1997巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. (伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司)
# 1997 Chairman's Letter (1997年董事长信函)
# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: (致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们：)
Our gain in net worth during 1997 was $8.0 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 34.1%. Over the last 33 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $25,488, a rate of 24.1% compounded annually.
在1997年，我们的净资产价值增长了80亿美元，使我们的A类和B类股票每股账面价值均增加了34.1%。在过去33年中（也就是自现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值从19美元增长到了25,488美元，年复合增长率达24.1%。
- All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.
本报告中使用的所有数据均适用于伯克希尔的A股——这是1996年之前公司唯一发行在外的股票的延续。B股的经济权益相当于A股的1/30。
Given our gain of 34.1%, it is tempting to declare victory and move on. But last year's performance was no great triumph: Any investor can chalk up large returns when stocks soar, as they did in 1997. In a bull market, one must avoid the error of the preening duck that quacks boastfully after a torrential rainstorm, thinking that its paddling skills have caused it to rise in the world. A right-thinking duck would instead compare its position after the downpour to that of the other ducks on the pond.
鉴于我们实现了34.1%的增长率，很容易让人想宣布胜利然后继续前进。但去年的表现并不算什么伟大的成就：当股市像1997年那样飙升时，任何投资者都能获得丰厚回报。在牛市中，我们必须避免犯下那只骄傲鸭子的错误——它在暴雨过后得意地嘎嘎叫，以为自己划水的技术让它飞黄腾达。理性的鸭子应该把自己雨后的处境和其他池塘里的鸭子做比较。
So what's our duck rating for 1997? The table on the facing page shows that though we paddled furiously last year, passive ducks that simply invested in the S&P Index rose almost as fast as we did. Our appraisal of 1997's performance, then: Quack.
那么我们1997年的“鸭子评级”如何呢？下一页的表格显示，尽管我们去年拼命努力，那些只是被动投资于标准普尔指数的“懒鸭子”上升的速度几乎和我们一样快。因此，我们对1997年表现的评价是：嘎嘎。
When the market booms, we tend to suffer in comparison with the S&P Index. The Index bears no tax costs, nor do mutual funds, since they pass through all tax liabilities to their owners. Last year, on the other hand, Berkshire paid or accrued $4.2 billion for federal income tax, or about 18% of our beginning net worth.
当市场繁荣时，我们往往难以跑赢标准普尔指数。该指数本身无需承担税务成本，共同基金也是一样，因为它们将所有税务责任都转嫁给了其持有人。而去年，伯克希尔支付或计提了42亿美元的联邦所得税，约占我们年初净资产的18%。
Berkshire will always have corporate taxes to pay, which means it needs to overcome their drag in order to justify its existence. Obviously, Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I won't be able to lick that handicap every year. But we expect over time to maintain a modest advantage over the Index, and that is the yardstick against which you should measure us. We will not ask you to adopt the philosophy of the Chicago Cubs fan who reacted to a string of lackluster seasons by saying, "Why get upset? Everyone has a bad century now and then."
伯克希尔始终需要缴纳企业所得税，这意味着它必须克服这种拖累才能证明自身存在的合理性。显然，我和伯克希尔副主席兼我的合伙人查理·芒格不可能每年都克服这一劣势。但我们期望长期来看能维持相对于指数的一个小幅优势，这才是你们衡量我们的标准。我们不会要求你们接受那种芝加哥小熊队球迷的哲学——他们面对一连串低迷赛季时说：“何必生气？每个人偶尔都会经历糟糕的世纪。”
Gains in book value are, of course, not the bottom line at Berkshire. What truly counts are gains in per-share intrinsic business value. Ordinarily, though, the two measures tend to move roughly in tandem, and in 1997 that was the case: Led by a blow-out performance at GEICO, Berkshire's intrinsic value (which far exceeds book value) grew at nearly the same pace as book value.
当然，在伯克希尔，账面价值的增长并不是最终目标。真正重要的是每股内在商业价值的增长。通常情况下，这两项指标大致同步变动，而在1997年也是如此：在GEICO表现出色的带动下，伯克希尔的内在价值（远高于账面价值）以与账面价值几乎相同的速度增长。
For more explanation of the term, intrinsic value, you may wish to refer to our Owner's Manual, reprinted on pages 62 to 71. This manual sets forth our owner-related business principles, information that is important to all of Berkshire's shareholders.
如需更深入理解“内在价值”这一术语，请参阅我们重印于第62至71页的《股东手册》。这本手册阐述了我们与股东相关的经营原则，这些信息对所有伯克希尔的股东都至关重要。
In our last two annual reports, we furnished you a table that Charlie and I believe is central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key components of value. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments (discussed on pages 69 and 70), but after all interest and corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect, the columns show what Berkshire would look like were it split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs.
在前两年的年度报告中，我们提供了一张查理和我都认为对于估算伯克希尔内在价值至关重要的表格。以下是我们对该表的最新更新版本，其中展示了我们价值的两个关键组成部分。第一列列出了我们每股所持有的投资（包括现金及等价物），第二列则显示了扣除所有利息和公司费用后、但尚未扣除税款和购并会计调整（见第69至70页）的伯克希尔运营业务每股收益。第二列不包括我们在第一列所列投资中实现的所有股息、利息和资本利得。实际上，这些列展示的是如果伯克希尔被拆分为两部分会是什么样子：一个实体持有我们的投资，另一个实体经营所有业务并承担所有公司成本。
| Year | Investments Per Share (每股投资金额) | Pre-tax Earnings Excluding All Income from Investments (不含投资收入的税前收益) |
|---|---|---|
| 1967 | $ 41 | $ 1.09 |
| 1977 | 372 | 12.44 |
| 1987 | 3,910 | 108.14 |
| 1997 | 38,043 | 717.82 |
Pundits who ignore what our 38,000 employees contribute to the company, and instead simply view Berkshire as a de facto investment company, should study the figures in the second column. We made our first business acquisition in 1967, and since then our pre-tax operating earnings have grown from $1 million to $888 million. Furthermore, as noted, in this exercise we have assigned all of Berkshire's corporate expenses -- overhead of $6.6 million, interest of $66.9 million and shareholder contributions of $15.4 million -- to our business operations, even though a portion of these could just as well have been assigned to the investment side.
那些忽视我们38,000名员工对公司贡献，并仅仅将伯克希尔视为一家事实上的投资公司的评论人士，应该仔细研究第二列的数据。我们在1967年完成了第一笔企业收购，自此以来，我们的税前运营利润已从100万美元增长到了8.88亿美元。此外，正如所述，在这次分析中我们将伯克希尔所有的公司开支——包括660万美元的管理费用、6,690万美元的利息以及1,540万美元的股东捐赠——都归入了业务运营中，尽管其中一部分其实也可以合理地分摊到投资方面。
| Decade Ending | Investments Per Share (每股投资金额) | Pre-tax Earnings Excluding All Income from Investments (不含投资收入的税前收益) |
|---|---|---|
| 1977 | 24.6% | 27.6% |
| 1987 | 26.5% | 24.1% |
| 1997 | 25.5% | 20.8% |
| Annual Growth Rate, 1967-1997 (1967-1997年复合增长率) | 25.6% | 24.2% |
During 1997, both parts of our business grew at a satisfactory rate, with investments increasing by $9,543 per share, or 33.5%, and operating earnings growing by $296.43 per share, or 70.3%. One important caveat: Because we were lucky in our super-cat insurance business (to be discussed later) and because GEICO's underwriting gain was well above what we can expect in most years, our 1997 operating earnings were much better than we anticipated and also more than we expect for 1998.
1997年，我们业务的两个部分都以令人满意的速度增长，投资部分每股增长了9,543美元，即33.5%；运营收益每股增长了296.43美元，即70.3%。但有一个重要提醒：由于我们在超级再保险（super-cat）业务中运气不错（稍后详述），且GEICO的承保利润远高于我们多数年份的预期，因此我们1997年的运营收益显著好于预期，也高于我们对1998年的预期。
Our rate of progress in both investments and operations is certain to fall in the future. For anyone deploying capital, nothing recedes like success. My own history makes the point: Back in 1951, when I was attending Ben Graham's class at Columbia, an idea giving me a $10,000 gain improved my investment performance for the year by a full 100 percentage points. Today, an idea producing a $500 million pre-tax profit for Berkshire adds one percentage point to our performance. It's no wonder that my annual results in the 1950s were better by nearly thirty percentage points than my annual gains in any subsequent decade. Charlie's experience was similar. We weren't smarter then, just smaller. At our present size, any performance superiority we achieve will be minor.
未来，我们在投资与运营方面的增长速度无疑会放缓。对于任何进行资金配置的人来说，没有什么比成功更难持续。我自己就有一段经历可以说明这一点：1951年我在哥伦比亚大学上本·格雷厄姆的课时，一个想法带来的10,000美元盈利使我的年度投资回报率提升了整整100个百分点。而如今，一个为伯克希尔带来5亿美元税前利润的想法，对我们整体表现的提升也不过是1个百分点而已。难怪我1950年代的投资回报率比之后任何一个十年都高出近三十个百分点。查理的经历也很类似。我们那时候并不更聪明，只是规模更小。以我们现在如此庞大的体量，任何优于市场的表现都将非常有限。
Though we are delighted with what we own, we are not pleased with our prospects for committing incoming funds. Prices are high for both businesses and stocks. That does not mean that the prices of either will fall -- we have absolutely no view on that matter -- but it does mean that we get relatively little in prospective earnings when we commit fresh money.
虽然我们对我们目前拥有的资产感到满意，但我们对未来部署新进资金的前景并不乐观。无论是企业还是股票，当前的价格都很高。这并不意味着它们的价格一定会下跌——我们对此毫无预测能力——但它的确意味着当我们投入新的资金时，所能获得的预期收益相对较低。
Under these circumstances, we try to exert a Ted Williams kind of discipline. In his book The Science of Hitting, Ted explains that he carved the strike zone into 77 cells, each the size of a baseball. Swinging only at balls in his "best" cell, he knew, would allow him to bat .400; reaching for balls in his "worst" spot, the low outside corner of the strike zone, would reduce him to .230. In other words, waiting for the fat pitch would mean a trip to the Hall of Fame; swinging indiscriminately would mean a ticket to the minors.
在这种情况下，我们努力展现出泰德·威廉姆斯式的纪律性。他在其著作《击球的科学》中解释道，他把打击区划分为77个格子，每个格子大小相当于一个棒球。他清楚地知道，只在自己“最佳区域”的球挥棒，他的打击率能达到四成；而如果去打位于最差位置——也就是好球区外下角的球，他的打击率就会降到二成三。换句话说，耐心等待最好的投球才能进入名人堂；而随意挥棒只会让你回到小联盟。
If they are in the strike zone at all, the business "pitches" we now see are just catching the lower outside corner. If we swing, we will be locked into low returns. But if we let all of today's balls go by, there can be no assurance that the next ones we see will be more to our liking. Perhaps the attractive prices of the past were the aberrations, not the full prices of today. Unlike Ted, we can't be called out if we resist three pitches that are barely in the strike zone; nevertheless, just standing there, day after day, with my bat on my shoulder is not my idea of fun.
如果我们现在看到的商业机会哪怕还算在“好球区”，那也只是勉强擦过外角低位置的球。如果我们贸然出手，就只能锁定较低的回报。但如果我们放过今天所有这些球，也无法保证下一个球会更合我们心意。也许过去那些具有吸引力的价格才是反常现象，而如今的高价才是常态。不同于泰德·威廉姆斯的是，就算我们连续三次放过接近好球区边缘的球，也不会被三振出局；尽管如此，每天站在打击区里、肩上扛着球棒一动不动，并不是我所喜欢的事。
# Unconventional Commitments (非传统投资)
When we can't find our favorite commitment -- a well-run and sensibly-priced business with fine economics -- we usually opt to put new money into very short-term instruments of the highest quality. Sometimes, however, we venture elsewhere. Obviously we believe that the alternative commitments we make are more likely to result in profit than loss. But we also realize that they do not offer the certainty of profit that exists in a wonderful business secured at an attractive price. Finding that kind of opportunity, we know that we are going to make money -- the only question being when. With alternative investments, we think that we are going to make money. But we also recognize that we will sometimes realize losses, occasionally of substantial size.
当我们找不到最偏好的投资——一家管理良好、价格合理且具备优秀经济特性的企业时，我们通常会选择将新资金投入最高质量的短期工具中。不过有时候，我们也会涉足其他领域。显然，我们认为这些替代性投资更可能带来利润而非亏损。但我们同时也意识到，它们不具备像以有吸引力价格购得优质企业那样确定的盈利前景。当我们找到那种机会时，我们知道一定会赚钱——唯一的问题是何时实现。而在进行替代性投资时，我们只是认为自己将会赚钱，但也清楚有时会遭遇亏损，而且偶尔亏损还可能相当大。
We had three non-traditional positions at yearend. The first was derivative contracts for 14.0 million barrels of oil, that being what was then left of a 45.7 million barrel position we established in 1994-95. Contracts for 31.7 million barrels were settled in 1995-97, and these supplied us with a pre-tax gain of about $61.9 million. Our remaining contracts expire during 1998 and 1999. In these, we had an unrealized gain of $11.6 million at yearend. Accounting rules require that commodity positions be carried at market value. Therefore, both our annual and quarterly financial statements reflect any unrealized gain or loss in these contracts. When we established our contracts, oil for future delivery seemed modestly underpriced. Today, though, we have no opinion as to its attractiveness.
