2024巴菲特股东大会4.5万字问答实录
# Warren Buffett's 2024 Berkshire Shareholder Meeting Q&A (股神巴菲特2024年股东大会问答实录)
On the evening of May 4, 2024 (Beijing time), Warren Buffett, known as the "Sage of Investing," hosted Berkshire Hathaway's annual shareholder meeting in Omaha, Nebraska.
沃伦·巴菲特: 北京时间5月4日晚,“股神”沃伦·巴菲特(Warren Buffett)领导的伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司在美国内布拉斯加州的奥马哈市举办2024年年度股东大会。
At this annual "Oscars of the investing world," Buffett, nearing his 94th birthday, once again took the stage to share his investment "bible" with global investors.
沃伦·巴菲特: 在这场一年一度的“投资界春晚”上,即将年满94岁的巴菲特再度坐在主席台上,向来自全球的投资者分享了他的投资“圣经”。
This year marks the first shareholder meeting held after the passing of Buffett's long-time partner, Charlie Munger.
沃伦·巴菲特: 今年是巴菲特的黄金搭档查理·芒格(Charlie Munger)离世后举行的首个股东大会。
Starting at 9:15 a.m. local time (10:15 p.m. Beijing time) on May 4, the nearly five-hour Q&A session featured Buffett and two other vice chairmen, Greg Abel and Ajit Jain, who collectively answered 37 questions, delivering another spectacular investment feast for global investors.
沃伦·巴菲特: 从当地时间5月4日上午9点15分(北京时间晚10点15分)开始,在长达近五个小时的问答环节中,“股神”和公司的另外两位副董事长格雷格·阿贝尔(Greg Abel)、阿吉特·贾恩(Ajit Jain)共回答了37个问题,再次为全球投资者奉献了一场精彩的投资盛宴。
The following is the full transcript (over 45,000 words) .
以下为全程实录,全文超过4.5万字,略有删节。
# Warren Buffett's 2024 Berkshire Shareholder Meeting Q&A (股神巴菲特2024年股东大会问答实录)
Warren Buffett: Now you see the first slide, this is the first-quarter report. Now Berkshire's operations and all of its operating income are the results we have achieved during our operations. There were also some changes in between, for example, the first quarter this year was better than the same period last year.
沃伦·巴菲特: 现在您看到第一张投影片,这是第一季度的报告。现在伯克希尔公司运作以及所有的运营收入,这些也都是在我们运作的时候得到的结果。中间也有其他的一些变动的现象,比如说第一个季度,你也看到了,也是比去年一季度要更好。
Mr. Jain wanted me to mention today that he cannot analyze the insurance calculations at this point in time. Of course, storms happening around the world will affect our income—that’s the number one reason. Perhaps by our standards, the timing might not be right, especially regarding events on the East Coast. This is the first and most risky issue we must evaluate. There are also earthquakes.
贾恩先生今天要我跟大家说,他现在在讲到第一季度的保险的一些计算,在保险上是不能够予以相应的进行分析的。当然,全世界发生的相应风暴也会影响到我们的收入,这是第一个最重要的原因。也许在我们的标准来讲,时机可能不对,特别在东岸发生的事情,这也是我们现在第一点觉得必须在做评估时候,最具风险的一个事项。另外还有地震。
I cannot say this quarter was the best, nor can I say it was the worst. In the insurance industry, there are always moments of luck or unpredictability. However, we will absolutely continue improving our insurance operations. The returns in annual reports are particularly high. In the report, you can see we already secured fixed short-term investments and interest rate adjustments last year. The numbers look very impressive.
一个季度我不能说它是最棒的一个季度,但是也不能说是最差的一个季度。任何事情在保险界来讲,都是会有幸运的时候或者是完全不能够考虑到的时候。但是,在保险业我们绝对会再进行改善,在每一个年度报告之中,这中间的收益是特别的高。所以在报告中你也看到,在去年我们已经得到了固定的短期投资,另外还有利息的改变。所以,这样一个数字看起来是非常的令人瞩目的。
We can now invest more money than before, which is a current phenomenon. And I think it is reasonable and predictable.
可以告诉大家,我们现在可以投资的钱还是比以前要更多,这是现在的一个现象。而且我觉得是合理的,是可以进行预测的。
Looking at railway revenues, I think its decline has been relatively moderate. Of course, we cannot immediately guess certain revenues or sudden situations. Regarding railways, there is still potential income. For example, how many railcars we loaded last week may change in scale. Therefore, every week we have different revenue results, but these are relatively average. We expect some numbers to generate more income in the future. It is very simple, but this is what we have always tried to maintain.
再看铁路的收益上,我想它的下滑还是比较平缓的。当然,我们不能够马上猜测有时候某一些收益,或者是立即发生的状况。现在讲到铁路上的一些影响,它还是有潜在收入的。比如说,我们在前一个礼拜到底装了多少车厢,这中间的一些规模可能也会再进行改变。所以,每一个礼拜我们都会有不同的一些收益结果,但是这些是比较平均的。我们期待中的一些数字是预期中,应该会赚取更多的收益。
In addition, energy companies have delivered better returns. Sometimes due to environmental impacts, we must note these in our annual reports. We expect stable returns, which aligns with Berkshire’s goal to satisfy shareholders. This is an example of how we aim to improve operations. It is very simple, but this is what we have always tried to maintain.
除此之外还有能源公司,我们有了比较好的收益,有的时候因为环境受到的影响,我们必须要在我们的年度报告中进行注明,我们期待的收益应该会非常稳健,我想这样一些情况,也就是伯克希尔的目标,希望让大家满意的,这就是我刚刚要举的一个例子,能够增加我们的运营。非常的简单,但这就是我们一直在试图维持进行的。
The mentioned returns are interesting, but we must consider depreciation, amortization, and taxes. Berkshire has daily inflows and outflows of at least $1 billion, including weekends and holidays. When flipping to the next page, you’ll understand why I explain this. Sometimes we make mistakes, but they are not necessarily painful ones.
这些讲到的收益是非常有趣的,但是我们必须考虑到折旧,还有摊销以及税收等等。伯克希尔每一天都会有大概至少一亿以上的进出状况,包括周末,还有放假的日期,有的时候翻到下一页再看这个数字的时候,就可以看到为什么我这么解释。有的时候我们做的一些事情可能也是会有错误,但是我想,犯的一些错误有时候并不是真正的非常具惨痛性的。
There have been at least five or six, or even dozens of instances in the past 57 or 58 years where major decisions shaped our guiding principles. We have a group of truly excellent shareholders and partners committed to cost-saving. These include the David family and their descendants.
大概至少有五六次吧,或者是十几次,在过去的57或58年之中,不管是怎么做,我想最重要的就是要做大的决策,持续地能够成为我们现在的指导原则。我们这中间有一群真正的非常棒的股东,而且有一群我们的合作伙伴,随时都在希望能够替我们节省花费。就是我刚刚已经介绍的这一批人,(David)家族,还有他们的儿子、孙子、曾孙辈。
Our cash and government bonds are around $182 billion, possibly reaching $200 billion by year-end or this quarter. We want to spend this money but must find suitable targets with low risk and high returns.
我们的现金还有国债,在1820亿美元左右,可能会在今年年底涨到2000亿美元,或者在这个季度结束的时候达到2000亿美元。这个钱我们想要花,但是花的话,一定要找到合适的标的。希望风险能够足够的小,而且回报也能够很大。
Our stocks have slightly appreciated compared to purchase prices, but we won’t make large-scale purchases as many companies don’t sell in large quantities. We will remain cautious about stock buybacks.
我们的股票也是比我们在买的时候价值略微有一些增长,我们不会以一个很大的方式来进行股票购买了,因为很多公司也不会以大数额来进行销售。所以,在股票的回购上我们也会足够谨慎。
We are on the last slide. Over the past five years, we haven’t issued as much stock as other companies. With so many investors, we need to control circulating shares. They don’t plan to sell our stocks, right? We don’t monitor stock prices daily or weekly. Those who track prices daily rarely profit. Many shareholders simply hold their stocks without checking frequently.
我们进入到最后一张幻灯片,过去五年的情况来看,我们没有办法像其他公司一样发行那么多的股票。我们有这么多的投资者,我们需要控制流通股的数量。他们不会想着卖我们的股票,对不对?我们每天或者每周可能都不会去关注股票的价格,这些每天关注股票价格的人,反而赚不了钱。很多时候大家买了我们的股票就放在那里,甚至不看太多。
This is Berkshire’s story. We will deliver long-term revenue growth and reduce circulating shares, hoping to occasionally find quality investment opportunities.
这就是伯克希尔过去的一些故事,我们会在长期给大家带来营收的增长,也希望能够减少流通股的数量,希望能够偶尔看到投资的机会,能够有一个合适的优质的仓位。
That concludes the background information for the first quarter. I’ll now hand over to Becky Quick for the Q&A session. Becky and the audience will alternate questions.
好,第一季度的背景信息就讲到这里,我把话筒交给Becky Quick进行接下来的问答环节。Becky和观众之间的提问会交替进行。
# Q1: Today, there were news reports that Berkshire sold another 125 million Apple shares, now its largest holding. A 27-year-old B-share shareholder from Malaysia asked: Last year, you mentioned Coca-Cola and American Express as Berkshire’s longest-held investments, which brought great returns. But Apple was not included. Do you think Apple’s appeal and investment value have declined since 2016 when you invested? (今天早上有一些新闻,伯克希尔又卖出了1.25亿的苹果股票,现在这是伯克希尔最重仓的一支股票。一位27岁的B股股东,他来自马来西亚,他说去年你讲到可口可乐和美国运通是伯克希尔两只持股最长的公司,你也讲了这些业务给股东带来了很好的收益。但是你没有把苹果包括进它们的行列当中,你是不是觉得从苹果这边来看,它的吸引力、它的投资魅力可能都比2016年你当时投资的时候有所下降? )
Warren Buffett: We still own a lot of Apple shares. By year-end, Apple could become our largest common stock holding. Charlie and I view these equities as businesses, not just stocks. We see Dairy Queen, Coca-Cola, and American Express similarly—as businesses.
沃伦·巴菲特:我们还是有很多苹果的股票,我想说,在今年年底的时候,苹果很有可能会是我们有史以来最大普通股的持有方。查理和我都会去看这些普通股的权益,我们把它们认为是业务,不单单只是股票。我们也有冰雪皇后的股票,我们也把它看为业务,可口可乐也是一家公司,运通也是一家公司,我们把它们看成是业务,看成是公司。
We can buy excellent companies but not 80% or more of their shares. When evaluating Apple, American Express, and Coca-Cola, we treat them as businesses. Tax and management factors differ, but we focus on each company’s fundamentals, not just stock investments. We don’t predict markets or “pick stocks.”
我们可以买下非常棒的公司,但是买不了它们所有的或者说80%以上的股份。当我们去审视苹果、运通和可口可乐的时候,我们把它们看成是公司。当然,有一些税务、管理等等方面因素的不同,但当我们配置资金的时候,我们会去看每一个公司,而不是说只是把它们当成股票的投资。我们也不会想去预测市场,不会试图去“选股”,单单选股。
I’ve long been fascinated by stocks and markets. But I once heard a wise investor’s advice: “View stocks as businesses. Don’t focus on short-term returns but long-term portfolio benefits.” This inspired Charlie and me. Our investment philosophy evolved with capital growth, but Graham’s principle remains: Picking stocks is futile. Capital must go to better places. Charlie gave me better guidance, directing funds to suitable investments.
我很早就对买股票感兴趣,我对股市也是,觉得股市充满了魅力。但是最后,我听到了一个聪明的投资者给我的一个箴言,就几句话而已。他当时比我说得更好,意思大致是如此,“你在看股票的时候你要把它看成是一家公司、一项业务。你不要把它们看成是会给你带来回报,而是长期怎么服务于你的组合”。这句话当时让我深受启发,查理和我在配置资产的时候也是一直在思考这句话,我们多年来的投资理念随着资本的增加,其实也有所改变,改变了很多。但是最基本的原则还是在那里,就是格雷厄姆的哲学,如果你只是去选股的话,你是在浪费时间。你需要把资金放在更好的地方。查理又给了我更好的建议,让我把钱配置到了更合适的地方。
This is why we’ve held Coca-Cola and American Express for so long. Apple is an even better business. We will hold all three long-term and have seen great success.
所以这也是为什么我们一直以来拥有像美国运通和可口可乐这样出色的业务。苹果甚至是更好的一项业务,一家公司。我们还是会长期持有这三家公司的股票,而且在过去也取得了很多的成功。
As investors, we must stay grounded. Events may alter capital allocation strategies, but Apple remains our largest long-term investment. I’m comfortable with cash growth and exploring alternatives in equity markets.
我觉得我们作为投资者,我们的心态要摆正。当有一些事情发生的时候,它可能会很大地改变我们资本配置的策略。但是在苹果这个例子上,它仍然长期会是我们最大的一笔投资,只是在现在的一些情况下,我也不介意我们现金的持续增长,并且会去看在股市上权益市场中有哪些替代的方案。
One surprising fact: Almost everyone focuses on tax avoidance. While we don’t mind paying taxes at Berkshire, our federal rate is 21%. Apple’s rate is 35%, once reaching 52%. The government owns a portion of our revenues through taxes, and rates may change annually.
有一件事情可能会让大家吃惊,我认识的几乎每一个人都把很多注意力放在怎么不交税上。当然,避税我觉得是合理的,我们虽然不介意在伯克希尔这边交税,我们现在是以21%的联邦税率来付税。那在苹果这边是35%,过去曾经达到52%。联邦政府对于我们的这个收入,有一部分是有所有权的,就是我们的营收当中有一部分是要交给政府的。而且这样的一个税率,他们任何一年都有可能改变它的百分比。
I believe the 21% rate may rise due to fiscal policy. Higher taxes are likely soon. The government may take a larger share of Berkshire’s revenue, perhaps to reduce fiscal deficits.
现在这个税率21%,因为现在的财政政策,我觉得这个税率很有可能在将来会提高。高税率很有可能在不久的将来发生。政府会想从伯克希尔的营收当中拿走更大的一部分,他们也许也会决定说,不希望自己的财政赤字还是这么大。
We know their spending is huge. They may take a larger share from big companies like ours. But we will still pay taxes and contribute to federal coffers. For us, this is appropriate for the country. The nation’s economic growth has generously benefited our shareholders. We are fortunate to be an American company.
我们知道他们支出确实很大,他们也许会在我们这样的大公司中拿走更大的一部分。但是我们还是会付税的,我们也希望伯克希尔能够在联邦的赋税上做出贡献。因为对于我们来说,对于这个国家来说,这是合适的。因为这个国家,它的经济发展为我们的股东带来了慷慨的发展。我们很幸运成为美国公司的一员。
Last year, we paid over $5 billion in federal taxes—a fact we’re proud of. No U.S. company likely matches our tax rigor. This doesn’t include property or social security taxes, which may emerge in the future. I hope to maintain an $800 billion+ market cap—large taxes won’t trouble me. I wish every U.S. company would act similarly. If my rate rises from 21%, I won’t mind.
去年我们给美国联邦政府交了超过50亿美元的税,这也让我们很自豪。我觉得没有任何一家美国的公司可能会在联邦的赋税上像我们做得如此严谨。而且这里面还没有包括什么财产税、社保税,我觉得这些都有可能是在未来会出现的。我希望能够继续保持这个8000亿美元以上的市值,因为有这样的市值,交大额的税也不会让我有太多的困扰。我希望我们每一个在美国的公司都能够像这样。如果我今年交21%的税,将来这个税率再有所上升,我也不会介意。
# Q2: Buffett, hello. I’m from Hong Kong and run my own investment company. Learning from you has been a truly precious opportunity. You previously invested in BYD but have recently reduced your stake. Do you think there will be opportunities to invest in Chinese companies again in the future?(巴菲特你好,我来自中国香港。我有自己的一个投资公司,我们从你这里学习,真的是感到非常珍贵的一个机会。你之前投资了比亚迪的公司,现在又减仓。你觉得之后还有没有机会再去投资中国的公司?)
Warren Buffett: Our main investment targets will always be in the U.S.—this is our firm belief. The companies we invest in, such as American Express and Coca-Cola, have global operations. These are businesses prioritized by global consumers, like beverages. Globally, there is now a consensus that companies like American Express and Coca-Cola have no real competitors worldwide. I believe their operations are exceptionally strong. Over the past two decades, this trend has continued steadily.
沃伦·巴菲特:我们主要的投资标的都会位于美国,这是我们坚信不移的。你看我们在美国投资的公司,包括像运通等等,还有可口可乐,都有全球的业务。它们是全球的消费者都会优先考虑的,比如像饮料。全球现在有这样一种共识,就对于像运通还有可口可乐这样的公司,在全球都找不出来能够跟它们匹敌的标的,我觉得它们做的业务非常强劲。我觉得在过去的二十多年,这样的一个情况也是在持续进行当中。
I think this investment in BYD is somewhat similar to our investments in Japan. We moved quickly and spent a year investing in five major Japanese trading companies. You may not see such large-scale investments from us outside the U.S., especially given today’s global economic landscape.
沃伦·巴菲特:我觉得比亚迪的这笔投资,跟我们在日本做出的比较相似。我们很快就进行了投资,花了一年的时间投资了五家日本重要的商社。你可能不会看到像这样,我们在美国之外做如此大笔的投资,特别是根据现在世界的经济来讲。
However, I understand your question. We recognize the role the U.S. plays today, as well as our strengths and weaknesses. But personally, I don’t fully grasp the cultural or economic dynamics of every country in today’s global economy.
沃伦·巴菲特:但我了解你的问题,美国现在扮演的角色以及我们的长项以及短板,这都是我们了解的。但是我的感觉,对于今天的世界经济,我并不是在任何文化或者其他一些国家的文化都能够完完全全理解的。
For example, some smaller countries may not have strong economies overall, but they’ve already developed significant economic activity within their borders. Globally, about half of all countries—50%—and possibly over 20% of them contribute meaningfully to global output, which is quite impressive. However, our focus remains on the U.S., where we direct most of our investments today.
沃伦·巴菲特:比如说某一些比较小的国家,它的经济可能不是那么强大,但它在这个国家之中已经有了相应的一些经济了。我现在要讲的大概全世界里面有一半的,50%的这些国家,也许超过了20%都能够对世界进行产出的,而且是非常让人觉得惊喜的。但我们将还是以美国为主,对美国的投资是我们现在相对主要的方向。
Charlie and I have often discussed this in recent years. Sometimes when I proposed ideas to him, he would say, “This isn’t great, but maybe it’s the best idea you’ve come up with so far.” He sometimes agreed with me, but Charlie always reminded me to think carefully before acting.
沃伦·巴菲特:同时在过去的几年之中,查理也跟我说过,他常常跟我说这些事情。有的时候我在跟他提出一些建议的时候,他说“这是不太好的,但也许这是你能够想出来目前最好的点子吧”。他有的时候还是会对我同意,但是查理他常常都会跟我讲,你要三思而后行。
Looking back at BYD, Charlie was extremely enthusiastic at the time. I should have been even more aggressive than him, but I wasn’t. For us, that was still a significant move. We’ve considered many companies. Of course, I understand the general market conditions in most regions. However, for large-scale commitments or investments in specific countries, we currently have no such plans.
沃伦·巴菲特:比亚迪再回头来看的话,那个时候查理是非常非常积极的,我那时应该比他更积极,但我没有。所以对我们来讲,那个时候还是一件大事。很多的公司我们都考虑过。当然,在大部分的市场,到底发生的一些状况,我都还是了解的。但我的想法,对于一些巨大的承诺,或者在某一些国家,我们现在还没有这样的打算。
Of course, this isn’t impossible either. I feel quite satisfied with our stance on investing in Japanese companies. But you must assess the broader trends, as conditions may differ across regions. We must truly safeguard your investments—we absolutely cannot tolerate losses. Currently, we focus on the U.S., hoping to avoid major mistakes moving forward.
沃伦·巴菲特:当然,这也不是不可能。对于我们投资日本公司的立场,我感觉还是相当满意的。但您必须要看看整个大势,整个地方的情况也许是不同的。我们也要真正地照顾您投资的金钱,我们绝对是没有办法容忍万一有赔钱的状况。目前我们在美国,我们希望没有再造成更多的大错误。
# Q3: This question comes from Salt Lake City. We know from Berkshire’s 2024 annual report that energy investments may have disappointed investors, especially given current conditions. Investors are naturally concerned about environmental changes and regulatory measures. In this context, have we accepted the public utility model for electricity and followed their approach? Additionally, we know that regulators in Utah have begun mandating energy procurement plans. Should we reconsider energy investments or power plant investments before retirement?(问题3:下面是来自盐湖城的问题。我们知道在2024年的年度报告书中,您现在已经解释了。但对于能源的部分,伯克希尔可能有一些让我们失望,特别是我们现在看到的这些情况。我们的投资人当然是比较担心现在环境的一些改变,还有一些监管的措施。那么在这个情况之下,我们是不是已经接受了这些所谓公共事业对于电力的模型,然后我们也朝着他们的方向这么做?另外我们知道在犹他州的一些监管部门也开始强制实施了购买能源的计划,我们是不是能够在退休之前还要再重新考虑是否要进行能源的投资,或者投资在电力工厂上?)
Warren Buffett: Let me put it this way—I believe what’s happening in Utah is fair to us. Their efforts have still provided us with respectable returns because these assets are our own.
沃伦·巴菲特:这么说吧,我感觉犹他州发生的一些事情对于我们来讲也算是公平的。他们的这些工作还是给了我们一些值得尊敬的回报,因为这些东西还是我们自己的资产。
Regarding public utilities, let me say this: In 1930, when Senator George Norris was active, we had different experiences. I must emphasize that free markets and free competition still define our role. Privately owned power companies or public utilities may operate more efficiently than those owned by states or governments.
沃伦·巴菲特:如果讲到公共电力,我会这么说,在1930年的时候,那时(乔治诺尔)先生,他是参议员,我们那时也遭遇了一些不同的经历。我现在必须要指出的,自由经济、自由竞争现在还是我们扮演的角色。一些私人拥有的电力公司,或者是公共事业的公司,也许它们操作上会比较有效率,比这种州或者国家拥有的运作得更好。
However, we know that modern public utilities or power infrastructure often require massive investments. We must spend significant capital on power companies. Sometimes, private investors simply cannot handle such scale.
沃伦·巴菲特:但我们知道,现在在讲到的这些公共事业或者公共电力,这中间也许在很多地方必须要有大量的投入,我们必须要花大量的金钱在电力公司上。有的时候,私人的投资人可能对这些情况是没有办法做的。
Therefore, Berkshire is quite satisfied with our current involvement and the areas where national needs are greatest. We will earn returns, though not necessarily enormous ones—the rate of return is sensitive. Of course, we wouldn’t engage in projects with zero returns—that would be madness. Some of our activities and ongoing work are tied to current environmental changes.
