2025巴菲特致股东的信最新
# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: This letter comes to you as part of Berkshire’s annual report. As a public company, we are required to periodically tell you many specific facts and figures.
致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东：这封信是伯克希尔年度报告的一部分。作为一家上市公司，我们需要定期向你们披露许多具体的事实和数据。
“Report,” however, implies a greater responsibility. In addition to the mandated data, we believe we owe you additional commentary about what you own and how we think. Our goal is to communicate with you in a manner that we would wish you to use if our positions were reversed – that is, if you were Berkshire’s CEO while I and my family were passive investors, trusting you with our savings.
然而，“报告”一词隐含着更重的责任。除了法律要求的数据外，我们认为还有义务向您提供额外的解读，说明您所拥有的资产以及我们的思维方式。我们的目标是以我们希望你们在角色互换时使用的沟通方式与你们交流——即，如果你们是伯克希尔的CEO，而我和我的家人是被动投资者，将我们的积蓄托付于你们。
This approach leads us to an annual recitation of both good and bad developments at the many businesses you indirectly own through your Berkshire shares. When discussing problems at specific subsidiaries, we do, however, try to follow the advice Tom Murphy gave to me 60 years ago: “praise by name, criticize by category.”
这一理念促使我们每年都会向您汇报：通过持有伯克希尔股份而间接拥有的众多企业中，既有积极进展，也有负面事件。在讨论某些子公司的具体问题时，我们始终遵循汤姆·墨菲（Tom Murphy）60年前给我的建议：“表扬点名道姓，批评泛泛而谈。”
# Mistakes – Yes, We Make Them at Berkshire (我们也会犯错——伯克希尔的情况)
Sometimes I’ve made mistakes in assessing the future economics of a business I’ve
purchased for Berkshire – each a case of capital allocation gone wrong. That happens with both
judgments about marketable equities – we view these as partial ownership of businesses – and
the 100% acquisitions of companies.
有时我在评估伯克希尔所收购企业的未来经济前景时会犯错——这些都属于资本配置错误。无论是购买可交易股票（我们视其为对企业的部分所有权）还是全资收购公司，这类错误都可能发生。
At other times, I’ve made mistakes when assessing the abilities or fidelity of the
managers Berkshire is hiring. The fidelity disappointments can hurt beyond their financial
impact, a pain that can approach that of a failed marriage.
在人事决策方面，我也曾犯错，尤其是在评估伯克希尔聘用经理人的能力或忠诚度时。忠诚度的失望不仅带来财务损失，其伤害甚至可能接近婚姻破裂的痛苦。
A decent batting average in personnel decisions is all that can be hoped for. The cardinal
sin is delaying the correction of mistakes or what Charlie Munger called “thumb-sucking.”
Problems, he would tell me, cannot be wished away. They require action, however
uncomfortable that may be.
在人事决策中，能达到合理的成功率已是万幸。最不可饶恕的错误是拖延纠正失误，查理·芒格称这种行为为“优柔寡断”。他常提醒我，问题不会凭空消失，无论行动多么令人不适，必须采取行动。
During the 2019-23 period, I have used the words “mistake” or “error” 16 times in my
letters to you. Many other huge companies have never used either word over that span. Amazon,
I should acknowledge, made some brutally candid observations in its 2021 letter. Elsewhere, it
has generally been happy talk and pictures.
在2019年至2023年期间，我在致股东信中使用了16次“错误”或“失误”等词汇。许多其他大型企业在这段时间内从未使用过这两个词中的任何一个。我必须承认，亚马逊在2021年的信中做出了尖锐坦率的观察，但其他公司普遍充斥着乐观言论和美好画面。
I have also been a director of large public companies at which “mistake” or “wrong” were
forbidden words at board meetings or analyst calls. That taboo, implying managerial perfection,
always made me nervous (though, at times, there could be legal issues that make limited
discussion advisable. We live in a very litigious society.)
我也曾担任过其他大型上市公司的董事，在那些公司的董事会会议或分析师电话会议上，“失误”或“错误”是被禁止使用的词汇。这种禁忌暗示着管理层必须完美无缺，始终让我感到不安（尽管有时确实存在法律风险，使得有限度的讨论更为妥当。我们所处的社会充满了诉讼风险）。
At 94, it won’t be long before Greg Abel replaces me as CEO and will be writing the
annual letters. Greg shares the Berkshire creed that a “report” is what a Berkshire CEO annually
owes to owners. And he also understands that if you start fooling your shareholders, you will
soon believe your own baloney and be fooling yourself as well.
94岁时，距离格雷格·阿贝尔接替我担任CEO并撰写年度信函的日子已不远。格雷格认同伯克希尔的核心理念：伯克希尔CEO每年必须向股东提交一份“报告”。他也深知，一旦你开始欺骗股东，很快就会陷入自我欺骗的荒谬逻辑中。
# Pete Liegl – One of a Kind (皮特·李格尔——独一无二)
Let me pause to tell you the remarkable story of Pete Liegl, a man unknown to most
Berkshire shareholders but one who contributed many billions to their aggregate wealth. Pete
died in November, still working at 80.
请允许我暂停片刻，讲述皮特·李格尔的非凡故事。这位鲜为人知的人物为伯克希尔股东创造了数千亿美元的财富。皮特于11月去世时仍在工作，享年80岁。
I first heard of Forest River – the Indiana company Pete founded and managed – on
June 21, 2005. On that day I received a letter from an intermediary detailing relevant data about
the company, a recreational vehicle (“RV”) manufacturer. The writer said that Pete, the 100%
owner of Forest River, specifically wanted to sell to Berkshire. He also told me the price that Pete
expected to receive. I liked this no-nonsense approach.
我第一次听说森林河公司（Forest River）是在2005年6月21日。当天，我收到一封中介的来信，详细介绍了这家位于印第安纳州的房车（“RV”）制造商。信中提到，皮特作为森林河100%的股东，明确希望将公司出售给伯克希尔，并告知了他期望的价格。我欣赏这种直截了当的方式。
I did some checking with RV dealers, liked what I learned and arranged a June 28th
meeting in Omaha. Pete brought along his wife, Sharon, and daughter, Lisa. When we met, Pete
assured me that he wanted to keep running the business but would feel more comfortable if he
could assure financial security for his family.
我随后向房车经销商核实信息，结果令人满意，并于6月28日在奥马哈安排了会面。皮特带着妻子沙伦和女儿丽莎一同前来。见面后，皮特向我保证他希望继续经营公司，但若能确保家庭财务安全，他会更加安心。
Pete next mentioned that he owned some real estate that was leased to Forest River and
had not been covered in the June 21 letter. Within a few minutes, we arrived at a price for those
assets as I expressed no need for appraisal by Berkshire but would simply accept his valuation.
接着，皮特提到他名下还有部分出租给森林河的房地产资产未在6月21日的信中提及。几分钟内，我们便敲定了这些资产的价格——我明确表示无需伯克希尔评估，完全接受他的定价。
Then we arrived at the other point that needed clarity. I asked Pete what his compensation
should be, adding that whatever he said, I would accept. (This, I should add, is not an approach I
recommend for general use.)