我们在年底持有三项非传统头寸。第一项是对1,400万桶石油的衍生品合约，这是我们于1994至1995年间建立的4,570万桶头寸中剩余的部分。其中3,170万桶的合约已在1995至1997年间结算，为我们带来了约6,190万美元的税前收益。剩下的合约将在1998和1999年到期。截至年底，这部分未实现收益为1,160万美元。会计规则要求商品头寸按市值计价，因此我们的年度和季度财务报表均反映了这些合约中的任何未实现损益。当初建立这些合约时，远期交割的油价看起来略微偏低。但现在，我们对它的吸引力已无明确看法。
Our second non-traditional commitment is in silver. Last year, we purchased 111.2 million ounces. Marked to market, that position produced a pre-tax gain of $97.4 million for us in 1997. In a way, this is a return to the past for me: Thirty years ago, I bought silver because I anticipated its demonetization by the U.S. Government. Ever since, I have followed the metal's fundamentals but not owned it. In recent years, bullion inventories have fallen materially, and last summer Charlie and I concluded that a higher price would be needed to establish equilibrium between supply and demand. Inflation expectations, it should be noted, play no part in our calculation of silver's value.
第二项非传统投资是白银。去年我们购买了1.112亿盎司白银。按市值计算，该头寸在1997年为我们带来了9,740万美元的税前收益。从某种意义上说，这是我重返旧地：三十年前，我曾因预期美国政府将取消白银的货币属性而买入白银。自那以后我一直关注其基本面，但并未实际持有。近年来，实物白银库存大幅下降，去年夏天查理和我们判断，需要更高的价格才能重新平衡供需关系。请注意，通胀预期并未纳入我们对白银价值的评估中。
Finally, our largest non-traditional position at yearend was $4.6 billion, at amortized cost, of long-term zero-coupon obligations of the U.S. Treasury. These securities pay no interest. Instead, they provide their holders a return by way of the discount at which they are purchased, a characteristic that makes their market prices move rapidly when interest rates change. If rates rise, you lose heavily with zeros, and if rates fall, you make outsized gains. Since rates fell in 1997, we ended the year with an unrealized pre-tax gain of $598.8 million in our zeros. Because we carry the securities at market value, that gain is reflected in yearend book value.
最后，我们在年底最大的非传统头寸是46亿美元（按摊销成本计算）的长期美国财政部零息债券。这些证券不支付利息，而是通过折价出售的方式提供回报，这种特性使得它们的市场价格在利率变动时剧烈波动。如果利率上升，你将严重亏损；如果利率下降，你则可获得超额收益。由于1997年利率下降，我们持有的这些债券带来了5.988亿美元的未实现税前收益。因为我们以市值计价这些证券，这一收益已体现在年末账面价值中。
In purchasing zeros, rather than staying with cash-equivalents, we risk looking very foolish: A macro-based commitment such as this never has anything close to a 100% probability of being successful. However, you pay Charlie and me to use our best judgment -- not to avoid embarrassment -- and we will occasionally make an unconventional move when we believe the odds favor it. Try to think kindly of us when we blow one. Along with President Clinton, we will be feeling your pain: The Munger family has more than 90% of its net worth in Berkshire and the Buffetts more than 99%.
与保持现金等价物相比，购买零息债券可能会让我们显得非常愚蠢：这类基于宏观判断的投资从来不可能接近100%的成功率。然而，你们付钱给查理和我，是为了让我们运用最佳判断——而不是为了避免难堪——当我们认为胜算较高时，我们会偶尔做出一些非传统的决策。当我们判断失误时，请尽量对我们宽容一点。就像克林顿总统一样，我们也会感受到你们的痛苦：芒格家族超过90%的净资产和巴菲特家族超过99%的净资产都集中在伯克希尔。
# How We Think About Market Fluctuations (我们如何看待市场波动)
A short quiz: If you plan to eat hamburgers throughout your life and are not a cattle producer, should you wish for higher or lower prices for beef? Likewise, if you are going to buy a car from time to time but are not an auto manufacturer, should you prefer higher or lower car prices? These questions, of course, answer themselves.
一个小测试：如果你打算一生吃汉堡包，但你不是养牛户，你应该希望牛肉价格更高还是更低？同样地，如果你偶尔要买一辆车，但你不是汽车制造商，你应更偏好较高的还是较低的汽车价格？这些问题的答案显然是不言而喻的。
But now for the final exam: If you expect to be a net saver during the next five years, should you hope for a higher or lower stock market during that period? Many investors get this one wrong. Even though they are going to be net buyers of stocks for many years to come, they are elated when stock prices rise and depressed when they fall. In effect, they rejoice because prices have risen for the "hamburgers" they will soon be buying. This reaction makes no sense. Only those who will be sellers of equities in the near future should be happy at seeing stocks rise. Prospective purchasers should much prefer sinking prices.
接下来才是真正的考试题：如果你预计未来五年仍是净储蓄者，那么在这段时间内，你是否应希望股市上涨或下跌？许多投资者对此判断错误。尽管他们在未来多年仍将作为股票的净买家，但在股价上涨时却感到高兴，下跌时感到沮丧。实际上，他们因为即将购买的“汉堡”价格上涨而感到高兴，这种反应毫无道理。只有那些近期打算卖出股票的人才会因股价上涨而高兴。未来的买家则应更希望价格走低。
For shareholders of Berkshire who do not expect to sell, the choice is even clearer. To begin with, our owners are automatically saving even if they spend every dime they personally earn: Berkshire "saves" for them by retaining all earnings, thereafter using these savings to purchase businesses and securities. Clearly, the more cheaply we make these buys, the more profitable our owners' indirect savings program will be.
对于那些不打算卖出伯克希尔股份的股东来说，答案更加清晰。首先，即使我们的股东花光了自己赚到的每一分钱，他们仍然在自动储蓄：伯克希尔通过保留全部收益替他们“存钱”，并随后用这些储蓄去购买企业和证券。显然，我们买得越便宜，我们股东的间接储蓄计划就越有利可图。
Furthermore, through Berkshire you own major positions in companies that consistently repurchase their shares. The benefits that these programs supply us grow as prices fall: When stock prices are low, the funds that an investee spends on repurchases increase our ownership of that company by a greater amount than is the case when prices are higher. For example, the repurchases that Coca-Cola, The Washington Post and Wells Fargo made in past years at very low prices benefitted Berkshire far more than do today's repurchases, made at loftier prices.
此外，通过伯克希尔，你持有几家持续回购自身股票公司的大量股份。这些回购计划带来的好处随股价下跌而增加：当股价低迷时，被投资公司用于回购的资金能显著提升我们在该公司中的持股比例，而若股价高企，效果则差得多。例如，可口可乐、《华盛顿邮报》和富国银行前几年以极低价格进行的回购，比如今以更高价格进行的回购对伯克希尔的帮助大得多。
At the end of every year, about 97% of Berkshire's shares are held by the same investors who owned them at the start of the year. That makes them savers. They should therefore rejoice when markets decline and allow both us and our investees to deploy funds more advantageously.
每年年底，大约97%的伯克希尔股份仍由年初就已持有的投资者持有。这意味着他们是储蓄者。因此，当市场下跌、使我们以及我们的被投公司能更有利地配置资金时，他们理应感到欣喜。
So smile when you read a headline that says "Investors lose as market falls." Edit it in your mind to "Disinvestors lose as market falls -- but investors gain." Though writers often forget this truism, there is a buyer for every seller and what hurts one necessarily helps the other. (As they say in golf matches: "Every putt makes someone happy.")
所以当你读到“市场下跌，投资者损失惨重”这样的标题时，请微笑。请在心中把它改为：“抛售者受损，投资者受益。”虽然很多作者常常忘记这个真理，但每个卖家都有一个买家，伤害一方必然帮助另一方。（正如高尔夫比赛中常说的：“每一记推杆总会让某人开心。”）
We gained enormously from the low prices placed on many equities and businesses in the 1970s and 1980s. Markets that then were hostile to investment transients were friendly to those taking up permanent residence. In recent years, the actions we took in those decades have been validated, but we have found few new opportunities. In its role as a corporate "saver," Berkshire continually looks for ways to sensibly deploy capital, but it may be some time before we find opportunities that get us truly excited.
我们在上世纪70年代和80年代得益于许多股票和企业的低价环境。当时对短期投资者不利的市场，反而对长期定居型投资者十分友好。近年来，我们在那些年代采取的行动已被证明是正确的，但我们发现的新机会却很少。作为一家“储蓄型”企业，伯克希尔不断寻找明智的资金配置方式，但或许还要一段时间，我们才能找到真正令我们兴奋的机会。
# Insurance Operations -- Overview (保险业务概览)
What does excite us, however, is our insurance business. GEICO is flying, and we expect that it will continue to do so. Before we expound on that, though, let's discuss "float" and how to measure its cost. Unless you understand this subject, it will be impossible for you to make an informed judgment about Berkshire's intrinsic value.
然而，真正令我们兴奋的是我们的保险业务。GEICO正处于腾飞状态，我们预计这种势头还会持续。不过在深入讨论这一点之前，让我们先谈谈“浮存金”（float）以及如何衡量其成本。如果你不了解这个概念，你就无法对伯克希尔的内在价值做出有根据的判断。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. Typically, this pleasant activity carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.
首先，“浮存金”是我们持有但不属于我们的资金。在保险业务中，浮存金产生于保费收入早于赔付支出的时间差，有时这一时间差会延续多年。在这段时间里，保险公司可以将这些资金用于投资。通常情况下，这种活动令人愉快，但也伴随着风险：保险公司收取的保费往往不足以覆盖最终必须支付的损失和费用，这导致了“承保亏损”，也就是浮存金的成本。如果一家保险公司的浮存金成本长期低于公司获取资金的市场成本，那么这家保险公司是有价值的；但如果其浮存金成本高于市场利率，那这家公司就只是一个糟糕的投资。
A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Estimating errors, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. As for Berkshire, Charlie and I attempt to be conservative in presenting its underwriting results to you, because we have found that virtually all surprises in insurance are unpleasant ones.
这里需要特别提醒：由于损失成本必须依赖估算，保险公司在计算承保结果时拥有很大的自由度，这也使得投资者很难准确判断一家公司浮存金的真实成本。这些估算误差有时候是无心之失，有时候却并非如此，而且误差可能非常巨大。这些错误的后果会直接影响利润表。经验丰富的观察者通常能识别出大规模的准备金错误，但普通公众通常只能接受报表上呈现的数据。有时我看到一些知名审计机构默许的数字也感到震惊。至于伯克希尔，查理和我在向你们展示承保结果时尽量采取保守态度，因为我们发现保险业几乎所有的意外都是负面的。
As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's insurance business has been a huge winner. For the table, we have calculated our float -- which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume -- by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last five, our cost of float has been negative. In effect, we have been paid for holding money.
如下表所示的数据表明，伯克希尔的保险业务取得了巨大成功。为制作这张表格，我们通过以下方式计算浮存金——相对于我们的保费规模，我们生成了大量的浮存金：我们将净损失准备金、理赔调整准备金、再保险承担下的资金、未赚取保费准备金相加，然后减去代理人账户余额、预付取得成本、预付税款及适用于所承担再保险的递延费用。我们的浮存金成本由承保盈亏决定。在我们实现承保盈利的年份（如过去五年），我们的浮存金成本为负值。换句话说，我们实际上是被“付费持有资金”。
| Underwriting Loss (承保亏损) | Average Float (平均浮存金) | Approximate Cost of Funds (资金成本近似值) | Yearend Yield on Long-Term Govt. Bonds (年末长期国债收益率) |
|---|---|---|---|
| (In $ Millions) | (百万美元) | (第1栏与第2栏比率) | |
| 1967 | profit | less than zero | 5.50% |
| 1968 | profit | less than zero | 5.90% |
| 1969 | profit | less than zero | 6.79% |
| 1970 | 0.37 | 1.14% | 6.25% |
| 1971 | profit | less than zero | 5.81% |
| 1972 | profit | less than zero | 5.82% |
| 1973 | profit | less than zero | 7.27% |
| 1974 | 7.36 | 9.30% | 8.13% |
| 1975 | 11.35 | 12.96% | 8.03% |
| 1976 | profit | less than zero | 7.30% |
| 1977 | profit | less than zero | 7.97% |
| 1978 | profit | less than zero | 8.93% |
| 1979 | profit | less than zero | 10.08% |
| 1980 | profit | less than zero | 11.94% |
| 1981 | profit | less than zero | 13.61% |
| 1982 | 21.56 | 9.77% | 10.64% |
| 1983 | 33.87 | 14.64% | 11.84% |
| 1984 | 48.06 | 18.98% | 11.58% |
| 1985 | 44.23 | 11.34% | 9.34% |
| 1986 | 55.84 | 7.00% | 7.60% |
| 1987 | 55.43 | 4.38% | 8.95% |
| 1988 | 11.08 | 0.74% | 9.00% |
| 1989 | 24.40 | 1.58% | 7.97% |
| 1990 | 26.65 | 1.63% | 8.24% |
| 1991 | 119.59 | 6.31% | 7.40% |
| 1992 | 108.96 | 4.76% | 7.39% |
| 1993 | profit | less than zero | 6.35% |
| 1994 | profit | less than zero | 7.88% |
| 1995 | profit | less than zero | 5.95% |
| 1996 | profit | less than zero | 6.64% |
| 1997 | profit | less than zero | 5.92% |
Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float has grown at an annual compounded rate of 21.7%. Better yet, it has cost us nothing, and in fact has made us money. Therein lies an accounting irony: Though our float is shown on our balance sheet as a liability, it has had a value to Berkshire greater than an equal amount of net worth would have had.
