2017巴菲特致股东的信
# To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司的股东：
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2017 was $65.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 23%. Over the last 53 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from $19 to $211,750, a rate of 19.1% compounded annually.*
伯克希尔2017年净资产增值653亿美元，使A类和B类股票每股账面价值均增长23%。在过去53年里（即现管理层接管以来），每股账面价值从19美元增至211,750美元，年复合增长率为19.1%。*
The format of that opening paragraph has been standard for 30 years. But 2017 was far from standard: A large portion of our gain did not come from anything we accomplished at Berkshire.
这段开场白的格式已沿用30年。但2017年远非常规：我们大部分收益并非来自伯克希尔的经营成果。
The $65 billion gain is nonetheless real – rest assured of that. But only $36 billion came from Berkshire’s operations. The remaining $29 billion was delivered to us in December when Congress rewrote the U.S. Tax Code. (Details of Berkshire’s tax-related gain appear on page K-32 and pages K-89 – K-90.)
尽管如此，650亿美元收益是真实的——请放心。其中只有360亿美元来自伯克希尔运营，剩余290亿美元是国会12月修订美国税法后带来的。（伯克希尔与税收相关的收益细节请参见K-32页及K-89至K-90页。）
After stating those fiscal facts, I would prefer to turn immediately to discussing Berkshire’s operations. But, in still another interruption, I must first tell you about a new accounting rule – a generally accepted accounting principle (GAAP) – that in future quarterly and annual reports will severely distort Berkshire’s net income figures and very often mislead commentators and investors.
陈述完这些财政事实后，我本希望立即转向讨论伯克希尔的业务。但还有一个问题必须说明：一项新的会计准则（通用会计准则）将在未来季度和年度报告中严重扭曲伯克希尔的净利润数据，经常误导评论员和投资者。
# The New Rule Exacerbates Long-Standing Issues
新规则加剧了长期存在的问题
The new rule says that the net change in unrealized investment gains and losses in stocks we hold must be included in all net income figures we report to you. That requirement will produce some truly wild and capricious swings in our GAAP bottom-line. Berkshire owns $170 billion of marketable stocks (not including our shares of Kraft Heinz), and the value of these holdings can easily swing by $10 billion or more within a quarterly reporting period. Including gyrations of that magnitude in reported net income will swamp the truly important numbers that describe our operating performance. For analytical purposes, Berkshire’s “bottom-line” will be useless.
新规则要求，我们持有的股票未实现投资损益的净变化值必须计入所有向您报告的净利润数据。这一要求将导致我们的GAAP净利润出现剧烈波动。伯克希尔持有1700亿美元可交易股票（不含卡夫亨氏股份），这些持仓价值在一个季度报告期内可能轻易波动100亿美元或更多。将如此规模的波动计入报告净利润，会淹没真正反映运营表现的重要数据。若作为分析用途，伯克希尔的“净利润”将毫无意义。
The new rule compounds the communication problems we have long had in dealing with the realized gains (or losses) that accounting rules compel us to include in our net income. In past quarterly and annual press releases, we have regularly warned you not to pay attention to these realized gains, because they – just like our unrealized gains – fluctuate randomly.
新规则加剧了我们在处理已实现收益（或亏损）时长期存在的沟通问题——会计准则强制要求我们将这些损益计入净利润。过去季度和年度财报中，我们多次警告不要关注这些已实现收益，因为它们与未实现收益一样，存在随机波动。
That’s largely because we sell securities when that seems the intelligent thing to do, not because we are trying to influence earnings in any way. As a result, we sometimes have reported substantial realized gains for a period when our portfolio, overall, performed poorly (or the converse).
这主要是因为我们会在看似明智时出售证券，而非为了影响收益。因此，我们有时会在投资组合整体表现不佳（或相反）的时期报告大额已实现收益。
*All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for the A shares.
*本报告中所有每股数据均适用于伯克希尔A股。B股数据为A股的1/1500。
# Addressing the Distortion
应对扭曲效应
With the new rule about unrealized gains exacerbating the distortion caused by the existing rules applying to realized gains, we will take pains every quarter to explain the adjustments you need in order to make sense of our numbers. But televised commentary on earnings releases is often instantaneous with their receipt, and newspaper headlines almost always focus on the year-over-year change in GAAP net income. Consequently, media reports sometimes highlight figures that unnecessarily frighten or encourage many readers or viewers.
由于未实现收益新规加剧了已实现收益规则造成的扭曲效应，我们将每季度努力解释调整项，帮助您理解数据。但电视媒体对财报的解读往往即时发布，报纸头条几乎总聚焦GAAP净利润的同比变化。因此，媒体报道有时会突出令读者或观众过度恐慌或兴奋的数字。
We will attempt to alleviate this problem by continuing our practice of publishing financial reports late on Friday, well after the markets close, or early on Saturday morning. That will allow you maximum time for analysis and give investment professionals the opportunity to deliver informed commentary before markets open on Monday. Nevertheless, I expect considerable confusion among shareholders for whom accounting is a foreign language.
我们将通过延后财报发布时间缓解此问题——继续选择周五收盘后或周六清晨发布。这将为您提供充分分析时间，并让专业投资者在周一开盘前发表深度解读。然而，对于会计知识薄弱的股东，我预计仍会产生大量困惑。
At Berkshire what counts most are increases in our normalized per-share earning power. That metric is what Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I focus on – and we hope that you do, too. Our scorecard for 2017 follows.
在伯克希尔，最重要的指标是常规化每股盈利能力的增长。这一指标是我和长期合作伙伴查理·芒格关注的核心——也希望您同样重视。以下是我们的2017年成绩单。
# Acquisitions
收购
There are four building blocks that add value to Berkshire: (1) sizable stand-alone acquisitions; (2) bolt-on acquisitions that fit with businesses we already own; (3) internal sales growth and margin improvement at our many and varied businesses; and (4) investment earnings from our huge portfolio of stocks and bonds. In this section, we will review 2017 acquisition activity.
伯克希尔的价值来源于四大支柱：（1）大规模独立收购；（2）与现有业务契合的追加收购；（3）旗下众多业务的内生销售增长与利润率提升；（4）庞大股票和债券组合的投资收益。本节将回顾2017年的收购活动。
In our search for new stand-alone businesses, the key qualities we seek are durable competitive strengths; able and high-grade management; good returns on the net tangible assets required to operate the business; opportunities for internal growth at attractive returns; and, finally, a sensible purchase price.
在寻找独立收购标的时，我们关注的核心特质包括：持久的竞争优势；能力出众且品德优良的管理层；对运营所需净资产的良好回报率；具备吸引力的内生增长机会；以及最重要的——合理的价格。
That last requirement proved a barrier to virtually all deals we reviewed in 2017, as prices for decent, but far from spectacular, businesses hit an all-time high. Indeed, price seemed almost irrelevant to an army of optimistic purchasers.
这一最终要求却成为2017年几乎所有交易的障碍——优质但非顶尖企业的收购价格达到历史高点。事实上，价格对大量乐观买家而言似乎已不再重要。
Why the purchasing frenzy? In part, it’s because the CEO job self-selects for “can-do” types. If Wall Street analysts or board members urge that brand of CEO to consider possible acquisitions, it’s a bit like telling your ripening teenager to be sure to have a normal sex life.
为何出现这种疯狂收购？部分原因在于CEO职位天然吸引“行动派”。如果华尔街分析师或董事会成员建议这类CEO考虑收购，就像告诉青春期的孩子必须拥有正常性生活一样。
Once a CEO hungers for a deal, he or she will never lack for forecasts that justify the purchase. Subordinates will be cheering, envisioning enlarged domains and the compensation levels that typically increase with corporate size. Investment bankers, smelling huge fees, will be applauding as well. (Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.)
一旦CEO渴望交易，总能找到支持收购的预测。下属会欢呼雀跃，期待扩张领地及伴随企业规模增长的薪资提升；投行家嗅到巨额费用也会鼓掌欢迎。（别问理发师你是否需要理发。）
If the historical performance of the target falls short of validating its acquisition, large “synergies” will be forecast. Spreadsheets never disappoint.
若目标企业历史表现不足以支撑收购合理性，就会预测巨额“协同效应”。电子表格永远不会让人失望。
The ample availability of extraordinarily cheap debt in 2017 further fueled purchase activity. After all, even a high-priced deal will usually boost per-share earnings if it is debt-financed. At Berkshire, in contrast, we evaluate acquisitions on an all-equity basis, knowing that our taste for overall debt is very low and that to assign a large portion of our debt to any individual business would generally be fallacious (leaving aside certain exceptions, such as debt dedicated to Clayton’s lending portfolio or to the fixed-asset commitments at our regulated utilities). We also never factor in, nor do we often find, synergies.
2017年超低利率债务的充裕进一步刺激了收购活动。毕竟，即便高价交易若通过债务融资，通常也能提升每股收益。但伯克希尔始终以全股权视角评估收购，因为我们整体负债偏好极低，且将大部分债务分配至单一业务通常不成立（克莱顿贷款组合或受监管公用事业的固定资产承诺等特例除外）。我们从不纳入、也极少真正发现所谓的协同效应。
Our aversion to leverage has dampened our returns over the years. But Charlie and I sleep well. Both of us believe it is insane to risk what you have and need in order to obtain what you don’t need. We held this view 50 years ago when we each ran an investment partnership, funded by a few friends and relatives who trusted us. We also hold it today after a million or so “partners” have joined us at Berkshire.