随后我们讨论了另一项关键问题：薪酬。我询问了皮特的薪酬期望，并补充说无论他说出什么数字，我都会接受。（需要说明的是，这种方法并不适用于普遍场景。）
Pete paused as his wife, daughter and I leaned forward. Then he surprised us: “Well, I
looked at Berkshire’s proxy statement and I wouldn’t want to make more than my boss, so pay
me $100,000 per year.” After I picked myself off the floor, Pete added: “But we will earn X (he
named a number) this year, and I would like an annual bonus of 10% of any earnings above what
the company is now delivering.” I replied: “OK Pete, but if Forest River makes any significant
acquisitions we will make an appropriate adjustment for the additional capital thus employed.” I
didn’t define “appropriate” or “significant,” but those vague terms never caused a problem.
皮特稍作停顿，妻子、女儿和我屏息聆听。他随后语出惊人：“我看了伯克希尔的代理声明，我不愿拿比我老板更高的报酬，所以每年付我10万美元就行。”震惊之余，我回过神来。皮特又补充道：“但今年我们会赚到X（他报了一个数字），我希望获得超出当前利润部分10%的年度奖金。”我回答：“好的，皮特，但如果森林河进行重大收购，我们会根据新增资本调整条款。”我没有定义“适当”或“重大”的具体含义，但这些模糊表述从未引发任何问题。
# Pete Liegl – One of a Kind (皮特·李格尔——独一无二)
The four of us then went to dinner at Omaha’s Happy Hollow Club and lived happily
ever after. During the next 19 years, Pete shot the lights out. No competitor came close to his
performance.
我们四人随后前往奥马哈的快乐中空俱乐部共进晚餐，从此过上了幸福的生活。在接下来的19年里，皮特大放异彩，没有任何竞争对手能接近他的表现。
Every company doesn’t have an easy-to-understand business and there are very few
owners or managers like Pete. And, of course, I expect to make my share of mistakes about the
businesses Berkshire buys and sometimes err in evaluating the sort of person with whom I’m
dealing.
并非每家公司都有简单易懂的商业模式，像皮特这样的所有者或管理者也屈指可数。当然，我在评估伯克希尔收购的企业和交易对象时，也会犯下属于自己的错误。
But I’ve also had many pleasant surprises in both the potential of the business as well as
the ability and fidelity of the manager. And our experience is that a single winning decision can
make a breathtaking difference over time. (Think GEICO as a business decision, Ajit Jain as a
managerial decision and my luck in finding Charlie Munger as a one-of-a-kind partner, personal
advisor and steadfast friend.) Mistakes fade away; winners can forever blossom.
但我也曾多次因企业潜力、管理者的才能和忠诚度而感到惊喜。我们的经验表明，一个正确的决策能在长期内产生惊人的影响。（例如，选择GEICO作为投资标的、任命阿吉特·贾因为管理者，以及我幸运地找到查理·芒格作为独一无二的伙伴、私人顾问和坚定的朋友。）错误会逐渐消散，而赢家却能永久绽放。
# One Further Point in Our CEO Selections: Education Doesn’t Matter (CEO选拔的另一准则：学历无关紧要)
One further point in our CEO selections: I never look at where a candidate has gone to
school. Never!
关于CEO的选拔，还有另一个关键点：我从不关注候选人就读过哪些学校。绝不！
Of course, there are great managers who attended the most famous schools. But there are
plenty such as Pete who may have benefitted by attending a less prestigious institution or even
by not bothering to finish school. Look at my friend, Bill Gates, who decided that it was far more
important to get underway in an exploding industry that would change the world than it was to
stick around for a parchment that he could hang on the wall. (Read his new book, Source Code.)
当然，许多顶尖管理者曾就读于最著名的学府。但也有很多像皮特这样的人，他们或许因进入非顶尖院校，甚至未完成学业而受益。看看我的朋友比尔·盖茨，他选择投身一个正在爆发、将改变世界的行业，而非为了墙上挂一张文凭而停留。
Not long ago, I met – by phone – Jessica Toonkel, whose step-grandfather, Ben Rosner,
long ago ran a business for Charlie and me. Ben was a retailing genius and, in preparing for this
report, I checked with Jessica to confirm Ben’s schooling, which I remembered as limited.
Jessica’s reply: “Ben never went past 6th grade.”
不久前，我通过电话联系了杰西卡·图恩克尔，她的继祖父本·罗丝纳多年前曾为我们（查理和我）经营一家企业。本是一位零售业天才，在准备这份报告时，我向杰西卡确认本的受教育程度。她回答道：“本连六年级都没上完。”
I was lucky enough to get an education at three fine universities. And I avidly believe in
lifelong learning. I’ve observed, however, that a very large portion of business talent is innate
with nature swamping nurture.
我有幸在三所顶尖大学接受教育，并坚信终身学习的重要性。但我观察到，商业天赋的很大一部分源于先天禀赋，远超后天培养。
Pete Liegl was a natural.
皮特·李格尔是天生的。
# Last Year’s Performance (2024年业绩回顾)
In 2024, Berkshire did better than I expected though 53% of our 189 operating
businesses reported a decline in earnings. We were aided by a predictable large gain in
investment income as Treasury Bill yields improved and we substantially increased our holdings
of these highly-liquid short-term securities.
尽管伯克希尔旗下189家运营企业中有53%的利润下降，但2024年的表现仍超出我的预期。随着国库券收益率上升，我们大幅增加了高流动性短期证券的持仓，从而获得了可观的投资收入。
Our insurance business also delivered a major increase in earnings, led by the
performance of GEICO. In five years, Todd Combs has reshaped GEICO in a major way,
increasing efficiency and bringing underwriting practices up to date. GEICO was a long-held
gem that needed major repolishing, and Todd has worked tirelessly in getting the job done.
保险业务的盈利也大幅增长，其中盖可保险（GEICO）表现尤为突出。五年间，托德·康布斯（Todd Combs）对GEICO进行了彻底改革，显著提升了效率并更新了承保实践。GEICO曾是一颗需要重新打磨的明珠，而托德为此付出了不懈努力。
Though not yet complete, the 2024 improvement was spectacular.
In general, property-casualty (“P/C”) insurance pricing strengthened during 2024,
reflecting a major increase in damage from convective storms. Climate change may have been
announcing its arrival. However, no “monster” event occurred during 2024. Someday, any day, a
truly staggering insurance loss will occur – and there is no guarantee that there will be only one
per annum.
尽管改革尚未完成，但2024年的改善堪称辉煌。整体来看，财产险/意外险（“P/C”）的保费定价在2024年走强，反映了对流风暴造成的损失大幅增加。气候变化可能已初现端倪，但2024年未发生“灾难级”事件。终将有一天，一场规模空前的保险损失会突然降临——且无法保证每年仅发生一次。
The P/C business is so central to Berkshire that it warrants a further discussion that
appears later in this letter.
Berkshire’s railroad and utility operations, our two largest businesses outside of
insurance, improved their aggregate earnings. Both, however, have much left to accomplish.
财产险/意外险业务对伯克希尔至关重要，后文将专门展开讨论。铁路和公用事业是保险业务之外的两大核心板块，其综合收益有所提升，但仍有大量工作待完成。
Late in the year we increased our ownership of the utility operation from about 92% to
100% at a cost of roughly $3.9 billion, of which $2.9 billion was paid in cash with a balance in
Berkshire “B” shares.
