距尤为显著。尽管如此，查理和我相信，我们的账面价值——即使被低估了——仍是追踪内在价值变化最有用的工具。正如本信开头所述，按这一标准衡量，自1965财年以来，我们的账面价值以年均20.3%的速度复合增长。
*All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
*本报告中所有每股数据均适用于伯克希尔A类股。B类股的数据为A类股的1/1500。
We should note that had we instead chosen market prices as our yardstick, Berkshire’s results would look better, showing a gain since the start of fiscal 1965 of 22% compounded annually. Surprisingly, this modest difference in annual compounding rate leads to an 801,516% market-value gain for the entire 45-year period compared to the book-value gain of 434,057% (shown on page 2). Our market gain is better because in 1965 Berkshire shares sold at an appropriate discount to the book value of its underearning textile assets, whereas today Berkshire shares regularly sell at a premium to the accounting values of its first-class businesses.
我们还应注意，如果我们当初选择市场价格作为衡量标准，伯克希尔的表现看起来会更好。自1965财年开始，年复合增长率将达到22%。令人惊讶的是，年化增长率上这点微小差异，在整个45年间却导致市值增长达到惊人的801,516%，相比之下，账面价值的增长为434,057%（见第2页）。我们的市值增长更高是因为在1965年，伯克希尔的股票是以对其盈利能力不足的纺织资产账面价值适当折价的价格出售的，而如今伯克希尔的股票通常以其一流业务会计价值的溢价交易。
Summed up, the table on page 2 conveys three messages, two positive and one hugely negative. First, we have never had any five-year period beginning with 1965-69 and ending with 2005-09 – and there have been 41 of these – during which our gain in book value did not exceed the S&P’s gain. Second, though we have lagged the S&P in some years that were positive for the market, we have consistently done better than the S&P in the eleven years during which it delivered negative results. In other words, our defense has been better than our offense, and that’s likely to continue.
总结一下，第2页的表格传达了三个信息，其中两个是正面的，一个是极为负面的。首先，从1965-1969年开始直到2005-2009为止，共有41个五年时间段，而我们的账面价值增长从未落后于标普500指数。其次，尽管在市场整体上涨的某些年份里我们落后于标普500指数，但在标普500指数下跌的11年中，我们始终表现优于它。换句话说，我们的防守优于进攻，这种情况很可能还会持续。
The big minus is that our performance advantage has shrunk dramatically as our size has grown, an unpleasant trend that is certain to continue. To be sure, Berkshire has many outstanding businesses and a cadre of truly great managers, operating within an unusual corporate culture that lets them maximize their talents. Charlie and I believe these factors will continue to produce better-than-average results over time. But huge sums forge their own anchor and our future advantage, if any, will be a small fraction of our historical edge.
最大的负面因素是，随着公司规模的扩大，我们的业绩优势已大幅缩小，这是一个令人不快的趋势，而且必将持续。当然，伯克希尔拥有很多卓越的企业和一批真正杰出的管理者，他们在一种独特的企业文化中运作，能够充分发挥他们的才能。查理和我相信，随着时间推移，这些因素将继续带来优于平均水平的结果。但庞大的体量自带阻力，未来我们若还有优势，也仅会是我们历史优势的一小部分。
# 我们不做的事情
# What We Don’t Do
Long ago, Charlie laid out his strongest ambition: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there.” That bit of wisdom was inspired by Jacobi, the great Prussian mathematician, who counseled “Invert, always invert” as an aid to solving difficult problems. (I can report as well that this inversion approach works on a less lofty level: Sing a country song in reverse, and you will quickly recover your car, house and wife.)
很久以前，查理曾表达过他最强烈的一个愿望：“我只想知道我会死在哪里，这样我就永远不会去那里。”这个智慧的灵感来自伟大的普鲁士数学家雅可比（Jacobi），他曾建议人们“倒过来想，总是倒过来想”，以帮助解决难题。（我也可以说，在一个没那么高深的层面上，这种逆向思维也有效：把一首乡村歌曲倒着唱，你就能迅速找回你的车、房子和妻子。）
Here are a few examples of how we apply Charlie’s thinking at Berkshire:
以下是我们如何在伯克希尔应用查理思维方式的一些例子：
• Charlie and I avoid businesses whose futures we can’t evaluate, no matter how exciting their products may be. In the past, it required no brilliance for people to foresee the fabulous growth that awaited such industries as autos (in 1910), aircraft (in 1930) and television sets (in 1950). But the future then also included competitive dynamics that would decimate almost all of the companies entering those industries. Even the survivors tended to come away bleeding.
• 查理和我都会避开那些我们无法评估其未来的企业，无论它们的产品多么令人兴奋。过去，人们并不需要多聪明就能预见到汽车行业（1910年）、航空业（1930年）和电视机行业（1950年）将经历的巨大增长。但当时的未来还包括激烈的竞争动态，几乎摧毁了所有进入这些行业的公司。即使是幸存下来的企业，往往也伤痕累累。
Just because Charlie and I can clearly see dramatic growth ahead for an industry does not mean we can judge what its profit margins and returns on capital will be as a host of competitors battle for supremacy. At Berkshire we will stick with businesses whose profit picture for decades to come seems reasonably predictable. Even then, we will make plenty of mistakes.
仅仅因为查理和我能清楚地看到某个行业即将迎来惊人的增长，并不意味着我们能判断在众多竞争者争夺主导地位的过程中，该行业的利润率和资本回报率会是多少。在伯克希尔，我们会专注于那些未来几十年利润前景相对可预测的企业。即便如此，我们也会犯很多错误。
• We will never become dependent on the kindness of strangers. Too-big-to-fail is not a fallback position at Berkshire. Instead, we will always arrange our affairs so that any requirements for cash we may conceivably have will be dwarfed by our own liquidity. Moreover, that liquidity will be constantly refreshed by a gusher of earnings from our many and diverse businesses.
• 我们永远不会依赖陌生人的善意。在伯克希尔，“大而不倒”从来不是我们的备选策略。相反，我们总会妥善安排，使我们可能需要的任何现金需求与自身充足的流动性相比都微不足道。此外，这种流动性将持续由我们众多且多元化的业务所带来的盈利不断更新补充。
When the financial system went into cardiac arrest in September 2008, Berkshire was a supplier of liquidity and capital to the system, not a supplicant. At the very peak of the crisis, we poured $15.5 billion into a business world that could otherwise look only to the federal government for help. Of that, $9 billion went to bolster capital at three highly-regarded and previously-secure American businesses that needed – without delay – our tangible vote of confidence. The remaining $6.5 billion satisfied our commitment to help fund the purchase of Wrigley, a deal that was completed without pause while, elsewhere, panic reigned.
2008年9月金融危机达到顶峰时，伯克希尔是向系统提供流动性和资本的一方，而非求助者。危机最严重之时，我们向商业世界投入了155亿美元，否则这些企业只能指望联邦政府来救助。其中90亿美元用于增强三家备受尊敬、此前财务稳健的美国企业的资本金，它们急需我们的实质性支持。剩下的65亿美元则兑现了我们对资助收购箭牌（Wrigley）的承诺——这笔交易在市场一片恐慌中顺利达成，未受干扰。
We pay a steep price to maintain our premier financial strength. The $20 billion-plus of cash-equivalent assets that we customarily hold is earning a pittance at present. But we sleep well.
为了维持顶级的财务实力，我们必须付出高昂代价。我们通常持有的超过200亿美元的现金等价资产目前收益微薄。但我们依然可以安心入睡。
• We tend to let our many subsidiaries operate on their own, without our supervising and monitoring them to any degree. That means we are sometimes late in spotting management problems and that both operating and capital decisions are occasionally made with which Charlie and I would have disagreed had we been consulted. Most of our managers, however, use the independence we grant them magnificently, rewarding our confidence by maintaining an owner-oriented attitude that is invaluable and too seldom found in huge organizations. We would rather suffer the visible costs of a few bad decisions than incur the many invisible costs that come from decisions made too slowly – or not at all – because of a stifling bureaucracy.
• 我们倾向于让旗下众多子公司自主运营，不会进行任何程度的监督或监控。这意味着我们有时会较晚发现管理问题，一些经营和资本决策也可能是在未经我们同意的情况下做出的。然而，大多数经理人出色地运用了我们赋予他们的独立性，他们保持了股东导向的态度，这极其宝贵，在大型组织中却很少见。我们宁愿承受少数糟糕决策带来的可见成本，也不愿因官僚主义导致决策缓慢甚至无法决策而承担许多隐形成本。
With our acquisition of BNSF, we now have about 257,000 employees and literally hundreds of different operating units. We hope to have many more of each. But we will never allow Berkshire to become some monolith that is overrun with committees, budget presentations and multiple layers of management. Instead, we plan to operate as a collection of separately-managed medium-sized and large businesses, most of whose decision-making occurs at the operating level. Charlie and I will limit ourselves to allocating capital, controlling enterprise risk, choosing managers and setting their compensation.
随着对BNSF的收购，我们现在拥有约257,000名员工和数百个不同的运营单位。我们希望未来拥有更多。但我们绝不会让伯克希尔变成一个被委员会、预算汇报和多重管理层充斥的庞然大物。相反，我们计划以多个独立管理的中型和大型企业集合的方式运作，绝大多数决策都在运营层面做出。查理和我本人将专注于资本配置、控制企业风险、选择经理人以及设定薪酬。
• We make no attempt to woo Wall Street. Investors who buy and sell based upon media or analyst commentary are not for us. Instead we want partners who join us at Berkshire because they wish to make a long-term investment in a business they themselves understand and because it’s one that follows policies with which they concur.
• 我们从不刻意讨好华尔街。我们不需要那些仅凭媒体或分析师评论就买入或卖出股票的投资者。我们想要的是真正的合作伙伴，他们加入伯克希尔是因为他们希望长期投资于一家自己理解的企业，并认同这家企业的政策。
If Charlie and I were to go into a small venture with a few partners, we would seek individuals in sync with us, knowing that common goals and a shared destiny make for a happy business “marriage” between owners and managers. Scaling up to giant size doesn’t change that truth.
如果查理和我要与几位合伙人共同创办一家小企业，我们会寻找与我们理念一致的人，因为我们深知共同的目标和命运才能促成股东与管理者之间愉快的“商业婚姻”。即使企业规模扩大到巨大程度，这一真理也不会改变。
To build a compatible shareholder population, we try to communicate with our owners directly and informatively. Our goal is to tell you what we would like to know if our positions were reversed. Additionally, we try to post our quarterly and annual financial information on the Internet early on weekends, thereby giving you and other investors plenty of time during a non-trading period to digest just what has happened at our multi-faceted enterprise. (Occasionally, SEC deadlines force a non-Friday disclosure.) These matters simply can’t be adequately summarized in a few paragraphs, nor do they lend themselves to the kind of catchy headline that journalists sometimes seek.
