2004巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
Our gain in net worth during 2004 was $8.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 10.5%. Over the last 40 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $55,824, a rate of 21.9% compounded annually.*
2004年我们的净值增长了83亿美元，使A类和B类股票的每股账面价值均增长了10.5%。在过去40年里（即现任管理层接管以来），账面价值从19美元增长至55,824美元，年复合增长率达21.9%。
It’s per-share intrinsic value that counts, however, not book value. Here, the news is good: Between 1964 and 2004, Berkshire morphed from a struggling northern textile business whose intrinsic value was less than book into a diversified enterprise worth far more than book. Our 40-year gain in intrinsic value has therefore somewhat exceeded our 21.9% gain in book. (For an explanation of intrinsic value and the economic principles that guide Charlie Munger, my partner and Berkshire’s vice-chairman, and me in running Berkshire, please read our Owner’s Manual, beginning on page 73.)
然而，真正重要的是每股内在价值而非账面价值。好消息是：1964年至2004年间，伯克希尔从一家内在价值低于账面价值的挣扎纺织企业，转型为价值远超账面的多元化企业。因此，我们40年的内在价值增长略高于账面价值的21.9%增幅。（关于内在价值及指导查理·芒格——我的合伙人兼伯克希尔副主席——和我经营公司的经济原则，请参阅第73页起的《股东手册》。）
Despite their shortcomings, yearly calculations of book value are useful at Berkshire as a slightly understated gauge for measuring the long-term rate of increase in our intrinsic value. The calculations are less relevant, however, than they once were in rating any single year’s performance versus the S&P 500 index (a comparison we display on the facing page). Our equity holdings (including convertible preferreds) have fallen considerably as a percentage of our net worth, from an average of 114% in the 1980s, for example, to less than 50% in recent years. Therefore, yearly movements in the stock market now affect a much smaller portion of our net worth than was once the case, a fact that will normally cause us to underperform in years when stocks rise substantially and overperform in years when they fall.
尽管存在不足，但年度账面价值计算对伯克希尔仍有意义，它略微保守地衡量了内在价值长期增长率。然而，与过去相比，这些计算在评估单一年度表现与标普500指数（参见下一页对比）的关联性已降低。我们的股权持仓（含可转换优先股）占净资产的比例大幅下降，例如从1980年代平均114%降至近年不足50%。因此，股市波动对我们的净资产影响已显著缩小，这意味着在股市大幅上涨时我们可能跑输大盘，而在下跌时则可能跑赢。
However the yearly comparisons work out, Berkshire’s long-term performance versus the S&P remains all-important. Our shareholders can buy the S&P through an index fund at very low cost. Unless we achieve gains in per-share intrinsic value in the future that outdo the S&P, Charlie and I will be adding nothing to what you can accomplish on your own.
无论年度对比如何，伯克希尔与标普的长期表现对比始终至关重要。股东们可通过指数基金以极低成本投资标普。若未来我们无法实现超越标普的每股内在价值增长，则查理和我将无法为您自主投资增添任何价值。
Last year, Berkshire’s book-value gain of 10.5% fell short of the index’s 10.9% return. Our lackluster performance was not due to any stumbles by the CEOs of our operating businesses: As always, they pulled more than their share of the load. My message to them is simple: Run your business as if it were the only asset your family will own over the next hundred years. Almost invariably they do just that and, after taking care of the needs of their business, send excess cash to Omaha for me to deploy.
去年，伯克希尔账面价值增长10.5%，略低于标普10.9%的回报率。这一平淡表现并非因旗下企业CEO的失误：一如既往，他们承担了远超预期的责任。我对他们的要求很简单：将公司当作家族未来百年唯一持有的资产来经营。他们几乎都做到了这一点，在满足企业需求后，将剩余现金送至奥马哈由我调配。
I didn’t do that job very well last year. My hope was to make several multi-billion dollar acquisitions that would add new and significant streams of earnings to the many we already have. But I struck out. Additionally, I found very few attractive securities to buy. Berkshire therefore ended the year with $43 billion of cash equivalents, not a happy position. Charlie and I will work to translate some of this hoard into more interesting assets during 2005, though we can’t promise success.
去年我未能很好地完成这一任务。我本希望完成几项数十亿美元级收购，为现有庞大收益流增添新亮点，但遗憾未能成功。此外，我亦发现极少具有吸引力的证券。因此，伯克希尔以430亿美元现金及等价物收官，这并非理想状态。查理和我将在2005年努力将部分储备转化为更具吸引力的资产，但无法保证成功。
In one respect, 2004 was a remarkable year for the stock market, a fact buried in the maze of numbers on page 2. If you examine the 35 years since the 1960s ended, you will find that an investor’s return, including dividends, from owning the S&P has averaged 11.2% annually (well above what we expect future returns to be). But if you look for years with returns anywhere close to that 11.2% – say, between 8% and 14% – you will find only one before 2004. In other words, last year’s “normal” return is anything but.
从某角度看，2004年股市表现非凡，这一事实隐藏在第2页的数字迷阵中。若观察自1960年代结束后的35年，你会发现持有标普的年化回报率（含股息）达11.2%（远高于我们对未来的预期）。但若寻找回报率接近11.2%（如8%-14%）的年份，2004年前仅有一次。换言之，去年的“正常”回报实则异常。
*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.
*本报告所有数据均适用于伯克希尔A类股，该股份为1996年前公司唯一流通股的延续。B类股经济权益为A类股的1/30。
Over the 35 years, American business has delivered terrific results. It should therefore have been easy for investors to earn juicy returns: All they had to do was piggyback Corporate America in a diversified, low-expense way. An index fund that they never touched would have done the job. Instead many investors have had experiences ranging from mediocre to disastrous.
过去35年，美国企业创造了卓越成果。因此，投资者本应轻松获得丰厚回报：只需以分散且低成本的方式跟随美国企业即可。一只从未操作的指数基金便能达成目标。然而许多投资者的经历却从平庸到灾难不等。
There have been three primary causes: first, high costs, usually because investors traded excessively or spent far too much on investment management; second, portfolio decisions based on tips and fads rather than on thoughtful, quantified evaluation of businesses; and third, a start-and-stop approach to the market marked by untimely entries (after an advance has been long underway) and exits (after periods of stagnation or decline). Investors should remember that excitement and expenses are their enemies. And if they insist on trying to time their participation in equities, they should try to be fearful when others are greedy and greedy only when others are fearful.
主要原因有三：首先，高成本，通常源于过度交易或支付过高的投资管理费用；其次，基于小道消息和潮流而非深思熟虑、量化分析企业的投资决策；第三，市场参与上“忽进忽出”的策略，表现为在涨势持续后入场、在停滞或下跌后退出。投资者应谨记：冲动与费用是敌人。若执意择时，应在他人贪婪时恐惧，在他人恐惧时贪婪。
# Sector Results
部门业绩
As managers, Charlie and I want to give our owners the financial information and commentary we would wish to receive if our roles were reversed. To do this with both clarity and reasonable brevity becomes more difficult as Berkshire’s scope widens. Some of our businesses have vastly different economic characteristics from others, which means that our consolidated statements, with their jumble of figures, make useful analysis almost impossible.
作为管理者，查理和我希望向股东提供我们自己也希望收到的财务信息与评述。随着伯克希尔业务范围扩大，要在清晰与简洁间取得平衡愈发困难。不同业务经济特性差异显著，合并报表中混杂的数据几乎使有效分析难以实现。
On the following pages, therefore, we will present some balance sheet and earnings figures from our four major categories of businesses along with commentary about each. We particularly want you to understand the limited circumstances under which we will use debt, given that we typically shun it. We will not, however, inundate you with data that has no real value in estimating Berkshire’s intrinsic value. Doing so would tend to obfuscate the facts that count.
因此，下文将展示我们四大业务板块的部分资产负债表及盈利数据，并附上相应评述。我们特别希望您理解：尽管我们通常规避债务，但在特定有限情况下会使用债务。然而，我们不会堆砌对估算伯克希尔内在价值无实质意义的数据，这反而会掩盖关键事实。
# Regulated Utility Businesses
受监管的公用事业板块
We have an 80.5% (fully diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.7 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 698,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; and (3) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry 7.9% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.
我们持有中美能源控股公司80.5%（完全稀释后）权益，该公司拥有广泛的公用事业运营。其中最大的三项业务为：（1）英国约克郡电力公司和北方电力公司，服务370万电力用户，为英国第三大电力分销商；（2）中美能源公司，主要为爱荷华州69.8万电力用户提供服务；（3） Kern River和Northern Natural天然气管道，输送量占美国天然气消费量的7.9%。
The remaining 19.5% of MidAmerican is owned by three partners of ours: Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, the brilliant managers of these businesses, and Walter Scott, a long-time friend of mine who introduced me to the company. Because MidAmerican is subject to the Public Utility Holding Company Act (“PUHCA”), Berkshire’s voting interest is limited to 9.9%. Voting control rests with Walter.
中美能源剩余19.5%权益由三位合作伙伴持有：卓越的管理者戴夫·索科尔和格雷格·埃布尔，以及引荐我认识该公司的老友沃尔特·斯科特。由于中美能源受《公共事业控股公司法》（PUHCA）约束，伯克希尔投票权被限制在9.9%，投票控制权归属沃尔特。
Our limited voting interest forces us to account for MidAmerican in an abbreviated manner. Instead of our fully incorporating the company’s assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses into Berkshire’s statements, we make one-line entries only in both our balance sheet and income account. It’s likely, though, that PUHCA will someday – perhaps soon – be repealed or that accounting rules will change. Berkshire’s consolidated figures would then incorporate all of MidAmerican, including the substantial debt it utilizes (though this debt is not now, nor will it ever be, an obligation of Berkshire).
受限的投票权迫使我们以简化方式核算中美能源。我们未将其资产、负债、收入和费用全额并入伯克希尔报表，而仅在资产负债表和利润表中作单行记录。不过，PUHCA未来（可能很快）或被废除，或会计准则或生变故。届时伯克希尔合并报表将全面涵盖中美能源，包括其使用的巨额债务（但该债务目前及未来均不构成伯克希尔义务）。
At yearend, $1.478 billion of MidAmerican’s junior debt was payable to Berkshire. This debt has allowed acquisitions to be financed without our partners needing to increase their already substantial investments in MidAmerican. By charging 11% interest, Berkshire is compensated fairly for putting up the funds needed for purchases, while our partners are spared dilution of their equity interests. Because MidAmerican made no large acquisitions last year, it paid down $100 million of what it owes us.
年末，中美能源欠伯克希尔的次级债务为14.78亿美元。该债务融资使合作伙伴无需追加已相当可观的投入即可完成收购。通过收取11%利息，伯克希尔合理获得资金使用补偿，而合作伙伴则避免了股权稀释。因中美能源去年未进行重大收购，其偿还了1亿美元债务。
# MidAmerican also owns a significant non-utility business
中美能源还拥有一项重要的非公用事业业务
MidAmerican also owns a significant non-utility business, HomeServices of America, the second largest real estate broker in the country. Unlike our utility operations, this business is highly cyclical, but nevertheless one we view enthusiastically. We have an exceptional manager, Ron Peltier, who through both his acquisition and operational skills is building a brokerage powerhouse.
中美能源还持有美国第二大房地产经纪公司HomeServices of America的重大权益。与公用事业不同，该业务具有高度周期性，但我们仍对其充满热情。我们拥有卓越的管理者罗恩·佩尔蒂埃，他凭借并购和运营能力，正在打造一家经纪行业巨头。
HomeServices participated in $59.8 billion of transactions in 2004, a gain of $11.2 billion from 2003. About 24% of the increase came from six acquisitions made during the year. Through our 17 brokerage firms – all of which retain their local identities – we employ more than 18,000 brokers in 18 states. HomeServices is almost certain to grow substantially in the next decade as we continue to acquire leading localized operations.
2004年，HomeServices参与了价值598亿美元的交易，较2003年增长112亿美元。其中约24%的增长来自年内完成的六项收购。通过旗下17家保留本地品牌特色的经纪公司，我们在18个州雇佣了超过18,000名经纪人。随着持续收购区域性龙头企业，HomeServices几乎肯定将在下一个十年实现大幅增长。
Last year MidAmerican wrote off a major investment in a zinc recovery project that was initiated in 1998 and became operational in 2002. Large quantities of zinc are present in the brine produced by our California geothermal operations, and we believed we could profitably extract the metal. For many months, it appeared that commercially-viable recoveries were imminent. But in mining, just as in oil exploration, prospects have a way of “teasing” their developers, and every time one problem was solved, another popped up. In September, we threw in the towel.
去年中美能源注销了一项始于1998年、2002年投入运营的锌回收项目重大投资。我们的加州地热业务产生的卤水中含有大量锌，我们曾认为可盈利提取该金属。数月间看似即将实现商业化回收，但在采矿领域（如同石油勘探），前景往往“戏弄”开发者——每当解决一个问题，总会冒出另一个问题。最终于9月彻底放弃该项目。
Our failure here illustrates the importance of a guideline – stay with simple propositions – that we usually apply in investments as well as operations. If only one variable is key to a decision, and the variable has a 90% chance of going your way, the chance for a successful outcome is obviously 90%. But if ten independent variables need to break favorably for a successful result, and each has a 90% probability of success, the likelihood of having a winner is only 35%. In our zinc venture, we solved most of the problems. But one proved intractable, and that was one too many. Since a chain is no stronger than its weakest link, it makes sense to look for – if you’ll excuse an oxymoron – mono-linked chains.
此次失败凸显了我们一贯遵循的原则——坚持简单命题——在投资和运营中的重要性。若决策仅依赖一个关键变量且成功概率为90%，结果成功率即为90%；但若需十个独立变量全部成功（每个成功概率同为90%），整体成功率骤降至35%。在锌项目中我们解决了多数问题，但一个难题无法攻克，这已足够致命。正如“链条强度取决于最弱环节”，容我使用矛盾修辞——应寻找“单一链接的链条”。
A breakdown of MidAmerican’s results follows. In 2004, the “other” category includes a $72.2 million profit from sale of an Enron receivable that was thrown in when we purchased Northern Natural two years earlier. Walter, Dave and I, as natives of Omaha, view this unanticipated gain as war reparations – partial compensation for the loss our city suffered in 1986 when Ken Lay moved Northern to Houston, after promising to leave the company here. (For details, see Berkshire’s 2002 annual report.)
以下为中美能源业务细分。2004年“其他”类别包含出售安然应收账款获得的7,220万美元收益（两年前收购Northern Natural时附带取得）。作为奥马哈本地人，沃尔特、戴夫和戏称这笔意外收益为“战争赔款”——补偿1986年肯·莱违背承诺将公司迁往休斯顿给本市造成的损失。（详情见伯克希尔2002年报）
# Key Figures on MidAmerican’s Operations (中美能源运营关键数据)
Earnings (in $ millions) (收益，单位：百万美元)
| Segment (板块) | 2004 | 2003 |
|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities (英国公用事业) | $326 | $289 |
| Iowa utility (爱荷华州公用事业) | $268 | $269 |
| Pipelines (天然气管道) | $288 | $261 |
| HomeServices | $130 | $113 |
| Other (net) (其他净收益) | $172 | $190 |
| Loss from zinc project (锌项目亏损) | $(579) | $(46) |
Earnings before corporate interest and taxes (税息前收益):
2004: $605 million
2003: $1,076 million
Interest, other than to Berkshire (非伯克希尔利息支出):
2004: $(212) million
2003: $(225) million
Interest on Berkshire junior debt (伯克希尔次级债务利息):
2004: $(170) million
2003: $(184) million
Income tax (所得税):
2004: $(53) million
2003: $(251) million
Net earnings (净利润):
2004: $170 million
2003: $416 million
Earnings applicable to Berkshire* (归属于伯克希尔收益):
2004: $237 million
2003: $429 million
Debt owed to others (应付第三方债务):
2004: $10,528 million
2003: $10,296 million
Debt owed to Berkshire (应付伯克希尔债务):
2004: $1,478 million
2003: $1,578 million
*Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $110 in 2004 and $118 in 2003.
*包含伯克希尔获得的利息收入（扣除相关所得税）：2004年1.1亿美元，2003年1.18亿美元。
# Insurance (保险业务)
Since Berkshire purchased National Indemnity (“NICO”) in 1967, property-casualty insurance has been our core business and the propellant of our growth. Insurance has provided a fountain of funds with which we’ve acquired the securities and businesses that now give us an ever-widening variety of earnings streams. So in this section, I will be spending a little time telling you how we got where we are.