年底时，我们以约39亿美元的成本将公用事业公司的持股比例从92%增至100%，其中29亿美元以现金支付，剩余部分通过伯克希尔B类股票完成。
# Operating Earnings & Investment Philosophy (运营利润与投资哲学)
All told, we recorded operating earnings of $47.4 billion in 2024. We regularly – endlessly,
some readers may groan – emphasize this measure rather than the GAAP-mandated earnings that
are reported on page K-68.
2024年，伯克希尔录得运营利润474亿美元。我们一贯强调这一指标（某些读者或许已感到厌烦），而非GAAP准则要求的K-68页所列利润数据。
Our measure excludes capital gains or losses on the stocks and bonds we own, whether
realized or unrealized. Over time, we think it highly likely that gains will prevail – why else
would we buy these securities? – though the year-by-year numbers will swing wildly and
unpredictably. Our horizon for such commitments is almost always far longer than a single year.
我们的统计剔除了所持股票和债券的已实现或未实现资本损益。从长期看，我们坚信收益终将占优——否则为何持有这些证券？尽管如此，年度数据可能剧烈波动且难以预测。我们的投资期限几乎总是远超一年。
In many, our thinking involves decades. These long-termers are the purchases that sometimes
make the cash register ring like church bells.
许多投资决策的周期跨度长达数十年。这些长期布局有时会带来如教堂钟声般清脆响亮的现金流回报。
# 2023-24 Earnings Breakdown (2023-24年收益分解)
Here’s a breakdown of the 2023-24 earnings as we see them. All calculations are after depreciation, amortization and income tax. EBITDA, a flawed favorite of Wall Street, is not for us.
以下是2023-24年收益的分解情况。所有计算均扣除折旧、摊销和所得税。EBITDA是华尔街常用的指标，但我们不采用这一标准。
| Category | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| Insurance-underwriting | $9,020 | $5,428 |
| Insurance-investment income | $13,670 | $9,567 |
| BNSF | $5,031 | $5,087 |
| Berkshire Hathaway Energy | $3,730 | $2,331 |
| Other controlled businesses | $13,072 | $13,362 |
| Non-controlled businesses* | $1,519 | $1,750 |
| Other** | $1,395 | $(175) |
| Operating earnings | $47,437 | $37,350 |
| Category | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| 保险业务承保利润 | $9,020 | $5,428 |
| 保险投资收入 | $13,670 | $9,567 |
| BNSF铁路公司 | $5,031 | $5,087 |
| 伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司 | $3,730 | $2,331 |
| 其他控股企业 | $13,072 | $13,362 |
| 非控股企业* | $1,519 | $1,750 |
| 其他** | $1,395 | $(175) |
| 运营利润 | $47,437 | $37,350 |
# Notes (注释)
* Includes businesses with 20%-50% ownership (e.g., Kraft Heinz, Occidental Petroleum, Berkadia).
** Includes foreign currency exchange gains: $1.1 billion in 2024 and $211 million in 2023, driven by non-U.S. dollar debt usage.
* 包括伯克希尔持股20%-50%的企业（如卡夫亨氏、西方石油、伯克戴亚）。
** 包含外汇汇率收益：2024年11亿美元 和 2023年2.11亿美元，源自非美元债务使用。
# Surprise, Surprise! An Important American Record is Smashed (令人惊讶！一项重要美国纪录被打破)
Sixty years ago, present management took control of Berkshire. That move was a
mistake – my mistake – and one that plagued us for two decades. Charlie, I should emphasize,
spotted my obvious error immediately: Though the price I paid for Berkshire looked cheap, its
business – a large northern textile operation – was headed for extinction.
60年前，现管理层接手了伯克希尔。这一决定是一个错误——我的错误——并困扰我们长达二十年。查理立刻察觉了我的明显失误：尽管我为伯克希尔支付的价格看似低廉，但其核心业务——一家大型北方纺织企业——注定走向消亡。
The U.S. Treasury, of all places, had already received silent warnings of Berkshire’s
destiny. In 1965, the company did not pay a dime of income tax, an embarrassment that had
generally prevailed at the company for a decade. That sort of economic behavior may be
understandable for glamorous startups, but it’s a blinking yellow light when it happens at a
venerable pillar of American industry. Berkshire was headed for the ash can.
最讽刺的是，美国财政部早已收到伯克希尔命运的无声警示。1965年，公司未缴纳一分钱所得税，这种窘境在公司内部持续了十年。这种财务表现对光鲜的初创企业或许可以理解，但若发生在曾是美国工业中流砥柱的企业身上，却是一个危险的信号。伯克希尔当时已濒临淘汰边缘。
Fast forward 60 years and imagine the surprise at the Treasury when that same
company – still operating under the name of Berkshire Hathaway – paid far more in corporate
income tax than the U.S. government had ever received from any company – even the American
tech titans that commanded market values in the trillions.
快进60年，想象一下美国财政部的震惊：同一家公司——仍以伯克希尔哈撒韦之名运营——缴纳的企业所得税远超美国政府历史上任何企业（包括市值达数万亿美元的科技巨头）。
To be precise, Berkshire last year made four payments to the IRS that totaled $26.8
billion. That’s about 5% of what all of corporate America paid. (In addition, we paid sizable
amounts for income taxes to foreign governments and to 44 states.)
具体而言，伯克希尔去年分四次向美国国税局（IRS）缴纳税款总计268亿美元，占全美企业总缴税额的5%。（此外，我们还向外国政府和44个州缴纳了大量所得税。）
Note one crucial factor allowing this record-shattering payment: Berkshire shareholders
during the same 1965-2024 period received only one cash dividend. On January 3, 1967, we
disbursed our sole payment – $101,755 or 10¢ per A share. (I can’t remember why I suggested
this action to Berkshire’s board of directors. Now it seems like a bad dream.)
请注意一个关键因素：在此期间（1965-2024年），伯克希尔股东仅收到过一次现金分红。1967年1月3日，我们进行了唯一一次分红——总额101,755美元，即每股A类股票10美分。（我已记不清当初为何向董事会提议这一操作，如今回想起来更像是场糟糕的梦。）
For sixty years, Berkshire shareholders endorsed continuous reinvestment and that
enabled the company to build its taxable income. Cash income-tax payments to the U.S.
Treasury, miniscule in the first decade, now aggregate more than $101 billion . . . and counting.
六十年来，伯克希尔股东支持持续再投资，这使公司得以积累应税收入。最初十年上缴美国财政部的所得税微乎其微，但如今累计总额已突破1010亿美元……且仍在增长。
# Huge Numbers & Tax Payments (巨额数字与税务支付)
Huge numbers can be hard to visualize. Let me recast the $26.8 billion that we paid last
year.
巨额数字往往难以直观感受。让我重新描述去年支付的268亿美元：
If Berkshire had sent the Treasury a $1 million check every 20 minutes throughout all of
2024 – visualize 366 days and nights because 2024 was a leap year – we still would have owed
the federal government a significant sum at yearend. Indeed, it would be well into January before
the Treasury would tell us that we could take a short breather, get some sleep, and prepare for our
2025 tax payments.