自从1967年我们进入保险行业以来，我们的浮存金以每年21.7%的复合增长率增长。更妙的是，它对我们而言不仅没有成本，反而带来了收益。这就形成了一个会计上的讽刺：尽管我们的浮存金在资产负债表上列为负债，但它对伯克希尔的价值远远超过同等金额的净资产所能带来的价值。
The expiration of several large contracts will cause our float to decline during the first quarter of 1998, but we expect it to grow substantially over the long term. We also believe that our cost of float will continue to be highly favorable.
几项大型合同即将到期，这将导致我们在1998年第一季度的浮存金有所下降，但我们预计从长期来看，浮存金仍会有显著增长。我们也相信，我们的浮存金成本将继续保持高度有利。
# Super-Cat Insurance (超级巨灾保险)
Occasionally, however, the cost of our float will spike severely. That will occur because of our heavy involvement in the super-cat business, which by its nature is the most volatile of all insurance lines. In this operation, we sell policies that insurance and reinsurance companies purchase in order to limit their losses when mega-catastrophes strike. Berkshire is the preferred market for sophisticated buyers: When the "big one" hits, the financial strength of super-cat writers will be tested, and Berkshire has no peer in this respect.
然而，偶尔我们的浮存金成本也会出现剧烈飙升。这是因为我们在“超级巨灾保险”（super-cat）业务中深度参与，而这类保险本质上是所有保险产品中波动性最大的。在这项业务中，我们出售的保单供保险公司和再保险公司购买，以便在发生特大灾难时限制其损失。伯克希尔是成熟买家的首选市场：当“真正的大灾难”来临时，巨灾保险承保商的财务实力将受到考验，而在这一点上，伯克希尔无人可比。
Since truly major catastrophes are rare occurrences, our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits in most years -- and to record a huge loss occasionally. In other words, the attractiveness of our super-cat business will take a great many years to measure. What you must understand, however, is that a truly terrible year in the super-cat business is not a possibility -- it's a certainty. The only question is when it will come.
由于真正的重大灾难极为罕见，我们的超级巨灾保险业务在大多数年份都能带来可观利润，但偶尔也会录得巨额亏损。换句话说，这项业务的吸引力需要经过多年才能体现出来。你必须明白的一点是，在超级巨灾保险领域，遭遇极其糟糕的年份不是“可能性”，而是“必然性”。唯一的问题是何时发生。
Last year, we were very lucky in our super-cat operation. The world suffered no catastrophes that caused huge amounts of insured damage, so virtually all premiums that we received dropped to the bottom line. This pleasant result has a dark side, however. Many investors who are "innocents" -- meaning that they rely on representations of salespeople rather than on underwriting knowledge of their own -- have come into the reinsurance business by means of purchasing pieces of paper that are called "catastrophe bonds." The second word in this term, though, is an Orwellian misnomer: A true bond obliges the issuer to pay; these bonds, in effect, are contracts that lay a provisional promise to pay on the purchaser.
去年，我们在超级巨灾保险业务中非常幸运。全球没有发生造成巨额保险损失的重大灾难，因此我们收到的几乎所有保费都直接转化为利润。然而，这种令人满意的结果也有其阴暗面。许多被称为“门外汉”的投资者——他们依赖销售人员的宣传而非自己具备承保知识——通过购买名为“巨灾债券”（catastrophe bonds）的金融工具进入了再保险行业。但这个词中的“债券”一词其实是一种奥威尔式的误称：真正的债券要求发行方必须支付本金和利息；而这些所谓的“债券”实质上是合同，它们将付款义务暂时转嫁给了购买者。
This convoluted arrangement came into being because the promoters of the contracts wished to circumvent laws that prohibit the writing of insurance by entities that haven't been licensed by the state. A side benefit for the promoters is that calling the insurance contract a "bond" may also cause unsophisticated buyers to assume that these instruments involve far less risk than is actually the case.
这种复杂的结构之所以存在，是因为这些合同的发起人希望绕过禁止未经州政府许可的实体从事保险业务的法律。对发起人来说，还有一个附带好处是：将保险合同称为“债券”，可能会让缺乏经验的买家误以为这些工具的风险远低于实际情况。
Truly outsized risks will exist in these contracts if they are not properly priced. A pernicious aspect of catastrophe insurance, however, makes it likely that mispricing, even of a severe variety, will not be discovered for a very long time. Consider, for example, the odds of throwing a 12 with a pair of dice -- 1 out of 36. Now assume that the dice will be thrown once a year; that you, the "bond-buyer," agree to pay $50 million if a 12 appears; and that for "insuring" this risk you take in an annual "premium" of $1 million. That would mean you had significantly underpriced the risk. Nevertheless, you could go along for years thinking you were making money -- indeed, easy money. There is actually a 75.4% probability that you would go for a decade without paying out a dime. Eventually, however, you would go broke.
如果定价不当，这些合同将蕴含着极大的风险。然而，巨灾保险的一个有害特性在于：即使出现了严重的价格偏差，也可能在很长时间内不被发现。举个例子，掷一对骰子得到12点的概率是1/36。现在假设每年掷一次骰子；你作为“债券买家”，同意在出现12点时支付5,000万美元；而为了“承保”这个风险，你每年收取100万美元的“保费”。这意味着你严重低估了风险。然而，你可能会连续多年认为自己在赚钱——甚至是轻松赚钱。实际上，有75.4%的概率你在十年内都不会支付一分钱。但最终，你会破产。
In this dice example, the odds are easy to figure. Calculations involving monster hurricanes and earthquakes are necessarily much fuzzier, and the best we can do at Berkshire is to estimate a range of probabilities for such events. The lack of precise data, coupled with the rarity of such catastrophes, plays into the hands of promoters, who typically employ an "expert" to advise the potential bond-buyer about the probability of losses. The expert puts no money on the table. Instead, he receives an up-front payment that is forever his no matter how inaccurate his predictions. Surprise: When the stakes are high, an expert can invariably be found who will affirm -- to return to our example -- that the chance of rolling a 12 is not 1 in 36, but more like 1 in 100. (In fairness, we should add that the expert will probably believe that his odds are correct, a fact that makes him less reprehensible -- but more dangerous.)
在这个掷骰子的例子中，概率很容易计算。但涉及大型飓风和地震的计算就模糊得多。在伯克希尔，我们最多只能为这类事件估算一个概率范围。缺乏精确数据，加上灾难事件本身极为罕见，这正好被推销者所利用。他们通常会聘请一位“专家”，向潜在债券买家解释损失发生的可能性。这位专家自己并不承担任何资金风险，而是收取一笔预付费用，无论其预测多么不准确，这笔费用都是他的了。不出所料的是，在赌注巨大的情况下，总能找到一位专家——回到我们的例子来说——他会坚称掷出12点的概率不是1/36，而是更接近于1/100。（公平起见，我们也应指出：这位专家可能真的相信自己的概率判断，这一事实使他没那么可责，但也更加危险。）
The influx of "investor" money into catastrophe bonds -- which may well live up to their name -- has caused super-cat prices to deteriorate materially. Therefore, we will write less business in 1998. We have some large multi-year contracts in force, however, that will mitigate the drop. The largest of these are two policies that we described in last year's report -- one covering hurricanes in Florida and the other, signed with the California Earthquake Authority, covering earthquakes in that state. Our "worst-case" loss remains about $600 million after-tax, the maximum we could lose under the CEA policy. Though this loss potential may sound large, it is only about 1% of Berkshire's market value. Indeed, if we could get appropriate prices, we would be willing to significantly increase our "worst-case" exposure.
大量所谓“投资者”的资金涌入巨灾债券（这些债券最终可能真如其名般带来灾难性后果），导致超级巨灾保险的价格大幅下降。因此我们在1998年将减少承保业务。不过，我们仍有一些多年期的大额合同正在执行中，这些合同将在一定程度上缓解业务下滑。其中最大的两个合同是我们去年年报中提到的：一个是覆盖佛罗里达州飓风风险的保单；另一个是与加州地震局签署的、覆盖该州地震风险的保单。我们目前面临的“最坏情况”损失约为税后6亿美元，这也是我们在加州地震局合约下可能承受的最大损失。尽管这个潜在损失听起来很大，但它仅占伯克希尔市值的大约1%。事实上，如果我们能获得合适的价格，我们愿意显著增加“最坏情况”下的风险敞口。
Our super-cat business was developed from scratch by Ajit Jain, who has contributed to Berkshire's success in a variety of other ways as well. Ajit possesses both the discipline to walk away from business that is inadequately priced and the imagination to then find other opportunities. Quite simply, he is one of Berkshire's major assets. Ajit would have been a star in whatever career he chose; fortunately for us, he enjoys insurance.
我们的超级巨灾保险业务是由阿吉特·杰恩（Ajit Jain）从零开始一手打造的，他在其他许多方面也为伯克希尔的成功做出了贡献。阿吉特既具备拒绝定价不足业务的纪律，又拥有寻找新机会的想象力。简单地说，他是伯克希尔最重要的资产之一。无论他选择哪条职业道路，他都注定会成为明星人物；对我们而言幸运的是，他热爱保险行业。
# Insurance -- GEICO (1-800-555-2756) and Other Primary Operations
（保险业务——GEICO（电话：1-800-555-2756）及其他主营业务）
Last year I wrote about GEICO's Tony Nicely and his terrific management skills. If I had known then what he had in store for us in 1997, I would have searched for still greater superlatives. Tony, now 54, has been with GEICO for 36 years and last year was his best. As CEO, he has transmitted vision, energy and enthusiasm to all members of the GEICO family -- raising their sights from what has been achieved to what can be achieved.
去年我曾谈到GEICO的托尼·尼利（Tony Nicely）及其卓越的管理能力。如果我当时知道他在1997年为我们带来的成就，我会使用更加夸张的赞美之词。现年54岁的托尼已在GEICO工作了36年，而去年是他表现最好的一年。作为首席执行官，他向整个GEICO团队传递了愿景、能量与热情，提升了他们的目标——从关注已取得的成绩转向追求未来所能实现的成就。
We measure GEICO's performance by first, the net increase in its voluntary auto policies (that is, not including policies assigned us by the state) and, second, the profitability of "seasoned" auto business, meaning policies that have been with us for more than a year and are thus past the period in which acquisition costs cause them to be money-losers.
我们衡量GEICO业绩的标准有两个：第一是自愿购买的汽车保单数量的净增长（即不包括政府指派给我们的保单）；第二是“成熟”汽车业务的盈利能力，指的是已经持有超过一年的保单，这些保单已过了因获取成本而导致亏损的阶段。
In 1996, in-force business grew 10%, and I told you how pleased I was, since that rate was well above anything we had seen in two decades. Then, in 1997, growth jumped to 16%.
1996年，有效保单增长了10%，我当时曾表示非常满意，因为这一增速远高于过去二十年中的任何水平。到了1997年，增长率跃升至16%。
Below are the new business and in-force figures for the last five years:
以下是过去五年新增保单和有效保单的数据：
| Years (年份) | New Voluntary Auto Policies (新增自愿汽车保单) | Voluntary Auto Policies in Force (在手自愿汽车保单) |
|---|---|---|
| 1993 | 354,882 | 2,011,055 |
| 1994 | 396,217 | 2,147,549 |
| 1995 | 461,608 | 2,310,037 |
| 1996 | 617,669 | 2,543,699 |
| 1997 | 913,176 | 2,949,439 |
Of course, any insurer can grow rapidly if it gets careless about underwriting. GEICO's underwriting profit for the year, though, was 8.1% of premiums, far above its average. Indeed, that percentage was higher than we wish it to be: Our goal is to pass on most of the benefits of our low-cost operation to our customers, holding ourselves to about 4% in underwriting profit. With that in mind, we reduced our average rates a bit during 1997 and may well cut them again this year. Our rate changes varied, of course, depending on the policyholder and where he lives; we strive to charge a rate that properly reflects the loss expectancy of each driver.
当然，只要承保标准松懈，任何保险公司都能迅速扩张。但GEICO今年的承保利润达到了保费收入的8.1%，远高于平均水平。事实上，这一比例甚至超过了我们期望的水平：我们的目标是将低成本运营所带来的大部分好处回馈给客户，只保留大约4%的承保利润。考虑到这一点，我们在1997年略微降低了平均费率，并可能在今年再次下调。当然，我们的费率调整因投保人及其居住地不同而异；我们努力设定能够准确反映每位驾驶人预期损失的费率。
GEICO is not the only auto insurer obtaining favorable results these days. Last year, the industry recorded profits that were far better than it anticipated or can sustain. Intensified competition will soon squeeze margins very significantly. But this is a development we welcome: Long term, a tough market helps the low-cost operator, which is what we are and intend to remain.