自1967年收购国民保险公司（NICO）以来，财险业务始终是伯克希尔的核心业务及增长引擎。保险为我们提供了源源不断的资金，用于收购证券和企业，从而构建了日益多元化的收益流。因此本节将详细阐述我们如何走到今天这一步。
# The Source of Our Insurance Funds: Float (保险资金来源：浮存金)
The source of our insurance funds is “float,” which is money that doesn’t belong to us but that we temporarily hold. Most of our float arises because (1) premiums are paid upfront though the service we provide – insurance protection – is delivered over a period that usually covers a year and; (2) loss events that occur today do not always result in our immediately paying claims, because it sometimes takes many years for losses to be reported (asbestos losses would be an example), negotiated and settled. The $20 million of float that came with our 1967 purchase has now increased – both by way of internal growth and acquisitions – to $46.1 billion.
我们的保险资金来源于“浮存金”——不属于我们但暂时持有的资金。浮存金主要产生于两点：（1）保费先于保障服务支付（通常覆盖一年期限）；（2）当前发生的事故未必立即赔付，因损失上报、协商和解决常需多年（如石棉相关损失）。1967年收购带来的2,000万美元浮存金，现已通过内生增长和并购增至461亿美元。
# The Cost of Float (浮存金成本)
Float is wonderful – if it doesn’t come at a high price. Its cost is determined by underwriting results, meaning how the expenses and losses we will ultimately pay compare with the premiums we have received. When an underwriting profit is achieved – as has been the case at Berkshire in about half of the 38 years we have been in the insurance business – float is better than free. In such years, we are actually paid for holding other people’s money. For most insurers, however, life has been far more difficult: In aggregate, the property-casualty industry almost invariably operates at an underwriting loss. When that loss is large, float becomes expensive, sometimes devastatingly so.
浮存金妙不可言——前提是成本可控。其成本取决于承保结果：即最终赔付的费用和损失与已收保费的对比。当实现承保利润时（伯克希尔过去38年中约半数年份达成），浮存金成本优于免费资金。此时我们实际上因持有他人资金而获得报酬。但对多数保险公司而言情况艰难得多：财险行业整体几乎长期处于承保亏损状态。当亏损巨大时，浮存金成本将变得极其高昂。
# Overcoming Industry Challenges (突破行业困局)
Insurers have generally earned poor returns for a simple reason: They sell a commodity-like product. Policy forms are standard, and the product is available from many suppliers, some of whom are mutual companies (“owned” by policyholders rather than stockholders) with profit goals that are limited. Moreover, most insureds don’t care from whom they buy. Customers by the millions say “I need some Gillette blades” or “I’ll have a Coke” but we wait in vain for “I’d like a National Indemnity policy, please.” Consequently, price competition in insurance is usually fierce. Think airline seats.
保险公司普遍回报率低下的根本原因在于：其产品具有大宗商品属性。保单条款标准化，市场上存在众多供应商（包括以保户而非股东为导向的互助公司）。且投保人通常不关心购买对象。千万消费者会说“我要吉列刀片”或“我要喝可乐”，但无人要求“请给我一份国民保险保单”。因此保险业的价格竞争异常激烈——类似航空业的座位销售。
# How Berkshire Succeeds (伯克希尔的成功之道)
So, you may ask, how do Berkshire’s insurance operations overcome the dismal economics of the industry and achieve some measure of enduring competitive advantage? We’ve attacked that problem in several ways. Let’s look first at NICO’s strategy.
您或许会问：伯克希尔如何突破行业困局并建立持久竞争优势？我们采取了多种策略，首先聚焦NICO的战略。
When we purchased the company – a specialist in commercial auto and general liability insurance – it did not appear to have any attributes that would overcome the industry’s chronic troubles. It was not well-known, had no informational advantage (the company has never had an actuary), was not a low-cost operator, and sold through general agents, a method many people thought outdated. Nevertheless, for almost all of the past 38 years, NICO has been a star performer. Indeed, had we not made this acquisition, Berkshire would be lucky to be worth half of what it is today.
收购NICO时（专注商业车险和综合责任险），其并无显见优势可破解行业顽疾：品牌知名度低、无信息优势（公司从未设精算师）、非低成本运营、通过总代理销售（被许多人视为过时模式）。但过去38年中，NICO几乎始终表现卓越。若未完成此项收购，伯克希尔今日价值恐不足现水平的一半。
# The Managerial Mindset (管理思维)
What we’ve had going for us is a managerial mindset that most insurers find impossible to replicate. Take a look at the facing page. Can you imagine any public company embracing a business model that would lead to the decline in revenue that we experienced from 1986 through 1999? That colossal slide, it should be emphasized, did not occur because business was unobtainable. Many billions of premium dollars were readily available to NICO had we only been willing to cut prices. But we instead consistently priced to make a profit, not to match our most optimistic competitor. We never left customers – but they left us.
我们的核心优势是一种多数保险公司难以复制的管理思维。请看下一页图表：您能否想象任何上市公司会主动采用导致1986-1999年收入持续下滑的商业模式？这一剧烈下滑并非因为市场无需求。只要我们愿意降价，NICO本可轻松获取数十亿美元保费。但我们始终坚持“以盈利为目标定价”，而非追随最激进竞争对手。我们从未抛弃客户——是客户主动离开了我们。
# The Institutional Imperative (机构惯性)
Most American businesses harbor an “institutional imperative” that rejects extended decreases in volume. What CEO wants to report to his shareholders that not only did business contract last year but that it will continue to drop? In insurance, the urge to keep writing business is also intensified because the consequences of foolishly-priced policies may not become apparent for some time. If an insurer is optimistic in its reserving, reported earnings will be overstated, and years may pass before true loss costs are revealed (a form of self-deception that nearly destroyed GEICO in the early 1970s).
多数美国企业存在一种“机构惯性”——拒绝接受长期业务萎缩。哪位CEO愿意向股东报告“今年业务缩水且未来还将继续下滑”？在保险业，这种惯性更因以下原因加剧：错误定价政策的后果可能多年后才显现。若保险公司低估理赔准备金，报表利润将被虚增，真实损失成本可能多年后才暴露（这种自我欺骗曾让GEICO在1970年代初濒临破产）。
# MidAmerican also owns a significant non-utility business
中美能源还拥有一项重要的非公用事业业务
MidAmerican also owns a significant non-utility business, HomeServices of America, the second largest real estate broker in the country. Unlike our utility operations, this business is highly cyclical, but nevertheless one we view enthusiastically. We have an exceptional manager, Ron Peltier, who through both his acquisition and operational skills is building a brokerage powerhouse.
中美能源还持有美国第二大房地产经纪公司HomeServices of America的重大权益。与公用事业不同，该业务具有高度周期性，但我们仍对其充满热情。我们拥有卓越的管理者罗恩·佩尔蒂埃，他凭借并购和运营能力，正在打造一家经纪行业巨头。
HomeServices participated in $59.8 billion of transactions in 2004, a gain of $11.2 billion from 2003. About 24% of the increase came from six acquisitions made during the year. Through our 17 brokerage firms – all of which retain their local identities – we employ more than 18,000 brokers in 18 states. HomeServices is almost certain to grow substantially in the next decade as we continue to acquire leading localized operations.
2004年，HomeServices参与了价值598亿美元的交易，较2003年增长112亿美元。其中约24%的增长来自年内完成的六项收购。通过旗下17家保留本地品牌特色的经纪公司，我们在18个州雇佣了超过18,000名经纪人。随着持续收购区域性龙头企业，HomeServices几乎肯定将在下一个十年实现大幅增长。
Last year MidAmerican wrote off a major investment in a zinc recovery project that was initiated in 1998 and became operational in 2002. Large quantities of zinc are present in the brine produced by our California geothermal operations, and we believed we could profitably extract the metal. For many months, it appeared that commercially-viable recoveries were imminent. But in mining, just as in oil exploration, prospects have a way of “teasing” their developers, and every time one problem was solved, another popped up. In September, we threw in the towel.
去年中美能源注销了一项始于1998年、2002年投入运营的锌回收项目重大投资。我们的加州地热业务产生的卤水中含有大量锌，我们曾认为可盈利提取该金属。数月间看似即将实现商业化回收，但在采矿领域（如同石油勘探），前景往往“戏弄”开发者——每当解决一个问题，总会冒出另一个问题。最终于9月彻底放弃该项目。
Our failure here illustrates the importance of a guideline – stay with simple propositions – that we usually apply in investments as well as operations. If only one variable is key to a decision, and the variable has a 90% chance of going your way, the chance for a successful outcome is obviously 90%. But if ten independent variables need to break favorably for a successful result, and each has a 90% probability of success, the likelihood of having a winner is only 35%. In our zinc venture, we solved most of the problems. But one proved intractable, and that was one too many. Since a chain is no stronger than its weakest link, it makes sense to look for – if you’ll excuse an oxymoron – mono-linked chains.
此次失败凸显了我们一贯遵循的原则——坚持简单命题——在投资和运营中的重要性。若决策仅依赖一个关键变量且成功概率为90%，结果成功率即为90%；但若需十个独立变量全部成功（每个成功概率同为90%），整体成功率骤降至35%。在锌项目中我们解决了多数问题，但一个难题无法攻克，这已足够致命。正如“链条强度取决于最弱环节”，容我使用矛盾修辞——应寻找“单一链接的链条”。
A breakdown of MidAmerican’s results follows. In 2004, the “other” category includes a $72.2 million profit from sale of an Enron receivable that was thrown in when we purchased Northern Natural two years earlier. Walter, Dave and I, as natives of Omaha, view this unanticipated gain as war reparations – partial compensation for the loss our city suffered in 1986 when Ken Lay moved Northern to Houston, after promising to leave the company here. (For details, see Berkshire’s 2002 annual report.)
以下为中美能源业务细分。2004年“其他”类别包含出售安然应收账款获得的7,220万美元收益（两年前收购Northern Natural时附带取得）。作为奥马哈本地人，沃尔特、戴夫和戏称这笔意外收益为“战争赔款”——补偿1986年肯·莱违背承诺将公司迁往休斯顿给本市造成的损失。（详情见伯克希尔2002年报）
# Key Figures on MidAmerican’s Operations (中美能源运营关键数据)
Earnings (in $ millions) (收益，单位：百万美元)
| Segment (板块) | 2004 | 2003 |
|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities (英国公用事业) | $326 | $289 |
| Iowa utility (爱荷华州公用事业) | $268 | $269 |
| Pipelines (天然气管道) | $288 | $261 |
| HomeServices | $130 | $113 |
| Other (net) (其他净收益) | $172 | $190 |
| Loss from zinc project (锌项目亏损) | $(579) | $(46) |
Earnings before corporate interest and taxes (税息前收益):
2004: $605 million
2003: $1,076 million
Interest, other than to Berkshire (非伯克希尔利息支出):
2004: $(212) million
2003: $(225) million
Interest on Berkshire junior debt (伯克希尔次级债务利息):
2004: $(170) million
2003: $(184) million
Income tax (所得税):
2004: $(53) million
2003: $(251) million
Net earnings (净利润):
2004: $170 million
2003: $416 million
Earnings applicable to Berkshire* (归属于伯克希尔收益):
2004: $237 million
2003: $429 million
Debt owed to others (应付第三方债务):
2004: $10,528 million
2003: $10,296 million
Debt owed to Berkshire (应付伯克希尔债务):
2004: $1,478 million
2003: $1,578 million
*Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $110 in 2004 and $118 in 2003.
*包含伯克希尔获得的利息收入（扣除相关所得税）：2004年1.1亿美元，2003年1.18亿美元。
# Insurance (保险业务)
Since Berkshire purchased National Indemnity (“NICO”) in 1967, property-casualty insurance has been our core business and the propellant of our growth. Insurance has provided a fountain of funds with which we’ve acquired the securities and businesses that now give us an ever-widening variety of earnings streams. So in this section, I will be spending a little time telling you how we got where we are.
自1967年收购国民保险公司（NICO）以来，财险业务始终是伯克希尔的核心业务及增长引擎。保险为我们提供了源源不断的资金，用于收购证券和企业，从而构建了日益多元化的收益流。因此本节将详细阐述我们如何走到今天这一步。
# The Source of Our Insurance Funds: Float (保险资金来源：浮存金)
The source of our insurance funds is “float,” which is money that doesn’t belong to us but that we temporarily hold. Most of our float arises because (1) premiums are paid upfront though the service we provide – insurance protection – is delivered over a period that usually covers a year and; (2) loss events that occur today do not always result in our immediately paying claims, because it sometimes takes many years for losses to be reported (asbestos losses would be an example), negotiated and settled. The $20 million of float that came with our 1967 purchase has now increased – both by way of internal growth and acquisitions – to $46.1 billion.
我们的保险资金来源于“浮存金”——不属于我们但暂时持有的资金。浮存金主要产生于两点：（1）保费先于保障服务支付（通常覆盖一年期限）；（2）当前发生的事故未必立即赔付，因损失上报、协商和解决常需多年（如石棉相关损失）。1967年收购带来的2,000万美元浮存金，现已通过内生增长和并购增至461亿美元。
# The Cost of Float (浮存金成本)
Float is wonderful – if it doesn’t come at a high price. Its cost is determined by underwriting results, meaning how the expenses and losses we will ultimately pay compare with the premiums we have received. When an underwriting profit is achieved – as has been the case at Berkshire in about half of the 38 years we have been in the insurance business – float is better than free. In such years, we are actually paid for holding other people’s money. For most insurers, however, life has been far more difficult: In aggregate, the property-casualty industry almost invariably operates at an underwriting loss. When that loss is large, float becomes expensive, sometimes devastatingly so.
浮存金妙不可言——前提是成本可控。其成本取决于承保结果：即最终赔付的费用和损失与已收保费的对比。当实现承保利润时（伯克希尔过去38年中约半数年份达成），浮存金成本优于免费资金。此时我们实际上因持有他人资金而获得报酬。但对多数保险公司而言情况艰难得多：财险行业整体几乎长期处于承保亏损状态。当亏损巨大时，浮存金成本将变得极其高昂。
# Overcoming Industry Challenges (突破行业困局)
Insurers have generally earned poor returns for a simple reason: They sell a commodity-like product. Policy forms are standard, and the product is available from many suppliers, some of whom are mutual companies (“owned” by policyholders rather than stockholders) with profit goals that are limited. Moreover, most insureds don’t care from whom they buy. Customers by the millions say “I need some Gillette blades” or “I’ll have a Coke” but we wait in vain for “I’d like a National Indemnity policy, please.” Consequently, price competition in insurance is usually fierce. Think airline seats.
保险公司普遍回报率低下的根本原因在于：其产品具有大宗商品属性。保单条款标准化，市场上存在众多供应商（包括以保户而非股东为导向的互助公司）。且投保人通常不关心购买对象。千万消费者会说“我要吉列刀片”或“我要喝可乐”，但无人要求“请给我一份国民保险保单”。因此保险业的价格竞争异常激烈——类似航空业的座位销售。
# How Berkshire Succeeds (伯克希尔的成功之道)
So, you may ask, how do Berkshire’s insurance operations overcome the dismal economics of the industry and achieve some measure of enduring competitive advantage? We’ve attacked that problem in several ways. Let’s look first at NICO’s strategy.
您或许会问：伯克希尔如何突破行业困局并建立持久竞争优势？我们采取了多种策略，首先聚焦NICO的战略。
When we purchased the company – a specialist in commercial auto and general liability insurance – it did not appear to have any attributes that would overcome the industry’s chronic troubles. It was not well-known, had no informational advantage (the company has never had an actuary), was not a low-cost operator, and sold through general agents, a method many people thought outdated. Nevertheless, for almost all of the past 38 years, NICO has been a star performer. Indeed, had we not made this acquisition, Berkshire would be lucky to be worth half of what it is today.
收购NICO时（专注商业车险和综合责任险），其并无显见优势可破解行业顽疾：品牌知名度低、无信息优势（公司从未设精算师）、非低成本运营、通过总代理销售（被许多人视为过时模式）。但过去38年中，NICO几乎始终表现卓越。若未完成此项收购，伯克希尔今日价值恐不足现水平的一半。
# The Managerial Mindset (管理思维)
What we’ve had going for us is a managerial mindset that most insurers find impossible to replicate. Take a look at the facing page. Can you imagine any public company embracing a business model that would lead to the decline in revenue that we experienced from 1986 through 1999? That colossal slide, it should be emphasized, did not occur because business was unobtainable. Many billions of premium dollars were readily available to NICO had we only been willing to cut prices. But we instead consistently priced to make a profit, not to match our most optimistic competitor. We never left customers – but they left us.
我们的核心优势是一种多数保险公司难以复制的管理思维。请看下一页图表：您能否想象任何上市公司会主动采用导致1986-1999年收入持续下滑的商业模式？这一剧烈下滑并非因为市场无需求。只要我们愿意降价，NICO本可轻松获取数十亿美元保费。但我们始终坚持“以盈利为目标定价”，而非追随最激进竞争对手。我们从未抛弃客户——是客户主动离开了我们。
# The Institutional Imperative (机构惯性)
Most American businesses harbor an “institutional imperative” that rejects extended decreases in volume. What CEO wants to report to his shareholders that not only did business contract last year but that it will continue to drop? In insurance, the urge to keep writing business is also intensified because the consequences of foolishly-priced policies may not become apparent for some time. If an insurer is optimistic in its reserving, reported earnings will be overstated, and years may pass before true loss costs are revealed (a form of self-deception that nearly destroyed GEICO in the early 1970s).