假设伯克希尔在2024年每隔20分钟就向财政部寄出一张100万美元的支票——想象一下全年无休（因2024年是闰年）——年底时我们仍会欠联邦政府一笔可观的尾款。事实上，财政部可能要到次年一月才会通知我们可以稍作喘息、补个睡眠，然后准备2025年的纳税工作。
# Where Your Money Is (您的资金去向)
Berkshire’s equity activity is ambidextrous. In one hand we own control of many
businesses, holding at least 80% of the investee’s shares. Generally, we own 100%.
伯克希尔的股权投资具有双轨特性。一方面，我们控股多数企业，持有至少80%的被投资方股份（通常为100%）。
These 189 subsidiaries have similarities to marketable common stocks but are far from
identical. The collection is worth many hundreds of billions and includes a few rare gems,
many good-but-far-from-fabulous businesses and some laggards that have been disappointments.
We own nothing that is a major drag, but we have a number that I should not have purchased.
这189家子公司与可交易普通股有相似之处，但本质不同。其总价值达数千亿美元，包含少数珍稀资产、大量表现良好但非顶尖的企业，以及一些令人失望的落后业务。我们持有的企业无一严重拖累整体表现，但确实存在几项我本不该收购的投资。
In the other hand, we own a small percentage of a dozen or so very large and highly
profitable businesses with household names such as Apple, American Express, Coca-Cola and
Moody’s. Many of these companies earn very high returns on the net tangible equity required for
their operations. At yearend, our partial-ownership holdings were valued at $272 billion.
另一方面，我们持有一打左右大型高盈利企业的少量股份，这些耳熟能详的公司包括苹果、美国运通、可口可乐和穆迪。其中许多公司凭借运营所需的净资产实现了高额回报。年末，这部分非控股投资组合估值达2,720亿美元。
Understandably, really outstanding businesses are very seldom offered in their entirety, but small
fractions of these gems can be purchased Monday through Friday on Wall Street and, very
occasionally, they sell at bargain prices.
显然，真正卓越的企业极少会整体出售，但它们的小部分股权可通过华尔街每日交易购得，偶尔还能以折扣价买入。
We are impartial in our choice of equity vehicles, investing in either variety based upon
where we can best deploy your (and my family’s) savings. Often, nothing looks compelling; very
infrequently we find ourselves knee-deep in opportunities. Greg has vividly shown his ability to
act at such times as did Charlie.
我们在股权工具选择上保持中立，根据最能有效配置您（及我的家族）储蓄的方向进行投资。多数时间市场缺乏吸引力，极少数时刻我们才会深陷投资良机。格雷格已充分展现其把握此类时机的能力，正如查理一贯的作风。
With marketable equities, it is easier to change course when I make a mistake.
Berkshire’s present size, it should be underscored, diminishes this valuable option. We can’t
come and go on a dime. Sometimes a year or more is required to establish or divest an
investment. Additionally, with ownership of minority positions we can’t change management if
that action is needed or control what is done with capital flows if we are unhappy with the
decisions being made.
在可交易股票投资中，当我犯错时更容易调整方向。但必须强调的是，伯克希尔当前的规模削弱了这一宝贵灵活性。我们无法像过去那样快速建仓或退出投资，有时甚至需要一年以上的时间完成交易。此外，持有少数股权时，若管理层决策不符合我们的预期，我们无法干预管理或资本流向。
With controlled companies, we can dictate these decisions, but we have far less flexibility
in the disposition of mistakes. In reality, Berkshire almost never sells controlled businesses
unless we face what we believe to be unending problems. An offset is that some business owners
seek out Berkshire because of our steadfast behavior. Occasionally, that can be a decided plus for
us.
对于控股企业，我们可以主导决策，但在处置错误时灵活性更低。实际上，除非遭遇我们认为无法解决的长期问题，伯克希尔几乎从不出售控股企业。一个积极影响是，部分企业主因我们的稳健风格主动寻求合作，这偶尔能为我们带来显著优势。
# Despite Cash Reserves, Equities Remain Core (尽管现金储备充足，股权投资仍是核心)
Despite what some commentators currently view as an extraordinary cash position at
Berkshire, the great majority of your money remains in equities. That preference won’t change.
尽管部分评论家认为伯克希尔持有异常高的现金头寸，但您的资金仍大部分配置于股权投资，这一策略不会改变。
While our ownership in marketable equities moved downward last year from $354 billion to
$272 billion, the value of our non-quoted controlled equities increased somewhat and remains far
greater than the value of the marketable portfolio.
去年，我们的可交易股票持仓价值从3,540亿美元降至2,720亿美元，但非上市控股企业的价值有所增长，且仍远超可交易股票组合。
Berkshire shareholders can rest assured that we will forever deploy a substantial majority
of their money in equities – mostly American equities although many of these will have
international operations of significance. Berkshire will never prefer ownership of cash-equivalent
assets over the ownership of good businesses, whether controlled or only partially owned.
伯克希尔股东可以放心，我们永远会将您资金的绝大部分投入股权投资——主要是美国企业，尽管其中许多公司具有重要的国际业务。我们绝不会偏好持有现金等价物，而非优质企业股权，无论是控股还是参股。
Paper money can see its value evaporate if fiscal folly prevails. In some countries, this
reckless practice has become habitual, and, in our country’s short history, the U.S. has come
close to the edge. Fixed-coupon bonds provide no protection against runaway currency.
若财政政策失控，纸币价值可能瞬间蒸发。某些国家已习惯这种鲁莽操作，在我们国家短暂的历史中，美国也曾濒临边缘。固定票息债券无法抵御货币失控风险。
Businesses, as well as individuals with desired talents, however, will usually find a way
to cope with monetary instability as long as their goods or services are desired by the country’s
citizenry. So, too, with personal skills. Lacking such assets as athletic excellence, a wonderful
voice, medical or legal skills or, for that matter, any special talents, I have had to rely on equities
throughout my life. In effect, I have depended on the success of American businesses and I will
continue to do so.
然而，只要企业的产品和服务被国民所需，或个人具备独特才能（如运动天赋、艺术造诣、医疗/法律技能等），通常能找到应对货币不稳定的办法。我自己缺乏这类天赋，因此一生依赖股权投资。本质上，我始终依靠美国企业的成功，并将继续如此。
# Capitalism & Berkshire’s Role (资本主义与伯克希尔的角色)
One way or another, the sensible – better yet imaginative – deployment of savings by
citizens is required to propel an ever-growing societal output of desired goods and services. This
system is called capitalism. It has its faults and abuses – in certain respects more egregious now
than ever – but it also can work wonders unmatched by other economic systems.
无论通过何种方式，公民对储蓄的合理（甚至富有创造力的）配置，是社会持续产出所需商品和服务的核心。这一系统称为资本主义。它存在缺陷和滥用问题——某些方面甚至比以往更严重——但它创造的奇迹远超其他经济体系。
America is Exhibit A. Our country’s progress over its mere 235 years of existence could
not have been imagined by even the most optimistic colonists in 1789, when the Constitution
was adopted and the country’s energies were unleashed.
