1984年巴菲特致股东的信

# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东)

Our gain in net worth during 1984 was $152.6 million, or $133 per share. This sounds pretty good but actually it’s mediocre. Economic gains must be evaluated by comparison with the capital that produces them. Our twenty-year compounded annual gain in book value has been 22.1% (from $19.46 in 1964 to $1108.77 in 1984), but our gain in 1984 was only 13.6%.

1984年，我们的净资产增长了1.526亿美元，即每股增长133美元。这个数字听起来不错，但实际上只能算平庸。衡量经济收益，必须将其与产生收益的资本进行对比。过去20年，我们每股账面价值的复合年增长率为22.1%（从1964年的19.46美元增长至1984年的1108.77美元），而1984年的增长率仅为13.6%。

As we discussed last year, the gain in per-share intrinsic business value is the economic measurement that really counts. But calculations of intrinsic business value are subjective. In our case, book value serves as a useful, although somewhat understated, proxy. In my judgment, intrinsic business value and book value increased during 1984 at about the same rate.

正如我们去年所讨论的，每股内在商业价值的增长才是真正重要的经济衡量指标。但内在商业价值的计算具有主观性。对我们而言，账面价值虽略有低估，却是一个有用的替代指标。在我看来，1984年我们的内在商业价值与账面价值的增长率基本持平。

Using my academic voice, I have told you in the past of the drag that a mushrooming capital base exerts upon rates of return. Unfortunately, my academic voice is now giving way to a reportorial voice. Our historical 22% rate is just that - history. To earn even 15% annually over the next decade (assuming we continue to follow our present dividend policy, about which more will be said later in this letter) we would need profits aggregating about $3.9 billion. Accomplishing this will require a few big ideas - small ones just won’t do. Charlie Munger, my partner in general management, and I do not have any such ideas at present, but our experience has been that they pop up occasionally. (How’s that for a strategic plan?)

过去，我曾以学术化的口吻向大家说明，不断扩大的资本基数会对回报率产生拖累。遗憾的是，现在我不得不以纪实的口吻来陈述事实：我们过去22%的增长率已成为历史。即便在未来十年，假设我们继续执行当前的股息政策（本信后续将对此展开更多讨论），要实现每年15%的增长率，我们仍需累计实现约39亿美元的利润。要达成这一目标，必须依靠几个重大举措——小打小闹根本无济于事。我的通用管理合伙人查理·芒格（Charlie Munger）与我目前尚未有此类重大构想，但根据我们的经验，这类构想偶尔会突然出现。（这样的战略规划听起来如何？）

# Sources of Reported Earnings (财报收益来源)

The table on the following page shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. Berkshire’s net ownership interest in many of the constituent businesses changed at midyear 1983 when the Blue Chip merger took place. Because of these changes, the first two columns of the table provide the best measure of underlying business performance.

下一页的表格列出了伯克希尔财报收益的来源。1983年年中，随着蓝筹邮票公司（Blue Chip）的合并，我们在多家组成企业中的净持股比例发生了变化。鉴于这些变化，表格中前两列的数据最能反映基础业务的实际表现。

All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions on the line near the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings. (We regard any annual figure for realized capital gains or losses as meaningless, but we regard the aggregate realized and unrealized capital gains over a period of years as very important.)

任何业务实体因非经常性资产出售所产生的重大损益，均与证券交易损益一同计入表格底部的相关项目，不纳入营业收益。（我们认为，单年度的已实现资本利得或损失数据毫无意义，但多年度的已实现与未实现资本利得总和则至关重要。）

Furthermore, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix to my letter in the 1983 annual report, is set forth as a separate item.

此外，商誉摊销不会计入特定业务的成本，而是作为一个单独项目列示，其原因已在我1983年年度报告的附录中说明。

（单位：千美元，省略千位）	----------------------------------------------------------
	税前收益（Earnings Before Income Taxes）
	总计（Total）
	1984年
---	---
营业收益（Operating Earnings）：
保险集团（Insurance Group）：
- 承保业务（Underwriting）	$(48,060)
- 净投资收益（Net Investment Income）	68,903
布法罗新闻（Buffalo News）	27,328
内布拉斯加家具商城（Nebraska Furniture Mart）(1)	14,511
喜诗糖果（See’s Candies）	26,644
联合零售商店（Associated Retail Stores）	(1,072)
蓝筹邮票公司（Blue Chip Stamps）(2)	(1,843)
互助储蓄与贷款（Mutual Savings and Loan）	1,456
精密钢铁（Precision Steel）	4,092
纺织业务（Textiles）	418
韦斯科金融（Wesco Financial）	9,777
商誉摊销（Amortization of Goodwill）	(1,434)
债务利息（Interest on Debt）	(14,734)
股东指定捐赠（Shareholder-Designated Contributions）	(3,179)
其他（Other）	4,932
---	---
营业收益小计（Operating Earnings）	87,739
GEICO特别分配（Special GEICO Distribution）	--
通用食品特别分配（Special Gen. Foods Distribution）	8,111
证券出售及非经常性资产出售（Sales of securities and unusual sales of assets）	104,699
---	---
所有实体总收益（Total Earnings - all entities）	$200,549
---	---

(1) 1983年数据为10月至12月的季度数据。
(2) 1984年与1983年数据不具可比性；1983年年中蓝筹邮票公司合并时，其主要资产已进行转移。

Sharp-eyed shareholders will notice that the amount of the special GEICO distribution and its location in the table have been changed from the presentation of last year. Though they reclassify and reduce “accounting” earnings, the changes are entirely of form, not of substance. The story behind the changes, however, is interesting.

目光敏锐的股东可能会发现，GEICO特别分配的金额及其在表格中的列示位置与去年有所不同。尽管这些调整重新分类并降低了“会计层面”的收益，但本质上只是形式变化，不涉及实质内容。不过，这一调整背后的故事颇为有趣。

As reported last year: (1) in mid-1983 GEICO made a tender offer to buy its own shares; (2) at the same time, we agreed by written contract to sell GEICO an amount of its shares that would be proportionately related to the aggregate number of shares GEICO repurchased via the tender from all other shareholders; (3) at completion of the tender, we delivered 350,000 shares to GEICO, received $21 million cash, and were left owning exactly the same percentage of GEICO that we owned before the tender; (4) GEICO’s transaction with us amounted to a proportionate redemption, an opinion rendered us, without qualification, by a leading law firm; (5) the Tax Code logically regards such proportionate redemptions as substantially equivalent to dividends and, therefore, the $21 million we received was taxed at only the 6.9% inter-corporate dividend rate; (6) importantly, that $21 million was far less than the previously-undistributed earnings that had inured to our ownership in GEICO and, thus, from the standpoint of economic substance, was in our view equivalent to a dividend.

正如去年所披露的：（1）1983年年中，GEICO发起要约收购自身股份；（2）与此同时，我们通过书面合同约定，向GEICO出售的股份数量，将与GEICO通过要约从其他所有股东处回购的股份总数成比例；（3）要约收购完成后，我们向GEICO交付了35万股股份，收到2100万美元现金，且我们在GEICO的持股比例与收购前完全一致；（4）一家顶尖律师事务所明确出具意见，认为GEICO与我们的此次交易属于“按比例赎回”；（5）税法合理地将此类按比例赎回视为与股息实质等同，因此我们收到的2100万美元仅按6.9%的公司间股息税率缴税；（6）重要的是，这2100万美元远低于我们在GEICO持股期间累积的未分配利润，因此从经济实质角度看，我们认为其等同于股息。

Because it was material and unusual, we highlighted the GEICO distribution last year to you, both in the applicable quarterly report and in this section of the annual report. Additionally, we emphasized the transaction to our auditors, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. Both the Omaha office of Peat Marwick and the reviewing Chicago partner, without objection, concurred with our dividend presentation.

由于该交易金额重大且性质特殊，去年我们在相关季度报告及年度报告的本部分中，均特别向大家强调了GEICO的这笔分配。此外，我们还向审计机构毕马威会计师事务所（Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.）重点说明该交易。毕马威奥马哈分所及负责复核的芝加哥合伙人均无异议，认可我们将其列为股息的列报方式。

In 1984, we had a virtually identical transaction with General Foods. The only difference was that General Foods repurchased its stock over a period of time in the open market, whereas GEICO had made a “one-shot” tender offer. In the General Foods case we sold to the company, on each day that it repurchased shares, a quantity of shares that left our ownership percentage precisely unchanged. Again our transaction was pursuant to a written contract executed before repurchases began. And again the money we received was far less than the retained earnings that had inured to our ownership interest since our purchase. Overall we received $21,843,601 in cash from General Foods, and our ownership remained at exactly 8.75%.

1984年，我们与通用食品公司（General Foods）进行了一笔几乎完全相同的交易。唯一的区别在于，通用食品通过公开市场分阶段回购股份，而GEICO则是通过“一次性”要约收购。在通用食品的交易中，其每回购一天股份，我们就向其出售相应数量的股份，确保我们的持股比例始终保持不变。此次交易同样依据回购开始前签署的书面合同执行，且我们收到的款项仍远低于自持股以来累积的留存收益。最终，我们从通用食品获得了21,843,601美元现金，持股比例仍维持在8.75%。

At this point the New York office of Peat Marwick came into the picture. Late in 1984 it indicated that it disagreed with the conclusions of the firm’s Omaha office and Chicago reviewing partner. The New York view was that the GEICO and General Foods transactions should be treated as sales of stock by Berkshire rather than as the receipt of dividends. Under this accounting approach, a portion of the cost of our investment in the stock of each company would be charged against the redemption payment and any gain would be shown as a capital gain, not as dividend income. This is an accounting approach only, having no bearing on taxes: Peat Marwick agrees that the transactions were dividends for IRS purposes.

此时，毕马威纽约分所介入了此事。1984年末，该分所表示不认同奥马哈分所及芝加哥复核合伙人的结论。纽约分所认为，GEICO与通用食品的交易应被视为伯克希尔出售股票，而非收取股息。按照这一会计处理方式，我们对每家公司股票投资成本的一部分需从赎回款项中扣除，产生的收益应列为资本利得，而非股息收入。这仅为会计处理方式的差异，与税务无关：毕马威也认可，从美国国税局（IRS）的角度，这些交易仍属于股息性质。

We disagree with the New York position from both the viewpoint of economic substance and proper accounting. But, to avoid a qualified auditor’s opinion, we have adopted herein Peat Marwick’s 1984 view and restated 1983 accordingly. None of this, however, has any effect on intrinsic business value: our ownership interests in GEICO and General Foods, our cash, our taxes, and the market value and tax basis of our holdings all remain the same.

无论从经济实质还是恰当会计处理的角度，我们都不认同纽约分所的立场。但为避免审计意见被附带保留条款，我们在本报告中采用了毕马威1984年的观点，并相应重述了1983年的数据。然而，这一切均不影响内在商业价值：我们在GEICO和通用食品的持股

The other benefit of repurchases is less subject to precise measurement but can be fully as important over time. By making repurchases when a company’s market value is well below its business value, management clearly demonstrates that it is given to actions that enhance the wealth of shareholders, rather than to actions that expand management’s domain but that do nothing for (or even harm) shareholders. Seeing this, shareholders and potential shareholders increase their estimates of future returns from the business. This upward revision, in turn, produces market prices more in line with intrinsic business value. These prices are entirely rational. Investors should pay more for a business that is lodged in the hands of a manager with demonstrated pro-shareholder leanings than for one in the hands of a self-interested manager marching to a different drummer. (To make the point extreme, how much would you pay to be a minority shareholder of a company controlled by Robert Wesco?)

股票回购的另一项益处虽难以精确衡量，但长期来看其重要性毫不逊色。当公司市值远低于其商业价值时进行回购，管理层相当于明确表明，他们会采取提升股东财富的行动，而非一味扩张管理层自身权力范围、却对股东毫无益处（甚至造成损害）的行动。看到这一点，现有股东及潜在股东会提高对公司未来回报的预期。这种预期上调进而会推动股价更贴近内在商业价值，而这样的股价完全是合理的。对于由经事实证明倾向于股东利益的管理者掌控的企业，投资者理应比为受只顾自身利益、我行我素的管理者掌控的企业支付更高价格。（举个极端的例子，若一家公司由罗伯特·韦斯科（Robert Wesco）掌控，你愿意为其少数股东权益支付多少对价？）

The key word is “demonstrated”. A manager who consistently turns his back on repurchases, when these clearly are in the interests of owners, reveals more than he knows of his motivations. No matter how often or how eloquently he mouths some public relations-inspired phrase such as “maximizing shareholder wealth” (this season’s favorite), the market correctly discounts assets lodged with him. His heart is not listening to his mouth - and, after a while, neither will the market.

关键在于“经事实证明”。若管理者在回购明显符合股东利益时，仍一贯拒绝采取这一行动，其真实动机将暴露无遗，即便他自己可能并未察觉。无论他多么频繁、多么动听地念叨那些公关话术，比如“最大化股东财富”（当下最热门的说法），市场仍会理性地对其掌控的资产进行折价。他的内心并未听从口中的言辞——久而久之，市场也不会再听信。

We have prospered in a very major way - as have other shareholders - by the large share repurchases of GEICO, Washington Post, and General Foods, our three largest holdings. (Exxon, in which we have our fourth largest holding, has also wisely and aggressively repurchased shares but, in this case, we have only recently established our position.) In each of these companies, shareholders have had their interests in outstanding businesses materially enhanced by repurchases made at bargain prices. We feel very comfortable owning interests in businesses such as these that offer excellent economics combined with shareholder-conscious managements.

得益于我们三大重仓股——GEICO、《华盛顿邮报》（Washington Post）和通用食品的大规模股票回购，我们与其他股东都获得了丰厚回报。（我们的第四大重仓股埃克森（Exxon）也明智且积极地进行了股票回购，但我们是近期才建立该持仓的。）在这几家公司中，管理层以低廉价格回购股票，显著提升了股东在优质企业中的权益价值。持有这类兼具出色经济效益与股东意识的管理层所管理的企业股权，我们感到非常安心。

The following table shows our 1984 yearend net holdings in marketable equities. All numbers exclude the interests attributable to minority shareholders of Wesco and Nebraska Furniture Mart.

下表列出了我们1984年末持有的可流通股票净额。所有数据均不包含韦斯科（Wesco）和内布拉斯加家具商城（Nebraska Furniture Mart）少数股东应享有的权益。

持股数量（No. of Shares）	公司名称（Company Name）	成本（Cost）（单位：千美元，省略千位）	市值（Market）（单位：千美元，省略千位）
690,975	关联出版公司（Affiliated Publications, Inc.）	$ 3,516	$ 32,908
740,400	美国广播公司（American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.）	44,416	46,738
3,895,710	埃克森公司（Exxon Corporation）	173,401	175,307
4,047,191	通用食品公司（General Foods Corporation）	149,870	226,137
6,850,000	GEICO公司（GEICO Corporation）	45,713	397,300
2,379,200	汉迪-哈曼公司（Handy & Harman）	27,318	38,662
818,872	英特帕布利克集团（Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc.）	2,570	28,149
555,949	西北工业公司（Northwest Industries）	26,581	27,242
2,553,488	时代公司（Time, Inc.）	89,327	109,162
1,868,600	《华盛顿邮报》公司（The Washington Post Company）	10,628	149,955
		----------	----------
	上述股票小计	$ 573,340	$ 1,231,560
	其他所有普通股（All Other Common Stockholdings）	11,634	37,326
		----------	----------
	普通股总计（Total Common Stocks）	$ 584,974	$ 1,268,886
		==========	==========

It’s been over ten years since it has been as difficult as now to find equity investments that meet both our qualitative standards and our quantitative standards of value versus price. We try to avoid compromise of these standards, although we find doing nothing the most difficult task of all. (One English statesman attributed his country’s greatness in the nineteenth century to a policy of “masterly inactivity”. This is a strategy that is far easier for historians to commend than for participants to follow.)