沃伦·巴菲特:所以,伯克希尔的公司其实对我们现在参与的部分,以及在国家高度需要的一些地方,我们还是挺满意的。我们将会有回报,但回报率可能不会让我们变得非常富有,回报率还是具有敏感度的。当然,如果说我们完全得不到投资回报的话,我们是不会在这方面进行工作的,如果真的这么做的话那就太疯狂了。你会看到一些我们进行的活动它的成本,还有在进行的一些工作,可能都跟现在的环境变迁有所相关。
Certainly, today’s electricity rates or public infrastructure costs can sometimes seem shocking. However, we still have capital and participate in large-scale projects—these are crucial initiatives for the country. We will continue doing so; we won’t recklessly waste money.
沃伦·巴菲特:当然,今天电费或者一些公共开支的成本,有的时候都是让人觉得非常讶异的。但是我想,我们还是有一些资金,我们也相应地参与大项目,这些对我们来讲都是在这个国家当中非常重要的一些行动。我想我们还是会这么做,我们不会真正把这些钱让它就这么丢到水中。
Oops, I just called Ajit “Charlie” again. I need to ask Greg to answer, but I mixed up the names. I’ve reminded myself not to make this mistake, but old habits die hard sometimes.
沃伦·巴菲特:我又叫错查理了。我现在要请我们的格雷格来回答,但我叫错成查理了。其实我自己已经提醒过自己不要再叫错人了,但有时候还是说漏嘴了。
Greg Abel: I’m honored to hold this position. When you mentioned energy in your letters, the challenges we face today stem from our massive investments in energy and public utilities, which will require sustained efforts over many years.
格雷格·阿贝尔:我非常荣幸能够担任这个位置,当您讲到信件中也提及了能源的部分。今天面临的行业中的挑战,我想这中间是归功于我们现在有庞大的一些投资,对于能源和更多的公共事业的部分,而且这中间还有很多年我们要持续进行。
You mentioned Utah’s impact, but looking deeper at underlying demand, the scale of public utility investments today is significant and deserves attention.
格雷格·阿贝尔:您刚刚提到了,肯定在犹他州受到了一些影响。但如果再看一下底层的特别的需求量,在建立这样一个状态之下,公共事业还有今天投资的这个金额,这是让人觉得非常不可忽视的,而且是非常让人瞩目的。
Should we continue large-scale investments? We pay close attention to public policy and regulations, which provide encouragement. Specific policies—like those governing public utilities in Iowa and over 20 other regions—have been in place for decades. With AI development driving demand, we expect growth to double in the future.
格雷格·阿贝尔:是不是我们还要继续大量的投资?我们对于公共政策是非常注意的,而且是非常持续的。具体的法规也会让我们觉得非常鼓励,特别是一百年之内关于这些公共事项,在美国还有在爱荷华的这些公共电力,另外还有二十多个不同的相关地区。特别是我们现在对于AI已经进行了相应的开发和需求,以及以后一定会有双倍的成长。
During this period, doubling investment is inevitable. We now require greater infrastructure investment across the U.S. Take Nevada as another example—we own two distinct public utility projects there, and their transmission lines are significant.
格雷格·阿贝尔:那么在这段时间之中,我想再翻倍的情况肯定是会发生的。我们现在要求在今天的美国社群有更大的投资。如果我们现在讲到内华达州,这是另外一个例子,我们在那里也拥有两个不同的公共事业项目,这些线路在内华达也是不可忽视的。
After 2030, these needed transmission lines and overall demand will require investments exceeding billions. In Utah alone, growth has already surpassed $10 billion—growth rates are accelerating.
格雷格·阿贝尔:在2030年以后,我觉得这些需要的线路,以及所有的一些需求,绝对会发生至少上十亿以上的改变,那么在中间要投资的钱也是不可忽视的。刚刚讲到的犹他,这中间真正的增长已经超过至少有大概一百亿,所以这些增长率也开始发生了。
The top priority is addressing legal challenges and lawsuits—particularly in the Pacific region—by continuously resolving these issues.
沃伦·巴菲特:所以第一件事情也是最重要的事情,所有的这些我们面临的诉讼,或者与法制相关的挑战,我们会一直不断地予以应对,解决现在的这些问题,特别是在太平洋地区。
We’ve worked closely with state governments for years, coordinating across regions to ensure uninterrupted power supply. All teams and employees must function without disruptions.
沃伦·巴菲特:还有一件事情,我们要怎么样能够在这样的情况下运作我们的资产。我们已经跟当地的州进行多年的工作,而且跨越州政府各个地方多年进行了协调,基本的目标是保持电力的畅通。另外所有的相应团队,还有这些员工们,能够在没有任何中断的情况下进行工作。
Wildfires have caused over $30 billion in claims—highlighting the urgency of communication and risk management.
沃伦·巴菲特:野火的发生,这中间也发生在很多的地方,对于我们的索赔上已经超过三百亿美元了,这个让人不可忽视的情况已经发生了。
We must change our culture, reassess all assets thoroughly, and upgrade operational systems to immediately shut off power during wildfires, preventing disruptions in unaffected areas.
沃伦·巴菲特:所以第一件事情必须要做的,我们要改变现在这方面的文化。我们必须开始真正地重新了解现在所有资产的状况。第二件事情就是改变现在的运作系统,也就是什么时候万一发生火灾的时候,可以马上把所有的电源关闭,让我们的系统能够直接进行相应的不受干扰的限制。
Legislative and regulatory reforms are needed across Pacific states to enable gradual capital investment. We reject reckless spending—discipline is key.
沃伦·巴菲特:但是从基本面来讲,我觉得在未来我们需要立法和监管的改革,这是在所有的太平洋沿岸的州都要进行的,这样我们才能用渐进式的资本投入来为这些业务做出贡献。因为我们不想就简单地把钱投出去,让这个钱浪费掉。所以我们需要有更多的纪律。
For Berkshire Energy, Utah’s legislation setting a uniform cap on wildfire insurance is vital. Pacific Power will improve, and so will Berkshire Energy.
沃伦·巴菲特:沃伦提到犹他州,我们的投资感到非常的放心,它当然不处于太平洋沿岸,所以我们有一些空间和缓冲的地带。他们最近的一次立法,犹他真正通过了这个法案,而且做了几件非常重要的事情。作为伯克希尔能源公司来说,这很重要。另外这也是一个太平洋电力这边的问题。我觉得太平洋电力公司也会在这边做出改进,伯克希尔能源公司也是如此。
Public utilities, especially energy, yield only moderate returns. Climate change exacerbates wildfires, adding new challenges.
沃伦·巴菲特:公共事业这边,特别是能源,最多只能获得一些非常中等的回报。而现在又有了气候变化的威胁,给我们带来了更多的野火。
We will certainly invest over $100 billion here, but we refuse to waste money recklessly.
沃伦·巴菲特:我们是肯定会在这上面付出超过一千亿美元以上的投入,但我们不能简单地把钱扔进去让它浪费掉。
# Q4: I’m from San Francisco. How much advantage do you think generative AI can bring to traditional industries?(问题4:我从旧金山过来,你现在觉得生成式AI(人工智能)对传统行业能带来多大的优势?)
Warren Buffett: I asked four questions and now regret it—I should have only asked two. I know nothing about artificial intelligence, but that doesn’t mean the technology isn't important.
沃伦·巴菲特:我问了四区问题,现在后悔了,应该问二区的。我对人工智能一无所知,但这不意味着说这个技术不重要。
Last year, I also mentioned that we've already let the genie out of the bottle—especially when we invented nuclear weapons. It's doing some harm now, and the power of this genie sometimes frightens me. And once out, it can never be put back in. AI is somewhat similar—it has already been released.
去年我也提到过,我们已经让精灵从瓶子里跳了出来,特别是在之前我们发明核武器的时候,它现在正在做一些坏事,这个精灵的力量有时候让我感到恐惧,而且它再也不能塞回瓶子里了。AI也有一点相似,已经让它跳了出来。
It’s certainly very important and has great significance for many people. But we hope this genie will do good in the future. However, I cannot evaluate it, especially not me—I fundamentally cannot evaluate it.
它当然非常重要,对很多人来说作用非常的大。但我们希望这样的一个精灵,能够在未来做好事。但我没有办法对它进行评估,特别是我,我根本没有办法去做评估。
During WWII, with nuclear technology, we developed the atomic bomb, which we felt was necessary to end the war. In the long run, it saved lives for the U.S. Einstein also warned that if we conducted nuclear tests, we might destroy civilization. But ultimately, the U.S. decided to let the genie out of the bottle.
二战的时候有了核技术,我们当时发明了原子弹,我们觉得好像是非常必要的,来终止战争。对美国来说,可以在长期拯救生命。而且爱因斯坦也提过说,你如果做了核试验,你可能会让文明终止。但最后美国还是决定把这个精灵从瓶子里放出来。
I believe such decisions will affect our next generation and the future—which is exactly what we are seeing today. With AI, its development, frankly, makes me a bit nervous, especially recent developments.
我觉得这样的决定会影响我们下一代,影响未来。这也是我们现在所看到的。在AI这边,它的发展,老实说还是让我有一些紧张的,特别是最近的一些进展。
Sometimes I imagine a picture of myself screaming at me. What does that mean? That something went wrong and no one could save me.
我有些时候眼前会有一张这样的图片,我出现在那张照片里对着我尖叫。这是什么意思?就是我当时出了问题,没有任何人能救得了我。
So think about it—you can use this technology in the future to commit fraud, to regenerate an image like this. For example, an image of me asking you for money. This is something generative AI can do—create an image of me so convincingly that you can’t tell the difference, or say how much money I need. Fraud has always existed in America. If I had invested in the fraud market before, it would have grown rapidly.
所以你去思考一下,在未来你可以用这样的技术去欺诈,去重新生成这样一张图片,比如图片里面也是我,然后我来找你说需要钱,这是生成式AI可以做的事情,让我出现在一张图片里,你难辨真假,或者说我需要多少钱。欺诈在美国一直都是一种出现的情况。如果我之前有兴趣投资欺诈市场的话,它增长会很快。
Of course, AI also has the potential to do good, but the example I just gave, and some phenomena I’ve seen, are quite alarming. I might even see such a photo and not know whether it's real, and perhaps send money to this fake "me."
AI当然也有潜力做好事,但我刚才提到的这个事情,这个例子,和我之前目睹的一些现象,我觉得可能会有一些吓人。我可能甚至看到这个照片以后,我难辨真假,甚至都会把钱寄给这个来骗自己的“我”。
So just like with nuclear technology, the genie has already escaped the bottle, and I know absolutely nothing about it. I believe AI has tremendous potential—both for good and for evil—and I can only let it unfold naturally in the future.
所以跟核技术一样,这个精灵已经被从瓶子里放出去了,而我对此一无所知。我觉得AI还是有很大潜力的,不管是做好事还是做坏事的潜力,我只能让它自然而然地在未来发生。
By the way, Becky, Ajit won’t be here this afternoon, so if anyone has insurance-related questions for him, please ask them in the morning session.
我也想跟Becky说一声,阿吉特今天下午不会在现场,所以如果今天有一些问题跟保险有关想问他的话,尽量在上午问。
# Q5: A shareholder from Minneapolis asks: In past years, there was an interview saying Geico has improved its branding and marketing, while Progressive is a data company and data will win in the long run. You may have started valuing data ten years later than others, and Geico has adopted a new strategy direction. Will you still allow them to proceed? Could this lead to fragility? Berkshire’s CEO also mentioned that Geico’s business divisions have gone off track and hopes Ajit can provide more updates.(问题5:来自明尼阿波利斯的一个股东,过去几年有这样一个采访,Geico在做品牌做营销做得更好,Progressive是一家数据公司,数据在长期会获胜。您可能在十年后才开始重视数据,而Geico现在有了全新的策略方向,您还是会放手让他们做吗?这会不会带来一些脆弱性?伯克希尔的CEO也提过,Geico这些业务的部门已经脱轨了,希望阿吉特可以给我们持续带来更新。)
Ajit Jain: Warren has previously mentioned that Geico’s current weaknesses lie in its underwriting rates and analytical comparisons, where we haven’t performed well for years. We continue to catch up, and technology remains a major bottleneck, though we are making progress.
阿吉特·贾恩:沃伦过去也提过,Geico现在的一些劣势就是在它的投保率和分析的比较上,这个比率并没有做得很好,几年来我们还在不停地追赶,而且技术在这边也是我们很大的一个瓶颈,但我们还是在不断进步的。
Equally important is that the employees we now hire in data analysis and pricing are better than before. We are taking steps to close the gap and by the end of 2025, we should be among the best in the industry in terms of data analytics. We still have a long way to go in pricing and underwriting.
同样很重要的是,我们现在雇佣的员工在数据的分析和数据定价上比以前更优秀了。我们也正在采取措施缩小我们的差距,尤其是在2025年底前,我们应该在数据分析上成为业内最好的一家公司之一。在定价、投保这些上面我们还任重而道远。
Warren Buffett: I think the ratio between premium rates and risk must be appropriate. Sometimes we're just taking small risks, losing small amounts of money. Other times, we take big risks and lose large sums. In this aspect, Progressive definitely does better than Geico. Geico still has its advantages—its costs remain the lowest in the industry. We want to reduce underwriting risk to below 10%. This is not just about survival; it’s also about profitability.
沃伦·巴菲特:我觉得在费率上,费率跟风险的比一定要合适。我们有时候可能仅仅是在冒险,丢掉一些小钱,而有的时候的冒险却在丢掉大钱。所以在这个方面,Progressive确实比Geico做得好。Geico还是有它的优势,就是它的成本,投保的成本还是全行业最小的。我们希望把这一个风险,这个承保风险的率降低到10%以下。这不仅仅是生存的问题,这也跟获利,跟利润有关。
In March, we didn’t lose too many policies, and we operated with low costs. So I don’t think this is currently a threat to survival or profits. Long-term, however, our growth depends on maintaining the best insurance model with low cost delivery to customers.
3月的时候,我们没有失去太多的这种保单,而且我们也是用低成本在进行运营。所以我觉得这不是一个威胁,现在不足以构成对于生存的威胁。对于利润来说也不构成威胁,但是长期来讲我们的成长是希望以最好的保险行业的模型为基础,能够以低成本的方式继续向我们的客户交付价值。
The company was founded in 1936, and its operating principles have remained unchanged over time. Its premiums have always been lower than those of industry competitors—that’s our advantage. Geico is a highly attractive business, though we sometimes need to match today’s risk ratios with slower cost progressions.
1936年这个公司就成立了,它的运行原则也是长期以来不变的,它的投保额一直比行业的竞争对手要低,这是我们的优势。Geico保险公司也是非常吸引人的业务,当然这种比较慢的一些成本上的推进,有的时候我们还是要完完全全跟今天风险的比率进行匹配的。
# Q6: Hello, I'm from Munich, Germany. We just saw Ted and your wife and children. What do you think is the highest value of investing for them?(问题6:你好,我来自德国的慕尼黑,我们刚刚也看到Tedd,还有您的妻子、您的小孩,您觉得投资最高的价值对他们来说应该是什么?)
Warren Buffett: Of course, investment advice depends on other factors. I completely trust my children and my wife, but that doesn’t mean I’ll advise them on which stocks to buy.
沃伦·巴菲特:我想对于投资的建议来讲的话,当然还要根据其他的一些事情。我相信,我的小孩以及我的妻子,我完完全全信任他们,但不代表我会建议他们去买什么股票。
As for managing your own money, I’m probably not the ideal person to talk to—but that doesn’t mean I don’t refer to others’ opinions. If I were to make investments alone, I wouldn’t participate either. Of course, sometimes I talk to myself when investing.
关于管理您的钱这个话题上来讲,我想你要跟我来谈的话,也不见得我是世界上最理想的谈话对象,不代表说我不去参考其他人的意见。另外,如果说我自己一个人在做的话,我当然也不会参与这样的一个工作。当然有的时候我也会自说自话,对于投资的时候我也会这么做。
Over the years, my kids have become increasingly smart, as has my wife. Sometimes I listen to them talk about many things—especially my daughter, who lives nearby and knows far more than I do. I sometimes listen to what my wife says, though I occasionally ignore the details.
我的小孩在这么多年,他们也变得越来越聪明,当然我的妻子也是如此。有的时候我会听他们在讲很多很多事,特别是我的女儿,她也住在附近,她其实知道的这些知识比我多很多。我有的时候也会听我的妻子跟我讲什么内容,当然有的时候我也会忽视他们讲的细节。
But this is very important—you live in the present, pay attention to life around you. Life shouldn’t be limited to yourself or the people you trust; otherwise, life becomes less interesting.
但这件事情是非常重要的,您生活在当下,或者是关注到周围的一些生活,不能限制在只有你自己或者你相信的人,这样的话,这个生命就没有那么有趣了。
When I was twenty, I trusted people around me. But sometimes I made mistakes—for example, meeting Charlie and realizing how significant he was. He never lied to me during all these years of working together, except once. He never rephrased anything, nor did he ever force me into any decision.
在我二十岁的时候,我那时都是相信我周围的人。但有的时候我发觉还会犯错,比如说我举个例子,我那个时候跟查理碰面了,认识了他。我觉得,所有的事情对我来讲都是非常非常重要的。因为特别是在投资的方面,查理在我们一起共同经营的这么多年,他从来没有跟我撒过谎,但只有一次。而且他从来不会重新再讲某些事情,所以他也不会完完全全地强迫我说非得怎么做。
At the level of partnership, I can't think of a single conversation with Charlie that wasn’t important. My advice is to cherish the important people in your life.
就合作伙伴的层面来讲,我没有办法想出任何一个我跟查理讲过的曾经的谈话是不重要的。所以在你讲到你的生命之中,特别是在你讲到的这些非常重要的你身边的人,当然我的建议就是如此。
# Q7: The following question is for Ajit. Environmental change is already playing a crucial role in the insurance industry, as floods are happening in California. Mr. Ajit, what changes do you see in expanding your insurance risk business and across all investments?(问题7:下面的问题是阿吉特的。环境的变化现在已经在保险行业扮演非常重要的角色,因为在加州也开始发生洪水。所以阿吉特先生,您觉得在扩展您的保险的风险业务上来讲以及所有的投资上,有什么样的变更?)
Ajit Jain: I know environmental change and increasing environmental risk are definitely very important and a huge issue. Addressing these, particularly in liability insurance or disaster coverage, is our top priority.
阿吉特·贾恩:我知道环境的改变,环境风险的增加现在肯定是非常重要的,而且这是一个非常大的议题。要疏解这些问题,特别是我们现在讲到的责任险或者是一些灾难险等等,这都是我们最重要的议题。
We started seizing opportunities last year to reprice and make corresponding decisions. This is very important—the insurance industry is fundamentally about pricing.
我们去年年底的时候已经在开始把握机会,能够再重新定价,做出相应的决定。这是非常重要的,这个行业就是定价的一个行业。
Several factors make us realize that every year, we must consider all possibilities. When it comes to price changes or environmental shifts, we must scientifically assess these price adjustments. Regulatory agencies don’t make our job easier either—they often require more considerations when adjusting prices.
一些因素也会让我们开始觉得,在每一年做这种考虑的时候,必须要考虑所有的可能性。当然,在讲到改变价格或者环境的一些改变,我们到底要涨多少钱,我们要以非常科学的方式来进行考虑这些价格。另外监管机构也不让我们这个行业活得更容易,因为还有很多的规定,这中间在改价钱的时候,有的时候也必须要参考更多的结果。
My view is: when choosing an insurer, you must care about their returns and whether they maintain adequate return rates on asset allocations.
所以我的观点,你今天到底是要在哪一个公司进行投保,你是否要关心它的回报,还有这中间这个公司必须要有相应的回报率,在配置它们的资产上。
You mentioned asset allocation and whether every company has been profitable in recent years. Not necessarily. In our insurance business, environmental conditions, fires, storms, or floods will impact performance.
您讲到了资产的这些配置,还有讲到是否在过去的几年,是不是每家公司都开始赚钱。当然这不见得是每个公司都会做的。在我们的保险业中,不管现在环境或者是一些发生了火灾,风灾,或者是洪水的情况,都是会影响到的。
Warren Buffett: I think environmental change increases our risk, which is certain and widely known. Ultimately, we must consider whether the business can grow larger, and whether we will eventually go bankrupt or suffer greater losses. These are the key concerns.
沃伦·巴菲特:我想环境的变迁会增加我们的风险,这是肯定的,也是众所周知的。最终我们要考虑这个业务是不是能够变得更庞大,在一段时间之后我们是不是会破产,或者是会损失更多的利润。这些都是我们要考虑的。
I usually ask Ajit to reassess the results of underwriters and analyses from managers. I also consider Atlantic hurricanes—are they the biggest risk? Are we doing enough? What do we really know about hurricanes, what’s essential, what’s good or bad, and whether their speed and frequency have changed.
我通常会请阿吉特再重新评估这些承保公司的结果,还有更多经理人提出的分析。我也会考虑到大西洋地区也开始产生风灾,这是不是最大的风险。今天我们在做的一些事情是不是能够做得更多,还有在这种飓风的状况下,你到底知道些什么,哪些东西是最需要,最好的或者是坏的,另外还有它发生的快速的程度,以及它的频率,是否已经有了改变。
Such events may occur once a year, so I can't tell you whether they'll happen again in five or ten years. Perhaps you understand the insurance business, but you can’t fully predict whether environmental changes will actually occur. Climate change carries non-zero risk. Some years we can manage or handle exceptions, but whether such decisions can be delayed longer requires forward-looking consideration—or whether certain things can be avoided altogether.
这种事情也许是一年发生一次的,所以我没有办法告诉你五年或十年之后会不会发生同样的状况。也许你了解了保险的这些业务,但你没有办法完全相信今天这些环境的变迁是否会发生。我们对于气候的改变,这并不是完全没有风险的,某一年我们可以这么做,或者可以做这种例外的考量,但未来是不是能够如此,这些决策是不是可以延迟到更长的时间,这些都必须以未来进行考虑,或者是不是能够避免某些事情。
What matters now is analyzing more deeply, understanding current flood and rainfall patterns—this is very wise.
我们现在要讲的就是必须要分析,做更多的事情,了解现在的洪水或者降雨的情况,这是非常智慧的。
Ajit Jain: Today, climate change is to us what inflation is.
阿吉特·贾恩:讲到今天气候的变化,对于我们来讲,就跟通胀一样的。
Warren Buffett: Exactly. Regarding Geico, cars now cost $40,000–$50,000 each. They’re safer, but repair costs keep rising. Inflation helps, but Geico must consider other factors.