美国就是典型案例。仅用235年时间，国家发展速度之快，连1789年宪法通过时最乐观的殖民者都无法想象。当时国家潜力被彻底释放，如今成果远超预期。
# 美国奇迹与伯克希尔的角色
True, our country in its infancy sometimes borrowed abroad to supplement our own
savings. But, concurrently, we needed many Americans to consistently save and then needed
those savers or other Americans to wisely deploy the capital thus made available. If America had
consumed all that it produced, the country would have been spinning its wheels.
确实，建国初期的美国曾向国外借贷以弥补储蓄不足，但同时，国家需要大量民众持续储蓄，并依赖这些储蓄者或其他美国人明智地配置由此产生的资本。如果美国将所有产出用于消费，国家将陷入原地踏步的困境。
The American process has not always been pretty – our country has forever had many
scoundrels and promoters who seek to take advantage of those who mistakenly trust them with
their savings. But even with such malfeasance – which remains in full force today – and also
much deployment of capital that eventually floundered because of brutal competition or
disruptive innovation, the savings of Americans has delivered a quantity and quality of output
beyond the dreams of any colonist.
美国的发展历程并非总是光彩夺目——我们的国家始终存在试图利用他人信任谋取私利的奸诈之徒和投机者。即使今日这类行为仍屡见不鲜，且许多资本因残酷竞争或颠覆性创新而最终失败，但美国人的储蓄仍创造了远超殖民者想象的产出规模与品质。
From a base of only four million people – and despite a brutal internal war early on,
pitting one American against another – America changed the world in the blink of a celestial eye.
在仅四百万人口的基础上——尽管早期爆发了同胞相残的惨烈内战——美国在历史长河中如电光火石般彻底改变了世界。
# 伯克希尔股东对美国奇迹的贡献
In a very minor way, Berkshire shareholders have participated in the American miracle by
foregoing dividends, thereby electing to reinvest rather than consume. Originally, this
reinvestment was tiny, almost meaningless, but over time, it mushroomed, reflecting the mixture
of a sustained culture of savings, combined with the magic of long-term compounding.
伯克希尔股东以放弃分红的方式，微弱地参与了这一奇迹：他们选择再投资而非消费。起初，这种再投资微不足道，但随着时间推移，它如滚雪球般增长，体现了美国持续储蓄文化与长期复利魔法的结合。
Berkshire’s activities now impact all corners of our country. And we are not finished.
Companies die for many reasons but, unlike the fate of humans, old age itself is not lethal.
Berkshire today is far more youthful than it was in 1965.
伯克希尔的活动如今已触及美国每个角落，而我们仍未止步。企业消亡有诸多原因，但与人类不同，衰老本身并非致命因素。今天的伯克希尔比1965年时更具活力。
However, as Charlie and I have always acknowledged, Berkshire would not have
achieved its results in any locale except America whereas America would have been every bit the
success it has been if Berkshire had never existed.
然而，正如查理和我始终承认的：伯克希尔的成功离不开美国；而即使没有伯克希尔，美国也会成为今天的模样。
# 致美国的感谢与期待
So thank you, Uncle Sam. Someday your nieces and nephews at Berkshire hope to send
you even larger payments than we did in 2024. Spend it wisely. Take care of the many who, for
no fault of their own, get the short straws in life. They deserve better. And never forget that we
need you to maintain a stable currency and that result requires both wisdom and vigilance on
your part.
因此，感谢您，山姆大叔。总有一天，伯克希尔的“侄子侄女们”会向您缴纳比2024年更大的税款。请谨慎用之，照顾那些因自身无过错而遭遇不公的人。他们值得更好生活。永远不要忘记，我们需要您维持货币稳定，这需要您的智慧与警惕。
# 财产险/意外险（P/C保险）
Property-Casualty Insurance
P/C insurance continues to be Berkshire’s core business. The industry follows a financial
model that is rare – very rare – among giant businesses.
财产险/意外险（P/C保险）仍是伯克希尔的核心业务。这一行业遵循一种在大型企业中极为罕见的财务模式。
Customarily, companies incur costs for labor, materials, inventories, plant and equipment,
etc. before – or concurrently with – the sale of their products or services. Consequently, their
CEOs have a good fix on knowing the cost of their product before they sell it. If the selling price
is less than its cost, managers soon learn they have a problem. Hemorrhaging cash is hard to
ignore.
通常，企业在产品或服务销售前（或同步）即产生人工、材料、库存、厂房设备等成本。因此，CEO能准确预判产品成本是否低于售价，若售价低于成本，管理层会迅速察觉问题。现金流枯竭的痛苦难以忽视。
# 财产险/意外险保险（Property-Casualty Insurance）
When writing P/C insurance, we receive payment upfront and much later learn what our
product has cost us – sometimes a moment of truth that is delayed as much as 30 or more years.
(We are still making substantial payments on asbestos exposures that occurred 50 or more years ago.)
在提供财产险/意外险时，我们先收取保费，但要到很久以后才知悉实际成本——有时真相的揭示可能长达30年以上。（例如，我们仍在支付50多年前石棉暴露事故的赔偿金。）
This mode of operations has the desirable effect of giving P/C insurers cash before
they incur most expenses but carries with it the risk that the company can be losing
money – sometimes mountains of money – before the CEO and directors realize what is
happening.
这种运营模式的优势在于让保险公司提前获得现金流（即“浮存金”），但也存在风险：公司可能在管理层意识到问题前已蒙受巨额亏损。
Certain lines of insurance minimize this mismatch, such as crop insurance or hail damage
in which losses are quickly reported, evaluated and paid. Other lines, however, can lead to
executive and shareholder bliss as the company is going broke. Think coverages such as medical
malpractice or product liability. In “long-tail” lines, a P/C insurer may report large but fictitious
profits to its owners and regulators for many years – even decades. The accounting can be
particularly dangerous if the CEO is an optimist or a crook. These possibilities are not fanciful:
History reveals a large number of each species.
某些险种能减少这种错配，例如农作物保险或冰雹灾害保险，损失可快速申报、评估和赔付。但另一些险种（如医疗过失或产品责任险）却可能导致管理层和股东在公司破产前仍沉迷于虚假利润中。“长尾险种”可能多年甚至数十年向股东和监管报告巨额但虚构的利润。若CEO是乐观主义者或骗子，这类会计风险尤为致命。历史表明，这两种人不在少数。
In recent decades, this “money-up-front, loss-payments-later” model has allowed
Berkshire to invest large sums (“float”) while generally delivering what we believe to be a small
underwriting profit. We make estimates for “surprises” and, so far, these estimates have been
sufficient.
近几十年来，这种“先收钱、后赔付”的模式让伯克希尔得以利用大额浮存金投资，同时实现小额承保利润。我们对潜在“意外”预留了缓冲，目前来看，这些预估足够应对风险。
We are not deterred by the dramatic and growing loss payments sustained by our
activities. (As I write this, think wildfires.) It’s our job to price to absorb these and unemotionally
take our lumps when surprises develop. It’s also our job to contest “runaway” verdicts, spurious
litigation and outright fraudulent behavior.