近十年来，从未像现在这样难以找到同时符合我们定性标准与价值价格比定量标准的股票投资标的。我们努力避免在这些标准上妥协，尽管我们发现“无所作为”是所有任务中最难的一件。（英国有位政治家将该国在19世纪的辉煌归功于“高明的不作为”政策。这种策略，历史学家称赞起来容易，亲身实践者却难以效仿。）

In addition to the figures supplied at the beginning of this section, information regarding the businesses we own appears in Management’s Discussion on pages 42-47. An amplified discussion of Wesco’s businesses appears in Charlie Munger’s report on pages 50-59. You will find particularly interesting his comments about conditions in the thrift industry. Our other major controlled businesses are Nebraska Furniture Mart, See’s, Buffalo Evening News, and the Insurance Group, to which we will give some special attention here.

除本节开头提供的数据外，关于我们旗下业务的更多信息，请参见第42-47页的“管理层讨论与分析”部分。关于韦斯科业务的详细讨论，可参见第50-59页查理·芒格（Charlie Munger）的报告，其中他对储蓄贷款行业状况的评论尤为值得关注。我们其他主要控股企业包括内布拉斯加家具商城、喜诗糖果（See’s）、《布法罗晚报》（Buffalo Evening News）及保险集团，下文将重点介绍这些业务。

# Nebraska Furniture Mart (内布拉斯加家具商城)

Last year I introduced you to Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin) and her family. I told you they were terrific, and I understated the case. After another year of observing their remarkable talents and character, I can honestly say that I never have seen a managerial group that either functions or behaves better than the Blumkin family.

去年我向大家介绍了B夫人（罗斯·布卢姆金，Rose Blumkin）及其家族。当时我说他们非常出色，现在看来这还远远不够。经过又一年的观察，目睹他们卓越的才能与品格后，我可以坦诚地说，我从未见过比布卢姆金家族更优秀的管理团队，无论是在业务运营还是为人处世方面。

Mrs. B, Chairman of the Board, is now 91, and recently was quoted in the local newspaper as saying, “I come home to eat and sleep, and that’s about it. I can’t wait until it gets daylight so I can get back to the business”. Mrs. B is at the store seven days a week, from opening to close, and probably makes more decisions in a day than most CEOs do in a year (better ones, too).

现年91岁的B夫人担任公司董事长，最近当地报纸援引她的话说：“我回家就只是吃饭睡觉，除此之外别无他事。我巴不得天快点亮，好回到店里工作。”B夫人每周七天都在店里，从开门到打烊全程在岗，她一天做出的决策数量可能比大多数CEO一年的决策还多（而且质量更高）。

In May Mrs. B was granted an Honorary Doctorate in Commercial Science by New York University. (She’s a “fast track” student: not one day in her life was spent in a school room prior to her receipt of the doctorate.) Previous recipients of honorary degrees in business from NYU include Clifton Garvin, Jr., CEO of Exxon Corp.; Walter Wriston, then CEO of Citicorp; Frank Cary, then CEO of IBM; Tom Murphy, then CEO of General Motors; and, most recently, Paul Volcker. (They are in good company.)

今年5月，B夫人被纽约大学授予商业科学荣誉博士学位。（她可谓“速成”学生：在获得该学位之前，她从未在学校里读过一天书。）此前获得纽约大学商业领域荣誉学位的人士包括埃克森公司首席执行官小克利夫顿·加文（Clifton Garvin, Jr.）、时任花旗集团（Citicorp）首席执行官沃尔特·里斯顿（Walter Wriston）、时任IBM首席执行官弗兰克·卡里（Frank Cary）、时任通用汽车首席执行官汤姆·墨菲（Tom Murphy），以及最近的保罗·沃尔克（Paul Volcker）。（B夫人与这些杰出人士并列，实至名归。）

The Blumkin blood did not run thin. Louie, Mrs. B’s son, and his three boys, Ron, Irv, and Steve, all contribute in full measure to NFM’s amazing success. The younger generation has attended the best business school of them all - that conducted by Mrs. B and Louie - and their training is evident in their performance.

布卢姆金家族的优秀基因一脉相承。B夫人的儿子路易（Louie）及其三个儿子罗恩（Ron）、欧文（Irv）和史蒂夫（Steve），都为内布拉斯加家具商城的辉煌成就付出了全部努力。年轻一代都毕业于“最好的商学院”——由B夫人和路易亲自授课的实战课堂，他们的能力在业绩中体现得淋漓尽致。

Last year NFM’s net sales increased by $14.3 million, bringing the total to $115 million, all from the one store in Omaha. That is by far the largest volume produced by a single home furnishings store in the United States. In fact, the gain in sales last year was itself greater than the annual volume of many good-sized successful stores. The business achieves this success because it deserves this success. A few figures will tell you why.

去年，内布拉斯加家具商城的净销售额增长了1430万美元，总销售额达1.15亿美元，且全部来自奥马哈的一家门店。这是目前美国单一家居用品店的最高销售额。事实上，其去年的销售额增量，就超过了许多规模可观的成功门店的年销售额总和。这份成功实至名归，以下数据将说明原因。

In its fiscal 1984 10-K, the largest independent specialty retailer of home furnishings in the country, Levitz Furniture, described its prices as “generally lower than the prices charged by conventional furniture stores in its trading area”. Levitz, in that year, operated at a gross margin of 44.4% (that is, on average, customers paid it $100 for merchandise that had cost it $55.60 to buy). The gross margin at NFM is not much more than half of that. NFM’s low mark-ups are possible because of its exceptional efficiency: operating expenses (payroll, occupancy, advertising, etc.) are about 16.5% of sales versus 35.6% at Levitz.

美国最大的独立家居用品专业零售商莱维茨家具（Levitz Furniture）在其1984财年10-K报告中称，其价格“通常低于所在商圈内传统家具店的定价”。该公司当年的毛利率为44.4%（即客户平均支付100美元购买的商品，其成本仅为55.60美元）。而内布拉斯加家具商城的毛利率还不到这个数字的一半。之所以能维持低加价，是因为其运营效率极高：运营费用（薪资、场地租金、广告等）占销售额的比例约为16.5%，而莱维茨这一比例为35.6%。

None of this is in criticism of Levitz, which has a well-managed operation. But the NFM operation is simply extraordinary (and, remember, it all comes from a $500 investment by Mrs. B in 1937). By unparalleled efficiency and astute volume purchasing, NFM is able to earn excellent returns on capital while saving its customers at least $30 million annually from what, on average, it would cost them to buy the same merchandise at stores maintaining typical mark-ups. Such savings enable NFM to constantly widen its geographical reach and thus to enjoy growth well beyond the natural growth of the Omaha market.

这并非对莱维茨的批评，该公司的运营管理同样出色。但内布拉斯加家具商城的运营水平堪称非凡（要知道，这一切都始于1937年B夫人500美元的投资）。凭借无可比拟的效率和明智的大批量采购，内布拉斯加家具商城既能实现出色的资本回报率，又能为客户节省开支——若客户在保持常规加价的门店购买相同商品，年均多支出的费用至少达3000万美元。这种价格优势使其客户辐射范围不断扩大，从而实现远超奥马哈市场自然增长速度的业务扩张。

I have been asked by a number of people just what secrets the Blumkins bring to their business. These are not very esoteric. All members of the family: (1) apply themselves with an enthusiasm and energy that would make Ben Franklin and Horatio Alger look like dropouts; (2) define with extraordinary realism their area of special competence and act decisively on all matters within it; (3) ignore even the most enticing propositions failing outside of that area of special competence; and, (4) unfailingly behave in a high-grade manner with everyone they deal with. (Mrs. B boils it down to “sell cheap and tell the truth”.)

很多人问我，布卢姆金家族经营业务的秘诀是什么。其实这些秘诀并不深奥。家族所有成员都做到了以下几点：（1）以极大的热情和精力投入工作，即便本杰明·富兰克林（Ben Franklin）和霍雷肖·阿尔杰（Horatio Alger）（注：二者均为美国励志人物代表）在他们面前，也会显得像“后进生”；（2）以极强的现实感明确自身的专长领域，并在该领域内的所有事务上果断行动；（3）即便超出专长领域的机会再诱人，也坚决不予理会；（4）与所有打交道的人相处时，始终保持高尚的品行。（B夫人将其总结为“低价销售，诚信经营”。）

Our evaluation of the integrity of Mrs. B and her family was demonstrated when we purchased 90% of the business: NFM had never had an audit and we did not request one; we did not take an inventory nor verify the receivables; we did not check property titles. We gave Mrs. B a check for $55 million and she gave us her word. That made for an even exchange.

我们收购该公司90%股权时的做法，足以体现我们对B夫人及其家族诚信的信任：内布拉斯加家具商城从未进行过审计，我们也没有要求审计；我们没有盘点库存，没有核实应收账款，也没有核查财产所有权。我们给了B夫人一张5500万美元的支票，她则向我们做出了承诺。这是一场公平的交易。

You and I are fortunate to be in partnership with the Blumkin family.

能与布卢姆金家族成为合作伙伴，你我都十分幸运。

# See’s Candy Shops, Inc. (喜诗糖果公司)

Below is our usual recap of See’s performance since the time of purchase by Blue Chip Stamps:

以下是喜诗糖果自被蓝筹邮票公司（Blue Chip Stamps）收购以来的业绩回顾，与往年格式一致：

# | 52-53周财年（52-53 Week Year）
截至12月31日左右（Ended About December 31） | 销售额（Sales Revenues） | 税后利润（Operating Profits After

股票回购的另一项益处虽难以精确衡量，但长期来看可能同样重要。当公司市值远低于其商业价值时进行回购，管理层相当于明确表明，他们会采取提升股东财富的行动，而非选择扩张管理层权力范围却对股东毫无益处（甚至造成损害）的举措。看到这一点，现有股东和潜在股东都会上调对公司未来回报的预期。这种上调进而会推动股价更贴近内在商业价值，这样的股价完全合理。对于由已证明倾向于股东利益的管理者掌控的企业，投资者理应支付更高价格，而非选择由只顾自身利益、与股东目标背道而驰的管理者掌控的企业。（换个极端的说法，若一家公司由罗伯特·韦斯科（Robert Wesco）掌控，你愿意为其少数股权支付多少代价？）

关键在于“已证明”这三个字。若在回购明显符合股东利益的情况下，管理者仍始终拒绝回购，其真实动机便会不自觉地暴露。无论他多么频繁、多么动听地念叨那些公关话术，比如“实现股东财富最大化”（本赛季的热门说法），市场都会理性地对其掌控的资产进行折价。他的内心并未与口中的承诺保持一致——久而久之，市场也不会再相信他的言辞。

得益于我们三大重仓股——GEICO、《华盛顿邮报》（Washington Post）和通用食品的大规模股票回购，我们与其他股东都获得了丰厚回报。（我们的第四大重仓股埃克森（Exxon）也明智且积极地进行了股票回购，但我们是近期才建立该持仓的。）在这些公司中，通过以低价回购股票，股东在优质企业中的权益均得到了实质性提升。能够持有这类兼具出色经济效益与股东意识的管理层的企业股权，我们感到非常安心。

The following table shows our 1984 yearend net holdings in marketable equities. All numbers exclude the interests attributable to minority shareholders of Wesco and Nebraska Furniture Mart.

持股数量（No. of Shares）	公司名称（Company Name）	成本（Cost）（单位：千美元，省略千位）	市值（Market）（单位：千美元，省略千位）
690,975	关联出版公司（Affiliated Publications, Inc.）	$ 3,516	$ 32,908
740,400	美国广播公司（American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.）	44,416	46,738
3,895,710	埃克森公司（Exxon Corporation）	173,401	175,307
4,047,191	通用食品公司（General Foods Corporation）	149,870	226,137
6,850,000	GEICO公司（GEICO Corporation）	45,713	397,300
2,379,200	汉迪-哈曼公司（Handy & Harman）	27,318	38,662
818,872	英特帕布利克集团（Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc.）	2,570	28,149
555,949	西北工业公司（Northwest Industries）	26,581	27,242
2,553,488	时代公司（Time, Inc.）	89,327	109,162
1,868,600	《华盛顿邮报》公司（The Washington Post Company）	10,628	149,955
		----------	----------
	小计（Subtotal）	$ 573,340	$ 1,231,560
	其他所有普通股持仓（All Other Common Stockholdings）	11,634	37,326
		----------	----------
	普通股总计（Total Common Stocks）	$ 584,974	$ 1,268,886
		==========	==========

近十多年来，从未像现在这样难以找到同时符合我们定性标准与“价值-价格”定量标准的股票投资标的。我们努力避免在这些标准上妥协，尽管我们发现“按兵不动”是所有任务中最难的一件事。（一位英国政治家将其国家在19世纪的辉煌归功于“高明的不作为”政策。这种策略对历史学家而言极易称赞，但对实践者来说却极难遵循。）

除本节开头提供的数据外，关于我们所持有企业的更多信息，可参见第42-47页的“管理层讨论与分析”部分。关于韦斯科业务的详细讨论，可见查理·芒格（Charlie Munger）报告的第50-59页，其中他对储蓄贷款行业现状的评论尤其值得关注。我们其他主要控股企业包括内布拉斯加家具商城、喜诗糖果、《布法罗晚报》和保险集团，下文将对这些企业予以重点介绍。

# Nebraska Furniture Mart (内布拉斯加家具商城)

去年我向大家介绍了B夫人（罗斯·布鲁姆金，Rose Blumkin）及其家族。当时我说他们非常出色，但如今看来，那还远远不够。经过又一年对他们卓越才能与品格的观察，我可以坦诚地说，我从未见过比布鲁姆金家族更优秀的管理团队——无论是在业务运营还是行事风格上。

现年91岁的B夫人是公司董事长，最近当地报纸援引她的话说：“我回家就只是吃饭和睡觉，仅此而已。我迫不及待地盼着天亮，这样就能回到工作中去了。”B夫人每周七天都在店里，从开门营业到打烊关门全程在岗，她一天内做出的决策数量，可能比大多数CEO一年做出的还要多（而且决策质量也更高）。

今年5月，纽约大学授予B夫人商业科学荣誉博士学位。（她堪称“速成”学生：在获得该学位之前，她从未在学校里读过一天书。）此前获得纽约大学商业领域荣誉学位的人士包括：埃克森公司CEO小克利夫顿·加文（Clifton Garvin, Jr.）、时任花旗集团CEO沃尔特·里斯顿（Walter Wriston）、时任IBM CEO弗兰克·卡里（Frank Cary）、时任通用汽车CEO汤姆·墨菲（Tom Murphy），以及最近的保罗·沃尔克（Paul Volcker）。（能与这些人并列，足以说明其分量。）