沃伦·巴菲特:没有错,讲到Geico保险公司,现在一部车的价值可以达到四五万这样的情况,现在的车辆是非常的安全,但在修理的时候成本也越来越高了。另外还有通胀的影响,在通胀的情况下是非常好的,但是Geico这家公司没有办法不考虑其他的因素。
# Q8: I’m from Ontario, Canada. Twenty-seven years ago, my father introduced me to Berkshire stock. My job has changed, and I’ve attended more of these meetings. My question is: Is there anything worth mentioning about the Canadian economy, including banks and stocks? If you had invested only in McDonald's back then, I think after all these years, people are still eating McDonald's and drinking Coca-Cola.(问题8:我来自加拿大安大略省,那个时候是我父亲介绍给我伯克希尔的股票,大概过去了27年。我那个时候担任的工作一直有变,另外也是更多参加我们的会议。我的问题是,加拿大的经济现在有一些值得一提的,我们讲到的银行、股票,如果您那时还是只要投资在麦当劳的话,我想这么多年,现在大家还在吃麦当劳,在喝可口可乐。)
Greg Abel: We operate several projects in Canada, and we have multiple companies running operations there. Our investments in Canada are acceptable. We’re continuously watching for further investment opportunities.
格雷格·阿贝尔:在加拿大我们运作有好几个项目,我们有几个公司在运营,而且我们的投资在加拿大还是可以接受的。我们在加拿大也随时在观察是否可以增加相应的投资。
Warren Buffett: Indeed, Canada also has many large companies, just like the U.S. As long as they meet our investment criteria and carry no danger, we’ll invest regardless of location.
沃伦·巴菲特:没错,在加拿大也有很多大的公司,就跟美国一样。如果有满足我们的这些要求标准的话,或者我觉得没有任何的危险,能够进行更大金额投资的话,不管是在加拿大或者任何一些地方,我们都会这么做。
I think Canada can benefit from Berkshire’s participation in various ways. We made similar investments decades ago. Canada also has its own financial institutions with internal issues. I remember problems growing like snowballs beyond fundamental causes.
我觉得加拿大在有些地方是可以从伯克希尔的参与中获得益处的,我们多年前也有这样的一些投入。但那边也有自己的金融机构,他们有一些自己的问题。我记得在那里出现的问题有时候滚雪球一样越滚越大,甚至不是基本面的基础问题了。
In any case, they must first meet our investment standards. Of course, many countries besides Canada are hard to understand. Canada has a solid economy, though smaller than the U.S., and overall, it's heading in the right direction. Gradually, we will feel confident about operations in Canada.
所以我觉得,不管以什么方式,他们首先必须要符合我们的投资标准。当然,除了加拿大以外,还有好多国家可能都无法理解,加拿大有一个非常稳健的经济,虽然这个经济量不如美国,但是总体来说经济是向好的。我们慢慢地在搞清楚事情之后,也会对在加拿大的运营感到有信心。
# Q9: Warren, you’ve said Ajit’s insurance evaluations give you more confidence than any other manager. Over the years, you've spoken highly of Ajit’s impact on Berkshire. You even joked that if both of you were on a sinking ship and only one could be saved, we should save Ajit. Regarding Berkshire’s future CEO, you haven’t mentioned whether Ajit has a successor. With so many insurance challenges ahead, how do you think about Ajit’s succession? I’d also like to hear from Ajit.(问题9:沃伦你提过阿吉特做的保险评估比任何其他经理人都更放心。多年以来你都在讲阿吉特对伯克希尔的影响,你甚至开玩笑说,你和阿吉特在一艘沉船上的时候,我们只能救一个人,你让大家去救阿吉特。未来有这么多保险方面的挑战,你觉得在阿吉特的继承人上是怎么想的?我也想听听阿吉特的意见。)
Warren Buffett: It's truly difficult to find a successor for Ajit. Fortunately, he is much younger than me, so we don’t need to worry about him now—worry about my age first.
沃伦·巴菲特:确实很难找到阿吉特的继任者,幸好阿吉特比我年轻很多,现在我们不需要担心他,你们先担心一下我的年龄好了。
There simply isn't another Ajit. He helped build our excellent insurance operations—or at least a large part of it. Without him, it would be hard for anyone else to replicate what we have today. I wouldn’t even try to recreate the achievements he has created for us.
确实找不到第二个阿吉特,他帮助我们打造了保险这边的极佳的运营。或者至少其中很大一部分都是得益于他。没有他的话,很难有第二个人来复制现在的这个业绩。我也不会尝试去复制他给我们缔造的这些成绩。
We’ve institutionalized some of our advantages, and Ajit is indispensable to that. His arrival made all of this possible. The structure of our insurance business today was unimaginable before he joined in 1996. Insurance is truly one of Berkshire’s most important business lines.
我们已经把我们的一些优势体制化了,而且阿吉特在其中不可或缺,他的出现让我们做到了这一切。现在我们打造起来的保险业务的架构,在他1996年出现之前是完全不可能去想象的。保险真的是我们伯克希尔最重要的业务线之一。
Of course, investments are important too, but compared to insurance, they are incomparable. Without Ajit, our insurance business would never have reached its current level of excellence. So we must thank Ajit.
当然,投资也很重要,但是跟保险业务相比,它们完全不能相提并论。没有阿吉特的,我们的保险业务真的不可能有今天这么优秀。所以一定要感谢阿吉特。
When Ajit came in 1986, we were already involved in insurance. I bought Geico in the 1950s, National Indemnity in 1957, and several other insurance companies. Ajit walked into my office on a Saturday, told me he had ideas on how we could improve insurance operations—that moment changed the future of Berkshire’s insurance business forever. So thank you, Ajit.
他1986年过来的时候,我们已经在保险行业当中有所涉足。我50年代的时候就买了Geico,1957年的时候买了国家保险,也还有一系列其他的保险公司。阿吉特那个时候在一个周六来到我的办公室,然后我告诉他,我这边有很多的挑战,他跟我们说,我们现在保险上需要做以下的措施。就是那个时刻改变了整个伯克希尔保险业务的未来。所以感谢他。
Ajit Jain: Thank you for Warren’s kind words and everyone’s applause. But the truth is, no one is irreplaceable. We have Tim Cook at Apple as a great example—he succeeded Steve Jobs and did an excellent job.
阿吉特·贾恩:谢谢沃伦的溢美之词,也谢谢大家的掌声。我觉得事实是什么,没有任何人是不可取代的。我们下面也有苹果的CEO库克,他也给我们树立了一个楷模,他接替乔布斯以来做了很好的工作。
Warren Buffett: That’s a great example.
沃伦·巴菲特:这是很好的例子。
Ajit Jain: Given that, I want to say our board has always been thinking about succession—not just for Warren, but for myself as well. Every year, they ask me questions and I share my thoughts. They want to know how our insurance business would continue if something happened to me tomorrow. Through many operating cycles, we’ve gradually developed a picture of potential future candidates. We will slowly find someone who gives me confidence to take over.
阿吉特·贾恩:既然这么讲了,我想说我们的董事会也一直在关注继任者,不仅仅是沃伦,也有我这边。每一年他们都会问我问题,让我跟他们分享一些我的想法。就是如果我不小心被卡车撞了,明天公司的保险业务要怎么做。我们也经历过非常多的运营的周期,我们心目中也慢慢有了关于未来候选人的形象。我们也会在未来慢慢地找到一个让我有信心的接替者。
But just as Cook demonstrated, when great people leave, the world still turns and everything finds a solution. No one is irreplaceable.
不过就像库克给我们证实的一样,我觉得当伟人离去之后,这个世界这个地球还是会转,一切都会迎刃而解,没有人是不可取代的。
Warren Buffett: That may be the best answer, but we still can’t find another Ajit.
沃伦·巴菲特:这可能是最好的答案,但是我们也确实找不到第二个阿吉特。
# Q10: If you could spend one day with Charlie Munger again, what would you do together?(问题10:我想如果你还能跟查理·芒格先生共度一天的话,你会想和他做一些什么?)
Warren Buffett: That’s an interesting question. I feel like I still have one day left with him, though perhaps not a full day. We lived life in ways that brought happiness. Charlie loved learning—this short video clip showed his broad interests.
沃伦·巴菲特:有意思的问题。我觉得我确实还有一天,但是可能不是一个全天。我们生活的方式都是尽可能让自己开心的方式,查理非常喜欢学习,刚才的短片中也听到了,他对好多事物感兴趣。
His interests were much broader than mine. He wasn’t like me, and I didn’t want to be like him either. But we got along extremely well—we played tennis, golf, did many things together. Spending time together was more enjoyable than being alone. But we still had work to do, and we faced difficulties together.
他的兴趣比我宽泛很多。他不像我这样,我也不想像他那样,但是我们两个在一起非常志趣相投,我们一起做很多事情,打网球,打高尔夫球,好多事情一起做。我们在一起度过的时间甚至比独处要更加的开心。但我们还是必须工作,遇到困难的时候一起去克服它们。
Having Charlie as a partner helped us through all kinds of difficulties over decades—it really made me happy. And many of his ideas from ten years ago are still making money for us today.
所以拥有查理作为这样一个伙伴,帮助我们一起摆脱各种各样的困难,这几十年来真的让我非常开心。而且他在十年前给我们的很多想法还在不断让我们获利赚钱。
He lived to 99.9 years old and once said that aside from his military service, he never exercised or thought much about what he ate or whether it was nutritious. Yet he lived to nearly 100. Charlie had broader interests than me, but we never doubted each other. So if we spent another day together, it wouldn’t be much different from all the days we had before.
他活了99.9岁,他也提过,除了自己从军的时候,他完全没有自己出去锻炼过。他根本没有想过自己要吃什么,他根本没有想过自己吃的营不营养、健不健康,但还是活了99.9岁。查理比我的兴趣要更广泛,但我们在一起从来没有对对方充满怀疑的态度。所以我跟他如果再共度一天的话,我觉得跟我们之前共度的所有的日子都不会有太大的区别。
Of course, not knowing when we’ll leave this world is also a blessing. Charlie once said, “It would be nice to know when you’re going to die so you can avoid that day.” He approached life with curiosity and inspired the world. I think that was truly unparalleled.
当然,不知道我们哪一天会离开,这也是一个很大的幸事,查理曾说,要是知道自己哪天会去世就好了,这样我永远不会往那一天走去。他还是带着这样好奇的心态去到了非常多的地方。所以他不仅仅对于这个世界感兴趣,我觉得全世界也开始对他产生了好奇心。我觉得这真的是无与伦比的一件事。
In recent years, I told him, I’ve never seen anyone reach their peak at 99 years old. At 99, the whole world wants to meet you.
我过去几年当中也跟他提过这一点,我说我从来没有见过哪个人在99岁的时候活到了自己人生的巅峰。在99岁的时候,全世界都想来找你。
We made mistakes before, and we learned from them, becoming smarter. He and I shared a lifelong curiosity and applied knowledge to investing.
但我们之前也犯过错,所以我们也不断在错误中吸取教训,变得更加聪明。而且他跟我在学以致用的这些方法上,还有对世界的好奇心上,也是一直保持着好奇心。
So there’s no perfect answer to your question. But I’d say, Charlie and I would probably spend the day just like we always did. Sometimes I asked him about books, and he'd say, “I’ve already read it.” He often reads while dining—he's truly unparalleled and exceptional. He’s met almost everyone worth meeting.
所以这个问题没有一个完美的答案,但是我想说,我和查理还会在接下来这一天,以从前的方式一样共度。我问查理有些时候关于某些书的时候,他老是说“我已经读过了”。他一般去餐厅也是会看书,他真的是非常无与伦比、杰出的人,他基本上该见的人全部都见过了。
This is a fascinating question. I think you should ask yourself—who would you want to spend your last day with? If you can think of someone, go meet them today. Don’t wait until the end.
这个问题很有意思,我觉得你要问自己一个问题,你觉得有谁愿意跟你共度生命中的最后一天?如果想到有这样一个人的话,现在就去跟他见面,明天就去找他吧,而且经常跟他见面,不用等到生命的最后一天。
# Q11: This question comes from Switzerland. It’s for Mr. Buffett and Mr. Jain. Now, political changes—such as cyberattacks and pressure—have increased risks. For our cybersecurity today, in insurance or infrastructure businesses like airports, power companies, ports, etc., how do you assess future possibilities?(问题11:这个问题是来自瑞士。这个问题要问巴菲特先生跟贾恩先生。现在政治上的一些变化,比如说网络上的攻击以及压力等等,所有的风险也因此增加。对于我们现在的网络安全,在保险或者我们讲到的很多业务,比如硬件设施,像机场、电力公司、港口等等,您对于未来的可能性到底是怎么判断的?)
Ajit Jain: Cybersecurity insurance is now a very trendy topic and product. We estimate the market value to be at least $10 billion. But realistically, only about 20% of that is insurable.
阿吉特·贾恩:现在我们在讲到的网络安全保险,可能现在已经是一个非常时尚的话题,以及产品。而且我们现在已经讲了,有至少100亿以上的市场价值。但我想真正要保的话,大概至少20%会增加在保险单上的价值。这么讲之后,伯克希尔公司是否做这种网络安全保险?我们是非常谨慎的。因为有两个理由:
First, deep understanding is difficult. Once damage occurs, calculating the loss is very hard. Operationally, is there a standard for assessment? Can we calculate future risk? These are huge challenges.
第一,加深理解是非常困难的。损害发生一次之后,要计算这种损失是非常难的。而且在运作的层面之下,是否有认定的标准,是否有未来风险上面的计算?这是非常庞大的。
Second, the cost of losses today is hard to quantify. A cyberattack doesn’t necessarily result in immediate loss; damage can be long-term. Losses aren’t easily captured by simple math—you can’t assume every dollar of loss generates 40 cents of coverage. Today’s actual losses are difficult to calculate. Many people want to operate in this area. When writing policies, you must understand how to price them properly. Only with solid mechanisms can we avoid heavy losses. Sometimes you make money, sometimes you lose big.
第二,您今天在讲到的损失上面的一些成本是非常难计算的,而且不见得是一次攻击之后有损失,而且这些损失发生的时间可能很长,会有很长期的影响。也许这个损失,不是说一块钱就能投4毛钱就能捕捉,或者就能疏解的,不能这么计算的。今天的实际损失怎么计算,这是很难进行计算的。在我现在运行的保险上面来讲,有很多的人也许都希望能够运营这一个情况,所以你要写保单的时候,必须了解保单怎么样能够做费率的计算,要有了这样的保险机制之后,才不会真正损失太多的钱。有的时候会赚钱,有的时候会输大钱。
Currently, many view this as a massive business opportunity, but I believe at some point it could suddenly collapse and cause significant losses because many serious issues will arise. That’s my view.
今天的轨迹,当然大家都觉得这是一个非常庞大的业务,但我的猜测是在某一点也许会突然暴跌,而得到很大的损失,因为有很多严重的事情会发生。这是我的想法。
Warren Buffett: His view is representative. Right now, such insurance is essentially valueless because you must guarantee certain things, and ensure transactions. In 1968, riots occurred globally under President Kennedy’s time. Any event requires clear policy limits. But the problem today is, if an event happens—for example, a severe assassination in a city causing massive business losses—how do you handle it after having written the policy?
沃伦·巴菲特:他的想法是有代表性的。现在来讲,这种保险还是无价值的。因为您要保证或者确保某一些东西,去确保某一个交易。第一个问题是,讲到1968年,曾经在各地发生了暴乱,那是肯尼迪在位的时候。讲到任何的一些事件,你要写保单的时候,必须要限制在保单中保险的范围。但现在的问题是,如果发生的事件,比如说某个人在某一个城市里进行严重的刺杀行为,而且造成了有上千上万的业务都已经损失的状况。但你已经写了这些保单了,因为一次性的事件,您到底要怎么样能够进行补救呢?
Cyberattacks may not be worse than assassinations, but they can be equally or more damaging. When assessing risk values, sometimes losses can reach millions. If you issue too many policies and events chain together, one thousand policies might connect to other incidents. Court decisions also play a role. Most people buy cyber insurance just because it’s fashionable. Agents earn high commissions. But when writing policies, you must fully understand accumulated risks—you won’t foresee everything.
所以在讲到这些风险上面能够计算的一些价值,有的时候一次会损失到上千万。如果真正发觉了这个问题,写了很多保单,但有些事件是有连锁反应的。今天也许提供了一千个保险,但这中间还跟其他的一些事件进行了连接。有些时候,你还要有法庭来做这些决定。有大部分的人,我想他们是因为追求时尚,所以说就来保一个所谓的网络安全保险。当然,这些保险代理人也可以赚到丰厚的佣金。但你在写保单的时候,必须要知道这些人在管理这些保单时要完完全全了解现在累积的风险是什么?你有一天是没有办法想到的。
Take earthquakes—they occur somewhere, bringing disasters. Even with limits in the tens or hundreds of millions, natural disasters are what insurers face. So we aren’t excited about this trend just because it’s fashionable. People should remain optimistic but realistic.
今天讲到地震,某些地方已经发生了,给人类带来了灾难。你有上千万上百万的限制,但人类天然发生的灾难,也就是现在保险公司将会面临的。所以我们现在并不是说因为它时尚就感觉非常的兴奋。大家还是要非常乐观务实。
# Q12: This question is for Mr. Buffett and Mr. Abel. I’m a retiree from Las Vegas, Nevada. As you know, this week sees many Latin American residents in our region—I represent all Latinos in Nevada, many of whom struggle to afford electricity bills. When evaluating whether Nevada’s electricity prices are affordable and clean energy available, why hasn’t Berkshire opened a new natural gas plant or invested in gas in Nevada? Since we have constant sunlight here, shouldn’t we explore other energy investments instead of fossil fuels?(问题12:这个问题要问巴菲特先生和格雷格·阿贝尔先生。我是一个退休人员,来自内华达拉斯维加斯。你知道这一周有很多拉美的和更多的我们这个地区的人——我现在几乎能够代表所有的在内华达州的这些拉美裔们,我们有些人已经在挣扎地付内华达的电费。所以在评估是否内华达现在的电费能够负担得起,以及又有清洁的能源。我今天想说,为什么伯克希尔公司不在那个地方再开一个新的天然气工厂或者进行天然气的投资?这样的话在我们的内华达州,因为随时都有太阳光,所以是不是可以再进行相应的其他的投资?而且不要再投资到我们刚刚讲的这些石化的投资上,而做其他的新能源?)
Greg Abel: This is a serious question. Solar energy is a great opportunity and an enviable resource. We will continue using this resource and exploring other possibilities in Nevada. Our goal is to better serve customers every minute of every day.
格雷格·阿贝尔:这个问题是非常严肃的。关于能源,太阳能也是非常好的机会,也是非常让人羡慕的能源,我们会持续使用这个资源,还有其他的一些资源的可能性在内华达州进行。我们希望能够每天更好地服务我们的客户,而且每一分钟、每一秒钟都能够提供你相应的服务。
We use wind energy too, but if the wind stops tomorrow, we need alternative resources like natural gas plants to fill the gap. This is the challenge we face in Nevada. Of course, we are continuously transitioning in Nevada—whether it’s wind energy from elsewhere, or battery integration.
风能我们也用到,但是如果第二天这个风没有了,那我们必须要有其他的天然气资源或者其他的天然气工厂来补足它的需求,这就是我们现在在内华达州发生的问题。当然,现在我们持续在内华达进行相应的转换,不管是内华达的风或者是其他地区的风,或者是综合电池等等。
Warren Buffett: I think we have sufficient capital to invest reasonably, but sensitivity is required. This applies to Nevada and every state. Each investment decision involves committees with different views on public utilities.
沃伦·巴菲特:我想我们有足够的资本,只要是合理的考量进行相应的投资,但必须要有敏感性。在内华达州,以及所有的州都是如此。所以每一次我们进行投资的时候,还有各个相关的委员会里面,他们也有不同的想法,对于公共服务事业上。
What can be done—and what meets our standards—requires careful decisions. When shifting from one form of energy to another, we must consider whether the shift causes significant disruption and whether we can reliably make the change. What seems feasible today might fail tomorrow. There’s no transition period. Problems can’t happen daily. Our company must ensure lights stay on every day, and people can turn them on anytime. Fossil fuels are the oldest power source for electricity generation. Storage is also a consideration.
哪些东西是可以做,而且能够真正地做到,达到我们的要求标准,这些是非常需要再做决策的。而且非常符合的业务,如果从一个方式转换到另外一个地方的话,必须要看到这种方式是不是会造成相当的影响,我们是不是能够真正地这么做。也许今天想到这么做,明天就发生了问题。这个没有过渡期的,问题是不能天天发生的。我们的公司要确定每天都有照明的可能性,都能得到使用灯的希望。当然曾经讲过化石是最古老的资源,就是在发电上面来讲。但我们也讲到,比如说在储存上也是我们考虑的问题。
Greg Abel: On batteries, they're currently economically viable but limited to about four hours of power. There are economic and technological challenges ahead. We must seek reliability and balance. Electricity costs matter greatly—we aim to provide the most reliable and trustworthy power.
格雷格·阿贝尔:另外还有,刚刚讲到电池,电池现在是一个比较经济的方式。但一个电池可能只有四个小时的电力,这中间还有更多的经济上面的一些挑战,也就是还需要技术上面的推进,不管怎么说,我们必须要寻求它的可靠性,以及平衡度。电费在今天是非常重要的考量,能够提供最可靠,而且是可信任的电力,这就是我们的目标。
Warren Buffett: My friend Bill Gates has been working on this, aiming to shorten electricity delivery time. He’s also focused on battery development. I now see many smart people pushing these projects forward. Sometimes I don’t understand why lights turn on or off. But certain things take time to develop.
沃伦·巴菲特:我想我的朋友,比尔·盖茨先生也一直在进行这方面的工作,他希望能够缩短我们现在提供电力的时间。另外还有电池方面的工作,他也一直在做。我现在已经了解今天有很多聪明才智的人在推进这些项目。有的时候,我不知道到底理由是什么,什么时候开灯什么时候关灯。但某些事情,你必须要花一段的时间才能够开始进行。
# Q13: This question comes from Florida. Warren and Ajit, can you tell us about the solutions for vehicle and asset insurance in Florida? It seems like things have gotten out of control there, and residents are noticing. Does Berkshire see better opportunities now?(问题13:这个问题来自佛罗里达。沃伦和阿吉特,可不可以让我们知道,在车辆和这些资产方面的保险,在佛罗里达的解决方案?因为我觉得在佛罗里达好像这些已经失控了,我们的居民发现了这样的现象,所以伯克希尔现在是不是有更好的机会?)
Ajit Jain: I understand your concern. In Florida, over the past few years, reinsurance and home and auto insurance have gone through some turbulence, leading to sharply rising premiums. Additionally, Florida has seen increased frequency and severity of windstorms and other weather events, causing massive losses in the insurance industry today.
阿吉特·贾恩:我了解你的想法,在佛罗里达这几年再保险和家庭房屋保险、车辆保险,是面临了一些曲折的情况,所以造成了佛罗里达的保费急剧增加。另外佛罗里达也有一些风灾,以及其他的一些风灾的情况发生的频率也变高了,而且非常严重。所以佛罗里达的损失也造成了今天保险界巨额损失的情况。
Florida has its own challenges. Future rates will rise but eventually reach a balance point where risk bearers can achieve their desired returns.