为了建立一个志同道合的股东群体，我们努力以直接且信息丰富的方式与股东沟通。我们的目标是告诉你们，如果我们互换角色，我们也希望了解的信息。此外，我们尽量在周末尽早公布季度和年度财务信息，以便你们和其他投资者在非交易期间有充足时间了解我们这个多元化企业的真实情况。（偶尔由于SEC披露截止日期的要求，我们不得不在非周五发布。）这些内容无法用几段话概括清楚，也无法提炼成记者们常追求的那种吸引眼球的标题。
Last year we saw, in one instance, how sound-bite reporting can go wrong. Among the 12,830 words in the annual letter was this sentence: “We are certain, for example, that the economy will be in shambles throughout 2009 – and probably well beyond – but that conclusion does not tell us whether the market will rise or fall.” Many news organizations reported – indeed, blared – the first part of the sentence while making no mention whatsoever of its ending. I regard this as terrible journalism: Misinformed readers or viewers may well have thought that Charlie and I were forecasting bad things for the stock market, though we had not only in that sentence, but also elsewhere, made it clear we weren’t predicting the market at all. Any investors who were misled by the sensationalists paid a big price: The Dow closed the day of the letter at 7,063 and finished the year at 10,428.
去年我们亲身经历了简短报道（sound-bite）如何误导公众的例子。在年报长达12,830字的内容中，有一句话写道：“例如，我们可以确定经济将在整个2009年乃至更长时间内处于混乱状态，但这一结论并不能告诉我们市场会上涨还是下跌。”许多新闻机构只强调并放大了这句话的前半部分，完全忽略了后半句。我认为这是非常糟糕的新闻报道：不明真相的读者或观众可能会误以为查理和我在预测股市前景不佳，尽管我们在那句话及其它地方都明确表示我们根本没有预测市场走势。任何被这类耸动报道误导的投资者付出了惨重代价：道琼斯指数在信发布的当天收盘于7,063点，年底则收于10,428点。
Given a few experiences we’ve had like that, you can understand why I prefer that our communications with you remain as direct and unabridged as possible.
有了类似这样的几次经历，你就能理解为什么我始终坚持与你们的沟通尽可能直接且完整无缺。
Let’s move to the specifics of Berkshire’s operations. We have four major operating sectors, each differing from the others in balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together, as is standard in financial statements, impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
现在让我们进入伯克希尔运营的具体细节。我们有四大主要运营板块，每个板块在资产负债表和损益账户特征上各不相同。因此，像财务报表中常见的那样将它们合并在一起，会妨碍分析。我们将它们作为四个独立业务分别呈现，这也是查理和我们看待它们的方式。
# 保险业务
# Insurance
Our property-casualty (P/C) insurance business has been the engine behind Berkshire’s growth and will continue to be. It has worked wonders for us. We carry our P/C companies on our books at $15.5 billion more than their net tangible assets, an amount lodged in our “Goodwill” account. These companies, however, are worth far more than their carrying value – and the following look at the economic model of the P/C industry will tell you why.
我们的财产与意外险（P/C）业务一直是伯克希尔增长的引擎，并将继续如此。它为我们带来了奇迹般的效果。我们在账面上将这些P/C公司的价值记录为比其有形净资产高出155亿美元，这一差额计入我们的“商誉”账户。然而，这些公司实际价值远高于账面价值——以下对P/C行业经济模型的分析将告诉你原因。
Insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float.
保险公司先收取保费，之后才支付理赔。在某些极端情况下，例如某些工伤赔偿事故，赔付可能持续数十年。这种“现在收钱、以后付款”的模式让我们持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——这笔钱最终会流向他人。但在此期间，我们可以为伯克希尔的利益投资这些浮存金。尽管个别保单和理赔不断变化，我们所持有的浮存金额相对于保费规模而言却保持出奇稳定。因此，随着业务的增长，我们的浮存金也随之增长。
If premiums exceed the total of expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income produced from the float. This combination allows us to enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the hope of this happy result attracts intense competition, so vigorous in most years as to cause the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Usually this cost is fairly low, but in some catastrophe-ridden years the cost from underwriting losses more than eats up the income derived from use of float.
如果保费收入超过费用与最终理赔损失总额，我们就实现了承保利润，这将增加来自浮存金的投资收益。这种组合使我们得以使用“免费资金”，更妙的是，我们还能因持有这些资金而获得报酬。遗憾的是，这种美好结果的前景吸引了激烈的竞争，以至于大多数年份中，整个P/C行业整体上都处于显著的承保亏损状态。实际上，这种亏损就是该行业为持有浮存金所付出的代价。通常这种成本并不高，但在一些灾难频发的年份里，承保亏损的成本甚至会吞噬掉浮存金带来的投资收益。
In my perhaps biased view, Berkshire has the best large insurance operation in the world. And I will absolutely state that we have the best managers. Our float has grown from $16 million in 1967, when we entered the business, to $62 billion at the end of 2009. Moreover, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for seven consecutive years. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most – though certainly not all – future years. If we do so, our float will be cost-free, much as if someone deposited $62 billion with us that we could invest for our own benefit without the payment of interest.
或许我有些偏见，但我认为伯克希尔拥有全球最出色的大型保险运营体系。我可以毫不夸张地说，我们拥有最优秀的经理人。我们的浮存金从1967年进入保险业时的1,600万美元，已增长至2009年底的620亿美元。此外，我们已经连续七年实现承保盈利。我相信，在未来多数年份（当然并非所有年份），我们仍将持续盈利性承保。如果我们确实能做到这一点，那我们的浮存金就相当于零成本，就像有人把620亿美元存入我们这里，我们可以用来投资获利，而无需支付任何利息。
Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not a result to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of that achieved by the S&P 500. Outstanding economics exist at Berkshire only because we have some outstanding managers running some unusual businesses. Our insurance CEOs deserve your thanks, having added many billions of dollars to Berkshire’s value. It’s a pleasure for me to tell you about these all-stars.
请允许我再次强调：零成本浮存金并非整个P/C行业可以期待的结果。多年来，大多数年份的保费收入都不足以覆盖理赔与费用支出。因此，整个行业的有形权益回报率长期远远落后于标普500指数的表现。伯克希尔之所以能拥有如此优异的经济表现，仅仅是因为我们拥有一群杰出的管理者在经营一些非同寻常的企业。我们的保险业务CEO们值得你们的感谢，他们为伯克希尔创造了数千亿美元的价值。我很高兴向各位介绍这些明星人物。
Let’s start at GEICO, which is known to all of you because of its $800 million annual advertising budget (close to twice that of the runner-up advertiser in the auto insurance field). GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18. Now 66, Tony still tap-dances to the office every day, just as I do at 79. We both feel lucky to work at a business we love.
让我们从GEICO开始谈起，你们所有人都知道这家公司，因为它每年高达8亿美元的广告预算（几乎是汽车保险领域第二大广告主的两倍）。GEICO由Tony Nicely管理，他18岁加入公司。现年66岁的Tony每天仍然像我79岁时一样，轻快地跳着舞步去上班。我们都感到幸运，能在自己热爱的事业中工作。
GEICO’s customers have warm feelings toward the company as well. Here’s proof: Since Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its market share has increased from 2.5% to 8.1%, a gain reflecting the net addition of seven million policyholders. Perhaps they contacted us because they thought our gecko was cute, but they bought from us to save important money. (Maybe you can as well; call 1-800-847-7536 or go to www.GEICO.com.) And they’ve stayed with us because they like our service as well as our price.
GEICO的客户对公司也有着深厚的感情。证据如下：自伯克希尔于1996年取得GEICO控制权以来，其市场份额从2.5%上升到了8.1%，净增七百万投保人。也许他们最初联系我们是因为觉得我们的壁虎吉祥物很可爱，但他们选择购买我们的产品是为了节省大笔开支。（也许你也可以；拨打1-800-847-7536或访问www.GEICO.com。）而他们继续留下，是因为他们不仅喜欢我们的价格，也喜欢我们的服务。
Berkshire acquired GEICO in two stages. In 1976-80 we bought about one-third of the company’s stock for $47 million. Over the years, large repurchases by the company of its own shares caused our position to grow to about 50% without our having bought any more shares. Then, on January 2, 1996, we acquired the remaining 50% of GEICO for $2.3 billion in cash, about 50 times the cost of our original purchase.
伯克希尔分两个阶段收购了GEICO。1976年至1980年间，我们以4,700万美元购入了约三分之一的公司股份。此后多年，公司自身进行了大量回购，使我们的持股比例自然增长到约50%，期间我们并未再买入股票。随后，在1996年1月2日，我们以23亿美元现金收购了剩余的50%股权，约为原始投资成本的50倍。
An old Wall Street joke gets close to our experience:
一个华尔街的老笑话恰好描述了我们的经历：
Customer:
Thanks for putting me in XYZ stock at 5. I hear it’s up to 18.
Broker:
Yes, and that’s just the beginning. In fact, the company is doing so well now, that it’s an even better buy at 18 than it was when you made your purchase.
Customer:
Damn, I knew I should have waited.
顾客：
谢谢你当初让我以5美元买进XYZ股票。听说现在已经涨到18美元了。
经纪人：
是的，这才刚刚开始。事实上，公司现在的表现这么好，18美元买进比你当初买的时候更划算。
顾客：
该死，我就知道应该再等等的。
GEICO’s growth may slow in 2010. U.S. vehicle registrations are actually down because of slumping auto sales. Moreover, high unemployment is causing a growing number of drivers to go uninsured. (That’s illegal almost everywhere, but if you’ve lost your job and still want to drive . . .) Our “low-cost producer” status, however, is sure to give us significant gains in the future. In 1995, GEICO was the country’s sixth largest auto insurer; now we are number three. The company’s float has grown from $2.7 billion to $9.6 billion. Equally important, GEICO has operated at an underwriting profit in 13 of the 14 years Berkshire has owned it.
GEICO在2010年的增长可能会放缓。由于汽车销售下滑，美国车辆注册数量实际上正在下降。此外，高失业率导致越来越多的司机选择不投保。（这在几乎每个地方都是非法的，但如果你丢了工作还想开车……）然而，我们“低成本生产商”的地位必将为我们带来未来的显著增长。1995年，GEICO还是美国第六大汽车保险公司；如今我们已是第三名。它的浮存金从27亿美元增长到了96亿美元。同样重要的是，在伯克希尔拥有GEICO的14年中，它在其中13年实现了承保盈利。
I became excited about GEICO in January 1951, when I first visited the company as a 20-year-old student. Thanks to Tony, I’m even more excited today.
1951年1月，我还是一个20岁的学生，第一次拜访GEICO时，我就对它产生了浓厚兴趣。多亏了Tony，今天我对它的热情甚至更高了。
A hugely important event in Berkshire’s history occurred on a Saturday in 1985. Ajit Jain came into our office in Omaha – and I immediately knew we had found a superstar. (He had been discovered by Mike Goldberg, now elevated to St. Mike.)