对杠杆的厌恶确实降低了多年来的回报。但查理和我睡得很安稳。我们都认为，为了获取不需要的东西而冒险失去必需之物是疯狂的。50年前，当各自管理由亲友资助的投资合伙时我们便持此观点；如今百万级“合伙人”加入伯克希尔后，我们依然如此。
Despite our recent drought of acquisitions, Charlie and I believe that from time to time Berkshire will have opportunities to make very large purchases. In the meantime, we will stick with our simple guideline: The less the prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we must conduct our own.
尽管近期收购活动匮乏，查理和我仍相信伯克希尔偶尔会遇到重大收购机会。在此期间，我们将坚持简单准则：他人越不谨慎，我们必须越谨慎。
We were able to make one sensible stand-alone purchase last year, a 38.6% partnership interest in Pilot Flying J (“PFJ”). With about $20 billion in annual volume, the company is far and away the nation’s leading travel-center operator.
去年我们完成了一项合理的独立收购——取得Pilot Flying J（PFJ）38.6%的合伙权益。该公司年营收约200亿美元，是美国绝对领先的旅行中心运营商。
PFJ has been run from the get-go by the remarkable Haslam family. “Big Jim” Haslam began with a dream and a gas station 60 years ago. Now his son, Jimmy, manages 27,000 associates at about 750 locations throughout North America. Berkshire has a contractual agreement to increase its partnership interest in PFJ to 80% in 2023; Haslam family members will then own the remaining 20%. Berkshire is delighted to be their partner.
PFJ自创立起便由卓越的Haslam家族经营。“大吉姆”Haslam 60年前以一个梦想和一座加油站起步。如今其子Jimmy管理着北美约750个网点的27,000名员工。伯克希尔有合同约定将于2023年将合伙权益增至80%，Haslam家族保留剩余20%。伯克希尔非常荣幸能成为其合作伙伴。
When driving on the Interstate, drop in. PFJ sells gasoline as well as diesel fuel, and the food is good. If it’s been a long day, remember, too, that our properties have 5,200 showers.
驶上州际公路时，请顺道光临。PFJ提供汽油和柴油，食物也很美味。若长途驾驶疲惫，别忘了我们的设施配有5,200间淋浴房。
# Bolt-on Acquisitions
追加收购
Let’s move now to bolt-on acquisitions. Some of these were small transactions that I will not detail. Here is an account, however, of a few larger purchases whose closings stretched between late 2016 and early 2018.
接下来我们讨论追加收购。其中部分交易规模较小，此处不再赘述。以下记录的是几笔较大收购，交易时间横跨2016年底至2018年初。
Š Clayton Homes acquired two builders of conventional homes during 2017, a move that more than doubled our presence in a field we entered only three years ago. With these additions – Oakwood Homes in Colorado and Harris Doyle in Birmingham – I expect our 2018 site built volume will exceed $1 billion.
Š 克莱顿房屋公司2017年收购了两家传统住宅开发商，这一动作使我们在该领域（三年前进入）的业务规模翻倍。新增的两家公司是科罗拉多的橡木屋（Oakwood Homes）和伯明翰的哈里斯·多伊尔（Harris Doyle），预计2018年我们的现场建造业务规模将超过10亿美元。
Clayton’s emphasis, nonetheless, remains manufactured homes, both their construction and their financing. In 2017 Clayton sold 19,168 units through its own retail operation and wholesaled another 26,706 units to independent retailers. All told, Clayton accounted for 49% of the manufactured-home market last year. That industry-leading share – about three times what our nearest competitor did – is a far cry from the 13% Clayton achieved in 2003, the year it joined Berkshire.
但克莱顿的核心仍是预制房屋业务（包括制造与融资）。2017年，其自营零售渠道售出19,168套房屋，并向独立零售商批发了26,706套。总计来看，去年克莱顿占据49%的预制房屋市场份额——这一行业领先地位（约为第二名的三倍）远超其2003年加入伯克希尔时的13%。
Both Clayton Homes and PFJ are based in Knoxville, where the Clayton and Haslam families have long been friends. Kevin Clayton’s comments to the Haslams about the advantages of a Berkshire affiliation, and his admiring comments about the Haslam family to me, helped cement the PFJ deal.
克莱顿房屋与PFJ总部均位于诺克斯维尔，克莱顿家族与Haslam家族长期为友。凯文·克莱顿向Haslam家族强调伯克希尔合作优势，以及他对该家族的赞赏，进一步促成了PFJ交易。
Š Near the end of 2016, Shaw Industries, our floor coverings business, acquired U.S. Floors (“USF”), a rapidly growing distributor of luxury vinyl tile. USF’s managers, Piet Dossche and Philippe Erramuzpe, came out of the gate fast, delivering a 40% increase in sales in 2017, during which their operation was integrated with Shaw’s. It’s clear that we acquired both great human assets and business assets in making the USF purchase.
Š 2016年底，我们的地板业务子公司肖工业（Shaw Industries）收购了快速扩张的豪华乙烯基地板分销商美国地板公司（USF）。USF管理层皮特·多希（Piet Dossche）和菲利普·埃拉穆兹佩（Philippe Erramuzpe）迅速行动，2017年整合期间实现销售额增长40%。此次收购不仅获得优质业务资产，更收获了卓越的人才团队。
Vance Bell, Shaw’s CEO, originated, negotiated and completed this acquisition, which increased Shaw’s sales to $5.7 billion in 2017 and its employment to 22,000. With the purchase of USF, Shaw has substantially strengthened its position as an important and durable source of earnings for Berkshire.
肖工业CEO万斯·贝尔（Vance Bell）主导了此次收购的策划、谈判与完成，使肖工业2017年销售额增至57亿美元，员工达22,000人。通过收购USF，肖工业作为伯克希尔重要且稳定的盈利来源地位显著增强。
Š I have told you several times about HomeServices, our growing real estate brokerage operation. Berkshire backed into this business in 2000 when we acquired a majority interest in MidAmerican Energy (now named Berkshire Hathaway Energy). MidAmerican’s activities were then largely in the electric utility field, and I originally paid little attention to HomeServices.
Š 我已多次提及我们的地产经纪业务HomeServices。伯克希尔2000年收购中美能源公司（现伯克希尔哈撒韦能源）多数股权时，意外涉足该业务。当时中美能源主要专注于电力公用事业，我最初并未关注HomeServices。
But, year-by-year, the company added brokers and, by the end of 2016, HomeServices was the second-largest brokerage operation in the country – still ranking, though, far behind the leader, Realogy. In 2017, however, HomeServices’ growth exploded. We acquired the industry’s third-largest operator, Long and Foster; number 12, Houlihan Lawrence; and Gloria Nilson.
但逐年扩展后，至2016年底HomeServices成为全国第二大地产经纪商（仍大幅落后于第一大Realogy）。2017年，其增长爆发：收购了行业第三大连锁Long and Foster、第十二大的霍利汉·劳伦斯（Houlihan Lawrence）及格洛丽亚·尼尔森（Gloria Nilson）。
With those purchases we added 12,300 agents, raising our total to 40,950. HomeServices is now close to leading the country in home sales, having participated (including our three acquisitions pro-forma) in $127 billion of “sides” during 2017. To explain that term, there are two “sides” to every transaction; if we represent both buyer and seller, the dollar value of the transaction is counted twice.
通过这些收购新增12,300名经纪人，总人数达40,950人。如今HomeServices已接近成为全国房屋销售冠军，2017年参与（含三家被收购公司模拟数据）的交易“方数”达1,270亿美元。这里需解释术语：“每笔交易有两方（sides）”——若我们同时代理买卖双方，则交易金额被计算两次。
Despite its recent acquisitions, HomeServices is on track to do only about 3% of the country’s home-brokerage business in 2018. That leaves 97% to go. Given sensible prices, we will keep adding brokers in this most fundamental of businesses.
尽管近期频繁收购，HomeServices预计2018年仅占全美地产经纪业务的约3%，仍有97%市场待开拓。只要价格合理，我们将持续在这一基础性行业中增加经纪人。
Š Finally, Precision Castparts, a company built through acquisitions, bought Wilhelm Schulz GmbH, a German maker of corrosion resistant fittings, piping systems and components. Please allow me to skip a further explanation. I don’t understand manufacturing operations as well as I do the activities of real estate brokers, home builders or truck stops.
Š 最后，通过收购成长的精密铸件公司（Precision Castparts）收购了德国防腐管件、管道系统制造商Wilhelm Schulz GmbH。请允许我略去详细说明：我对制造业的理解不如对地产经纪、住宅建筑或卡车服务站那样深入。
Fortunately, I don’t need in this instance to bring knowledge to the table: Mark Donegan, CEO of Precision, is an extraordinary manufacturing executive, and any business in his domain is slated to do well. Betting on people can sometimes be more certain than betting on physical assets.
幸运的是，此次无需我亲力亲为：精密铸件CEO马克·多尼根（Mark Donegan）是卓越的制造业管理者，他掌管的业务注定表现优异。有时，对人的投入比对实物资产的投入更具确定性。
# Transition to Operations
转向业务运营
Let’s now move on to operations, beginning with property-casualty (“p/c”) insurance, a business I do understand and the engine that for 51 years has powered Berkshire’s growth.