多数美国企业存在一种“机构惯性”——拒绝接受长期业务萎缩。哪位CEO愿意向股东报告“今年业务缩水且未来还将继续下滑”？在保险业，这种惯性更因以下原因加剧：错误定价政策的后果可能多年后才显现。若保险公司低估理赔准备金，报表利润将被虚增，真实损失成本可能多年后才暴露（这种自我欺骗曾让GEICO在1970年代初濒临破产）。
# Portrait of a Disciplined Underwriter
严谨承保的典范
# National Indemnity Company
国民保险公司
Year (年份) | Written Premium (In $ millions) (保费收入，单位：百万美元) | No. of Employees at Year-End (年末员工数) | Ratio of Operating Expenses to Written Premium (运营费用/保费比率) | *Underwriting Profit (Loss) as a Percentage of Premiums (承保利润/亏损占保费比率)
1980 ........................... | $79.6 | 372 | 32.3% | 8.2%
1981 ........................... | $59.9 | 353 | 36.1% | (0.8%)
1982 ........................... | $52.5 | 323 | 36.7% | (15.3%)
1983 ........................... | $58.2 | 308 | 35.6% | (18.7%)
1984 ........................... | $62.2 | 342 | 35.5% | (17.0%)
1985 ........................... | $160.7 | 380 | 28.0% | 1.9%
1986 ........................... | $366.2 | 403 | 25.9% | 30.7%
1987 ........................... | $232.3 | 368 | 29.5% | 27.3%
1988 ........................... | $139.9 | 347 | 31.7% | 24.8%
1989 ........................... | $98.4 | 320 | 35.9% | 14.8%
1990 ........................... | $87.8 | 289 | 37.4% | 7.0%
1991 ........................... | $88.3 | 284 | 35.7% | 13.0%
1992 ........................... | $82.7 | 277 | 37.9% | 5.2%
1993 ........................... | $86.8 | 279 | 36.1% | 11.3%
1994 ........................... | $85.9 | 263 | 34.6% | 4.6%
1995 ........................... | $78.0 | 258 | 36.6% | 9.2%
1996 ........................... | $74.0 | 243 | 36.5% | 6.8%
1997 ........................... | $65.3 | 240 | 40.4% | 6.2%
1998 ........................... | $56.8 | 231 | 40.4% | 9.4%
1999 ........................... | $54.5 | 222 | 41.2% | 4.5%
2000 ........................... | $68.1 | 230 | 38.4% | 2.9%
2001 ........................... | $161.3 | 254 | 28.8% | (11.6%)
2002 ........................... | $343.5 | 313 | 24.0% | 16.8%
2003 ........................... | $594.5 | 337 | 22.2% | 18.1%
2004 ........................... | $605.6 | 340 | 22.5% | 5.1%
*Note (注释):
It takes a long time to learn the true profitability of any given year. First, many claims are received after the end of the year, and we must estimate how many of these there will be and what they will cost. (In insurance jargon, these claims are termed IBNR – incurred but not reported.) Second, claims often take years, or even decades, to settle, which means there can be many surprises along the way.
*说明：
确定任何一年的真实盈利能力需要较长时间。首先，许多理赔申请在年末后才收到，需预估其数量和成本（保险术语称为IBNR——已发生但未报告）。其次，理赔解决可能耗时数年甚至数十年，过程中可能出现意外结果。
For these reasons, the results in this column simply represent our best estimate at the end of 2004 as to how we have done in prior years. Profit margins for the years through 1999 are probably close to correct because these years are “mature,” in the sense that they have few claims still outstanding. The more recent the year, the more guesswork is involved. In particular, the results shown for 2003 and 2004 are apt to change significantly.
因此，本表数据仅反映我们2004年底对过往业绩的最佳预估。1999年前的年份因“成熟”（剩余未决理赔极少），利润率接近真实值；近年数据则更多依赖估算，尤其是2003-2004年结果可能显著调整。
Finally, there is a fear factor at work, in that a shrinking business usually leads to layoffs. To avoid pink slips, employees will rationalize inadequate pricing, telling themselves that poorly-priced business must be tolerated in order to keep the organization intact and the distribution system happy. If this course isn’t followed, these employees will argue, the company will not participate in the recovery that they invariably feel is just around the corner.
此外，存在一种“恐惧因素”：业务萎缩常导致裁员。为避免解雇，员工会为低价承保辩护，认为必须容忍低利润业务以维持组织完整和分销体系满意。否则，他们认为公司无法参与即将到来的市场复苏。
To combat employees’ natural tendency to save their own skins, we have always promised NICO’s workforce that no one will be fired because of declining volume, however severe the contraction. (This is not Donald Trump’s sort of place.) NICO is not labor-intensive, and, as the table suggests, can live with excess overhead. It can’t live, however, with underpriced business and the breakdown in underwriting discipline that accompanies it. An insurance organization that doesn’t care deeply about underwriting at a profit this year is unlikely to care next year either.
为对抗员工自保倾向，我们始终承诺NICO员工不会因业务量下降被解雇（这里不是特朗普式风格）。NICO非劳动密集型，如表格所示可承受冗余成本。但无法容忍低价承保及随之而来的承保纪律崩溃。若企业今年不重视盈利承保，明年亦难重视。
Naturally, a business that follows a no-layoff policy must be especially careful to avoid overstaffing when times are good. Thirty years ago Tom Murphy, then CEO of Cap Cities, drove this point home to me with a hypothetical tale about an employee who asked his boss for permission to hire an assistant. The employee assumed that adding $20,000 to the annual payroll would be inconsequential. But his boss told him the proposal should be evaluated as a $3 million decision, given that an additional person would probably cost at least that amount over his lifetime, factoring in raises, benefits and other expenses (more people, more toilet paper). And unless the company fell on very hard times, the employee added would be unlikely to be dismissed, however marginal his contribution to the business.
自然，执行不裁员政策的企业需在繁荣期谨慎避免人浮于事。三十年前，Cap Cities前CEO汤姆·墨菲曾用一个假设故事提醒我：员工认为增加2万美元年薪的助理开支微不足道，但老板指出需将其视为300万美元决策——因终身成本（含加薪、福利、其他支出）可能超过该数字，且除非极端困难，新增员工难以解雇，无论其贡献多微薄。
It takes real fortitude – embedded deep within a company’s culture – to operate as NICO does. Anyone examining the table can scan the years from 1986 to 1999 quickly. But living day after day with dwindling volume – while competitors are boasting of growth and reaping Wall Street’s applause – is an experience few managers can tolerate. NICO, however, has had four CEOs since its formation in 1940 and none have bent. (It should be noted that only one of the four graduated from college. Our experience tells us that extraordinary business ability is largely innate.)
NICO式运营需植根于企业文化的真实坚韧。观察表格者可快速浏览1986-1999年数据，但日复一日面对业务萎缩（而竞争对手炫耀增长、收获华尔街掌声）的体验鲜有管理者能承受。然而，自1940年成立以来，NICO历经四位CEO均坚守原则（需指出仅一人大学毕业，我们的经验表明卓越商业才能多为天生）。
The current managerial star – make that superstar – at NICO is Don Wurster (yes, he’s “the graduate”), who has been running things since 1989. His slugging percentage is right up there with Barry Bonds’ because, like Barry, Don will accept a walk rather than swing at a bad pitch. Don has now amassed $950 million of float at NICO that over time is almost certain to be proved the negative-cost kind. Because insurance prices are falling, Don’s volume will soon decline very significantly and, as it does, Charlie and I will applaud him ever more loudly.
NICO现任管理明星——确切说是超级明星——是唐·沃斯特（是的，他是“毕业生”），自1989年执掌至今。他的“打击率”堪比巴里·邦兹，因他像巴里一样宁愿选球保送而非挥棒坏球。唐已为NICO积累9.5亿美元浮存金，其成本几乎肯定为负值。因保险价格下跌，唐的业务量将大幅下滑，届时查理和我将愈发热烈地为他喝彩。
Another way to prosper in a commodity-type business is to be the low-cost operator. Among auto insurers operating on a broad scale, GEICO holds that cherished title. For NICO, as we have seen, an ebb-and-flow business model makes sense. But a company holding a low-cost advantage must pursue an unrelenting foot-to-the-floor strategy. And that’s just what we do at GEICO.
在大宗商品型业务中成功的另一路径是成为低成本运营商。在大规模车险公司中，GEICO占据这一珍贵地位。正如我们所见，NICO的波动业务模式合理，但低成本优势企业需采取“油门踩到底”的不懈策略。这正是GEICO的行事风格。
A century ago, when autos first appeared, the property-casualty industry operated as a cartel. The major companies, most of which were based in the Northeast, established “bureau” rates and that was it. No one cut prices to attract business. Instead, insurers competed for strong, well-regarded agents, a focus that produced high commissions for agents and high prices for consumers.
一个世纪前汽车初现时，财险行业曾为卡特尔垄断。主要公司（多位于东北部）设立“局定费率”，无需降价揽客。保险公司转而争夺优质代理，导致代理人佣金高企、消费者保费昂贵。
In 1922, State Farm was formed by George Mecherle, a farmer from Merna, Illinois, who aimed to take advantage of the pricing umbrella maintained by the high-cost giants of the industry. State Farm employed a “captive” agency force, a system keeping its acquisition costs lower than those incurred by the bureau insurers (whose “independent” agents successfully played off one company against another). With its low-cost structure, State Farm eventually captured about 25% of the personal lines (auto and homeowners) business, far outdistancing its once-mighty competitors. Allstate, formed in 1931, put a similar distribution system into place and soon became the runner-up in personal lines to State Farm.
1922年，伊利诺伊州农民乔治·梅切尔创立州农场保险（State Farm），意图利用行业巨头高价形成的定价庇护。州农场采用“专属代理制”，获客成本低于局定费率公司（其“独立”代理在各家间周旋获利）。凭借低成本结构，州农场最终占据约25%个人险业务（车险和家财险），远超昔日强敌。1931年成立的好事达（Allstate）效仿该分销体系，很快成为州农场之后的第二大个人险公司。
Capitalism had worked its magic, and these low-cost operations looked unstoppable.
资本主义发挥了魔力，这些低成本运营看似势不可挡。
# Leo Goodwin’s Vision: Founding GEICO
利奥·古德温的远见：GEICO的创立
But a man named Leo Goodwin had an idea for an even more efficient auto insurer and, with a skimpy $200,000, started GEICO in 1936. Goodwin’s plan was to eliminate the agent entirely and to deal instead directly with the auto owner. Why, he asked himself, should there be any unnecessary and expensive links in the distribution mechanism when the product, auto insurance, was both mandatory and costly. Purchasers of business insurance, he reasoned, might well require professional advice, but most consumers knew what they needed in an auto policy. That was a powerful insight.
但一位名叫利奥·古德温的人提出了更高效的车险模式，并以仅20万美元启动资金于1936年创立GEICO。古德温计划彻底取消代理人，直接与车主对接。他自问：既然车险是强制且昂贵的产品，为何分销链条中需要不必要的高昂环节？他认为企业险购买者或许需要专业建议，但多数消费者清楚自己所需的车险内容。这一洞察力极具革命性。
# GEICO’s Growth and Challenges
GEICO的成长与挑战
Originally, GEICO mailed its low-cost message to a limited audience of government employees. Later, it widened its horizons and shifted its marketing emphasis to the phone, working inquiries that came from broadcast and print advertising. And today the Internet is coming on strong.
最初，GEICO通过邮件向有限的政府雇员推广低价优势。随后，其将市场拓展至电话渠道，处理来自广播和印刷广告的咨询。如今，互联网营销正强势崛起。
Between 1936 and 1975, GEICO grew from a standing start to a 4% market share, becoming the country’s fourth largest auto insurer. During most of this period, the company was superbly managed, achieving both excellent volume gains and high profits. It looked unstoppable. But after my friend and hero Lorimer Davidson retired as CEO in 1970, his successors soon made a huge mistake by under-reserving for losses. This produced faulty cost information, which in turn produced inadequate pricing. By 1976, GEICO was on the brink of failure.
1936至1975年间，GEICO从零起步占据4%市场份额，成为美国第四大车险公司。此期间管理卓越，实现规模与利润双增长，看似不可阻挡。但1970年我的朋友兼英雄洛里默·戴维森卸任CEO后，继任者因低估理赔准备金犯下重大错误，导致成本信息失真，进而引发定价过低。至1976年，GEICO濒临破产。
# Turnaround Leadership: Jack Byrne and Tony Nicely
力挽狂澜的领导者：杰克·伯恩与托尼·尼利
Jack Byrne then joined GEICO as CEO and, almost single-handedly, saved the company by heroic efforts that included major price increases. Though GEICO’s survival required these, policyholders fled the company, and by 1980 its market share had fallen to 1.8%. Subsequently, the company embarked on some unwise diversification moves. This shift of emphasis away from its extraordinary core business stunted GEICO’s growth, and by 1993 its market share had grown only fractionally, to 1.9%. Then Tony Nicely took charge.
杰克·伯恩接任CEO后，几乎以一己之力通过大幅提价等措施挽救公司。尽管生存代价是客户流失，1980年市占率跌至1.8%。随后的非核心多元化战略进一步阻碍增长，至1993年市占率仅微增至1.9%。托尼·尼利接管后局面彻底扭转。
And what a difference that’s made: In 2005 GEICO will probably secure a 6% market share. Better yet, Tony has matched growth with profitability. Indeed, GEICO delivers all of its constituents major benefits: In 2004 its customers saved $1 billion or so compared to what they would otherwise have paid for coverage, its associates earned a $191 million profit-sharing bonus that averaged 24.3% of salary, and its owner – that’s us – enjoyed excellent financial returns.
转变之大令人惊叹：2005年GEICO市占率预计达6%。更难得的是，尼利实现了增长与盈利并重。实际上，GEICO为各方带来显著利益：2004年客户节省保费约10亿美元，员工获得相当于薪资24.3%的1.91亿美元分红，而我们——公司所有者——也收获了丰厚财务回报。
# New Jersey Expansion Success
新泽西州扩张的成功
In 2003, however, New Jersey took a new look at its chronic auto-insurance problems and enacted legislation that would curb fraud and allow insurers a fair playing field. Even so, one might have expected the state’s bureaucracy to make change slow and difficult.
然而2003年，新泽西州重新审视长期车险问题，立法遏制欺诈并为保险公司创造公平环境。尽管如此，人们本可能预期官僚体系会让变革缓慢而艰难。
But just the opposite occurred. Holly Bakke, the New Jersey insurance commissioner, who would be a success in any line of work, was determined to turn the law’s intent into reality. With her staff’s cooperation, GEICO ironed out the details for re-entering the state and was licensed last August. Since then, we’ve received a response from New Jersey drivers that is multiples of my expectations.
实际情况却截然相反。新泽西保险专员霍莉·巴克（无论从事哪行都能成功）决心将法律意图转化为现实。在其团队协作下，GEICO解决细节问题，于去年8月获准复营。此后收到的新泽西驾驶者反响远超预期。
We are now serving 140,000 policyholders – about 4% of the New Jersey market – and saving them substantial sums (as we do drivers everywhere). Word-of-mouth recommendations within the state are causing inquiries to pour in. And once we hear from a New Jersey prospect, our closure rate – the percentage of policies issued to inquiries received – is far higher in the state than it is nationally.
目前我们已服务14万保单持有者（占新泽西市场4%），为客户节省巨额保费（与全球客户相同）。州内口碑推荐带来大量咨询，且新泽西客户的转化率（核保数/咨询量）远高于全国水平。
# Competitive Pricing and Shareholder Benefits
竞争力定价与股东福利
We make no claim, of course, that we can save everyone money. Some companies, using rating systems that are different from ours, will offer certain classes of drivers a lower rate than we do. But we believe GEICO offers the lowest price more often than any other national company that serves all segments of the public. In addition, in most states, including New Jersey, Berkshire shareholders receive an 8% discount.
当然，我们不声称能为所有人省钱。部分公司采用不同定价系统，可能对特定驾驶群体提供更低费率。但我们相信，GEICO比任何服务全民的全国性公司更频繁提供最低价格。此外，在包括新泽西在内的多数州，伯克希尔股东可享8%折扣。
So gamble fifteen minutes of your time and go to GEICO.com – or call 800-847-7536 – to see whether you can save big money (which you might want to use, of course, to buy other Berkshire products).