我们不会因赔付金额的增长而退缩。（写到这里时，我想到的是野火灾害。）我们的职责是合理定价以吸收此类损失，并在突发情况发生时冷静承受打击。同时，我们也会坚决对抗“天价判决”、虚假诉讼和欺诈行为。
Under Ajit, our insurance operation has blossomed from an obscure Omaha-based
company into a world leader, renowned for both its taste for risk and its Gibraltar-like financial
strength. Moreover, Greg, our directors and I all have a very large investment in Berkshire in
relation to any compensation we receive. We do not use options or other one-sided forms of
compensation; if you lose money, so do we. This approach encourages caution but does not
ensure foresight.
在阿吉特的领导下，我们的保险业务从一家名不见经传的奥马哈本地公司成长为全球领导者，以敢于承保风险和直布罗陀般的财务实力闻名。此外，格雷格、董事会成员和我本人均重仓持有伯克希尔股份（远超薪酬回报）。我们不使用期权或其他单边激励手段——您亏损时，我们同样亏损。这种机制鼓励审慎经营，但无法确保先见之明。
# 保险增长与经济风险的关系
P/C insurance growth is dependent on increased economic risk. No risk – no need for
insurance.
财产险/意外险的增长依赖经济风险的增加。没有风险，便无需保险。
Think back only 135 years when the world had no autos, trucks or airplanes. Now there
are 300 million vehicles in the U.S. alone, a massive fleet causing huge damage daily. Property
damage arising from hurricanes, tornadoes and wildfires is massive, growing and increasingly
unpredictable in their patterns and eventual costs.
回顾135年前，世界尚无汽车、卡车或飞机。如今仅美国就有3亿辆车，庞大的车队每天造成巨大损失。飓风、龙卷风和野火引发的财产损失同样规模惊人，且损失模式和最终成本愈发难以预测。
# 财产险/意外险保险（Property-Casualty Insurance）
It would be foolish – make that madness – to write ten-year policies for these coverages,
but we believe one-year assumption of such risks is generally manageable. If we change our
minds, we will change the contracts we offer. During my lifetime, auto insurers have generally
abandoned one-year policies and switched to the six-month variety. This change reduced float
but allowed more intelligent underwriting.
为这些风险承保十年期保单是愚蠢的——确切地说是疯狂的。我们认为一年期的风险承担通常是可控的。若未来观点改变，我们会调整所提供的保单类型。在我职业生涯中，汽车保险公司已普遍放弃一年期保单，转而采用半年期保单。这种转变降低了浮存金规模，但实现了更精准的承保定价。
# 风险承担与定价原则
No private insurer has the willingness to take on the amount of risk that Berkshire can
provide. At times, this advantage can be important. But we also need to shrink when prices are
inadequate. We must never write inadequately-priced policies in order to stay in the game. That
policy is corporate suicide.
没有其他私营保险公司具备像伯克希尔一样承担大规模风险的能力。这一优势在某些时刻至关重要。但若价格不足，我们也需收缩业务。绝不能为维持市场份额而承保低价保单——这种策略等同于企业自杀。
Properly pricing P/C insurance is part art, part science and is definitely not a business for
optimists. Mike Goldberg, the Berkshire executive who recruited Ajit, said it best: “We want our
underwriters to daily come to work nervous, but not paralyzed.”
财产险/意外险的合理定价既是一门艺术，也是一门科学，绝非乐观主义者的游戏。曾招募阿吉特的伯克希尔高管迈克·戈德堡一语中的：“我们希望承保人每天上班时保持谨慎，但不至于因恐惧而瘫痪。”
# 保险业务的核心竞争力
All things considered, we like the P/C insurance business. Berkshire can financially and
psychologically handle extreme losses without blinking. We are also not dependent on reinsurers
and that gives us a material and enduring cost advantage. Finally, we have outstanding managers
(no optimists) and are particularly well-situated to utilize the substantial sums P/C insurance
delivers for investment.
综合来看，我们热爱财产险/意外险业务。伯克希尔在财务与心理层面均能从容应对极端损失。我们亦无需依赖再保险公司，这为我们提供了持久的成本优势。最后，我们拥有卓越的管理团队（绝非盲目乐观者），能够高效利用保险业务带来的巨额资金进行投资。
Over the past two decades, our insurance business has generated $32 billion of after-tax
profits from underwriting, about 3.3 cents per dollar of sales after income tax. Meanwhile, our
float has grown from $46 billion to $171 billion. The float is likely to grow a bit over time and,
with intelligent underwriting (and some luck), has a reasonable prospect of being costless.
过去二十年，我们的保险业务通过承保实现了320亿美元的税后利润，相当于每美元保费收入贡献3.3美分净利润（扣除所得税后）。与此同时，我们的浮存金从460亿美元增长至1,710亿美元。若承保定价合理（并辅以些许运气），浮存金规模有望持续增长，且具备实现“零成本浮存金”的合理前景。
# 日本投资战略（Berkshire Increases its Japanese Investments）
A small but important exception to our U.S.-based focus is our growing investment in
Japan.
我们的投资重心始终在美国，但对日本的投资是一个重要例外。
It’s been almost six years since Berkshire began purchasing shares in five Japanese
companies that very successfully operate in a manner somewhat similar to Berkshire itself. The
five are (alphabetically) ITOCHU, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo. Each of these
large enterprises, in turn, owns interests in a vast array of businesses, many based in Japan but
others that operate throughout the world.
六年前，伯克希尔开始收购五家日本公司的股份。这些公司以类似伯克希尔的模式运营得极为成功。它们按字母顺序排列为：伊藤忠商事（ITOCHU）、丸红（Marubeni）、三菱商事（Mitsubishi）、三井物产（Mitsui）和住友商事（Sumitomo）。这些大型企业各自控股着广泛业务，其中许多立足日本，另一些则在全球范围内运营。
# Berkshire Increases its Japanese Investments (伯克希尔加大对日本的投资)
Berkshire made its first purchases involving the five in July 2019. We simply looked at
their financial records and were amazed at the low prices of their stocks. As the years have
passed, our admiration for these companies has consistently grown. Greg has met many times
with them, and I regularly follow their progress. Both of us like their capital deployment, their
managements and their attitude in respect to their investors.
伯克希尔于2019年7月首次买入这五家日本公司的股份。我们仅查看了它们的财务记录，便震惊于其股价之低。随着时间推移，我们对这些公司的钦佩持续增长。格雷格多次与他们会面，我也会定期跟进其进展。我们两人都欣赏它们的资本配置、管理层及其对投资者的态度。
Each of the five companies increase dividends when appropriate, they repurchase their
shares when it is sensible to do so, and their top managers are far less aggressive in their
compensation programs than their U.S. counterparts.
这五家公司均在适当时候提高分红，在合理时回购股份，其高管薪酬计划也远比美国同行更保守。
Our holdings of the five are for the very long term, and we are committed to supporting
their boards of directors. From the start, we also agreed to keep Berkshire’s holdings below 10%
of each company’s shares. But, as we approached this limit, the five companies agreed to
moderately relax the ceiling. Over time, you will likely see Berkshire’s ownership of all five
increase somewhat.
我们对这五家公司的持股是长期的，并承诺支持其董事会。从一开始，我们约定持股比例不超过每家公司股份的10%。但当我们接近这一上限时，五家公司同意适度放宽限制。未来，您可能会看到伯克希尔对这五家公司的持股比例有所上升。
At yearend, Berkshire’s aggregate cost (in dollars) was $13.8 billion and the market value
of our holdings totaled $23.5 billion.