现在转向业务运营，从我深谙的财产和意外险（“P/C”）保险开始——这项业务在过去51年中驱动了伯克希尔的成长。
# Insurance
保险业务
Before I discuss our 2017 insurance results, let me remind you of how and why we entered the field. We began by purchasing National Indemnity and a smaller sister company for $8.6 million in early 1967. With our purchase we received $6.7 million of tangible net worth that, by the nature of the insurance business, we were able to deploy in marketable securities. It was easy to rearrange the portfolio into securities we would otherwise have owned at Berkshire itself. In effect, we were “trading dollars” for the net worth portion of the cost.
在我讨论2017年保险业务成果前，请允许我回顾我们进入这一领域的初衷与方式。1967年初，我们以860万美元收购了National Indemnity及其规模较小的姊妹公司。此次收购使我们获得670万美元的有形净资产，按照保险业务特性，这部分资金可投资于可交易证券。我们轻易将这些资产重新配置为伯克希尔本就会持有的证券组合。实际上，我们是以“用美元换净资产”的方式完成交易。
The $1.9 million premium over net worth that Berkshire paid brought us an insurance business that usually delivered an underwriting profit. Even more important, the insurance operation carried with it $19.4 million of “float” – money that belonged to others but was held by our two insurers.
伯克希尔支付的190万美元溢价（超出净资产部分）为我们带来了通常实现承保利润的保险业务。更重要的是，该业务附带了1,940万美元的“浮存金”——属于他人但由我们两家保险公司持有的资金。
Ever since, float has been of great importance to Berkshire. When we invest these funds, all dividends, interest and gains from their deployment belong to Berkshire. (If we experience investment losses, those, of course, are on our tab as well.)
自那以来，浮存金对伯克希尔至关重要。当我们投资这些资金时，其产生的股息、利息及投资收益均归伯克希尔所有。（当然，若出现投资亏损，也由我们承担。）
# Float: Mechanisms and Growth
浮存金：机制与增长
Float materializes at p/c insurers in several ways: (1) Premiums are generally paid to the company upfront whereas losses occur over the life of the policy, usually a six-month or one-year period; (2) Though some losses, such as car repairs, are quickly paid, others – such as the harm caused by exposure to asbestos – may take many years to surface and even longer to evaluate and settle; (3) Loss payments are sometimes spread over decades in cases, say, of a person employed by one of our workers’ compensation policyholders being permanently injured and thereafter requiring expensive lifetime care.
财产险公司的浮存金产生机制主要有三种：（1）保费通常在保单生效时一次性支付，而损失赔付贯穿整个保险周期（通常为6个月或1年）；（2）部分损失（如车辆维修）需快速赔付，而其他损失（如石棉暴露导致的损害）可能需数十年才显现，评估和解决耗时更长；（3）例如，某员工因工伤致永久残疾需终身护理时，损失赔付可能跨越数十年。
Float generally grows as premium volume increases. Additionally, certain p/c insurers specialize in lines of business such as medical malpractice or product liability – business labeled “long-tail” in industry jargon – that generate far more float than, say, auto collision and homeowner policies, which require insurers to almost immediately make payments to claimants for needed repairs.
浮存金通常随保费规模增长而扩大。此外，部分财产险公司专注“长尾”业务（行业术语），如医疗过失或产品责任险，其产生的浮存金远超汽车碰撞险或房屋保险（后者需在出险后迅速向索赔人支付维修费用）。
Berkshire has been a leader in long-tail business for many years. In particular, we have specialized in jumbo reinsurance policies that leave us assuming long-tail losses already incurred by other p/c insurers. As a result of our emphasizing that sort of business, Berkshire’s growth in float has been extraordinary. We are now the country’s second largest p/c company measured by premium volume and its leader, by far, in float.
伯克希尔多年来一直是长尾业务的领军者。特别是我们专注于巨额再保险合约，承担其他财产险公司已发生的长尾损失。正因聚焦此类业务，伯克希尔的浮存金增长极为显著。目前我们按保费规模是美国第二大财产险公司，按浮存金规模则遥遥领先。
# Historical Performance Metrics
历史业绩数据
Here’s the record:
| Year | Premium Volume ($ millions) | Float ($ millions) |
|---|---|---|
| 1970 | 39 | 39 |
| 1980 | 185 | 237 |
| 1990 | 582 | 1,632 |
| 2000 | 19,343 | 27,871 |
| 2010 | 30,749 | 65,832 |
| 2017 | 60,597 | 114,500 |
我们的2017年数据受益于一笔巨额交易：我们为AIG承保了最高200亿美元的长尾损失，保费收入达102亿美元，创世界纪录且不可复制。因此2018年保费规模将有所下降。
浮存金可能在未来几年缓慢增长，最终即使出现下降，幅度也仅每年约3%。不同于银行存款或含退保选择权的人寿保单，财产险浮存金不可被提取。这意味着在金融压力时期，财产险公司不会遭遇大规模“挤兑”，这一特性对伯克希尔至关重要，已纳入我们的投资决策框架。
# Risk Management Philosophy
风险管理哲学
Charlie and I never will operate Berkshire in a manner that depends on the kindness of strangers – or even that of friends who may be facing liquidity problems of their own. During the 2008-2009 crisis, we liked having Treasury Bills – loads of Treasury Bills – that protected us from having to rely on funding sources such as bank lines or commercial paper. We have intentionally constructed Berkshire in a manner that will allow it to comfortably withstand economic discontinuities, including such extremes as extended market closures.
查理和我永远不会以依赖陌生人善意的方式经营伯克希尔——甚至不会依赖可能自身面临流动性问题的朋友。在2008-2009年危机期间，我们持有大量国债（Treasury Bills），这使我们免于依赖银行信贷或商业票据等融资渠道。我们有意构建了伯克希尔的业务结构，使其能够从容应对经济断裂风险，包括市场长期关闭等极端情况。
# The Downside of Float
浮存金的潜在风险
The downside of float is that it comes with risk, sometimes oceans of risk. What looks predictable in insurance can be anything but. Take the famous Lloyds insurance market, which produced decent results for three centuries. In the 1980’s, though, huge latent problems from a few long-tail lines of insurance surfaced at Lloyds and, for a time, threatened to destroy its storied operation. (It has, I should add, fully recovered.)
浮存金的弊端在于伴随的风险，有时甚至是巨量风险。保险业看似可预测的表象下可能隐藏着不可预测性。以劳合社保险市场为例，其三百年来业绩稳健，但1980年代，其长尾业务潜藏的巨大问题爆发，一度威胁到这一传奇机构的生存。（需要补充的是，劳合社已完全恢复。）
Berkshire’s insurance managers are conservative and careful underwriters, who operate in a culture that has long prioritized those qualities. That disciplined behavior has produced underwriting profits in most years, and in such instances, our cost of float was less than zero. In effect, we got paid then for holding the huge sums tallied in the earlier table.
伯克希尔的保险经理人始终秉持保守审慎的承保文化。这种纪律性使我们在多数年份实现承保利润，此时浮存金成本甚至低于零——换句话说，我们通过持有早期表格中的巨额资金还获得了收益。
# Catastrophe Risk and Industry Lessons
巨灾风险与行业教训
I have warned you, however, that we have been fortunate in recent years and that the catastrophe-light period the industry was experiencing was not a new norm. Last September drove home that point, as three significant hurricanes hit Texas, Florida and Puerto Rico.
然而我曾警告过，近年的幸运并非常态，行业经历的低灾难周期终将结束。2017年9月的三场飓风袭击德克萨斯、佛罗里达和波多黎各，印证了这一点。
My guess at this time is that the insured losses arising from the hurricanes are $100 billion or so. That figure, however, could be far off the mark. The pattern with most mega-catastrophes has been that initial loss estimates ran low. As well-known analyst V.J. Dowling has pointed out, the loss reserves of an insurer are similar to a self-graded exam. Ignorance, wishful thinking or, occasionally, downright fraud can deliver inaccurate figures about an insurer’s financial condition for a very long time.
目前估计飓风造成的保险损失约1000亿美元，但这一数字可能严重偏离最终结果。历史规律表明，重大灾难初期的损失预估往往偏低。正如知名分析师V.J.道林指出，保险公司损失准备金如同自我评分的考试，无知、侥幸心理甚至欺诈可能长期掩盖真实的财务状况。
We currently estimate Berkshire’s losses from the three hurricanes to be $3 billion (or about $2 billion after tax). If both that estimate and my industry estimate of $100 billion are close to accurate, our share of the industry loss was about 3%. I believe that percentage is also what we may reasonably expect to be our share of losses in future American mega-cats.
伯克希尔当前预估飓风损失为30亿美元（税后约20亿美元）。若此估算与行业总损失1000亿美元接近准确，则我们承担了行业损失的约3%。我认为这一比例也将是未来美国巨灾损失中的合理份额。
# Financial Resilience in Catastrophes
巨灾下的财务韧性
It’s worth noting that the $2 billion net cost from the three hurricanes reduced Berkshire’s GAAP net worth by less than 1%. Elsewhere in the reinsurance industry there were many companies that suffered losses in net worth ranging from 7% to more than 15%. The damage to them could have been far worse: Had Hurricane Irma followed a path through Florida only a bit to the east, insured losses might well have been an additional $100 billion.
值得注意的是，三场飓风导致的20亿美元净成本仅使伯克希尔GAAP净资产缩水不到1%。再保险行业其他公司则普遍遭受7%-15%的净资产损失。若伊尔玛飓风路径东移数英里横扫佛罗里达，保险损失可能再增加1000亿美元。
We believe that the annual probability of a U.S. mega-catastrophe causing $400 billion or more of insured losses is about 2%. No one, of course, knows the correct probability. We do know, however, that the risk increases over time because of growth in both the number and value of structures located in catastrophe-vulnerable areas.