目前，并非只有GEICO一家汽车保险公司取得了良好成绩。去年，整个行业录得的利润远超预期，也难以长期维持。随着竞争加剧，利润率很快将受到显著压缩。但我们欢迎这种局面：从长远来看，艰难的市场环境有利于低成本运营者，而这正是我们现在的定位，也是我们希望继续保持的方向。
Last year I told you about the record 16.9% profit-sharing contribution that GEICO's associates had earned and explained that two simple variables set the amount: policy growth and profitability of seasoned business. I further explained that 1996's performance was so extraordinary that we had to enlarge the chart delineating the possible payouts. The new configuration didn't make it through 1997: We enlarged the chart's boundaries again and awarded our 10,500 associates a profit-sharing contribution amounting to 26.9% of their base compensation, or $71 million. In addition, the same two variables -- policy growth and profitability of seasoned business -- determined the cash bonuses that we paid to dozens of top executives, starting with Tony.
去年我曾告诉你们，GEICO员工获得了创纪录的16.9%的利润分享提成，并解释说金额由两个简单变量决定：保单增长和成熟业务的盈利能力。我还进一步说明，1996年的表现如此非凡，以至于我们必须扩大原有的奖金分配图表范围。然而这一新设定也没能撑过1997年：我们再次扩大了图表边界，最终为我们的10,500名员工发放了相当于其基本薪酬26.9%的利润分享，总额达7,100万美元。此外，同样是基于这两个变量——保单增长和成熟业务的盈利状况——我们还向包括托尼在内的数十位高管发放了现金奖金。
At GEICO, we are paying in a way that makes sense for both our owners and our managers. We distribute merit badges, not lottery tickets: In none of Berkshire's subsidiaries do we relate compensation to our stock price, which our associates cannot affect in any meaningful way. Instead, we tie bonuses to each unit's business performance, which is the direct product of the unit's people. When that performance is terrific -- as it has been at GEICO -- there is nothing Charlie and I enjoy more than writing a big check.
在GEICO，我们的薪酬支付方式对股东和管理层都有意义。我们发放的是功劳奖章，而不是彩票：在伯克希尔旗下所有子公司中，我们从未将薪酬与股价挂钩，因为这是员工无法实质性影响的因素。相反，我们将奖金与各单位的经营绩效挂钩，而这些绩效正是单位员工直接创造的结果。当这种绩效表现出色时——正如GEICO所展现的那样——查理和我最乐意做的就是签出一张大额支票。
GEICO's underwriting profitability will probably fall in 1998, but the company's growth could accelerate. We're planning to step on the gas: GEICO's marketing expenditures this year will top $100 million, up 50% from 1997. Our market share today is only 3%, a level of penetration that should increase dramatically in the next decade. The auto insurance industry is huge -- it does about $115 billion of volume annually -- and there are tens of millions of drivers who would save substantial money by switching to us.
GEICO的承保利润在1998年可能会有所下降，但公司增长速度有望加快。我们计划加大投入力度：GEICO今年的营销支出将超过1亿美元，较1997年增长50%。目前我们的市场份额仅为3%，这一渗透率在未来十年有望大幅提升。汽车保险行业规模巨大——年保费收入约为1,150亿美元——数以千万计的驾驶者如果转投我们，每年都将节省大量保费支出。
In the 1995 report, I described the enormous debt that you and I owe to Lorimer Davidson. On a Saturday early in 1951, he patiently explained the ins and outs of both GEICO and its industry to me -- a 20-year-old stranger who'd arrived at GEICO's headquarters uninvited and unannounced. Davy later became the company's CEO and has remained my friend and teacher for 47 years. The huge rewards that GEICO has heaped on Berkshire would not have materialized had it not been for his generosity and wisdom. Indeed, had I not met Davy, I might never have grown to understand the whole field of insurance, which over the years has played such a key part in Berkshire's success.
在1995年的报告中，我曾提到你我和洛里默·戴维森（Lorimer Davidson）之间所欠下的巨大恩情。1951年初的一个星期六，他耐心地向我这位20岁、未经邀请、突然造访GEICO总部的陌生人解释了GEICO及其所在行业的来龙去脉。戴维后来成为该公司的首席执行官，并在过去47年里一直是我的朋友和导师。如果没有他的慷慨与智慧，GEICO为伯克希尔带来的巨大回报也就无从谈起。事实上，如果不是遇见戴维，我可能永远不会真正理解保险这一领域，而它多年来对伯克希尔的成功起到了至关重要的作用。
Davy turned 95 last year, and it's difficult for him to travel. Nevertheless, Tony and I hope that we can persuade him to attend our annual meeting, so that our shareholders can properly thank him for his important contributions to Berkshire. Wish us luck.
去年戴维已满95岁，出行已不太方便。但托尼和我们仍希望说服他出席我们的年度股东大会，让股东们能当面向他表达对他为伯克希尔做出重大贡献的感谢。请为我们加油。
Though they are, of course, far smaller than GEICO, our other primary insurance operations turned in results last year that, in aggregate, were fully as stunning. National Indemnity's traditional business had an underwriting profit of 32.9% and, as usual, developed a large amount of float compared to premium volume. Over the last three years, this segment of our business, run by Don Wurster, has had a profit of 24.3%. Our homestate operation, managed by Rod Eldred, recorded an underwriting profit of 14.1% even though it continued to absorb the expenses of geographical expansion. Rod's three-year record is an amazing 15.1%. Berkshire's workers' compensation business, run out of California by Brad Kinstler, had a modest underwriting loss in a difficult environment; its three-year underwriting record is a positive 1.5%. John Kizer, at Central States Indemnity, set a new volume record while generating good underwriting earnings. At Kansas Bankers Surety, Don Towle more than lived up to the high expectations we had when we purchased the company in 1996.
虽然这些业务当然远不及GEICO规模庞大，但我们其他主要保险业务去年的整体表现也相当惊人。国家责任保险公司（National Indemnity）的传统业务实现了32.9%的承保利润，一如既往地产生了大量浮存金，且其金额远超保费收入。过去三年中，由唐·沃斯特（Don Wurster）管理的这部分业务年均利润达24.3%。我们本土业务由罗德·埃尔德雷德（Rod Eldred）管理，在继续承担地域扩张成本的情况下，实现了14.1%的承保利润；罗德过去三年的表现更是达到了惊人的15.1%。伯克希尔在加州由布拉德·金斯勒（Brad Kinstler）负责的工人赔偿险业务虽处于艰难环境，仅出现小幅承保亏损，但过去三年整体录得1.5%的正收益。约翰·凯泽（John Kizer）领导的中央州责任公司（Central States Indemnity）创造了新的保费纪录，同时实现了良好的承保利润。堪萨斯银行家担保公司（Kansas Bankers Surety）的唐·托尔（Don Towle）也完全兑现了我们在1996年收购该公司时对他的期望。
In aggregate, these five operations recorded an underwriting profit of 15.0%. The two Dons, along with Rod, Brad and John, have created significant value for Berkshire, and we believe there is more to come.
总体来看，这五项业务合计录得了15.0%的承保利润。两位“唐”、罗德、布拉德和约翰共同为伯克希尔创造了巨大价值，我们相信未来还将带来更多成果。
# Sources of Reported Earnings (盈利来源)
The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on pages 69 and 70, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally-accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表展示了伯克希尔报告盈利的主要来源。在本表中，购并会计调整并未分配至具体适用的业务，而是统一汇总并单独列示。这种方式使你可以看到我们各项业务在未被收购前原本会呈现的盈利情况。出于第69至70页所述原因，我们认为这种展示方式比遵循一般公认会计准则（GAAP）——即按业务逐项摊销购买溢价——对投资者和管理者更具实用性。表中所列总盈利当然与我们经审计财务报表中的GAAP总额一致。
| (in millions) Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) | |
|---|---|
| 1997 | |
| Pre-Tax Earnings | |
| Operating Earnings: | |
| Insurance Group: | |
| Underwriting – Super-Cat | $ 283.0 |
| Underwriting – Other Reinsurance | (155.2) |
| Underwriting – GEICO | 280.7 |
| Underwriting – Other Primary | 52.9 |
| Net Investment Income | 882.3 |
| Buffalo News | 55.9 |
| Finance Businesses | 28.1 |
| FlightSafety | 139.5 |
| Home Furnishings | 56.8(2) |
| Jewelry | 31.6 |
| Scott Fetzer(excluding finance operation) | 118.9 |
| See's Candies | 58.6 |
| Shoe Group | 48.8 |
| Purchase-Accounting Adjustments | (104.9) |
| Interest Expense(3) | (106.6) |
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions | (15.4) |
| Other | 60.7 |
| Operating Earnings | $1,715.7 |
| Capital Gains from Investments | 1,111.9 |
| Total Earnings - All Entities | $2,827.6 |
(1) From date of acquisition, December 23, 1996.
(2) Includes Star Furniture from July 1, 1997.
(3) Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.
Overall, our operating businesses continue to perform exceptionally well, far outdoing their industry norms. We are particularly pleased that profits improved at Helzberg's after a disappointing 1996. Jeff Comment, Helzberg's CEO, took decisive steps early in 1997 that enabled the company to gain real momentum by the crucial Christmas season. In the early part of this year, as well, sales remained strong.
总体而言，我们的运营企业持续表现出色，远远优于行业平均水平。我们特别欣慰的是，赫兹伯格珠宝店（Helzberg’s）在经历了令人失望的1996年后，盈利能力在1997年明显改善。其CEO杰夫·康芒特（Jeff Comment）在1997年初果断采取措施，使公司在关键的圣诞节销售季前重新焕发生机。今年初，其销售依然强劲。
Casual observers may not appreciate just how extraordinary the performance of many of our businesses has been: If the earnings history of, say, Buffalo News or Scott Fetzer is compared to the records of their publicly-owned peers, their performance might seem to have been unexceptional. But most public companies retain two-thirds or more of their earnings to fund their corporate growth. In contrast, those Berkshire subsidiaries have paid 100% of their earnings to us, their parent company, to fund our growth.
普通观察者或许没有意识到我们许多企业的业绩有多非凡：如果将《布法罗新闻报》（Buffalo News）或斯科特费策公司（Scott Fetzer）的盈利记录与其上市公司同行比较，它们的表现似乎并不突出。但大多数上市公司通常会保留三分之二甚至更多的利润用于自身增长。相比之下，这些伯克希尔子公司将其全部利润上缴给了母公司，用以支持我们的成长。
In effect, the records of the public companies reflect the cumulative benefits of the earnings they have retained, while the records of our operating subsidiaries get no such boost. Over time, however, the earnings these subsidiaries have distributed have created truly huge amounts of earning power elsewhere in Berkshire. The News, See's and Scott Fetzer have alone paid us $1.8 billion, which we have gainfully employed elsewhere. We owe their managements our gratitude for much more than the earnings that are detailed in the table.
实际上，上市公司的业绩记录反映了它们多年来保留利润所带来的累积收益，而我们的运营子公司则没有这种“助推”。然而从长远来看，这些子公司所分配的利润已在伯克希尔其他领域创造了巨大的盈利潜力。仅《布法罗新闻报》（The News）、喜诗糖果（See's）和斯科特费策公司（Scott Fetzer）就向我们支付了18亿美元，我们已将这笔资金有效地再投资到其他地方。除了表中列出的盈利数据外，我们对这些管理层还应怀有更深的感激之情。
Additional information about our various businesses is given on pages 36 - 50, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 55 - 61, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the financial information that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed.
有关我们各项业务的更多信息请参见第36至50页，在那里你也能看到以GAAP基础报告的分部盈利情况。此外，在第55至61页，我们还以非GAAP方式重新整理了伯克希尔的财务数据，并按查理和我们思考公司的方式进行分类展示。我们的目的是为你提供一份信息——如果角色互换，我们也希望你能这样为我们提供信息。
# Look-Through Earnings (穿透式盈利)
Reported earnings are a poor measure of economic progress at Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table presented earlier include only the dividends we receive from investees -- though these dividends typically represent only a small fraction of the earnings attributable to our ownership. Not that we mind this division of money, since on balance we regard the undistributed earnings of investees as more valuable to us than the portion paid out. The reason is simple: Our investees often have the opportunity to reinvest earnings at high rates of return. So why should we want them paid out?
伯克希尔的报告盈利并不能很好地反映其经济进步，部分原因在于上表中的数字仅包括我们从被投资公司收到的股息——而这些股息通常只是归属于我们所有权的盈利中的一小部分。我们并不介意这种分配方式，因为总体而言，我们认为被投资公司未分配的盈利对我们来说比已分配的部分更有价值。原因很简单：这些被投资公司往往有机会以高回报率进行再投资。既然如此，我们又何必要求它们将利润发放给我们呢？
To depict something closer to economic reality at Berkshire than reported earnings, though, we employ the concept of "look-through" earnings. As we calculate these, they consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) our share of the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating "operating earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting adjustments as well as capital gains and other major non-recurring items.