不妨花十五分钟访问GEICO官网（或致电800-847-7536），看看能否节省大笔保费（当然，省下的钱可用于购买其他伯克希尔产品）。
# Reinsurance: Managing Catastrophic Risks
再保险：管理巨灾风险
Reinsurance – insurance sold to other insurers who wish to lay off part of the risks they have assumed – should not be a commodity product. At bottom, any insurance policy is simply a promise, and as everyone knows, promises vary enormously in their quality.
再保险——即保险公司为转移部分风险而购买的保险——不应是同质化商品。本质上，任何保险单都是一种承诺，而众所周知，承诺的质量差异极大。
# Primary vs. Reinsurance Solvency Risks
直保与再保险的偿付风险对比
At the primary insurance level, nevertheless, just who makes the promise is often of minor importance. In personal-lines insurance, for example, states levy assessments on solvent companies to pay the policyholders of companies that go broke. In the business-insurance field, the same arrangement applies to workers’ compensation policies. “Protected” policies of these types account for about 60% of the property-casualty industry’s volume.
然而在直保层面，承诺方的重要性往往较低。例如个人险中，各州要求偿付能力公司分摊破产公司保单持有人的赔付。商业险领域，工伤险亦适用该机制。“受保护”保单约占财险行业60%的体量。
Prudently-run insurers are irritated by the need to subsidize poor or reckless management elsewhere, but that’s the way it is.
稳健经营的保险公司虽不满需补贴他处糟糕或鲁莽的管理，但现状如此。
Other forms of business insurance at the primary level involve promises that carry greater risks for the insured. When Reliance Insurance and Home Insurance were run into the ground, for example, their promises proved to be worthless. Consequently, many holders of their business policies (other than those covering workers’ compensation) suffered painful losses.
其他直保商业险则包含更高风险承诺。例如Reliance Insurance和Home Insurance破产时，其承诺变得一文不值，许多非工伤险保单持有人遭受重大损失。
The solvency risk in primary policies, however, pales in comparison to that lurking in reinsurance policies. When a reinsurer goes broke, staggering losses almost always strike the primary companies it has dealt with.
但直保的偿付风险与再保险相比相形见绌。当再保险公司破产时，与其合作的直保公司往往面临巨额损失。
This risk is far from minor: GEICO has suffered tens of millions in losses from its careless selection of reinsurers in the early 1980s.
此风险不容小觑：GEICO因1980年代初随意选择再保公司而损失数千万美元。
# Preparing for Mega-Catastrophes
应对超级巨灾
Were a true mega-catastrophe to occur in the next decade or two – and that’s a real possibility – some reinsurers would not survive. The largest insured loss to date is the World Trade Center disaster, which cost the insurance industry an estimated $35 billion. Hurricane Andrew cost insurers about $15.5 billion in 1992 (though that loss would be far higher in today’s dollars).
若未来一二十年发生超级巨灾（可能性真实存在），部分再保险公司将无法生存。迄今最大保单损失为“9·11”事件，保险业损失约350亿美元。1992年安德鲁飓风造成155亿美元损失（按当前货币价值计算更高）。
Both events rocked the insurance and reinsurance world. But a $100 billion event, or even a larger catastrophe, remains a possibility if either a particularly severe earthquake or hurricane hits just the wrong place. Four significant hurricanes struck Florida during 2004, causing an aggregate of $25 billion or so in insured losses. Two of these – Charley and Ivan – could have done at least three times the damage they did had they entered the U.S. not far from their actual landing points.
两次事件震撼了保险与再保险业。但若超强地震或飓风袭击关键区域，损失达千亿美元甚至更高仍是可能的。2004年四场重大飓风袭击佛罗里达，造成约250亿美元保单损失。其中查利和伊万若登陆点稍偏，损失将至少扩大三倍。
Many insurers regard a $100 billion industry loss as “unthinkable” and won’t even plan for it. But at Berkshire, we are fully prepared. Our share of the loss would probably be 3% to 5%, and earnings from our investments and other businesses would comfortably exceed that cost. When “the day after” arrives, Berkshire’s checks will clear.
许多保险公司认为千亿美元损失“不可想象”且拒绝规划。但伯克希尔已充分准备：我们承担的损失可能为3%-5%，而投资与其他业务收益足以覆盖。当“灾难次日”来临，伯克希尔的支票将如期兑付。
# Reinsurance Performance and Leadership
再保险表现与领导力
Though the hurricanes hit us with a $1.25 billion loss, our reinsurance operations did well last year. At General Re, Joe Brandon has restored a long-admired culture of underwriting discipline that, for a time, had lost its way. The excellent results he realized in 2004 on current business, however, were offset by adverse developments from the years before he took the helm.
尽管飓风造成12.5亿美元损失，我们的再保险业务去年表现优异。通用再保险公司（General Re）乔·布兰登重塑了久负盛名的承保纪律文化（一度迷失方向）。2004年新业务成果优异，但被其上任前遗留问题部分抵消。
At NICO’s reinsurance operation, Ajit Jain continues to successfully underwrite huge risks that no other reinsurer is willing or able to accept. Ajit’s value to Berkshire is enormous.
NICO再保险板块中，阿吉特·杰恩持续成功承保其他再保险公司不愿或无力承担的巨大风险。他对伯克希尔的价值无可估量。
#---
# Insurance Achievements and Float Performance
保险业绩与浮存金表现
Our insurance managers, maximizing the competitive strengths I’ve mentioned in this section, again delivered first-class underwriting results last year. As a consequence, our float was better than costless. Here’s the scorecard:
我们的保险经理们充分发挥本节提及的竞争优势，去年再次交出卓越承保成绩。因此，我们的浮存金成本优于免费资金。以下是成绩单：
Financial Metrics (in $ millions) (财务指标，单位：百万美元)
| Insurance Operations (保险业务) | Underwriting Profit 2004 (2004年承保利润) | Yearend Float 2004 (2004年末浮存金) | Yearend Float 2003 (2003年末浮存金) |
|---|---|---|---|
| General Re (通用再保险) | $3 | $23,120 | $23,654 |
| B-H Reinsurance (伯克希尔-哈撒韦再保险) | $417 | $15,278 | $13,948 |
| GEICO | $970 | $5,960 | $5,287 |
| Other Primary* (其他直保业务) | $161 | $1,736 | $1,331 |
| Total (总计) | $1,551 | $46,094 | $44,220 |
*Includes: In addition to National Indemnity, a variety of other exceptional insurance businesses, run by Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Tom Nerney and Don Towle.
*包含：除国民保险公司外，还包括罗德·埃尔德里德、约翰·基泽、汤姆·纳尼和唐·托尔运营的多家卓越保险业务。
Berkshire’s float increased $1.9 billion in 2004, even though a few insureds opted to commute (that is, unwind) certain reinsurance contracts. We agree to such commutations only when we believe the economics are favorable to us (after giving due weight to what we might earn in the future on the money we are returning).
尽管少数保单持有者选择终止（即清算）部分再保险合约，伯克希尔浮存金2004年仍增长19亿美元。我们仅在经济利益有利时同意此类清算（需综合考虑返还资金未来潜在收益）。
To summarize, last year we were paid more than $1.5 billion to hold an average of about $45.2 billion. In 2005 pricing will be less attractive than it has been. Nevertheless, absent a mega-catastrophe, we have a decent chance of achieving no-cost float again this year.
总结而言，去年我们因持有约452亿美元平均浮存金获得15亿美元收益。2005年定价吸引力将下降，但若无超级巨灾，我们仍有较大可能再次实现零成本浮存金。
# Finance and Finance Products (金融及金融产品)
Last year in this section we discussed a potpourri of activities. In this report, we’ll skip over several that are now of lesser importance: Berkadia is down to tag ends; Value Capital has added other investors, negating our expectation that we would need to consolidate its financials into ours; and the trading operation that I run continues to shrink.
去年本章节讨论了多项金融活动。今年报告中将略过若干次要业务：Berkadia已接近尾声；Value Capital引入新投资者，无需合并其财务报表；本人主导的交易业务持续收缩。
# Key Business Updates (核心业务进展)
Leasing Operations (租赁业务):
Both of Berkshire’s leasing operations rebounded last year. At CORT (office furniture), earnings remain inadequate, but are trending upward. XTRA disposed of its container and intermodal businesses in order to concentrate on trailer leasing, long its strong suit. Overhead has been reduced, asset utilization is up and decent profits are now being achieved under Bill Franz, the company’s new CEO.
伯克希尔旗下租赁业务去年全面复苏。CORT（办公家具）盈利仍不足但呈改善趋势；XTRA出售集装箱和联运业务，专注拖车租赁（长期优势领域）。在新CEO比尔·弗兰茨领导下，管理费用下降、资产利用率提升，已实现可观利润。Derivatives Wind-down (衍生品清算):
The wind-down of Gen Re Securities continues. We decided to exit this derivative operation three years ago, but getting out is easier said than done. Though derivative instruments are purported to be highly liquid – and though we have had the benefit of a benign market while liquidating ours – we still had 2,890 contracts outstanding at yearend, down from 23,218 at the peak. Like Hell, derivative trading is easy to enter but difficult to leave. (Other similarities come to mind as well.)
通用再保险证券部的衍生品清算持续推进。三年前决定退出该业务，但实际操作远难于决策。尽管衍生品宣称高流动性——清算期间亦受益于温和市场环境——但年末仍有2,890份未到期合约（峰值达23,218份）。衍生品交易易进难退，恰似地狱（其他相似比喻亦可联想）。
Gen Re’s derivative contracts have always been required to be marked to market, and I believe the company’s management conscientiously tried to make realistic “marks.” The market prices of derivatives, however, can be very fuzzy in a world in which settlement of a transaction is sometimes decades away and often involves multiple variables as well. In the interim the marks influence the managerial and trading bonuses that are paid annually. It’s small wonder that phantom profits are often recorded.
通用再保险始终要求衍生品按市价计价，管理层亦努力做出合理估值。然而在衍生品世界中，交易结算可能数十年后才发生，且常涉及多重变量，市场价格往往模糊不清。期间估值直接影响年度管理层和交易奖金发放，虚幻利润频现不足为奇。
# Clayton Homes Synergy (克莱顿房屋协同效应)
After 40 years, we’ve finally generated a little synergy at Berkshire: Clayton Homes is doing well and that’s in part due to its association with Berkshire. The manufactured home industry continues to reside in the intensive care unit of Corporate America, having sold less than 135,000 new homes last year, about the same as in 2003. Volume in these years was the lowest since 1962, and it was also only about 40% of annual sales during the years 1995-99. That era, characterized by irresponsible financing and naïve funders, was a fool’s paradise for the industry.
历经40年，伯克希尔终于产生协同效应：克莱顿房屋表现优异，部分归功于伯克希尔支持。预制房行业仍深陷美国企业界的重症监护室，去年销量不足13.5万套（2003年水平相当），创1962年来最低纪录，仅相当于1995-1999年年均销量的40%。当年不负责任的融资和天真的资金方曾是行业的“乌托邦”。
Because one major lender after another has fled the field, financing continues to bedevil manufacturers, retailers and purchasers of manufactured homes. Here Berkshire’s support has proven valuable to Clayton. We stand ready to fund whatever makes sense, and last year Clayton’s management found much that qualified.
随着大型贷款机构接连退出，融资难题持续困扰制造商、零售商和购房者。伯克希尔的支持对克莱顿至关重要。我们随时准备为合理项目提供资金，去年克莱顿管理层发现大量符合条件的投资机会。
As we explained in our 2003 report, we believe in using borrowed money to support profitable, interest-bearing receivables. At the beginning of last year, we had borrowed $2 billion to relend to Clayton (at a one percentage-point markup) and by January 2005 the total was $7.35 billion. Most of the dollars added were borrowed by us on January 4, 2005, to finance a seasoned portfolio that Clayton purchased on December 30, 2004 from a bank exiting the business.
正如2003年报所述，我们主张通过借贷支持有盈利潜力的生息应收款。去年初向克莱顿转贷20亿美元（加价1个百分点），至2005年1月总额已达73.5亿美元。其中大部分资金为2005年1月4日借入，用于资助克莱顿2004年12月30日从退出业务银行收购的成熟资产组合。
We now have two additional portfolio purchases in the works, totaling about $1.6 billion, but it’s quite unlikely that we will secure others of any significance. Therefore, Clayton’s receivables (in which originations will roughly offset payoffs) will probably hover around $9 billion for some time and should deliver steady earnings. This pattern will be far different from that of the past, in which Clayton, like all major players in its industry, “securitized” its receivables, causing earnings to be front-ended. In the last two years, the securitization market has dried up. The limited funds available today come only at higher cost and with harsh terms. Had Clayton remained independent in this period, it would have had mediocre earnings as it struggled with financing.
目前另有两笔合计16亿美元的资产组合收购在推进中，但未来大幅扩展可能性较低。因此，克莱顿应收款（新增与偿还大致平衡）将长期维持约90亿美元规模，带来稳定收益。此模式与过往截然不同：过去克莱顿与行业同行一样通过“证券化”提前确认利润。近两年证券化市场枯竭，现有资金成本更高、条款更苛刻。若克莱顿保持独立，融资困境将导致平庸业绩。
In April, Clayton completed the acquisition of Oakwood Homes and is now the industry’s largest producer and retailer of manufactured homes. We love putting more assets in the hands of Kevin Clayton, the company’s CEO. He is a prototype Berkshire manager. Today, Clayton has 11,837 employees, up from 7,136 when we purchased it, and Charlie and I are pleased that Berkshire has been useful in facilitating this growth.
4月，克莱顿完成对Oakwood Homes收购，现为全球最大预制房制造商和零售商。我们乐于将更多资产交由CEO凯文·克莱顿管理——他是伯克希尔式管理者的典范。目前员工人数从收购时7,136人增至11,837人，查理和我欣慰地看到伯克希尔在推动增长中发挥了作用。
For simplicity’s sake, we include all of Clayton’s earnings in this sector, though a sizable portion of these are derived from areas other than consumer finance.
为简化披露，本板块包含克莱顿全部收益，尽管其中相当部分来自消费金融以外领域。
# Financial Performance Breakdown (财务表现明细)
(in $ millions, pre-tax earnings and interest-bearing liabilities)
| Business Segment (业务板块) | 2004 Pre-Tax Earnings (2004年税前利润) | 2003 Pre-Tax Earnings (2003年税前利润) | 2004 Interest-Bearing Liabilities (2004年生息负债) | 2003 Interest-Bearing Liabilities (2003年生息负债) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trading – ordinary income (常规交易) | $264 | $355 | $5,751 | $7,826 |
| Gen Re Securities (通用再保险证券部) | $(44) | $(99) | $5,437* | $8,041* |
| Life and annuity operation (寿险与年金) | $(57) | $85 | $2,467 | $2,331 |
| Value Capital | $30 | $31 | N/A | N/A |
| Berkadia | $1 | $101 | — | $525 |
| Leasing operations (租赁业务) | $92 | $34 | $391 | $482 |
| Manufactured housing finance (克莱顿房屋金融) | $220 | $37** | $3,636 | $2,032 |
| Other | $78 | $75 | N/A | N/A |
| Income before capital gains (资本利得前收益) | $584 | $619 | — | — |
| Trading – capital gains (资本利得) | $1,750 | $1,215 | — | — |
| Total (总计) | $2,334 | $1,834 | — | — |
* Includes all liabilities (包含全部负债)
* From date of acquisition, August 7, 2003 (自2003年8月7日收购日起计算)*
# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
制造、服务与零售业务
Our activities in this category cover the waterfront. But let’s look at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement consolidating the entire group.
本板块涵盖广泛业务领域。以下是合并后的资产负债表及利润表摘要：
Balance Sheet 12/31/04 (in $ millions) (2004年12月31日资产负债表，单位：百万美元)
| Assets (资产) | Amount (金额) | Liabilities and Equity (负债及权益) | Amount (金额) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents (现金及等价物) | $899 | Notes payable (应付票据) | $1,143 |
| Accounts and notes receivable (应收款项) | $3,074 | Other current liabilities (其他流动负债) | $4,685 |
| Inventory (存货) | $3,842 | Total current liabilities (流动负债合计) | $5,828 |
| Other current assets (其他流动资产) | $254 | ||
| Total current assets (流动资产合计) | $8,069 | ||
| Goodwill and other intangibles (商誉及其他无形资产) | $8,362 | Deferred taxes (递延税项) | $248 |
| Fixed assets (固定资产) | $6,161 | Term debt and other liabilities (长期债务及其他负债) | $1,965 |
| Other assets (其他资产) | $1,044 | Equity (权益) | $15,595 |
| 总计 | $23,636 | 总计 | $23,636 |
Earnings Statement (in $ millions) (利润表，单位：百万美元)
| 指标 | 2004年 | 2003年 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenues (收入) | $44,142 | $32,106 |
| Operating expenses (运营费用，含折旧：2004年6.76亿美元，2003年6.05亿美元) | $41,604 | $29,885 |
| Interest expense (net) (净利息支出) | $57 | $64 |
| Pre-tax earnings (税前利润) | $2,481 | $2,157 |
| Income taxes (所得税) | $941 | $813 |
| Net income (净利润) | $1,540 | $1,344 |
This eclectic group, which sells products ranging from Dilly Bars to fractional interests in Boeing 737s, earned a very respectable 21.7% on average tangible net worth last year, compared to 20.7% in 2003. It’s noteworthy that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving these returns. Clearly, we own some very good businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at substantial premiums to net worth – a matter that is reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet – and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 9.9%.