我们估算美国发生导致4000亿美元以上保险损失的巨灾年概率约为2%。当然无人能准确预测，但我们确知风险随灾害易发区建筑数量和价值增长而上升。
# Berkshire’s Unique Preparedness
伯克希尔的独特优势
No company comes close to Berkshire in being financially prepared for a $400 billion mega-cat. Our share of such a loss might be $12 billion or so, an amount far below the annual earnings we expect from our non-insurance activities. Concurrently, much – indeed, perhaps most – of the p/c world would be out of business. Our unparalleled financial strength explains why other p/c insurers come to Berkshire – and only Berkshire – when they, themselves, need to purchase huge reinsurance coverages for large payments they may have to make in the far future.
在应对4000亿美元级巨灾的财务准备上，没有任何公司能与伯克希尔比肩。此类损失中我们的承担额约120亿美元，远低于非保险业务的年预期收益。与此同时，大部分财产险公司可能面临破产。这种无与伦比的财务实力，正是其他财产险公司在需要购买远期巨额再保险时，只找伯克希尔的根本原因。
Prior to 2017, Berkshire had recorded 14 consecutive years of underwriting profits, which totaled $28.3 billion pre-tax. I have regularly told you that I expect Berkshire to attain an underwriting profit in a majority of years, but also to experience losses from time to time. My warning became fact in 2017, as we lost $3.2 billion pre-tax from underwriting.
2017年前，伯克希尔连续14年实现承保利润，累计税前收益283亿美元。我曾反复强调，我们预计多数年份将实现承保利润，但也需接受周期性亏损。2017年警告成真，承保业务导致税前损失32亿美元。
A large amount of additional information about our various insurance operations is included in the 10-K at the back of this report. The only point I will add here is that you have some extraordinary managers working for you at our various p/c operations. This is a business in which there are no trade secrets, patents, or locational advantages. What counts are brains and capital. The managers of our various insurance companies supply the brains and Berkshire provides the capital.
本报告附录的10-K文件中包含更多保险业务细节。此处仅强调：我们的财产险业务拥有卓越的管理团队。这一行业不存在商业秘密、专利或地理优势，核心竞争力在于智慧与资本。我们的保险经理人提供智慧，伯克希尔提供资本。
# Summary of Non-Insurance Businesses
非保险业务总结
For many years, this letter has described the activities of Berkshire’s many other businesses. That discussion has become both repetitious and partially duplicative of information regularly included in the 10-K that follows the letter. Consequently, this year I will give you a simple summary of our dozens of non-insurance businesses. Additional details can be found on pages K-5 – K-22 and pages K-40 – K-50.
多年来，本信件持续描述伯克希尔旗下其他业务。此类讨论已变得重复且部分内容与信末10-K文件重叠。因此今年我将简要总结我们的数十家非保险企业，更多细节请参见K-5至K-22页及K-40至K-50页。
Viewed as a group – and excluding investment income – our operations other than insurance delivered pre-tax income of $20 billion in 2017, an increase of $950 million over 2016. About 44% of the 2017 profit came from two subsidiaries: BNSF, our railroad, and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (of which we own 90.2%). You can read more about these businesses on pages K-5 – K-10 and pages K-40 – K-44.
2017年，非保险业务（不含投资收益）整体实现税前利润200亿美元，较2016年增长9.5亿美元。其中约44%利润来自两大子公司——BNSF铁路公司和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（我们持有90.2%股份）。详情请参见K-5至K-10页及K-40至K-44页。
# Tiered Performance of Key Subsidiaries
核心子公司分层表现
Proceeding down Berkshire’s long list of subsidiaries, our next five non-insurance businesses, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically) — Clayton Homes, International Metalworking Companies, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts — had aggregate pre-tax income in 2017 of $5.5 billion, little changed from the $5.4 billion these companies earned in 2016.
在伯克希尔长长的子公司清单中，按盈利排名紧随其后的五家非保险企业（按字母顺序排列）——克莱顿房屋、国际金属加工公司、路博润、马蒙集团和精密铸件公司——2017年合计税前利润为55亿美元，与2016年的54亿美元基本持平。
The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Forest River, Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and TTI) earned $2.1 billion last year, up from $1.7 billion in 2016.
再下一层的五家企业（森林河公司、约翰曼维尔、MiTek、肖工业和TTI）2017年利润为21亿美元，高于2016年的17亿美元。
# Remaining Business Performance
其他业务表现
The remaining businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – recorded little change in pre-tax income, which was $3.7 billion in 2017 versus $3.5 billion in 2016.
伯克希尔旗下其余众多企业2017年税前利润为37亿美元，略高于2016年的35亿美元。
Depreciation charges for all of these non-insurance operations totaled $7.6 billion; capital expenditures were $11.5 billion. Berkshire is always looking for ways to expand its businesses and regularly incurs capital expenditures that far exceed its depreciation charge. Almost 90% of our investments are made in the United States. America’s economic soil remains fertile.
非保险业务总折旧费用达76亿美元，资本支出为115亿美元。伯克希尔始终寻求业务扩张，资本支出常年显著高于折旧费用。近90%投资集中于美国，美国经济土壤依然肥沃。
Amortization charges were an additional $1.3 billion. I believe that in large part this item is not a true economic cost. Partially offsetting this good news is the fact that BNSF (like all other railroads) records depreciation charges that fall well short of the sums regularly needed to keep the railroad in first-class shape.
摊销费用额外增加13亿美元。我认为这在很大程度上并非真实经济成本。抵消这一利好的是，BNSF（如所有铁路公司）的折旧费用远低于维持铁路一流运营所需的常规投入。
# Strategic Financial Positioning
战略财务布局
Berkshire’s goal is to substantially increase the earnings of its non-insurance group. For that to happen, we will need to make one or more huge acquisitions. We certainly have the resources to do so. At yearend Berkshire held $116.0 billion in cash and U.S. Treasury Bills (whose average maturity was 88 days), up from $86.4 billion at yearend 2016. This extraordinary liquidity earns only a pittance and is far beyond the level Charlie and I wish Berkshire to have. Our smiles will broaden when we have redeployed Berkshire’s excess funds into more productive assets.
伯克希尔的目标是大幅提高非保险业务的盈利能力。为此，我们需要完成一宗或数宗大型收购。我们显然具备相应资源。年末公司持有1,160亿美元现金及美国国债（平均到期日88天），高于2016年末的864亿美元。这种超额流动性仅带来微薄收益，远超查理和期望的合理水平。当我们将这些资金重新配置到更具生产力的资产时，笑容才会真正绽放。
# Investments
投资
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding – 325,442,152 shares – because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries its Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of $17.6 billion. The shares had a yearend market value of $25.3 billion, and a cost basis of $9.8 billion.
以下列出年末市值最大的15项普通股投资。我们未将持有的325,442,152股卡夫亨氏（Kraft Heinz）列入，因伯克希尔属于其控股方，须按“权益法”核算该投资。根据GAAP，伯克希尔资产负债表上卡夫亨氏持股价值为176亿美元，年末市值为253亿美元，成本基础为98亿美元。
Shares*
持股数量*
151,610,700; 166,713,209; 700,000,000; 53,307,534; 225,000,000; 6,789,054; 400,000,000; 53,110,395; 44,527,147; 11,390,582; 24,669,778; 74,587,892; 47,659,456; 103,855,045; 482,544,468
Percentage of Company
公司持股比例
American Express Company .................. 17.6%
Apple Inc. ......................................... 3.3%
Bank of America Corporation ................. 6.8%
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation . . . . . . 5.3%
BYD Company Ltd. ............................... 8.2%
Charter Communications, Inc. ................. 2.8%
The Coca-Cola Company ....................... 9.4%
Delta Airlines Inc. .............................. 7.4%
General Motors Company ...................... 3.2%
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. ............... 3.0%
Moody’s Corporation ............................ 12.9%
Phillips 66 ......................................... 14.9%
Southwest Airlines Co. ......................... 8.1%
U.S. Bancorp .................................... 6.3%
Wells Fargo & Company ....................... 9.9%
Others ............................................
12/31/17
年末数据
Cost** (in millions)
成本（百万美元）
1,287; 20,961; 5,007; 2,230; 232; 1,210; 1,299; 2,219; 1,343; 654; 248; 5,841; 1,997; 3,343; 11,837
Market (in millions)
市值（百万美元）
15,056; 28,213; 20,664; 2,871; 1,961; 2,281; 18,352; 2,974; 1,825; 2,902; 3,642; 7,545; 3,119; 5,565; 29,276
Total Common Stocks Carried at Market......... $170,540
以市值计价的普通股总额：1705.4亿美元
- Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
- 排除伯克希尔子公司养老金基金持有的股份。
** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.
** 此为实际购买价格及税务成本；少数情况下GAAP“成本”因减值要求与实际成本不同。
# Portfolio Management by Combs and Weschler
康布斯与韦施勒的投资管理
Some of the stocks in the table are the responsibility of either Todd Combs or Ted Weschler, who work with me in managing Berkshire’s investments. Each, independently of me, manages more than $12 billion; I usually learn about decisions they have made by looking at monthly portfolio summaries. Included in the $25 billion that the two manage is more than $8 billion of pension trust assets of certain Berkshire subsidiaries. As noted, pension investments are not included in the preceding tabulation of Berkshire holdings.