截至年末，伯克希尔对这五家公司的总成本为138亿美元，而持仓市值达到235亿美元。
Meanwhile, Berkshire has consistently – but not pursuant to any formula – increased its
yen-denominated borrowings. All are at fixed rates, no “floaters.” Greg and I have no view on
future foreign exchange rates and therefore seek a position approximating currency-neutrality.
与此同时，伯克希尔持续（但无固定公式）增加日元计价借款，且均为固定利率，无浮动利率债务。格雷格和我对未来汇率没有预判，因此力求实现货币中性。
We are required, however, under GAAP rules to regularly recognize in our earnings a calculation
of any gains or losses in the yen we have borrowed and, at yearend, had included $2.3 billion of
after-tax gains due to dollar strength of which $850 million occurred in 2024.
然而，根据GAAP准则，我们必须定期计算所借日元的汇兑损益。截至年末，因美元走强已确认23亿美元税后收益，其中8.5亿美元发生在2024年。
I expect that Greg and his eventual successors will be holding this Japanese position for
many decades and that Berkshire will find other ways to work productively with the five
companies in the future.
We like the current math of our yen-balanced strategy as well. As I write this, the annual
dividend income expected from the Japanese investments in 2025 will total about $812 million
and the interest cost of our yen-denominated debt will be about $135 million.
我预计格雷格及其继任者会将这一日本持仓维持数十年，并在未来探索与这五家公司更多合作方式。
我们当前的日元平衡策略也令人满意。撰写本文时，2025年日本投资的预期年分红收入约为8.12亿美元，而日元计价债务的利息成本约为1.35亿美元。
# The Annual Gathering in Omaha (奥马哈年度聚会)
I hope you will join us in Omaha on May 3rd. We are following a somewhat changed
schedule this year, but the basics remain the same. Our goal is that you get many of your
questions answered, that you connect with friends, and that you leave with a good impression of
Omaha. The city looks forward to your visits.
希望您能于5月3日来奥马哈参加聚会。今年日程略有调整，但核心不变：解答您的问题、结识朋友，并留下对奥马哈的美好印象。这座城市正期待您的到来。
# The Annual Gathering in Omaha (奥马哈年度聚会)
We will have much the same group of volunteers to offer you a wide variety of Berkshire
products that will lighten your wallet and brighten your day. As usual, we will be open on Friday
from noon until 5 p.m. with lovable Squishmallows, underwear from Fruit of the Loom, Brooks
running shoes and a host of other items to tempt you.
我们将有熟悉的志愿者团队为您提供丰富的伯克希尔产品，这些商品足以让您掏空钱包并点亮您的一天。周五中午12点至下午5点，我们照常开放展销会，推出广受欢迎的软萌玩偶（Squishmallows）、金霸王（Fruit of the Loom）内衣、布鲁克斯跑鞋（Brooks running shoes）以及其他诱人商品。
Again, we will have only one book for sale. Last year we featured Poor Charlie’s
Almanack and sold out – 5,000 copies disappeared before the close of business on Saturday.
今年我们仍将仅出售一本图书。去年的《查理·芒格箴言录》（Poor Charlie’s Almanack）售罄——5,000册在周六闭馆前全部售罄。
This year we will offer 60 Years of Berkshire Hathaway. In 2015, I asked Carrie Sova,
who among her many duties managed much of the activity at the annual meeting, to try her hand
at putting together a light-hearted history of Berkshire. I gave her full reign to use her
imagination, and she quickly produced a book that blew me away with its ingenuity, contents and
design.
今年我们将推出《伯克希尔哈撒韦六十年》（60 Years of Berkshire Hathaway）。2015年，我邀请卡莉·索瓦（Carrie Sova）尝试编写一部轻松幽默的公司历史。她曾负责年会多项事务，我给予她充分创作自由，她迅速完成了一本令我惊叹的作品——从创意、内容到设计均令人折服。
Subsequently, Carrie left Berkshire to raise a family and now has three children. But each
summer, the Berkshire office force gets together to watch the Omaha Storm Chasers play
baseball against a Triple A opponent. I ask a few alums to join us, and Carrie usually comes with
her family. At this year’s event, I brazenly asked her if she would do a 60th Anniversary issue,
featuring Charlie’s photos, quotes and stories that have seldom been made public.
随后卡莉离开伯克希尔回归家庭，如今已育有三个孩子。但每年夏天，伯克希尔员工会聚在一起观看奥马哈风暴追逐者棒球队（Omaha Storm Chasers）对阵3A级对手的比赛。我邀请几位老同事参加，卡莉通常会携家人出席。今年活动现场，我厚着脸皮请求她为60周年纪念版操刀，收录查理鲜为人知的照片、语录与故事。
Even with three young children to manage, Carrie immediately said “yes.” Consequently,
we will have 5,000 copies of the new book available for sale on Friday afternoon and from
7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Saturday.
尽管要照顾三个年幼的孩子，卡莉仍欣然答应。因此，新书将在周五下午开放销售，并于周六早上7点至下午4点继续发售，限量5,000册。
Carrie refused any payment for her extensive work on the new “Charlie” edition. I
suggested she and I co-sign 20 copies to be given to any shareholder contributing $5,000 to the
Stephen Center that serves homeless adults and children in South Omaha. The Kizer family,
beginning with Bill Kizer, Sr., my long-time friend and Carrie’s grandfather, have for decades
been assisting this worthy institution. Whatever is raised through the sale of the 20 autographed
books, I will match.
卡莉拒绝为新版“查理特辑”收取任何报酬。我提议由她与我共同签名20册，赠予向南奥马哈服务无家可归成人及儿童的史蒂芬中心（Stephen Center）捐赠5,000美元的股东。几十年来，我的老友、卡莉的祖父比尔·基泽（Bill Kizer, Sr.）家族始终支持这一公益事业。通过20册签名书募集的善款，我将全额配捐。
# Saturday’s Re-Engineered Event (周六改版活动)
Becky Quick will cover our somewhat re-engineered gathering on Saturday. Becky
knows Berkshire like a book and always arranges interesting interviews with managers,
investors, shareholders and an occasional celebrity. She and her CNBC crew do a great job of
both transmitting our meetings worldwide and archiving much Berkshire-related material. Give
our director, Steve Burke, credit for the archive idea.
周六活动将由贝基·奎克（Becky Quick）主持。她对伯克希尔的了解堪称透彻，一贯擅长安排与管理层、投资者、股东甚至偶尔到场的名人的精彩访谈。她与CNBC团队出色完成了全球直播与伯克希尔资料存档工作。档案化构想源自我们的导演史蒂夫·伯克（Steve Burke），请给予他应有肯定。
We will not have a movie this year but rather will convene a bit earlier at 8 a.m. I will
make a few introductory remarks, and we will promptly get to the Q&A, alternating questions
between Becky and the audience.
今年取消电影放映，改在早上8点提前开始。我会发表简短开场白，随后直接进入问答环节，由贝基与现场观众交替提问。
Greg and Ajit will join me in answering questions and we will take a half-hour break at 10:30 a.m. When we reconvene at 11:00 a.m., only Greg will join me on stage. This year we will disband at 1:00 p.m. but stay open for shopping in the exhibit area until 4:00 p.m.