为了更贴近伯克希尔的实际经济状况，我们引入了“穿透式盈利”（look-through earnings）这一概念。我们计算的穿透式盈利包括：(1) 前一节中报告的运营盈利；加上 (2) 我们在主要被投企业中所占的留存运营盈利（这部分按照GAAP会计准则并未体现在我们的利润中）；减去 (3) 如果这些被投企业的留存盈利曾被实际分配给我们的情况下，伯克希尔需缴纳的预估税款。在统计“运营盈利”时，我们排除了购并会计调整、资本利得及其他重大非经常性项目。
The following table sets forth our 1997 look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures can be no more than approximate, since they are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 11, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
下表展示了我们在1997年的穿透式盈利。不过我要提醒你的是，这些数字只能是近似值，因为它们基于许多判断性估计。（这些被投企业支付给我们的股息已包含在第11页列示的运营盈利中，主要是“保险集团：净投资收益”项下。）
| Berkshire's Major Investees (伯克希尔主要被投企业) | Berkshire's Ownership at Yearend (年末持股比例)(1) | Berkshire's Share of Undistributed Operating Earnings (未分配运营盈利归属伯克希尔份额) (百万美元)(2) |
|---|---|---|
| American Express Company (美国运通公司) | 10.7% | $161 |
| The Coca-Cola Company (可口可乐公司) | 8.1% | 216 |
| The Walt Disney Company (华特迪士尼公司) | 3.2% | 65 |
| Freddie Mac (房地美) | 8.6% | 86 |
| The Gillette Company (吉列公司) | 8.6% | 82 |
| The Washington Post Company (华盛顿邮报公司) | 16.5% | 30 |
| Wells Fargo & Company (富国银行) | 7.8% | 103 |
| Berkshire's share of undistributed earnings of major investees (伯克希尔在主要被投企业未分配盈利中的份额) | 743 | |
| Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings (假设对上述未分配盈利征税)(3) | (105) | |
| Reported operating earnings of Berkshire (伯克希尔报告运营盈利) | 1,292 | |
| Total look-through earnings of Berkshire (伯克希尔穿透式总盈利) | $1,930 |
(1) Does not include shares allocable to minority interests
（不包括少数权益所对应的股份）
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
（根据全年平均持股比例计算）
(3) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays on the dividends it receives
（采用的税率是14%，即伯克希尔对其收到的股息所支付的税率）
# Acquisitions of 1997 (1997年并购交易)
In 1997, we agreed to acquire Star Furniture and International Dairy Queen (a deal that closed early in 1998). Both businesses fully meet our criteria: They are understandable; possess excellent economics; and are run by outstanding people.
1997年，我们达成了收购Star Furniture和International Dairy Queen的协议（后者于1998年初完成交割）。这两家企业完全符合我们的标准：业务清晰易懂；具备优异的经济特性；由杰出的人才管理。
The Star transaction has an interesting history. Whenever we buy into an industry whose leading participants aren't known to me, I always ask our new partners, "Are there any more at home like you?" Upon our purchase of Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983, therefore, the Blumkin family told me about three outstanding furniture retailers in other parts of the country. At the time, however, none was for sale.
Star这笔交易有一段有趣的背景故事。每当我们进入一个我不熟悉的行业时，我总会问我们的新合作伙伴：“你们家里还有像你这样的吗？”因此，在1983年我们收购Nebraska Furniture Mart时，布卢姆金家族告诉我国内另外三个地区还有三家非常出色的家具零售商。但当时这三家企业都无意出售。
Many years later, Irv Blumkin learned that Bill Child, CEO of R.C. Willey -- one of the recommended three -- might be interested in merging, and we promptly made the deal described in the 1995 report. We have been delighted with that association -- Bill is the perfect partner. Furthermore, when we asked Bill about industry standouts, he came up with the remaining two names given me by the Blumkins, one of these being Star Furniture of Houston. But time went by without there being any indication that either of the two was available.
多年后，艾尔夫·布卢姆金得知R.C. Willey的CEO比尔·查尔德（Bill Child）——那三家之一——可能有兴趣合并，于是我们迅速完成了1995年报中描述的交易。我们对这次合作非常满意——比尔是一位理想的合作伙伴。此外，当我们向比尔询问行业中还有哪些优秀企业时，他提到了当初布卢姆金家族推荐给我名单上的另两家公司，其中一家就是位于休斯顿的Star Furniture。但时间一年年过去，这两家公司似乎都没有出售意向。
On the Thursday before last year's annual meeting, however, Bob Denham of Salomon told me that Melvyn Wolff, the long-time controlling shareholder and CEO of Star, wanted to talk. At our invitation, Melvyn came to the meeting and spent his time in Omaha confirming his positive feelings about Berkshire. I, meanwhile, looked at Star's financials, and liked what I saw.
然而，在去年年度股东大会前的那个星期四，所罗门公司的鲍勃·丹纳姆（Bob Denham）告诉我，Star Furniture长期的控股股东兼CEO梅尔文·沃尔夫（Melvyn Wolff）有意洽谈。应我们的邀请，梅尔文来到股东大会现场，并在奥马哈停留期间进一步表达了他对伯克希尔的认可。与此同时，我研究了Star的财务报表，发现它的表现令人满意。
A few days later, Melvyn and I met in New York and made a deal in a single, two-hour session. As was the case with the Blumkins and Bill Child, I had no need to check leases, work out employment contracts, etc. I knew I was dealing with a man of integrity and that's what counted.
几天后，我和梅尔文在纽约会面，仅用了两个小时就敲定了交易。就像与布卢姆金家族和比尔·查尔德的合作一样，我无需再去核查租赁合同、制定雇佣协议等等。我知道我面对的是一个正直的人，这才是最重要的。
Though the Wolff family's association with Star dates back to 1924, the business struggled until Melvyn and his sister Shirley Toomin took over in 1962. Today Star operates 12 stores -- ten in Houston and one each in Austin and Bryan -- and will soon move into San Antonio as well. We won't be surprised if Star is many times its present size a decade from now.
尽管沃尔夫家族与Star的渊源可追溯至1924年，但在梅尔文和他的姐姐雪莉·图明（Shirley Toomin）于1962年接手之前，这家企业一直举步维艰。如今，Star在休斯顿拥有10家门店，在奥斯汀和布莱恩各有一家，不久还将进入圣安东尼奥市场。我们毫不意外地预计，十年之后，Star的规模可能是今天的数倍。
Here's a story illustrating what Melvyn and Shirley are like: When they told their associates of the sale, they also announced that Star would make large, special payments to those who had helped them succeed -- and then defined that group as everyone in the business. Under the terms of our deal, it was Melvyn and Shirley's money, not ours, that funded this distribution. Charlie and I love it when we become partners with people who behave like that.
这里有一个小故事可以说明梅尔文和雪莉是什么样的人：当他们向员工宣布出售公司的消息时，也同时宣布Star将向所有帮助过他们取得成功的人发放大额特别奖金，并且他们定义的“所有人”包括了整个公司的每一位员工。根据我们交易的条款，这笔奖金由梅尔文和雪莉自掏腰包支付，而非动用伯克希尔的资金。查理和我都非常喜欢能与这样行事的人成为合作伙伴。
The Star transaction closed on July 1. In the months since, we've watched Star's already-excellent sales and earnings growth accelerate further. Melvyn and Shirley will be at the annual meeting, and I hope you get a chance to meet them.
# Star的交易于7月1日完成。此后几个月里，我们观察到Star本已出色的增长势头进一步加快。梅尔文和雪莉将出席今年的年度股东大会，我希望你们有机会亲自认识他们。
Next acquisition: International Dairy Queen. There are 5,792 Dairy Queen stores operating in 23 countries -- all but a handful run by franchisees -- and in addition IDQ franchises 409 Orange Julius operations and 43 Karmelkorn operations. In 190 locations, "treat centers" provide some combination of the three products.
下一项收购：国际Dairy Queen公司。目前全球23个国家共开设了5,792家Dairy Queen门店——除极少数外均由特许经营者运营。此外，IDQ还授权经营409家Orange Julius门店和43家Karmelkorn门店。在其中190个地点，“甜品中心”提供这三种产品的组合套餐。
For many years IDQ had a bumpy history. Then, in 1970, a Minneapolis group led by John Mooty and Rudy Luther took control. The new managers inherited a jumble of different franchising agreements, along with some unwise financing arrangements that had left the company in a precarious condition. In the years that followed, management rationalized the operation, extended food service to many more locations, and, in general, built a strong organization.
多年来，IDQ的发展历程起伏不定。直到1970年，由约翰·穆蒂（John Mooty）和鲁迪·卢瑟（Rudy Luther）领导的一组来自明尼阿波利斯的团队接管了公司。新管理层接手时面对的是混乱的特许经营协议以及一些导致公司陷入困境的不当融资安排。此后几年，管理层理顺了运营结构，将食品服务扩展到更多地区，并逐步打造了一个强大的组织。
Last summer Mr. Luther died, which meant his estate needed to sell stock. A year earlier, Dick Kiphart of William Blair & Co., had introduced me to John Mooty and Mike Sullivan, IDQ's CEO, and I had been impressed with both men. So, when we got the chance to merge with IDQ, we offered a proposition patterned on our FlightSafety acquisition, extending selling shareholders the option of choosing either cash or Berkshire shares having a slightly lower immediate value. By tilting the consideration as we did, we encouraged holders to opt for cash, the type of payment we by far prefer. Even then, only 45% of IDQ shares elected cash.
去年夏天，卢瑟先生去世，意味着他的遗产需要出售股票。一年前，威廉·布莱尔公司（William Blair & Co.）的迪克·基帕特（Dick Kiphart）曾向我引荐了约翰·穆蒂和时任IDQ首席执行官迈克·沙利文（Mike Sullivan），我对他们两人印象深刻。因此，当有机会与IDQ合并时，我们提出了类似收购FlightSafety时的方案：允许卖方股东选择以现金或略低于即时市值的伯克希尔股票进行交易。通过这种设计，我们鼓励股东选择现金支付方式，这是我们最偏好的付款形式。即便如此，也只有45%的IDQ股份选择了现金。
Charlie and I bring a modicum of product expertise to this transaction: He has been patronizing the Dairy Queens in Cass Lake and Bemidji, Minnesota, for decades, and I have been a regular in Omaha. We have put our money where our mouth is.
查理和我在产品方面也有一点点经验：查理几十年来一直是明尼苏达州卡斯湖（Cass Lake）和贝米吉（Bemidji）两家Dairy Queen的老顾客，而我也是奥马哈店的常客。我们用自己的钱包为我们的观点背书。
# A Confession (一个坦白)
I've mentioned that we strongly prefer to use cash rather than Berkshire stock in acquisitions. A study of the record will tell you why: If you aggregate all of our stock-only mergers (excluding those we did with two affiliated companies, Diversified Retailing and Blue Chip Stamps), you will find that our shareholders are slightly worse off than they would have been had I not done the transactions. Though it hurts me to say it, when I've issued stock, I've cost you money.
我曾提到，我们在并购中强烈偏好使用现金而非伯克希尔股票。回顾历史记录便能明白原因：如果你把我们所有仅用股票完成的并购（不包括与Diversified Retailing和Blue Chip Stamps这两家关联公司的交易）汇总来看，你会发现我们的股东因这些交易而略有损失。尽管说出这一点令我很痛心，但事实是，当我发行股票时，我确实让你们亏了钱。
Be clear about one thing: This cost has not occurred because we were misled in any way by sellers or because they thereafter failed to manage with diligence and skill. On the contrary, the sellers were completely candid when we were negotiating our deals and have been energetic and effective ever since.
请明确一点：这一成本并非因为卖家对我们有任何误导，也不是因为他们之后未能勤勉、高效地管理业务。相反，在谈判过程中，卖家完全坦诚；而在交易完成后，他们的表现一直积极且有效。
Instead, our problem has been that we own a truly marvelous collection of businesses, which means that trading away a portion of them for something new almost never makes sense. When we issue shares in a merger, we reduce your ownership in all of our businesses -- partly-owned companies such as Coca-Cola, Gillette and American Express, and all of our terrific operating companies as well. An example from sports will illustrate the difficulty we face: For a baseball team, acquiring a player who can be expected to bat .350 is almost always a wonderful event -- except when the team must trade a .380 hitter to make the deal.
问题其实出在我们自身：我们拥有一系列真正卓越的企业，这意味着用我们现有的一部分去换取新的资产几乎从不划算。当我们以股票进行并购时，实质上是在稀释你对所有伯克希尔旗下企业的所有权——包括可口可乐、吉列、美国运通等参股企业，也包括我们旗下所有出色的运营实体。体育界的一个例子可以说明我们面临的难题：对于一支棒球队来说，引进一名预期打击率为.350的球员通常是个好消息——除非为了这笔交易必须送出一名打击率高达.380的球员。
Because our roster is filled with .380 hitters, we have tried to pay cash for acquisitions, and here our record has been far better. Starting with National Indemnity in 1967, and continuing with, among others, See's, Buffalo News, Scott Fetzer and GEICO, we have acquired -- for cash -- a number of large businesses that have performed incredibly well since we bought them. These acquisitions have delivered Berkshire tremendous value -- indeed, far more than I anticipated when we made our purchases.
由于我们手中握有的都是“.380打击率”的选手，我们一直努力以现金完成并购，而这方面的成绩要好得多。自1967年收购National Indemnity开始，随后又陆续完成了See's、《布法罗新闻报》、Scott Fetzer和GEICO等多笔现金收购，我们买入了许多大型企业，它们自被我们收购以来表现出色。这些收购为伯克希尔带来了巨大价值——实际上远超我当初购买时的预期。
We believe that it is almost impossible for us to "trade up" from our present businesses and managements. Our situation is the opposite of Camelot's Mordred, of whom Guenevere commented, "The one thing I can say for him is that he is bound to marry well. Everybody is above him." Marrying well is extremely difficult for Berkshire.