布鲁姆金家族的优秀基因从未褪色。B夫人的儿子路易（Louie），以及路易的三个儿子罗恩（Ron）、欧文（Irv）和史蒂夫（Steve），都为内布拉斯加家具商城的辉煌成就倾注了全部力量。年轻一代都就读过“最好的商学院”——那是由B夫人和路易亲自授课的“家族商学院”，他们的能力在业绩中体现得淋漓尽致。

去年，内布拉斯加家具商城的净销售额增长了1430万美元，总销售额达1.15亿美元——这全部来自奥马哈的一家门店。这是目前美国单一家居用品商店的最高销售额。事实上，该商城去年的销售额增量，就超过了许多规模可观且运营成功的商店的年销售额。它能取得这样的成功，完全是实至名归。以下几组数据将说明原因。

美国最大的独立家居用品专业零售商莱维茨家具（Levitz Furniture）在其1984财年的10-K报告中称，其价格“通常低于所在商圈内传统家具店的定价”。该公司当年的毛利率为44.4%（也就是说，顾客平均支付100美元购买的商品，其成本仅为55.60美元）。而内布拉斯加家具商城的毛利率还不到这个数字的一半。之所以能维持低加价，是因为其运营效率极高：运营费用（薪资、场地租赁、广告等）占销售额的比例约为16.5%，而莱维茨的这一比例为35.6%。

这并非是在批评莱维茨——它本身也是一家管理出色的企业。但内布拉斯加家具商城的运营水平堪称非凡（要知道，这一切都始于1937年B夫人500美元的投资）。凭借无可匹敌的效率和精明的批量采购策略，该商城在为股东创造出色资本回报的同时，每年还能为顾客节省至少3000万美元——这是顾客在保持常规加价的商店购买同等商品所需支付的平均费用。这种价格优势使其不断扩大地理辐射范围，从而实现远超奥马哈市场自然增长速度的业务扩张。

很多人问我，布鲁姆金家族经营企业的秘诀是什么。其实这些秘诀并不深奥。家族所有成员都做到了以下几点：（1）投入的热情与精力极为充沛，即便与本杰明·富兰克林（Ben Franklin）和霍雷肖·阿尔杰（Horatio Alger）相比，也会让后两者显得像“懒人”；（2）以极强的现实感明确自身的专长领域，对该领域内的所有事务都果断决策；（3）即便超出专长领域的机会再诱人，也会坚决拒绝；（4）与所有业务伙伴打交道时，始终保持高尚的行事风格。（B夫人将其总结为“低价销售，诚信经营”。）

我们对B夫人及其家族诚信的信任，在收购该公司90%股权时体现得淋漓尽致：内布拉斯加家具商城从未进行过审计，我们也没有要求做审计；我们没有盘点库存，没有核实应收账款，也没有核查财产所有权。我们给了B夫人一张5500万美元的支票，她则给了我们一句承诺。这是一场公平的交易。

You and I are fortunate to be in partnership with the Blumkin family.

能与布鲁姆金家族成为合作伙伴，你我都十分幸运。

# See’s Candy Shops, Inc. (喜诗糖果店公司)

Below is our usual recap of See’s performance since the time of purchase by Blue Chip Stamps:

以下是喜诗糖果自被蓝筹邮票公司（Blue Chip Stamps）收购以来的业绩回顾，与往年格式一致：

截至12月31日的财年（52-53周）（52-53 Week Year Ended About December 31）	销售额（Sales Revenues）	税后营业利润（Operating Profits After Taxes）	糖果销售量（磅）（Number of Pounds of Candy Sold）	年末门店数量（Number of Stores Open at Year End）
1984年	$135,946,000	$13,380,000	24,759,000	214
1983年（53周）	$133,531,000	$13,699,000	24,651,000	207
1982年	$123,662,000	$11,875,000	24,216,000	202
1981年	$112,578,000	$10,779,000	24,052,000	199
1980年	$97,715,000	$7,547,000	24,065,000	191
1979年	$87,314,000	$6,330,000	23,985,000	188
1978年	$73,653,000	$6,178,000	22,407,000	182
1977年	$62,886,000	$6,154,000	20,921,000	179
1976年（53周）	$56,333,000	$5,569,000	20,553,000	173
1975年	$50,492,000	$5,132,000	19,134,000	172
1974年	$41,248,000	$3,021,000	17,883,000	170
1973年	$35,050,000	$1,940,000	17,813,000	169
1972年	$31,337,000	$2,083,000	16,954,000	167

This performance has not been produced by a generally rising tide. To the contrary, many well-known participants in the boxed-chocolate industry either have lost money in this same period or have been marginally profitable. To our knowledge, only one good-sized competitor has achieved high profitability. The success of See’s reflects the combination of an exceptional product and an exceptional manager, Chuck Huggins.

喜诗的这份业绩并非得益于行业整体的繁荣。相反，在同一时期，盒装巧克力行业的许多知名企业要么处于亏损状态，要么仅实现微薄盈利。据我们所知，该行业中仅有一家规模较大的竞争对手实现了高盈利。喜诗的成功，是卓越产品与卓越管理者查克·哈金斯（Chuck Huggins）共同作用的结果。

During 1984 we increased prices considerably less than has been our practice in recent years: per-pound realization was $5.49, up only 1.4% from 1983. Fortunately, we made good progress on cost control, an area that has caused us problems in recent years. Per-pound costs - other than those for raw materials, a segment of expense largely outside of our control - increased by only 2.2% last year.

1984年，我们的提价幅度远低于近年来的常规水平：每磅糖果的售价为5.49美元，仅比1983年上涨1.4%。幸运的是，我们在成本控制方面取得了良好进展——这是近年来一直困扰我们的领域。去年，除原材料成本（这部分支出很大程度上超出我们的控制范围）外，每磅糖果的其他成本仅增长2.2%。

Our cost-control problem has been exacerbated by the problem of modestly declining volume (measured by pounds, not dollars) on a same-store basis. Total pounds sold through shops in recent years has been maintained at a roughly constant level only by the net addition of a few shops annually. This more-shops-to-get-the-same-volume situation naturally puts heavy pressure on per-pound selling costs.

单店销量（以磅为单位，而非美元）的小幅下滑，进一步加剧了我们的成本控制难题。近年来，门店糖果总销量之所以能维持在大致稳定的水平，完全依赖于每年新增几家门店的净增长。这种“靠增加门店数量维持总销量”的情况，自然会给每磅糖果的销售成本带来巨大压力。

In 1984, same-store volume declined 1.1%. Total shop volume, however, grew 0.6% because of an increase in stores. (Both percentages are adjusted to compensate for a 53-week fiscal year in 1983.)

1984年，单店销量下降1.1%。但得益于门店数量的增加，总销量增长了0.6%。（上述两个百分比均已根据1983年为53周财年的情况进行了调整。）

See’s business tends to get a bit more seasonal each year. In the four weeks prior to Christmas, we do 40% of the year’s volume and earn about 75% of the year’s profits. We also earn significant sums in the Easter and Valentine’s Day periods, but pretty much tread water the rest of the year. In recent years, shop volume at Christmas has grown in relative importance, and so have quantity orders and mail orders. The increased concentration of business in the Christmas period produces a multitude of managerial problems, all of which have been handled by Chuck and his associates with exceptional skill and grace.

喜诗的业务季节性每年都略有增强。在圣诞节前的四周里，我们的销量占全年的40%，利润占全年的75%左右。复活节和情人节期间我们也能获得可观利润，但在一年中的其他时间，业绩基本持平。近年来，圣诞节期间的门店销量占比持续上升，批量订单和邮购订单也呈现同样趋势。业务过度集中在圣诞节期间会引发一系列管理难题，而查克及其团队凭借出色的能力和从容的态度，成功应对了所有挑战。

Their solutions have in no way involved compromises in either quality of service or quality of product. Most of our larger competitors could not say the same. Though faced with somewhat less extreme peaks and valleys in demand than we, they add preservatives or freeze the finished product in order to smooth the production cycle and thereby lower unit costs. We reject such techniques, opting, in effect, for production headaches rather than product modification.

他们在解决问题的过程中，从未在服务质量或产品质量上做出妥协。而我们的大多数大型竞争对手却无法做到这一点。尽管他们面临的需求波动幅度不如我们剧烈，但为了平稳生产周期、降低单位成本，他们会在产品中添加防腐剂或对成品进行冷冻处理。我们坚决拒绝这类做法，事实上，我们宁愿承受生产上的麻烦，也不愿改变产品品质。

Our mall stores face a host of new food and snack vendors that provide particularly strong competition at non-holiday periods. We need new products to fight back and during 1984 we introduced six candy bars that, overall, met with a good reception. Further product introductions are planned.

我们位于购物中心的门店面临着众多新兴食品和零食商家的竞争，尤其在非节假日期间，竞争更为激烈。我们需要推出新产品来应对竞争，1984年我们推出了六款糖果棒，总体反响良好。我们计划在未来继续推出更多新产品。

In 1985 we will intensify our efforts to keep per-pound cost increases below the rate of inflation. Continued success in these efforts, however, will require gains in same-store poundage. Prices in 1985 should average 6% - 7% above those of 1984. Assuming no change in same-store volume, profits should show a moderate gain.

1985年，我们将加大力度，确保每磅糖果的成本增幅低于通货膨胀率。但要持续实现这一目标，必须提高单店销量（以磅为单位）。1985年的平均售价预计比1984年高出6%-7%。若单店销量保持不变，利润应能实现适度增长。

# Buffalo Evening News (《布法罗晚报》)

Profits at the News in 1984 were considerably greater than we expected. As at See’s, excellent progress was made in controlling costs. Excluding hours worked in the newsroom, total hours worked decreased by about 2.8%. With this productivity improvement, overall costs increased only 4.9%. This performance by Stan Lipsey and his management team was one of the best in the industry.

1984年，《布法罗晚报》的利润远超我们的预期。与喜诗一样，我们在成本控制方面取得了显著进展。剔除新闻编辑部的工时后，总工时减少了约2.8%。凭借生产效率的提升，总成本仅增长4.9%。斯坦·利普西（Stan Lipsey）及其管理团队的这一业绩，在行业内堪称顶尖水平。

However, we now face an acceleration in costs. In mid-1984 we entered into new multi-year union contracts that provided for a large “catch-up” wage increase. This catch-up is entirely appropriate: the cooperative spirit of our unions during the unprofitable 1977-1982 period was an important factor in our success in remaining cost competitive with The Courier-Express. Had we not kept costs down, the outcome of that struggle might well have been different.

然而，我们目前面临成本加速上涨的压力。1984年年中，我们签订了新的多年期工会合同，其中包含大幅“追补性”加薪条款。这种追补性加薪完全合理：在1977-1982年亏损期间，工会展现出的合作精神，是我们能够维持成本竞争力、与《信使快报》（The Courier-Express）抗衡并取得成功的重要因素。若当时未能控制成本，那场竞争的结果可能会截然不同。

Because our new union contracts took effect at varying dates, little of the catch-up increase was reflected in our 1984 costs. But the increase will be almost totally effective in 1985 and, therefore, our unit labor costs will rise this year at a rate considerably greater than that of the industry. We expect to mitigate this increase by continued small gains in productivity, but we cannot avoid significantly higher wage costs this year. Newsprint price trends also are less favorable now than they were in 1984. Primarily because of these two factors, we expect at least a minor contraction in margins at the News.

由于新工会合同的生效日期不同，1984年的成本中几乎未体现追补性加薪的影响。但这部分加薪将在1985年完全生效，因此我们今年的单位人工成本增幅将远高于行业平均水平。我们预计通过持续小幅提升生产效率来缓解成本上涨压力，但今年薪资成本大幅增加已不可避免。此外，新闻纸价格走势也不如1984年乐观。主要受这两个因素影响，我们预计《布法罗晚报》的利润率至少会出现小幅收缩。

Working in our favor at the News are two factors of major economic importance:

(1) Our circulation is concentrated to an unusual degree in the area of maximum utility to our advertisers. “Regional” newspapers with wide-ranging circulation, on the other hand, have a significant portion of their circulation in areas that are of negligible utility to most advertisers. A subscriber several hundred miles away is not much of a prospect for the puppy you are offering to sell via a classified ad - nor for the grocer with stores only in the metropolitan area. “Wasted” circulation - as the advertisers call it - hurts profitability: expenses of a newspaper are determined largely by gross circulation while advertising revenues (usually 70% - 80% of total revenues) are responsive only to useful circulation;

(2) Our penetration of the Buffalo retail market is exceptional; advertisers can reach almost all of their potential customers using only the News.

对《布法罗晚报》而言，有两个具有重要经济意义的因素对我们有利：

我们的发行量高度集中在对广告商效用最大的区域。相比之下，“区域性”报纸的发行范围虽广，但有很大一部分发行量集中在对大多数广告商而言效用极低的区域。对于你通过分类广告出售的小狗，或是仅在大都会地区设有门店的杂货店来说，几百英里外的订阅者几乎没有成为客户的可能。广告商所谓的“无效发行量”会损害盈利能力：报纸的成本主要由总发行量决定，而广告收入（通常占总收入的70%-80%）却仅取决于有效发行量；
我们在布法罗零售市场的渗透率极高：广告商只需通过《布法罗晚报》，就能触达几乎所有潜在客户。

Last year I told you about this unusual reader acceptance: among the 100 largest newspapers in the country, we were then number one, daily, and number three, Sunday, in penetration. The most recent figures show us number one in penetration on weekdays and number two on Sunday. (Even so, the number of households in Buffalo has declined, so our current weekday circulation is down slightly; on Sundays it is unchanged.)

去年我曾向大家提及读者对我们的极高认可度：在全美发行量最大的100家报纸中，我们的平日渗透率排名第一，周日渗透率排名第三。最新数据显示，我们的平日渗透率仍居首位，周日渗透率升至第二位。（尽管如此，布法罗的家庭数量有所减少，因此我们目前的平日发行量略有下降，周日发行量则保持不变。）

I told you also that one of the major reasons for this unusual acceptance by readers was the unusual quantity of news that we delivered to them: a greater percentage of our paper is devoted to news than is the case at any other dominant paper in our size range. In 1984 our “news hole” ratio was 50.9%, (versus 50.4% in 1983), a level far above the typical 35% - 40%. We will continue to maintain this ratio in the 50% area. Also, though we last year reduced total hours worked in other departments, we maintained the level of employment in the newsroom and, again, will continue to do so. Newsroom costs advanced 9.1% in 1984, a rise far exceeding our overall cost increase of 4.9%.

我还曾提到，读者对我们高度认可的一个主要原因是我们提供的新闻内容数量异常丰富：与同规模的其他主流报纸相比，我们报纸中用于刊登新闻的版面占比更高。1984年，我们的“新闻版面占比”为50.9%（1983年为50.4%），远高于行业常规的35%-40%。我们将继续把这一比例维持在50%左右。此外，尽管去年我们减少了其他部门的总工时，但仍维持了新闻编辑部的人员规模，未来也将继续保持这一做法。1984年，新闻编辑部的成本增长9.1%，远高于我们4.9%的整体成本增幅。

Our news hole policy costs us significant extra money for newsprint. As a result, our news costs (newsprint for the news hole plus payroll and expenses of the newsroom) as a percentage of revenue run higher than those of most dominant papers of our size. There is adequate room, however, for our paper or any other dominant paper to sustain these costs: the difference between “high” and “low” news costs at papers of comparable size runs perhaps three percentage points while pre-tax profit margins are often ten times that amount.