表中部分股票由托德·康布斯（Todd Combs）或泰德·韦施勒（Ted Weschler）负责，他们与我共同管理伯克希尔投资。两人各自独立管理超120亿美元资金；我通常通过月度投资组合摘要了解他们的决策。两人管理的250亿美元中，包含伯克希尔子公司超过80亿美元的养老金信托资产。如前所述，养老金投资未列入上述伯克希尔持仓统计。
# Investment Philosophy: Ownership, Not Trading
投资哲学：所有权思维，而非交易
Charlie and I view the marketable common stocks that Berkshire owns as interests in businesses, not as ticker symbols to be bought or sold based on their “chart” patterns, the “target” prices of analysts or the opinions of media pundits. Instead, we simply believe that if the businesses of the investees are successful (as we believe most will be), our investments will be successful as well. Sometimes the payoffs to us will be modest; occasionally the cash register will ring loudly. And sometimes I will make expensive mistakes. Overall – and over time – we should get decent results. In America, equity investors have the wind at their back.
查理和我将伯克希尔持有的可交易普通股视为企业所有权的一部分，而非基于“图表模式”、分析师“目标价”或媒体评论员观点进行买卖的代码。我们坚信，只要被投企业成功（我们相信多数企业会成功），投资自然会成功。有时回报有限，偶尔收益显著；当然，有时我也会犯代价高昂的错误。但长期来看，我们应取得合理回报。在美国，股票投资者始终拥有顺风环境。
# Dividend Income and Retained Earnings
股息收入与留存收益
From our stock portfolio – call our holdings “minority interests” in a diversified group of publicly-owned businesses – Berkshire received $3.7 billion of dividends in 2017. That’s the number included in our GAAP figures, as well as in the “operating earnings” we reference in our quarterly and annual reports.
2017年，我们的股票投资组合（即对多家上市公司持有的少数股权）为伯克希尔带来37亿美元股息收入。这一数字已包含在GAAP财务数据及我们季报年报引用的“运营收益”中。
That dividend figure, however, far understates the “true” earnings emanating from our stock holdings. For decades, we have stated in Principle 6 of our “Owner-Related Business Principles” (page 19) that we expect undistributed earnings of our investees to deliver us at least equivalent earnings by way of subsequent capital gains.
然而，股息远未反映持仓的“真实”收益。数十年来，我们在《股东相关商业原则》第六条中明确指出：被投企业的未分配利润应通过后续资本增值为我们创造至少同等价值的收益。
Our recognition of capital gains (and losses) will be lumpy, particularly as we conform with the new GAAP rule requiring us to constantly record unrealized gains or losses in our earnings. I feel confident, however, that the earnings retained by our investees will over time, and with our investees viewed as a group, translate into commensurate capital gains for Berkshire.
资本利得（或损失）的确认过程必然是波动的，尤其在遵循新GAAP规则——将未实现损益持续计入收益的情况下。但我确信，从长期群体视角看，被投企业留存的收益终将转化为伯克希尔相应的资本增值。
# Graham’s Wisdom: Voting Machine vs. Weighing Machine
格雷厄姆箴言：投票机与称重机
The connection of value-building to retained earnings that I’ve just described will be impossible to detect in the short term. Stocks surge and swoon, seemingly untethered to any year-to-year buildup in their underlying value. Over time, however, Ben Graham’s oft-quoted maxim proves true: “In the short run, the market is a voting machine; in the long run, however, it becomes a weighing machine.”
价值创造与留存收益的关联短期内难以察觉。股价起伏看似与企业内在价值的年度积累无关。然而长期来看，本杰明·格雷厄姆的经典论断终将应验：“短期而言，市场是投票机；长期而言，市场是称重机。”
# Berkshire, itself, provides some vivid examples of how price randomness in the short term can obscure long-term growth in value
伯克希尔自身：短期波动如何掩盖长期价值增长的生动例证
For the last 53 years, the company has built value by reinvesting its earnings and letting compound interest work its magic. Year by year, we have moved forward. Yet Berkshire shares have suffered four truly major dips. Here are the gory details:
过去53年，公司通过再投资收益并利用复利效应创造价值，年复一年稳步前进。然而伯克希尔股价曾经历四次重大回撤。具体数据如下：
| Period | High | Low | Percentage Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|
| March 1973 - January 1975 | 93 | 38 | (59.1%) |
| 10/2/87 - 10/27/87 | 4,250 | 2,675 | (37.1%) |
| 6/19/98 - 3/10/2000 | 80,900 | 41,300 | (48.9%) |
| 9/19/08 - 3/5/09 | 147,000 | 72,400 | (50.7%) |
# Lessons from Price Volatility
价格波动的启示
This table offers the strongest argument I can muster against ever using borrowed money to own stocks. There is simply no telling how far stocks can fall in a short period. Even if your borrowings are small and your positions aren’t immediately threatened by the plunging market, your mind may well become rattled by scary headlines and breathless commentary. And an unsettled mind will not make good decisions.
这张表格是我能提出的最有力论据，反对任何使用杠杆资金持有股票的行为。短期内股价可能下跌的幅度完全无法预测。即使借贷规模较小且持仓未立即受到市场暴跌威胁，恐慌的新闻标题和夸张的评论也可能扰乱你的判断。而情绪波动必然导致错误决策。
# The Inevitability of Future Declines
未来下跌的必然性
In the next 53 years our shares (and others) will experience declines resembling those in the table. No one can tell you when these will happen. The light can at any time go from green to red without pausing at yellow.
未来53年，我们的股票（及其他资产）仍将经历类似表中的下跌。无人能预知何时发生——市场可能随时由绿转红，跳过任何警示信号。
# Opportunities in Adversity
危机中的机遇
When major declines occur, however, they offer extraordinary opportunities to those who are not handicapped by debt. That’s the time to heed these lines from Kipling’s If:
然而重大下跌发生时，正是无负债者抓住非凡机遇的时刻。此时应铭记吉卜林《如果》中的诗句：
"If you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs . . .
If you can wait and not be tired by waiting . . .
If you can think – and not make thoughts your aim . . .
If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you . . .
Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it."（“如果你能在众人失去理智时保持冷静……
如果你能等待而不因等待疲倦……
如果你能思考而不以思想为目的……
如果众人怀疑你时你仍相信自己……
这世界就是你的，一切皆属于你。”）
# “The Bet” is Over and Has Delivered an Unforeseen Investment Lesson
“赌注”已结束：一次意料之外的投资启示
Last year, at the 90% mark, I gave you a detailed report on a ten-year bet I had made on December 19, 2007. (The full discussion from last year’s annual report is reprinted on pages 24 – 26.) Now I have the final tally – and, in several respects, it’s an eye-opener.
去年达到90%进度时，我曾详细汇报过我在2007年12月19日发起的十年期赌注（完整讨论见去年年报第24-26页）。现在我公布最终结果——这一结果在多个方面令人震惊。
I made the bet for two reasons: (1) to leverage my outlay of $318,250 into a disproportionately larger sum that – if things turned out as I expected – would be distributed in early 2018 to Girls Inc. of Omaha; and (2) to publicize my conviction that my pick – a virtually cost-free investment in an unmanaged S&P 500 index fund – would, over time, deliver better results than those achieved by most investment professionals, however well-regarded and incentivized those “helpers” may be.
我发起这场赌注有两个目的：（1）将我的318,250美元投入放大成远超预期的金额（若结果如我所料，该资金将于2018年初捐赠给奥马哈女孩公司）；（2）公开证明我的信念：一项几乎零成本的被动型标普500指数基金投资，长期来看将超越大多数投资专业人士的业绩——无论这些“助手”声誉多高、激励机制如何设计。
Addressing this question is of enormous importance. American investors pay staggering sums annually to advisors, often incurring several layers of consequential costs. In the aggregate, do these investors get their money’s worth? Indeed, again in the aggregate, do investors get anything for their outlays?
这个问题意义重大。美国投资者每年向顾问支付巨额费用，往往涉及多层叠加成本。总体而言，这些钱花得值吗？更进一步，投资者真的获得了与支出相匹配的回报吗？
# The Bet Against Protégé Partners
与Protégé公司的赌注
Protégé Partners, my counterparty to the bet, picked five “funds-of-funds” that it expected to overperform the S&P 500. That was not a small sample. Those five funds-of-funds in turn owned interests in more than 200 hedge funds.
我的对手方Protégé公司选出了五只“基金中的基金”（Fund-of-Funds），预期其表现将超越标普500指数。这不是一个小样本——这五只母基金又投资了超过200只对冲基金。
Essentially, Protégé, an advisory firm that knew its way around Wall Street, selected five investment experts who, in turn, employed several hundred other investment experts, each managing his or her own hedge fund. This assemblage was an elite crew, loaded with brains, adrenaline and confidence.
本质上，Protégé这家深谙华尔街之道的咨询公司挑选了五位投资专家，而后者又雇佣了数百位专家各自管理对冲基金。这支团队汇聚了顶尖人才，充满智慧、激情与自信。
The managers of the five funds-of-funds possessed a further advantage: They could – and did – rearrange their portfolios of hedge funds during the ten years, investing with new “stars” while exiting their positions in hedge funds whose managers had lost their touch.