这一多元化集团的产品范围从Dilly Bars零食到波音737飞机的部分所有权。2004年其平均有形净资产收益率达21.7%（2003年为20.7%），且仅使用了少量财务杠杆。值得注意的是，我们拥有许多优质企业，但多数收购价格显著高于账面价值——反映在资产负债表的商誉科目——导致按平均账面价值计算的回报率降至9.9%。
# Key Business Segments Performance
核心业务板块表现
Here are the pre-tax earnings for the larger categories or units:
以下是主要业务板块的税前利润：
Pre-Tax Earnings (in $ millions) (税前利润，单位：百万美元)
| 业务板块 | 2004年 | 2003年 |
|---|---|---|
| Building Products (建筑产品) | $643 | $559 |
| Shaw Industries (肖氏工业) | $466 | $436 |
| Apparel & Footwear (服装与鞋类) | $325 | $289 |
| Retailing of Jewelry, Home Furnishings and Candy (珠宝、家居及糖果零售) | $215 | $224 |
| Flight Services (飞行服务) | $191 | $72 |
| McLane (麦克莱恩公司) | $228 | $150* |
| Other businesses (其他业务) | $413 | $427 |
| 总计 | $2,481 | $2,157 |
* From date of acquisition, May 23, 2003. (自2003年5月23日收购日起计算)
# Management Commentary
管理层评述
Building Products Sector (建筑产品板块):
In the building-products sector and at Shaw, we’ve experienced staggering cost increases for both raw materials and energy. By December, for example, steel costs at MiTek (whose primary business is connectors for roof trusses) were running 100% over a year earlier. And MiTek uses 665 million pounds of steel every year. Nevertheless, the company continues to be an outstanding performer. Since we purchased MiTek in 2001, Gene Toombs, its CEO, has made some brilliant "bolt-on" acquisitions and is on his way to creating a mini-Berkshire.
建筑产品板块及肖氏工业面临原材料和能源成本激增。例如，MiTek（主营屋顶桁架连接件）的钢材成本12月同比上涨100%，而该公司年耗钢量达6.65亿磅。尽管如此，MiTek仍保持卓越表现。自2001年收购以来，CEO吉恩·图姆斯通过多项补强型收购，正打造一个“微型伯克希尔”。Shaw Industries (肖氏工业):
Shaw fielded a barrage of price increases in its main fiber materials during the year, a hit that added more than $300 million to its costs. (When you walk on carpet you are, in effect, stepping on processed oil.) Though we followed these hikes in costs with price increases of our own, there was an inevitable lag. Therefore, margins narrowed as the year progressed and remain under pressure today. Despite these roadblocks, Shaw, led by Bob Shaw and Julian Saul, earned an outstanding 25.6% on tangible equity in 2004. The company is a powerhouse and has a bright future.
肖氏工业的主要纤维材料价格全年持续上涨，导致成本增加超3亿美元（“当你踩上地毯时，实际上踩的是加工过的石油”）。尽管我们随后提高售价应对成本压力，但存在不可避免的滞后。因此，全年利润率收窄且至今承压。尽管如此，在鲍勃·肖和朱利安·索尔领导下，公司2004年有形权益资本回报率达25.6%，展现出强大实力，前景光明。Apparel & Footwear (服装与鞋类):
Fruit of the Loom increased unit sales by 10 million dozen, or 14%, with shipments of intimate apparel for women and girls growing by 31%. Charlie, who is far more knowledgeable than I am on this subject, assures me that women are not wearing more underwear. With this expert input, I can only conclude that our market share in the women’s category must be growing rapidly. Thanks to John Holland, Fruit is on the move. A smaller operation, Garan, also had an excellent year. Led by Seymour Lichtenstein and Jerry Kamiel, this company manufactures the popular Garanimals line for children. Next time you are in a Wal-Mart, check out this imaginative product.
内衣品牌Fruit of the Loom销量增长1,000万打（14%），女性及少女内衣出货量增长31%。查理指出女性并未增加内衣穿着量，因此我推断我们在该品类的市场份额快速提升。感谢约翰·霍兰德，Fruit正加速发展。小型服装公司Garan亦表现优异，在西摩·利希滕斯坦和杰里·卡米埃尔领导下，其儿童服装系列Garanimals广受欢迎。下次去沃尔玛时，不妨关注这款创意产品。Retailing Operations (零售业务):
Among our retailers, Ben Bridge (jewelry) and R. C. Willey (home furnishings) were particular standouts last year.
在零售板块中，Ben Bridge（珠宝）和R. C. Willey（家居）去年尤为突出。Ben Bridge: Same-store sales grew 11.4%, the best gain among publicly-held jewelers. Profit margin widened. Over the past decade, same-store sales averaged 8.8% growth annually. Fourth-generation managers Ed and Jon Bridge run the business as if it were their own, expanding through strategic locations and enthusiastic staff. We will enter Minneapolis-St. Paul this year.
同店销售增长11.4%，为上市公司珠宝商最高。利润率扩大。过去十年同店销售年均增长8.8%。第四代管理者Ed和Jon Bridge以家族企业模式经营，通过选址优化和热情专业的团队推动增长。今年将进军明尼阿波利斯-圣保罗市场。R. C. Willey: Expansion gains dramatic, with 41.9% of 2004 sales from out-of-state stores opened since 1999. New Las Vegas stores boosted margins. Initially skeptical about Sunday-closure policy outside Utah, I was proven wrong by the first Las Vegas store (opened 2001), which became our top-performing unit. A second Las Vegas store (20 minutes away) further succeeded, each generating 26% more volume than other stores. Reno opening next; Bill and Scott Hymas continue to lead despite my misguided advice.
扩张成果显著，2004年41.9%销售额来自1999年后开设的州外门店。拉斯维加斯新店提升利润率。尽管我曾质疑犹他州外门店的周日闭店政策，但2001年开业的拉斯维加斯首店迅速成为最盈利单元。第二家门店（相距20分钟车程）进一步成功，两家门店销量均超其他门店26%。即将进军雷诺市，CEO比尔和斯科特继续推进扩张，尽管我的建议常被证明错误。
# Flight Services Performance
飞行服务业务表现
Earnings improved in flight services. At FlightSafety, the world’s leader in pilot training, profits rose as corporate aviation rebounded and our business with regional airlines increased. We now operate 283 simulators with an original cost of $1.2 billion. Pilots are trained one at a time on this expensive equipment. This means that as much as $3.50 of capital investment is required to produce $1 of annual revenue. With this level of capital intensity, FlightSafety requires very high operating margins in order to obtain reasonable returns on capital, which means that utilization rates are all-important. Last year, FlightSafety’s return on tangible equity improved to 15.1% from 8.4% in 2003.
飞行服务业务利润提升。作为全球飞行员培训领导者，FlightSafety受益于企业航空复苏及与区域性航空公司的合作增长。目前运营283台模拟器（原始成本12亿美元），单次培训仅限一名飞行员。这意味着每创造1美元年收入需投入3.5美元资本。如此高资本密集度要求FlightSafety必须保持高运营利润率以实现合理回报，设备利用率成为关键。2004年有形权益回报率从2003年的8.4%提升至15.1%。
# Leadership Transition at FlightSafety
FlightSafety领导层更替
In another 2004 event, Al Ueltschi, who founded FlightSafety in 1951 with $10,000, turned over the CEO position to Bruce Whitman, a 43-year veteran at the company. (But Al’s not going anywhere; I won’t let him.) Bruce shares Al’s conviction that flying an aircraft is a privilege to be extended only to people who regularly receive the highest quality of training and are undeniably competent. A few years ago, Charlie was asked to intervene with Al on behalf of a tycoon friend whom FlightSafety had flunked. Al’s reply to Charlie: “Tell your pal he belongs in the back of the plane, not the cockpit.”
2004年另一事件：创始人Al Ueltschi（1951年以1万美元创立公司）将CEO职位交予任职43年的Bruce Whitman。（但Al不会离开，我已阻止。）Bruce延续Al的理念——驾驶飞机是一项特权，仅限持续接受最高质量培训且能力无可争议者。几年前，查理曾为一位被FlightSafety淘汰的富豪朋友求情，Al的回应：“告诉你朋友他该坐在机舱后排，而非驾驶舱。”
# NetJets Operations
NetJets运营
FlightSafety’s number one customer is NetJets, our aircraft fractional-ownership subsidiary. Its 2,100 pilots spend an average of 18 days a year in training. Additionally, these pilots fly only one aircraft type whereas many flight operations juggle pilots among several types. NetJets’ high standards on both fronts are two of the reasons I signed up with the company years before Berkshire bought it.
FlightSafety最大客户为伯克希尔旗下飞机部分所有权子公司NetJets。其2,100名飞行员年均培训18天，且仅执飞单一机型（多数公司需飞行员切换多种机型）。NetJets在培训和机型专精上的高标准是我多年前加入的关键原因，早于伯克希尔收购。
Fully as important in my decisions to both use and buy NetJets, however, was the fact that the company was managed by Rich Santulli, the creator of the fractional-ownership industry and a fanatic about safety and service. I viewed the selection of a flight provider as akin to picking a brain surgeon: you simply want the best. (Let someone else experiment with the low bidder.)
然而，我决定使用并收购NetJets的核心原因在于其创始人Rich Santulli——分时所有权行业缔造者，对安全和服务近乎偏执。选择飞行服务商如同挑选脑外科医生：你只想要最优秀者。（让他人去尝试低价投标者吧。）
Last year NetJets again gained about 70% of the net new business (measured by dollar value) going to the four companies that dominate the industry. A portion of our growth came from the 25-hour card offered by Marquis Jet Partners. Marquis is not owned by NetJets, but is instead a customer that repackages the purchases it makes from us into smaller packages that it sells through its card. Marquis deals exclusively with NetJets, utilizing the power of our reputation in its marketing.
去年NetJets在行业四大公司中占据约70%的新业务份额（按交易金额计算）。部分增长来自Marquis Jet Partners的25小时飞行卡。Marquis虽非伯克希尔旗下，但通过将向我们购买的服务拆分为更小单元销售，成为专注合作的客户，利用伯克希尔品牌声誉营销。
Our U.S. contracts, including Marquis customers, grew from 3,877 to 4,967 in 2004 (versus approximately 1,200 contracts when Berkshire bought NetJets in 1998). Some clients (including me) enter into multiple contracts because they wish to use more than one type of aircraft, selecting for any given trip whichever type best fits the mission at hand.
美国合同（含Marquis客户）从3,877份增至4,967份（1998年伯克希尔收购时约1,200份）。部分客户（含本人）持有多个合同，因希望使用不同机型，按需选择最适合的飞机。
NetJets earned a modest amount in the U.S. last year. But what we earned domestically was largely offset by losses in Europe. We are now, however, generating real momentum abroad. Contracts (including 25-hour cards that we ourselves market in Europe) increased from 364 to 693 during the year. We will again have a very significant European loss in 2005, but domestic earnings will likely put us in the black overall.
NetJets美国业务利润微薄，欧洲亏损抵消大部分收益。但欧洲市场已现增长动能：合同（含自销的25小时卡）从364份增至693份。2005年欧洲仍将亏损显著，但美国盈利有望实现整体盈利。
Europe has been expensive for NetJets – far more expensive than I anticipated – but it is essential to building a flight operation that will forever be in a class by itself. Our U.S. owners already want a quality service wherever they travel and their wish for flight hours abroad is certain to grow dramatically in the decades ahead. Last year, U.S. owners made 2,003 flights in Europe, up 22% from the previous year and 137% from 2000. Just as important, our European owners made 1,067 flights in the U.S., up 65% from 2003 and 239% from 2000.
NetJets欧洲业务成本远超预期，但这是打造全球顶尖飞行服务的必要投入。美国客户已要求全球优质服务，未来数十年海外飞行需求必将激增。去年美国客户欧洲飞行量达2,003架次（同比+22%，2000年以来+137%）。同样重要的是，欧洲客户美国飞行量达1,067架次（同比+65%，2000年以来+239%）。
# Investments
投资组合
We show below our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $600 million at the end of 2004 are itemized.
以下为伯克希尔普通股投资组合，2004年末市值超6亿美元的个股单独列示：
2004年12月31日投资组合（单位：百万美元）
| 持股数量 | 公司名称 | 持股比例 | 成本 | 市值 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company (美国运通) | 12.1% | $1,470 | $8,546 |
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company (可口可乐) | 8.3% | $1,299 | $8,328 |
| 96,000,000 | The Gillette Company (吉列) | 9.7% | $600 | $4,299 |
| 14,350,600 | H&R Block, Inc. (H&R布洛克公司) | 8.7% | $223 | $703 |
| 6,708,760 | M&T Bank Corporation (M&T银行) | 5.8% | $103 | $723 |
| 24,000,000 | Moody’s Corporation (穆迪公司) | 16.2% | $499 | $2,084 |
| 2,338,961,000 | PetroChina “H” shares (中国石油H股) | 1.3% | $488 | $1,249 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company (华盛顿邮报) | 18.1% | $11 | $1,698 |
| 56,448,380 | Wells Fargo & Company (富国银行) | 3.3% | $463 | $3,508 |
| 1,724,200 | White Mountains Insurance (怀特山保险) | 16.0% | $369 | $1,114 |
| 其他 | — | — | $3,531 | $5,465 |
| 总计 | — | — | $9,056 | $37,717 |
*成本：实际购买价格（亦为税务基础）；GAAP成本因会计调整（如减值/增值）略有差异。
Some people may look at this table and view it as a list of stocks to be bought and sold based upon chart patterns, brokers’ opinions, or estimates of near-term earnings. Charlie and I ignore such distractions and instead view our holdings as fractional ownerships in businesses. This is an important distinction. Indeed, this thinking has been the cornerstone of my investment behavior since I was 19. At that time I read Ben Graham’s The Intelligent Investor, and the scales fell from my eyes. (Previously, I had been entranced by the stock market, but didn’t have a clue about how to invest.)
有人可能通过技术图表、券商观点或短期盈利预测解读此表。查理和我则专注企业部分所有权的本质，这是关键区别。自19岁读《聪明的投资者》后，这一理念即为我投资核心。（此前我虽沉迷股市，但不知如何投资。）
# Performance of the "Big Four"
“四大”投资表现
Let’s look at how the businesses of our “Big Four” – American Express, Coca-Cola, Gillette and Wells Fargo – have fared since we bought into these companies. As the table shows, we invested $3.83 billion in the four through multiple transactions between May 1988 and October 2003. On a composite basis, our dollar-weighted purchase date is July 1992. By yearend 2004, therefore, we had held these “business interests,” on a weighted basis, about 12½ years.
观察“四大”——美国运通、可口可乐、吉列和富国银行的经营表现。表格显示我们通过多次交易（1988年5月至2003年10月）累计投资38.3亿美元，加权购买时间为1992年7月，截至2004年末持有期约12.5年。
In 2004, Berkshire’s share of the group’s earnings amounted to $1.2 billion. These earnings might legitimately be considered “normal.” True, they were swelled because Gillette and Wells Fargo omitted option costs in their presentation of earnings; but on the other hand they were reduced because Coke had a non-recurring write-off.
2004年伯克希尔享有的四大公司利润达12亿美元，可视为“正常”水平。需注意：吉列和富国银行利润未计入期权成本，但可口可乐的一次性减记又拉低了收益。
Our share of the earnings of these four companies has grown almost every year, and now amounts to about 31.3% of our cost. Their cash distributions to us have also grown consistently, totaling $434 million in 2004, or about 11.3% of cost. All in all, the Big Four have delivered a satisfactory, though far from spectacular, business result.
四大公司利润贡献逐年增长，现占初始成本的31.3%。现金分红亦持续增长，2004年达4.34亿美元（占成本的11.3%）。总体而言，这四大投资虽非耀眼，但成果稳健。
That’s true as well of our experience in the market with the group. Since our original purchases, valuation gains have somewhat exceeded earnings growth because price/earnings ratios have increased. On a year-to-year basis, however, the business and market performances have often diverged, sometimes to an extraordinary degree. During The Great Bubble, market-value gains far outstripped business performance. In the aftermath of the Bubble, the reverse was true.