我们的新闻版面政策使我们在新闻纸上投入了额外的巨额成本。因此，我们的新闻成本（新闻版面所用新闻纸成本加上新闻编辑部的薪资和费用）占收入的比例，高于大多数同规模主流报纸。然而，无论是我们的报纸还是其他任何主流报纸，都有足够的空间承担这些成本：同规模报纸的“高”新闻成本与“低”新闻成本之间的差距约为3个百分点，而税前利润率往往是这一差距的10倍。

The economics of a dominant newspaper are excellent, among the very best in the business world. Owners, naturally, would like to believe that their wonderful profitability is achieved only because they unfailingly turn out a wonderful product. That comfortable theory wilts before an uncomfortable fact. While first-class newspapers make excellent profits, the profits of third-rate papers are as good or better - as long as either class of paper is dominant within its community. Of course, product quality may have been crucial to the paper in achieving dominance. We believe this was the case at the News, in very large part because of people such as Alfred Kirchhofer who preceded us.

主流报纸的经济效益极佳，在商界中位居前列。报纸所有者自然愿意相信，他们出色的盈利能力完全得益于始终如一地提供优质产品。但这一令人心安的理论，在一个令人不安的事实面前不攻自破：无论是一流报纸还是三流报纸，只要能在所在社区占据主导地位，前者能赚取丰厚利润，后者的利润也毫不逊色，甚至更高。当然，产品质量对于报纸获得主导地位可能至关重要。我们认为《布法罗晚报》的情况便是如此，这在很大程度上要归功于阿尔弗雷德·基希霍夫（Alfred Kirchhofer）等前辈的努力。

Once dominant, the newspaper itself, not the marketplace, determines just how good or how bad the paper will be. Good or bad, it will prosper. That is not true of most businesses: inferior quality generally produces inferior economics. But even a poor newspaper is a bargain to most citizens simply because of its “bulletin board” value. Other things being equal, a poor product will not achieve quite the level of readership achieved by a first-class product. A poor product, however, will still remain essential to most citizens, and what commands their attention will command the attention of advertisers.

一旦占据主导地位，报纸自身而非市场，将决定其质量的优劣。无论质量好坏，它都能实现盈利。这与大多数行业不同：在其他行业，劣质产品通常会导致经济效益不佳。但即便报纸质量一般，对大多数民众而言仍极具价值——仅因其“公告栏”属性就足以吸引读者。在其他条件相同的情况下，劣质报纸的发行量或许不及一流报纸，但它对大多数民众而言仍是必需品。而能吸引民众关注的媒介，自然也能吸引广告商的关注。

Since high standards are not imposed by the marketplace, management must impose its own. Our commitment to an above-average expenditure for news represents an important quantitative standard. We have confidence that Stan Lipsey and Murray Light will continue to apply the far-more important qualitative standards. Charlie and I believe that newspapers are very special institutions in society. We are proud of the News, and intend an even greater pride to be justified in the years ahead.

由于市场不会强制要求报纸遵循高标准，管理层必须自行设定标准。我们承诺在新闻内容上投入高于行业平均水平的成本，这是一项重要的量化标准。我们相信斯坦·利普西（Stan Lipsey）和默里·莱特（Murray Light）会继续执行更重要的定性标准。查理和我都认为，报纸是社会中极具特殊性的机构。我们为《布法罗晚报》感到自豪，并期望在未来几年，这份自豪感能有更充分的理由变得更强烈。

# Insurance Operations (保险业务)

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table listing two key figures for the insurance industry:

以下是我们常用表格的更新版本，列出了保险行业的两项关键数据：

年份（Year）	承保保费年度变化率（Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%)）	保单持有人股息后综合比率（Combined Ratio after Policy-holder Dividends）
1972年	10.2	96.2
1973年	8.0	99.2
1974年	6.2	105.4
1975年	11.0	107.9
1976年	21.9	102.4
1977年	19.8	97.2
1978年	12.8	97.5
1979年	10.3	100.6
1980年	6.0	103.1
1981年	3.9	106.0
1982年	4.4	109.7
1983年（修订后）	4.5	111.9
1984年（预估）	8.1	117.7
数据来源（Source）	贝斯特综合与平均报告（Best’s Aggregates and Averages）	贝斯特综合与平均报告（Best’s Aggregates and Averages）

Best’s data reflect the experience of practically the entire industry, including stock, mutual, and reciprocal companies. The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.

贝斯特的数据几乎涵盖了整个保险行业，包括股份制保险公司、相互保险公司和互惠保险公司。综合比率是指保险总成本（已发生损失加上费用）与保费收入的比值：该比率低于100意味着承保盈利，高于100则意味着承保亏损。

For a number of years, we have told you that an annual increase by the industry of about 10% per year in premiums written is necessary for the combined ratio to remain roughly unchanged. We assumed in making that assertion that expenses as a percentage of premium volume would stay relatively stable and that losses would grow at about 10% annually because of the combined influence of unit volume increases, inflation, and judicial rulings that expand what is covered by the insurance policy.

多年来我们一直认为，要使行业综合比率大致保持稳定，保险行业的承保保费每年需增长约10%。我们得出这一结论的假设前提是：费用占保费收入的比例保持相对稳定；而由于保险业务量增长、通货膨胀，以及司法裁决扩大保险保障范围等因素的综合影响，已发生损失每年将增长约10%。

Our opinion is proving dismayingly accurate: a premium increase of 10% per year since 1979 would have produced an aggregate increase through 1984 of 61% and a combined ratio in 1984 almost identical to the 100.6 of 1979. Instead, the industry had only a 30% increase in premiums and a 1984 combined ratio of 117.7. Today, we continue to believe that the key index to the trend of underwriting profitability is the year-to-year percentage change in industry premium volume.

事实证明，我们的判断准确得令人不安：若自1979年起保费每年增长10%，那么到1984年，总保费增幅将达到61%，1984年的综合比率也将与1979年的100.6基本持平。但实际情况是，行业保费仅增长30%，1984年的综合比率高达117.7。如今，我们仍认为，衡量承保盈利能力趋势的关键指标，是行业保费收入的同比变化率。

It now appears that premium volume in 1985 will grow well over 10%. Therefore, assuming that catastrophes are at a “normal” level, we would expect the combined ratio to begin easing downward toward the end of the year. However, under our industrywide loss assumptions (i.e., increases of 10% annually), five years of 15%-per-year increases in premiums would be required to get the combined ratio back to 100. This would mean a doubling of industry volume by 1989, an outcome that seems highly unlikely to us. Instead, we expect several years of premium gains somewhat above the 10% level, followed by highly-competitive pricing that generally will produce combined ratios in the 108-113 range.

目前来看，1985年的保费收入增幅将远超过10%。因此，假设巨灾损失处于“正常”水平，我们预计综合比率将在年底开始回落。然而，根据我们对全行业损失的假设（即每年增长10%），要使综合比率回到100，需要连续五年保费每年增长15%。这意味着到1989年，行业保费规模将翻倍，我们认为这种情况极不可能发生。相反，我们预计未来几年保费增幅将略高于10%，随后市场将进入激烈的价格竞争阶段，综合比率通常会维持在108-113的区间。

Our own combined ratio in 1984 was a humbling 134. (Here, as throughout this report, we exclude structured settlements and the assumption of loss reserves in reporting this ratio. Much additional detail, including the effect of discontinued operations on the ratio, appears on pages 42-43). This is the third year in a row that our underwriting performance has been far poorer than that of the industry. We expect an improvement in the combined ratio in 1985, and also expect our improvement to be substantially greater than that of the industry. Mike Goldberg has corrected many of the mistakes I made before he took over insurance operations. Moreover, our business is concentrated in lines that have experienced poorer-than-average results during the past several years, and that circumstance has begun to subdue many of our competitors and even eliminate some. With the competition shaken, we were able during the last half of 1984 to raise prices significantly in certain important lines with little loss of business.

1984年，我们自身的综合比率高达134，这一结果令人汗颜。（与本报告其他部分一致，此处的综合比率未包含结构化和解及损失准备金承接的影响。更多细节，包括已终止业务对该比率的影响，详见第42-43页。）这已是我们的承保业绩连续第三年远逊于行业平均水平。我们预计1985年综合比率将有所改善，且改善幅度会显著超过行业平均水平。迈克·戈德堡（Mike Goldberg）接手保险业务后，纠正了我此前犯下的许多错误。此外，我们的业务集中在过去几年业绩低于行业平均水平的险种上，这种情况已导致许多竞争对手实力减弱，部分甚至被淘汰。随着竞争对手实力受损，我们在1984年下半年成功地对部分重要险种大幅提价，且几乎没有流失业务。

For some years I have told you that there could be a day coming when our premier financial strength would make a real difference in the competitive position of our insurance operation. That day may have arrived. We are almost without question the strongest property/casualty insurance operation in the country, with a capital position far superior to that of well-known companies of much greater size.

多年来我一直告诉大家，总有一天，我们卓越的财务实力将为保险业务的竞争地位带来实质性改变。这一天或许已经到来。我们无疑是美国实力最强的财产意外险保险公司，资本实力远超那些规模更大的知名同行。

Equally important, our corporate policy is to retain that superiority. The buyer of insurance receives only a promise in exchange for his cash. The value of that promise should be appraised against the possibility of adversity, not prosperity. At a minimum, the promise should appear able to withstand a prolonged combination of depressed financial markets and exceptionally unfavorable underwriting results. Our insurance subsidiaries are both willing and able to keep their promises in any such environment - and not too many other companies clearly are.

同样重要的是，我们的公司政策是保持这种优势。投保人支付资金，换来的只是一份承诺。评估这份承诺的价值，应基于逆境而非顺境的可能性。至少，这份承诺应能承受金融市场长期低迷与承保业绩异常糟糕的双重冲击。我们的保险子公司无论在何种环境下，都愿意且有能力履行承诺——而能明确做到这一点的其他公司并不多。

Our financial strength is a particular asset in the business of structured settlements and loss reserve assumptions that we reported on last year. The claimant in a structured settlement and the insurance company that has reinsured loss reserves need to be completely confident that payments will be forthcoming for decades to come. Very few companies in the property/casualty field can meet this test of unquestioned long-term strength. (In fact, only a handful of companies exists with which we will reinsure our own liabilities.)

我们的财务实力在结构化和解与损失准备金承接业务中是一项特殊优势，去年我们曾就这两项业务进行过汇报。结构化和解中的索赔人，以及为损失准备金办理再保险的保险公司，需要完全确信未来数十年能持续收到款项。在财产意外险领域，极少有公司能通过这种“无争议长期实力”的考验。（事实上，我们愿意为自身负债办理再保险的合作方，也仅有少数几家公司。）

We have grown in these new lines of business: funds that we hold to offset assumed liabilities grew from $16.2 million to $30.6 million during the year. We expect growth to continue and perhaps to greatly accelerate. To support this projected growth we have added substantially to the capital of Columbia Insurance Company, our reinsurance unit specializing in structured settlements and loss reserve assumptions. While these businesses are very competitive, returns should be satisfactory.

我们在这两项新业务上实现了增长：年内，我们为抵消承接负债而持有的资金从1620万美元增至3060万美元。我们预计业务将继续增长，增速甚至可能大幅提升。为支撑这一预期增长，我们大幅增加了哥伦比亚保险公司（Columbia Insurance Company）的资本金——该公司是我们旗下专注于结构化和解与损失准备金承接业务的再保险子公司。尽管这些业务竞争激烈，但预期回报应能达到满意水平。

At GEICO the news, as usual, is mostly good. That company achieved excellent unit growth in its primary insurance business during 1984, and the performance of its investment portfolio continued to be extraordinary. Though underwriting results deteriorated late in the year, they still remain far better than those of the industry. Our ownership in GEICO at yearend amounted to 36% and thus our interest in their direct property/casualty volume of $885 million amounted to $320 million, or well over double our own premium volume.

GEICO的情况一如既往地总体向好。1984年，该公司核心保险业务的业务量实现了出色增长，投资组合表现也依旧卓越。尽管年末承保业绩有所下滑，但仍远优于行业平均水平。年末我们持有GEICO 36%的股权，因此在其8.85亿美元的直接财产意外险保费中，我们对应的权益达3.2亿美元，远超我们自身的保费规模（是其两倍多）。

I have reported to you in the past few years that the performance of GEICO’s stock has considerably exceeded that company’s business performance, brilliant as the latter has been. In those years, the carrying value of our GEICO investment on our balance sheet grew at a rate greater than the growth in GEICO’s intrinsic business value. I warned you that over performance by the stock relative to the performance of the business obviously could not occur every year, and that in some years the stock must under perform the business. In 1984 that occurred and the carrying value of our interest in GEICO changed hardly at all, while the intrinsic business value of that interest increased substantially. Since 27% of Berkshire’s net worth at the beginning of 1984 was represented by GEICO, its static market value had a significant impact upon our rate of gain for the year. We are not at all unhappy with such a result: we would far rather have the business value of GEICO increase by X during the year, while market value decreases, than have the intrinsic value increase by only 1/2 X with market value soaring. In GEICO’s case, as in all of our investments, we look to business performance, not market performance. If we are correct in expectations regarding the business, the market eventually will follow along.

过去几年我曾向大家汇报，尽管GEICO的业务表现已十分出色，但其股价表现仍大幅超过业务表现。在那些年份，我们资产负债表上GEICO投资的账面价值增速，高于GEICO内在商业价值的增速。我曾提醒过大家，股价相对业务表现的“超额收益”显然不可能每年都出现，某些年份股价表现必然会落后于业务表现。1984年就出现了这种情况：我们持有的GEICO股权账面价值几乎没有变化，但其内在商业价值却大幅提升。由于1984年初GEICO占伯克希尔净资产的27%，其股价的停滞对我们全年的收益率产生了显著影响。但我们对这一结果毫不不满：我们宁愿GEICO年内业务价值增长X而股价下跌，也不愿其内在价值仅增长X/2而股价飙升。与我们所有投资一样，对于GEICO，我们关注的是业务表现而非股价表现。若我们对其业务前景的预期正确，股价最终会随之跟上。

You, as shareholders of Berkshire, have benefited in enormous measure from the talents of GEICO’s Jack Byrne, Bill Snyder, and Lou Simpson. In its core business - low-cost auto and homeowners insurance - GEICO has a major, sustainable competitive advantage. That is a rare asset in business generally, and it’s almost non-existent in the field of financial services. (GEICO, itself, illustrates this point: despite the company’s excellent management, superior profitability has eluded GEICO in all endeavors other than its core business.) In a large industry, a competitive advantage such as GEICO’s provides the potential for unusual economic rewards, and Jack and Bill continue to exhibit great skill in realizing that potential.