1985年的一个周六，伯克希尔历史上一次极为重要的事件发生了。Ajit Jain走进了我们在奥马哈的办公室——我立刻意识到我们找到了一位超级明星。（他是Mike Goldberg发现的，如今我尊称他为“圣迈克”。）
We immediately put Ajit in charge of National Indemnity’s small and struggling reinsurance operation. Over the years, he has built this business into a one-of-a-kind giant in the insurance world.
我们立即任命Ajit负责国家赔款公司（National Indemnity）旗下小型且困难重重的再保险业务。多年来，他将这项业务打造成了保险界独一无二的巨无霸。
Staffed today by only 30 people, Ajit’s operation has set records for transaction size in several areas of insurance. Ajit writes billion-dollar limits – and then keeps every dime of the risk instead of laying it off with other insurers. Three years ago, he took over huge liabilities from Lloyds, allowing it to clean up its relationship with 27,972 participants (“names”) who had written problem-ridden policies that at one point threatened the survival of this 322-year-old institution. The premium for that single contract was $7.1 billion. During 2009, he negotiated a life reinsurance contract that could produce $50 billion of premium for us over the next 50 or so years.
如今，Ajit的团队仅有30人，但他在多个保险领域的交易规模创下了纪录。Ajit敢于承保数十亿美元级别的风险——而且他选择自行承担全部风险，而不是将其转嫁给其他保险公司。三年前，他接手了劳合社（Lloyds）的巨额负债，帮助这家有着322年历史的机构摆脱困境，使其与27,972名参与者（即“投保人”）之间的问题保单关系得以理清，那些保单曾一度威胁到该机构的生存。这份合同的保费高达71亿美元。2009年，他谈判达成了一项人寿再保险合约，预计在未来大约50年内为我们带来500亿美元的保费收入。
Ajit’s business is just the opposite of GEICO’s. At that company, we have millions of small policies that largely renew year after year. Ajit writes relatively few policies, and the mix changes significantly from year to year. Throughout the world, he is known as the man to call when something both very large and unusual needs to be insured.
Ajit的业务与GEICO正好相反。在GEICO，我们拥有数以百万计的小型保单，大部分年年续保。而Ajit签发的保单数量相对较少，且每年的业务构成差异很大。在全球范围内，当需要为某种既巨大又异常的风险提供保障时，人们都知道应该找谁——那就是Ajit。
If Charlie, I and Ajit are ever in a sinking boat – and you can only save one of us – swim to Ajit.
如果有一天查理、我和Ajit一起落水，而你只能救一个人——那就游向Ajit吧。
Our third insurance powerhouse is General Re. Some years back this operation was troubled; now it is a gleaming jewel in our insurance crown.
我们的第三个保险巨头是通用再保险公司（General Re）。几年前，这家公司曾陷入困境；如今，它已成为我们保险皇冠上的一颗璀璨明珠。
Under the leadership of Tad Montross, General Re had an outstanding underwriting year in 2009, while also delivering us unusually large amounts of float per dollar of premium volume. Alongside General Re’s P/C business, Tad and his associates have developed a major life reinsurance operation that has grown increasingly valuable.
在Tad Montross的领导下，通用再保险在2009年实现了卓越的承保业绩，同时每美元保费所带来的浮存金也异常丰厚。除了P/C业务外，Tad和他的团队还发展了一个重要的寿险再保险业务，其价值日益提升。
Last year General Re finally attained 100% ownership of Cologne Re, which since 1995 has been a key – though only partially-owned – part of our presence around the world. Tad and I will be visiting Cologne in September to thank its managers for their important contribution to Berkshire.
去年，通用再保险终于取得了科隆再保险公司（Cologne Re）的完全所有权。自1995年以来，该公司虽然只是部分归属于我们，但一直是我们全球布局中的关键一环。今年九月，Tad和我将前往科隆，感谢那里的管理层为伯克希尔做出的重要贡献。
Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.
最后，我们拥有一组规模较小的公司，其中大多数专注于保险领域中的特殊细分市场。总体而言，它们的业绩一直保持盈利，如下表所示，它们为我们提供的浮存金也相当可观。查理和我非常珍视这些公司及其管理者。
Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:
Underwriting Profit (承保利润) | Year-end Float (in millions) (年末浮存金额，单位：百万美元)
Insurance Operations (保险业务板块) | 2009 | 2008 | 2009 | 2008
General Re...................... | $477 | $342 | $21,014 | $21,074
BH Reinsurance.................. | 349 | 1,324 | 26,223 | 24,221
GEICO......................... | 649 | 916 | 9,613 | 8,454
Other Primary................... | 84 | 210 | 5,061 | 4,739
Total (总计) | $1,559 | $2,792 | $61,911 | $58,488
这是我们财产与意外险及寿险业务四大板块的记录：
承保利润 | 年末浮存金额（单位：百万美元）
保险业务板块 | 2009年 | 2008年 | 2009年 | 2008年
通用再保险（General Re） | 4.77亿美元 | 3.42亿美元 | 210.14亿美元 | 210.74亿美元
伯克希尔再保险（BH Reinsurance） | 3.49亿美元 | 13.24亿美元 | 262.23亿美元 | 242.21亿美元
GEICO | 6.49亿美元 | 9.16亿美元 | 96.13亿美元 | 84.54亿美元
其他直保公司（Other Primary） | 0.84亿美元 | 2.10亿美元 | 50.61亿美元 | 47.39亿美元
总计 | 15.59亿美元 | 27.92亿美元 | 619.11亿美元 | 584.88亿美元
And now a painful confession: Last year your chairman closed the book on a very expensive business fiasco entirely of his own making.
现在我要坦白一个令人痛心的教训：去年，你们的董事长亲手终结了一项代价高昂的失败商业决策。
For many years I had struggled to think of side products that we could offer our millions of loyal GEICO customers. Unfortunately, I finally succeeded, coming up with a brilliant insight that we should market our own credit card. I reasoned that GEICO policyholders were likely to be good credit risks and, assuming we offered an attractive card, would likely favor us with their business. We got business all right – but of the wrong type.
多年来，我一直在苦思冥想，如何为我们的数百万忠实GEICO客户拓展副业产品。不幸的是，我终于“成功”了——我提出一个“绝妙”建议：推出我们自己的信用卡。我推断GEICO投保人可能信用风险较低，如果我们提供一张有吸引力的信用卡，他们很可能会选择支持我们。确实，我们获得了业务——但却是错误类型的客户。
Our pre-tax losses from credit-card operations came to about $6.3 million before I finally woke up. We then sold our $98 million portfolio of troubled receivables for 55¢ on the dollar, losing an additional $44 million.
在幡然醒悟之前，我们的信用卡业务税前亏损已达约630万美元。随后，我们将价值9,800万美元的不良应收账款以每美元面值仅55美分的价格出售，又额外损失了4,400万美元。
GEICO’s managers, it should be emphasized, were never enthusiastic about my idea. They warned me that instead of getting the cream of GEICO’s customers we would get the – – – – – well, let’s call it the non-cream. I subtly indicated that I was older and wiser.
必须强调的是，GEICO的管理层从未对我的想法表示过热情。他们警告我，我们吸引来的不会是GEICO最优质的客户群体——而是……好吧，姑且称为“非优质客户”。我含蓄地表示自己更年长、更睿智。
I was just older.
我只是更老而已。
# 受监管的公用事业业务
# Regulated Utility Business
Berkshire has an 89.5% interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million end users make it the U.K.’s third largest distributor of electricity; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 725,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.
伯克希尔持有中美能源控股公司（MidAmerican Energy Holdings）89.5%的权益，该公司拥有多种公用事业运营资产。其中最大的包括：(1) 约克郡电力公司（Yorkshire Electricity）和北方电力公司（Northern Electric），其380万终端用户使其成为英国第三大电力分销商；(2) 中美能源公司（MidAmerican Energy），主要服务于爱荷华州的725,000名电力客户；(3) 太平洋电力公司（Pacific Power）和落基山电力公司（Rocky Mountain Power），在西部六个州服务约170万电力客户；(4) Kern River和Northern Natural天然气管道公司，承担了美国约8%的天然气消耗运输。
MidAmerican has two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. In addition, my long-time friend, Walter Scott, along with his family, has a major ownership position in the company. Walter brings extraordinary business savvy to any operation. Ten years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have reinforced my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners. They are truly a dream team.
中美能源拥有两位卓越的管理者——Dave Sokol和Greg Abel。此外，我的长期好友Walter Scott及其家族也持有公司重要股份。Walter为任何业务都带来了非凡的商业洞察力。与Dave、Greg和Walter共事十年的经历进一步坚定了我的信念：伯克希尔找不到比他们更好的合作伙伴。他们确实是一支梦幻团队。
Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 21 locally-branded firms that have 16,000 agents. Though last year was again a terrible year for home sales, HomeServices earned a modest sum. It also acquired a firm in Chicago and will add other quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices. A decade from now, HomeServices is likely to be much larger.
略显突兀的是，中美能源还拥有美国第二大房地产经纪公司HomeServices of America。该公司通过21个本地品牌公司运营，拥有16,000名经纪人。尽管去年房地产销售依然低迷，HomeServices仍实现了微薄盈利。它还在芝加哥收购了一家公司，并将在价格合理时继续收购优质经纪业务。十年后，HomeServices的规模很可能大幅扩张。
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:
Earnings (收益，单位：百万美元)
Operations (业务板块) | 2009 | 2008
U.K. utilities (英国公用事业) | $248 | $339
Iowa utility (爱荷华州公用事业) | 285 | 425
Western utilities (西部公用事业) | 788 | 703
Pipelines (天然气管道) | 457 | 595
HomeServices | 43 | (45)
Other (net) (其他净收益) | 25 | 186
Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes (税息前运营收益) | $1,846 | $2,203
Constellation Energy* (星座能源公司收入) | — | $1,092
Interest, other than to Berkshire (非伯克希尔利息支出) | (318) | (332)
Interest on Berkshire junior debt (伯克希尔次级债务利息) | (58) | (111)
Income tax (所得税) | (313) | (1,002)
Net earnings (净利润) | $1,157 | $1,850
Earnings applicable to Berkshire** (归属伯克希尔收益) | $1,071 | $1,704
Debt owed to others (应付第三方债务) | $19,579 | $19,145
Debt owed to Berkshire (应付伯克希尔债务) | 353 | 1,087
*Consists of a breakup fee of $175 million and a profit on our investment of $917 million.
**Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $38 in 2009 and $72 in 2008.
以下是中美能源运营的关键数据：
收益（单位：百万美元）
业务板块 | 2009年 | 2008年
英国公用事业 | 2.48亿 | 3.39亿
爱荷华州公用事业 | 2.85亿 | 4.25亿
西部公用事业 | 7.88亿 | 7.03亿
天然气管道 | 4.57亿 | 5.95亿
HomeServices | 0.43亿 | (0.45亿)
其他净收益 | 0.25亿 | 1.86亿
税息前运营收益 | 18.46亿 | 22.03亿
星座能源公司收入* | — | 10.92亿
非伯克希尔利息支出 | (3.18亿) | (3.32亿)
伯克希尔次级债务利息 | (0.58亿) | (1.11亿)
所得税 | (3.13亿) | (10.02亿)
净利润 | 11.57亿 | 18.50亿
归属伯克希尔收益** | 10.71亿 | 17.04亿
应付第三方债务 | 195.79亿 | 191.45亿
应付伯克希尔债务 | 3.53亿 | 10.87亿
*包含1.75亿美元分手费及9.17亿美元投资收益。
**包含伯克希尔获得的利息（扣除相关所得税），2009年为3,800万美元，2008年为7,200万美元。
Our regulated electric utilities, offering monopoly service in most cases, operate in a symbiotic manner with the customers in their service areas, with those users depending on us to provide first-class service and invest for their future needs. Permitting and construction periods for generation and major transmission facilities stretch way out, so it is incumbent on us to be far-sighted. We, in turn, look to our utilities’ regulators (acting on behalf of our customers) to allow us an appropriate return on the huge amounts of capital we must deploy to meet future needs. We shouldn’t expect our regulators to live up to their end of the bargain unless we live up to ours.
我们的受监管电力公用事业在多数地区具有垄断地位，与服务区域内的客户形成共生关系——用户依赖我们提供一流服务并为未来需求投资。发电和主要输电设施的审批与建设周期极长，因此我们必须具备远见。反过来，我们期待公用事业监管机构（代表客户利益）允许我们对投入的巨额资本获得合理回报。除非我们履行自身义务，否则不应期待监管机构兑现他们的承诺。
Dave and Greg make sure we do just that. National research companies consistently rank our Iowa and Western utilities at or near the top of their industry. Similarly, among the 43 U.S. pipelines ranked by a firm named Mastio, our Kern River and Northern Natural properties tied for second place.
Dave和Greg确保我们做到这一点。全国性研究机构持续将我们的爱荷华州和西部公用事业公司评为行业前三甲。同样，在Mastio公司排名的43家美国天然气管道企业中，我们的Kern River和Northern Natural管道并列第二。
Moreover, we continue to pour huge sums of money into our operations so as to not only prepare for the future but also make these operations more environmentally friendly. Since we purchased MidAmerican ten years ago, it has never paid a dividend. We have instead used earnings to improve and expand our properties in each of the territories we serve. As one dramatic example, in the last three years our Iowa and Western utilities have earned $2.5 billion, while in this same period spending $3 billion on wind generation facilities.
此外，我们持续投入巨资，不仅为未来做准备，也使运营更加环保。自十年前收购中美能源以来，该公司从未支付股息。我们始终将收益用于改善和扩展我们服务的每个地区的设施。例如，过去三年间，我们的爱荷华州和西部公用事业公司累计盈利25亿美元，却在同一时期投入30亿美元建设风力发电设施。
MidAmerican has consistently kept its end of the bargain with society and, to society’s credit, it has reciprocated: With few exceptions, our regulators have promptly allowed us to earn a fair return on the ever-increasing sums of capital we must invest. Going forward, we will do whatever it takes to serve our territories in the manner they expect. We believe that, in turn, we will be allowed the return we deserve on the funds we invest.
中美能源始终恪守对社会的承诺，值得肯定的是，社会也给予了积极回应：除少数例外，监管机构均及时批准了我们对不断增长的投资资本的合理回报。展望未来，我们将竭尽所能以客户期望的方式服务区域。我们相信，作为回报，我们也将获得应得的投资回报。
In earlier days, Charlie and I shunned capital-intensive businesses such as public utilities. Indeed, the best businesses by far for owners continue to be those that have high returns on capital and that require little incremental investment to grow. We are fortunate to own a number of such businesses, and we would love to buy more. Anticipating, however, that Berkshire will generate ever-increasing amounts of cash, we are today quite willing to enter businesses that regularly require large capital expenditures. We expect only that these businesses have reasonable expectations of earning decent returns on the incremental sums they invest. If our expectations are met – and we believe that they will be – Berkshire’s ever-growing collection of good to great businesses should produce above-average, though certainly not spectacular, returns in the decades ahead.
早年，查理和我曾回避像公用事业这样的重资本行业。确实，对所有者而言最好的企业，仍是那些资本回报率高且无需大量新增投资即可增长的企业。我们幸运地拥有若干此类企业，并渴望收购更多。然而，考虑到伯克希尔未来将产生日益增长的现金流，我们现在愿意涉足那些需要持续大额资本支出的行业。我们唯一的要求是，这些企业能对新增资金产生合理的回报预期。如果这一预期得以实现（我们相信会实现），伯克希尔日益壮大的优质企业组合将在未来几十年内创造超越平均水平——尽管未必是惊人的回报。
# 我们的BNSF业务与公用事业的相似性
# Our BNSF operation, it should be noted, has certain important economic characteristics that resemble those of our electric utilities.
Our BNSF operation, it should be noted, has certain important economic characteristics that resemble those of our electric utilities. In both cases we provide fundamental services that are, and will remain, essential to the economic well-being of our customers, the communities we serve, and indeed the nation. Both will require heavy investment that greatly exceeds depreciation allowances for decades to come. Both must also plan far ahead to satisfy demand that is expected to outstrip the needs of the past. Finally, both require wise regulators who will provide certainty about allowable returns so that we can confidently make the huge investments required to maintain, replace and expand the plant.
值得注意的是，我们的BNSF铁路业务具备一些与电力公用事业相似的重要经济特征。两者均提供基础服务，这些服务不仅现在，而且未来仍将对客户、服务社区乃至整个国家的经济福祉至关重要。未来数十年，两者所需的资本投入将远超折旧费用；两者都必须提前规划，以满足预计将超过历史需求的增长；最后，两者都需要明智的监管者提供回报率确定性，使我们能够放心投入巨资维护、更新和扩建设施。
We see a “social compact” existing between the public and our railroad business, just as is the case with our utilities. If either side shirks its obligations, both sides will inevitably suffer. Therefore, both parties to the compact should – and we believe will – understand the benefit of behaving in a way that encourages good behavior by the other. It is inconceivable that our country will realize anything close to its full economic potential without its possessing first-class electricity and railroad systems. We will do our part to see that they exist.
我们认为铁路业务与公众之间存在一种“社会契约”，正如公用事业一样。任何一方逃避责任，双方都将不可避免地受损。因此，契约双方都应（且我们相信会）理解：通过自身行为鼓励对方良性互动的益处。若没有一流的电力系统和铁路系统，美国几乎无法实现其全部经济潜力。我们将尽己所能确保它们的存在。
In the future, BNSF results will be included in this “regulated utility” section. Aside from the two businesses having similar underlying economic characteristics, both are logical users of substantial amounts of debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Both will retain most of their earnings. Both will earn and invest large sums in good times or bad, though the railroad will display the greater cyclicality. Overall, we expect this regulated sector to deliver significantly increased earnings over time, albeit at the cost of our investing many tens – yes, tens – of billions of dollars of incremental equity capital.
未来，BNSF的业绩将被纳入“受监管公用事业”板块。除了两者具备相似的基础经济特征外，它们都是合理使用大量非伯克希尔担保债务的企业；两者都将留存大部分收益；无论经济好坏，两者都会持续盈利并投资巨额资金（尽管铁路业务周期性更强）。总体而言，我们预计这一受监管板块的收益将随时间显著增长，尽管这需要我们投入数千亿美元的增量股本资金。
# 制造业、服务业与零售业运营
# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
伯克希尔在这一领域的业务覆盖广泛。让我们先看看整个板块的合并资产负债表和利润表概览。
# 资产负债表（2009年12月31日，单位：百万美元）
# Balance Sheet 12/31/09 (in millions)
| 资产 Assets | 金额 | 负债与股东权益 Liabilities and Equity | 金额 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 现金及等价物 Cash and equivalents | $3,018 | 应付票据 Notes payable | $1,842 |
| 应收账款 Accounts and notes receivable | 5,066 | 其他流动负债 Other current liabilities | 7,414 |
| 存货 Inventory | 6,147 | 流动负债合计 Total current liabilities | 9,256 |
| 其他流动资产 Other current assets | 625 | 递延税项 Deferred taxes | 2,834 |
| 流动资产合计 Total current assets | 14,856 | 长期债务及其他负债 Term debt and other liabilities | 6,240 |
| 商誉及其他无形资产 Goodwill and other intangibles | 16,499 | 股东权益 Equity | 30,469 |
| 固定资产 Fixed assets | 15,374 | ||
| 其他资产 Other assets | 2,070 | ||
| 总资产 Total assets | $48,799 | 总负债与股东权益 Total liabilities and equity | $48,799 |
# 利润表（单位：百万美元）
# Earnings Statement (in millions)
| 项目 | 2009年 | 2008年 | 2007年 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 营业收入 Revenues | $61,665 | $66,099 | $59,100 |
| 营业支出（含折旧：2009年14.22亿，2008年12.8亿，2007年9.55亿） Operating expenses (including depreciation) | 59,509 | 61,937 | 55,026 |
| 利息支出 Interest expense | 98 | 139 | 127 |
| 税前收益 Pre-tax earnings | 2,058* | 4,023* | 3,947* |
| 所得税与少数股东权益 Income taxes and minority interests | 945 | 1,740 | 1,594 |
| 净利润 Net income | $1,113 | $2,283 | $2,353 |
*注：不含购买会计调整。Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.
Almost all of the many and widely-diverse operations in this sector suffered to one degree or another from 2009’s severe recession. The major exception was McLane, our distributor of groceries, confections and non-food items to thousands of retail outlets, the largest by far Wal-Mart.
这一板块中几乎所有业务都在2009年的严重衰退中受到不同程度冲击。主要例外是McLane公司——我们向数千家零售店（其中最大的是沃尔玛）分销杂货、糖果和非食品商品的企业。
Grady Rosier led McLane to record pre-tax earnings of $344 million, which even so amounted to only slightly more than one cent per dollar on its huge sales of $31.2 billion. McLane employs a vast array of physical assets – practically all of which it owns – including 3,242 trailers, 2,309 tractors and 55 distribution centers with 15.2 million square feet of space. McLane’s prime asset, however, is Grady.