五只母基金的管理者还拥有额外优势：他们可以在十年内动态调整所持对冲基金组合，投资新晋“明星”并退出表现不佳的基金。
# The Incentive Structure and Its Pitfalls
激励机制及其陷阱
Every actor on Protégé’s side was highly incentivized: Both the fund-of-funds managers and the hedge-fund managers they selected significantly shared in gains, even those achieved simply because the market generally moves upwards. (In 100% of the 43 ten-year periods since we took control of Berkshire, years with gains by the S&P 500 exceeded loss years.)
Protégé阵营的所有参与者都享有高额激励：母基金管理者和他们挑选的对冲基金经理能大幅分享收益——即使这些收益仅仅源于市场整体上涨趋势。（自我们接管伯克希尔以来的43个十年周期中，标普500上涨年份占比100%。）
Those performance incentives, it should be emphasized, were frosting on a huge and tasty cake: Even if the funds lost money for their investors during the decade, their managers could grow very rich. That would occur because fixed fees averaging a staggering 21⁄2% of assets or so were paid every year by the fund-of-funds’ investors, with part of these fees going to the managers at the five funds-of-funds and the balance going to the 200-plus managers of the underlying hedge funds.
需强调的是，这些业绩激励只是巨额蛋糕上的糖霜：即使基金十年内让投资者亏损，管理者仍可能变得极其富有。原因在于，投资者每年需支付平均约2.5%的固定管理费，其中部分流向五只母基金管理者，其余分配给200多位底层对冲基金经理。
# The Results: A Decade-Long Underperformance
结果：十年持续跑输
Here’s the final scorecard for the bet:
| Year | Fund-of-Funds A | Fund-of-Funds B | Fund-of-Funds C | Fund-of-Funds D | Fund-of-Funds E | S&P Index Fund |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 | -16.5% | -22.3% | -21.3% | -29.3% | -30.1% | -37.0% |
| 2009 | 11.3% | 14.5% | 21.4% | 16.5% | 16.8% | 26.6% |
| 2010 | 5.9% | 6.8% | 13.3% | 4.9% | 11.9% | 15.1% |
| 2011 | -6.3% | -1.3% | 5.9% | -6.3% | -2.8% | 2.1% |
| 2012 | 3.4% | 9.6% | 5.7% | 6.2% | 9.1% | 16.0% |
| 2013 | 10.5% | 15.2% | 8.8% | 14.2% | 14.4% | 32.3% |
| 2014 | 4.7% | 4.0% | 18.9% | 0.7% | -2.1% | 13.6% |
| 2015 | 1.6% | 2.5% | 5.4% | 1.4% | -5.0% | 1.4% |
| 2016 | -3.2% | 1.9% | -1.7% | 2.5% | 4.4% | 11.9% |
| 2017 | 12.2% | 10.6% | 15.6% | — | 18.0% | 21.8% |
| Final Gain | 21.7% | 42.3% | 87.7% | — | — | 125.8% |
| Annualized | 2.0% | 3.6% | 6.5% | 2.4% | 0.3% | 8.5% |
Footnote: Under my agreement with Protégé Partners, the names of these funds-of-funds have never been publicly disclosed. I, however, have received their annual audits from Protégé. The 2016 figures for funds A, B and C were revised slightly from those originally reported last year. Fund D was liquidated in 2017; its average annual gain is calculated for the nine years of its operation.
注：根据与Protégé公司的协议，五只母基金名称从未公开披露。我已从Protégé获得年度审计报告。基金A、B、C的2016年数据较去年略有修正。基金D于2017年清算，其年化收益按9年运营期计算。
The five funds-of-funds got off to a fast start, each beating the index fund in 2008. Then the roof fell in. In every one of the nine years that followed, the funds-of-funds as a whole trailed the index fund.
五只母基金开局迅猛，2008年全部跑赢指数基金。但随后形势急转直下：接下来的九年里，母基金整体每年都落后于指数基金。
# Lessons for Investors
给投资者的启示
Let me emphasize that there was nothing aberrational about stock-market behavior over the ten-year stretch. If a poll of investment “experts” had been asked late in 2007 for a forecast of long-term common-stock returns, their guesses would have likely averaged close to the 8.5% actually delivered by the S&P 500. Making money in that environment should have been easy. Indeed, Wall Street “helpers” earned staggering sums. While this group prospered, however, many of their investors experienced a lost decade.
必须强调，这十年股市表现并无异常。若2007年底向投资“专家”调查预测长期股票回报率，他们的预估可能接近标普500实际实现的8.5%。在这种环境下赚钱本应轻而易举。事实上，华尔街“助手”们赚得盆满钵满。然而，他们的投资者却经历了失落的十年。
Performance comes, performance goes. Fees never falter.
业绩时好时坏，但费用永不衰竭。
# The Bet Illuminates Market Irrationality
赌注揭示市场非理性
The bet illuminated another important investment lesson: Though markets are generally rational, they occasionally do crazy things. Seizing the opportunities then offered does not require great intelligence, a degree in economics or a familiarity with Wall Street jargon such as alpha and beta. What investors then need instead is an ability to both disregard mob fears or enthusiasms and to focus on a few simple fundamentals. A willingness to look unimaginative for a sustained period – or even to look foolish – is also essential.
这场赌注揭示了另一个重要投资教训：尽管市场通常理性，但偶尔会做出疯狂举动。抓住这种机会无需高智商、经济学学位或熟悉华尔街术语（如α和β）。投资者真正需要的是无视群体恐惧或狂热的能力，并聚焦于简单基本面。同时，必须愿意长期保持“缺乏想象力”——甚至显得愚蠢。
# The Bond-to-Stock Switch: A Calculated Move
债券转股票：精准操作
Originally, Protégé and I each funded our portion of the ultimate $1 million prize by purchasing $500,000 face amount of zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bonds (sometimes called “strips”). These bonds cost each of us $318,250 – a bit less than 64¢ on the dollar – with the $500,000 payable in ten years.
起初，Protégé和我各自出资50万美元面值的零息美国国债（即“剥离债券”）作为百万美元赌注本金。每方成本为318,250美元（约64美分兑1美元），十年后到期兑付50万美元。
As the name implies, the bonds we acquired paid no interest, but (because of the discount at which they were purchased) delivered a 4.56% annual return if held to maturity. Protégé and I originally intended to do no more than tally the annual returns and distribute $1 million to the winning charity when the bonds matured late in 2017.
顾名思义，这些债券不支付利息，但因折价购买而实现4.56%的年化收益（持有到期）。我们原计划仅计算年化回报，待2017年底债券到期后将100万美元奖金分配给胜出方的慈善机构。
After our purchase, however, some very strange things took place in the bond market. By November 2012, our bonds – now with about five years to go before they matured – were selling for 95.7% of their face value. At that price, their annual yield to maturity was less than 1%. Or, to be precise, .88%.
然而购买后，债券市场出现异常。至2012年11月，剩余约五年到期的债券以面值95.7%的价格交易，年化到期收益率不足1%（精确为0.88%）。
Given that pathetic return, our bonds had become a dumb – a really dumb – investment compared to American equities. Over time, the S&P 500 – which mirrors a huge cross-section of American business, appropriately weighted by market value – has earned far more than 10% annually on shareholders’ equity (net worth).
相比美国股市，这种回报率低得可怜。标普500指数长期来看（按市值加权反映美国企业全貌）在股东权益（净资产）上的年化回报远超10%。
In November 2012, as we were considering all this, the cash return from dividends on the S&P 500 was 21⁄2% annually, about triple the yield on our U.S. Treasury bond. These dividend payments were almost certain to grow. Beyond that, huge sums were being retained by the companies comprising the 500. These businesses would use their retained earnings to expand their operations and, frequently, to repurchase their shares as well. Either course would, over time, substantially increase earnings-per-share. And – as has been the case since 1776 – whatever its problems of the minute, the American economy was going to move forward.
2012年11月权衡时，标普500股息收益率为2.5%，约为我们国债收益率的三倍。这些股息几乎必然增长。此外，成分股公司留存了巨额收益，将用于业务扩张或股票回购，长期显著提升每股收益。自1776年以来，无论短期问题如何，美国经济始终向前发展。
# The Strategic Pivot to Berkshire
转向伯克希尔的战略决策
Presented late in 2012 with the extraordinary valuation mismatch between bonds and equities, Protégé and I agreed to sell the bonds we had bought five years earlier and use the proceeds to buy 11,200 Berkshire “B” shares. The result: Girls Inc. of Omaha found itself receiving $2,222,279 last month rather than the $1 million it had originally hoped for.
2012年底面对债券与股票的极端估值错配，Protégé和我决定出售五年前购买的债券，将资金投入11,200股伯克希尔B股。结果：奥马哈女孩公司最终收到222.2万美元，远超原本预期的100万美元。
Berkshire, it should be emphasized, has not performed brilliantly since the 2012 substitution. But brilliance wasn’t needed: After all, Berkshire’s gain only had to beat that annual .88% bond bogey – hardly a Herculean achievement.
需强调的是，2012年转换后伯克希尔表现并不卓越。但无需卓越：只需跑赢0.88%的债券收益率——这并非难以完成的壮举。
The only risk in the bonds-to-Berkshire switch was that yearend 2017 would coincide with an exceptionally weak stock market. Protégé and I felt this possibility (which always exists) was very low. Two factors dictated this conclusion: The reasonable price of Berkshire in late 2012, and the large asset build-up that was almost certain to occur at Berkshire during the five years that remained before the bet would be settled. Even so, to eliminate all risk to the charities from the switch, I agreed to make up any shortfall if sales of the 11,200 Berkshire shares at yearend 2017 didn’t produce at least $1 million.