作为伯克希尔的股东，你们在很大程度上受益于GEICO的杰克·伯恩（Jack Byrne）、比尔·斯奈德（Bill Snyder）和卢·辛普森（Lou Simpson）的才能。在其核心业务——低成本汽车保险与房屋保险领域，GEICO拥有重大且可持续的竞争优势。这种优势在商界普遍稀缺，在金融服务领域更是几乎不存在。（GEICO自身就印证了这一点：尽管公司管理出色，但除核心业务外，其他所有业务均未能实现卓越盈利。）在一个庞大的行业中，像GEICO这样的竞争优势，意味着获取超额经济回报的潜力，而杰克和比尔在挖掘这种潜力方面，持续展现出卓越能力。

Most of the funds generated by GEICO’s core insurance operation are made available to Lou for investment. Lou has the rare combination of temperamental and intellectual characteristics that produce outstanding long-term investment performance. Operating with below-average risk, he has generated returns that have been by far the best in the insurance industry. I applaud and appreciate the efforts and talents of these three outstanding managers.

GEICO核心保险业务产生的大部分资金，都交由卢用于投资。卢兼具罕见的性格特质与专业素养，这两种特质的结合使其能实现卓越的长期投资业绩。在风险低于行业平均水平的情况下，他创造的回报至今仍是保险行业中最顶尖的。我为这三位杰出管理者的努力与才能表示赞赏和感谢。

# Errors in Loss Reserving (损失准备金计提误差)

Any shareholder in a company with important interests in the property/casualty insurance business should have some understanding of the weaknesses inherent in the reporting of current earnings in that industry. Phil Graham, when publisher of the Washington Post, described the daily newspaper as “a first rough draft of history”. Unfortunately, the financial statements of a property/casualty insurer provide, at best, only a first rough draft of earnings and financial condition.

对于在财产意外险业务中拥有重要权益的公司股东而言，都应了解该行业当期盈利报告中固有的缺陷。菲尔·格雷厄姆（Phil Graham）担任《华盛顿邮报》出版商时，曾将日报描述为“历史的第一份草稿”。遗憾的是，财产意外险公司的财务报表，充其量也只能算是盈利与财务状况的“第一份草稿”。

The determination of costs is the main problem. Most of an insurer’s costs result from losses on claims, and many of the losses that should be charged against the current year’s revenue are exceptionally difficult to estimate. Sometimes the extent of these losses, or even their existence, is not known for decades.

成本确认是核心问题。保险公司的成本大多来自索赔损失，而许多本应计入当期收入抵扣项的损失，极难进行估算。有时，这些损失的规模甚至是否存在，可能数十年都无法确定。

The loss expense charged in a property/casualty company’s current income statement represents: (1) losses that occurred and were paid during the year; (2) estimates for losses that occurred and were reported to the insurer during the year, but which have yet to be settled; (3) estimates of ultimate dollar costs for losses that occurred during the year but of which the insurer is unaware (termed “IBNR”: incurred but not reported); and (4) the net effect of revisions this year of similar estimates for (2) and (3) made in past years.

财产意外险公司当期利润表中列示的损失费用包括以下四部分：（1）年内发生且已赔付的损失；（2）年内发生且已向保险公司报案、但尚未赔付的损失估算额；（3）年内发生但保险公司尚未知晓的损失的最终金额估算额（即“IBNR”，已发生未报案损失）；（4）本年度对往年（2）和（3）类损失估算额进行调整的净影响。

Such revisions may be long delayed, but eventually any estimate of losses that causes the income for year X to be misstated must be corrected, whether it is in year X + 1, or X + 10. This, perforce, means that earnings in the year of correction also are misstated. For example, assume a claimant was injured by one of our insureds in 1979 and we thought a settlement was likely to be made for $10,000. That year we would have charged $10,000 to our earnings statement for the estimated cost of the loss and, correspondingly, set up a liability reserve on the balance sheet for that amount. If we settled the claim in 1984 for $100,000, we would charge earnings with a loss cost of $90,000 in 1984, although that cost was truly an expense of 1979. And if that piece of business was our only activity in 1979, we would have badly misled ourselves as to costs, and you as to earnings.

这类调整可能会延迟很久，但最终，任何导致X年度收入错报的损失估算，无论在X+1年还是X+10年，都必须纠正。这必然意味着，调整发生年度的盈利也会被错报。例如，假设1979年有一位索赔人被我们的被保险人伤害，我们当时预估赔付金额为1万美元。那一年，我们会在利润表中计提1万美元的预估损失成本，并在资产负债表中相应计提1万美元的负债准备金。若1984年该索赔最终以10万美元达成和解，我们会在1984年的利润表中额外计提9万美元的损失成本——尽管这笔成本实际上属于1979年。如果1979年我们仅有这一项业务活动，那么我们在成本认知上会严重误导自己，在盈利报告上也会严重误导各位股东。

The necessarily-extensive use of estimates in assembling the figures that appear in such deceptively precise form in the income statement of property/casualty companies means that some error must seep in, no matter how proper the intentions of management. In an attempt to minimize error, most insurers use various statistical techniques to adjust the thousands of individual loss evaluations (called case reserves) that comprise the raw data for estimation of aggregate liabilities. The extra reserves created by these adjustments are variously labeled “bulk”, “development”, or “supplemental” reserves. The goal of the adjustments should be a loss-reserve total that has a 50-50 chance of being proved either slightly too high or slightly too low when all losses that occurred prior to the date of the financial statement are ultimately paid.

财产意外险公司的利润表数据看似精确，实则大量依赖估算，这意味着无论管理层意图多么正当，都必然会存在误差。为尽量减少误差，大多数保险公司会采用各种统计方法，对数千项单项损失评估（即“个案准备金”）进行调整——这些评估是估算总负债的原始数据。通过这些调整额外计提的准备金，被赋予“批量准备金”“发展准备金”或“补充准备金”等不同名称。调整的目标应是：当财务报表日之前发生的所有损失最终赔付完毕时，总损失准备金被证明略高或略低的概率各占50%。

At Berkshire, we have added what we thought were appropriate supplemental reserves but in recent years they have not been adequate. It is important that you understand the magnitude of the errors that have been involved in our reserving. You can thus see for yourselves just how imprecise the process is, and also judge whether we may have some systemic bias that should make you wary of our current and future figures.

在伯克希尔，我们虽已计提了自认为适当的补充准备金，但近年来这些准备金仍显不足。你有必要了解我们在准备金计提中出现的误差规模，这样既能直观看到该过程的不精确性，也能判断我们是否存在某种系统性偏差，从而对当前及未来的数据保持警惕。

The following table shows the results from insurance underwriting as we have reported them to you in recent years, and also gives you calculations a year later on an “if-we-knew-then-what-we think-we-know-now” basis. I say “what we think we know now” because the adjusted figures still include a great many estimates for losses that occurred in the earlier years. However, many claims from the earlier years have been settled so that our one-year-later estimate contains less guess work than our earlier estimate:

下表列出了近年来我们向你汇报的保险承保业绩，同时提供了一年后基于“若当时知晓如今所知信息”的调整后数据。我之所以说“如今所知信息”，是因为调整后的数据仍包含大量对早年发生损失的估算。但由于早年的许多索赔已完成赔付，一年后的估算相比最初的估算，猜测成分更少：

年份（Year）	向你汇报的承保业绩（Underwriting Results as Reported to You）	经一年经验调整后的业绩（Corrected Figures After One Year’s Experience）
1980年	$ 6,738,000	$ 14,887,000
1981年	$ 1,478,000	$ (1,118,000)
1982年	$ (21,462,000)	$ (25,066,000)
1983年	$ (33,192,000)	$ (50,974,000)
1984年	$ (45,413,000)	?

我们的结构化和解与损失准备金承接业务未纳入本表。关于损失准备金变动情况的重要补充信息，详见第43-45页。

To help you understand this table, here is an explanation of the most recent figures: 1984’s reported pre-tax underwriting loss of $45.4 million consists of $27.6 million we estimate that we lost on 1984’s business, plus the increased loss of $17.8 million reflected in the corrected figure for 1983.

为帮助你理解本表，以下对最新数据进行说明：1984年汇报的税前承保亏损4540万美元，由两部分构成：一是1984年业务的预估亏损2760万美元，二是1983年调整后数据中新增的1780万美元亏损。

As you can see from reviewing the table, my errors in reporting to you have been substantial and recently have always presented a better underwriting picture than was truly the case. This is a source of particular chagrin to me because: (1) I like for you to be able to count on what I say; (2) our insurance managers and I undoubtedly acted with less urgency than we would have had we understood the full extent of our losses; and (3) we paid income taxes calculated on overstated earnings and thereby gave the government money that we didn’t need to. (These overpayments eventually correct themselves, but the delay is long and we don’t receive interest on the amounts we overpaid.)

从表中不难看出，我向你汇报时出现的误差规模较大，且近年来始终呈现出比实际情况更乐观的承保业绩。这让我深感懊恼，原因有三：（1）我希望你能信任我的表述；（2）若当初知晓损失的完整规模，我和保险业务管理层的行动无疑会更紧迫；（3）我们基于虚增的利润缴纳了所得税，向政府支付了本无需支付的资金。（这些多缴款项最终会自行调整，但周期漫长，且我们无法就多缴金额获得利息。）

Because our business is weighted toward casualty and reinsurance lines, we have more problems in estimating loss costs than companies that specialize in property insurance. (When a building that you have insured burns down, you get a much faster fix on your costs than you do when an employer you have insured finds out that one of his retirees has contracted a disease attributable to work he did decades earlier.) But I still find our errors embarrassing. In our direct business, we have far underestimated the mushrooming tendency of juries and courts to make the “deep pocket” pay, regardless of the factual situation and the past precedents for establishment of liability. We also have underestimated the contagious effect that publicity regarding giant awards has on juries. In the reinsurance area, where we have had our worst experience in under reserving, our customer insurance companies have made the same mistakes. Since we set reserves based on information they supply us, their mistakes have become our mistakes.

由于我们的业务以意外险和再保险为主，相比专注于财产险的公司，我们在估算损失成本时面临更多困难。（当你承保的建筑物烧毁时，成本确认速度远快于：你承保的雇主发现某位退休员工因数十年前的工作患上疾病。）但我仍为这些误差感到难堪。在直接保险业务中，我们严重低估了陪审团和法院“向资金雄厚方追责”的趋势——无论实际情况如何、过往责任认定先例怎样，这种趋势都在不断加剧。我们也低估了巨额赔偿案件的曝光对陪审团产生的“传染效应”。在再保险领域，我们的准备金计提不足问题最为严重，而客户保险公司也犯了同样的错误。由于我们的准备金基于他们提供的信息计提，他们的失误也成了我们的失误。

I heard a story recently that is applicable to our insurance accounting problems: a man was traveling abroad when he received a call from his sister informing him that their father had died unexpectedly. It was physically impossible for the brother to get back home for the funeral, but he told his sister to take care of the funeral arrangements and to send the bill to him. After returning home he received a bill for several thousand dollars, which he promptly paid. The following month another bill came along for $15, and he paid that too. Another month followed, with a similar bill. When, in the next month, a third bill for $15 was presented, he called his sister to ask what was going on. “Oh”, she said. “I forgot to tell you. We buried Dad in a rented suit.”

最近我听到一个故事，恰好能说明我们的保险会计问题：一个人在国外旅行时，接到妹妹的电话，得知父亲意外去世。他因路途遥远无法赶回家参加葬礼，便让妹妹负责安排葬礼事宜，并表示费用由他承担。回国后，他收到了一张数千美元的账单，立即付清。次月，又收到一张15美元的账单，他也付了。再下个月，同样的账单再次出现。当第四个月收到第三张15美元账单时，他打电话问妹妹怎么回事。妹妹回答：“哦，忘了告诉你，我们给爸爸穿的是租来的西装。”

If you’ve been in the insurance business in recent years - particularly the reinsurance business - this story hurts. We have tried to include all of our “rented suit” liabilities in our current financial statement, but our record of past error should make us humble, and you suspicious. I will continue to report to you the errors, plus or minus, that surface each year.

近年来若你身处保险行业——尤其是再保险行业——这个故事定会让你感同身受。我们已尽力在当前财务报表中纳入所有“租西装”式的隐性负债，但过往的误差记录应让我们保持谦逊，也让你保持警惕。我会继续向你汇报每年暴露的各类误差（无论是正向还是负向）。

Not all reserving errors in the industry have been of the innocent-but-dumb variety. With underwriting results as bad as they have been in recent years - and with managements having as much discretion as they do in the presentation of financial statements - some unattractive aspects of human nature have manifested themselves. Companies that would be out of business if they realistically appraised their loss costs have, in some cases, simply preferred to take an extraordinarily optimistic view about these yet-to-be-paid sums. Others have engaged in various transactions to hide true current loss costs.

行业内的准备金计提误差并非都是“无心之失”。近年来承保业绩惨淡，且管理层在财务报表列报上拥有较大自主权，这使得人性中一些负面特质显现出来。有些公司若如实评估损失成本，早已资不抵债，但它们却对未赔付金额采取极度乐观的态度。还有些公司通过各类交易掩盖当前的真实损失成本。

Both of these approaches can “work” for a considerable time: external auditors cannot effectively police the financial statements of property/casualty insurers. If liabilities of an insurer, correctly stated, would exceed assets, it falls to the insurer to volunteer this morbid information. In other words, the corpse is supposed to file the death certificate. Under this “honor system” of mortality, the corpse sometimes gives itself the benefit of the doubt.

这两种做法在相当长的时间内都能“奏效”：外部审计机构无法有效监督财产意外险公司的财务报表。若保险公司的负债（如实列报）超过资产，需由保险公司主动披露这一“致命”信息。换句话说，相当于“尸体”要自行填写死亡证明。在这种“诚信为本”的存亡规则下，“尸体”有时会选择“自证清白”（掩盖真实状况）。

In most businesses, of course, insolvent companies run out of cash. Insurance is different: you can be broke but flush. Since cash comes in at the inception of an insurance policy and losses are paid much later, insolvent insurers don’t run out of cash until long after they have run out of net worth. In fact, these “walking dead” often redouble their efforts to write business, accepting almost any price or risk, simply to keep the cash flowing in. With an attitude like that of an embezzler who has gambled away his purloined funds, these companies hope that somehow they can get lucky on the next batch of business and thereby cover up earlier shortfalls. Even if they don’t get lucky, the penalty to managers is usually no greater for a $100 million shortfall than one of $10 million; in the meantime, while the losses mount, the managers keep their jobs and perquisites.

当然，在大多数行业，资不抵债的公司会陷入现金短缺。但保险业不同：公司可能已破产，却仍有充足现金。由于保费在保单生效时收取，而损失赔付则滞后很久，资不抵债的保险公司在净资产耗尽后，仍能在很长一段时间内保持现金充足。事实上，这些“行尸走肉”般的公司往往会加倍拓展业务，几乎不计价格和风险，只为维持现金流入。它们的心态如同挪用公款后赌博输光的贪污者，希望能在接下来的业务中“赌赢”，从而掩盖之前的亏空。即便未能如愿，管理层面临的惩罚也通常不会因亏空从1000万美元扩大到1亿美元而加重；在此期间，尽管损失不断累积，管理层仍能保住职位和福利。

The loss-reserving errors of other property/casualty companies are of more than academic interest to Berkshire. Not only does Berkshire suffer from sell-at-any-price competition by the “walking dead”, but we also suffer when their insolvency is finally acknowledged. Through various state guarantee funds that levy assessments, Berkshire ends up paying a portion of the insolvent insurers’ asset deficiencies, swollen as they usually are by the delayed detection that results from wrong reporting. There is even some potential for cascading trouble. The insolvency of a few large insurers and the assessments by state guarantee funds that would follow could imperil weak-but-previously-solvent insurers. Such dangers can be mitigated if state regulators become better at prompt identification and termination of insolvent insurers, but progress on that front has been slow.