我们认为，从我们现有的业务和管理层出发实现“升级式并购”几乎是不可能的。我们的处境正与亚瑟王传奇中的莫德雷德（Mordred）相反。桂妮薇儿皇后曾评价他说：“我能说他的一点好处就是他一定能娶到好老婆。因为所有人都比他强。”而对伯克希尔而言，想要“高攀”却极其困难。
So you can be sure that Charlie and I will be very reluctant to issue shares in the future. In those cases when we simply must do so -- when certain shareholders of a desirable acquiree insist on getting stock -- we will include an attractive cash option in order to tempt as many of the sellers to take cash as is possible.
因此你可以确信，查理和我未来会非常谨慎地避免发行新股。只有在万不得已的情况下——即某些目标公司的股东坚持要求获得伯克希尔股票时——我们才会考虑这种方式，并且我们会提供具有吸引力的现金选项，尽可能吸引卖方选择现金支付。
Merging with public companies presents a special problem for us. If we are to offer any premium to the acquiree, one of two conditions must be present: Either our own stock must be overvalued relative to the acquiree's, or the two companies together must be expected to earn more than they would if operated separately. Historically, Berkshire has seldom been overvalued. In this market, moreover, undervalued acquirees are almost impossible to find. That other possibility -- synergy gains -- is usually unrealistic, since we expect acquirees to operate after we've bought them just as they did before. Joining with Berkshire does not normally raise their revenues nor cut their costs.
与上市公司合并对我们来说存在特殊挑战。如果我们打算对目标公司支付溢价，必须满足以下两个条件之一：要么我们的股票相对目标公司被高估；要么合并后整体盈利能力要高于各自独立运营时的总和。历史上，伯克希尔很少处于被高估状态。而在当前市场环境下，低估的目标公司几乎难以找到。至于另一个可能性——协同效应收益——通常并不现实，因为我们希望收购对象在被我们收购后继续像以前一样运营。加入伯克希尔通常不会提高其收入，也不会降低成本。
Indeed, their reported costs (but not their true ones) will rise after they are bought by Berkshire if the acquiree has been granting options as part of its compensation packages. In these cases, "earnings" of the acquiree have been overstated because they have followed the standard -- but, in our view, dead wrong -- accounting practice of ignoring the cost to a business of issuing options. When Berkshire acquires an option-issuing company, we promptly substitute a cash compensation plan having an economic value equivalent to that of the previous option plan. The acquiree's true compensation cost is thereby brought out of the closet and charged, as it should be, against earnings.
事实上，如果目标公司在薪酬计划中包含股票期权，那么被伯克希尔收购后，其报告成本（但不是真实成本）会上升。这是因为过去“忽略发放期权对企业成本的影响”是一种通行的会计做法——但我们认为这种做法大错特错。当伯克希尔收购一家发行期权的公司时，我们会立即用经济价值相当的现金薪酬计划取代原有期权计划。这样一来，目标公司的实际薪酬成本就不再隐藏起来，而是如实计入损益表中。
The reasoning that Berkshire applies to the merger of public companies should be the calculus for all buyers. Paying a takeover premium does not make sense for any acquirer unless a) its stock is overvalued relative to the acquiree's or b) the two enterprises will earn more combined than they would separately. Predictably, acquirers normally hew to the second argument because very few are willing to acknowledge that their stock is overvalued. However, voracious buyers -- the ones that issue shares as fast as they can print them -- are tacitly conceding that point. (Often, also, they are running Wall Street's version of a chain-letter scheme.)
伯克希尔在并购上市公司时所依据的逻辑，应成为所有买家的决策标准。除非满足以下两种情况之一，否则支付并购溢价毫无意义：a）买方股票相对于目标公司被高估；或 b）合并后的盈利将高于两者各自运营之和。不出所料，大多数买家倾向于使用第二种理由，因为很少有人愿意承认自己的股票被高估。然而，那些疯狂收购者——也就是不断增发股票、快速扩张的人——实际上已默认了第一种情况。（很多时候，他们所做的不过是华尔街版的“资金盘骗局”。）
In some mergers there truly are major synergies -- though oftentimes the acquirer pays too much to obtain them -- but at other times the cost and revenue benefits that are projected prove illusory. Of one thing, however, be certain: If a CEO is enthused about a particularly foolish acquisition, both his internal staff and his outside advisors will come up with whatever projections are needed to justify his stance. Only in fairy tales are emperors told that they are naked.
有些并购确实产生了显著的协同效应——尽管有时买方为此付出了过高的代价；但在其他情况下，原本预测的成本节约和收入增长最终被证明只是幻影。但有一点你可以确定：如果一位CEO热衷于某项明显愚蠢的收购，他的内部员工和外部顾问总会提出各种所需预测来支持他的立场。只有在童话故事里，才有人敢告诉皇帝他其实一丝不挂。
# Common Stock Investments (普通股投资)
Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a market value of more than $750 million are itemized.
以下是我们持有的普通股投资情况。市场价值超过7.5亿美元的个股已单独列出。
| Shares (持股数量) | Company (公司名称) | Cost (成本)* (百万美元) | Market (市值) (百万美元) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 49,456,900 | American Express Company（美国运通公司） | $1,392.7 | $4,414.0 |
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company（可口可乐公司） | 1,298.9 | 13,337.5 |
| 21,563,414 | The Walt Disney Company（华特迪士尼公司） | 381.2 | 2,134.8 |
| 63,977,600 | Freddie Mac（房地美） | 329.4 | 2,683.1 |
| 48,000,000 | The Gillette Company（吉列公司） | 600.0 | 4,821.0 |
| 23,733,198 | Travelers Group Inc.（旅行者集团） | 604.4 | 1,278.6 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company（华盛顿邮报公司） | 10.6 | 840.6 |
| 6,690,218 | Wells Fargo & Company（富国银行） | 412.6 | 2,270.9 |
| Others（其他） | 2,177.1 | 4,467.2 | |
| Total Common Stocks | $7,206.9 | $36,247.7 |
- Represents tax-basis cost which, in aggregate, is $1.8 billion less than GAAP cost.
（表示税基成本，总计比GAAP成本低18亿美元。）
We made net sales during the year that amounted to about 5% of our beginning portfolio. In these, we significantly reduced a few of our holdings that are below the $750 million threshold for itemization, and we also modestly trimmed a few of the larger positions that we detail. Some of the sales we made during 1997 were aimed at changing our bond-stock ratio moderately in response to the relative values that we saw in each market, a realignment we have continued in 1998.
我们在本年度进行了净卖出操作，总金额约为年初投资组合的5%。其中我们大幅减少了若干未达7.5亿美元披露门槛的投资标的，并适度减持了部分我们列出的大额持仓。1997年期间的部分出售操作是为了根据我们对股票与债券市场的相对估值进行适度调整；这一再平衡策略在1998年仍在继续。
Our reported positions, we should add, sometimes reflect the investment decisions of GEICO's Lou Simpson. Lou independently runs an equity portfolio of nearly $2 billion that may at times overlap the portfolio that I manage, and occasionally he makes moves that differ from mine.
另外需要说明的是，我们的报告持仓有时也反映了GEICO投资经理路·辛普森（Lou Simpson）的投资决策。他独立管理着一个接近20亿美元的股票投资组合，有时会与我管理的组合有所重叠，偶尔也会做出与我不一致的操作。
Though we don't attempt to predict the movements of the stock market, we do try, in a very rough way, to value it. At the annual meeting last year, with the Dow at 7,071 and long-term Treasury yields at 6.89%, Charlie and I stated that we did not consider the market overvalued if 1) interest rates remained where they were or fell, and 2) American business continued to earn the remarkable returns on equity that it had recently recorded. So far, interest rates have fallen -- that's one requisite satisfied -- and returns on equity still remain exceptionally high. If they stay there -- and if interest rates hold near recent levels -- there is no reason to think of stocks as generally overvalued. On the other hand, returns on equity are not a sure thing to remain at, or even near, their present levels.
虽然我们从不试图预测股市走势，但我们的确以一种粗略的方式尝试对其估值。去年股东大会上，当时道琼斯指数为7,071点、长期国债收益率为6.89%，查理和曾表示：只要满足两个条件，我们就认为市场并未被高估——一是利率维持现状或下降；二是美国企业的股本回报率继续保持近年来的高水平。目前来看，利率已经下降——这是第一个条件已满足；而股本回报率仍处于高位。如果这两个指标都能维持当前水平——且利率保持低位——那么就没有理由认为整体股票被高估了。但另一方面，股本回报率未必能持续维持在当前，甚至接近当前的水平。
In the summer of 1979, when equities looked cheap to me, I wrote a Forbes article entitled "You pay a very high price in the stock market for a cheery consensus." At that time skepticism and disappointment prevailed, and my point was that investors should be glad of the fact, since pessimism drives down prices to truly attractive levels. Now, however, we have a very cheery consensus. That does not necessarily mean this is the wrong time to buy stocks: Corporate America is now earning far more money than it was just a few years ago, and in the presence of lower interest rates, every dollar of earnings becomes more valuable. Today's price levels, though, have materially eroded the "margin of safety" that Ben Graham identified as the cornerstone of intelligent investing.
1979年夏天，当我认为股市便宜时，我在《福布斯》杂志发表了一篇题为《你在股市为乐观共识付出了高昂代价》的文章。当时市场弥漫着怀疑与失望情绪，我的观点是：投资者应为此感到高兴，因为悲观情绪会让股价降至极具吸引力的水平。如今，我们面对的却是极度乐观的一致预期。这并不意味着现在就不是买入股票的好时机：美国企业目前的盈利远高于几年前，再加上利率走低，每一美元的盈利都变得更加值钱。然而，今天的股价水平已显著削弱了格雷厄姆所强调的“安全边际”——即理性投资的基石。
# Common Stock Investments (普通股投资)
（以下内容为前文已翻译部分，略去重复翻译）
In last year's annual report, I discussed Coca-Cola, our largest holding. Coke continues to increase its market dominance throughout the world, but, tragically, it has lost the leader responsible for its outstanding performance.
在去年的年度报告中，我曾谈到可口可乐——我们最大的持仓。可口可乐在全球范围继续增强其市场主导地位，但令人痛心的是，它失去了那位造就卓越业绩的领导者。
Roberto Goizueta, Coke's CEO since 1981, died in October. After his death, I read every one of the more than 100 letters and notes he had written me during the past nine years. Those messages could well serve as a guidebook for success in both business and life.
罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔（Roberto Goizueta）自1981年起担任可口可乐CEO，于10月去世。他去世后，我重读了他在过去九年里写给我的100多封信件和便条。这些信息完全可以作为商业与人生成功的指南。
In these communications, Roberto displayed a brilliant and clear strategic vision that was always aimed at advancing the well-being of Coke shareholders. Roberto knew where he was leading the company, how he was going to get there, and why this path made the most sense for his owners -- and, equally important, he had a burning sense of urgency about reaching his goals.
在这些通信中，罗伯托展现出了非凡而清晰的战略眼光，始终以提升股东利益为目标。他清楚地知道公司要走向何方、如何实现目标，并且深知为何这一路径对股东最为合理；同样重要的是，他对达成目标有着强烈的紧迫感。
An excerpt from one handwritten note he sent to me illustrates his mind-set: "By the way, I have told Olguita that what she refers to as an obsession, you call focus. I like your term much better."
他曾亲笔写下的一段话体现了他的思维方式：“顺便说一句，我告诉奥尔古伊塔（Olguita），她称之为执念的东西，你称之为专注。我更喜欢你的说法。”
Like all who knew Roberto, I will miss him enormously.
所有认识罗伯托的人，都会深深怀念他。
Consistent with his concern for the company, Roberto prepared for a seamless succession long before it seemed necessary. Roberto knew that Doug Ivester was the right man to take over and worked with Doug over the years to ensure that no momentum would be lost when the time for change arrived.
出于对公司长远发展的关切，罗伯托早在必要之前就为平稳接班做了准备。他早就认定道格·艾斯特（Doug Ivester）是合适的继任者，并多年亲自培养，确保交接时不会失去发展势头。
The Coca-Cola Company will be the same steamroller under Doug as it was under Roberto.
在道格的领导下，可口可乐公司将延续罗伯托时代的强大执行力，继续保持“势不可挡”的态势。
# Convertible Preferreds (可转换优先股)
Two years ago, I gave you an update on the five convertible preferreds that we purchased through private placements in the 1987–1991 period. At the time of that earlier report, we had realized a small profit on the sale of our Champion International holding. The four remaining preferred commitments included two, Gillette and First Empire State, that we had converted into common stock in which we had large unrealized gains, and two others, USAir and Salomon, that had been trouble-prone. At times, the last two had me mouthing a line from a country song: "How can I miss you if you won't go away?"
两年前，我曾向你们汇报了我们在1987至1991年间通过私募方式购入的五只可转换优先股的情况。当时我们已从出售金霸王国际（Champion International）中获得小幅盈利。其余四只优先股中，吉列（Gillette）和第一帝国州银行（First Empire State）已被我们转为普通股，且账面浮盈丰厚；而另外两只——美国航空（USAir）和所罗门公司（Salomon）则一直表现不佳。有时我甚至会用一句乡村歌曲的歌词来形容它们：“如果你们不肯离开，我又怎能想念？”
Since I delivered that report, all four holdings have grown significantly in value. The common stocks of both Gillette and First Empire have risen substantially, in line with the companies' excellent performance. At yearend, the $600 million we put into Gillette in 1989 had appreciated to $4.8 billion, and the $40 million we committed to First Empire in 1991 had risen to $236 million.