在Grady Rosier领导下，McLane创下了3.44亿美元的税前利润记录，但即便如此，每美元销售额仅产生略高于1美分的利润（年销售额达312亿美元）。McLane拥有庞大的实物资产（几乎全部自持）：3,242辆拖车、2,309台牵引车，以及55个总面积达1,520万平方英尺的配送中心。然而，McLane最核心的资产是Grady本人。
We had a number of companies at which profits improved even as sales contracted, always an exceptional managerial achievement. Here are the CEOs who made it happen:
我们有若干公司在销售额下滑的情况下仍实现了利润增长，这始终是管理层的卓越成就。以下是这些CEO名单：
# 关键子公司及CEO
# COMPANY & CEO
| 公司 (COMPANY) | 业务领域 | CEO |
|---|---|---|
| Benjamin Moore (本杰明·摩尔) | 油漆制造 | Denis Abrams |
| Borsheims (博世海姆) | 珠宝零售 | Susan Jacques |
| H. H. Brown (H.H.布朗) | 鞋类制造与零售 | Jim Issler |
| CTB (CTB) | 农业设备 | Vic Mancinelli |
| Dairy Queen (冰雪皇后) | 快餐连锁 | John Gainor |
| Nebraska Furniture Mart (内布拉斯加家具商城) | 家具零售 | Ron and Irv Blumkin |
| Pampered Chef (宠厨) | 厨房用具直销 | Marla Gottschalk |
| See’s (喜式) | 糖果制造与零售 | Brad Kinstler |
| Star Furniture (星牌家具) | 家具零售 | Bill Kimbrell |
Among the businesses we own that have major exposure to the depressed industrial sector, both Marmon and Iscar turned in relatively strong performances. Frank Ptak’s Marmon delivered a 13.5% pre-tax profit margin, a record high. Though the company’s sales were down 27%, Frank’s cost-conscious management mitigated the decline in earnings.
在受工业低迷严重影响的业务中，Marmon和Iscar表现相对强劲。Frank Ptak领导的Marmon实现了13.5%的税前利润率（历史新高）。尽管销售额下降27%，但Frank的成本控制管理缓解了利润下滑。
Nothing stops Israel-based Iscar – not wars, recessions or competitors. The world’s two other leading suppliers of small cutting tools both had very difficult years, each operating at a loss throughout much of the year. Though Iscar’s results were down significantly from 2008, the company regularly reported profits, even while it was integrating and rationalizing Tungaloy, the large Japanese acquisition that we told you about last year. When manufacturing rebounds, Iscar will set new records. Its incredible managerial team of Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman will see to that.
总部位于以色列的Iscar无惧任何挑战——战争、衰退或竞争者都无法阻止它。全球另外两大小型切削工具供应商均经历了艰难一年，大部分时间处于亏损状态。尽管Iscar业绩较2008年显著下滑，但即使在整合去年我们提及的日本大型收购Tungaloy并优化运营期间，仍保持持续盈利。当制造业复苏时，Iscar将再创新纪录。其惊人的管理团队Eitan Wertheimer、Jacob Harpaz和Danny Goldman将确保这一点。
Every business we own that is connected to residential and commercial construction suffered severely in 2009. Combined pre-tax earnings of Shaw, Johns Manville, Acme Brick, and MiTek were $227 million, an 82.5% decline from $1.295 billion in 2006, when construction activity was booming. These businesses continue to bump along the bottom, though their competitive positions remain undented.
我们所有涉及住宅与商业建筑的业务在2009年均遭受重创。Shaw、Johns Manville、Acme Brick和MiTek的合并税前利润仅为2.27亿美元，较2006年建筑业繁荣期的12.95亿美元暴跌82.5%。这些业务仍在谷底挣扎，但其竞争地位未受影响。
The major problem for Berkshire last year was NetJets, an aviation operation that offers fractional ownership of jets. Over the years, it has been enormously successful in establishing itself as the premier company in its industry, with the value of its fleet far exceeding that of its three major competitors combined. Overall, our dominance in the field remains unchallenged.
伯克希尔去年的最大问题是NetJets——提供公务机部分所有权的航空运营企业。多年来，它成功确立了行业领导地位，其机队价值远超三大主要竞争对手总和。总体而言，我们在该领域的主导地位依然无人能撼。
NetJets’ business operation, however, has been another story. In the eleven years that we have owned the company, it has recorded an aggregate pre-tax loss of $157 million. Moreover, the company’s debt has soared from $102 million at the time of purchase to $1.9 billion in April of last year. Without Berkshire’s guarantee of this debt, NetJets would have been out of business. It’s clear that I failed you in letting NetJets descend into this condition. But, luckily, I have been bailed out.
然而，NetJets的运营却是另一番景象。在我们拥有的11年间，公司累计录得税前亏损1.57亿美元。此外，其债务从收购时的1.02亿美元激增至去年4月的19亿美元。若无伯克希尔的债务担保，NetJets早已破产。显然，我未能阻止NetJets陷入此困境，辜负了各位的信任。但幸运的是，我们最终得以脱困。
# NetJets的转型与Dave Sokol的领导
# Dave Sokol, the enormously talented builder and operator of MidAmerican Energy, became CEO of NetJets in August.
Dave Sokol, the enormously talented builder and operator of MidAmerican Energy, became CEO of NetJets in August. His leadership has been transforming: Debt has already been reduced to $1.4 billion, and, after suffering a staggering loss of $711 million in 2009, the company is now solidly profitable.
才华横溢的中美能源建设者兼运营者Dave Sokol于8月出任NetJets首席执行官。他的领导带来了变革：债务已从19亿美元降至14亿美元，且在2009年巨亏7.11亿美元后，公司现已实现稳定盈利。
Most important, none of the changes wrought by Dave have in any way undercut the top-of-the-line standards for safety and service that Rich Santulli, NetJets’ previous CEO and the father of the fractional-ownership industry, insisted upon. Dave and I have the strongest possible personal interest in maintaining these standards because we and our families use NetJets for almost all of our flying, as do many of our directors and managers. None of us are assigned special planes nor crews. We receive exactly the same treatment as any other owner, meaning we pay the same prices as everyone else does when we are using our personal contracts. In short, we eat our own cooking. In the aviation business, no other testimonial means more.
最重要的是，Dave推行的所有改革从未削弱Rich Santulli（NetJets前CEO、飞机部分所有权行业创始人）坚持的安全与服务最高标准。Dave和我本人对维护这些标准有最强烈的个人利益，因为我们和家人、董事会成员及管理层几乎全部使用NetJets出行。我们无人享有专属飞机或机组，享受与普通客户完全相同的待遇——使用私人合同飞行时支付同等费用。简而言之，我们以身作则。在航空业，没有比这更有说服力的背书。
# 金融与金融产品业务
# Finance and Financial Products
Our largest operation in this sector is Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer of modular and manufactured homes. Clayton was not always number one: A decade ago the three leading manufacturers were Fleetwood, Champion and Oakwood, which together accounted for 44% of the output of the industry. All have since gone bankrupt. Total industry output, meanwhile, has fallen from 382,000 units in 1999 to 60,000 units in 2009.
这一领域最大的业务是Clayton Homes——美国领先的模块化与预制房屋制造商。但Clayton并非一直位居榜首：十年前，行业前三强是Fleetwood、Champion和Oakwood，合计占据44%的市场份额。如今三者均已破产。整个行业产量也从1999年的38.2万套暴跌至2009年的6万套。
# 预制房屋行业的困境与出路
# The industry is in shambles for two reasons...
The industry is in shambles for two reasons, the first of which must be lived with if the U.S. economy is to recover. This reason concerns U.S. housing starts (including apartment units). In 2009, starts were 554,000, by far the lowest number in the 50 years for which we have data. Paradoxically, this is good news.
行业崩溃源于两个原因，第一个是美国经济复苏必须面对的结构性问题——住宅开工量（含公寓）。2009年新开工量仅55.4万套，是50年来的最低水平。矛盾的是，这反而是好消息。
People thought it was good news a few years back when housing starts – the supply side of the picture – were running about two million annually. But household formations – the demand side – only amounted to about 1.2 million. After a few years of such imbalances, the country unsurprisingly ended up with far too many houses.
几年前，当住房开工量（供应端）每年维持在200万套时，人们曾认为这是利好。但家庭新增数量（需求端）仅为120万套。这种失衡持续几年后，美国不出所料地面临房屋过剩。
There were three ways to cure this overhang:
(1) Blow up a lot of houses, a tactic similar to the destruction of autos that occurred with the “cash-for-clunkers” program;
(2) Speed up household formations by, say, encouraging teenagers to cohabitate, a program not likely to suffer from a lack of volunteers; or
(3) Reduce new housing starts to a number far below the rate of household formations.
解决供需失衡有三种方式：
(1) 拆毁大量房屋，类似“以旧换新”计划销毁旧车；
(2) 加快家庭组建速度，例如鼓励青少年同居（志愿者不会短缺的计划）；
(3) 将新房开工量压低至远低于家庭新增速度。
Our country has wisely selected the third option, which means that within a year or so residential housing problems should largely be behind us, the exceptions being only high-value houses and those in certain localities where overbuilding was particularly egregious. Prices will remain far below “bubble” levels, of course, but for every seller (or lender) hurt by this there will be a buyer who benefits. Indeed, many families that couldn’t afford to buy an appropriate home a few years ago now find it well within their means because the bubble burst.
美国明智地选择了第三种方案，意味着一年左右住房问题将基本缓解，仅高价房和过度建设地区仍受影响。价格将长期低于泡沫水平，但每有一位受损的卖家（或贷方），就会有一位受益买家。事实上，许多几年前买不起合适住房的家庭，如今因泡沫破裂反而负担得起。
# 利率差异对预制房屋行业的打击
# The second reason that manufactured housing is troubled...
The second reason that manufactured housing is troubled is specific to the industry: the punitive differential in mortgage rates between factory-built homes and site-built homes. Before you read further, let me underscore the obvious: Berkshire has a dog in this fight, and you should therefore assess the commentary that follows with special care. That warning made, however, let me explain why the rate differential causes problems for both large numbers of lower-income Americans and Clayton.
第二个行业特殊原因：工厂建造房屋与现场建造房屋的抵押贷款利率存在惩罚性差异。请先注意：伯克希尔在此议题上有直接利益，因此请审慎评估后续评论。但让我解释为何这种利率差异伤害了大量低收入美国人和Clayton。
The residential mortgage market is shaped by government rules that are expressed by FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Their lending standards are all-powerful because the mortgages they insure can typically be securitized and turned into what, in effect, is an obligation of the U.S. government. Currently buyers of conventional site-built homes who qualify for these guarantees can obtain a 30-year loan at about 5¼%. In addition, these are mortgages that have recently been purchased in massive amounts by the Federal Reserve, an action that also helped to keep rates at bargain-basement levels.
住宅抵押贷款市场由联邦住房管理局（FHA）、房利美和房地美的政策主导。它们的贷款标准具有决定性影响，因其承保的抵押贷款可证券化并转化为实质上的政府债务。目前符合担保条件的现场建造房屋买家可获得约5.25%的30年期贷款。此外，美联储近期大规模购买此类贷款，进一步压低利率至历史低位。
In contrast, very few factory-built homes qualify for agency-insured mortgages. Therefore, a meritorious buyer of a factory-built home must pay about 9% on his loan. For the all-cash buyer, Clayton’s homes offer terrific value. If the buyer needs mortgage financing, however – and, of course, most buyers do – the difference in financing costs too often negates the attractive price of a factory-built home.