其他财产意外险公司的准备金计提误差，对伯克希尔而言绝非仅具学术意义。我们不仅要承受“行尸走肉”式公司“低价倾销”带来的竞争压力，当这些公司最终承认资不抵债时，我们还会遭受损失。通过各州担保基金的摊派机制，伯克希尔最终要为这些破产保险公司的资产缺口支付一部分资金——而这些缺口往往因虚假报告导致的延迟发现而扩大。甚至存在“连锁危机”的潜在风险：几家大型保险公司破产，加上各州担保基金随后的摊派，可能会危及那些原本有偿付能力但实力较弱的公司。若各州监管机构能更及时地识别并清退破产保险公司，这类风险本可缓解，但目前在这方面进展缓慢。

# Washington Public Power Supply System (华盛顿公共电力供应系统)

From October, 1983 through June, 1984 Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries continuously purchased large quantities of bonds of Projects 1, 2, and 3 of Washington Public Power Supply System (“WPPSS”). This is the same entity that, on July 1, 1983, defaulted on $2.2 billion of bonds issued to finance partial construction of the now-abandoned Projects 4 and 5. While there are material differences in the obligors, promises, and properties underlying the two categories of bonds, the problems of Projects 4 and 5 have cast a major cloud over Projects 1, 2, and 3, and might possibly cause serious problems for the latter issues. In addition, there have been a multitude of problems related directly to Projects 1, 2, and 3 that could weaken or destroy an otherwise strong credit position arising from guarantees by Bonneville Power Administration.

1983年10月至1984年6月，伯克希尔的保险子公司持续大量购入华盛顿公共电力供应系统（“WPPSS”）1、2、3号项目的债券。该机构曾在1983年7月1日，对为现已废弃的4、5号项目部分建设融资而发行的22亿美元债券违约。尽管两类债券的债务人、承诺条款及抵押资产存在重大差异，但4、5号项目的问题给1、2、3号项目蒙上了巨大阴影，可能给后者的债券带来严重问题。此外，1、2、3号项目自身也存在诸多直接问题，可能削弱甚至摧毁其原本由邦纳维尔电力管理局（Bonneville Power Administration）担保所带来的强劲信用地位。

Despite these important negatives, Charlie and I judged the risks at the time we purchased the bonds and at the prices Berkshire paid (much lower than present prices) to be considerably more than compensated for by prospects of profit.

尽管存在这些重大不利因素，但查理和我认为，在我们购入债券时，结合伯克希尔支付的价格（远低于当前价格），潜在的利润回报已足以覆盖风险，甚至绰绰有余。

As you know, we buy marketable stocks for our insurance companies based upon the criteria we would apply in the purchase of an entire business. This business-valuation approach is not widespread among professional money managers and is scorned by many academics. Nevertheless, it has served its followers well (to which the academics seem to say, “Well, it may be all right in practice, but it will never work in theory.”) Simply put, we feel that if we can buy small pieces of businesses with satisfactory underlying economics at a fraction of the per-share value of the entire business, something good is likely to happen to us - particularly if we own a group of such securities.

如你所知，我们为保险公司购买可流通股票时，所依据的标准与收购整个企业的标准一致。这种“企业估值法”在专业基金经理中并不普及，还受到许多学者的质疑。尽管如此，它仍为追随者带来了良好回报（对此学者们似乎会说：“好吧，实践中或许可行，但理论上站不住脚。”）。简而言之，我们认为，若能以远低于整体企业每股价值的价格，购入具有良好基本面的企业“小块股权”，好事终将发生在我们身上——尤其是当我们持有一组此类证券时。

We extend this business-valuation approach even to bond purchases such as WPPSS. We compare the $139 million cost of our yearend investment in WPPSS to a similar $139 million investment in an operating business. In the case of WPPSS, the “business” contractually earns $22.7 million after tax (via the interest paid on the bonds), and those earnings are available to us currently in cash. We are unable to buy operating businesses with economics close to these. Only a relatively few businesses earn the 16.3% after tax on unleveraged capital that our WPPSS investment does and those businesses, when available for purchase, sell at large premiums to that capital. In the average negotiated business transaction, unleveraged corporate earnings of $22.7 million after-tax (equivalent to about $45 million pre-tax) might command a price of $250 - $300 million (or sometimes far more). For a business we understand well and strongly like, we will gladly pay that much. But it is double the price we paid to realize the same earnings from WPPSS bonds.

我们甚至将这种“企业估值法”延伸到WPPSS债券这类债券投资中。我们将年末WPPSS投资的1.39亿美元成本，与1.39亿美元投资于实体企业的情况进行对比。对WPPSS而言，这个“企业”通过债券利息，能带来2270万美元的税后合同收益，且这些收益当前可以现金形式获取。我们无法找到基本面接近这一水平的实体企业进行收购。仅有极少数企业能像我们的WPPSS投资那样，在无杠杆情况下实现16.3%的税后资本回报率；而这些企业若对外出售，价格通常会远高于其资本规模。在普通的企业收购交易中，若一家企业的无杠杆税后利润为2270万美元（相当于税前约4500万美元），其估值可能达到2.5亿-3亿美元（有时甚至更高）。对于我们充分了解且十分看好的企业，我们愿意支付这样的价格，但这一价格是我们通过WPPSS债券获取同等收益所支付成本的两倍。

However, in the case of WPPSS, there is what we view to be a very slight risk that the “business” could be worth nothing within a year or two. There also is the risk that interest payments might be interrupted for a considerable period of time. Furthermore, the most that the “business” could be worth is about the $205 million face value of the bonds that we own, an amount only 48% higher than the price we paid.

但就WPPSS而言，我们认为存在一种极低的风险：未来一两年内，这个“企业”可能变得一文不值。同时，也存在利息支付可能长期中断的风险。此外，这个“企业”的最高价值，不会超过我们所持债券2.05亿美元的面值——这一金额仅比我们的购买价高48%。

This ceiling on upside potential is an important minus. It should be realized, however, that the great majority of operating businesses have a limited upside potential also unless more capital is continuously invested in them. That is so because most businesses are unable to significantly improve their average returns on equity - even under inflationary conditions, though these were once thought to automatically raise returns.

这种上行潜力的上限是一个重要劣势。但需注意的是，绝大多数实体企业同样存在上行潜力限制，除非持续投入更多资本。原因在于，大多数企业无法显著提高平均净资产回报率——即便在通胀环境下也是如此，尽管人们曾认为通胀会自动推高回报率。

(Let’s push our bond-as-a-business example one notch further: if you elect to “retain” the annual earnings of a 12% bond by using the proceeds from coupons to buy more bonds, earnings of that bond “business” will grow at a rate comparable to that of most operating businesses that similarly reinvest all earnings. In the first instance, a 30-year, zero-coupon, 12% bond purchased today for $10 million will be worth $300 million in 2015. In the second, a $10 million business that regularly earns 12% on equity and retains all earnings to grow, will also end up with $300 million of capital in 2015. Both the business and the bond will earn over $32 million in the final year.)

（我们不妨将“债券视为企业”的例子再延伸一步：若你持有一只票面利率12%的债券，选择用利息收入再购买更多债券以“留存”年度收益，那么这个债券“企业”的收益增长率，将与大多数“留存全部收益再投资”的实体企业相当。一方面，今日以1000万美元购入一只30年期、票面利率12%的零息债券，到2015年其价值将达到3亿美元。另一方面，一家初始资本1000万美元、净资产回报率稳定为12%且留存全部收益用于扩张的企业，到2015年资本规模也将达到3亿美元。在最后一年，无论是该企业还是该债券，收益都将超过3200万美元。）

Our approach to bond investment - treating it as an unusual sort of “business” with special advantages and disadvantages - may strike you as a bit quirky. However, we believe that many staggering errors by investors could have been avoided if they had viewed bond investment with a businessman’s perspective. For example, in 1946, 20-year AAA tax-exempt bonds traded at slightly below a 1% yield. In effect, the buyer of those bonds at that time bought a “business” that earned about 1% on “book value” (and that, moreover, could never earn a dime more than 1% on book), and paid 100 cents on the dollar for that abominable business.

我们这种“将债券视为一种特殊‘企业’（兼具独特优势与劣势）”的投资思路，可能会让你觉得有些古怪。但我们认为，若投资者能以企业家的视角看待债券投资，许多严重的投资失误本可避免。例如，1946年，20年期AAA级免税债券的收益率略低于1%。实际上，当时购买这类债券的投资者，相当于以“账面价值”的100%价格，买下了一家“净资产回报率仅1%且永远无法超过1%”的糟糕“企业”。

If an investor had been business-minded enough to think in those terms - and that was the precise reality of the bargain struck - he would have laughed at the proposition and walked away. For, at the same time, businesses with excellent future prospects could have been bought at, or close to, book value while earning 10%, 12%, or 15% after tax on book. Probably no business in America changed hands in 1946 at book value that the buyer believed lacked the ability to earn more than 1% on book. But investors with bond-buying habits eagerly made economic commitments throughout the year on just that basis. Similar, although less extreme, conditions prevailed for the next two decades as bond investors happily signed up for twenty or thirty years on terms outrageously inadequate by business standards. (In what I think is by far the best book on investing ever written - “The Intelligent Investor”, by Ben Graham - the last section of the last chapter begins with, “Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.” This section is called “A Final Word”, and it is appropriately titled.)

若当时的投资者具备足够的商业思维，能看清这一交易的本质（事实也确实如此），他定会对这样的投资机会嗤之以鼻并转身离开。因为在同一时期，那些前景极佳的企业，不仅能以接近账面价值的价格收购，其税后净资产回报率还能达到10%、12%甚至15%。1946年，在美国，几乎没有任何一家以账面价值出售的企业，会让买家认为其净资产回报率无法超过1%。但习惯购买债券的投资者，却全年都在热切地基于“1%回报率”做出投资决策。在之后的20年里，类似（尽管程度较轻）的情况依然存在：债券投资者欣然接受那些按商业标准衡量极不合理的条款，签下20年或30年的投资协议。（在我看来，本杰明·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）所著的《聪明的投资者》（The Intelligent Investor）是迄今为止最好的投资书籍。该书最后一章的最后一节以“最具商业思维的投资，才是最明智的投资”开篇，这一节名为“最后的话”，标题恰如其分。）

We will emphasize again that there is unquestionably some risk in the WPPSS commitment. It is also the sort of risk that is difficult to evaluate. Were Charlie and I to deal with 50 similar evaluations over a lifetime, we would expect our judgment to prove reasonably satisfactory. But we do not get the chance to make 50 or even 5 such decisions in a single year. Even though our long-term results may turn out fine, in any given year we run a risk that we will look extraordinarily foolish. (That’s why all of these sentences say “Charlie and I”, or “we”.)

我们需再次强调，投资WPPSS无疑存在一定风险，且这类风险难以评估。若查理和我一生中有机会对50个类似项目进行评估，我们有信心让判断结果达到合理的满意水平。但在单一年度里，我们很难有机会做出50次甚至5次这样的决策。尽管长期结果可能良好，但在任意一个年度，我们都有可能面临“决策显得极其愚蠢”的风险。（这就是为什么这些表述中都用“查理和我”或“我们”的原因。）

Most managers have very little incentive to make the intelligent-but-with-some-chance-of-looking-like-an-idiot decision. Their personal gain/loss ratio is all too obvious: if an unconventional decision works out well, they get a pat on the back and, if it works out poorly, they get a pink slip. (Failing conventionally is the route to go; as a group, lemmings may have a rotten image, but no individual lemming has ever received bad press.)

大多数管理者都缺乏动力去做出“明智但可能显得愚蠢”的决策。他们个人的“收益-损失比”显而易见：若非常规决策成功，他们可能获得口头表扬；若失败，则可能被解雇。（“按常规方式失败”才是稳妥选择：旅鼠作为一个群体，形象或许糟糕，但没有任何一只单独的旅鼠会受到负面关注。）

Our equation is different. With 47% of Berkshire’s stock, Charlie and I don’t worry about being fired, and we receive our rewards as owners, not managers. Thus we behave with Berkshire’s money as we would with our own. That frequently leads us to unconventional behavior both in investments and general business management.

我们的处境则不同。查理和我持有伯克希尔47%的股份，无需担心被解雇，且我们的回报来自“股东”身份而非“管理者”身份。因此，我们对待伯克希尔资金的态度，与对待自己的资金完全一致。这使得我们在投资和日常经营管理中，常常采取非常规做法。

We remain unconventional in the degree to which we concentrate the investments of our insurance companies, including those in WPPSS bonds. This concentration makes sense only because our insurance business is conducted from a position of exceptional financial strength. For almost all other insurers, a comparable degree of concentration (or anything close to it) would be totally inappropriate. Their capital positions are not strong enough to withstand a big error, no matter how attractive an investment opportunity might appear when analyzed on the basis of probabilities.

我们在保险子公司的投资集中度上也保持着非常规策略，包括对WPPSS债券的投资。这种集中投资策略之所以可行，完全是因为我们的保险业务拥有极强的财务实力。对于几乎所有其他保险公司而言，类似（或接近）的投资集中度都是完全不合适的。它们的资本实力不足以承受重大失误，无论某个投资机会在概率分析层面看似多么有吸引力。

With our financial strength we can own large blocks of a few securities that we have thought hard about and bought at attractive prices. (Billy Rose described the problem of over-diversification: “If you have a harem of forty women, you never get to know any of them very well.”) Over time our policy of concentration should produce superior results, though these will be tempered by our large size. When this policy produces a really bad year, as it must, at least you will know that our money was committed on the same basis as yours.

凭借强大的财务实力，我们可以重仓持有少数几只经过深入研究且以有吸引力价格买入的证券。（比利·罗斯（Billy Rose）曾这样描述过度分散投资的问题：“若你拥有40个女人的后宫，你永远无法真正了解其中任何一个。”）长期来看，我们的集中投资策略应能带来卓越回报，尽管公司规模庞大可能会在一定程度上削弱这种回报。当该策略不可避免地导致某一年业绩惨淡时，至少你会知道，我们投入的资金与你的资金遵循着相同的决策逻辑。

We made the major part of our WPPSS investment at different prices and under somewhat different factual circumstances than exist at present. If we decide to change our position, we will not inform shareholders until long after the change has been completed. (We may be buying or selling as you read this.) The buying and selling of securities is a competitive business, and even a modest amount of added competition on either side can cost us a great deal of money. Our WPPSS purchases illustrate this principle. From October, 1983 through June, 1984, we attempted to buy almost all the bonds that we could of Projects 1, 2, and 3. Yet we purchased less than 3% of the bonds outstanding. Had we faced even a few additional well-heeled investors, stimulated to buy because they knew we were, we could have ended up with a materially smaller amount of bonds, purchased at a materially higher price. (A couple of coat-tail riders easily could have cost us $5 million.) For this reason, we will not comment about our activities in securities - neither to the press, nor shareholders, nor to anyone else - unless legally required to do so.