所以佛罗里达有自己的问题,未来费率还会上升,但会达到一个平衡,让风险的承受者也能够获得他们想要的回报。
# Q14: Warren, hello, I’m from California. Thank you for being our mentor and sharing your wisdom with us over the years. Today, is there one thing you think each of us needs to hear most?(问题14:沃伦你好,我来自加州。谢谢你作为我们的导师,这么多年把你的智慧传达给我们。你今天能不能给我们分享一下,你觉得我们每个人最需要听到的是什么?)
Warren Buffett: You probably meant to ask—what do we all want to hear? Let me say this: if I had one piece of advice, it’s that you’re incredibly lucky to live in America, where there are endless opportunities.
沃伦·巴菲特:你应该想问的是,我们每个人都想听到什么吧?我想说,如果我这里有一个建议的话,你们很幸运,你们生活在美国,这里有无限的机会。
I’d like to use Charlie Munger’s previous advice—as if I were reading his eulogy. Let me tell you, first and foremost, educate yourself, deal with the right people, based on your personal circumstances. For me personally, I wanted to find someone who could help guide my life in the right direction. Charlie would say—you seem to offer similar benefits to your partners.
我想用一下查理·芒格之前的建议,就像是我在读他的悼文一样。我想告诉你们,首先把教育做好,针对你自己个人的情况,跟正确的人打交道。对我来讲,我就是希望能够找到一个能够帮助我找到人生正确方向的人。查理会说,你好像是在给你的合作伙伴提供一些相同的效益。
America holds tremendous opportunity. If you rewind a few centuries, you couldn’t even imagine the incredible progress made over the past 200 years.
我觉得,在美国蕴藏着巨大的机遇。你倒回几个世纪去看,根本无法想象过去两百年我们实现的巨大发展是什么。
The Industrial Revolution came first, followed by great advances in science, education, and medicine—we’re truly fortunate to be born into this era. Many of us here are also lucky. You should seek out what you love doing, and find like-minded people to share this fortune with.
首先出现了工业革命,后来又因为科学、教育、医疗的巨大进步,我们真的非常幸运能在这样一个时代出生。我们在场的好多人也是足够幸运。你们也要去找到自己热爱的活动去参与,去找到志同道合的人一起分享现在这个世界带给你们的运气。
Charlie and I did exactly that—we found each other, shared common interests. If you haven't yet, keep searching. I always tell my students: find work you truly love. Sometimes you may find it early; sometimes it takes longer. But never forget your初心 (original purpose).
我和查理就是如此,我们找到了彼此,找到了共同的兴趣。你现在如果找不到的话,就继续去寻找吧。我也一直在告诉我的学生们,找到一个你想要的工作,有时候你可以很早找到这样一个非常喜欢的工作,有些时候可能要寻寻觅觅久,但是不要忘了自己的初心,一定要这样去做。
Sometimes you may start on the right path early but still make mistakes along the way. So overall, my advice is this: reflect on your life journey, start walking toward your goals today, find what you want, and find those who share your vision. There may be obstacles, but with confidence and determination, you’ll reach success.
有时候你可能很早就可以走上正确的道路,但你也不得不犯一些错误才能找到正途。所以,总的来讲给你的建议就是,试着回顾一下自己人生的道路,今天就开始走上这个目标的道路,去找到你想要的这个目标,找到跟你志同道合的人,这个路上可能会有一些困难,但是你只要有足够的自信,足够的决心,你是会到达那个成功的彼岸的。
# Q15: This question comes from Hamburg, Germany. After Ajit and Greg became vice chairs at Berkshire, what changes occurred? Do any CEOs still directly contact you instead of going through these two vice chairmen?(问题15:这个问题来自德国的汉堡,他说伯克希尔的CEO这边在阿吉特和格雷格成为主席之后有发生什么变化?我们有一些公司的CEO还是可以直接向巴菲特这边来进行联系,而不用通过这两位副主席?)
Warren Buffett: The answer might surprise you. Compared to 30 or 40 years ago, I’m certainly not as effective in execution. I don’t know all the managers on the board anymore. However, I have capable assistants like Greg and Ajit. Why only come to me? You can go to them too.
沃伦·巴菲特:这个答案可能会让你们有些吃惊,但是我想说,我现在跟30年或40年前比,我自己做执行这方面的工作肯定不像以前那么高效了,我没有办法认识所有这些董事会的经理人们。但是,我身边有格雷格和阿吉特这样的得力助手。为什么只来找我?也可以去找他们。
I think operations have been very efficient in recent years. Greg knows the issues better than I do and offers invaluable advice. He works with immense energy. And Ajit's wisdom is unmatched—he brought more people into the insurance industry and taught them how to operate effectively.
我觉得这样的运行在过去这一段时间还是非常高效,是非常有效的。格雷格这么多年来比我要更加清楚地意识到他们的问题在哪里,给他们的建议也是非常的珍贵。而且他一直是充满着能量地在工作。而且阿吉特这边的智慧是没有人可以拥有的,他让更多的人进入到保险行业,知道怎么去做事。
Nowadays, I receive almost no calls directly from managers. Greg handles all inquiries and phone calls—I don’t know how he does it, but I believe we’ve found the right people.
我每天接到的这些经理人的电话,基本上现在数量为零,而格雷格这边是在帮助我们应付所有的这些咨询和电话,我不知道他是怎么做到的,但我觉得我们真的找到了正确的人。
Ajit Jain: I’d like to add that the leadership transition has been smooth—for which credit goes entirely to Warren Buffett’s approach.
阿吉特·贾恩:我在这里可以补充一下,对于我来说,这样的一个领导层的过渡真的非常顺,但我觉得这一切真的要归功于沃伦·巴菲特在这件事上所做的操作。
Warren Buffett: Honestly, they seem to work more than 24 hours a day—it’s hard to believe Greg covers so many areas. His knowledge far surpasses that of an average person.
沃伦·巴菲特:我觉得每一天,他们工作的时间感觉都超过24小时一样,我真的很难置信格雷格可以覆盖这么多的领域。他对比普通人来说,真的要博学太多太多。
We share similar views on evaluating investment decisions and assessing attractiveness, though Greg carries much heavier responsibilities. I can’t handle everything myself anymore, but this transition has worked very well. I believe Berkshire will continue smoothly, even without me.
我们在评价投资的决定和标的的吸引力时有比较相似的意见,但他的工作量真的是要大很多。我现在确实没有办法应付如此多的工作,但现在这样的一个过渡,真的是非常行之有效的。我觉得,即使没有了我,伯克希尔仍然可以非常顺利地运行下去。
# Q16: Thank you for hosting us today. Your guidance has not only made us better investors but better human beings. I’m from New Jersey and manage an India-focused index fund. My question is about India. Indian equities and the economy have performed well over the past five to twenty years. It’s already the fifth-largest economy and will soon become the third.
# My question is, is Berkshire actively looking for opportunities in Indian equities? What would drive major investments in India?(问题16:谢谢你们今天在这里招待我们。你们的指导不仅让我们成为了更好的投资者,更重要的是成为更好的人,谢谢你们。我来自新泽西州,我做一家关注印度的指数基金。我的问题是跟印度相关的,印度的权益和经济在过去五到二十年中都表现良好,它现在已经是世界第五大经济体,很快未来几年将成为世界第三大经济体。我的问题是,伯克希尔是不是非常积极地在印度的权益市场找机会?有什么可以驱动你们在印度做出大的投资?)
Warren Buffett: That’s a great question. Yes, we are watching India closely. I believe India has enormous potential, but the key question is—do we have investments that India really wants us to participate in?
沃伦·巴菲特:这是一个很好的问题,确实,印度我们在关注。我相信印度有大把大把的机会,但我的问题是,我们的投资有没有是印度真的想要我们去参与的。
There are many participants in that environment, making their own transactions and following their own philosophies. We have our own principles. No matter what happens, today’s profits depend on your current investments. We must consider what future management will decide in this process.
在这个环境之中有许多的人都是在参与,他们在进行自己的交易,有时候他们有自己的哲学,但我们也有我们自己的理论。但不管发生什么事情,也许今天的这些利润是根据你今天投资有多少而决定,我们要看一下我们下一代的管理,他们到底在这个环节中要做什么样的决策。
My view is, within our companies, several individuals decide what global work to pursue. But you're absolutely right—if you're energetic and have methods to be a buyer, others will be eager to do business with you.
我的观点是,我们这些公司里面有好几个人,他们在全世界要做的工作是由他们来决定的。但是你讲的是非常对的,如果你今天精力充沛,而且有某些方法能够成为一个买主,今天参与方大家都是非常愿意跟你做生意的人。
Our investments in Japan were excellent, and I believe India may present similar opportunities. But whether Japan and India are completely alike, I can’t say. I don’t fully understand cultural differences between countries, nor can I distinguish them clearly.
日本的投资是非常好的,我想印度也有可能有这样的机遇。但日本跟印度是否是完全一样的,我自己并不清楚,我也无法告诉你它们的差异性。因为文化上来讲是比较不一样的,而且哪一国跟哪一国到底怎么样,我也没有办法区分。
# Q17: A Spanish question: Berkshire continues to grow. Earlier, you said Charlie was the architect and you the contractor. We greatly appreciate both of you and remain attentive to Berkshire’s current operations and culture, hoping to ensure the stability and strength of our “building.”
# If new contractors or architects needed to replace current ones, how would that affect the company? What kind of new architects might emerge?(问题17:来自西班牙的问题,伯克希尔现在在继续成长,你刚才讲到查理·芒格是建筑师,而沃伦你是承包商。我们非常感谢你们两位的工作,我们也随时在了解伯克希尔今天做的所有工作以及文化,希望能够保障我们现在投资这一个“建筑物”的稳定性以及坚实性。您觉得伯克希尔公司今天如果一些承包商必须要开始更新,或者有新的承包商加入的话,您觉得这样的一个改变会有什么样的影响?会有什么样新的建筑师加入,会有怎么样的情况?)
Warren Buffett: That’s a great question. Charlie isn’t with us anymore, but obviously, we discussed this topic often while he was alive.
沃伦·巴菲特:这是一个很好的问题。查理现在已经不再为我们工作了,但是很明显的,我跟查理也不断谈到这个问题。
Berkshire remains largely as it was. The people we attract are still similar to before. If the board needs to find new directors or some retire at 65—which rarely happens—we will reassess accordingly.
伯克希尔公司现在保持原有的状态,所以我们的工作,我们吸引的人还是跟以前差不多。如果对于我们的董事会要开始找到新的总监,或者他们某些人在65岁就退休,其实对于65岁退休来讲是一件不太会经常发生的事情。如果真正退休的话,我们当然要做重新的考量。
Earlier, I mentioned that we must grow, so they must make decisions frequently—that’s what our managers do.
我刚才也讲了我们必须要成长,所以他们必须要开始做任何的决策,而且频繁地做决策,这些就是我们的经理人要做的。
Also, only about 1% of CEO work is different. The decision-making process can be difficult—if you make the wrong call, it affects many people. So this is a very, very challenging job.
另外CEO有的时候只有1%的工作是不同的。这些工作的做法有时候也是蛮困难的,如果你做错了决策的话,可能会影响到很多,所以这是一个非常非常困难的工作。
Our foundation still exists. We hope to maintain it for another 20 years, though that’s unlikely. Hopefully, we remain fortunate, and our managers continue doing excellent work under the current structure, and in this century as well.
在进行运营的时候,我们的一些基础还是存在的,我们也希望在以后的二十年中也做到这种情况,但是这些事情现在的可能性还是比较低的。希望我们都非常幸运,也希望所有的经理人能够在我们现在的这种公司存在的情况之下,或者是在这一个世纪之中,还能够做同样的良好的工作。
So my answer is, perhaps we need some luck, and sometimes break tradition. But we must find energetic, inspiring leaders.
所以我现在的答案就是,也许我们需要一些好的运气,也许我们有的时候要打破传统。但是我们必须要找个精力充沛的,而且是真正能够鼓舞人心的经理人。
Greg Abel: Thank you for saying that. I’d like to add, any evaluation is driven by our culture. Berkshire’s culture is unique and won’t change.
格雷格·阿贝尔:谢谢您今天讲的,我必须要补充一下,任何的评断都是由我们的文化来决定。伯克希尔已经有的文化是非常特殊的,这不会改变的。
# Q18: I'm from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, working in a family business. Today, we’re here with great admiration for you heroes. You and Charlie have created many positive changes. Many admirers couldn’t attend today but are watching online. Thank you.
# My question is, what do you and your team believe you've done best regarding business, assets, and capital allocation—especially post-pandemic?(问题18:我来自吉隆坡,马来西亚的一个家庭企业里面做事。今天我非常高兴,我们今天来是抱着朝拜英雄的情况。你和查理给我们做了多少非常积极正面的转变,所以很多今天这些对你崇拜的人,有些人没有办法到现场,但他们已经在在线观看,谢谢你。我的问题是,您和您的团队,学到的业务、资产和资产配置,做结论来讲,觉得做得最棒的是什么?特别是在疫情之后,可不可以给我们一些您的观点?)
Warren Buffett: Thank you for your question. At the core, it’s about how you begin allocating your capital—for example, as I mentioned earlier, insurance, policies, and underwriting. You represent a group of shareholders, and our mission is crystal clear to us.
沃伦·巴菲特:谢谢你的问题。解答你的某些问题时,说到底也就是怎么能够开始进行你的资产配置,比如我刚刚讲到的保险、保单、保险政策,你是代表了一群股东们,我们的使命对我们来讲是非常清晰的。
There are certain ideas and qualifications we don’t need and won’t adopt. Over the next twenty years, we’ll provide relevant initiatives and ideas. Our board will make different decisions in the future—this is inevitable.
今天某些人他的某些想法、某些资质我们是不需要的,我们也不会采用的。在以后的二十年之中,我们将提供相应的一些项目,还有我们的这些想法,当然我们的董事会之后也会做其他,也许有不同的决策,这是肯定会发生的。
By now, maybe a few people understand my thinking. We have the right people on the board—they deeply understand their responsibilities and take them seriously. They don’t treat Berkshire as a stepping stone to jump to another board.
我讲到这里可能有几个人也知道我的想法是什么了,我们现在有正确的人在我们的董事会上,他们深知自己的责任在哪里,并严肃地对待这些责任,不会把伯克希尔作为一个垫脚石,跳到其他公司的董事会去。
We grew from a $2 billion market cap to $270 billion. We didn’t do many things—but just a few small things done better than others made all the difference.
我们从一个两亿市值的公司成长到现在两千七百亿,虽然我们并没有特别多的事情要做,但是在几件重要的小事上,我们做得比其他人好就够了。
# Q19: You now have over $160 billion in cash, and it’s even grown to over $180 billion. So what are you waiting for? Why not deploy this capital where it belongs?(问题19:你现在有一千六百多亿现金,现在超过一千八百多亿的现金,那么你在等什么,为什么不把它配置到它该有的地方去?)
Warren Buffett: That’s an easy question to answer. I think none of us on this stage have a great idea on how to use the money well right now. We won’t spend it under current conditions. Interest rates are high—don’t tell the Fed that.
沃伦·巴菲特:这个问题很好回答,我觉得我们在场,台上的这几个人,都没有一个很好的想法怎么好好地用这笔钱。我们不会在现在的情况下用这个钱。现在利率这么高,当然这一点不要跟美联储讲。
We only swing when the time is right, but many people today just keep swinging their bats no matter what. Maybe they missed before, so they swing more often, hoping to hit something eventually.
我们只在正确的时候去挥杆一击,但是现在好多人不管什么时候都在乱挥他们的棒球棒。因为可能觉得之前挥棒都打空,那我不停地打不停地击,总会打中正确的标的。
I think we can no longer expect returns as large as before—maybe exceeding $10 million would be appropriate now. If we stick to our old targets, we may not find enough opportunities.
我觉得我们现在可能对于回报不会再像以前一样想着要超过一百亿,也许超过一千万是比较合适的。现在如果还是以以前的目标的话,可能找不到这么多机会。
For example, if a company in Japan offered attractive returns, I might invest. But currently, there aren't enough compelling investment opportunities for me to allocate capital. We’ll see if anything changes—we’re watching closely.
比如在日本,一个公司如果可能回报会比较好,现在看到这样一家公司,也许我会去做的。现在没有足够的投资标的,没有足够有魅力、有吸引力的投资标的让我去配置资产,但看之后有没有什么变化,我们拭目以待。
# Q20: Every year your shareholder meeting is exceptional. I’m a real estate agent operating Berkshire businesses in Arizona. My family also works at Berkshire’s home services division. We’re honored to be part of Berkshire. The housing service business recently faced a lawsuit in the U.S., resulting in a $250 million loss—the largest among all home companies. What do you think about this settlement amount? And for Greg and Ajit—I’d like to ask, when buying your next home, will you consider using Berkshire’s own brokers?(问题20:每一年你的股东大会都如此出色,我是一个房地产经纪人,我在亚利桑那经营伯克希尔的业务,我的家人也在伯克希尔房屋公司任职,我们非常荣幸成为伯克希尔的一员。房屋服务现在在美国遇到了一个诉讼,损失了2.5亿美金。这比任何一家房屋公司的损失都更大。你觉得这样一个和解的金额怎么样,对于格雷格和阿吉特我也想问,你们在买下一个房子的时候会不会考虑伯克希尔自己的经纪人?)
Warren Buffett: I don’t buy houses as frequently as you might think. Investing in real estate seems unlikely going forward. Thank you for joining us today and asking such an interesting question. Greg previously informed me about this settlement. Greg, I fully trust you—please explain.
沃伦·巴菲特:我买房子不像你想的那么频繁。我觉得之后再去投资房产的可能性应该很低,谢谢你今天加入我们,而且问了这么有意思的一个问题。我觉得之前的和解,格雷格之前给我传达了这些信息。格雷格能不能讲一讲,我百分之百信任你。
Greg Abel: Thank you and your family for being part of our brokerage team working for Berkshire Home Services. Undoubtedly, the industry will undergo transformation due to this settlement. Many were heavily impacted, and significant changes will follow. This settlement has prompted those changes.
格雷格·阿贝尔:谢谢你和你的家庭都成为我们这个公司的经纪人,为伯克希尔这家房屋公司工作。毫无疑问,这个行业会经历一些变革,因为这次的和解会产生一些转型。很多人在这个和解当中都受损严重,接下来会有一系列的改变,而且因为这个和解,这个改变也被提了出来。
Warren Buffett: In my 93 years, I’ve only bought two homes and sold one. I still own two. I never tried to negotiate the commission rate down.
沃伦·巴菲特:我之前卖过两栋房子,在过去九十三年只做过两次房屋交易。买了一栋,现在还有另外的两栋。我从来没有把这个佣金率往下谈。
I think the current system still works, though it's interesting to observe how the old model operates. Brokers work long hours and earn relatively little, especially when deals fall through. I believe they deserve a better system.
我觉得这个体系现在还是有效的,现在去看那种古老体系的运作还是很有意思的。但也知道房屋经纪人工作非常长的时间,赚的钱也只有那么多,有时候可能到最后交易还没有谈下来。我觉得我们需要给他们一个更好的体系。
I really like our company—we have a large number of real estate agents working for us. I’m very pleased with our expansion in the real estate and housing transaction industries.
我很喜欢我们的这个公司,我们也有非常大量的房屋经纪人在为我们工作。我也为我们之前在房地产行业的扩展,还有房屋交易行业的扩展感到非常的欣慰。
Greg Abel: I think the broker model has already changed or needs to change. The role of real estate agents must also adjust accordingly.
格雷格·阿贝尔:我想,也许今天的经纪模式已经改变了或者我们今天担任房屋服务的工作要进行改变,这些中介的状况也要进行调整。
Warren Buffett: Exactly. I believe there is an appropriate and sustainable price structure in this industry. When I sold a house for $7 million, I didn’t haggle over the 6% commission—it was rightfully theirs.
沃伦·巴菲特:没错,我感觉这个行业中有适当的价格,而且是可行的,那个时候我卖房子卖了七百万,但是我没有跟中介人还价这6%的佣金,这个钱就是属于他的。
# Q21: Regarding Berkshire and Geico, and Elon Musk’s comments on full self-driving cars—what impact could that have on insurance? Our data shows autonomous vehicles could reduce accident risk by half. If Musk’s technology matures, how will insurance be affected? What future revenue changes should we expect?(问题21:对于伯克希尔,对于Geico,还有马斯克讲到的完全自动驾驶汽车的情况,这对于保险有什么样的影响?根据我们现在的数据显示,真正的自动驾驶汽车,可能对于人类开车的危险度其实是减少了一半。所以假设马斯克现在自动驾驶汽车的机制成型的话,现在的这些保险业会受到怎么样的影响?以后的收益会有什么样的变化?)
Warren Buffett: You’ve raised a real example. Unless some wild scenario emerges, autonomous driving could reduce accidents or costs, but it’s still difficult to assess. Some people are already using autonomous features, and over time, our numbers and data will show the actual impact. People have been discussing this for years.
沃伦·巴菲特:你今天已经讲了一个真正的例子,除非有一些疯狂的可能性,但是自动驾驶可能会减少车祸的发生,或者会减少成本,但现在还比较困难。当然有人已经在使用自动驾驶了,以后我们的数字以及所有的数据,也会显示出来到底会怎么样。过去几年中人们已经在讨论这个事情了。
Do you remember when Uber first emerged? Many said, “Is this possible?” But geography proved it worked. Sometimes pricing starts off wrong and later becomes correct. Insurance may seem easy to expand and operate, but it’s not. You must truly understand your business. If car accidents decrease by 50%, that sounds good. But we’re still exploring whether such a reduction is genuinely possible in society—and whether we can find such opportunities.
在保险行业,你们还记不记得在Uber开始的时候,很多公司会说,这可能吗,但地理环境证明这是可行的。所以有些事情可能一开始是错误的价钱,之后是对的。说起来保险界好像非常容易推展,运作非常容易,其实不然。你必须要真正地知道你在做些什么,因为很多的车祸,如果说能够减少50%的话,听起来是不错的。但我们现在在寻找这个社会上是不是有这种真正的可能性,我们在寻找这样的机遇。
Ajit Jain: My view is, Tesla’s results suggest that technological improvements may affect accident rates. However, looking at the numbers and other metrics, average losses may not necessarily decline.
阿吉特·贾恩:我想我今天要提出来的意见或者我的观点就是,特斯拉做的这些结果,听起来这些技术的改善会影响到发生车祸的比率。但您今天看到了,如果说这个数字以及发生的其他的标准进行相应考虑的话,不见得所有的平均数会下降。
Tesla has started talking about selling its own insurance directly or indirectly. But success is unpredictable. Transforming auto insurance entirely remains very costly.
特斯拉公司已经开始跟大家讲到他们想要自己开始卖他们自己的保险,直接或者间接的方式。但我觉得今天这事成功与否还是没有办法预料,这种汽车保险如果要完全转变的话,成本还是非常大的。
Warren Buffett: We’re almost at lunchtime. Let me thank everyone for staying put throughout this session. We’ll return at 1 p.m. sharp. I promise we’ll be back on time.