相比之下，极少预制房屋符合机构担保贷款资格。因此，优质买家需为预制房屋支付约9%的利率。全款买家可享受Clayton房屋的高性价比，但若需融资（绝大多数买家如此），融资成本差异往往抵消了价格优势。
Last year I told you why our buyers – generally people with low incomes – performed so well as credit risks. Their attitude was all-important: They signed up to live in the home, not resell or refinance it. Consequently, our buyers usually took out loans with payments geared to their verified incomes (we weren’t making “liar’s loans”) and looked forward to the day they could burn their mortgage. If they lost their jobs, had health problems or got divorced, we could of course expect defaults. But they seldom walked away simply because house values had fallen. Even today, though job-loss troubles have grown, Clayton’s delinquencies and defaults remain reasonable and will not cause us significant problems.
去年我曾解释为何我们的买家（通常为低收入群体）信用表现优异。关键在于他们的态度：购房用于居住而非炒卖。因此，买家通常按核实收入申请贷款（我们不发放“谎报收入”贷款），并期待早日还清房贷。即使失业、患病或离婚可能导致违约，但很少有人因房价下跌而弃房。即使在失业问题加剧的今天，Clayton的逾期和违约率仍可控，不会造成重大损失。
We have tried to qualify more of our customers’ loans for treatment similar to those available on the site-built product. So far we have had only token success. Many families with modest incomes but responsible habits have therefore had to forego home ownership simply because the financing differential attached to the factory-built product makes monthly payments too expensive. If qualifications aren’t broadened, so as to open low-cost financing to all who meet down-payment and income standards, the manufactured-home industry seems destined to struggle and dwindle.
我们尝试让更多客户贷款获得与现场建造房屋同等融资条件，但收效甚微。许多收入不高但信用良好的家庭被迫放弃购房，只因预制房屋的融资成本使月供过于高昂。若不放宽资质标准，向符合首付和收入门槛者开放低成本融资，预制房屋行业恐将持续萎缩。
Even under these conditions, I believe Clayton will operate profitably in coming years, though well below its potential. We couldn’t have a better manager than CEO Kevin Clayton, who treats Berkshire’s interests as if they were his own. Our product is first-class, inexpensive and constantly being improved. Moreover, we will continue to use Berkshire’s credit to support Clayton’s mortgage program, convinced as we are of its soundness. Even so, Berkshire can’t borrow at a rate approaching that available to government agencies. This handicap will limit sales, hurting both Clayton and a multitude of worthy families who long for a low-cost home.
即便如此，我相信Clayton未来仍能盈利，尽管远低于潜在水平。CEO Kevin Clayton将伯克希尔利益视如己出，我们无法找到更优秀的管理者。我们的产品品质一流、价格低廉且持续改进。此外，我们将继续以伯克希尔信用支持Clayton的房贷计划，坚信其稳健性。然而，伯克希尔的借贷成本无法媲美政府机构，这一劣势将限制销售，损害Clayton和渴望低价房家庭的利益。
# 金融板块收益概览
# Financial Products Segment Earnings Summary
| 项目 | 2009年（百万美元） | 2008年（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|
| 净投资收益 (Net investment income) | $278 | $330 |
| 保险与年金业务 (Life and annuity operations) | 116 | 23 |
| 租赁业务 (Leasing operations) | 14 | 87 |
| 预制房屋融资 (Clayton) | 187 | 206 |
| 其他收入* (Other income*) | 186 | 141 |
| 税前收益总计 | $781 | $787 |
*含2009年1.16亿美元和2008年0.92亿美元的伯克希尔信用使用费（计入“其他收入”）。
At the end of 2009, we became a 50% owner of Berkadia Commercial Mortgage (formerly known as Capmark), the country’s third-largest servicer of commercial mortgages. In addition to servicing a $235 billion portfolio, the company is an important originator of mortgages, having 25 offices spread around the country. Though commercial real estate will face major problems in the next few years, long-term opportunities for Berkadia are significant.
2009年底，伯克希尔成为Berkadia商业抵押公司（原Capmark）50%股权的持有者。该公司是美国第三大商业地产抵押服务商，除管理2350亿美元资产组合外，还拥有25家分支机构，是重要的抵押贷款发起人。尽管商业地产未来几年将面临挑战，但Berkadia的长期机遇显著。
# 与Leucadia的合作
# Our partner in this operation is Leucadia, run by Joe Steinberg and Ian Cumming...
Our partner in this operation is Leucadia, run by Joe Steinberg and Ian Cumming, with whom we had a terrific experience some years back when Berkshire joined with them to purchase Finova, a troubled finance business. In resolving that situation, Joe and Ian did far more than their share of the work, an arrangement I always encourage. Naturally, I was delighted when they called me to partner again in the Capmark purchase.
我们的合作伙伴是Leucadia，由Joe Steinberg和Ian Cumming领导。多年前，当伯克希尔与他们联手收购陷入困境的金融公司Finova时，我们曾有过愉快的合作经历。在那次合作中，Joe和Ian承担了远超预期的工作量，这是我一贯推崇的合作模式。当他们再次邀请我共同收购Capmark时，我自然欣然接受。
Our first venture was also christened Berkadia. So let’s call this one Son of Berkadia. Someday I’ll be writing you about Grandson of Berkadia.
我们首次合作的企业也命名为Berkadia。因此，这次合作可称为“Berkadia之子”（Son of Berkadia）。未来某天，我还会向各位汇报“Berkadia之孙”的进展。
# 投资组合概览
# Investments
Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.
下表列示了我们截至年末市值超过10亿美元的普通股投资：
# 伯克希尔重仓股清单（2009年）
# Berkshire’s Major Stock Holdings (Year-End 2009)
| 持股数量 (Shares) | 公司 (Company) | 持股比例 (% Owned) | 成本 (Cost) (百万美元)* | 市值 (Market) (百万美元) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company (美国运通公司) | 12.7% | 1,287 | 6,143 |
| 225,000,000 | BYD Company, Ltd. (比亚迪) | 9.9% | 232 | 1,986 |
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company (可口可乐) | 8.6% | 1,299 | 11,400 |
| 37,711,330 | ConocoPhillips (康菲石油) | 2.5% | 274 | 1,926 |
| 28,530,467 | Johnson & Johnson (强生) | 1.0% | 1,724 | 1,838 |
| 130,272,500 | Kraft Foods Inc. (卡夫食品) | 8.8% | 4,330 | 3,541 |
| 3,947,554 | POSCO (韩国浦项制铁) | 5.2% | 768 | 2,092 |
| 83,128,411 | The Procter & Gamble Company (宝洁) | 2.9% | 504 | 2,027 |
| 25,108,967 | Sanofi-Aventis (赛诺菲-安万特) | 1.9% | 1,979 | 1,367 |
| 234,247,373 | Tesco plc (乐购) | 3.0% | 1,620 | 2,371 |
| 76,633,426 | U.S. Bancorp (美国合众银行) | 4.0% | 2,087 | 1,725 |
| 39,037,142 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (沃尔玛) | 1.0% | 1,893 | 2,087 |
| 334,235,585 | Wells Fargo & Company (富国银行) | 6.5% | 7,394 | 9,021 |
| — | Others (其他) | — | 6,680 | 8,636 |
| 总计 | Total Common Stocks Carried at Market | 100% | $34,646 | $59,034 |
*成本为实际购入价格及税基；按会计准则（GAAP）调整后的账面价值因少数证券的减值或增值而略有差异。
This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
In addition, we own positions in non-traded securities of Dow Chemical, General Electric, Goldman Sachs, Swiss Re and Wrigley with an aggregate cost of $21.1 billion and a carrying value of $26.0 billion. We purchased these five positions in the last 18 months. Setting aside the significant equity potential they provide us, these holdings deliver us an aggregate of $2.1 billion annually in dividends and interest. Finally, we owned 76,777,029 shares (22.5%) of BNSF at yearend, which we then carried at $85.78 per share, but which have subsequently been melded into our purchase of the entire company.
此外，我们还持有非上市的陶氏化学、通用电气、高盛、瑞士再保险和箭牌公司证券，总成本211亿美元，账面价值260亿美元。这些头寸均在过去18个月内购入。除潜在股权增值外，这些持仓每年为我们带来21亿美元的股息和利息收入。最后，截至年末我们持有BNSF 22.5%股权（76,777,029股），每股成本85.78美元，该持仓已并入对BNSF的全面收购中。
In 2009, our largest sales were in ConocoPhillips, Moody’s, Procter & Gamble and Johnson & Johnson (sales of the latter occurring after we had built our position earlier in the year). Charlie and I believe that all of these stocks will likely trade higher in the future. We made some sales early in 2009 to raise cash for our Dow and Swiss Re purchases and late in the year made other sales in anticipation of our BNSF purchase.
2009年，我们最大的减持集中在康菲石油、穆迪、宝洁和强生（强生是在年初建仓后年末卖出）。查理和我坚信这些股票未来仍有升值空间。我们于2009年初出售部分股票以筹措对陶氏化学和瑞士再保险的投资资金，并在年末出售其他股票以筹备BNSF收购。
We told you last year that very unusual conditions then existed in the corporate and municipal bond markets and that these securities were ridiculously cheap relative to U.S. Treasuries. We backed this view with some purchases, but I should have done far more. Big opportunities come infrequently. When it’s raining gold, reach for a bucket, not a thimble.
去年我曾指出，当时企业债和市政债市场处于非常态，其估值较美国国债严重低估。我们以实际行动支持这一判断，但我本应投入更多。重大机会稀缺，当黄金如雨落下时，请拿起水桶而非汤匙。
We entered 2008 with $44.3 billion of cash-equivalents, and we have since retained operating earnings of $17 billion. Nevertheless, at yearend 2009, our cash was down to $30.6 billion (with $8 billion earmarked for the BNSF acquisition). We’ve put a lot of money to work during the chaos of the last two years. It’s been an ideal period for investors: A climate of fear is their best friend. Those who invest only when commentators are upbeat end up paying a heavy price for meaningless reassurance. In the end, what counts in investing is what you pay for a business – through the purchase of a small piece of it in the stock market – and what that business earns in the succeeding decade or two.
我们以443亿美元现金等价物进入2008年，并保留了170亿美元运营利润。尽管如此，到2009年底现金降至306亿美元（其中80亿美元指定用于BNSF收购）。过去两年的动荡中，我们已大规模部署资金。对投资者而言，恐惧才是最佳盟友。仅在舆论乐观时才投资的人，最终将为虚幻的安全感付出代价。投资的本质始终在于：你以什么价格买入企业（通过股市购入其一小部分），以及未来十年它能创造多少收益。
# 衍生品合约更新
# Last year I wrote extensively about our derivatives contracts...
Last year I wrote extensively about our derivatives contracts, which were then the subject of both controversy and misunderstanding. For that discussion, please go to www.berkshirehathaway.com.