债券转伯克希尔的唯一风险是2017年底恰逢极端熊市。我们认为此可能性（虽始终存在）极低，基于两点：2012年底伯克希尔估值合理；未来五年资产规模必然大幅增长。即便如此，为彻底消除慈善机构的风险，我承诺若2017年底卖出11,200股伯克希尔所得不足100万美元，我将补足差额。
# Redefining Risk: Bonds vs. Stocks
重新定义风险：债券与股票
Investing is an activity in which consumption today is foregone in an attempt to allow greater consumption at a later date. “Risk” is the possibility that this objective won’t be attained.
投资是放弃当前消费以换取未来更多消费的活动。“风险”即此目标无法达成的可能性。
By that standard, purportedly “risk-free” long-term bonds in 2012 were a far riskier investment than a long-term investment in common stocks. At that time, even a 1% annual rate of inflation between 2012 and 2017 would have decreased the purchasing-power of the government bond that Protégé and I sold.
以此标准衡量，2012年看似“无风险”的长期债券，其风险远高于股票长期投资。当时即使1%的年通胀率（2012-2017）也将削弱我们出售的国债购买力。
I want to quickly acknowledge that in any upcoming day, week or even year, stocks will be riskier – far riskier – than short-term U.S. bonds. As an investor’s investment horizon lengthens, however, a diversified portfolio of U.S. equities becomes progressively less risky than bonds, assuming that the stocks are purchased at a sensible multiple of earnings relative to then-prevailing interest rates.
需明确的是，在未来一天、一周甚至一年，股票风险远高于短期美国国债。然而随着投资期限拉长，若股票买入估值（相对于当时利率）合理，美国股票组合的多元化投资将比债券更安全。
It is a terrible mistake for investors with long-term horizons – among them, pension funds, college endowments and savings-minded individuals – to measure their investment “risk” by their portfolio’s ratio of bonds to stocks. Often, high-grade bonds in an investment portfolio increase its risk.
对于长期投资者（如养老基金、大学捐赠和储蓄者）而言，用债券与股票比例衡量“投资风险”是个可怕错误。事实上，投资组合中的高评级债券往往增加风险。
# Final Investment Lesson: The Power of Simplicity
最终投资启示：简单决策的力量
A final lesson from our bet: Stick with big, “easy” decisions and eschew activity. During the ten-year bet, the 200-plus hedge-fund managers that were involved almost certainly made tens of thousands of buy and sell decisions. Most of those managers undoubtedly thought hard about their decisions, each of which they believed would prove advantageous. In the process of investing, they studied 10-Ks, interviewed managements, read trade journals and conferred with Wall Street analysts.
这场赌注的最后一个启示：坚持重大而“简单”的决策，避免频繁操作。十年间，参与的200多位对冲基金经理几乎必然进行了数万次买卖决策。多数人无疑深入思考了每个决定，坚信其能带来优势。他们在投资过程中研究财报、访谈管理层、阅读行业期刊并与华尔街分析师讨论。
Protégé and I, meanwhile, leaning neither on research, insights nor brilliance, made only one investment decision during the ten years. We simply decided to sell our bond investment at a price of more than 100 times earnings (95.7 sale price/.88 yield), those being “earnings” that could not increase during the ensuing five years.
而Protégé和我未依赖研究、洞见或聪明才智，在十年间仅做了一项投资决策：以超过100倍市盈率（95.7售价/0.88%收益率）卖出债券投资，而这些“收益”在接下来五年内无法增长。
We made the sale in order to move our money into a single security – Berkshire – that, in turn, owned a diversified group of solid businesses. Fueled by retained earnings, Berkshire’s growth in value was unlikely to be less than 8% annually, even if we were to experience a so-so economy.
我们出售债券是为了将资金投入单一标的——伯克希尔，该公司拥有分散且稳健的业务组合。凭借留存收益，即使经济平庸，伯克希尔的价值年增长率也很难低于8%。
After that kindergarten-like analysis, Protégé and I made the switch and relaxed, confident that, over time, 8% was certain to beat .88%. By a lot.
完成这一基础级分析后，Protégé和我果断转换资产并安心等待，坚信长期来看8%的回报率必将大幅超越0.88%。
# Berkshire Hathaway Annual Shareholders Meeting
伯克希尔哈撒韦年度股东大会
The annual meeting falls on May 5th and will again be webcast by Yahoo!, whose web address is https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream (opens new window). The webcast will go live at 8:45 a.m. Central Daylight Time. Yahoo! will interview directors, managers, stockholders and celebrities before the meeting and during the lunch break. Both the interviews and meeting will be translated simultaneously into Mandarin.
年度股东大会定于5月5日举行，雅虎财经将再次进行网络直播，网址为https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream (opens new window)。直播将于美国中部时间上午8:45开始，雅虎将在会议前及午休期间采访董事、高管、股东和名人。访谈与会议内容将同步翻译成中文。
For those attending the meeting in person, the doors at the CenturyLink will open at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday to facilitate shopping prior to our shareholder movie, which begins at 8:30. The question-and-answer period will start at 9:15 and run until 3:30, with a one-hour lunch break at noon. Finally, at 3:45 we will begin the formal shareholder meeting, which usually runs from 15 to 45 minutes. Shopping will end at 4:30.
现场参会者可于周六上午7点入场购物，随后于8:30观看股东电影。问答环节从9:15持续至15:30，中午12点开始午休一小时。正式股东大会将于15:45开始，通常持续15至45分钟。购物活动于16:30结束。
On Friday, May 4th, our Berkshire exhibitors at CenturyLink will be open from noon until 5 p.m. We added that extra shopping time in 2015, and serious shoppers love it. Last year about 12,000 people came through the doors in the five hours we were open on Friday.
5月4日周五，世纪链接中心的伯克希尔展位将开放于中午12点至下午5点。这一额外购物时间自2015年增设以来广受欢迎，去年周五五小时内吸引约12,000人入场。
# Shopping Experience & Special Events
购物体验与特别活动
Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of our subsidiaries will be for sale. (Your Chairman discourages freebies.) Say hello to the many Berkshire managers who will be captaining their exhibits. And be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad layout that salutes all of our companies.
购物场所为毗邻会场的194,300平方英尺展厅，数十家子公司产品将在此展销（主席不鼓励免费赠品）。欢迎与各展位的伯克希尔高管交流，并务必参观致敬所有公司的BNSF铁路模型。
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them on Sunday at our sixth annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your meeting credentials. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in; even with Brooks running shoes, our times would be embarrassing.) Participation in the 5K grows every year. Help us set another record.
旗下跑鞋公司Brooks将推出纪念款跑鞋。购买后可于周日参加第六届“伯克希尔5公里”赛事，比赛将于世纪链接中心上午8点开跑。完整参赛信息包含在随会议证件寄送的《访客指南》中。参赛者将与伯克希尔高管、董事及员工并肩奔跑。（查理和我将缺席：即便穿Brooks跑鞋，我们的成绩也会令人尴尬。）5公里赛事参与人数逐年增长，请帮助我们再创新纪录。
# GEICO & Bookworm Highlights
GEICO与Bookworm书店亮点
A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. At last year’s meeting, we set a record for policy sales, up 43% from 2016.
购物区GEICO展位将由全国顶尖顾问驻场。去年会议期间保单销量创纪录，较2016年增长43%。
So stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money. Spend the savings on other Berkshire products.
欢迎咨询报价。多数情况下，GEICO提供股东专属折扣（通常8%），该优惠适用于我们运营的51个司法管辖区中的44个。（补充说明：若您符合其他折扣条件，如特定群体折扣，此优惠不可叠加。）请携带现有保险详情对比价格，我们能为您节省真实支出——将省下的钱用于购买其他伯克希尔产品。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. This Omaha-based retailer will carry more than 40 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. Berkshire shareholders are a bookseller’s dream: When Poor Charlie’s Almanack (yes, our Charlie) made its debut some years ago, we sold 3,500 copies at the meeting. The book weighed 4.85 pounds. Do the math: Our shareholders left the building that day carrying about 8½ tons of Charlie’s wisdom.
务必造访Bookworm书店。这家奥马哈零售商将展售40余本图书及DVD，包括数本新书。伯克希尔股东是书商的梦想客户：多年前《穷查理宝典》（是的，我们的查理）首发时，会议期间售出3,500册。每本书重4.85磅——计算一下：当天股东们带走的查理智慧总重量达8.5吨。
# Travel & Shopping Tips
出行与购物建议
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Keep in mind that most airlines substantially increase prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2½ hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.
随报告附带的委托材料附件详细说明如何获取参会凭证。请注意，多数航空公司会在伯克希尔周末大幅提高票价。若您从远方前来，建议比较飞往堪萨斯城与奥马哈的成本。两城车程约2.5小时，堪萨斯城可能为您节省数百至上千美元——请将省下的钱用于伯克希尔消费。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, May 1st and Monday, May 7th inclusive, and must also present your meeting credential. Last year, the one-week volume for the store was a staggering $44.6 million. Bricks and mortar are alive and well at NFM.
内布拉斯加家具市场（位于Dodge与Pacific之间的72街77英亩地块）将再次推出“伯克希尔周末”折扣。享受折扣需在5月1日至7日期间购物并出示会议凭证。去年该店一周销售额高达4,460万美元，证明实体零售在NFM依然繁荣。
The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. During “Berkshire Weekend,” NFM will be open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday and 11 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is hosting a picnic to which you are all invited.