沃伦·巴菲特:我们现在快到了午饭时间,我要告诉大家,我们非常感谢各位能够完完全全坐不离席地在这里听我们进行我们的会议。我们之后到1点钟再回现场,我会答应大家我们绝对会准时回场。
# Q22: I asked this last year and am bringing it up again this year, from a different angle. Looking at current trends, zero-emission vehicles are increasingly accepted by the market. What are your thoughts on zero-emission vehicles—whether in terms of the cars themselves, manufacturers, or underlying technologies? Do you see opportunity here? Also, does Berkshire still have interest in energy-related companies like BYD and Pilot?(问题22:我去年问过这个问题,我今年要继续问,同样的问题是用不同的方式,从反过来的方向来问这个问题。看到现在的趋势,零排放的车辆可能已经开始完完全全被市场接受了,所以您在所谓零排放的车辆上,不管是在车辆或者生产商或者相应的技术中,你的想法是怎么样?你认为有机会吗?另外伯克希尔公司是不是对于能源,还有比亚迪、Pilot等等这些公司,都还是有兴趣的?)
Warren Buffett: I'll leave the energy side to Greg. But regarding electric vehicles, I can say this: we're not making predictions about them. We've owned BYD shares, and I believe Charlie was quite enthusiastic about it. We reduced our position somewhat, but we still hold some shares.
沃伦·巴菲特:这个问题我让格雷格来谈能源的部分。不过关于电动车,我可以这么说:我们并没有对它们做出预测。我们曾经拥有比亚迪的股份,我相信查理当时是非常积极的。我们后来减持了一些,但我们仍然持有一部分。
But we don’t try to guess the future of electric vehicles. It’s hard to predict who will win or lose. There are many companies in the space, and we’re not sure which ones will dominate in ten or twenty years.
但我们并不试图去猜测电动车的未来。谁赢谁输很难预测。这个领域有很多公司,我们也不确定十年或二十年后哪家会占据主导地位。
If someone tells me that electric vehicles will take over the world in 10 or 20 years, I might agree—but I don’t know how much profit will come from that shift.
如果有人告诉我,电动车将在未来十到二十年全面接管世界,我或许会同意——但我也不知道这场转型能带来多少利润。
The auto insurance business may shrink significantly if autonomous driving reduces accidents by half. That’s a concern for Geico and others in the industry.
如果自动驾驶真的把事故减少了50%,汽车保险业务可能会大幅缩水,这对Geico和其他保险公司都是个挑战。
But let me hand over to Greg for the energy part.
不过,能源这一块我交给格雷格来讲。
Greg Abel: On the energy side, we're deeply involved in renewables. We continue investing in solar and wind power across the U.S. We also look at battery storage as a growing area of interest.
格雷格·阿贝尔:在能源方面,我们深度参与可再生能源,持续在美国各地投资太阳能和风能。我们也关注电池储存作为未来的增长点。
Berkshire Hathaway Energy will remain committed to infrastructure investments that serve customers reliably and affordably. Whether it's EV charging stations or transmission lines, we want to ensure we're building for the long term.
伯克希尔能源公司将继续致力于提供可靠且负担得起的服务的基础设施投资。无论是电动车充电站还是输电线路,我们都希望确保我们的建设是面向长期的。
We’re also open to new ideas and technologies, including hydrogen, green energy, and grid modernization. But whatever we do, it must meet our disciplined investment criteria.
我们对新理念和技术也保持开放态度,包括氢能、绿色能源和电网现代化。但无论我们做什么,都必须符合我们严谨的投资标准。
Warren Buffett: And we won’t bet on things we don’t understand. We’ve always believed in investing in what we know.
沃伦·巴菲特:而我们不会对我们不了解的东西下注。我们一直相信投资于我们所了解的领域。
沃伦·巴菲特:谢谢你。我想大量地接受这样的方式,但伯克希尔不觉得会引入更多特别的专业的一些人才,对于现在你讲的这些车辆或者是生产上面做更多的关注,因为我不太确定我们是不是会选择这样的一个议题来作为我们公司的一个指标。我不觉得现在真正的赢家会马上出现,我也不会预测到底会发生什么样的事情。
Warren Buffett: Thank you. I’d like to accept such approaches broadly, but Berkshire doesn’t think we’ll bring in more specialized professionals to focus more on these vehicles or manufacturing. Because I’m not sure whether we would choose this issue as an indicator for our company. I don’t believe the real winners will emerge immediately, nor will I make predictions about what exactly will happen.
Obviously, the topic of mobility is widely discussed now. Our society still has many problems, and perhaps governments haven't fulfilled their responsibilities well enough in solving them. However, environmental change and climate issues are also very problematic today. In fact, in the U.S., you’ve already seen situations causing problems, and society feels them. We hope to change our lifestyle, but can you actually do so? People are still uncertain and unable to resolve existing difficulties.
很明显,这个移动的标的,目前大家都在讨论。我们的社区上还有极多的问题,也许政府还没有做到他们应该要解决问题的职责,做得不好。但是环境的变迁、改变,气候的改变,目前也是非常糟糕的。而且实际上,在美国你已经看到了造成问题的一些情况,我们的社会也感觉到了,我们希望我们要改变我们现在生活的方式,但你是不是能够做到?所以大家都还觉得是莫衷一是的,无法解决现有的困难。
Of course, this is an issue worth everyone’s vigilance and a huge topic—how to break down current outcomes and conduct deeper analysis. I’ve been aware of this since my birth in 1930. Back then, the global population was about 2 billion; now it's 8 billion.
当然,这是一个让每一个人都值得警觉的问题,而且是庞大的议题,到底要怎么样能够分解出我们现在的这一些结果,以及进行更深层次的分析。我从1930年出生的时候就开始有这个问题了。我们现在看到了,原来那个时候我们有大概20亿人,现在已经有80亿,从1930年到现在。
Surely among the world’s 50 smartest people, they hope to solve today’s challenges. But looking back over the past 93 years, when we’ve reached 8 billion people, we still haven’t solved these problems.
所以全世界最聪明的五十个人,他们都希望解决现在的问题。但最终的这些人口上的问题在过去的93年中,我觉得已经在讲到有80亿人口的时候,我们还没有解决这些问题。
In fact, the U.S. has tremendous advantages because we are constantly allocating resources and developing more projects. People talk about wanting to change lifestyles. But some of these issues are extremely difficult and unsolvable.
当然,在美国其实是有非常大的一些优势,因为我们已经在随时配置,已经在开发更多的一些项目。人们都在讲,我们也希望能够在改变人们生活的方式。但这些问题有的时候是非常极度困难,而且是没有办法解决的。
Let me introduce someone else—many of you know her. She’s attended our meetings many times. Her name is Caro (pronounced similarly), a senior journalist who will turn 95 in June. We thank her for being here today. Caro is truly a notable figure and important role at Berkshire, having joined us in 1977.
当然,我在这里要介绍另外一个人,我想很多人都认识她。这位女士曾经参加过我们的会议很多很多次了,Caro(音),她是一位资深的记者,她在6月的时候马上就95岁高龄了,我们在这里要感谢她今天能够出席我们的会议。Caro真的是伯克希尔一位值得瞩目的名人,一个重要的角色。从1977年开始,她就已经加入我们了。
There are two points I want to mention today—and I do this every year. I especially commend Caro—I give her a small gift each year, like a bracelet or something meaningful, thanking her for covering our meetings since 1977. So she should be our permanent seat reporter. If she wore all the bracelets I’ve given her, her arms would be full. You can see the one she’s wearing today.
所以有两点我今天要跟大家提出来,而且每一年我都会这么指出。我要特别褒奖Caro,我每一年都要送她一个小礼物,比如一个手环或者是我们最重要的纪念品,感谢她对于我们会议的报道,从1977年就开始进行了这么重要的工作。所以她应该是我们永久席位的记者。如果她把我每一年送给她的手链戴上来的话,可能手都戴满了。你可以看到她今天戴的手链。
Let me ask one final question. I believe everyone in the audience grew up with her stories just as I did. Caro’s office is at Sixth Avenue and 50th Street in New York, facing NBC and Rockefeller Center. At noon, Caro would cross the street for lunch. Once, she appeared on a popular TV show and was asked a baseball question—she’s a true fan and knows all the answers. She got it right. She mentioned she was single, and after returning to the office, received a call from a young man in Georgia whose uncle was Tyrus Cobb. He invited her to lunch at a restaurant on 21st Street. Caro happily accepted, had lunch with Tyrus Cobb, and later even had another lunch. Afterward, she decided that couldn’t keep happening. Baseball fans may recall that in the 1990s, they discovered issues with Cobb’s statistics—his batting average had inaccuracies, with certain hits no longer counted. The problem came up again.
我想再问最后一个问题,我相信观众中的每一个人都是跟我一样伴着她长大。Caro的办公室在纽约第六大道和第五十街交界处,对面是NBC和洛克菲勒中心。Caro中午都会过街去吃饭。有一次她上了电视节目,那个节目当时非常风靡。Caro当时就被问了一个关于棒球的问题,她是棒球迷,是一本百科全书,知道所有的答案,她答对了。她当时提到自己是单身,回到办公室之后接到一个电话,一个来自于乔治亚州的年轻人打电话来说:“我的叔叔是Tyrus Cobb,他想请你在二十一街的餐厅吃顿午饭。”于是Caro就欣然应邀,在二十一街和Tyrus Cobb吃了饭,之后又吃了一顿午饭。Caro后来决定不行,不能再这样下去了。喜欢棒球的人应该都知道九十年代时,他们发现Tyrus Cobb的统计数据有问题,击球率有些出入,某些击球是不能算进去的,问题就来了。
I don’t know if Caro can help answer this: Did you really go out with Tyrus Cobb? If his batting average was only .366, would you still go? What’s the cutoff for you? Can Caro answer this for us? This has always been a mystery—I think many people want to know her answer, and only she knows it. Later, she married someone even better—her daughter Barbara is sitting nearby. Barbara, you must be curious too, right? Will Caro answer, or shall we invite Barbara to join us?
我不知道这个问题是不是可以让Caro帮我们回答一下:你有没有和Tyrus Cobb约会过?如果他的击球率只有366,她还会不会和他约会?你赴约的底线是多少?Caro能不能帮我们回答一下这个问题?这个问题一直以来都是一个谜,我想很多人都想知道她的答案,只有她自己知道答案。她后来跟一个更出色的人结婚了,女儿Barbara就在旁边,你一定也很想知道这个问题,对不对?Caro能回答一下吗?还是说我们要不要请Barbara当嘉宾?
Barbara: Regardless of the batting average, she would have gone anyway.
巴芭拉: 不管击球率是多少,她都会去赴约的。
Warren Buffett: Caro is the best business writer—she may have written over a thousand articles. She took accounting classes and is among the top business writers. She didn’t want to be an editor originally, working at Fortune, but she truly loved writing business stories—no one writes better than her. She learned on her own. In 1977, I asked her to report on Berkshire. As you’ve seen, she continues to write exceptionally well and never missed a meeting until this day. Caro has served as editor and lead writer for Berkshire reports. Those who enjoy reading these reports should be grateful for her contributions over the years. She brought the bracelet today as well.
沃伦·巴菲特:Caro是最好的商业撰稿人,她可能写了上千篇的文章,她也上过会计课,也是我们商业撰稿人中的翘楚。她之前本来不想当编辑,不想当主编,她在《财富》那边工作,但她真的非常喜欢写这些与商业有关的故事,没有任何人写得比她好,而且她是自学成才。1977年的时候,我也让她来报道伯克希尔这边的情况。大家也都看到了,她真的在做报道和她写文章是一样的出色,一直到今年她都没有缺席过。Caro一直在帮伯克希尔的报告做编辑和主编,喜欢读这个报告的人,我们都要非常感谢Caro这么多年来做的贡献,她今天也把手环带到了现场。
We’ll continue after lunch. As mentioned earlier, we’ll play a short video first—let’s dim the lights and show what a Berkshire shareholder has done. She may represent many Berkshire shareholders. She saw our returns and gave $1 billion to Einstein Medical School. When Ruth gave Albert Einstein $1 billion, what did he do with it? Let’s watch the video.
我们接下来用午餐,之后再聊。刚才也说过了,再放一段很短的短片,我们先把灯光变暗,展示一下一个伯克希尔的股东做了些什么。这个人可能是很多伯克希尔股东当中的一位典型,她对伯克希尔的投资是看到了我们的这些收益。当爱因斯坦收到十亿美元之后,她做了些什么。Ruth当时给了爱因斯坦十亿美金,当时爱因斯坦做这个宣布的时候,他们做了些什么。我们来看一看这个短片。
Video: We’re thrilled to announce that starting in August, the Albert Einstein College of Medicine will eliminate tuition fees for all students.
短片: 很开心跟大家宣布,从8月开始,阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦医学院将会免除所有学生的学费。
Warren Buffett: This is why Charlie and I love working at Berkshire. He sold Berkshire shares and invested $1 billion into the medical school, allowing many students to receive free education. This is how Ruth helped 150 students pursue their life goals debt-free. She made this decision willingly and actively—not for the spotlight, but from genuine conviction. We thank her, and Ruth is here in the audience today.
沃伦·巴菲特:这就是为什么查理和我喜欢在伯克希尔工作。他把伯克希尔的股票卖掉,用这十亿美金投资于医学院,让这么多学生都可以免费接受教育。所以在这中间,没有任何的自负情绪,Ruth她就是觉得说我可以帮助这一百五十名学生,让他们能够免费的、无债一身轻地去追逐他们人生的目标。而且她是欣然并主动积极地做出了这个决定。不是为了好像只是在聚光灯下,这真的是她从心底里做的决定,我们感谢她,Ruth今天也坐在下面。
Now, let’s take lunch. We’ll return at 1 p.m.—I promise to be back on time.
我们接下来用午餐,之后再聊。我们现在快到了午饭时间,我要告诉大家,我们非常感谢各位能够完完全全坐不离席地在这里听我们进行我们的会议。我们之后到1点钟再回现场,我会答应大家绝对准时回场。
# Q23: Regarding the role of CEO, Mr. Abel will naturally have to make many changes in management and operations under your current model. What choices would you make?(问题23:关于担任CEO的一些情况,格雷格先生当然要在很多层面改变,巴菲特先生在管理以及职能上面的运作,现在有不同的一些情况,您会做什么样的选择?)
Warren Buffett: Let me answer this way—if I’m not around, they might just make decisions behind my back. Of course, everyone does the job differently. I don’t know exactly how they divide responsibilities. But all areas are covered. I feel very secure, but in reality, our board already has different intellectual contributions making decisions in various ways under different circumstances.
沃伦·巴菲特:我想这个问题要这么回答,在做决策的时候,我如果不在的话,他们可能就会在我背后做决策了。当然,这样的工作,每个人做起来都是不一样的。我不知道他们是怎么样来区分他们的工作的。但是所有的一些层面都会被覆盖住。我感觉到非常的安心,但是实际上的事实就是,今天我们的董事会已经有了不同的一些脑力激荡的力量,然后他们也在做各种决策,也许在不同的情况之下有不同的工具。
If I were on the board and had to decide, I would assign capital allocation responsibility to Greg. He fully understands how our business operates and knows exactly what to do with our common stocks. We’ve already hired investment managers—though their strategies may differ slightly from others, our assets are still managed carefully. Money is the most important thing.
如果我是董事会成员并做出这个决定,我会将资金配置的责任交给格雷格。格雷格非常了解我们业务是怎么运作的,对伯克希尔也非常了解。同时他对于我们的普通股到底是怎么样,他完完全全知道该怎么做。所以我们现在已经雇佣了这些投资的经理人,当然这些经理人可能会在自己基金上的投资策略上跟其他人有所不同。不过,在我们的管理资产上,金钱是最重要的。
Tedd and Todd’s roles are clear—I believe they fulfill them completely. Sometimes I may disagree with certain views, but ultimately, that’s part of the CEO’s responsibility. The CEO can make helpful decisions, but those decisions may carry different levels of accountability. When deciding how to deploy funds, it’s up to them. So I’d say, when we start deploying capital more broadly for greater Berkshire interests, we must ensure these 200+ people managing billions in projects are effective—or we won’t keep them.
Tedd和Todd他们的责任是非常明显的,我感觉到对于责任的履行,而且他们是完完全全做到应该做的。有时候我会对于这一观点有不同的想法,但是我想就责任来讲,这应该是CEO的责任。CEO做什么样的决策可能是有帮助的,但是这个决策有的时候也会对于他能够承担的责任会有所不同。在他们决定要怎么样运作这些资金的时候,这些都根据他们来决定。所以,我会说我的想法就是,在开始做更扩展性的这些资金部署的时候,如果要成就更大的伯克希尔的这些利益,我们要试图让这200多个人在管理几十亿的每个项目之中,如果他们做不成,我们就不能让他们继续这么做。
Strategic considerations are crucial. Greg has the ability to make strategic moves. Actually, sometimes I miss things from the past—I question why certain actions were taken, but everyone knows about 2008 and 2009, when there was little anyone could do against what happened. Especially during the financial crisis in 2008–2009.
战略上的一些考量是非常重要的。格雷格他是有能力去做战略上的部署。我想,有的时候我会错过某些过去的事情,实际上到底他们为什么会这么做,我有的时候也会怀疑,但是大家都知道2008、2009年的时候,那个时候你再怎么做也没有办法抵挡当时发生的事情。特别是2008、2009年金融危机的时候。
If you have a lot of money, how do you deploy it more efficiently—or how will you redeploy over the next five years? I can tell you, over the years, especially every ten years, many things become complex and interrelated—rarely do they go as planned.
如果说有大量的资金,如何可以运作得更有效率,或者是在以后的五年之中你会再次进行怎么样的部署。我可以告诉大家,在几年之中,每十年之中,很多的事情其实都是非常复杂的,而且是彼此之间有相互关联的,很多事情不见得会发展地那么理想。
We must explore new possibilities before deploying capital or acquiring companies. You must think carefully. Not everyone lacked capital in 2008, but some froze. Many missed opportunities or avoided action when needed. The government also recognized issues and took responsibility at that time.
所以要通过更多的探索找到不同的可能性,在你开始部署你的股票的时候,或者要买任何公司或者业务的时候,必须要开始对于这些事情进行审慎的考虑。而且并不是某些人在2008年的时候没有资金,有些人在当时陷入了瘫痪。而且很多的人没有把握到这样的一些优势,或者有些人不愿意再参与当时应该做的一些事情。政府在那个时候也看到了一些问题,承担了相应的一些责任。
I think under Greg’s leadership, things may unfold more interestingly—and more logically than I could manage. You never know what will happen next week, next year, or even a century from now. These are unpredictable. Things get more complex, and connections grow stronger. With deeper thinking and global financial understanding, you reduce fragility. Greg, am I making this too hard for you?
我想,在这种情况之下,格雷格他可能在进行他的工作的时候,比我更有趣地在从事他的工作,更好的事情将会发生,也会有更有逻辑性的一些立场。你不知道下个礼拜会发生什么事情,或者是明年或者是十年之后到底会走向什么方向,或者是一个世纪之后会成为什么样的结果,这些都是不可预知的,我们都不确定。事情会越来越复杂,他们之间的纽带也会越来越严重。当然如果更深思熟虑或者了解全世界的财务的一些状况,你就会对于这个脆弱的一些情况越来越减少。格雷格,我这么讲你会不会觉得有一些难?
Greg Abel: I think you answered the question perfectly and directly. During the transition, we hope you continue holding onto the key principles of capital allocation. Berkshire continues to thrive today because of this disciplined approach.
格雷格·阿贝尔:我想你已经非常完美地回答了这个问题,而且直截了当。我想,我们在进行过渡的时候,也就是希望你能够把握最重要的配置的原则,伯克希尔能够在今天继续持续地生存,就是处理得非常好。
We have both insurance and non-insurance assets—both are essential and well-managed. Current results are successful. Expected returns exceed what we currently hold, and we still have cash reserves.
我们有保险业以及非保险业的资产,这些都是非常需要的,也是适当的,目前的结果也是非常成功的。现在期待的投资回报率也超过了我们现有的,而且有剩余的现金。
Regarding new businesses, we completely agree with your view—we must find more businesses to invest in, whether taking 1% or 100% ownership. We must fully understand each business and assess economic trends going forward. Will our current portfolio truly double in value? We certainly aim to accumulate more cash under our safest investment philosophy. Our greatest goal is protecting shareholders and maintaining Berkshire’s position—this is truly the most rational path.
讲到新的一些业务,您曾经讲过,我们完完全全同意,要找到更多的业务,投资到不同的业务,不管是1%或者是100%在投入这个业务,我们要完完全全理解这些业务,要看到经济的趋势到底如何,从现在或者是到以后,我们现在的资产组合是不是真正能够加倍地成长,我们现在做的一些工作是肯定希望能够积存更多的现金,在我们最安全的投资理念之下,而且我们最大的目标就是保护我们的股东们,能够在这个层面之下维持我们现有伯克希尔的位置,这是真正最合理的情况。
Warren Buffett: We’re in a better position than before, though not everything remains stable. In America’s unique environment, which is constantly changing, businesses can continuously generate profits. Some years are better than others, and outcomes vary across periods.
沃伦·巴菲特:我们现在的位置比以前更好,当然并不是说我们现在所有的位置都是一直保持。在美国这个特殊的环境之中是非常多变化的,而且是非常多变化的美国的业务之中,能够一直都在赚钱。但有的时候某一年会更好,有一些年度也会有不同的结果。
This is what makes predicting future performance difficult—that’s what winners do. If you look globally, among the top 20 companies, you’ll see that long-term operational excellence over ten years isn’t easy. If you believe your company is being assessed correctly, don’t let others persuade you to change. That’s our current mindset.
所以这就是所谓的,希望能够做更好的一些预测,这就是赢家。您回头看在全世界可能有前20名的公司,在十年之间,你会看到他们真正在经营上可以表现更好的时候,看起来都不是那么容易。所以如果你觉得对于公司是做得最好的考量方式,就不要让人家说服你不再这么做,这是我们现在的一些想法。
Greg Abel: As I just said, we will always protect shareholder value.
格雷格·阿贝尔:我想,刚刚就像你讲的,我们是永远维护我们伯克希尔股东的权益的。
# Q24: I’m from Düsseldorf, Germany. This is my first time in Omaha attending this shareholder meeting—thank you for the opportunity. My question is for Mr. Buffett and Mr. Abel. In 2019, you spoke about IT allocation and investments in technology and data sectors. Could you share your current views—are these businesses more competitive today than back then?(问题24:我来自德国杜塞尔多夫,这是我第一次来到奥马哈参加这次的股东大会,感谢您能够让我来此拜访。我今天的问题是要给巴菲特先生和阿贝尔先生。2019年您讲到IT的配置,还有在技术科技方面、数据方面的行业。我想请您今年给我们仔细叙述一下,对于配置在IT的权益以及业务上来讲,以今天的立场来看,这些业务是不是更具竞争性?)
Warren Buffett: When it comes to deploying our capital across all businesses, we’ve already gained relevant experience and insights. However, whether we’ll continue or limit such investments going forward is something Greg should address more directly than me. You asked about our current stance on managers and whether we’re buying or redeploying elsewhere. Sometimes, we don’t need to repeat the same advice constantly.