去年我曾详细阐述我们的衍生品合约，当时这些产品饱受争议且常被误解。完整讨论请访问伯克希尔官网。
We have since changed only a few of our positions. Some credit contracts have run off. The terms of about 10% of our equity put contracts have also changed: Maturities have been shortened and strike prices materially reduced. In these modifications, no money changed hands.
此后我们仅小幅调整头寸。部分信用合约已到期退出。约10%的股权看跌期权条款修改：到期日缩短，行权价大幅下调。这些调整均未涉及现金交割。
A few points from last year’s discussion are worth repeating:
去年讨论中几个要点值得重申：
# (1) 浮存金的双重收益
# (1) Though it’s no sure thing...
Though it’s no sure thing, I expect our contracts in aggregate to deliver us a profit over their lifetime, even when investment income on the huge amount of float they provide us is excluded in the calculation. Our derivatives float – which is not included in the $62 billion of insurance float I described earlier – was about $6.3 billion at yearend.
尽管无法完全确定，但我预计所有合约在其存续期内将实现净利，即使不计算合约提供的大量浮存金投资收益。年末衍生品浮存金约为63亿美元（不含此前提及的620亿保险浮存金）。
# (2) 极低的抵押风险
# (2) Only a handful of our contracts require...
Only a handful of our contracts require us to post collateral under any circumstances. At last year’s low point in the stock and credit markets, our posting requirement was $1.7 billion, a small fraction of the derivatives-related float we held. When we do post collateral, let me add, the securities we put up continue to earn money for our account.
仅少数合约在极端情况下需提供抵押。去年股市和信贷市场最低点时，我们的抵押要求仅为17亿美元，远低于相关衍生品浮存金规模。且抵押证券仍持续为伯克希尔创造收益。
# (3) 季度波动不影响长期价值
# (3) Finally, you should expect large swings...
Finally, you should expect large swings in the carrying value of these contracts, items that can affect our reported quarterly earnings in a huge way but that do not affect our cash or investment holdings. That thought certainly fit 2009’s circumstances. Here are the pre-tax quarterly gains and losses from derivatives valuations that were part of our reported earnings last year:
最后，这些合约的账面价值将剧烈波动，可能显著影响季度财报，但不会影响现金或投资组合。2009年即如此。以下是去年各季度衍生品估值带来的税前损益：
# 2009年衍生品季度损益（单位：十亿美元）
# Pre-Tax Quarterly Gains/Losses from Derivatives
| 季度 (Quarter) | 损益 ($ Gain/Loss in Billions) |
|---|---|
| 第一季度 (1) | $(1.517) |
| 第二季度 (2) | $2.357 |
| 第三季度 (3) | $1.732 |
| 第四季度 (4) | $1.052 |
As we’ve explained, these wild swings neither cheer nor bother Charlie and me. When we report to you, we will continue to separate out these figures (as we do realized investment gains and losses) so that you can more clearly view the earnings of our operating businesses. We are delighted that we hold the derivatives contracts that we do. To date we have significantly profited from the float they provide. We expect also to earn further investment income over the life of our contracts.
正如我们反复强调，这些剧烈波动既不会让我们欣喜若狂，也不会令我们困扰。在报告中，我们将继续单列这些数据（如同区分已实现投资损益），以便您更清晰了解运营利润。我们对现有衍生品合约感到满意：它们不仅提供了浮存金，至今已贡献可观利润，未来合约存续期内还将产生额外投资收益。
# 衍生品合约的风险管理哲学
# We have long invested in derivatives contracts that Charlie and I think are mispriced...
We have long invested in derivatives contracts that Charlie and I think are mispriced, just as we try to invest in mispriced stocks and bonds. Indeed, we first reported to you that we held such contracts in early 1998. The dangers that derivatives pose for both participants and society – dangers of which we’ve long warned, and that can be dynamite – arise when these contracts lead to leverage and/or counterparty risk that is extreme. At Berkshire nothing like that has occurred – nor will it.
我们长期投资于查理和我认为定价错误的衍生品合约，就像我们寻找被低估的股票和债券一样。事实上，我们早在1998年初就首次向各位汇报了这类持仓。衍生品对参与者和社会的危险——我们早已警告过这种风险如同炸药——往往源于极端的杠杆效应和交易对手风险。但在伯克希尔从未发生此类问题，未来也绝不会出现。
It’s my job to keep Berkshire far away from such problems. Charlie and I believe that a CEO must not delegate risk control. It’s simply too important. At Berkshire, I both initiate and monitor every derivatives contract on our books, with the exception of operations-related contracts at a few of our subsidiaries, such as MidAmerican, and the minor runoff contracts at General Re. If Berkshire ever gets in trouble, it will be my fault. It will not be because of misjudgments made by a Risk Committee or Chief Risk Officer.
我的职责就是让伯克希尔远离这类风险。查理和我坚信，CEO绝不能将风控权下放。这太重要了。在伯克希尔，我亲自发起并监控所有衍生品合约，仅少数子公司（如中美能源）的运营相关合约和通用再保险的小额到期合约除外。若伯克希尔真陷入困境，那一定是我之过，而非风险委员会或首席风控官的失误。
# 对董事会的尖锐批评
# In my view a board of directors of a huge financial institution is derelict...
In my view a board of directors of a huge financial institution is derelict if it does not insist that its CEO bear full responsibility for risk control. If he’s incapable of handling that job, he should look for other employment. And if he fails at it – with the government thereupon required to step in with funds or guarantees – the financial consequences for him and his board should be severe.
我认为，若大型金融机构的董事会未能坚持要求CEO对风控承担全部责任，那就是失职。若CEO无法胜任这一工作，他应另谋高就。若他在此问题上失败——迫使政府动用资金或担保介入——他和董事会成员必须承受严重的财务后果。
It has not been shareholders who have botched the operations of some of our country’s largest financial institutions. Yet they have borne the burden, with 90% or more of the value of their holdings wiped out in most cases of failure. Collectively, they have lost more than $500 billion in just the four largest financial fiascos of the last two years. To say these owners have been “bailed-out” is to make a mockery of the term.
美国最大金融机构的运营混乱并非股东所为，但损失却由他们承担——多数失败案例中股东资产价值蒸发超过90%。仅过去两年四大金融灾难就让股东损失超5000亿美元。称这些股东被“救助”是对这个词的亵渎。
The CEOs and directors of the failed companies, however, have largely gone unscathed. Their fortunes may have been diminished by the disasters they oversaw, but they still live in grand style. It is the behavior of these CEOs and directors that needs to be changed: If their institutions and the country are harmed by their recklessness, they should pay a heavy price – one not reimbursable by the companies they’ve damaged nor by insurance. CEOs and, in many cases, directors have long benefitted from oversized financial carrots; some meaningful sticks now need to be part of their employment picture as well.
然而，破产公司的CEO和董事们大多毫发无损。即使他们监管的机构酿成灾难，他们的生活依然优渥。必须改变的是这些人的行为模式：若他们的鲁莽行为损害了机构和国家利益，就应付出惨重代价——这种代价不能由其损害的公司或保险公司报销。长期以来，CEO和许多董事享受着巨额财务激励；如今，他们的雇佣合同中也必须加入实质性的惩罚机制。
# 并购中的股票发行争议
# An Inconvenient Truth (Boardroom Overheating)
An Inconvenient Truth (Boardroom Overheating)
一个不便的事实（董事会发热）
Our subsidiaries made a few small “bolt-on” acquisitions last year for cash, but our blockbuster deal with BNSF required us to issue about 95,000 Berkshire shares that amounted to 6.1% of those previously outstanding. Charlie and I enjoy issuing Berkshire stock about as much as we relish prepping for a colonoscopy.
去年子公司通过现金完成几笔小型“补强型”收购，但与BNSF的重磅交易需发行约95,000股伯克希尔股票（占原有股份6.1%）。查理和我对增发股票的厌恶程度，堪比对肠镜检查的抵触。
The reason for our distaste is simple. If we wouldn’t dream of selling Berkshire in its entirety at the current market price, why in the world should we “sell” a significant part of the company at that same inadequate price by issuing our stock in a merger?
我们厌恶增发的原因很简单：若我们绝不会以当前市场价格整体出售伯克希尔，又怎会以同样低估的价格“出售”公司部分股权来进行并购？
In evaluating a stock-for-stock offer, shareholders of the target company quite understandably focus on the market price of the acquirer’s shares that are to be given them. But they also expect the transaction to deliver them the intrinsic value of their own shares – the ones they are giving up. If shares of a prospective acquirer are selling below their intrinsic value, it’s impossible for that buyer to make a sensible deal in an all-stock deal. You simply can’t exchange an undervalued stock for a fully-valued one without hurting your shareholders.
评估换股并购时，目标公司股东自然关注收购方股票的市场价格，但他们更期待交易能兑现自己股份的内在价值。若收购方股价被低估，全股票交易必然损害股东利益——用低估资产换取公允估值的资产，本质上就是在损害股东利益。
Imagine, if you will, Company A and Company B, of equal size and both with businesses intrinsically worth $100 per share. Both of their stocks, however, sell for $80 per share. The CEO of A, long on confidence and short on smarts, offers 11⁄4 shares of A for each share of B, correctly telling his directors that B is worth $100 per share. He will neglect to explain, though, that what he is giving will cost his shareholders $125 in intrinsic value. If the directors are mathematically challenged as well, and a deal is therefore completed, the shareholders of B will end up owning 55.6% of A & B’s combined assets and A’s shareholders will own 44.4%. Not everyone at A, it should be noted, is a loser from this nonsensical transaction. Its CEO now runs a company twice as large as his original domain, in a world where size tends to correlate with both prestige and compensation.
试想两家规模相等、内在价值均为每股100美元的公司A和B，股价均被低估至80美元。A公司CEO（自信过剩而智慧不足）提出以1.25股A股换取1股B股，向董事会正确指出B股价值100美元。但他刻意隐瞒的是，这相当于每股多支付了25美元内在价值。若董事会也缺乏基本数学常识，交易完成后，B股东将持有合并后公司55.6%的股份，A股东仅剩44.4%。值得注意的是，这场荒唐交易中有人却大获其利：A公司CEO现在掌管着规模翻倍的公司——在这个规模决定地位和薪酬的世界里。
# 股票发行的双重逻辑
# If an acquirer’s stock is overvalued, it’s a different story...
If an acquirer’s stock is overvalued, it’s a different story: Using it as a currency works to the acquirer’s advantage. That’s why bubbles in various areas of the stock market have invariably led to serial issuances of stock by sly promoters. Going by the market value of their stock, they can afford to overpay because they are, in effect, using counterfeit money. Periodically, many air-for-assets acquisitions have taken place, the late 1960s having been a particularly obscene period for such chicanery. Indeed, certain large companies were built in this way. (No one involved, of course, ever publicly acknowledges the reality of what is going on, though there is plenty of private snickering.)