市场表现亦然。因市盈率提升，估值收益略超盈利增长。但年度表现常与企业实际业绩背离，尤其在科技泡沫期间市场涨幅远超企业表现，泡沫破裂后则相反。
# Investment Philosophy and Market Timing
投资理念与市场择时
Clearly, Berkshire’s results would have been far better if I had caught this swing of the pendulum. That may seem easy to do when one looks through an always-clean, rear-view mirror. Unfortunately, however, it’s the windshield through which investors must peer, and that glass is invariably fogged. Our huge positions add to the difficulty of our nimbly dancing in and out of holdings as valuations swing.
显然，若我能精准捕捉市场周期波动，伯克希尔的业绩会更出色。事后回望或许显得简单，但投资者必须透过的“挡风玻璃”始终雾气朦胧。庞大的持仓规模进一步增加了灵活进出市场的难度。
Nevertheless, I can properly be criticized for merely clucking about nose-bleed valuations during the Bubble rather than acting on my views. Though I said at the time that certain of the stocks we held were priced ahead of themselves, I underestimated just how severe the overvaluation was. I talked when I should have walked.
尽管如此，我在泡沫期仅口头警示高估风险而未果断行动，这一失误值得批评。当时虽指出部分持仓股价超前反映基本面，却低估了高估的严重程度。本应果断离场时，我却停留在口头警告。
# Capital Allocation Challenges
资本配置难题
What Charlie and I would like is a little action now. We don’t enjoy sitting on $43 billion of cash equivalents that are earning paltry returns. Instead, we yearn to buy more fractional interests similar to those we now own or – better still – more large businesses outright. We will do either, however, only when purchases can be made at prices that offer us the prospect of a reasonable return on our investment.
查理和我渴望现在有所行动。我们并不乐于持有430亿美元现金等价物（仅产生微薄收益），更希望收购类似现有持仓的部分权益，或直接收购大型企业。但唯有在价格提供合理回报前景时，我们才会出手。
# Realized vs. Unrealized Gains
已实现收益与未实现收益
We’ve repeatedly emphasized that the “realized” gains that we report quarterly or annually are meaningless for analytical purposes. We have a huge amount of unrealized gains on our books, and our thinking about when, and if, to cash them depends not at all on a desire to report earnings at one specific time or another.
我们反复强调：季度或年度报告的“已实现”收益对分析无意义。账面存在巨额未实现收益，何时变现取决于投资逻辑，而非财报窗口需求。
A further complication in our reported gains occurs because GAAP requires that foreign exchange contracts be marked to market, a stipulation that causes unrealized gains or losses in these holdings to flow through our published earnings as if we had sold our positions.
报告收益的另一复杂性源于GAAP要求外汇合约按市价计价，导致未实现损益如同已售仓位般计入财报。
Despite the problems enumerated, you may be interested in a breakdown of the gains we reported in 2003 and 2004. The data reflect actual sales except in the case of currency gains, which are a combination of sales and marks to market.
尽管存在上述问题，您或许仍对2003-2004年收益明细感兴趣。数据反映实际交易，唯外汇收益包含卖出和市价调整两部分。
Pre-Tax Gain (in $ millions) (税前收益，单位：百万美元)
| Category (类别) | 2004年 | 2003年 |
|---|---|---|
| Common Stocks (普通股) | $870 | $448 |
| U.S. Government Bonds (美国国债) | $104 | $1,485 |
| Junk Bonds (垃圾债券) | $730 | $1,138 |
| Foreign Exchange Contracts (外汇合约) | $1,839 | $825 |
| Other (其他) | $(47) | $233 |
| 总计 | $3,496 | $4,129 |
The junk bond profits include a foreign exchange component. When we bought these bonds in 2001 and 2002, we focused first, of course, on the credit quality of the issuers, all of which were American corporations. Some of these companies, however, had issued bonds denominated in foreign currencies. Because of our views on the dollar, we favored these for purchase when they were available.
垃圾债券收益包含外汇因素。2001-2002年购买时首要考量发行方信用质量（均为美国企业）。部分公司发行外币债券，因我们对美元前景判断，优先选择这类债券。
As an example, we bought €254 million of Level 3 bonds (10 ¾% of 2008) in 2001 at 51.7% of par, and sold these at 85% of par in December 2004. This issue was traded in Euros that cost us 88¢ at the time of purchase but that brought $1.29 when we sold. Thus, of our $163 million overall gain, about $85 million came from the market’s revised opinion about Level 3’s credit quality, with the remaining $78 million resulting from the appreciation of the Euro. (In addition, we received cash interest during our holding period that amounted to about 25% annually on our dollar cost.)
以Level 3债券为例：2001年以面值51.7%购入2.54亿欧元债券（2008年到期10.75%票息），2004年12月以85%价格卖出。购入时欧元汇率为0.88美元，卖出时升至1.29美元。1.63亿美元总收益中，8,500万来自市场对Level 3信用评级修正，7,800万源于欧元升值。（持有期间年化利息收益达成本价25%。）
# Media Misconceptions
媒体误解
The media continue to report that “Buffett buys” this or that stock. Statements like these are almost always based on filings Berkshire makes with the SEC and are therefore wrong. As I’ve said before, the stories should say “Berkshire buys.”
媒体持续报道“巴菲特买入某股票”，这类说法通常基于伯克希尔向SEC提交的文件，实则有误。正如我多次强调，应表述为“伯克希尔买入”。
# Portrait of a Disciplined Investor
严谨投资者典范
# Lou Simpson's Track Record (路·辛普森投资记录)
| Year (年份) | GEICO回报 | Equities (股票) | S&P 500 (标普500) | Relative Results (超额收益) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1980 | 23.7% | 32.3% | (8.6%) | 1980年 |
| 1981 | 5.4% | (5.0%) | 10.4% | 1981年 |
| 1982 | 45.8% | 21.4% | 24.4% | 1982年 |
| 1983 | 36.0% | 22.4% | 13.6% | 1983年 |
| 1984 | 21.8% | 6.1% | 15.7% | 1984年 |
| 1985 | 45.8% | 31.6% | 14.2% | 1985年 |
| 1986 | 38.7% | 18.6% | 20.1% | 1986年 |
| 1987 | (10.0%) | 5.1% | (15.1%) | 1987年 |
| 1988 | 30.0% | 16.6% | 13.4% | 1988年 |
| 1989 | 36.1% | 31.7% | 4.4% | 1989年 |
| 1990 | (9.9%) | (3.1%) | (6.8%) | 1990年 |
| 1991 | 56.5% | 30.5% | 26.0% | 1991年 |
| 1992 | 10.8% | 7.6% | 3.2% | 1992年 |
| 1993 | 4.6% | 10.1% | (5.5%) | 1993年 |
| 1994 | 13.4% | 1.3% | 12.1% | 1994年 |
| 1995 | 39.8% | 37.6% | 2.2% | 1995年 |
| 1996 | 29.2% | 23.0% | 6.2% | 1996年 |
| 1997 | 24.6% | 33.4% | (8.8%) | 1997年 |
| 1998 | 18.6% | 28.6% | (10.0%) | 1998年 |
| 1999 | 7.2% | 21.0% | (13.8%) | 1999年 |
| 2000 | 20.9% | (9.1%) | 30.0% | 2000年 |
| 2001 | 5.2% | (11.9%) | 17.1% | 2001年 |
| 2002 | (8.1%) | (22.1%) | 14.0% | 2002年 |
| 2003 | 38.3% | 28.7% | 9.6% | 2003年 |
| 2004 | 16.9% | 10.9% | 6.0% | 2004年 |
| Average Annual Gain 1980-2004 (1980-2004年均收益) | 20.3% | 13.5% | 6.8% |
Even then, it is typically not I who make the buying decisions. Lou Simpson manages about $2½ billion of equities that are held by GEICO, and it is his transactions that Berkshire is usually reporting. Customarily his purchases are in the $200-$300 million range and are in companies that are smaller than the ones I focus on. Take a look at the facing page to see why Lou is a cinch to be inducted into the investment Hall of Fame.
实际上，多数交易决策由路·辛普森作出。他管理着GEICO约25亿美元股票组合，伯克希尔报告的交易多为其操作。其单笔交易通常在2-3亿美元区间，聚焦规模小于我关注的企业。请参见下表，了解为何路理应入选投资名人堂。
# Lou Simpson’s Investment Autonomy
路·辛普森的投资自主权
You may be surprised to learn that Lou does not necessarily inform me about what he is doing. When Charlie and I assign responsibility, we truly hand over the baton – and we give it to Lou just as we do to our operating managers. Therefore, I typically learn of Lou’s transactions about ten days after the end of each month. Sometimes, it should be added, I silently disagree with his decisions. But he’s usually right.
您或许会惊讶地发现，路·辛普森未必会向我汇报其投资操作。当查理和我授权责任时，我们真正交出“指挥棒”——对路的信任与对运营经理的授权完全相同。因此，我通常在每月结束约十天后才会知晓其交易。需要补充的是，有时我会默默反对他的决策，但他多数时候是正确的。
# Foreign Currencies
外汇持仓
Berkshire owned about $21.4 billion of foreign exchange contracts at yearend, spread among 12 currencies. As I mentioned last year, holdings of this kind are a decided change for us. Before March 2002, neither Berkshire nor I had ever traded in currencies. But the evidence grows that our trade policies will put unremitting pressure on the dollar for many years to come – so since 2002 we’ve heeded that warning in setting our investment course. (As W.C. Fields once said when asked for a handout: “Sorry, son, all my money’s tied up in currency.”)
伯克希尔年末持有约214亿美元的外汇合约，覆盖12种货币。正如去年所述，此类持仓对我们而言是重大转变。2002年3月前，伯克希尔及我个人从未涉足外汇交易。但越来越多证据表明，我们的贸易政策将在未来多年持续施压美元，因此自2002年起我们将此警告纳入投资决策。（正如W.C.菲尔兹被请求施舍时所言：“抱歉，孩子，我的钱都锁在货币里了。”）
# America’s Trade Deficit and Wealth Transfer
美国贸易赤字与财富转移
Be clear on one point: In no way does our thinking about currencies rest on doubts about America. We live in an extraordinarily rich country, the product of a system that values market economics, the rule of law and equality of opportunity. Our economy is far and away the strongest in the world and will continue to be. We are lucky to live here.
请明确一点：我们对货币的思考绝非源于对美国的怀疑。我们生活在一个极为富裕的国家，其繁荣源于尊重市场经济、法治和机会平等的制度。美国经济无疑仍是全球最强，并将持续保持。我们能生活在此是幸运的。
But as I argued in a November 10, 2003 article in Fortune (available at berkshirehathaway.com), our country’s trade practices are weighing down the dollar. The decline in its value has already been substantial, but is nevertheless likely to continue. Without policy changes, currency markets could even become disorderly and generate spillover effects, both political and financial. No one knows whether these problems will materialize. But such a scenario is a far-from-remote possibility that policymakers should be considering now. Their bent, however, is to lean toward not-so-benign neglect: A 318-page Congressional study of the consequences of unremitting trade deficits was published in November 2000 and has been gathering dust ever since. The study was ordered after the deficit hit a then-alarming $263 billion in 1999; by last year it had risen to $618 billion.
但在2003年11月10日《财富》文章（详见伯克希尔官网）中，我曾指出美国贸易政策正在拖累美元。其贬值已显著，但未来可能加剧。若不改变政策，外汇市场甚至可能陷入混乱并引发政治与金融外溢效应。尽管无人能预知问题是否会爆发，但这一情景并非遥不可及，政策制定者应尽早考虑。然而，他们的倾向却是“善意忽视”：2000年国会曾发布318页贸易赤字后果研究报告，此后一直束之高阁。该研究源于1999年赤字突破2,630亿美元（当时被视为警戒线），而去年赤字已升至6,180亿美元。
Charlie and I, it should be emphasized, believe that true trade – that is, the exchange of goods and services with other countries – is enormously beneficial for both us and them. Last year we had $1.15 trillion of such honest-to-God trade and the more of this, the better. But, as noted, our country also purchased an additional $618 billion in goods and services from the rest of the world that was unreciprocated. That is a staggering figure and one that has important consequences.
需要强调的是，查理和我相信真正的贸易——即与他国的商品和服务交换——对我们和对方均大有裨益。去年此类真实贸易达1.15万亿美元，贸易越多越好。但正如所指出的，我国还额外购买了6,180亿美元商品和服务却未换取等量出口，这是惊人的数字，且后果深远。
# The Hidden Cost of One-Way Trade
单向贸易的隐性代价
The balancing item to this one-way pseudo-trade — in economics there is always an offset — is a transfer of wealth from the U.S. to the rest of the world. The transfer may materialize in the form of IOUs our private or governmental institutions give to foreigners, or by way of their assuming ownership of our assets, such as stocks and real estate. In either case, Americans end up owning a reduced portion of our country while non-Americans own a greater part. This force-feeding of American wealth to the rest of the world is now proceeding at the rate of $1.8 billion daily, an increase of 20% since I wrote you last year. Consequently, other countries and their citizens now own a net of about $3 trillion of the U.S. A decade ago their net ownership was negligible.
这种单向伪贸易的平衡项——经济学中必然存在抵消机制——是财富从美国向世界转移。这种转移可能体现为私人或政府机构向外国人开具的欠条，或外国持有我国资产（如股票和房地产）的增长。无论哪种形式，美国人在本国的持股比例下降，而外国人持股上升。这种强制性的财富输出以每天18亿美元的速度进行，较去年增加20%。目前外国持有美国资产净额达3万亿美元，而十年前几乎可以忽略不计。
# Distinguishing Budget and Current Account Deficits
财政赤字与经常账户赤字的区别
The mention of trillions numbs most brains. A further source of confusion is that the current account deficit (the sum of three items, the most important by far being the trade deficit) and our national budget deficit are often lumped as “twins.” They are anything but. They have different causes and different consequences.
提及万亿级金额常令人麻木。另一混淆点是将经常账户赤字（包含三项，其中最重要的是贸易赤字）与国家财政赤字混为一谈，称其为“双胞胎”。实则二者截然不同，成因与后果均异。
A budget deficit in no way reduces the portion of the national pie that goes to Americans. As long as other countries and their citizens have no net ownership of the U.S., 100% of our country’s output belongs to our citizens under any budget scenario, even one involving a huge deficit.
财政赤字绝不会减少美国人享有的国家财富份额。只要外国无美国净所有权，即便预算赤字巨大，100%的国家产出仍属美国公民。
As a rich “family” awash in goods, Americans will argue through their legislators as to how government should redistribute the national output – that is who pays taxes and who receives governmental benefits. If “entitlement” promises from an earlier day have to be reexamined, “family members” will angrily debate among themselves as to who feels the pain. Maybe taxes will go up; maybe promises will be modified; maybe more internal debt will be issued. But when the fight is finished, all of the family’s huge pie remains available for its members, however it is divided. No slice must be sent abroad.
作为富裕的“家庭”，美国人在立法者推动下争论政府如何重新分配国家产出——即谁纳税、谁受益。若需重新审视过去的“福利承诺”，家庭成员将激烈辩论谁承担痛苦。可能增税、调整承诺或发行更多内债。但争论结束后，所有财富仍归家庭成员分配，无须对外输送。
Large and persisting current account deficits produce an entirely different result. As time passes, and as claims against us grow, we own less and less of what we produce. In effect, the rest of the world enjoys an ever-growing royalty on American output. Here, we are like a family that consistently overspends its income. As time passes, the family finds that it is working more and more for the “finance company” and less for itself.
但长期巨额经常账户赤字导致截然不同的结果。随着时间推移，对外债务增长，我们对自己产出的所有权持续下降。实际上，世界其他国家享受着日益增长的“美国产出版税”。我们如同一个不断超支的家庭，最终发现越来越多劳动成果归“金融公司”，而非自己。
Should we continue to run current account deficits comparable to those now prevailing, the net ownership of the U.S. by other countries and their citizens a decade from now will amount to roughly $11 trillion. And, if foreign investors were to earn only 5% on that net holding, we would need to send a net of $.55 trillion of goods and services abroad every year merely to service the U.S. investments then held by foreigners. At that date, a decade out, our GDP would probably total about $18 trillion (assuming low inflation, which is far from a sure thing). Therefore, our U.S. “family” would then be delivering 3% of its annual output to the rest of the world simply as tribute for the overindulgences of the past. In this case, unlike that involving budget deficits, the sons would truly pay for the sins of their fathers.