沃伦·巴菲特:我想分配我们所有的业务来讲,我们已经有了相应的经历以及经验。但是对于未来我们是否同意或者要限制这样的一些投资,我想格雷格应该介入得比我更多。刚刚你讲到你要知道目前这些经理,我们目前的立场是怎么样,我们是要买还是要做其他的部署。我想,我们要提出的这些建议,有的时候不见得是每次都会不断再提出的。
Greg Abel: In 2019, tech stocks represented a unique opportunity with clear value at that time. We made certain allocations accordingly. I discussed this with Buffett back then. He found it quite interesting to invest in this sector. Later, we saw even better valuations and fully understood the business potential when making those allocations.
格雷格·阿贝尔:2019年的时候,科技股对于我们是非常独特的机会,也看到了当下那个时候的一些价值。因此,我们进行了一定的资产配置。我跟巴菲特那时也讲过了,也谈过了这些情况。巴菲特那个时候也觉得非常有趣,能够投入这个行业之中。之后我们也看到了更多好的价值,已经完全了解在进行配置的时候的一些业务的可能性。
We acquired TTI, though TTI isn’t exactly aligned with pure data or tech. More importantly, there were superior models we needed to observe. For example, when we discovered TTI’s business, it had the potential to generate at least $10 billion in revenue, but on average, it only sold at nine cents per dollar. $95 billion went into inventory. It takes the right people to navigate such opportunities—unique capabilities are required to seize them. We saw the technical data, and Warren thought it was a defining moment—we placed bets, though returns weren't always the highest.
沃伦·巴菲特:你讲的没有错,我们看到过去五年是什么样的状况。有些业务在过去四五年里并不是你做梦就可以达成的业务。这是一个还算让人满意的商业模式。这中间也许每个公司大概有上百个SKU的代码,像有很多很多不同颜色的糖果一样,但是服务的人群有不同的一些目标,很多产品在不同层次上也都进行了影响,比如要减少一些系统或者得到更好的系统,或者最终不要让用户被绑紧,这都需要很多的资产才能运作。所以,这中间没有任何神奇的方式来进行管理。TTI是一个非常让人觉得很有趣的,而且是非常瞩目的一个经营的方式。但您要知道,当您看到一个很棒的人开始经营某一个业务的时候,这中间在某一个层次来讲,你要选择最好的一些人才能做这样的一些经营。当时那边有大概三百多个人,其中没有一个人说了一些关于这个方面信服的话。
Maco is an exceptional person whose Berkshire experience speaks for itself. We rewarded him proportionally to his contributions. When you meet someone like him, looking back or forward, they’re truly valuable. We've encountered several of these individuals over the years. The distribution business isn’t the most exciting, but it’s solid and sufficiently scaled. We made a relatively small acquisition with TTI—I only see their numbers when reading quarterly reports.
Maco(音)是一个非常棒的人,他在伯克希尔的经历让人信服。他对伯克希尔的贡献我们也以完全正比的方式回馈给他。当你碰到这样的人,不管是前前看向后看,都是非常宝贵的。我们遇到过好几个像他这样的人。这个分销的业务不是特别棒的业务,但确实是实打实的业务,而且也足够有规模。TTI我们也是做了比较小型的收购,我到每个季度读报告的时候才能看到他们的数字。
We aim to build our own presence in every operating field we enter. We have enough capital to deploy and are open to smaller acquisitions, provided they align with our investment principles—not just investing for the sake of investing. We may currently lack the right person to help identify ideal targets.
我们想在每一个运营的领域都去打造自己的业务,我们也有足够的资产来进行配置,我们当然也愿意做一些小的收购,前提是它要符合我们现在所拥有的这些投资的特质,而不是为了投而投。我们现在可能缺少这样的一个人来帮助我们找到理想的标的。
We might be willing to invest in the area you mentioned, but even if we did, it wouldn’t make a big impact. If this industry doesn’t work out, we’ll look elsewhere for better opportunities. We could buy more TTI shares for shareholders, but stock buybacks would still be more helpful.
你说的问题中问到的这个领域,我们可能愿意会去投。但即使投了,它不会激起太大的水花。如果这个行业投不起,我们会去另外一个行业,找到值得我们投的。我们也可以给股东买更多的TTI,但还是股票的回购更有帮助。
Now it's Becky's turn to ask questions.
接下来是Becky问问题。
# Q25: Many wonder where you see future opportunities. How do you value Apple? In 1999, you mentioned owning nearly all top 500 U.S. companies, worth around $10 trillion. You said that might not be a great investment. Today, the total market cap of the top 500 has reached $44 trillion. Is the current market similar to 1999?(问题25:很多人在想,你到底接下来觉得机会在哪里?怎么去对苹果进行估值?1999年的年会上你提到几乎有所有美国前五百名的股票,价格可能有十万亿那么多。如果你投了所有前五百名的公司的话。你当时说这可能是不太好的一笔投资,那么现在美国前五百名的公司已经有44万亿的市值,比你1999年的投资更划得来。今天的市场和1999年的市场比有没有相同之处?)
Warren Buffett: I think the market has changed dramatically since 1999. There were periods in my life where I certainly missed good investment opportunities and wish I’d invested more—but I’m also glad about some decisions I made. We haven’t seen any investment object today with the same logic as before. Over the years, we’ve made several acquisitions—Berkshire, myself, and Greg can talk about deals like the $300 million one. If the opportunity fits, we will pursue it.
沃伦·巴菲特:我觉得1999年到现在市场发生了剧变。在我的人生当中曾经有这样的时期,我确实觉得肯定错过了一些好的投资机会,应该在上面加仓的,但是也庆幸自己做出了正确的决定。我们现在还没有看多任何的投资对象有如此的合理性,我们这么多年来确实也做了一些收购,伯克希尔,我和格雷格可能会讲一讲,比如说做一笔三亿美元的收购。如果足够合适,我们会去做的。
If our managers believe a target fits our strategy, we’ll evaluate it. Because our managers may calculate differently than us, we take their perspectives into account. No matter what we decide, our managers don’t need to be the best asset allocators—they just need to understand clients and industries well to become excellent managers. Some are great allocators; others aren’t.
如果我们的经理人也觉得有适合的对象,我们也会去审视。因为有可能我们的经理人计算的公式和我们不太一样,所以我们也会思考一下。所以不管我们决定做什么,但是有一些经理人跟我们资产配置的方式或者想法、思维也不太一样,他们不需要是配置资产方面最出色的人,他们只需要了解客户了解行业,他们可以成为很好的经理人。很多的人,有一些是好的资产配置者,有一些却不是。
This is not a great time for markets. Why? Because there are better times ahead. Charlie and I missed many opportunities—we regret missing large ones, but feel no remorse when we miss industries we didn’t understand.
现在这个时机并不好,为什么这么说?因为有比现在这个时刻更好的时机。查理和我其实也错失了非常多的机会,我们真正遗憾的就是可能错过了一些非常大的投资机会,但这些机会要是我们懂的,当我们错过一些不懂的行业的投资机会的话,我们一点不会觉得遗憾。
I won’t compare today’s market to 1999—it’s not my strength. I think the changes between 1999 and now have been enormous. I remember how things looked in 2008–2009, which wasn’t so different from 2015 or 1987. I don’t think I find such investment opportunities daily. Let me hand it over to Greg.
所以我不会想说现在跟1999年有多相似,我自己对这个也不擅长。我觉得确实,1999年到现在的剧变已经太多了,我记得2008、2009年的时候,跟2015年、1987年,可能也没有太多的区别。我并不认为我每天都可以找到这样的投资对象。格雷格来补充一下。
Greg Abel: I have nothing to add here. Let me borrow a phrase from Charlie Munger—“Nothing to add.”
格雷格·阿贝尔:我觉得在这儿没有什么可以补充的,我要学一下芒格先生的金句,“没有可补充的”。
Warren Buffett: See how many people applauded after that short sentence—you know it’s powerful.
沃伦·巴菲特:你看,突然这么短短一句话从嘴里说出来就有这么多人鼓掌,还是很棒的。
# Q26: I've come to Omaha every year since 2007. I'm deeply grateful for everything I've learned—from investing to life—and for helping me create an environment that allows for a fulfilling, healthy life. Thank you.
# Mr. Buffett, what is your favorite holding period—your decades-long investments in American Express and Coca-Cola, or something else? Recently, Berkshire increased its stake in Occidental Petroleum. Could you walk us through the decision-making process behind these investments?(问题26:我从2007年开始每年都来奥马哈,我也为我在这里所学到的一切,不管是投资,关于人生,以及打造一些环境能够让我实现一个丰富的人生、一个健康的人生,感觉非常感恩,谢谢你们。巴菲特先生,你最喜欢的持股时期是美国运通、可口可乐这几十年的持股,还是什么?最近伯克希尔好像是把西方石油这边也增仓,能不能够给我们一些例子,就是你们在做这些决定的时候思维的过程是什么样的?)
Warren Buffett: These decisions involve many factors, and cash availability is one of them—but not the only reason. I started making investment decisions at age 20. I began buying stocks in 1942. The decision-making process is quite interesting.
沃伦·巴菲特:做这些决定有非常多的因素,一方面是我们需要现金,当然这也不一定是所有的原因。我20岁的时候就开始做出多种多样的决定。我应该是1942年的时候就开始买股票,这个决定的流程、决策的过程是比较有意思的。
Charlie and I sometimes make decisions quickly. We reflect on what factors allow us to act swiftly—those factors were very visible to us. People often questioned why I put so much money into Apple. One thing Charlie and I learned is that consumer behavior matters.
查理和我有时候做决定是非常快的,我们会去思考到底是一些什么样的因素会让我们做出如此快的决策,这些因素我们都是很明显地看到了。有人会怀疑我为什么要把那么多的钱放到苹果,查理和我学到很多的一点就是,消费者的行为很重要。
For example, we couldn’t run a furniture store ourselves, but we learned from buying a chain in Omaha—quickly realizing it might be a mistake. Making that error made us smarter and improved our understanding of capital allocation. That’s how we slowly learned about consumer behavior.
比如说我们开不了一个家具店,但我们学到了当我们买一个家具连锁店,在奥马哈这边买家具连锁店,我们也会很快地意识到这可能是一个错误。但已经犯了这个错误以后会让我们更聪明,去更好地思考资产配置的过程更应该是什么样的。所以我们慢慢学会了消费者的行为。
Next came See’s Candies. We made that acquisition based on consumer behavior learning. We didn’t know how to run a candy business, nor did we understand many other things. But during that process, we learned a lot about consumer behavior—and that knowledge eventually extended to Apple products.
下一笔就是喜诗糖果的投资,我们也是通过学习消费者行为去做的收购。我们自己并不知道怎么做糖果生意,有很多东西我们都不明白。但是我们在这个过程中学习到了很多关于消费者行为的知识,而就是因为有这样的一些背景让我们不断去学习消费者的行为,这也体现到了苹果的产品上。
For instance, observing the furniture market or Apple’s product profitability, or seeing people visit Best Buy without purchasing—this kind of observation is necessary. You can see their interest in your brand and the information flow involved.
比如你买第二部iPhone电话跟你买第二部车相比,这个价格是没有办法比的。你可能买得起第二支iPhone,但是可能买不起第二辆车,第二辆车可能比你第二支iPhone贵二十倍。人们可能不会考虑这样的行为,但是我至少会去思考消费者的行为。我其实当时也不知道iPhone怎么运行,但是我至少知道它对人们的意义在哪里,他们愿意怎么使用它,这就是我对消费者行为的洞见,它是一个非常伟大的产品,也许是有史以来最伟大的一个产品,它的价值还远远被低估了,我觉得库克也是像史蒂夫·乔布斯一样出色的合作伙伴关系,他可以在公司掌舵这段时间做得非常出色,库克真的是我们非常棒的合作伙伴。
In psychology, this is called mass preference. Through this process, you gradually build up your knowledge and clarity, enabling faster decisions in cases like Apple. Of course, there are some aspects we can’t explain—some mysteries remain. But through various observations, I became clearer. When I recognized this phenomenon, I knew what it meant. At the time, I believed Apple’s stock was undervalued compared to its intrinsic value.
我觉得在心理学上这叫做大众的偏好,就是通过这样的过程你慢慢建立起了自己的知识水平,也可以让你思考更加清楚,让你可以在苹果的例子上更快地做出决策。当然,这中间还有一些没法谈到的,一些可能比较神秘的地方。但是,就是因为有这样那样的观察让我更加地清晰。当我体会到这种现象的时候,我知道它是什么。所以当时在苹果的例子上,我看到了就是觉得苹果在那个时候股票的价值低于它的实际价值。
For example, buying a second iPhone versus a second car—the pricing isn’t comparable. You might afford a second iPhone, but likely not a second car. A second car might cost twenty times more than a second iPhone. People may not consider this behavior, but I think about consumer behavior. I didn’t necessarily understand how the iPhone worked, but I understood its significance to consumers and how they used it. That insight showed me it was a great product—perhaps the greatest ever—and its value was significantly underestimated. Tim Cook has done exceptionally well, continuing Steve Jobs’ legacy.
比如说你买第二部iPhone电话跟你买第二部车相比,这个价格是没有办法比的。你可能买得起第二支iPhone,但是可能买不起第二辆车,第二辆车可能比你第二支iPhone贵二十倍。人们可能不会考虑这样的行为,但是我会去思考消费者的行为。我其实当时也不知道iPhone怎么运行,但是我至少知道它对人们的意义在哪里,他们愿意怎么使用它,这就是我对消费者行为的洞见,它是一个非常伟大的产品,也许是有史以来最伟大的一个产品,它的价值还远远被低估了,我觉得库克也是像史蒂夫·乔布斯一样出色的合作伙伴关系,他可以在公司掌舵这段时间做得非常出色,库克真的是我们非常棒的合作伙伴。
Take Geico, for example. In 1950, I bought it without full understanding until Davidson explained the auto insurance industry to me. I knew people disliked buying car insurance, but they needed it to drive. That Sunday, four hours filled all my knowledge gaps. Occasionally, we get those “aha” moments.
我在Geico的例子上也是如此。我1950年买他们的时候不知道自己看的清不清楚,但是Davidson(音)给我讲清楚了汽车保险的这个行业。我知道人们不喜欢买汽车保险,但是他们要开车的话是离不开汽车保险的,所以我心中所有的这些空白,在那个星期天的四个小时里被一一填满了。时不时我们都会有这样顿悟的时刻。
The people you meet may hold tremendous potential. Sometimes, you suddenly recognize a great investment.
你遇到的这些人都有可能是非常有潜力的人才,有时候你突然就可以做出这样的决定,这样的投资就是值得的。
We’ve talked about ideas that inspire admiration—especially when you suddenly see a business worth reinvesting in. Charlie and I shared this mindset.
我们也讲到了这些点子,或者真正让人觉得能够赞赏的这些时刻,特别是您突然觉得哪一个业务可以再进行投资。查理和我都是这样的想法。
So if you have deep experience in a particular business, you may instantly recognize its potential—like a flash of insight. Some things don’t happen overnight, but preparation helps.
所以如果说您今天对于某个业务有非常大量的经验,那么您看某些东西的时候,也许就等于是灵机一动了,突然就觉得很好了。但是某些事情不可能隔日就可以发生,可是您可以进行大量的准备。
Greg Abel: Regarding Occidental, I heard the speaker mention it earlier. You made the decision in a weekend, and now the company maintains excellent operations. Their CEO and assets are performing remarkably well.
格雷格·阿贝尔:我想刚刚听到这位发言人讲到西方石油的事情,那个时候你觉得买西方石油的时候一个周末就做了决定了。现在西方石油的位置以及它的资产,保持它现在非常棒的运作,是非凡的一些表现。另外他们有理想有能力的CEO,也保持他们的资产在非常令人满意的水平。
Warren Buffett: Exactly. What I learned was that sometimes you learn by doing. I heard about Occidental and kept studying the company and its services. I studied oil and gas businesses extensively, but sometimes I didn’t fully grasp the nuances. I stored many business insights in my mind. But later, when I met Vicky (Occidental’s CEO), we decided quickly—on a Friday or Saturday afternoon. And over time, things unfolded as expected.
沃伦·巴菲特:没错,你刚才讲的西方石油是最重要的观点。我学到最重要的事情,有时候是边学边做的。后来了解到西方石油这家公司,我就持续地对于这个公司进行研究,而且持续地了解他们的服务。我做了很多很多石油天然气上的业务研究,但是有的时候我并不是完完全全了解它们中间的一些诀窍。我有的时候心里会想到某些业务的一些观点,而且一直储存在我的心里。但是我后来真正地碰到了Vicky(音),西方石油的CEO。有一天,星期天的下午或者星期五、星期六谈完之后我们很快就做了决定。一段时间过去了,很多事情都在一一发生了。
Many outcomes today are unpredictable—we don’t always know why we made certain moves. But the idea of making such purchases develops over time.
很多时候都没有办法预测今天发生的一些结果,也不会知道我们为什么这么做。但是,融合成这种购买的想法的时候,是经过一段时间而发生的。
Sometimes, you suddenly make a decision. Many investors called me, but when Vicky presented the company and explained their vision, I got a completely new perspective. I’m very satisfied with this investment. I don’t know the current price, but I believe the outcome of this bet was strong. It was a good decision.
在某一点突然就做了这样的决定,我听到许多投资人打电话给我,但是Vicky呈现他们公司的时候,跟我解释的时候,和我在一起相谈,让我觉得有非常不同的让我想关注的想法。所以对于这场投资,我目前非常满意。我不知道他们现在的价钱怎么样,但是我感觉这个下注出来的结果是非常好的。这是一个良好的决策而得到的结果。
We now own more Occidental shares, and we’ll hold them for a long time. Some Berkshire holdings are meant for the long term.
我们现在又有更多的一些西方石油的股票,你也知道,这会有蛮久的时间要我们继续持仓的。伯克希尔公司的有些股票就是要买长期持有。
When we originally bought in, many were skeptical. As for Paramount movie studios, I take full responsibility for that investment. I must emphasize again—I made that call entirely. We lost a lot of money, which I hadn’t anticipated. Much happened in that industry. Beyond Paramount, we must look further ahead.
在我们当初买的时候很多人都是具有猜测性的,另外我现在讲到派拉蒙的电影公司,我是百分之百要对这一笔投资进行负责。所以我要强调一遍,我是百分之百做决策的人,我们损失了很多钱,这是我当初没有料到的,很多事情在这个行业中发生。除了派拉蒙之外,我们还要再往前看得更长远一些。
I want to think deeply, but sometimes I can’t. You raised these issues under normal circumstances—I may revisit them when relaxed. Entering entertainment or film and sports industries requires careful thinking. I wasn’t smart enough before, but now I’m more capable. Still, these were decisions made years ago, and reinvestment since then required new knowledge.
我想深入地考虑,但是有的时候也做不了。您刚刚讲的这些问题在我们一般的时间之内,在我放松的时候可能会再考虑一下,那个时候要加入今天的娱乐行业,或者是讲到电影和运动的行业,我还不够聪明,现在我已经足够有能力分辨了。但是这是好几年之前当初做的决定,我这个中间再投资了以后也要求取得不同的知识。
Let me clearly state—I admit we lost a lot on Paramount, and I take full personal responsibility for that decision.
我要明白地告诉大家,我承认在派拉蒙损失了不少钱,但是这件事情是我一个人要全权负责的。
# Q27: We saw in the board letter that BNSF is still declining, and compared to the other five railway companies, BNSF invests more in freight and spends more assets on infrastructure. But it's still declining. Could you explain why? Also, can you analyze your profit margins compared to these other rail companies?(问题27:我们看到董事会的信中也讲到了BNSF还是有滑落的现象,以及其他的五个铁路公司比较,BNSF更多投资到货运,花了更多的资产在建设上面。可是现在还是在滑落,所以我想请您解释一下到底是怎么回事?而且我们现在在利润率上面您可以不可以仔细跟我们分析一下,跟其他的五个铁路公司怎么进行比较?)
Warren Buffett: I understand your question, especially since Greg and I were the ones who decided on the BNSF purchase and its operations. I’ll now hand this over to Greg for a detailed explanation.
沃伦·巴菲特:我现在知道你的讲法,特别是我必须要特别解释,买BNSF,还有在进行运作,当初就是格雷格跟我做决定的。我现在把这个问题抛给格雷格解释。
Greg Abel: Warren already explained and commented. If you look at this quarter and last year’s results, there were certainly points that disappointed our shareholders. However, compared to other railway peers, we’re still doing reasonably well. When making comparisons to industry competitors, you must use the same baseline.
格雷格·阿贝尔:沃伦刚才解释过了而且也做了点评。你如果看一下这个季度,还有去年的结果,当然这中间有些观点让我们的股东非常失望。可是跟其他的同等的铁路公司来讲,我们还是差强人意的。如果您要将今天的业绩跟其他的相同行业的竞争对手来进行比较,你必须要根据相同的基础来进行判断。
Back in 2021, Burlington and our team, along with the March team, were operating effectively—completely different from today. In 2022, we discovered supply chain issues in the West and a lack of results. We called that a reset year.
如果回到2021年的时候,那个时候伯灵顿以及我们的团队,还有我们讲到的(March)团队,他们已经进行了有效的运营,那个情况是完全不同的。但在2022年,我们发现西部发生了供应链上的问题,而且缺乏现在的一些结果。所以那一年我们称之为归零的一年。
In 2023, we adjusted our cost structure and business model. We began seeing signs of improvement and expect demand to continue shifting. After the reset and cost restructuring, the team worked hard to reallocate costs and resources. We recognized that railways require demand re-evaluation. Opportunities must be seized—but would operations costs be affected? This ties directly to consumer products and industrial trends.
进入了2023年的时候,所有业务成本以及业务架构进行了相应的调整。所以,我们已经看到了好转的可能性,而且也期待这些要求量也会继续进行改变。在归零以及成本架构上的改造之后,团队也非常努力地进行工作,我们重新分配了不同的架构的成本,也重新开始寻找架构成本的资源。在那里我们也做了很多的事情。所以我们也认识到了,这些铁道公司是需要重新做需求考量的。机会来了,就必须要把握。但是是否有效?之后它的运营成本是否会影响?我想这中间也跟我们现在的这些消费者的产品,或者跟工业界整体都是有关系的。
What will happen long-term, perhaps next year or beyond? We must keep refining our approach. Also, competition comes from the trucking industry, whose cost structure allows us to remain competitive in transportation.
或者明年之后,到底长期之后会怎么样,这些都是我们必须要再进行考量的,而且要持续锻炼。同时我们的竞争对手还有卡车行业,卡车行业的成本结构也允许我们能够在做运输的时候,可以跟他们有竞争的可能性。
We must work hard to solve structural issues. We also need to catch up with other railway companies and truly understand their directions.