我们对WPPSS的大部分投资，是在与当前不同的价格和事实环境下完成的。若我们决定调整持仓，只会在调整完成很长时间后才告知股东（你阅读本文时，我们可能正在买入或卖出）。证券交易是竞争性业务，哪怕多一个对手方，都可能让我们损失巨额资金。我们对WPPSS债券的收购就印证了这一点：1983年10月至1984年6月，我们尽可能多地收购1、2、3号项目的债券，但最终购入量仍不足流通总量的3%。若当时有几位财力雄厚的投资者，因知晓我们的收购行为而跟风买入，我们最终可能只能以更高价格购入更少的债券（仅几位跟风者就可能让我们多支出500万美元）。因此，除非法律要求，否则我们不会就证券交易活动发表任何评论——无论是对媒体、股东还是其他人。

One final observation regarding our WPPSS purchases: we dislike the purchase of most long-term bonds under most circumstances and have bought very few in recent years. That’s because bonds are as sound as a dollar - and we view the long-term outlook for dollars as dismal. We believe substantial inflation lies ahead, although we have no idea what the average rate will turn out to be. Furthermore, we think there is a small, but not insignificant, chance of runaway inflation.

关于WPPSS投资，最后还有一点需说明：在大多数情况下，我们不喜欢购买长期债券，近年来也极少购入。原因在于，债券的价值与美元挂钩——而我们对美元的长期前景持悲观态度。我们认为未来将出现显著通胀，尽管无法预测具体的平均通胀率。此外，我们认为存在一种“概率低但影响重大”的恶性通胀风险。

Such a possibility may seem absurd, considering the rate to which inflation has dropped. But we believe that present fiscal policy - featuring a huge deficit - is both extremely dangerous and difficult to reverse. (So far, most politicians in both parties have followed Charlie Brown’s advice: “No problem is so big that it can’t be run away from.”) Without a reversal, high rates of inflation may be delayed (perhaps for a long time), but will not be avoided. If high rates materialize, they bring with them the potential for a runaway upward spiral.

考虑到当前通胀率已下降，这种担忧可能看似荒谬。但我们认为，当前以“巨额赤字”为特征的财政政策，既极度危险又难以逆转。（迄今为止，两党多数政客都遵循着查理·布朗（Charlie Brown）的建议：“没有什么问题大到不能逃避。”）若不扭转这一政策，高通胀或许能被推迟（可能推迟很长时间），但无法避免。一旦高通胀成为现实，就可能引发恶性通胀螺旋式上升。

While there is not much to choose between bonds and stocks (as a class) when annual inflation is in the 5%-10% range, runaway inflation is a different story. In that circumstance, a diversified stock portfolio would almost surely suffer an enormous loss in real value. But bonds already outstanding would suffer far more. Thus, we think an all-bond portfolio carries a small but unacceptable “wipe out” risk, and we require any purchase of long-term bonds to clear a special hurdle. Only when bond purchases appear decidedly superior to other business opportunities will we engage in them. Those occasions are likely to be few and far between.

当年度通胀率处于5%-10%区间时，债券与股票（作为资产类别）的差异不大，但恶性通胀的情况则完全不同。在恶性通胀环境下，多元化股票组合的实际价值几乎必然会大幅缩水，而已发行债券的损失会更为惨重。因此，我们认为全债券组合存在“清零”风险——尽管概率低，但风险不可接受。我们对任何长期债券的购买都设定了特殊门槛：只有当债券投资明显优于其他商业机会时，我们才会进行配置。而这样的机会可能寥寥无几。

# Dividend Policy (股息政策)

Dividend policy is often reported to shareholders, but seldom explained. A company will say something like, “Our goal is to pay out 40% to 50% of earnings and to increase dividends at a rate at least equal to the rise in the CPI”. And that’s it - no analysis will be supplied as to why that particular policy is best for the owners of the business. Yet, allocation of capital is crucial to business and investment management. Because it is, we believe managers and owners should think hard about the circumstances under which earnings should be retained and under which they should be distributed.

公司常会向股东披露股息政策，但很少解释背后的逻辑。比如某家公司可能会说：“我们的目标是将40%-50%的利润用于分红，且股息增长率至少不低于CPI涨幅。”仅此而已——不会分析为何该政策对企业所有者最有利。然而，资本配置对企业经营和投资管理至关重要。正因为如此，我们认为管理者与所有者都应认真思考：在哪些情况下应留存利润，哪些情况下应分配利润。

The first point to understand is that all earnings are not created equal. In many businesses particularly those that have high asset/profit ratios - inflation causes some or all of the reported earnings to become ersatz. The ersatz portion - let’s call these earnings “restricted” - cannot, if the business is to retain its economic position, be distributed as dividends. Were these earnings to be paid out, the business would lose ground in one or more of the following areas: its ability to maintain its unit volume of sales, its long-term competitive position, its financial strength. No matter how conservative its payout ratio, a company that consistently distributes restricted earnings is destined for oblivion unless equity capital is otherwise infused.

首先要明确的是，并非所有利润都具有同等价值。在许多企业（尤其是资产利润率较高的企业）中，通胀会导致部分或全部账面利润成为“虚假利润”。这部分虚假利润——我们称之为“限制性利润”——若企业想维持现有经济地位，就不能以股息形式分配。若将这类利润分红，企业会在以下一个或多个方面陷入困境：维持销量的能力、长期竞争地位、财务实力。无论分红比例多么保守，持续分配限制性利润的公司终将走向衰败，除非通过其他方式注入股权资本。

Restricted earnings are seldom valueless to owners, but they often must be discounted heavily. In effect, they are conscripted by the business, no matter how poor its economic potential. (This retention-no-matter-how-unattractive-the-return situation was communicated unwittingly in a marvelously ironic way by Consolidated Edison a decade ago. At the time, a punitive regulatory policy was a major factor causing the company’s stock to sell as low as one-fourth of book value; i.e., every time a dollar of earnings was retained for reinvestment in the business, that dollar was transformed into only 25 cents of market value. But, despite this gold-into-lead process, most earnings were reinvested in the business rather than paid to owners. Meanwhile, at construction and maintenance sites throughout New York, signs proudly proclaimed the corporate slogan, “Dig We Must”.)

限制性利润对所有者而言并非毫无价值，但往往需要大幅折价。实际上，无论企业的经济潜力多么糟糕，这部分利润都被企业“强制留存”。（十年前，爱迪生联合电气公司（Consolidated Edison）无意间以极具讽刺的方式展现了“无论回报多差都要留存利润”的情况。当时，严苛的监管政策导致该公司股价最低跌至账面价值的1/4——即每留存1美元利润用于再投资，这1美元仅能转化为25美分的市值。尽管存在这种“点金成铁”的情况，公司仍将大部分利润用于再投资，而非分配给所有者。与此同时，纽约各地的建设和维护现场，都骄傲地悬挂着公司标语：“我们必须挖掘（投资）”。）

Restricted earnings need not concern us further in this dividend discussion. Let’s turn to the much-more-valued unrestricted variety. These earnings may, with equal feasibility, be retained or distributed. In our opinion, management should choose whichever course makes greater sense for the owners of the business.

在股息政策的讨论中，我们无需进一步关注限制性利润，转而聚焦更具价值的“非限制性利润”。这类利润既可留存，也可分配，两种选择的可行性相当。在我们看来，管理层应选择对企业所有者更有利的方式。

This principle is not universally accepted. For a number of reasons managers like to withhold unrestricted, readily distributable earnings from shareholders - to expand the corporate empire over which the managers rule, to operate from a position of exceptional financial comfort, etc. But we believe there is only one valid reason for retention. Unrestricted earnings should be retained only when there is a reasonable prospect - backed preferably by historical evidence or, when appropriate, by a thoughtful analysis of the future - that for every dollar retained by the corporation, at least one dollar of market value will be created for owners. This will happen only if the capital retained produces incremental earnings equal to, or above, those generally available to investors.

这一原则并未得到普遍认可。出于多种原因，管理者倾向于扣留非限制性、可随时分配的利润——比如扩张自己掌控的“企业帝国”、维持极度宽松的财务状态等。但我们认为，只有一种留存利润的理由是合理的：只有当企业有合理前景（最好有历史数据支撑，或在适当时通过对未来的深入分析证明），证明每留存1美元利润，就能为所有者创造至少1美元市值时，才应留存非限制性利润。而要实现这一点，留存资本产生的增量收益必须等于或高于投资者通常能获得的收益水平。

To illustrate, let’s assume that an investor owns a risk-free 10% perpetual bond with one very unusual feature. Each year the investor can elect either to take his 10% coupon in cash, or to reinvest the coupon in more 10% bonds with identical terms; i.e., a perpetual life and coupons offering the same cash-or-reinvest option. If, in any given year, the prevailing interest rate on long-term, risk-free bonds is 5%, it would be foolish for the investor to take his coupon in cash since the 10% bonds he could instead choose would be worth considerably more than 100 cents on the dollar. Under these circumstances, the investor wanting to get his hands on cash should take his coupon in additional bonds and then immediately sell them. By doing that, he would realize more cash than if he had taken his coupon directly in cash. Assuming all bonds were held by rational investors, no one would opt for cash in an era of 5% interest rates, not even those bondholders needing cash for living purposes.

举个例子：假设某投资者持有一只无风险、票面利率10%的永续债券，且该债券有一个特殊条款——每年投资者可选择领取10%的现金利息，或用利息再投资于更多条款相同的10%永续债券（即同样永续存续，利息同样可选择现金或再投资）。若某一年长期无风险债券的市场利率为5%，投资者选择领取现金利息就是不明智的——因为他若选择再投资于10%利率的债券，这些债券的市值会远高于面值。在这种情况下，若投资者需要现金，应先选择以债券形式领取利息，再立即卖出债券，这样获得的现金会比直接领取现金利息更多。假设所有债券都由理性投资者持有，那么在利率为5%的时期，没人会选择现金利息——即便需要现金生活的债券持有者也不会。

If, however, interest rates were 15%, no rational investor would want his money invested for him at 10%. Instead, the investor would choose to take his coupon in cash, even if his personal cash needs were nil. The opposite course - reinvestment of the coupon - would give an investor additional bonds with market value far less than the cash he could have elected. If he should want 10% bonds, he can simply take the cash received and buy them in the market, where they will be available at a large discount.

但如果市场利率为15%，理性投资者绝不会同意让资金以10%的利率再投资。此时，即便投资者个人无需现金，也会选择领取现金利息。若选择相反的做法——将利息再投资，投资者获得的新增债券市值会远低于他本可领取的现金。若他确实想要10%利率的债券，只需拿着现金在市场上购买即可——此时这类债券会以大幅折价出售。

An analysis similar to that made by our hypothetical bondholder is appropriate for owners in thinking about whether a company’s unrestricted earnings should be retained or paid out. Of course, the analysis is much more difficult and subject to error because the rate earned on reinvested earnings is not a contractual figure, as in our bond case, but rather a fluctuating figure. Owners must guess as to what the rate will average over the intermediate future. However, once an informed guess is made, the rest of the analysis is simple: you should wish your earnings to be reinvested if they can be expected to earn high returns, and you should wish them paid to you if low returns are the likely outcome of reinvestment.

企业所有者在判断非限制性利润应留存还是分配时，可采用与上述假设债券投资者类似的分析逻辑。当然，实际分析会更复杂且易出错——因为再投资收益并非像债券那样是固定的合同利率，而是波动的数值。所有者必须预估未来中期的平均再投资收益率。但一旦做出合理预估，后续分析就很简单：若预期再投资能获得高回报，就应希望利润留存；若再投资可能仅获低回报，就应希望利润分配。

Many corporate managers reason very much along these lines in determining whether subsidiaries should distribute earnings to their parent company. At that level, the managers have no trouble thinking like intelligent owners. But payout decisions at the parent company level often are a different story. Here managers frequently have trouble putting themselves in the shoes of their shareholder-owners.

许多企业管理者在判断子公司是否应向母公司分配利润时，会遵循类似逻辑——在这一层面，他们能轻松以“明智所有者”的视角思考。但在母公司层面的分红决策上，情况往往截然不同。此时，管理者常常难以站在股东所有者的角度思考问题。

With this schizoid approach, the CEO of a multi-divisional company will instruct Subsidiary A, whose earnings on incremental capital may be expected to average 5%, to distribute all available earnings in order that they may be invested in Subsidiary B, whose earnings on incremental capital are expected to be 15%. The CEO’s business school oath will allow no lesser behavior. But if his own long-term record with incremental capital is 5% - and market rates are 10% - he is likely to impose a dividend policy on shareholders of the parent company that merely follows some historical or industry-wide payout pattern. Furthermore, he will expect managers of subsidiaries to give him a full account as to why it makes sense for earnings to be retained in their operations rather than distributed to the parent-owner. But seldom will he supply his owners with a similar analysis pertaining to the whole company.

在这种“双重标准”下，跨部门公司的CEO会要求增量资本收益率预计为5%的子公司A，将所有可用利润分配给母公司，以便将资金投资于增量资本收益率预计为15%的子公司B——商学院的教育让他们认为必须这样做。但如果CEO本人管理母公司增量资本的长期收益率仅为5%，而市场利率为10%，他却可能为母公司股东制定一套仅遵循历史或行业平均水平的分红政策。此外，他会要求子公司管理者详细说明“为何利润应留存于子公司而非分配给母公司所有者”，但却很少向母公司所有者提供关于“整个公司利润留存合理性”的类似分析。

In judging whether managers should retain earnings, shareholders should not simply compare total incremental earnings in recent years to total incremental capital because that relationship may be distorted by what is going on in a core business. During an inflationary period, companies with a core business characterized by extraordinary economics can use small amounts of incremental capital in that business at very high rates of return (as was discussed in last year’s section on Goodwill). But, unless they are experiencing tremendous unit growth, outstanding businesses by definition generate large amounts of excess cash. If a company sinks most of this money in other businesses that earn low returns, the company’s overall return on retained capital may nevertheless appear excellent because of the extraordinary returns being earned by the portion of earnings incrementally invested in the core business. The situation is analogous to a Pro-Am golf event: even if all of the amateurs are hopeless duffers, the team’s best-ball score will be respectable because of the dominating skills of the professional.

股东在判断管理者是否应留存利润时，不应简单对比近年“总增量利润”与“总增量资本”——这种关系可能会被核心业务的表现扭曲。在通胀时期，核心业务具有卓越经济效益的公司，只需投入少量增量资本就能获得极高回报（正如去年“商誉”部分所讨论的）。但除非这类公司的销量增长极为迅猛，否则卓越的核心业务本质上会产生大量闲置现金。若公司将大部分闲置现金投入其他低回报业务，整体留存资本收益率仍可能看似优异——只因投入核心业务的那部分增量利润带来了极高回报。这种情况类似于职业-业余混合高尔夫赛事：即便所有业余选手水平糟糕，团队的“最佳球得分”仍会很可观，只因职业选手的技术占据主导。

Many corporations that consistently show good returns both on equity and on overall incremental capital have, indeed, employed a large portion of their retained earnings on an economically unattractive, even disastrous, basis. Their marvelous core businesses, however, whose earnings grow year after year, camouflage repeated failures in capital allocation elsewhere (usually involving high-priced acquisitions of businesses that have inherently mediocre economics). The managers at fault periodically report on the lessons they have learned from the latest disappointment. They then usually seek out future lessons. (Failure seems to go to their heads.)