若持续当前经常账户赤字水平，十年后外国对美净所有权将达11万亿美元。若仅按5%回报率计算，我们每年需净输出5,500亿美元商品和服务以支付外国人持有的美国资产收益。届时GDP或达18万亿美元（假设低通胀，但该假设未必成立）。因此，美国“家庭”需将3%的年度产出作为“贡品”支付给世界，为过去的过度消费买单。与财政赤字不同，此时子女真正为父辈的过失付出代价。
# Political and Economic Implications
政治与经济影响
This annual royalty paid to the world – which would not disappear unless the U.S. massively underconsumed and began to run consistent and large trade surpluses – would undoubtedly produce significant political unrest in the U.S. Americans would still be living very well, indeed better than now because of the growth in our economy. But they would chafe at the idea of perpetually paying tribute to their creditors and owners abroad. A country that is now aspiring to an “Ownership Society” will not find happiness in – and I’ll use hyperbole here for emphasis – a “Sharecropper’s Society.” But that’s precisely where our trade policies, supported by Republicans and Democrats alike, are taking us.
这一持续支付给世界的“年金”——除非美国大规模缩减消费并实现长期巨额贸易顺差——无疑将在国内引发重大政治动荡。美国人生活水平仍将极高，甚至因经济增长优于当前，但他们将厌恶永远向海外债权人和所有者支付贡品。一个追求“所有权社会”的国家，不会在“佃农社会”中找到幸福（此处用夸张修辞强调）。而两党支持的贸易政策，正将我们引向这一方向。
Many prominent U.S. financial figures, both in and out of government, have stated that our current-account deficits cannot persist. For instance, the minutes of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee of June 29-30, 2004 say: “The staff noted that outsized external deficits could not be sustained indefinitely.” But, despite the constant handwringing by luminaries, they offer no substantive suggestions to tame the burgeoning imbalance.
美国政府内外多位知名财经人士均指出经常账户赤字不可持续。例如，2004年6月29-30日美联储公开市场委员会会议纪要提到：“工作人员指出，过度外部赤字无法无限期维持。” 然而，尽管精英们不断哀叹，却未提出实质性解决方案以遏制失衡加剧。
In the article I wrote for Fortune 16 months ago, I warned that “a gently declining dollar would not provide the answer.” And so far it hasn’t. Yet policymakers continue to hope for a “soft landing,” meanwhile counseling other countries to stimulate (read “inflate”) their economies and Americans to save more. In my view these admonitions miss the mark: There are deep-rooted structural problems that will cause America to continue to run a huge current-account deficit unless trade policies either change materially or the dollar declines by a degree that could prove unsettling to financial markets.
在16个月前的《财富》文章中，我曾警告“美元温和贬值无法解决问题”。事实证明这一判断正确。政策制定者却仍寄望“软着陆”，敦促他国刺激（即“放水”）经济、美国人增加储蓄。我认为这些建议偏离本质：除非贸易政策发生根本改变，或美元贬值冲击金融市场，结构性问题将使美国持续巨额经常账户赤字。
# Misaligned Trade Policies
扭曲的贸易政策
Proponents of the trade status quo are fond of quoting Adam Smith: “What is prudence in the conduct of every family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage.”
贸易现状的支持者热衷引用亚当·斯密：“一个家庭行事的审慎，在国家层面难以称为愚蠢。若外国能以更低廉价格提供商品，用我们具有优势的产业产出换取更划算。”
I agree. Note, however, that Mr. Smith’s statement refers to trade of product for product, not of wealth for product as our country is doing to the tune of $.6 trillion annually. Moreover, I am sure that he would never have suggested that “prudence” consisted of his “family” selling off part of its farm every day in order to finance its overconsumption. Yet that is just what the “great kingdom” called the United States is doing.
我认同这一观点。但需注意，斯密的论述基于产品换产品的贸易，而非像美国每年6,000亿美元的财富换产品行为。我确信他绝不会建议“家庭”每天出售农场以资助过度消费。而“伟大的王国”美国正是如此行事。
If the U.S. was running a $.6 trillion current-account surplus, commentators worldwide would violently condemn our policy, viewing it as an extreme form of “mercantilism” – a long-discredited economic strategy under which countries foster exports, discourage imports, and pile up treasure. I would condemn such a policy as well. But, in effect if not in intent, the rest of the world is practicing mercantilism in respect to the U.S., an act made possible by our vast store of assets and our pristine credit history. Indeed, the world would never let any other country use a credit card denominated in its own currency to the insatiable extent we are employing ours. Presently, most foreign investors are sanguine: they may view us as spending junkies, but they know we are rich junkies as well.
若美国存在6,000亿美元经常账户顺差，全球评论家必将激烈谴责其政策，视之为“重商主义”极端形式——一种早已被摒弃的经济策略（鼓励出口、抑制进口、囤积财富）。我也会谴责此类政策。但事实上，世界正以美国为“重商主义”对象——因其庞大的资产储备和良好信用记录，全球放任我们透支本币信用。目前，多数外国投资者持乐观态度：他们或许认为我们是消费狂人，但也承认我们是富裕的狂人。
# The Limits of America’s Credit
美国信用的边界
Our spendthrift behavior won’t, however, be tolerated indefinitely. And though it’s impossible to forecast just when and how the trade problem will be resolved, it’s improbable that the resolution will foster an increase in the value of our currency relative to that of our trading partners.
然而，我们的挥霍行为不会被无限期容忍。尽管无法预测贸易问题何时以何种方式解决，但结果几乎不会带来美元相对贸易伙伴货币升值。
We hope the U.S. adopts policies that will quickly and substantially reduce the current-account deficit. True, a prompt solution would likely cause Berkshire to record losses on its foreign-exchange contracts. But Berkshire’s resources remain heavily concentrated in dollar-based assets, and both a strong dollar and a low-inflation environment are very much in our interest.
我们希望美国采取政策迅速大幅减少经常账户赤字。诚然，快速解决可能导致伯克希尔外汇合约亏损，但我们的资源仍集中于美元资产，强势美元和低通胀环境符合我们的根本利益。
If you wish to keep abreast of trade and currency matters, read The Financial Times. This London-based paper has long been the leading source for daily international financial news and now has an excellent American edition. Both its reporting and commentary on trade are first-class.
若您希望掌握贸易与货币动态，请阅读《金融时报》。这份伦敦报纸长期是国际财经新闻权威来源，其美国版亦属一流，贸易报道与评论均具深度。
# Macro-Economic Risks and Reputation
宏观经济风险与声誉
And, again, our usual caveat: macro-economics is a tough game in which few people, Charlie and I included, have demonstrated skill. We may well turn out to be wrong in our currency judgments. (Indeed, the fact that so many pundits now predict weakness for the dollar makes us uneasy.) If so, our mistake will be very public. The irony is that if we chose the opposite course, leaving all of Berkshire’s assets in dollars even as they declined significantly in value, no one would notice our mistake.
再次重申我们的警示：宏观经济学是少数人（包括查理和我）能真正精通的领域。我们的货币判断可能出错（实际上，众多专家预测美元疲软反而令我们不安）。若判断失误，错误将极为显眼。讽刺的是，若我们反向操作——即使美元大幅贬值仍全部持有——无人会察觉这一错误。
John Maynard Keynes said in his masterful The General Theory: “Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.” (Or, to put it in less elegant terms, lemmings as a class may be derided but never does an individual lemming get criticized.) From a reputational standpoint, Charlie and I run a clear risk with our foreign-exchange commitment. But we believe in managing Berkshire as if we owned 100% of it ourselves. And, were that the case, we would not be following a dollar-only policy.
约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯在其巨著《就业、利息与货币通论》中写道：“世俗智慧教导我们，循规蹈矩的失败好过特立独行的成功。”（换种更直白的说法：群体跳崖虽被嘲笑，个体却不会挨批。）从声誉角度看，我们的外汇持仓决策确有风险。但我们始终以100%持股心态管理伯克希尔，若真为全资控股，绝不会采取单一美元策略。
# Miscellaneous
其他事项
- Student Scouts and Deals (学生侦察兵与交易)
Last year I told you about a group of University of Tennessee finance students who played a key role in our $1.7 billion acquisition of Clayton Homes. Earlier, they had been brought to Omaha by their professor, Al Auxier – he brings a class every year – to tour Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim’s, eat at Gorat’s and have a Q&A session with me at Kiewit Plaza. These visitors, like those who come for our annual meeting, leave impressed by both the city and its friendly residents.
去年我曾提及田纳西大学金融学生团队在17亿美元克莱顿房屋收购中的关键作用。此前，他们的教授阿尔·奥克瑟每年都会带学生参访内布拉斯加家具店和博西姆珠宝店、在戈拉特餐厅用餐并参加基维特广场问答会。这些访客（如同股东大会参与者）对城市与居民的友善印象深刻。
Other colleges and universities have now come calling. This school year we will have visiting classes, ranging in size from 30 to 100 students, from Chicago, Dartmouth (Tuck), Delaware State, Florida State, Indiana, Iowa, Iowa State, Maryland, Nebraska, Northwest Nazarene, Pennsylvania (Wharton), Stanford, Tennessee, Texas, Texas A&M, Toronto (Rotman), Union and Utah. Most of the students are MBA candidates, and I’ve been impressed by their quality. They are keenly interested in business and investments, but their questions indicate that they also have more on their minds than simply making money. I always feel good after meeting them.
其他高校亦纷至沓来。本学年参访院校包括芝加哥、达特茅斯（塔克商学院）、特拉华州立、佛罗里达州立、印第安纳、爱荷华、爱荷华州立、马里兰、内布拉斯加、西北拿撒勒、宾夕法尼亚（沃顿）、斯坦福、田纳西、德州农工、多伦多（罗特曼）、联合大学和犹他大学，班级规模30-100人。多数为MBA学生，他们高质量提问显示其关注点不仅限于赚钱。每次交流后我都倍感振奋。
At our sessions, I tell the newcomers the story of the Tennessee group and its spotting of Clayton Homes. I do this in the spirit of the farmer who enters his hen house with an ostrich egg and admonishes the flock: “I don’t like to complain, girls, but this is just a small sample of what the competition is doing.” To date, our new scouts have not brought us deals. But their mission in life has been made clear to them.
交流会上，我会讲述田纳西团队发现克莱顿房屋的故事，并引用一个比喻：农夫拿着鸵鸟蛋进入鸡舍告诫母鸡：“我不愿抱怨，但这只是竞争对手行动的冰山一角。”目前新学员尚未带来交易机会，但他们的人生使命已明确。
- Accounting Rule Quirk (会计规则的奇特影响)
You should be aware of an accounting rule that mildly distorts our financial statements in a pain-today, gain-tomorrow manner. Berkshire purchases life insurance policies from individuals and corporations who would otherwise surrender them for cash. As the new holder of the policies, we pay any premiums that become due and ultimately – when the original holder dies – collect the face value of the policies.
您需注意一项会计规则，该规则以“今日痛苦、明日收益”的方式轻微扭曲我们的财务报表。伯克希尔从个人和企业手中购买生命保险保单（否则将退保取现）。作为新持有人，我们支付到期保费，并最终在原持有人去世后获得保单面值。
The original policyholder is usually in good health when we purchase the policy. Still, the price we pay for it is always well above its cash surrender value (“CSV”). Sometimes the original policyholder has borrowed against the CSV to make premium payments. In that case, the remaining CSV will be tiny and our purchase price will be a large multiple of what the original policyholder would have received, had he cashed out by surrendering it.
收购时原保单持有人通常健康状况良好，但我们的购买价格远高于现金解约价值（CSV）。有时原持有人已用CSV质押支付保费，此时剩余CSV微不足道，我们的购买价格可能是CSV的数倍。
Under accounting rules, we must immediately charge as a realized capital loss the excess over CSV that we pay upon purchasing the policy. We also must make additional charges each year for the amount by which the premium we pay to keep the policy in force exceeds the increase in CSV. But obviously, we don’t think these bookkeeping charges represent economic losses. If we did, we wouldn’t buy the policies.
根据会计规则，我们需立即将超出CSV的购买价格计入已实现资本亏损，并将每年保费支出超出CSV增值部分计入费用。但这些账面亏损不代表实际经济损失，否则我们不会购买此类保单。
During 2004, we recorded net “losses” from the purchase of policies (and from the premium payments required to maintain them) totaling $207 million, which was charged against realized investment gains in our earnings statement (included in “other” in the table on page 17). When the proceeds from these policies are received in the future, we will record as realized investment gain the excess over the then-CSV.
2004年，我们记录了2.07亿美元“净亏损”（含保单购买与保费支付），冲抵已实现投资收益（见第17页“其他”项）。未来收到保单收益时，超出彼时CSV的部分将计入已实现投资收益。
- Governance Reforms (治理改革)
Two post-bubble governance reforms have been particularly useful at Berkshire, and I fault myself for not putting them in place many years ago. The first involves regular meetings of directors without the CEO present. I’ve sat on 19 boards, and on many occasions this process would have led to dubious plans being examined more thoroughly. In a few cases, CEO changes that were needed would also have been made more promptly. There is no downside to this process, and there are many possible benefits.
后泡沫时代两项治理改革对伯克希尔极具价值，我亦自责未早年推行。第一项是董事闭门会议（CEO缺席）。我曾任职19家董事会，此类会议本可更深入审查可疑计划，甚至更及时撤换不合格CEO。此机制无害且益处良多。
The second reform concerns the “whistleblower line,” an arrangement through which employees can send information to me and the board’s audit committee without fear of reprisal. Berkshire’s extreme decentralization makes this system particularly valuable both to me and the committee. (In a sprawling “city” of 180,000 – Berkshire’s current employee count – not every sparrow that falls will be noticed at headquarters.) Most of the complaints we have received are of “the guy next to me has bad breath” variety, but on occasion I have learned of important problems at our subsidiaries that I otherwise would have missed. The issues raised are usually not of a type discoverable by audit, but relate instead to personnel and business practices. Berkshire would be more valuable today if I had put in a whistleblower line decades ago.
第二项是“举报人热线”，员工可匿名向我及审计委员会传递信息。伯克希尔拥有18万员工的庞大“城市”，总部难以察觉所有异常，该机制对我们至关重要。多数投诉是“同事口臭”类琐事，但偶有重大人事或经营问题曝光。这些问题通常无法通过审计发现，却可通过举报机制预防。若几十年前设立此机制，伯克希尔价值将更高。
- Shareholder Activism (股东积极主义)
Charlie and I love the idea of shareholders thinking and behaving like owners. Sometimes that requires them to be pro-active. And in this arena large institutional owners should lead the way. So far, however, the moves made by institutions have been less than awe-inspiring. Usually, they’ve focused on minutiae and ignored the three questions that truly count. First, does the company have the right CEO? Second, is he/she overreaching in terms of compensation? Third, are proposed acquisitions more likely to create or destroy per-share value?
查理和我支持股东以所有者思维行动，有时需主动出击。机构投资者本应率先垂范，但目前行动乏善可陈。他们往往聚焦细枝末节，忽略三大核心问题：1. 公司CEO是否合适？2. 其薪酬是否过度？3. 拟议收购更可能创造还是毁损每股价值？
On such questions, the interests of the CEO may well differ from those of the shareholders. Directors, moreover, sometimes lack the knowledge or gumption to overrule the CEO. Therefore, it’s vital that large owners focus on these three questions and speak up when necessary.
此类问题上，CEO利益常与股东冲突。董事亦可能因缺乏知识或勇气而未能制衡CEO。因此，大额股东必须聚焦三大问题并在必要时发声。
Instead many simply follow a “checklist” approach to the issue du jour. Last year I was on the receiving end of a judgment reached in that manner. Several institutional shareholders and their advisors decided I lacked “independence” in my role as a director of Coca-Cola. One group wanted me removed from the board and another simply wanted me booted from the audit committee.
但许多机构仅机械遵循“清单式”流程。去年我亲历一例：数家机构及其顾问以“缺乏独立性”为由，要求撤销我在可口可乐的董事资格（或至少踢出审计委员会）。
# Independence and Governance
独立性与治理
My first impulse was to secretly fund the group behind the second idea. Why anyone would wish to be on an audit committee is beyond me. But since directors must be assigned to one committee or another, and since no CEO wants me on his compensation committee, it’s often been my lot to get an audit committee assignment. As it turned out, the institutions that opposed me failed and I was re-elected to the audit job. (I fought off the urge to ask for a recount.)
我的第一反应是暗中资助支持第二类提议的团体。为何有人渴望加入审计委员会？这让我费解。但董事必须分配至某一委员会，而CEO们显然不愿让我进入薪酬委员会，因此审计委员会席位常落在我身上。最终反对者未能如愿，我再次当选审计委员会成员。（我克制了要求重新计票的冲动。）
Some institutions questioned my “independence” because, among other things, McLane and Dairy Queen buy lots of Coke products. (Do they want us to favor Pepsi?) But independence is defined in Webster’s as “not subject to control by others.” I’m puzzled how anyone could conclude that our Coke purchases would “control” my decision-making when the counterweight is the well-being of $8 billion of Coke stock held by Berkshire. Assuming I’m even marginally rational, elementary arithmetic should make it clear that my heart and mind belong to the owners of Coke, not to its management.