当收购方股价被高估时情况截然不同：用高估股票作为支付货币反而成为优势。这正是股市泡沫催生连环资本运作的根本原因。精明的操盘手可以拿着市场高估的“伪钞”大肆收购。历史上这种“以纸换资产”的操作屡见不鲜，1960年代末尤甚。某些大公司正是这样建立的。（当然，无人会公开承认这种猫腻，不过私底下免不了窃笑。）
# BNSF并购案的特殊考量
# In our BNSF acquisition, the selling shareholders quite properly evaluated our offer at $100 per share...
In our BNSF acquisition, the selling shareholders quite properly evaluated our offer at $100 per share. The cost to us, however, was somewhat higher since 40% of the $100 was delivered in our shares, which Charlie and I believed to be worth more than their market value. Fortunately, we had long owned a substantial amount of BNSF stock that we purchased in the market for cash. All told, therefore, only about 30% of our cost overall was paid with Berkshire shares.
在BNSF并购案中，卖方合理地将我们的报价视为每股100美元。但对我们而言成本更高——因为40%的支付以股票形式完成，而查理和我深信伯克希尔股票价值远超市价。幸运的是，我们早先通过现金在二级市场买入大量BNSF股票。总体而言，我们仅用30%的股票完成交易。
In the end, Charlie and I decided that the disadvantage of paying 30% of the price through stock was offset by the opportunity the acquisition gave us to deploy $22 billion of cash in a business we understood and liked for the long term. It has the additional virtue of being run by Matt Rose, whom we trust and admire. We also like the prospect of investing additional billions over the years at reasonable rates of return. But the final decision was a close one. If we had needed to use more stock to make the acquisition, it would in fact have made no sense. We would have then been giving up more than we were getting.
最终，查理和我认为用股票支付30%的代价，被长期投资220亿美元于优质铁路业务的价值所抵消。更不用说该业务由我们信任的Matt Rose管理。我们还看好未来以合理回报率追加投资的前景。但最终决策实属艰难。若需更多股票支付，这交易就完全不成立——我们等于在出卖价值更高的资产。
# 对董事会决策机制的批判
# I have been in dozens of board meetings in which acquisitions have been deliberated...
I have been in dozens of board meetings in which acquisitions have been deliberated, often with the directors being instructed by high-priced investment bankers (are there any other kind?). Invariably, the bankers give the board a detailed assessment of the value of the company being purchased, with emphasis on why it is worth far more than its market price. In more than fifty years of board memberships, however, never have I heard the investment bankers (or management!) discuss the true value of what is being given. When a deal involved the issuance of the acquirer’s stock, they simply used market value to measure the cost. They did this even though they would have argued that the acquirer’s stock price was woefully inadequate – absolutely no indicator of its real value – had a takeover bid for the acquirer instead been the subject up for discussion.
我参加过数十次并购讨论的董事会会议，常有高薪投行家（难道还有其他类型吗？）向董事们授课。投行家总会详尽论证目标公司价值远超市价。但在五十余年的董事会经历中，我从未听投行家（或管理层！）讨论我们支付的股票真实价值。当交易涉及股票发行时，他们简单地用市价衡量成本，即便他们本应知道，若伯克希尔是被收购方，市价根本无法反映真实价值。
When stock is the currency being contemplated in an acquisition and when directors are hearing from an advisor, it appears to me that there is only one way to get a rational and balanced discussion. Directors should hire a second advisor to make the case against the proposed acquisition, with its fee contingent on the deal not going through. Absent this drastic remedy, our recommendation in respect to the use of advisors remains: “Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.”
当并购以股票支付且依赖顾问意见时，我认为唯一理性做法是聘请第二顾问专门唱反调，其费用与交易失败挂钩。否则我们建议：“别问理发师是否需要剪发。”
# 一个真实的银行并购故事
# I can’t resist telling you a true story from long ago...
I can’t resist telling you a true story from long ago. We owned stock in a large well-run bank that for decades had been statutorily prevented from acquisitions. Eventually, the law was changed and our bank immediately began looking for possible purchases. Its managers – fine people and able bankers – not unexpectedly began to behave like teenage boys who had just discovered girls.
我忍不住要分享一个真实故事。我们曾持有一家运营良好的大银行股份。几十年来法律禁止其并购，后来禁令解除后，管理层立即开始四处寻找标的。这些优秀银行家们——虽能力出众——表现得像刚恋爱的青少年。
They soon focused on a much smaller bank, also well-run and having similar financial characteristics in such areas as return on equity, interest margin, loan quality, etc. Our bank sold at a modest price (that’s why we had bought into it), hovering near book value and possessing a very low price/earnings ratio. Alongside, though, the small-bank owner was being wooed by other large banks in the state and was holding out for a price close to three times book value. Moreover, he wanted stock, not cash.
他们很快锁定一家更小但同样经营良好的银行。两家银行在ROE、净息差、贷款质量等核心指标高度相似。我们持有的银行估值平实（这也是我们买入的原因），股价徘徊在账面价值附近，市盈率极低。但小银行老板正被省内其他大银行追逐，坚持要求接近3倍账面价值的股价，且要求换股支付。
Naturally, our fellows caved in and agreed to this value-destroying deal. “We need to show that we are in the hunt. Besides, it’s only a small deal,” they said, as if only major harm to shareholders would have been a legitimate reason for holding back. Charlie’s reaction at the time: “Are we supposed to applaud because the dog that fouls our lawn is a Chihuahua rather than a Saint Bernard?”
我方代表自然妥协达成这笔毁损价值的交易。“我们需要展示并购雄心。再者这只是笔小买卖。”他们如此辩解，仿佛只有造成重大损失才是拒绝的理由。查理当时的反应一针见血：“难道我们应该庆幸糟蹋草坪的是一只吉娃娃而非圣伯纳犬？”
（注：此处星号为原文分隔符，按新要求忽略不计）
# 附录：并购交易的双重标准
# When stock is the currency being contemplated in an acquisition...
When stock is the currency being contemplated in an acquisition and when directors are hearing from an advisor, it appears to me that there is only one way to get a rational and balanced discussion. Directors should hire a second advisor to make the case against the proposed acquisition, with its fee contingent on the deal not going through. Absent this drastic remedy, our recommendation in respect to the use of advisors remains: “Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.”
当并购以股票支付且依赖顾问意见时，我认为唯一理性做法是聘请第二顾问专门唱反调，其费用与交易失败挂钩。否则我们建议：“别问理发师是否需要剪发。”
I can’t resist telling you a true story from long ago. We owned stock in a large well-run bank that for decades had been statutorily prevented from acquisitions. Eventually, the law was changed and our bank immediately began looking for possible purchases. Its managers – fine people and able bankers – not unexpectedly began to behave like teenage boys who had just discovered girls.
我忍不住要分享一个真实故事。我们曾持有一家运营良好的大银行股份。几十年来法律禁止其并购，后来禁令解除后，管理层立即开始四处寻找标的。这些优秀银行家们——虽能力出众——表现得像刚恋爱的青少年。
They soon focused on a much smaller bank, also well-run and having similar financial characteristics in such areas as return on equity, interest margin, loan quality, etc. Our bank sold at a modest price (that’s why we had bought into it), hovering near book value and possessing a very low price/earnings ratio. Alongside, though, the small-bank owner was being wooed by other large banks in the state and was holding out for a price close to three times book value. Moreover, he wanted stock, not cash.
他们很快锁定一家更小但同样经营良好的银行。两家银行在ROE、净息差、贷款质量等核心指标高度相似。我们持有的银行估值平实（这也是我们买入的原因），股价徘徊在账面价值附近，市盈率极低。但小银行老板正被省内其他大银行追逐，坚持要求接近3倍账面价值的股价，且要求换股支付。
Naturally, our fellows caved in and agreed to this value-destroying deal. “We need to show that we are in the hunt. Besides, it’s only a small deal,” they said, as if only major harm to shareholders would have been a legitimate reason for holding back. Charlie’s reaction at the time: “Are we supposed to applaud because the dog that fouls our lawn is a Chihuahua rather than a Saint Bernard?”
我方代表自然妥协达成这笔毁损价值的交易。“我们需要展示并购雄心。再者这只是笔小买卖。”他们如此辩解，仿佛只有造成重大损失才是拒绝的理由。查理当时的反应一针见血：“难道我们应该庆幸糟蹋草坪的是一只吉娃娃而非圣伯纳犬？”
# 股东提问记者联系方式
# The journalists and their e-mail addresses are...
| 记者姓名 (Journalist Name) | 所属媒体 (Affiliation) | 邮箱地址 (Email Address) |
|---|---|---|
| Carol Loomis | 《财富》Fortune | cloomis@fortunemail.com |
| Becky Quick | CNBC | BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com |
| Andrew Ross Sorkin | 《纽约时报》The New York Times | arsorkin@nytimes.com |
提问规则说明
Question Submission Guidelines
每位记者将从股东提交的问题中选出约12个最有趣且重要的问题。为提高入选概率，请：
- 保持问题简洁（Limit to one concise question）
- 单封邮件最多两个问题（No more than two questions per email）
- 注明是否愿意署名（Indicate if you wish your name mentioned）
查理和我都不会提前得知任何问题。我们期待记者们提出尖锐问题——这正是我们所期望的方式。
# 股东现场提问机制
# We will again have a drawing at 8:15 on Saturday...
We will again have a drawing at 8:15 on Saturday at each of 13 microphones for those shareholders wishing to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. We’ve added 30 minutes to the question time and will probably have time for about 30 questions from each group.
周六上午8:15，现场将设置13个麦克风，举行股东提问抽奖活动。会议期间，我将交替回答记者与中奖股东的问题。今年问答环节延长30分钟，预计记者与股东各可提问约30个问题。
（注：此处星号为原文分隔符，按新要求忽略不计）
# 巴菲特与芒格的感恩致词
# At 86 and 79, Charlie and I remain lucky beyond our dreams...
At 86 and 79, Charlie and I remain lucky beyond our dreams. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a “business” gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to that experienced by many people who contribute as much or more to our society’s well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. Indeed, over the years, our work has become ever more fascinating; no wonder we tap-dance to work. If pushed, we would gladly pay substantial sums to have our jobs (but don’t tell the Comp Committee).
86岁的查理和79岁的我依然幸运得超乎想象：生在美国；拥有卓越父母提供良好教育；享受幸福家庭与健康体魄；更幸运地拥有“商业基因”，让我们以远超社会贡献均值的方式获得成功。我们从事着热爱的工作，身边围绕着才华横溢的伙伴，工作反而成为最有趣的冒险。若真要付薪水上班，我们也会心甘情愿（但别告诉薪酬委员会）。
# 热情邀约：资本家的伍德斯托克
# Nothing, however, is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners...
Nothing, however, is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting. So join us on May 1st at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We’ll see you there.
对我们而言，最令人期待的还是与股东伙伴们的年度相聚。5月1日请到Qwest中心参加我们的“资本家伍德斯托克”。我们不见不散。
附言
P.S.
Come by rail.
（建议乘火车前来）
February 26, 2010
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
2010年2月26日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席