期间定价甚至适用于多家顶级制造商产品——它们通常严格禁止折扣，但为支持股东周末破例。我们感谢其合作。“伯克希尔周末”期间，NFM营业时间为周一至周六10:00-21:00，周日11:00-20:00。周六17:30-20:00将举办野餐活动，诚邀您的参与。
NFM will again extend its shareholder’s discount offerings to our Kansas City and Dallas stores. From May 1st through May 7th, shareholders who present meeting credentials or other evidence of their Berkshire ownership (such as brokerage statements) to those NFM stores will receive the same discounts enjoyed by those visiting the Omaha store.
NFM将把股东折扣延伸至堪萨斯城与达拉斯门店。5月1日至7日，持有会议凭证或能证明伯克希尔所有权（如券商对账单）的股东，可在上述门店享受与奥马哈店相同的折扣。
# Shopping & Special Events at Borsheims
波仙珠宝店购物与特别活动
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 4th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 6th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. Remember, the more you buy, the more you save (or so my daughter tells me when we visit the store).
波仙珠宝店将举办两场股东专属活动：5月4日（周五）下午6点至9点的鸡尾酒会；5月6日（周日）上午9点至下午4点的主庆典。周六营业至下午6点。记住，买得越多，省得越多（虽然女儿总说我们店里价格划算）。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 30th through Saturday, May 12th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing you own our stock.
本周末波仙珠宝店将人潮涌动。为方便购物，股东专属优惠将从4月30日（周一）延续至5月12日（周六）。期间请出示会议凭证或显示持股证明的券商对账单以确认股东身份。
# Bridge & Table Tennis with Celebrities
名人桥牌与乒乓球活动
On Sunday afternoon, on the upper level above Borsheims, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders. If they suggest wagering on the game, change the subject. Ajit, Charlie, Bill Gates and I will likely drop by as well.
周日下午，波仙珠宝店楼上将举办桥牌活动，世界顶级桥牌专家Bob Hamman和Sharon Osberg将与股东互动。若他们提议赌局，请巧妙转移话题。阿吉特、查理、比尔·盖茨和我也将到场。
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine, and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Ariel represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates did pretty well playing Ariel last year, so he may be ready to again challenge her. (My advice: Bet on Ariel.) I will participate on an advisory basis only.
我的朋友Ariel Hsing也将现身商场挑战乒乓球。我九岁时认识她，当时已难胜其一局。Ariel曾代表美国参加2012年奥运会。下午1点起欢迎前来挑战（去年比尔·盖茨表现不俗，可能再度应战，建议押注Ariel）。我仅担任顾问角色。
# Dining at Gorat’s Steakhouse
戈拉特牛排馆用餐
Gorat’s will be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 6th, serving from 12 p.m. until 10 p.m. To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 2nd (but not before). Show you are a sophisticated diner by ordering the T-bone with hash browns.
戈拉特牛排馆将于5月6日（周日）专为伯克希尔股东开放，营业时间为中午12点至晚上10点。4月2日（仅限当天）致电402-551-3733预订座位。彰显老饕身份的方式：点单时选择纽约客牛排配土豆饼。
# Q&A Session & Analyst Participation
问答环节与分析师参与
We will have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, the preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be e-mailed at loomisbrk@gmail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of the New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
股东大会问答环节将继续由三位财经记者主导，提问内容来自股东通过邮件提交的问题。记者及邮箱地址：传奇商业记者Carol Loomis（loomisbrk@gmail.com）；CNBC记者贝基·奎克（BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com）；《纽约时报》记者安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金（arsorkin@nytimes.com）。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important to shareholders. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)
每位记者将从投稿中挑选6个最有趣且重要的问题。记者建议：问题简洁、提前提交、聚焦伯克希尔，每封邮件最多2个问题，可备注希望被提及姓名（如问题被选中）。
An accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Gary Ransom of Dowling & Partners. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Since what we will be conducting is a shareholders’ meeting, our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.
三位分析师将同步提问：保险领域分析师Gary Ransom（Dowling & Partners），非保险业务分析师Jonathan Brandt（Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb）和Gregg Warren（晨星公司）。我们期待提问能增进股东对投资的理解。
# Meeting Format & Information Disclosure
会议形式与信息披露
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. Multi-part questions aren’t allowed; we want to give as many questioners as possible a shot at us. Our goal is for you to leave the meeting knowing more about Berkshire than when you came and for you to have a good time while in Omaha.
查理和我都不会提前得知任何问题。我们欢迎尖锐提问，且仅接受单一问题。目标是让您离场时比入场时更了解伯克希尔，并在奥马哈度过愉快时光。
All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. After the 54th, all questions come from the audience. Charlie and I have often tackled more than 60 by 3:30.
总计预计回答54个问题（每位分析师/记者6个 + 现场18个）。第54问后全部为现场提问。查理和我曾在3:30前回答超60个问题。
The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.
现场提问者将通过11轮抽奖产生，时间定于股东大会当日上午8:15。主会场及分会场共11个麦克风，每个麦克风对应一轮抽奖。
While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and, if possible, should also have adequate time to digest and analyze that information before any trading takes place. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday (a day that also eases traffic and parking problems).
借此机会重申：查理和我都认为所有股东应同步获取伯克希尔发布的重大信息，并有充足时间分析后再进行交易。因此我们选择周五收盘后或周六清晨发布财报，股东大会也固定在周六（兼顾交通便利性）。
We do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders. There is no one more important to us than the shareholder of limited means who trusts us with a substantial portion of his or her savings. As I run the company day-to-day – and as I write this letter – that is the shareholder whose image is in my mind.
我们从不单独与机构投资者或分析师沟通，所有股东平等对待。最重要的是信任我们的普通股东，他们将毕生积蓄托付给伯克希尔。每日经营公司与撰写此信时，我心中始终想着他们。
# Appreciation for Operating Managers
# 对运营经理的赞赏
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I also believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
我有充分理由经常赞扬我们的运营经理们。他们确实是全明星级别的管理者，像经营家族唯一资产一样经营自己的业务。我也相信，我们的管理层思维比任何大型上市公司都更以股东利益为导向。大多数经理人已无经济压力需要工作，但他们从实现商业“全垒打”中获得的成就感，与薪酬同样重要。
# Ownership Mindset & Governance
# 股东思维与治理
If managers (or directors) own Berkshire shares – and many do – it’s from open-market purchases they have made or because they received shares when they sold their businesses to us. None, however, gets the upside of ownership without risking the downside. Our directors and managers stand in your shoes.
如果经理人（或董事）持有伯克希尔股份——许多人确实持有——这些股份要么是他们在市场上自购的，要么是出售企业给我们时获得的。没有人能在不承担下行风险的情况下享受所有权收益。我们的董事和经理人始终站在股东角度思考。
# Headquarters Team: Efficient & Dedicated
# 总部团队：高效与奉献
We continue to have a wonderful group at headquarters. This team efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 32,700-page Federal income tax return, oversees the filing of 3,935 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities, fact-checks this letter – and the list goes on and on.
总部团队依然卓越。这支团队高效应对繁杂的SEC和其他监管要求，完成32,700页的联邦所得税申报，统筹3,935份州税申报，回应无数股东与媒体咨询，发布年报，筹备全美规模最大的年度股东大会，协调董事会活动，并对这封信进行事实核查——其职责远不止于此。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year, for example, they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and French fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. In addition, they cheerfully pitch in to help at the annual meeting in whatever way they are needed. They are proud to work for Berkshire, and I am proud of them.
他们以惊人的效率愉快地完成所有工作，使我的生活变得轻松愉快。他们的贡献远超公司核心事务：去年，他们协调了40所大学（从200所申请者中甄选）的学生来奥马哈与我进行问答交流；处理我收到的所有请求，安排差旅，甚至为我准备午餐的汉堡和薯条（当然必须淋上亨氏番茄酱）。此外，他们还会在股东大会期间随时提供支持。他们以服务伯克希尔为荣，我也为他们感到骄傲。
# Leadership Transition: Ajit & Greg
# 领导层过渡：阿吉特与格雷格
I’ve saved the best for last. Early in 2018, Berkshire’s board elected Ajit Jain and Greg Abel as directors of Berkshire and also designated each as Vice Chairman. Ajit is now responsible for insurance operations, and Greg oversees the rest of our businesses. Charlie and I will focus on investments and capital allocation.
最后分享最重磅的消息：2018年初，伯克希尔董事会任命阿吉特·杰恩（Ajit Jain）和格雷格·阿贝尔（Greg Abel）为董事，并分别指定为副主席。阿吉特将负责保险业务，格雷格管理其余所有业务。查理和我将专注投资与资本配置。
# A Call to Action: Visit Omaha
# 诚邀莅临奥马哈
You and I are lucky to have Ajit and Greg working for us. Each has been with Berkshire for decades, and Berkshire’s blood flows through their veins. The character of each man matches his talents. And that says it all.
我们能拥有阿吉特和格雷格是莫大幸运。两人服务伯克希尔数十年，血液里流淌着伯克希尔基因。他们的品格与才华完美匹配——这已是最高赞誉。
Come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – on May 5th and meet the Berkshire Bunch. All of us look forward to your visit.
5月5日，请来到资本主义的朝圣地奥马哈，与伯克希尔团队面对面交流。我们全体期待您的光临。
February 24, 2018
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
2018年2月24日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席