自上次报告以来，这四项投资的价值都大幅增长。吉列与第一帝国州银行的普通股市值随着公司出色的经营表现持续上涨。截至年底，我们于1989年投入吉列的6亿美元已增值至48亿美元；1991年对第一帝国州银行的4,000万美元投资也升值到了2.36亿美元。
Our two laggards, meanwhile, have come to life in a very major way. In a transaction that finally rewarded its long-suffering shareholders, Salomon recently merged into Travelers Group. All of Berkshire's shareholders -- including me, very personally -- owe a huge debt to Deryck Maughan and Bob Denham for, first, playing key roles in saving Salomon from extinction following its 1991 scandal and, second, restoring the vitality of the company to a level that made it an attractive acquisition for Travelers. I have often said that I wish to work with executives that I like, trust and admire. No two fit that description better than Deryck and Bob.
与此同时，那两个落后的投资项目也迎来了重大转机。在一项最终回报了长期煎熬股东的交易中，所罗门公司最近被旅行者集团收购。所有伯克希尔的股东——包括我个人在内——都应该深深感谢德里克·莫汉（Deryck Maughan）和鲍勃·丹纳姆（Bob Denham）：首先，他们在1991年丑闻后挽救了所罗门免于倒闭；其次，他们又成功恢复了公司的活力，使其成为旅行者集团愿意收购的目标。我曾多次说过，我希望与那些我喜欢、信任并敬佩的经理人合作，而德里克和鲍勃正是这样的人。
Berkshire's final results from its Salomon investment won't be tallied for some time, but it is safe to say that they will be far better than I anticipated two years ago. Looking back, I think of my Salomon experience as having been both fascinating and instructional, though for a time in 1991–92 I felt like the drama critic who wrote: "I would have enjoyed the play except that I had an unfortunate seat. It faced the stage."
目前，伯克希尔从所罗门投资中的最终收益还无法准确统计，但可以确定的是，结果将远好于我两年前的预期。回顾这段经历，我认为它既令人着迷又极具教育意义。当然，在1991到1992年间，我确实有过一段难熬时光，就像一位剧评人所说：“这场戏本来我很喜欢，可惜我的座位正对着舞台，看得太清楚了。”
The resuscitation of US Airways borders on the miraculous. Those who have watched my moves in this investment know that I have compiled a record that is unblemished by success. I was wrong in originally purchasing the stock, and I was wrong later, in repeatedly trying to unload our holdings at 50 cents on the dollar.
美国航空（US Airways）的复苏几乎称得上奇迹。熟悉我在这一投资上操作的人都知道，我的记录堪称“无一成功”。最初买入这只股票是个错误，之后我又多次试图以每美元仅值五毛钱的价格卖出，结果也都错了。
Two changes at the company coincided with its remarkable rebound: 1) Charlie and I left the board of directors and 2) Stephen Wolf became CEO. Fortunately for our egos, the second event was the key: Stephen Wolf's accomplishments at the airline have been phenomenal.
该公司的两次变化恰逢其强劲反弹：一是查理和我退出了董事会；二是斯蒂芬·沃尔夫（Stephen Wolf）接任CEO。对我们自尊心来说幸运的是，关键转折点是第二项：沃尔夫先生在航空公司取得的成绩堪称非凡。
There still is much to do at US Airways, but survival is no longer an issue. Consequently, the company made up the dividend arrearages on our preferred during 1997, adding extra payments to compensate us for the delay we suffered. The company's common stock, furthermore, has risen from a low of $4 to a recent high of $73.
尽管美国航空仍有大量工作要做，但生存问题已经解决。因此，公司在1997年补足了此前拖欠我们的优先股股息，并额外支付了一笔补偿款。此外，其普通股价格也从最低时的4美元涨至近期高点73美元。
Our preferred has been called for redemption on March 15. But the rise in the company's stock has given our conversion rights, which we thought worthless not long ago, great value. It is now almost certain that our US Airways shares will produce a decent profit -- that is, if my cost for Maalox is excluded -- and the gain could even prove indecent.
我们的优先股已于3月15日被赎回。然而，股价上涨使我们不久前还认为毫无价值的转换权变得极为宝贵。现在几乎可以肯定，我们的美国航空股份将带来一笔可观利润——也就是说，只要不算我当年买抗酸药Maalox花的钱，这笔利润甚至可能相当惊人。
Next time I make a big, dumb decision, Berkshire shareholders will know what to do: Phone Mr. Wolf.
下次我再做出一个巨大而愚蠢的决定时，伯克希尔的股东们就知道该怎么办了：打电话给沃尔夫先生。
In addition to the convertible preferreds, we purchased one other private placement in 1991, $300 million of American Express Percs. This security was essentially a common stock that featured a tradeoff in its first three years: We received extra dividend payments during that period, but we were also capped in the price appreciation we could realize. Despite the cap, this holding has proved extraordinarily profitable thanks to a move by your Chairman that combined luck and skill -- 110% luck, the balance skill.
除上述可转债外，我们在1991年还进行了另一项私募投资，即3亿美元的美国运通PERCS证券（一种附带特殊条款的优先参与权证）。这种证券本质上类似于普通股，但在头三年设有一个交换条件：我们在这段时间能获得额外股息，但也受限于资本增值上限。尽管如此，这项投资仍带来了巨额利润，这要归功于董事长的一次决策，融合了运气与判断力——其中110%靠运气，剩下的才是技巧。
Our Percs were due to convert into common stock in August 1994, and in the month before I was mulling whether to sell upon conversion. One reason to hold was Amex's outstanding CEO, Harvey Golub, who seemed likely to maximize whatever potential the company had (a supposition that has since been proved -- in spades). But the size of that potential was in question: Amex faced relentless competition from a multitude of card-issuers, led by Visa. Weighing the arguments, I leaned toward sale.
我们的PERCS本应在1994年8月自动转为普通股，而在前一个月，我还在犹豫是否应在其转换后立即卖出。不卖的理由之一是美国运通当时的CEO哈维·戈卢布（Harvey Golub）极其出色，他似乎能让公司潜力发挥到极致（后来的事实证明的确如此）。但我当时对其潜力规模仍存疑虑：美国运通面临来自维萨卡（Visa）等多家发卡机构的激烈竞争。综合考虑下，我原本更倾向于出售。
Here's where I got lucky. During that month of decision, I played golf at Prouts Neck, Maine with Frank Olson, CEO of Hertz. Frank is a brilliant manager, with intimate knowledge of the card business. So from the first tee on I was quizzing him about the industry. By the time we reached the second green, Frank had convinced me that Amex's corporate card was a terrific franchise, and I had decided not to sell. On the back nine I turned buyer, and in a few months Berkshire owned 10% of the company.
就在这关键时刻，我遇到了好运。那个月，我在缅因州普劳茨内克球场与赫兹租车（Hertz）的CEO弗兰克·奥尔森（Frank Olson）打了一场高尔夫。弗兰克是一位非常杰出的管理者，对信用卡行业有深入了解。从第一洞开始，我就不断向他请教相关业务。到第二洞果岭时，他已经说服我相信，美国运通的企业卡是一块极佳资产，我也因此决定不再出售。到了后九洞，我已经变成了买家，几个月后，伯克希尔便拥有了该公司10%的股份。
We now have a $3 billion gain in our Amex shares, and I naturally feel very grateful to Frank. But George Gillespie, our mutual friend, says that I am confused about where my gratitude should go. After all, he points out, it was he who arranged the game and assigned me to Frank's foursome.
如今，我们在美国运通上的持股已带来30亿美元的盈利，我对弗兰克自然心怀感激。不过我们的共同朋友乔治·吉尔皮（George Gillespie）却说，我把感恩对象搞错了。毕竟，他说，是他安排了那次高尔夫聚会，并把我分配进了弗兰克所在的小组。
# Quarterly Reports to Shareholders (季度股东报告)
In last year's letter, I described the growing costs we incur in mailing quarterly reports and the problems we have encountered in delivering them to "street-name" shareholders. I asked for your opinion about the desirability of our continuing to print reports, given that we now publish our quarterly and annual communications on the Internet, at our site, www.berkshirehathaway.com. Relatively few shareholders responded, but it is clear that at least a small number who want the quarterly information have no interest in getting it off the Internet. Being a life-long sufferer from technophobia, I can empathize with this group.
在去年的信中，我谈到邮寄季度报告的成本日益上升，以及在向“登记名下持有”（street-name）股东发送纸质报告时遇到的困难。我还征求大家意见，既然我们现在已在官网 www.berkshirehathaway.com (opens new window) 上发布季报与年报，是否还有必要继续印刷纸质报告。收到的反馈不多，但我们清楚仍有一小部分希望获取信息的股东并不习惯从互联网获取资料。作为一个长期“科技恐惧症患者”，我完全理解这个群体的感受。
The cost of publishing quarterlies, however, continues to balloon, and we have therefore decided to send printed versions only to shareholders who request them. If you wish the quarterlies, please complete the reply card that is bound into this report. In the meantime, be assured that all shareholders will continue to receive the annual report in printed form.
然而，季度报告的印刷成本仍在持续上升，因此我们决定今后仅向主动提出申请的股东寄送纸质版季报。若您希望接收纸质季报，请填写本报告附带的回执卡。同时请放心，无论您是否提出申请，所有股东都将收到纸质年度报告。
Those of you who enjoy the computer should check out our home page. It contains a large amount of current information about Berkshire and also all of our annual letters since 1977. In addition, our website includes links to the home pages of many Berkshire subsidiaries. On these sites you can learn more about our subsidiaries' products and -- yes -- even place orders for them.
热爱电脑的朋友们不妨访问我们的官方网站。网站上不仅包含大量关于伯克希尔的最新信息，还收录了自1977年以来的所有致股东信。此外，网站还链接了多家伯克希尔旗下子公司的官网。在这些页面上，您可以了解更多产品详情——没错，还可以直接下单购买。
We are required to file our quarterly information with the SEC no later than 45 days after the end of each quarter. One of our goals in posting communications on the Internet is to make this material information -- in full detail and in a form unfiltered by the media -- simultaneously available to all interested parties at a time when markets are closed. Accordingly, we plan to send our 1998 quarterly information to the SEC on three Fridays, May 15, August 14, and November 13, and on those nights to post the same information on the Internet. This procedure will put all of our shareholders, whether they be direct or "street-name," on an equal footing. Similarly, we will post our 1998 annual report on the Internet on Saturday, March 13, 1999, and mail it at about the same time.
根据规定，我们必须在每个季度结束后不超过45天内向证券交易委员会提交季度报告。我们将重要信息上传至网络的目的之一，就是在市场休市之时，确保所有感兴趣方都能第一时间获得未经媒体过滤的完整披露内容。为此，我们计划在1998年的三个周五——5月15日、8月14日和11月13日——向SEC提交季度报告，并在当晚同步在互联网发布相同内容。这一做法将让无论是直接持有还是登记名下持有的股东享有平等的信息获取权。同样地，我们将在1999年3月13日（星期六）在互联网发布1998年年度报告，并于同期邮寄纸质版本。
# Shareholder-Designated Contributions (股东指定捐赠计划)
About 97.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1997 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made were $15.4 million, and 3,830 charities were recipients. A full description of the program appears on pages 52 - 53.
在伯克希尔1997年的股东指定捐赠计划中，约有97.7%的符合条件股份参与了该计划。当年总捐赠金额为1,540万美元，共惠及3,830家慈善机构。有关本计划的完整说明请参见第52至53页。
Cumulatively, over the 17 years of the program, Berkshire has made contributions of $113.1 million pursuant to the instructions of our shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries, which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $8.1 million in 1997, including in-kind donations of $4.4 million.
自该计划实施以来的17年里，伯克希尔已根据股东指示累计捐赠1.131亿美元。其余捐赠由我们的子公司完成，这些公司延续了被收购前的慈善传统（只是他们前任所有者会自行负责个人慈善事务）。总计来看，我们的子公司在1997年进行了810万美元的捐赠，其中包括价值440万美元的实物捐赠。
Every year a few shareholders miss out on our contributions program because they don't have their shares registered in their own names on the prescribed record date or because they fail to get the designation form back to us within the 60-day period allowed. Charlie and I regret this. But if replies are received late, we have to reject them because we can't make exceptions for some shareholders while refusing to make them for others.
每年都有少数股东因未能在规定登记日将股份以本人名义登记，或未能在60天期限内提交捐赠指定表而错过本次计划。查理和我都对此感到遗憾。但若收到表格的时间超出期限，我们只能予以拒绝，因为不能对部分股东破例，而对其他股东不破例。
To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1998, will be ineligible for the 1998 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten.
如欲参与未来年度的捐赠计划，请确保您所持有的A类股份是以实际持有人而非券商、银行或托管机构名义登记。凡未于1998年8月31日前完成实名登记的股份，将无法参与1998年度计划。当您收到我们的捐赠表格后，请尽快寄回，以免延误或遗失。
# The Annual Meeting (年度股东大会)
Woodstock Weekend at Berkshire will be May 2–4 this year. The finale will be the annual meeting, which will begin at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, May 4. Last year we met at Aksarben Coliseum, and both our staff and the crowd were delighted with the venue. There was only one crisis: The night before the meeting, I lost my voice, thereby fulfilling Charlie's wildest fantasy. He was crushed when I showed up the next morning with my speech restored.