在这这些工作的层面之下,我们还是要必须努力想办法解决结构的问题。我们也看到其他的铁路公司,我们也必须要急起直追,真正关注他们的方向。
Additionally, how do we address challenges? How do we allocate our existing resources? Many efforts are still required.
另外我要提出一个想法,我们要怎么样解决挑战的事情。另外我们现有的一些资源要如何进行分配,这中间有很多的工作都必须要我们来努力的。
My team is fully committed to the right structure and continuously deepens its understanding of real needs and operations. But much work remains, and the team is deeply involved with strong dedication—we hope for better processes and outcomes.
我的团队百分之百都已经完全投入在正确的架构上,而且持续地在进行真正的需求以及业务上的理解。但是这中间还有很多事必须要做,团队真正加入了,而且投入了肯定是非常非常大的承诺,也希望在这里有更好的流程以及结果。
Warren Buffett: You're absolutely right—many things at Berkshire must continue to improve and accelerate. I want to emphasize—we don’t overly focus on certain details or nitpick, but there are matters where we must ask whether the company is performing well. If you do something exceptionally well—like building a tunnel in the western river district—it might be more difficult. But I can tell you, Berkshire’s attitude remains unchanged. Omaha has historically been a railroad hub, so back in the 1960s, I made some key decisions. I also knew it was quite possible even then to cross the continent coast to coast. However, building about 20,000 feet of railway from here to Missouri would be extremely difficult. Between Lincoln and Omaha, we've seen many railways, and anyone interested in financial events can truly learn about the development history of railways.
沃伦·巴菲特:你讲的没有错,在伯克希尔很多事情都必须持续进行努力,而且要加把劲。我现在要讲的就是,我们对某些事情不是非常纠结或者要抓你的小辫子,但有些事情,这个公司是不是做得很好,我们要提出很多的问题。某些事情如果你做得特别好,比如你要开凿一个隧道,在西岸,在西区的河流区,可能是比较困难的。但我可以告诉大家,伯克希尔的态度永远是不变的,在奥马哈,基本上这是一个铁路集中的城市,所以在60年代的时候,我那个时候就决定了一些结果。我也知道这是非常有可能的,所以要跨越美国大洲的所有的可能性,这中间是在1962年的时候就有这样的可能性的。但是要建立大概两万英尺的铁路,从这里到密苏里,这是非常困难的。从林肯到奥马哈,这中间我们看到了很多的铁路,而且任何人如果有兴趣的话,对于我们财务上的事件,我想你可以真正去了解一下铁路上的发展历史。
Union Pacific (UP) is our main competitor, but it was about twenty to twenty-five years behind before. Before Jamie Young arrived around 2000, we started studying railway stocks, including UP and CNO. Jamie Young’s actions were remarkable—UP offered three free different stocks. In 2009, we owned 22% of overall shares, and about $35 million in capital was significant at that time. Placing that business in the industry then included tax benefits. So owning 80% or 100% of the company was the right decision.
UP(联合太平洋铁路公司)这家公司是我们最主要的竞争对手,但是它对我们在讲的,它以前是落后了大概二十、二十五年。在Jam Young(音)来之前,2000年左右那时候我们就开始了解铁路的股票,那个时候还有联合太平洋、CNO。Jam Young做的事情非常让人瞩目,联合太平洋这家公司提供了免费的三个不同的股票。在2009年的时候,我们只占了22%的整体持股,但是这中间大概有3500万美元,对于我们那个时候来讲是一笔显著的资金,那个时候能够把这个业务放在这个行业之中,我感觉到中间有包含在税收上的一些优惠政策。所以那个时候80%以及100%拥有这个公司是对的决策。
The same capital could have gone to other railway companies, and maybe $35 million would still apply. But in those tough times, like Q3 2009, it might have been worse. So my BNSF purchase was actually a good decision. I bought it in 2008 or 2009, and today we’ve invested heavily, but at the time it felt satisfying. And from a tax-saving perspective, it was the best choice. The 100% ownership brings more benefits than 5–10%.
同样的资金如果投资在别的铁道公司,或者今天在讲的,这中间可能也要用3500万美元。但是在这种萧条的年代,比如我刚刚讲到了在2009年第三季度的时候,可能会更惨。所以实际上我买的BNSF,其实是蛮好的决策。我在2008年的时候把这个公司买下来了,或者是在2009年,今天我们放进了大量的投资资金,但是对我们来讲,那个时候其实是挺满意的。而且对于税收的节省来讲,也就是最好的抉择。这中间大概100%由我们拥有,而比可以得到大概5%到10%的拥有的方式还要更好。
I mentioned in the annual report that railways are essential to the nation—not because of their technology, but their necessity. At one point, the government nationalized them, later negotiating multiple rounds and even causing nationwide railway shutdowns. Imagine the impact of a nationwide railway shutdown. Today, building railways is nearly impossible—look at California’s high-speed rail struggles and environmental concerns for every mile built. In the U.S., such projects may take decades, even with government support.
我在年报中也提过,铁路对于整个国家来说是非常必要的。不是说它们的技术有多先进,它们的必要性就在那儿。所以政府这边,有一次把它们划为国有,曾经把它们划为国有,后来也进行了多轮的谈判,甚至也让全国的铁路停运过。你可以想想,全国铁路停运会带来多大的影响,而且现在要修铁路几乎是不可能的事情,你们看一下在加州发生了什么,他们想要建高铁,所有人都担心对环境的影响有多大。每一英里的铁路对于环境,比如对于珍惜的鸟类等等,会有什么样的影响。你可以想想,如果在美国全国做这样的事情,这个生意会有多大,可能需要几十年,政府即使把它纳为国有可能都办不下来。
Railway operations might not be the best business, but they are absolutely necessary. Their replacement value is extremely high, so we own this railway equity in the most tax-efficient way. The issue is whether other railway companies face similar challenges. We bought Union Pacific before Jamie Young passed away. Buying BNSF was also a good investment—this asset is precious to the nation. I just hope we can find more rational investment opportunities in other industries to grow faster.
它可能确实不会是最好的一项业务,但铁路绝对是一项必要的存在。它的替代价值真的是太高了,所以我们是以税收方面非常节约、非常高效的方式拥有这部分的铁路的权益。我觉得问题在于是其他的这些铁路公司,他们会不会遇到和我们一样的问题。我们在Jamie Young还活着的时候就买了太平洋联合铁路。买BNSF,对我们也是不错的投资,这对国家来说是非常珍贵的资产。我只是希望我们能够在其他的产业找到更合理的投资标的,能够利用好的时机得到更快的发展。
# Q28: Originally from Thailand, now living in New Zealand, this is my first time attending a Berkshire shareholder meeting in the U.S. I thought the journey was long, but everything was worth it. I’d like to personally thank you and the late Charlie Munger for organizing this outstanding event—and for being unparalleled role models, continuously sharing your wisdom over the years. Thank you.
# Mr. Buffett, in late 2018, you said you’d bet $1 million annually that the U.S. economy would deliver 50% annual returns. Do you still believe this? What would it take to achieve that today? Should we read Moody’s book or other references? Will you still seek fairly priced deals, or combine opportunity cost into your decision-making?(问题28:我原籍泰国,现在生活在新西兰,这是我第一次来美国参加股东大会。我觉得这个旅途很漫长,但一切都是值得的。我现在可以当面向您和已故的查理·芒格致谢,谢谢你们组织这样一场出色的活动,更重要的是你们能够成为我们无与伦比的楷模,这么多年来不断分享你们的智慧,感谢感谢。巴菲特先生,2018年底你提到过,你保证你可以每一年下了一百万美金的赌注,说年收益可以达到50%,你觉得美国的国运可以帮助你实现。现在你已经不是“Buffet”这个词了,更是精挑细选的代言。你觉得现在需要什么才能取得50%的收益?要看穆迪的书还是其他方面可以帮助到你?还是你继续会用公平的价格找合适的交易公司,还是你会把两边做一个结合,把机会成本作为你决策的关键?这就是我的问题。)
Warren Buffett: Thank you for coming all the way from New Zealand. For this question, I still refer to the two-volume Moody’s Manual. We were just talking about railways earlier—I flipped through the transportation pages in Moody’s dozens of times, covering thousands of pages. I found many interesting things when I read this at age 21. It’s hard to imagine someone in their twenties today knowing all these railway companies. There were hundreds of railway companies then, like Green Bay and Western (GBNW), which had a bond that was actually common stock. That could generate exceptional returns—but only if you had millions to invest.
沃伦·巴菲特:谢谢你从新西兰不远万里地过来。我对这个问题的答案,还是回去翻这两万页的穆迪手册。我们刚才还在讲铁路,我翻了好几次穆迪关于交通运输页的描述,这就有差不多几千页。我在里面找到好多有意思的内容。读这本书的时候我才21岁左右,现在很难想象二十几岁的人会知道这些铁路公司。当时有成百上千家的铁路公司,(GreenBay and Western)铁路公司,当时大家会给铁路公司起昵称GBNW,他们当时有一支债券,其实是普通股,普通股也是债券。这其实可以带来非常出众的结果。但是,你有几百万美元,这个结果才可能是无与伦比的。
When I first met Charlie, discussing details of this company impressed him deeply. Outsiders didn’t know what they were doing, and Charlie thought he was the only one who truly understood its value.
我第一次跟查理见面的时候,就是聊这家公司的一些细节让查理非常折服。外界根本不知道他们在做什么,查理当时以为他是唯一知道这家公司内涵的人。
As for your question, I don’t know what today’s equivalent of the Moody’s Manual is, but I believe knowledge must be accumulated step by step. If you had $1 million and achieved 50% annual returns, that would be amazing. But you can’t just chase money—you must conduct thorough research and analysis. Sometimes people find new opportunities in other industries because they’re willing to explore and seek suitable investments. Human intelligence is limitless—we all want to expand knowledge in different fields. Take chess masters—they accumulate experience through countless games.
所以回答你的这个问题,我不知道现在跟穆迪手册同样的知识手册是什么,但是我觉得我们都要从小处一点一点吸取这些知识。如果一百万美元,你有年回报50%的话,那可太棒了。你不能只是为了爱钱而去做这件事情,你必须要经过仔细的调研和分析。因为有的时候,别人会在其他行业找到新的机会,就是因为他们愿意去探索,他们想要找到合适的投资标的。因为有些时候,我们的人脑真的是有无穷的潜力。他们都希望在不同的领域能够扩大自己的知识面。比如说一个好的国际象棋大师,也是通过无数盘棋吸取了这些经验和知识。
I’m very willing to engage with smart people who excel in their fields. Some make foolish decisions in different areas, showing how complex the human mind is. But when you understand what your mind is suited for, your potential can be fully unlocked.
我是非常乐意和非常多的聪明人打交道的,他们在自己的领域都是杰出的人才。但也有一些人在不同的领域都做了非常多的愚蠢的事情。所以人脑真的非常复杂,但是当我们明白自己的大脑适合做什么事情的时候,你的潜力才能被充分地挖掘。
If I had a small amount of money and wanted 50% annual returns, you must find the right investment area. For example, if you love chess, you’ll play it. Similarly, this annual meeting is a place for learning. I’m glad you came this year and hope you return next.
如果我有一笔小钱,每年想它的年回报能够有50%,如果你没有办法找到适合你感兴趣的领域去投资的话,可能这个回报不会那么好。比如说你愿意下象棋,你喜欢下象棋,你才会去下。所以像这样一个年度的股东会也是这样,大家都是来这里学习知识,我非常高兴你今年能过来,也欢迎你明年再来。
# Q29: Munger once said that someone who owns property will manage it better. Many pension fund managers lack Berkshire’s strength and make decisions against shareholder interests. When you can’t vote against them, what actions will you take next?(问题29:芒格提过,这个人如果拥有这个产权的所有权的话,他会更好地管理它。很多养老金的资管公司并没有像伯克希尔这样的实力,而且他们所做的决策也不符合股东的权益。所以在你没有办法去投票反对他们的时候,你接下来还会对他们采取什么样的措施?)
Warren Buffett: I think this question has been largely answered. But who knows what new situations may arise? At Berkshire, we have excellent leadership, but we must deeply consider legal realities.
沃伦·巴菲特:我觉得这个问题暂时已经得到了回答。但是,谁知道未来又会出现一些什么样的情况呢?在伯克希尔我们有很好的掌舵人,但是我们必须要好好地去思考这个问题,要想一下我们现在法律上的现实是什么。
First, treat railways as national assets—this opens more solutions. If viewed as returns or other metrics, it’s a long-standing issue we must place on every director’s mind. They must break traditional thinking to address it. You don’t want to live with constant doubt. When others come to you, with so many resources, you must figure out how to use them. Whether in investment banking or other industries, this applies.
首先你要把它作为国家的资产来看待,这样的话你可以找到更多的解决方案。如果你把它作为一个回报或者其他层面来看的话,所以我想说这是一直我们放在心上思考的问题,也需要放到我们所有董事的心上。他们必须要跳脱出自己传统的思维去想一想这个问题。你不希望对生活一直抱着怀疑的态度,当别人来找你的时候,你可能有这么多的资源,你也想要搞清楚怎么样使用这些资源。所以不管他们在投行工作,在其他的行业工作,都是如此。
Life insurance brokers or investment bankers find value in different places. Imagine if everyone here followed others’ investment advice—saying 1% annual returns—and I told you how to invest. Since 1965, if someone took our advice to buy Berkshire shares, even with only 1% annual returns, they’d receive $8 billion in dividends today. Paying them a one-time commission would be the most cost-effective solution.
这些人寿保险的经纪人,或者说投资银行的这些人,他们都在不同的地方找到有价值的事情。所以试想一下,如果我们现场每一个人都去听所谓别人的投资建议,说每年1%的回报,那我告诉你怎么投你的钱,在50年代开始这个公司就告诉你怎么投,我们从1965年开始做,他们那个时候跟你说买伯克希尔的股票,现在如果他们真的听了那个建议的话,即使每年只有1%的回报,他们每年从股息这边就可以拿到80亿,所以这肯定会变得不一样,一次性就付给他们一些佣金是最划算的方式。
Human nature is complex. Reflect on Charlie’s words, and you’ll get ahead early.
人性就是如此的复杂,你如果去思考一下,想一想之前查理跟你说的那些话,你就会在一开始的时候走在很多人的前面。
Another interesting Charlie story: he deeply understood psychology’s impact on human behavior. He grasped this early and gave lectures on it. I remember he once said human psychology influences over 25 types of behavior. He explained this brilliantly—not only must you understand the psychology behind actions, but also how people mislead others. He was truly a master of human psychology.
还有一个跟查理很有趣的事情,查理很明白心理的重要性,心理学是有多么大的影响到人类的行为。他很早就悟出了这一点,他也就此做过一些讲演。我记得好像说,人类的心理会影响到25种甚至更多不同的人类的行为。而且他在解释上也做得很出色,他相信我们不仅仅要理解别人所作所为背后的心理学,而且也要知道他们为什么会用这些方法去误导别人。所以他真的是一个非常有意思的人,他真的是把人类的心理学看得透透的。
What psychological traits make a great insurance broker or investor? If you understand others’ weaknesses, you can become very wealthy. Recognizing this is crucial—you must realize you can be better than your current self. Learn to use your mind effectively.
你需要掌握什么样的心理才能成为一个很好的保险经纪人,一个投资家。你如果能够懂得别人的弱点在哪里,你真的会变得非常富有。所以要你认识到这一点是很重要的,你要理解说你比现在的自己要更出色。要学会使用、运用自己的心理。
Charlie also used psychology once or twice—he wasn’t proud of it, but he did it and benefited. He explained this to me. Once or twice, he used such techniques. He wouldn’t do it again, but it was a valid method.
查理也提过,他自己也用过一两次这样的心理学,他虽然不为此感到自豪,但是他确实用过这种方式,而且也尝到了甜头,他也向我进行过解释。确实有一两次,他用了这样的技巧。他虽然不打算再继续用下去,但这至少是一种方法。
His actions were flawed, but I can tell you that sometimes I believed my behavior was more upright, and my enthusiasm and work ethic differed afterward.
其实他那个时候做的行为是有缺失的,但是我可以告诉大家,有的时候我觉得自己的行为会比别人更端正,而且事后我的热忱和其他的工作比较还是有差别的。
We did certain things we wouldn’t do again—that’s the wisdom we gained when starting acquisitions and reading Charlie’s books like Poor Charlie’s Almanack. You must deeply consider these lessons—don’t overcomplicate them. If you’ve received clear guidance, start applying it. This book I mentioned—you can find it in libraries or bookstores.
我们做了某些事情,也许做了之后下一次就不想再做了,所以这就是我们在开始进行收购的时候使用的一些行为和智慧,以及我们现在在讨论这些书的时候,你可以在查理的书里找到一本《穷理查宝典》,你必须要深入地进行考虑,不要把事情考虑得更复杂。如果你已经得到了很多非常好的指引,您就开始真正地进行使用。这本书,我刚才跟你介绍的,你可以到图书馆或者书店找一下。
# Q30: My question is, Professor Graham—your mentor and father figure—had a huge influence on you. If you were to choose heroes today, how should we pick them?(问题30:我的问题是,格雷厄姆教授,也就是您的导师,或者您的父亲,对您都有非常大的影响。我的问题是,如果今天您要选择心目中的英雄,您觉得我们应该怎么样挑选呢?)
Warren Buffett: Thank you for your question. Many people have their own heroes—Charlie had his, and so did I. My sister did too.
沃伦·巴菲特:谢谢你的问题。这中间大概有很多的人都会有自己心目中的英雄,心目中的英雄这样的对象可能有很多。查理当初也有这样的心目中的英雄,我自己也有我崇拜的对象,我的妹妹也曾经有过这样的一些英雄。
Everyone goes through a phase of idolizing heroes—even as we age, their views may diverge from ours, or their values may be reevaluated. But this taught me more lessons. All rules that were once deployed were sometimes good, sometimes extreme. You might keep loving them, or change your view—this is what happened between Charlie and me.
我们每个人都会有崇拜英雄的经历,即便是年纪更长的时候,英雄原来的一些想法与我们会越来越相左,或者是他的价值观也是我们进行再次考量的。但是这等于说我们当初的一些想法让我学习到更多的经验。所有的一些规则在很多的规则已经开始部署的层面之下,有的时候是非常好的,但是有的时候是特别的。有的时候会持续喜爱这样的情况,但是有的时候也会改变,所以这也就是很明显的我跟查理中间也发生了一些歧见。
For example, back in Pennsylvania, Charlie and I ran away but were caught by state police. We lied, saying our parents allowed us to leave.
我举个例子,那个时候是在宾夕法尼亚州的时候,我们两个人在离家出走的时候,碰到了州警,把我们抓回去了。那个时候我们就决定跟他们撒谎说,我们的父母已经允许我们出门,我们没有离家出走。
In a few days, we returned home. But we walked a long way. When we got home, Raguer Bell’s mother was in the hospital. He wanted to cash his savings bonds. My mother asked, “You ran away and came back so soon?” My father said, “Running away wasn’t ideal—you could’ve done better.” Later, I realized—listen to my parents, and obey them more.
不管怎么样,我们在几天之后又回到自己的家。但是我们走了好长好长的一段路,进了家门的时候,Raguer Bell的母亲进了医院,他那时候说要兑现他的储蓄券。我那个时候回到华盛顿,我母亲说,你不是离家出走了,怎么一下就回来了?我父亲说,你要离家出走,可能这样做还是不够理想,你还可以做得更好是吗?后来我想,我要仔细聆听我父亲的话,还有我母亲的话,就是要更听话就是了。
Sometimes you don’t need heroes, but your achievements may not necessarily align with those you admire. My point is—if you choose the right role models, or if you earn money and live well, that’s great.
有时候你不需要有什么样的英雄,但是你的成就跟你崇拜的英雄,有时候不见得有相关性。我的意思就是说,如果你选择了正确的崇拜对象,或者你真正赚了钱,或者生活过得不错,那就很好了。
I often talked with my sister. I’ll tell you—she also ran away once, but not as far as I did. Why did she leave? She secretly stayed at our grandfather’s house for days—it was only two miles away. I won’t ruin her reputation—she was more restricted than me and didn’t run as far.
我常常跟我的妹妹一起谈话,我可以告诉你,我妹妹也曾经离家出走过,但是她走得还没有我远。她那个时候为什么要离家出走?她跑到我们祖父家偷偷住了几天,就是这样,祖父家和我们家只有两英里远。我不要破坏她的名誉,她那个时候做很多事情相比我还是有限制的,她跑得也没有我那么远。
# Q31: You and Charlie once looked for business partners, but Pilot had some disagreements during the acquisition. Did they really want to sell? The situation ended in court mediation, which was confidential and unknown to the public. Can you give any comments?(问题31:您跟查理那个时候要找出愿意一起做生意的人,但是Pilot(美国最大旅行服务中心运营商)这个中间可能对于投资的时候有些分歧,到底他们是不是要卖,当时的一些情况,最后还在法庭里进行了一些调节,我知道这是保密的,大家都不知道这件事情。您可不可以做一些点评?)
Warren Buffett: We had some doubts. Pilot was still a good company. My friend Simon Bitter once warned that certain businesses require caution. That’s why we’re in this position today. I won’t elaborate further on this confidential matter.
沃伦·巴菲特:我们那个时候产生了怀疑。Pilot对于我们来讲还是不错的,我的朋友(Simon Better)讲到有一些业务让你必须要警惕的。导致我们今天就处于现在的境地。这个问题我们就不讲了。
Let me tell you who runs Pilot. I’ve known him for a long time—he grew up in Omaha and is called Gred (phonetic). He and I grew up together, attended the same public high school, and later graduated from the University of Omaha. He was recruited by the New York Giants but got injured during spring training, ending his baseball career.
我再讲一下谁在运作Pilot这个公司好了。这个人我认识很久了,他也在奥马哈长大的,叫Gred(音)。他和我一起长大,一起上了公立高中,之后我们在奥马哈大学毕业。他被纽约巨人队给招募了,但是他后来在春季培训的时候受了伤,结束了在巨人队的棒球生涯。
He started a major company with full confidence. We felt the company was great—founded by Jim Haslon (phonetic). He wasn’t the only one in the U.S. doing this, but he truly understood the industry. My mother believed in him. Do you know he got injured during spring training with the New York Giants? I don’t think anyone else knows this—I chose him for my final example.
在那个时候,他还在开始经营一家非常大的公司,而且对自己有着十足的信心。我们那个时候觉得这个公司蛮好的,而且这个业务,当时是被Jim Haslon(音)创造的。那个时候不是唯一的在美国的这一类的公司,但是可以告诉你的就是,有些人是真正的懂这一行才开始经营这个公司的。而且我的母亲也相信他。你那个时候知不知道,在纽约巨人队的时候,他在春季开始受训的时候,在训练营受伤的事情,我不知道有没有人知道,这是我想到要讲的事情,这是我最后要选择的一个人。
I saw this man build a company with over 20,000 employees. His management results were highly satisfactory.