格雷格和阿吉特将与我一同回答问题，并于上午10:30休息半小时。11点恢复活动时，仅由格雷格与我登台。今年活动将于下午1点结束，但展厅购物区将持续开放至下午4点。
# 周六问答环节与活动安排
Greg and Ajit will join me in answering questions and we will take a half-hour break at
10:30 a.m. When we reconvene at 11:00 a.m., only Greg will join me on stage. This year we will
disband at 1:00 p.m. but stay open for shopping in the exhibit area until 4:00 p.m.
格雷格和阿吉特将与我一同回答问题，并于上午10:30休息半小时。11点恢复活动时，仅由格雷格与我登台。今年活动将于下午1点结束，但展厅购物区将持续开放至下午4点。
You can find the full details regarding weekend activities on page 16. Note particularly
the always-popular Brooks run on Sunday morning. (I will be sleeping.)
您可在第16页找到完整的周末活动详情，尤其关注周日上午广受欢迎的布鲁克斯晨跑活动。（届时我将在睡觉。）
# 关于妹妹Bertie的幽默故事
My wise and good-looking sister, Bertie, of whom I wrote last year, will be attending the
meeting along with two of her daughters, both good-looking as well. Observers all agree that the
genes producing this dazzling result flow down only the female side of the family. (Sob.)
去年信中提到的我的睿智且美貌的妹妹伯蒂（Bertie）将携两位同样气质出众的女儿出席大会。所有观察者一致认为，造就这一惊艳家族基因的血脉只流淌在女性一脉中。（叹息。）
Bertie is now 91 and we talk regularly on Sundays using old-fashion telephones for
communications. We cover the joys of old age and discuss such exciting topics as the relative
merits of our canes. In my case, the utility is limited to the avoidance of falling flat on my face.
伯蒂现年91岁，我们每周日用传统电话交流。我们畅谈老年乐趣，并热烈讨论拐杖设计优劣等激动人心的话题。对我来说，拐杖的唯一用处是避免跌倒；但伯蒂总能技高一筹——她声称拐杖还能带来额外福利。
But Bertie regularly one-ups me by asserting that she enjoys an additional benefit: When
a woman uses a cane, she tells me, men quit “hitting” on her. Bertie’s explanation is that the male
ego is such that little old ladies with canes simply aren’t an appropriate target. Presently, I have
no data to counter her assertion.
“拐杖能让男士停止搭讪，”她解释道，“男性自尊心让他们不会对拄拐杖的老太太出手。”目前我尚无数据反驳这一观点。
But I have suspicions. At the meeting I can’t see much from the stage, and I would
appreciate it if attendees would keep an eye on Bertie. Let me know if the cane is really doing its
job. My bet is that she will be surrounded by males. For those of a certain age, the scene will
bring back memories of Scarlett O’Hara and her horde of male admirers in Gone with the Wind.
但存疑的是，我在台上看得不够清楚。若您发现伯蒂被男性包围，请告知拐杖是否真在“工作”。我敢打赌，她会成为《乱世佳人》中斯嘉丽般的焦点人物。
# 致股东的邀请与祝福
The Berkshire directors and I immensely enjoy having you come to Omaha, and I predict
that you will have a good time and likely make some new friends.
伯克希尔董事们与我非常期待您来奥马哈相聚。我敢断言，您将收获愉快体验，并可能结识新朋友。
February 22, 2025 Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
（2025年2月22日 沃伦·E·巴菲特，董事会主席）
# Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500 (伯克希尔与标普500指数表现对比)
Annual Percentage Changein Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire in S&P 500 with Dividends Included
# 1965–1994 年度增长率
| 年份 | 伯克希尔每股市值增长率 | 标普500指数（含股息） |
|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 49.5% | 10.0% |
| 1966 | (3.4)% | (11.7)% |
| 1967 | 13.3% | 30.9% |
| 1968 | 77.8% | 11.0% |
| 1969 | 19.4% | (8.4)% |
| 1970 | (4.6)% | 3.9% |
| 1971 | 80.5% | 14.6% |
| 1972 | 8.1% | 18.9% |
| 1973 | (2.5)% | (14.8)% |
| 1974 | (48.7)% | (26.4)% |
| 1975 | 2.5% | 37.2% |
| 1976 | 129.3% | 23.6% |
| 1977 | 46.8% | (7.4)% |
| 1978 | 14.5% | 6.4% |
| 1979 | 102.5% | 18.2% |
| 1980 | 32.8% | 32.3% |
| 1981 | 31.8% | (5.0)% |
| 1982 | 38.4% | 21.4% |
| 1983 | 69.0% | 22.4% |
| 1984 | (2.7)% | 6.1% |
| 1985 | 93.7% | 31.6% |
| 1986 | 14.2% | 18.6% |
| 1987 | 4.6% | 5.1% |
| 1988 | 59.3% | 16.6% |
| 1989 | 84.6% | 31.7% |
| 1990 | (23.1)% | (3.1)% |
| 1991 | 35.6% | 30.5% |
| 1992 | 29.8% | 7.6% |
| 1993 | 38.9% | 10.1% |
| 1994 | 25.0% | 1.3% |
# 1995–2024 年度增长率
| 年份 | 伯克希尔每股市值增长率 | 标普500指数（含股息） |
|---|---|---|
| 1995 | 57.4% | 37.6% |
| 1996 | 6.2% | 23.0% |
| 1997 | 34.9% | 33.4% |
| 1998 | 52.2% | 28.6% |
| 1999 | (19.9)% | 21.0% |
| 2000 | 26.6% | (9.1)% |
| 2001 | 6.5% | (11.9)% |
| 2002 | (3.8)% | (22.1)% |
| 2003 | 15.8% | 28.7% |
| 2004 | 4.3% | 10.9% |
| 2005 | 0.8% | 4.9% |
| 2006 | 24.1% | 15.8% |
| 2007 | 28.7% | 5.5% |
| 2008 | (31.8)% | (37.0)% |
| 2009 | 2.7% | 26.5% |
| 2010 | 21.4% | 15.1% |
| 2011 | (4.7)% | 2.1% |
| 2012 | 16.8% | 16.0% |
| 2013 | 32.7% | 32.4% |
| 2014 | 27.0% | 13.7% |
| 2015 | (12.5)% | 1.4% |
| 2016 | 23.4% | 12.0% |
| 2017 | 21.9% | 21.8% |
| 2018 | 2.8% | (4.4)% |
| 2019 | 11.0% | 31.5% |
| 2020 | 2.4% | 18.4% |
| 2021 | 29.6% | 28.7% |
| 2022 | 4.0% | (18.1)% |
| 2023 | 15.8% | 26.3% |
| 2024 | 25.5% | 25.0% |
# 关键指标
| 指标 | 伯克希尔 | 标普500指数 |
|---|---|---|
| 1965-2024复合年化收益 | 19.9% | 10.4% |
| 1964-2024累计总收益 | 5,502,284% | 39,054% |
# 注释
- 数据基于日历年份，但以下例外：
- 1965年和1966年：财年结束时间为9月30日；
- 1967年：15个月数据，截止1967年12月31日。