部分机构质疑我的“独立性”，理由包括McLane和Dairy Queen大量采购可口可乐产品。（他们是否希望我们转而支持百事？）但《韦氏词典》对独立性的定义是“不受他人控制”。我不解为何有人认为伯克希尔的采购行为会影响决策，毕竟我们持有80亿美元可口可乐股票。若我具备基本理性，简单的算术即可证明我的立场属于股东而非管理层。
# Biblical Standard of Independence
圣经中的独立性标准
I can’t resist mentioning that Jesus understood the calibration of independence far more clearly than do the protesting institutions. In Matthew 6:21 He observed: “For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.” Even to an institutional investor, $8 billion should qualify as “treasure” that dwarfs any profits Berkshire might earn on its routine transactions with Coke. Measured by the biblical standard, the Berkshire board is a model:
不得不指出，耶稣对独立性的理解远胜于抗议机构。马太福音6:21中写道：“因为你的财宝在哪里，你的心也在哪里。” 对机构投资者而言，80亿美元显然是“财宝”，远超伯克希尔与可口可乐日常交易利润。按圣经标准，伯克希尔董事会堪称典范：
(a) Every director is a member of a family owning at least $4 million of stock;
(a) 每位董事所属家庭至少持有400万美元股票；
(b) None of these shares were acquired from Berkshire via options or grants;
(b) 所持股份均非通过期权或赠与获得；
(c) No directors receive committee, consulting or board fees from the company that are more than a tiny portion of their annual income;
(c) 董事会费用仅占董事年收入极小比例；
(d) Although we have a standard corporate indemnity arrangement, we carry no liability insurance for directors.
(d) 公司虽提供常规赔偿安排，但不为董事投保责任险。
At Berkshire, board members travel the same road as shareholders.
在伯克希尔，董事与股东同路而行。
# Director Independence: A Biblical Lens
董事独立性：圣经视角
Charlie and I have seen much behavior confirming the Bible’s “treasure” point. In our view, based on our considerable boardroom experience, the least independent directors are likely to be those who receive an important fraction of their annual income from the fees they receive for board service (and who hope as well to be recommended for election to other boards and thereby to boost their income further). Yet these are the very board members most often classed as “independent.”
查理和我观察到诸多行为印证圣经“财宝”观点。根据我们的董事会经验，最缺乏独立性的董事往往是那些从董事会费中获取可观收入（并期望被推荐至其他董事会以增加收入）的人。然而这些人却常被归类为“独立董事”。
Most directors of this type are decent people and do a first-class job. But they wouldn’t be human if they weren’t tempted to thwart actions that would threaten their livelihood. Some may go on to succumb to such temptations.
此类董事多数为人正直且尽职。但若某些行为威胁其生计，他们难免产生抵制冲动。部分人可能最终屈服于这种诱惑。
Let’s look at an example based upon circumstantial evidence. I have first-hand knowledge of a recent acquisition proposal (not from Berkshire) that was favored by management, blessed by the company’s investment banker and slated to go forward at a price above the level at which the stock had sold for some years (or now sells for). In addition, a number of directors favored the transaction and wanted it proposed to shareholders.
以下为间接证据案例：我亲历一家非伯克希尔公司的收购提案。管理层与投行均支持以高于多年股价（及当前股价）的价格推进交易。若干董事亦支持该交易并希望提交股东表决。
Several of their brethren, however, each of whom received board and committee fees totaling about $100,000 annually, scuttled the proposal, which meant that shareholders never learned of this multi-billion offer. Non-management directors owned little stock except for shares they had received from the company. Their open-market purchases in recent years had meanwhile been nominal, even though the stock had sold far below the acquisition price proposed. In other words, these directors didn’t want the shareholders to be offered X even though they had consistently declined the opportunity to buy stock for their own account at a fraction of X.
然而几位“兄弟”董事（年获董事及委员会费用约10万美元）却阻挠提案，导致股东从未知悉这项数十亿美元级收购。非管理层董事自身持股极少，近年亦未在公开市场增持，尽管股价远低于收购价。换言之，这些董事不愿股东获得X价格，尽管他们自己从未以X价格的零头买入股票。
I don’t know which directors opposed letting shareholders see the offer. But I do know that $100,000 is an important portion of the annual income of some of those deemed “independent,” clearly meeting the Matthew 6:21 definition of “treasure.” If the deal had gone through, these fees would have ended.
我不清楚具体哪些董事反对披露收购提议。但我确信，对于部分自诩“独立”的董事而言，10万美元年费已构成《马太福音》定义的“财宝”。若交易达成，他们的费用将终止。
Neither the shareholders nor I will ever know what motivated the dissenters. Indeed they themselves will not likely know, given that self-interest inevitably blurs introspection. We do know one thing, though: At the same meeting at which the deal was rejected, the board voted itself a significant increase in directors’ fees.
股东和我都无法知晓反对者的动机。或许他们自己亦难自察，因私利必然模糊自我审视。但我们知道一件事：在否决交易的同一次会议中，董事会投票大幅提高董事费用。
# Stock Option Expensing
股票期权费用化
While we are on the subject of self-interest, let’s turn again to the most important accounting mechanism still available to CEOs who wish to overstate earnings: the non-expensing of stock options. The accomplices in perpetuating this absurdity have been many members of Congress who have defied the arguments put forth by all Big Four auditors, all members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and virtually all investment professionals.
谈及自利问题时，必须再次关注CEO虚增利润的关键会计漏洞：股票期权不计入费用。延续这一荒谬做法的共谋者包括许多国会议员，他们无视四大会计师事务所、财务会计准则委员会全体成员及几乎全部投资专业人士的反对意见。
I’m enclosing an op-ed piece I wrote for The Washington Post describing a truly breathtaking bill that was passed 312-111 by the House last summer. Thanks to Senator Richard Shelby, the Senate didn’t ratify the House’s foolishness. And, to his great credit, Bill Donaldson, the investor-minded Chairman of the SEC, has stood firm against massive political pressure, generated by the check-waving CEOs who first muscled Congress in 1993 about the issue of option accounting and then repeated the tactic last year.
随附我为《华盛顿邮报》撰写的一篇社论，描述去年夏天众议院以312-111通过的一项令人震惊法案。多亏参议员理查德·谢尔比，参议院未批准众议院的荒唐之举。值得称道的是，SEC主席比尔·唐纳森作为投资者利益捍卫者，顶住企业高管的游说压力。这些高管1993年曾胁迫国会，去年又故技重施。
Because the attempts to obfuscate the stock-option issue continue, it’s worth pointing out that no one – neither the FASB, nor investors generally, nor I – are talking about restricting the use of options in any way. Indeed, my successor at Berkshire may well receive much of his pay via options, albeit logically-structured ones in respect to 1) an appropriate strike price, 2) an escalation in price that reflects the retention of earnings, and 3) a ban on his quickly disposing of any shares purchased through options. We cheer arrangements that motivate managers, whether these be cash bonuses or options. And if a company is truly receiving value for the options it issues, we see no reason why recording their cost should cut down on their use.
鉴于持续模糊股票期权问题的尝试，必须澄清：FASB、投资者及我本人从未主张限制期权使用。事实上，伯克希尔的继任者薪酬中可能包含期权，但必须满足三点：1) 合理行权价；2) 行权价随留存收益增长；3) 禁止快速抛售行权所得股份。我们支持任何激励管理层的方式，包括现金奖金或期权。若公司确实通过期权获得价值，我们不反对记录其成本。
The simple fact is that certain CEOs know their own compensation would be far more rationally determined if options were expensed. They also suspect that their stock would sell at a lower price if realistic accounting were employed, meaning that they would reap less in the market when they unloaded their personal holdings. To these CEOs such unpleasant prospects are a fate to be fought with all the resources they have at hand – even though the funds they use in that fight normally don’t belong to them, but are instead put up by their shareholders.
简单事实是：若期权计入费用，某些CEO薪酬将更合理。他们亦怀疑真实会计标准下股价可能下跌，导致自己抛售持股收益减少。对此类CEO而言，这种前景是必须动用一切资源对抗的命运——尽管这些资源实为股东资金。
Option-expensing is scheduled to become mandatory on June 15th. You can therefore expect intensified efforts to stall or emasculate this rule between now and then. Let your Congressman and Senators know what you think on this issue.
期权费用化将于6月15日强制实施。预计在此期间反对势力将加紧行动。请向国会议员及参议员明确表达您对此事的立场。
# The Annual Meeting
年度股东大会
There are two changes this year concerning the annual meeting. First, we have scheduled the meeting for the last Saturday in April (the 30th), rather than the usual first Saturday in May. This year Mother’s Day falls on May 8, and it would be unfair to ask the employees of Borsheim’s and Gorat’s to take care of us at that special time – so we’ve moved everything up a week. Next year we’ll return to our regular timing, holding the meeting on May 6, 2006.
今年股东大会有两个变动。第一，会议时间从往年的5月第一个周六（2006年恢复原计划于5月6日召开）调整至4月最后一个周六（4月30日）。因今年母亲节为5月8日，要求Borsheim珠宝店和Gorat牛排餐厅员工在此期间为我们服务显失公平，因此提前一周。
Additionally, we are changing the sequence of events on meeting day, April 30. Just as always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m. and the movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30, however, we will go directly to the question and answer period, which (allowing for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15.
此外，4月30日的活动流程亦有调整：Qwest中心仍于上午7点开门，8:30播放影片。但9:30直接进入问答环节（含午餐时段），持续至下午3点。短暂休会后，查理和我将于3:15召开正式股东大会。
We have made this change because a number of shareholders complained last year about the time consumed by two speakers who advocated proposals of limited interest to the majority of the audience – and who were no doubt relishing their chance to talk to a captive group of about 19,500. With our new procedure, those shareholders who wish to hear it all can stick around for the formal meeting and those who don’t can leave – or better yet shop.
调整原因：去年股东抱怨两名提案支持者占用过多时间（约19,500人被迫聆听）。新流程下，想听完整会议的股东可留下，其他人可自由离开或购物。
# Exhibition Hall and Shopping Extravaganza
展览厅与购物狂欢
There will be plenty of opportunity for that pastime in the vast exhibition hall that adjoins the meeting area. Kelly Muchemore, the Flo Ziegfeld of Berkshire, put on a magnificent shopping extravaganza last year, and she says that was just a warm-up for this year. (Kelly, I am delighted to report, is getting married in October. I’m giving her away and suggested that she make a little history by holding the wedding at the annual meeting. She balked, however, when Charlie insisted that he be the ringbearer.)
展览厅将提供充足购物机会。被誉为伯克希尔“齐格菲尔德”的凯莉·马切莫尔去年策划了盛大促销，今年她表示这仅是预热。（凯莉将于10月结婚，我将担任证婚人。查理坚持担任司仪，她方才拒绝这一提议。）
Again we will showcase a 2,100 square foot Clayton home (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings and NFM furniture). Take a tour through the home. Better yet, buy it.
再次展示克莱顿房屋的2,100平方英尺样板房（采用Acme砖块、肖氏地毯、约翰·曼维尔隔热材料、MiTek连接件、Carefree遮阳篷及NFM家具）。欢迎参观，更欢迎购买。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 45 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money.
GEICO将在现场设摊位，由全国顶尖顾问驻场提供车险报价。多数州可享8%股东专属折扣（50个司法管辖区中45个允许该优惠）。携带现有保单详情，看看能否为您节省保费。
On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets® available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane.
周六奥马哈机场将展示NetJets®飞机阵容。前往Qwest中心展位了解参观细节。建议乘大巴来，乘自己的新飞机离开。
# Book Sales and Special Offers
书籍销售与特别推荐
The Bookworm shop did a terrific business last year selling Berkshire-related books. Displaying 18 titles, they sold 2,920 copies for $61,000. Since we charge the shop no rent (I must be getting soft), it gives shareholders a 20% discount. This year I’ve asked The Bookworm to add Graham Allison’s Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, a must-read for those concerned with the safety of our country. In addition, the shop will premiere Poor Charlie’s Almanack, a book compiled by Peter Kaufman. Scholars have for too long debated whether Charlie is the reincarnation of Ben Franklin. This book should settle the question.
去年“书虫书店”销售2,920册伯克希尔相关书籍（销售额6.1万美元），因免收租金提供20%折扣。今年新增推荐格雷厄姆·阿莱森《核恐怖主义：可预防的终极灾难》（国家安全必读），并首发彼得·考夫曼编著《穷查理年鉴》——终结“查理是否本·富兰克林转世”的学术争论。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. They do a terrific job for us each year, and I thank them for it.
随代理材料附录将说明如何获取参会凭证。交通与住宿预订仍推荐美国运通（800-799-6634）协助，感谢他们每年为股东提供卓越服务。
# Nebraska Furniture Mart (NFM)
内布拉斯加家具店
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM eight years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $25.1 million in 2004 (up 45% from a year earlier). Every year has set a new record, and on Saturday of last year, we had the largest single-day sales in NFM’s history – $6.1 million.
位于道奇与太平洋大道72街占地77英亩的NFM家具店将延续“伯克希尔周末”折扣。该活动始于8年前，销售额从1997年530万美元激增至2004年2,510万美元（同比+45%）。每年刷新纪录，去年周六单日销售额创610万美元历史记录。
To get the discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, April 28 and Monday, May 2 inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but that, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. we are having a special affair for shareholders only. I’ll be there, eating barbeque and drinking Coke.
享受折扣需在4月28日至5月2日期间购物并出示参会凭证。部分品牌破例参与促销，我们对此深表感谢。NFM营业时间周一至六10:00-21:00，周日10:00-18:00。今年周六17:30-20:00将举办股东专属烧烤派对，我将在现场享用烤肉和可乐。
# Borsheim’s Jewelry Store
博西姆珠宝店
Borsheim’s – the largest jewelry store in the country except for Tiffany’s Manhattan store – will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, April 29. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Sunday, May 1. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.
博西姆（规模仅次于蒂芙尼纽约旗舰店的美国最大珠宝商）将举办两场股东专属活动：4月29日18:00-22:00鸡尾酒会；5月1日09:00-16:00主庆典。周六营业至18:00。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheim’s throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 25 through Saturday, May 7. During that period, just identify yourself as a shareholder through your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement.
本周末博西姆将人潮汹涌，因此股东折扣期延长至4月25日-5月7日，凭参会凭证或券商证明即可享受优惠。
Borsheim’s operates on a gross margin that is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals, even before the shareholders’ discount. Last year, business over the weekend increased 73% from 2003, setting a record that will be tough to beat. Show me it can be done.
博西姆毛利率比主要对手低20个百分点（未含股东折扣）。去年周末销量同比激增73%，刷新纪录。今年能否再创高峰？
In a tent outside of Borsheim’s, Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers in groups of six – blindfolded. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. They plan to keep their eyes open – but Bob never sorts his cards, even when playing for a national championship.
博西姆店外帐篷将举办国际象棋大师赛：两届全美冠军帕特里克·沃尔夫将蒙眼一对六对弈。周日下午桥牌世界冠军鲍勃·哈曼和莎伦·奥斯伯格与股东互动（鲍勃打牌时从不整理手牌，即使争夺全国冠军）。
# Gorat’s Steakhouse
戈拉特牛排餐厅
Gorat’s – my favorite steakhouse – will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 1, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on that day, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1 (but not before). If Sunday is sold out, try Gorat’s on one of the other evenings you will be in town. Enhance your reputation as an epicure by ordering, as I do, a rare T-bone with a double helping of hash browns.
我最爱的戈拉特餐厅将于5月1日16:00-22:00仅对股东开放。请于4月1日致电402-551-3733预订（不早于此日）。若周日客满，可尝试其他晚间用餐。推荐点单：我最爱的三分熟T骨牛排配双份土豆饼，提升美食家声誉。
# International Shareholder Reception
国际股东招待会
We will again have a special reception from 4:00 to 5:30 on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside of North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far. Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 400 of you including at least 100 from Australia. Any shareholder who comes from other than the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.
周六下午4:00-5:30将为北美以外股东举办专场招待会。每年吸引数百国际股东（去年400人中至少100位来自澳大利亚）。非美加股东将获特别凭证及参与指引。
# Closing Remarks
闭幕致辞
Charlie and I are lucky. We have jobs that we love and are helped every day in a myriad of ways by talented and cheerful associates. No wonder we tap-dance to work. But nothing is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting. So join us on April 30th at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists.
查理和我非常幸运：从事热爱的工作，每天被才华横溢的同事支持。难怪我们“踢踏舞上班”！而最有趣的时刻，是与股东伙伴们在Qwest中心参加这场“资本家伍德斯托克音乐节”（4月30日）。
February 28, 2005
2005年2月28日
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·E·巴菲特
Chairman of the Board
董事会主席