许多公司尽管在净资产回报率和整体增量资本回报率上始终表现良好，但实际上，它们将很大一部分留存利润投入了经济吸引力低下、甚至灾难性的项目中。然而，这些公司拥有每年盈利增长的卓越核心业务，这掩盖了它们在其他领域反复出现的资本配置失误（通常表现为高价收购本身盈利能力平庸的企业）。犯错的管理者会定期汇报从最新失误中吸取的“教训”，随后却往往会在未来重蹈覆辙（仿佛失败让他们迷失了方向）。

In such cases, shareholders would be far better off if earnings were retained only to expand the high-return business, with the balance paid in dividends or used to repurchase stock (an action that increases the owners’ interest in the exceptional business while sparing them participation in subpar businesses). Managers of high-return businesses who consistently employ much of the cash thrown off by those businesses in other ventures with low returns should be held to account for those allocation decisions, regardless of how profitable the overall enterprise is.

在这种情况下，若公司仅留存利润用于扩张高回报业务，剩余利润以股息形式分配或用于回购股票（此举既能提高所有者在卓越业务中的权益占比，又能避免他们被迫参与平庸业务），股东的利益会好得多。对于高回报业务的管理者，若持续将该业务产生的大量现金投入其他低回报项目，无论公司整体盈利如何，都应对这些资本配置决策负责。

Nothing in this discussion is intended to argue for dividends that bounce around from quarter to quarter with each wiggle in earnings or in investment opportunities. Shareholders of public corporations understandably prefer that dividends be consistent and predictable. Payments, therefore, should reflect long-term expectations for both earnings and returns on incremental capital. Since the long-term corporate outlook changes only infrequently, dividend patterns should change no more often. But over time distributable earnings that have been withheld by managers should earn their keep. If earnings have been unwisely retained, it is likely that managers, too, have been unwisely retained.

我们的讨论并非主张股息应随季度盈利波动或投资机会变化而频繁调整。上市公司股东自然更倾向于稳定、可预测的股息政策。因此，股息支付应反映对公司长期盈利和增量资本回报率的预期。由于公司长期前景很少发生变化，股息模式也不应频繁调整。但长期来看，管理者留存的可分配利润必须证明其留存的合理性。若利润被不明智地留存，那么管理者本身很可能也是被不明智地留任。

Let’s now turn to Berkshire Hathaway and examine how these dividend principles apply to it. Historically, Berkshire has earned well over market rates on retained earnings, thereby creating over one dollar of market value for every dollar retained. Under such circumstances, any distribution would have been contrary to the financial interest of shareholders, large or small.

现在我们以伯克希尔·哈撒韦为例，看看这些股息原则如何应用。从历史表现来看，伯克希尔留存利润的回报率远高于市场水平，每留存1美元就能创造超过1美元的市值。在这种情况下，任何利润分配都将损害所有股东（无论持股多少）的财务利益。

In fact, significant distributions in the early years might have been disastrous, as a review of our starting position will show you. Charlie and I then controlled and managed three companies, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Diversified Retailing Company, Inc., and Blue Chip Stamps (all now merged into our present operation). Blue Chip paid only a small dividend, Berkshire and DRC paid nothing. If, instead, the companies had paid out their entire earnings, we almost certainly would have no earnings at all now - and perhaps no capital as well. The three companies each originally made their money from a single business: (1) textiles at Berkshire; (2) department stores at Diversified; (3) trading stamps at Blue Chip. These cornerstone businesses (carefully chosen, it should be noted, by your Chairman and Vice Chairman) have, respectively, (1) survived but earned almost nothing, (2) shriveled in size while incurring large losses, and (3) shrunk in sales volume to about 5% its size at the time of our entry. (Who says “you can’t lose ‘em all”?) Only by committing available funds to much better businesses were we able to overcome these origins. (It’s been like overcoming a misspent youth.) Clearly, diversification has served us well.

事实上，若早年进行大额利润分配，后果可能是灾难性的，回顾我们的起点便可知晓。当时我和查理控制并管理着三家公司：伯克希尔·哈撒韦、多元化零售公司（Diversified Retailing Company）和蓝筹邮票公司（Blue Chip Stamps）——如今这三家公司已合并为当前的运营主体。其中，蓝筹邮票仅支付少量股息，伯克希尔和多元化零售公司则不分红。若当时这三家公司将全部利润分配，我们现在几乎肯定会毫无盈利，甚至可能失去所有资本。这三家公司最初的盈利都依赖单一业务：（1）伯克希尔的纺织业务；（2）多元化零售公司的百货商店业务；（3）蓝筹邮票公司的邮票业务。值得一提的是，这些基础业务是由董事长（我）和副董事长（查理）精心挑选的，但它们的结局分别是：（1）勉强存活但几乎无利可图；（2）规模萎缩且亏损严重；（3）销售额降至我们接手时的约5%。（谁说“不可能全输”？）我们之所以能摆脱这些困境，全靠将可用资金投入到远更优质的业务中（这就像弥补“虚度的青春”）。显然，多元化战略为我们带来了巨大帮助。

We expect to continue to diversify while also supporting the growth of current operations though, as we’ve pointed out, our returns from these efforts will surely be below our historical returns. But as long as prospective returns are above the rate required to produce a dollar of market value per dollar retained, we will continue to retain all earnings. Should our estimate of future returns fall below that point, we will distribute all unrestricted earnings that we believe can not be effectively used. In making that judgment, we will look at both our historical record and our prospects. Because our year-to-year results are inherently volatile, we believe a five-year rolling average to be appropriate for judging the historical record.

我们计划继续推进多元化，同时支持现有业务增长。但正如我们之前所指出的，这些举措带来的回报率肯定会低于历史水平。不过，只要预期回报率高于“每留存1美元创造1美元市值”所需的水平，我们就会继续留存全部利润。若我们对未来回报率的预估低于该水平，就会将所有我们认为无法有效利用的非限制性利润进行分配。在做出这一判断时，我们会同时参考历史业绩和未来前景。由于我们的年度业绩本质上存在波动，我们认为用五年滚动平均值来评估历史业绩是合适的。

Our present plan is to use our retained earnings to further build the capital of our insurance companies. Most of our competitors are in weakened financial condition and reluctant to expand substantially. Yet large premium-volume gains for the industry are imminent, amounting probably to well over $15 billion in 1985 versus less than $5 billion in 1983. These circumstances could produce major amounts of profitable business for us. Of course, this result is no sure thing, but prospects for it are far better than they have been for many years.

我们目前的计划是将留存利润用于进一步充实保险子公司的资本金。我们的大多数竞争对手财务状况薄弱，不愿大幅扩张。但保险业即将迎来保费收入的大幅增长——1985年行业保费增量可能远超过150亿美元，而1983年这一数字还不到50亿美元。这种环境有望为我们带来大量盈利业务。当然，这一结果并非必然，但前景比过去多年都要好得多。

# Miscellaneous (其他事项)

This is the spot where each year I run my small “business wanted” ad. In 1984 John Loomis, one of our particularly knowledgeable and alert shareholders, came up with a company that met all of our tests. We immediately pursued this idea, and only a chance complication prevented a deal. Since our ad is pulling, we will repeat it in precisely last year’s form:

每年我都会在这里刊登一则小型“求购企业”启事。1984年，我们一位极具洞察力和敏锐度的股东约翰·卢米斯（John Loomis）推荐了一家符合我们所有标准的公司。我们立即推进此事，最终仅因一个意外变故导致交易未能达成。鉴于这则启事此前有效，我们将完全沿用去年的表述再次刊登：

We prefer: (1) large purchases (at least $5 million of after-tax earnings), (2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turn-around” situations), (3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt, (4) management in place (we can’t supply it), (5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it), (6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

我们偏好以下类型的企业：（1）大规模收购（税后盈利至少500万美元）；（2）具有持续稳定的盈利能力（我们对未来预测不感兴趣，对“扭亏为盈”类项目也不感兴趣）；（3）净资产回报率良好，且很少或不依赖债务；（4）管理层团队稳定（我们无法提供管理层）；（5）业务简单（若涉及大量技术，我们无法理解）；（6）有明确报价（在价格未知的情况下，即使是初步洽谈也会浪费双方时间，我们不愿如此）。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuance of stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.

我们不进行恶意收购。我们承诺对洽谈内容完全保密，并会迅速反馈是否感兴趣——通常在5分钟内。我们倾向于现金收购，但如果能以同等内在商业价值进行股票交换，也会考虑。我们邀请潜在出售方通过联系我们过往的合作伙伴来了解我们。对于合适的企业和合适的管理者，我们能提供一个良好的发展平台。

A record 97.2% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1984 shareholder-designated contributions program. Total contributions made through this program were $3,179,000, and 1,519 charities were recipients. Our proxy material for the annual meeting will allow you to cast an advisory vote expressing your views about this program - whether you think we should continue it and, if so, at what per-share level. (You may be interested to learn that we were unable to find a precedent for an advisory vote in which management seeks the opinions of shareholders about owner-related corporate policies. Managers who put their trust in capitalism seem in no hurry to put their trust in capitalists.)

1984年，伯克希尔“股东指定捐赠计划”的参与率达到创纪录的97.2%（仅统计符合条件的股份）。该计划的总捐赠金额为317.9万美元，惠及1519家慈善机构。在年度股东大会的委托代理材料中，你可以通过咨询投票表达对该计划的看法——包括是否应继续实施，以及若继续实施，每股捐赠金额应设定为多少。（或许你会感兴趣：我们尚未找到“管理层就所有者相关公司政策征求股东意见”的咨询投票先例。看来信任资本主义的管理者，似乎并不急于信任资本家。）

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 60 and 61. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure that your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in “street” name or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1985 will be ineligible for the 1985 program.

我们建议新股东阅读第60-61页关于“股东指定捐赠计划”的说明。若你希望参与未来的该计划，强烈建议你立即确认所持股份以实际所有者名义登记，而非以“券商名义”或“代理人名义”登记。1985年9月30日前未完成实际所有者名义登记的股份，将无资格参与1985年的捐赠计划。

Our annual meeting will be on May 21, 1985 in Omaha, and I hope that you attend. Many annual meetings are a waste of time, both for shareholders and for management. Sometimes that is true because management is reluctant to open up on matters of business substance. More often a nonproductive session is the fault of shareholder participants who are more concerned about their own moment on stage than they are about the affairs of the corporation. What should be a forum for business discussion becomes a forum for theatrics, spleen-venting and advocacy of issues. (The deal is irresistible: for the price of one share you get to tell a captive audience your ideas as to how the world should be run.) Under such circumstances, the quality of the meeting often deteriorates from year to year as the antics of those interested in themselves discourage attendance by those interested in the business.

我们的年度股东大会将于1985年5月21日在奥马哈举行，希望你能参加。许多年度股东大会对股东和管理层而言都是浪费时间。有时这是因为管理层不愿就业务实质问题坦诚交流，但更多时候，会议低效是由于参会股东更关注“自我表现”，而非公司事务。本应是业务讨论的平台，却变成了“表演舞台”、“宣泄场所”或“议题宣传现场”（这诱惑难以抗拒：只需一股的成本，就能向 captive 听众宣扬自己对“世界应如何运转”的看法）。在这种情况下，会议质量往往逐年下降——只顾自我表现者的荒唐行为，会让关注业务的股东不愿参会。

Berkshire’s meetings are a different story. The number of shareholders attending grows a bit each year and we have yet to experience a silly question or an ego-inspired commentary. Instead, we get a wide variety of thoughtful questions about the business. Because the annual meeting is the time and place for these, Charlie and I are happy to answer them all, no matter how long it takes. (We cannot, however, respond to written or phoned questions at other times of the year; one-person-at-a time reporting is a poor use of management time in a company with 3000 shareholders.) The only business matters that are off limits at the annual meeting are those about which candor might cost our company real money. Our activities in securities would be the main example.

伯克希尔的股东大会则完全不同。参会股东人数每年都略有增加，且我们从未遇到过愚蠢的问题或出于自负的评论。相反，我们收到的都是关于业务的、多角度且深思熟虑的问题。正因为年度股东大会是讨论这些问题的合适时机和场所，我和查理很乐意回答所有问题，无论需要多长时间。（但在其他时间，我们无法回复书面或电话咨询——对于一家拥有3000名股东的公司，“一对一”回复是对管理层时间的低效利用。）股东大会上唯一不开放讨论的业务事项，是那些坦诚交流可能导致公司实际损失的内容，证券交易活动就是主要例子。

We always have bragged a bit on these pages about the quality of our shareholder-partners. Come to the annual meeting and you will see why. Out-of-towners should schedule a stop at Nebraska Furniture Mart. If you make some purchases, you’ll save far more than enough to pay for your trip, and you’ll enjoy the experience.

在这份报告中，我们总免不了要夸赞我们股东伙伴的高素质。参加一次股东大会，你就会明白原因。外地股东应安排时间参观内布拉斯加家具商城：若你在此购物，节省的开支将远超旅途费用，而且你会享受这段体验。

Warren E. Buffett
February 25, 1985
Chairman of the Board

Subsequent Event: On March 18, a week after copy for this report went to the typographer but shortly before production, we agreed to purchase three million shares of Capital Cities Communications, Inc. at $172.50 per share. Our purchase is contingent upon the acquisition of American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. by Capital Cities, and will close when that transaction closes. At the earliest, that will be very late in 1985. Our admiration for the management of Capital Cities, led by Tom Murphy and Dan Burke, has been expressed several times in previous annual reports. Quite simply, they are tops in both ability and integrity. We will have more to say about this investment in next year’s report.

后续事项：3月18日——本报告文稿送排版一周后、正式印刷前不久——我们同意以每股172.50美元的价格收购首都城市通信公司（Capital Cities Communications, Inc.）300万股股票。此次收购以首都城市通信公司收购美国广播公司（American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.）为前提，将在该交易完成时同步交割，最早可能在1985年末。在以往的年度报告中，我们曾多次表达对由汤姆·墨菲（Tom Murphy）和丹·伯克（Dan Burke）领导的首都城市通信公司管理层的钦佩。简而言之，他们在能力和诚信方面都是顶尖水平。关于这项投资，我们将在明年的报告中详细说明。

编辑

上次更新: 2025/11/13, 11:34:16

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1984年巴菲特致股东的信

# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东)

# Sources of Reported Earnings (财报收益来源)

# Nebraska Furniture Mart (内布拉斯加家具商城)

# See’s Candy Shops, Inc. (喜诗糖果公司)

# | 52-53周财年（52-53 Week Year）截至12月31日左右（Ended About December 31） | 销售额（Sales Revenues） | 税后利润（Operating Profits After

# Nebraska Furniture Mart (内布拉斯加家具商城)

# See’s Candy Shops, Inc. (喜诗糖果店公司)

# Buffalo Evening News (《布法罗晚报》)

# Insurance Operations (保险业务)

# Errors in Loss Reserving (损失准备金计提误差)

# Washington Public Power Supply System (华盛顿公共电力供应系统)

# Dividend Policy (股息政策)

# Miscellaneous (其他事项)

# | 52-53周财年（52-53 Week Year）
截至12月31日左右（Ended About December 31） | 销售额（Sales Revenues） | 税后利润（Operating Profits After