今年伯克希尔的“伍德斯托克周末”定于5月2日至4日举行，压轴活动是将于5月4日周一上午9:30开始的年度股东大会。去年我们在Aksarben竞技场召开大会，员工与参会者都对场地非常满意。唯一的小插曲是：会议前一天晚上我突然失声，实现了查理最疯狂的梦想；但第二天早上当我带着恢复的声音如期演讲时，他又显得十分失望。
Last year about 7,500 attended the meeting. They represented all 50 states, as well as 16 countries, including Australia, Brazil, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Greece. Taking into account several overflow rooms, we believe that we can handle more than 11,000 people, and that should put us in good shape this year even though our shareholder count has risen significantly. Parking is ample at Aksarben; acoustics are excellent; and seats are comfortable.
去年约有7,500人参加股东大会，代表美国全部50个州以及包括澳大利亚、巴西、以色列、沙特阿拉伯、新加坡和希腊在内的16个国家。考虑到多个分流场地的设置，我们相信今年可以容纳超过11,000人。即使股东人数大幅增加，这一容量也应能应付自如。Aksarben停车场宽敞，音响效果出色，座椅也非常舒适。
The doors will open at 7 a.m. on Monday and at 8:30 we will again feature the world premiere of a movie epic produced by Marc Hamburg, our CFO. The meeting will last until 3:30, with a short break at noon. This interval will permit the exhausted to leave unnoticed and allow time for the hardcore to lunch at Aksarben's concession stands. Charlie and I enjoy questions from owners, so bring up whatever is on your mind.
会议当日（星期一）早上7点开门，8:30分我们将再次放映由首席财务官马克·汉堡（Marc Hamburg）制作的年度主题短片。会议将持续到下午3:30，中午稍作休息。这段空档可以让疲惫的参会者悄然离席，也可以让热情的支持者前往会场外的摊位用餐。查理和我都非常欢迎股东们提出问题，所以无论你心中有什么想法，都可以提出来交流。
Berkshire products will again be for sale in the halls outside the meeting room. Last year -- not that I pay attention to this sort of thing -- we again set sales records, moving 2,500 pounds of See's candy, 1,350 pairs of Dexter shoes, $75,000 of World Books and related publications, and 888 sets of Quikut knives. We also took orders for a new line of apparel, featuring our Berkshire logo, and sold about 1,000 polo, sweat, and T-shirts. At this year's meeting, we will unveil our 1998 collection.
会议室外大厅将继续展售伯克希尔旗下产品。去年——虽然我并不太关注销售数字——我们又创下了新纪录，售出2,500磅喜诗糖果、1,350双Dexter鞋、价值75,000美元的世界图书及相关出版物，以及888套Quikut刀具。我们还首次推出印有伯克希尔标志的新款服装，售出了大约1,000件Polo衫、运动衫和T恤。在今年的大会上，我们将发布1998年新款商品系列。
GEICO will again be on hand with a booth staffed by star associates from its regional offices. Find out whether you can save money by shifting your auto insurance to GEICO. About 40% of those who check us out learn that savings are possible. The proportion is not 100% because insurers differ in their underwriting judgments, with some favoring drivers who live in certain geographical areas and work at certain occupations more than we do. We believe, however, that we more frequently offer the low price than does any other national carrier selling insurance to all comers. In the GEICO informational material that accompanies this report, you will see that in 38 states we now offer a special discount of as much as 8% to our shareholders. We also have applications pending that would extend this discount to drivers in other states.
GEICO将在现场设立展位，并由其区域办公室派出明星员工接待。您可以了解是否可以通过转投GEICO节省汽车保险费用。约有40%前来咨询的人发现确实可以节省保费。之所以比例不是100%，是因为各家保险公司承保判断标准不同，有些保险公司更青睐某些地区或职业的驾驶人。但我们相信，在面向所有客户的全国性保险公司中，我们最常提供最低价格。随本报告附上的GEICO资料中显示，目前我们在38个州向伯克希尔股东提供最高达8%的特别折扣。此外，我们也在申请将这项优惠扩展至其他州的驾驶人。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. We expect a large crowd, so get plane, hotel and car reservations promptly. American Express (800-799-6634) will be happy to help you with arrangements. As usual, we will have buses at the larger hotels that will take you to and from the meeting and also deliver you to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim's and the airport after its conclusion. You are likely, however, to find a car handy.
本报告所附委托书材料中包含一份附件，详细说明了您如何获取入场所需的证件。预计今年参会人数众多，请尽早预订机票、酒店和租车服务。美国运通公司（电话：800-799-6634）很乐意为您提供协助。与往年一样，我们会在大型酒店安排接送巴士往返会场，并在会议结束后送您前往Nebraska家具城、Borsheim珠宝店及机场。不过，您可能会发现租用汽车更为方便。
NFM's main store, located on a 75-acre site about a mile from Aksarben, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays, and noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. During the period from May 1 to May 5, shareholders who present NFM with the coupon that will accompany their meeting ticket will be entitled to a discount that is otherwise restricted to its employees.
位于Aksarben附近占地75英亩主卖场的Nebraska家具城营业时间为工作日上午10点至晚上9点，周六上午10点至下午6点，周日中午12点至下午6点。5月1日至5日期间，凭会议门票附带优惠券前来购物的股东可享受仅限员工才有的折扣优惠。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 3rd. Last year was our second-best shareholder's day, exceeded only by 1996's. I regard this slippage as an anomaly and hope that you will prove me right this year. Charlie will be available for autographs. He smiles, however, only if the paper he signs is a Borsheim's sales ticket. Shareholders who wish to visit on Saturday (10 a.m.-5:30 p.m.) or on Monday (10 a.m.-8 p.m.) should be sure to identify themselves as Berkshire owners so that Susan Jacques, Borsheim's CEO, can make you especially welcome. Susan, I should add, had a fabulous year in 1997. As a manager, she is everything that an owner hopes for.
Borsheim珠宝店通常在周日闭店，但在5月3日（周日）特地为股东开放，时间从上午10点至下午6点。去年这一天是我们历史上第二受欢迎的股东参观日，仅次于1996年。我认为这是一次反常现象，希望你们今年能证明我是错的。查理届时将亲临现场签名留念——当然，只有在他签署的是Borsheim销售单时才会露出笑容。若您计划于周六（上午10点至下午5:30）或周一（上午10点至晚上8点）造访，请务必表明自己是伯克希尔股东身份，以便Borsheim首席执行官苏珊·雅各布斯（Susan Jacques）给予特别欢迎。顺便说一句，苏珊在1997年表现极其出色，作为一名管理者，她正是股东们梦寐以求的那种人。
On Sunday afternoon we will also have a special treat for bridge players in the mall outside of Borsheim's. There, Bob Hamman -- a legend of the game for more than three decades -- will take on all comers. Join in and dazzle Bob with your skill.
周日下午，我们还为桥牌爱好者准备了一项特别活动。Borsheim商场外的购物中心将举办一场桥牌友谊赛，其中特邀嘉宾鲍勃·哈曼（Bob Hamman）是一位从事桥牌事业三十多年传奇人物。欢迎您上台切磋技艺，用您的高超技术令鲍勃惊艳。
My favorite steakhouse, Gorat's, opens one Sunday a year -- for Berkshire shareholders on the night before the annual meeting. Last year the restaurant started serving at 4 p.m. and finished about 1:30 a.m, an endurance trial that was the result of taking 1,100 reservations vs. a seating capacity of 235. If you make a reservation and then can't attend, be sure to let Gorat's know promptly, since it goes to great effort to help us and we want to reciprocate. You can make reservations beginning on April 1st (but not before) by calling 402-551-3733. Last year I had to leave Gorat's a little early because of my voice problem, but this year I plan to leisurely savor every bite of my rare T-bone and double order of hash browns.
我最喜欢的牛排馆Gorat’s每年仅在股东大会前夜的周日为伯克希尔股东开放。去年餐厅从下午4点一直营业到凌晨1点半，这种“马拉松式”服务源于我们收到了1,100个预订，而实际座位只有235个。如果您已预订却无法前来，请务必及时通知Gorat’s，因为他们非常努力地配合我们，我们也应予以尊重和回报。您可自4月1日起（不早于此）致电 402-551-3733 进行预订。去年因我失声提前离席，但今年我计划从容享用我的三分熟T骨牛排和双份土豆饼。
After this warmup, Charlie and I will head for the Dairy Queen on 114th, just south of Dodge. There are 12 great Dairy Queens in metropolitan Omaha, but the 114th Street location is the best suited to handle the large crowd that we expect. South of the property, there are hundreds of parking spaces on both sides of the street. Also, this Dairy Queen will extend its Sunday hours to 11 p.m. in order to accommodate our shareholders.
这场美食盛宴之后，查理和我会前往位于Dodge街以南的第114街Dairy Queen。奥马哈共有12家出色的Dairy Queen门店，但114街店最能容纳我们预期的大批股东。该店南侧街道两侧都有大量停车位。此外，这家Dairy Queen将在周日延长营业时间至晚上11点，以便接待我们的股东。
The 114th Street operation is now run by two sisters, Coni Birge and Deb Novotny, whose grandfather put up the building in 1962 at what was then the outer edge of the city. Their mother, Jan Noble, took over in 1972, and Coni and Deb continue as third generation owner-managers. Jan, Coni and Deb will all be on hand Sunday evening, and I hope that you meet them. Enjoy one of their hamburgers if you can't get into Gorat's. And then, around eight o'clock, join me in having a Dusty Sundae for dessert. This item is a personal specialty -- the Dairy Queen will furnish you a copy of my recipe -- and will be offered only on Shareholder Sunday.
这家门店目前由两姐妹Coni Birge与Deb Novotny经营，她们的祖父于1962年在这座城市边缘建起了这栋建筑。她们的母亲Jan Noble于1972年接手生意，如今姐妹俩成为家族第三代业主兼管理者。周日晚间，Jan、Coni与Deb都会亲自到场，希望各位能有机会认识她们。若您未能订到位子进入Gorat’s，不妨试试她们的汉堡。接着，在晚上八点左右，来一份专属甜品——“尘土圣代”（Dusty Sundae）。这可是我个人的秘方甜品，Dairy Queen会提供配方复印件——它只会在股东专属周日供应。
The Omaha Royals and Albuquerque Dukes will play baseball on Saturday evening, May 2nd, at Rosenblatt Stadium. As usual, your Chairman, shamelessly exploiting his 25% ownership of the team, will take the mound. But this year you will see something new.
5月2日星期六晚间，奥马哈皇家队将与阿尔伯克基公爵队在Rosenblatt体育场进行棒球比赛。一如既往地，作为球队拥有25%股份的董事长，我会厚着脸皮走上投手丘。但今年，你们将会看到不一样的东西。
In past games, much to the bafflement of the crowd, I have shaken off the catcher's first call. He has consistently asked for my sweeping curve, and I have just as regularly resisted. Instead, I have served up a pathetic fast ball, which on my best day was clocked at eight miles per hour (with a following wind).
以往的比赛里，我总是拒绝接捕手的第一记暗号，令观众一头雾水。他每次要求我投出大弧度曲球，我都坚决回绝；取而代之的是，我投出了一记可怜的慢速直球——即便在我状态最好的时候，也仅达到每小时8英里（顺风情况下）。
There's a story behind my unwillingness to throw the curve ball. As some of you may know, Candy Cummings invented the curve in 1867 and used it to great effect in the National Association, where he never won less than 28 games in a season. The pitch, however, drew immediate criticism from the very highest of authorities, namely Charles Elliott, then president of Harvard University, who declared, "I have heard that this year we at Harvard won the baseball championship because we have a pitcher who has a fine curve ball. I am further instructed that the purpose of the curve ball is to deliberately deceive the batter. Harvard is not in the business of teaching deception." (I'm not making this up.)
我不愿投出曲球背后有一个故事。可能有些朋友知道，Candy Cummings在1867年发明了曲球，并在国家棒球联盟中取得巨大成功，每个赛季至少赢下28场比赛。然而这项技术立即遭到了最高权威的批评。时任哈佛大学校长Charles Elliott曾表示：“听说今年我们哈佛之所以赢得棒球冠军，是因为有位球员擅长曲球。我还了解到，曲球的目的就是故意迷惑击球手。哈佛大学不会教授欺骗之道。”（我没编故事。）
Ever since I learned of President Elliott's moral teachings on this subject, I have scrupulously refrained from using my curve, however devastating its effect might have been on hapless batters. Now, however, it is time for my karma to run over Elliott's dogma and for me to quit holding back. Visit the park on Saturday night and marvel at the majestic arc of my breaking ball.
自从了解了Elliott校长的道德教诲后，我便严守这一原则，即使曲球对那些倒霉的击球手可能极具杀伤力，我也从未使用。但今年是时候让我的“好运”战胜他的教条，让我不再克制了。周六晚上请来到球场，亲眼见证我那优美又致命的曲球划破夜空。
Our proxy statement includes information about obtaining tickets to the game. We will also provide an information packet describing the local hot spots, including, of course, those 12 Dairy Queens.
我们的委托书文件中包含获取本场比赛门票的信息。此外，我们还将提供一份“股东指南”，介绍当地热门地点，当然也包括那12家Dairy Queen门店。
Come to Omaha -- the cradle of capitalism -- in May and enjoy yourself.
五月，欢迎来到奥马哈——资本主义的摇篮——尽情享受这段旅程吧！
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Warren E. Buffett
February 27, 1998
Chairman of the Board
沃伦·E·巴菲特（Warren E. Buffett）
1998年2月27日
董事会主席