我看到了这件事情,他后来自己又经营了公司,而且这个公司也做得非常的大。那个时候他有多少人?大概有两万多人还是两万五千人的员工。所以他经营了很多很多的公司,他经营的结果也是非常满意的。
I had no doubt about acquiring Pilot. If you want the full story, search online. There are blogs, including his own, that I recommend. Reading his blog, you’d be amazed—this was an exceptional group. Later, we also saw a strong asset structure—800+ travel centers where you can refuel.
我那个时候对于要收购Pilot这家公司没有任何的怀疑,如果你想读这个故事的话可以到网上找一找。我想这中间还有一些博客,他自己也有博客,你看了他的博客真的是会觉得拍手叫好,你会觉得这是非常棒的一群人。当然,后来我们也看到他有一组非常棒的资产结构,他这中间有八百多个旅游中心,而且你可以选择到不同Pilot的地方加油。
Greg Abel: Pilot’s gas stations, including their truck stops, offer many choices for large trucks to refuel.
格雷格·阿贝尔:Pilot这个加油站,我们也买了它的连锁店,这些大卡车在这些加油的地点是有许多的选择性的。
Warren Buffett: And sometimes, those stations are at least one or 1.5-acre sites—larger than small stations. They’re located near interstate highways where trucks refuel. This is Pilot’s unique strength.
沃伦·巴菲特:而且有的时候它一定会有,大概至少有一英亩或者1.5英亩这么大的加油站,跟别的小型加油站不一样,而且都是在州际公路附近,大卡车可以加油的地方。这就是Pilot加油站的特点。另外我们再讲到宾夕法尼亚州,还有田纳西大学都有。而且当初都是让人觉得惊讶的,还有他们也支持了更多的橄榄球队。
Of course, there was a transition story, but ultimately, this is a gas station business. Its returns are substantial—we’re very satisfied.
当然这中间还有一些过渡的故事,现在总而言之,这就是一个加油站。他们的回报应该是非常大的,我们非常满意。
# Q32: I’m from a small town. I want to sincerely thank you for offering such insightful and unparalleled advice at this shareholder meeting—especially for young investors like me. My question is, how can we maximize compounding investments? You once said that compounding stops if held too long. Could you explain the secret behind that again?(问题32:我来自一个小城市。我现在要跟您表达我诚挚的谢意,您今天在股东大会里提供了非常诚挚的意见以及不可比拟的意见,特别是对于我们这些年轻的投资人,绝对是很有益的。我的问题是关于怎么样能够让您今天在复利或者复合投资上的(利益)最大化,您讲到了进行复合投资的时候表示,如果停留太久就会消失了,所以您现在是不是要给我们最好的建议,到底怎么样能够再把中间的秘密解释一下?)
Warren Buffett: I think luck plays a significant role in investing—this is my real view. Perhaps when you start compounding, there will be periods of bad luck. My best skill is risk avoidance or escaping misfortune.
沃伦·巴菲特:我想,通常运气也是扮演非常重要的一个部分,这是我真正的意思。也许您现在在开始做复利投资时,总有一段时间运气不好。而我现在最好的一个技能,能够规避风险或者是逃避厄运。
It’s not because I took high school courses or did certain things that I reached 93 years old. I wasn’t particularly likable at the time.
不是因为我今天上了高中的课程,或者是我曾经能够做某些事情才能够活到今天90岁的位置,在93岁的年纪,我当时不是特别让人家喜欢的。
When you’re lucky, use it to the fullest—because luck isn’t always repeatable. If I lived my life again, many choices would be different. But I couldn’t miss the opportunities we have today. Interestingly, you’ll see how many mistakes you make, especially when you keep operating. Charlie understood this too—we often discussed how luck matters. Some people say, “I did this entirely on my own,” but I think they’re delusional.
当你幸运的时候,一定要最大化地去使用,因为运气不是你时时都可以获得的。如果我再活一次,可能我的很多选择会很不一样。但是我很难错过这些现在行之有效的选择和机会。很有意思的一点是,你可以看到你犯了多少个错误,特别是你还在不断经营下去的时候。查理也知道这一点,我们也经常会聊到这一点,你要不断地走下去,运气非常重要。有些人会说,这都是我自己做到的,我觉得他真的是脑袋不清楚。
Our country’s average lifespan is very long—I feel fortunate to live in this era. My sister is here today. She was as smart as me, and our father loved us both. He told me the world had endless opportunities, but he told her, “Marry young before you get ugly.” Back then, societal expectations for women and men were very different, even though parents loved both equally. Think about 1930—this was the reality. So much has changed since then, but during my life—especially the second half—we’ve seen dramatic shifts.
现在我们这个国家人的平均寿命也非常高,我觉得在这里生活也非常幸运。我的姐姐今天也在这里。我的姐姐和我一样聪明,父亲同样爱着我们,但是跟我说的是,这个世界大有可为,对我姐姐说的是,趁年轻赶快嫁人。那个时候的社会,向女性和向男性发出的信息是非常不一样的,即使父母对大家的爱都是如此。想想1930年的时候,就是这样的现实。1930年到现在已经过了这么久的时间,好多事情都改变了。但是在我的这一生当中,或者特别是后半生的时期,发生了剧变。
When my sister went to school, she still heard comments like, “Make sure you marry before you turn ugly, even during college. All good men will be taken by graduation.” For many women like my sister, that was the social reality.
当我姐姐去上学的时候还时不时听到家里人说,一定要确保在你还没有变丑之前赶快结婚,甚至在你上学的时候结婚。因为你毕业的时候,好男人都被抢光了。所以对很多的像我姐姐这样的女性来说,那时候就是这样一个社会。
Looking at the progress we’ve made is truly extraordinary. Reflecting on how long it took to reach this point makes us think. America’s historical heroes did great things, but how could they write “all men are created equal” in the Constitution when women had no property rights and lived in worse conditions? We learned through these steps. And shouldn’t we feel better about the future—for ourselves and our children? Definitely better than a century ago.
所以看到我们取得了这么多的进步,真的是无与伦比的。而且也看一下,花了多少时间我们走到了今天。这真的让我们不断反思,美国历史上这么多英雄,他们做了这么多杰出的事情,但是他们怎么好意思说人生而平等呢?这虽然写在我们美国的宪法里,那个时候好多女性没有办法拥有房子,生活的环境也比男性差很多。但是我们就是在这样的过程中一步一步学习我们可以做些什么。而且你应该为你的未来,为你的孩子感到更好对不对?肯定比一百年前有更好的期许了。
# Q33: A question from Connecticut: Previously, you said 90% of your money would go into short-term government bonds or the S&P 500. But now tech stocks make up a quarter of the S&P. Would you still invest in the S&P but not overweight tech stocks?(问题33:来自康涅狄格州的问题,过去你讲到,90%你的钱都会放到短期的政府债券或者是标普500指数,但现在高科技的指数占到标普500的四分之一,你现在会不会把一些基金放到标普基金当中,而不是科技股占更多的基金当中?)
Warren Buffett: For the next three years, I might write in my will that my money goes to the S&P. But currently, my views haven’t changed—it’s the same as my wife’s investment philosophy. I won’t change my approach. Whether or not we beat the S&P, the money left for her would far exceed what she could spend. I don’t want people to worry about outperforming the S&P. She believed she’d achieve financial independence. These trustees won’t face lawsuits either. Our economy is very different now—99% of the money goes to charity. My kids, in their 60s and 70s, are mature. They also don’t have much time left to spend that wealth.
沃伦·巴菲特:之后的三年里面,我可能会在遗嘱里写这样的话。我现在还没有变化的一点,就跟我的妻子当时的时候一样,我觉得我的投资理念还是不会有任何改变。不管是不是打败了标普500,我想最后给她留下的钱比她能花的多很多。我不希望别人担心是不是我们能够打败标普500指数,她当时觉得自己会到达这样财务的地步。而这些托管人也不会担心受到起诉,当然我们现在的经济跟当时非常不一样,99%的钱都会进入到慈善机构。我的孩子们,他们70多岁、60多岁,已经非常成熟。同时他们也没有那么多时间花这笔财富。
You first fulfill your personal goals, not knowing what happens after death. But you want to ensure the legacy you leave benefits many people. Of course, part goes to tax—and the rest is managed by my children.
你会首先完成自己的一些目标,你也不知道你死后会发生什么,但是你想确保的一点是,你留下的这一切,希望用它们向很多的人道谢。当然,这些照顾你家人的人肯定有一部分,其中很大一部分可能也会交税。剩余的这些基金就由我的孩子们去管。
As I mentioned—if you live as long as I have, you’ll naturally distribute assets effectively. Even if I live three more years, I won’t solve all life’s problems. I’ll just do my best. I’ve outlived most people, and many wealthy individuals have different ways of managing their assets. The remaining funds can provide comfort for many. Sometimes these decisions are quite amusing—we can observe them. Lawyers often tell us when we change wills, we’ll constantly regret and rewrite.
我对现在的现状还是非常开心的,我希望能够搞清楚,找到更好的方法,把最好的资源用到该用的地方,解决全世界最需要解决的问题。现在这些钱可以用到这个世界最需要的地方。当然,我是肯定想要解决这些更重要的问题,我觉得我们在场的所有人,当然不知道外国人,外国人我没法说,但是美国人你们都需要有自己的一份遗嘱。要知道,有四位美国前总统都是在去世的时候没有自己的遗嘱。你看我们现在有了四十五位总统,试想一下,你有一天成为美国总统,没有遗嘱会是多么可怕的一件事情。
Bob Getty (phonetic), the world’s richest man at the time, had five different wills. His grandson was later kidnapped. If you live such a life, you won’t be happy. He kept revising his wills, explaining why someone wasn’t included. He often added notes in his will. His opening lines always mentioned how much Eastern Airlines was worth at the time—each heir judged him.
林肯因为是遇刺,肯定是四位没有遗嘱的总统之一。你可能会说,他根本没有机会写遗嘱。但是很难想象这么伟大的一个人在死后没有留下自己的遗嘱。我们肯定也有很多研究林肯的学者可以向我解释这个问题,我也很想收到他们给我的信。但是我想说,人就是人,人性就是如此。我们都有自己的弱点,都有缺陷,不要对自己太狠。但是也不能够完完全全地去松懈,因为你可以改变未来。
Sometimes reading other people’s wills is funny—one left his wife most of his money so at least one person would mourn his death.
有时候看别人的遗嘱是很好笑的一件事,当时有一个人把钱留给了他,在死之前把钱留给了他的妻子,就是说至少另外一个人会为他的去世感到哀悼。
I’m happy with our current situation. I hope to figure out how to deploy resources to solve the world’s most urgent problems.
我对现在的现状还是非常开心的,我希望能够搞清楚,找到更好的方法,把最好的资源用到该用的地方,解决全世界最需要解决的问题。
The money can be directed to the world’s greatest needs. Of course, I want to tackle more important issues. I believe all Americans here need to have their own wills. It’s hard to imagine four U.S. presidents died without wills. Think—if you became U.S. president and had no will, how terrible that would be.
现在这些钱可以用到这个世界最需要的地方。当然,我是肯定想要解决这些更重要的问题,我觉得我们在场的所有人,当然不知道外国人,外国人我没法说,但是美国人你们都需要有自己的遗嘱。要知道,有四位美国前总统都是在去世的时候没有自己的遗嘱。你看我们现在有了四十五位总统,试想一下,你有一天成为美国总统,没有遗嘱会是多么可怕的一件事情。
Lincoln, assassinated, was among those four presidents. You might say, he had no chance to write a will. But it’s hard to imagine such a great man dying without one. Many Lincoln scholars could explain this to me—I’d love to receive their letters.
林肯因为是遇刺,肯定是四位没有遗嘱的总统之一。你可能会说,他根本没机会写遗嘱。但是很难想象这么伟大的一个人在死后没有留下遗嘱。我们肯定也有很多研究林肯的学者可以向我解释这个问题,我也很想收到他们给我的信。
But the truth is, we’re all human. We all have weaknesses and flaws—don’t be too hard on yourself. But don’t be completely careless either, because you can shape the future.
但是我想说,人就是人,人性就是如此。我们都有自己的弱点,都有缺陷,不要对自己太狠。但是也不能够完完全全地去松懈,因为你可以改变未来。
# Q34: Good afternoon, I’m a lawyer from San Diego. I know the audience might oppose me just hearing that—Charlie Munger was a lawyer too. First, I sincerely appreciate Mr. Buffett’s integrity, his righteous business, his leadership, and his support for charity. My question to you both is, now that the AI genie is out of the bottle—as you mentioned—what Berkshire business is most at risk from AI?(问题34:下午好,我是圣地亚哥的一名律师。我知道大家听到律师肯定会反对我。要知道,芒格曾经也是律师。首先我想真诚地感谢巴菲特先生的诚信、正直的事业,你的领导力,以及对慈善事业的支持和贡献。我对在座两位的问题是,现在AI这个精灵已经被从瓶子里放了出来,您今天已经提到了这一点。那你觉得伯克希尔哪项业务在AI面前有最大的风险?)
Warren Buffett: You’re asking a great question—but I truly don’t understand AI. I think any labor-intensive industry faces AI threats. Of course, AI could create more leisure time. But now, when people talk about relaxation, they wonder when they’ll finally stop working. They want to retire, but this raises deeper issues.
沃伦·巴菲特:你这个问题问得很好,但是问题是我真的不懂AI。我觉得,任何一个劳动密集的行业都会受到AI的威胁。当然,在此层面之下可以营造更多的,比如说娱乐的时间。可是现在的问题就是,今天你要在享受或者是放松的一些时间,有些人一去工作的时候就会想说,他们到底什么时候才能够放松呢?他们当然也希望能够不工作,能够休息一下。但是实际上这中间还有更多的问题。
People see AI as deeply impactful, and I called it a genie out of the bottle. I have jokes about that genie, but let’s focus on Berkshire. We have highly capable managers and executives working with us. If we apply AI at a higher level, it could benefit society more. But if used destructively—like building atomic bombs—it becomes problematic.
人工智能大家都觉得它是有深入的层面可以进行讨论,我刚才讲到它是一个精灵,已经从瓶子里面出来了。讲到这个精灵的笑话,其实我也好几个可以和大家分享的。在讲到我们的业务以及我们的生意之中,我们中间当然有非常有才智的经理人,以及跟我们一起工作的管理人员。如果我们用这些东西是在更高层面上,可能会对社会产生更好的一些影响或者是福利。但是如果说您今天要用这个来使用原子弹或者是做一些我们觉得不太适当的议题,可能就有问题了。
Greg Abel: I think AI improves efficiency across all work, delivers better results, and reduces idle time. However, when reallocating labor, we must ensure proper distribution within businesses.
格雷格·阿贝尔:我觉得是这样,AI在这些所有的工作上来讲,都是通过更高的效率,得到更好的结果,而且通过减少这种所谓的完全停滞的时间,我就能产生利润。但是有的时候,您开始要分配所有的一些劳动力的时候,希望在业务之中还是能够适当地进行分配。
Regarding industries with heavy labor, perhaps each company must evaluate which tasks can be replaced by AI—doing them better, safely, and efficiently, like hazardous processes. But drawing conclusions is still premature.
您讲到所有的行业,有一些比较吃重的工作,或者在我们现在的层面来讲,也许就是每个公司必须要讲的,哪些工作可以用AI来取代,做得更好、更安全、更有效率,比如一些危险的流程等等。不过,这个层面要讲结论还是太早。
Warren Buffett: Exactly. These astonishing ideas definitely exist, but what happens next? We won’t have answers for a century. It’s too early to predict outcomes—whether output or speed. AI’s power is unbelievable. But not all predictions are correct. We haven’t fully grasped the final results after deployment. In reality, we don’t know if we’ve developed a bomb or something else.
沃伦·巴菲特:没错,现在这些不可思议的想法是绝对存在的,但是到底以后会发生什么事情?也需要到之后的一百年之中才能有答案。现在还是太早去进行正确的预测,每一种产量的输出,或者它的速度到底是怎么样。当然,AI力量绝对是不可思议的。但是在大家的预测,不是完全都是正确的。而且,我们在进行探讨的时候并没有真正地想出来最后的结果会是怎么样。所以实际上,我们并不知道我们现在是不是之前开发出来的是一个炸弹,还是到底是怎样的状况。
Many countries will make more choices—whether these ideas remain theoretical or become real. Google started discussing this after reading letters. Leozad and Einstein, even Roosevelt, didn’t foresee the full impact of the atomic bomb. Roosevelt and Einstein discussed the issue, but when the project began, they found it surprisingly impactful. That’s how the Manhattan Project was born. Not everything was clear, but Einstein wrote a letter explaining his concerns to the president. Still, the project moved forward.
所以我想很多国家他们也会再进行更多的选择,这些东西是不是只能纸上谈兵,我想Google也开始讲,读了这些信之后。另外再到Leozad(音)和爱因斯坦,以及罗斯福总统也讲过,以前制造原子弹的时候他们也没有想到会有怎样的发生。所以Leozad先生也没有办法想到原子弹会有怎样的结果。罗斯福总统和爱因斯坦他们那个时候也考虑到这一问题了,可是那个时候研究这个议题的时候,大家都觉得非常让人惊喜的,于是诞生了曼哈顿项目。不是所有的事情大家都了解,但是我们知道爱因斯坦也发出了一封信,能够把他的理解告诉总统,但是曼哈顿计划还是开始了。
Anyway, we’ve moved past that—let’s continue.
不管怎么说这个事情已经是过去的事了,我们继续。
# Q35: As of March 25, 2024, U.S. Treasury market size is six times larger than 2008–2009. How does today’s situation differ from 2008–2009? With such massive Treasury supply, when will the market no longer absorb them?(问题35:我们现在看到2024年3月25日,今天美国国债的市场规模已经是2008、2009年的6倍。您觉得现在的状况跟2008、2009年有怎么样的不同,如此多的美债供应,何时会无法被市场吸收?)
Warren Buffett: I’d say—perhaps with the best guess—I believe U.S. Treasuries will be accepted by the market for a long time. Because outside of Treasuries, there are no better alternatives. Considering inflation, global crisis threats, and the dollar’s reserve currency status, Treasury supply isn’t particularly large—dollars remain the world’s reserve currency.
沃伦·巴菲特:我想我会这么说——当然可能会有最好的猜测——我觉得美国国债会在很长一段时间内都被市场所接受。因为除了国债之外,没有更多更好的其他选择。考虑到通胀、威胁全球经济的危机,以及美元作为储备货币的地位等各方面因素,美国国债的规模其实并不算特别大,而且我们现在还在用美元作为准备货币。
We saw this in 1980 too. Then, we faced near-collapse crises. I spoke with Paul Volcker—he worried about inflation. But back then, millionaires felt their wealth was disintegrating. They couldn’t predict what would happen.
在1980年的时候我们也看到了这个现象。那个时候也发生了一些濒临绝境的危机,我跟保罗·沃尔克(Paul Volcker)先生谈过,他也担心那个通胀的状况。但是实际上他真正要做一些决策,那个时候的百万富翁都觉得他们的财富开始崩解了。他们真的没有办法再去预测到底会发生什么样的现象。
Paul Volcker was the one who solved the inflation crisis. But today, it’s not the absolute debt quantity threatening the system—it’s whether cash itself becomes trash.
保罗·沃尔克就是想办法解决当时通胀危机的一个人。但是现在并不是我们讲到有多少债务量造成美国现在财务系统的威胁,而是我们现在讲到现金是不是就等于垃圾了这样的状况。
Think about whether the systems we built today will impact the world’s future. Volcker easily led reforms back then. If you don’t know the history, read about it.
所以您想一想看,我们现在设立的这些系统是不是真正地会影响到全世界的未来。所以保罗·沃尔克那个时候很容易开始整顿的工作。你们不清楚这段历史的话可以去读一读。
It’s not the absolute size of U.S. debt threatening the system—it’s inflation and the dollar’s future value. I don’t fear the absolute Treasury supply, but fiscal deficits going forward. You must recognize the general situation—think carefully, don’t stay inactive, but take action. Our true intent is good, and we must focus on the right issues. Many things happen unexpectedly. And we can’t predict what the Fed will decide.
不是美国债务的绝对数量在威胁美国金融体系,而是通胀和未来美元的价值在威胁整个系统。所以我不担心美国国债供应的绝对数量有多少,而是担心财政赤字的前景。你必须要认清楚一般的状况是怎么样,仔细想一想,不要老是坐在那里不动,而是要真正开始付诸行动,再次考虑一下,我们现在真正的意图其实都是好的,而且我们也有兴趣,也希望能够关注在我们现在必须关注的事项。因为很多的事情也都会在不期而至的状况下发生。而且美联储会做出什么样的决定,我们现在也无法预知。
Powell is smart, but fiscal policy isn’t solely his decision. You must understand all aspects.
鲍威尔是一个聪明人,但是我们国家的财政政策不是由他一个人考虑或决定的。所以您必须要注意所有的事项和实际状况。
We often saw a cartoon: “Who did I offend today?” I used to find it funny. Who did I offend today? I won’t elaborate further—I hope not to offend anyone.
以前我们常常看到一个漫画,今天我到底得罪谁了?那个漫画出来的时候我常常觉得很好笑,所以到底今天得罪的人是谁?我不会再讲下去了,希望没有得罪什么人。
# Q36: I’m from Germany. This is my first time attending such a grand event. I was invited to your dinner by another friend.
# We’ve just talked about how you admire American heroes with great values. Thank you for the advice. You’ve already become a lifelong hero of great achievements. To me, learning from your investing means seizing opportunities intelligently and timing them well. Regarding your wife and kids—if you could restart your life, would you prioritize them differently? Also, why did you invite my friend to dinner—can you directly invite me next time?(问题36:我来自德国,这是我第一次参加这样的盛会,并被另外一个朋友邀请参加了您的晚宴。我们刚刚讲了,您要崇拜美国的这些英雄,而且具有伟大价值观的英雄,谢谢您的建议。您就已经是这一辈子获得极大成就的英雄,对我来说,学习到您的投资,不仅要把握机会,还要聪明地把握时间。讲到您的妻子、孩子,如果您归零重新再做一遍的话,优先性会不会有所不同?或者您为什么邀请我的朋友参加您的晚宴,您能不能直接邀请我呢?)
Warren Buffett: Inviting you isn’t my top priority—don’t feel offended. I must know how to maximize value. I could rethink many things if I restarted my life. But I wouldn’t necessarily do better. Sometimes unexpected results emerge after events happen—you can’t redo past choices. Don’t over-blame yourself for past mistakes—otherwise, you’ll live in regret.
沃伦·巴菲特:能不能邀请您不是我现在优先考虑的事情,不要觉得这是有伤害你或者得罪你的话。我必须要知道怎么样进行最大化。我可以重新再想很多的事情,如果要归零的话,我要怎么做?当然我也不完美,我自己也常有自责的情况,有的时候我还不够现实,没有对实际情况进行审视。我不知道你做了哪些事情,但是某些事情在发生了之后可能得到的一些结果觉得是不一样的,甚至是你没有预料到的。所以您没办法说把过去的事情重新再做一遍,您也不要对于自己曾经做错的事情进行过多的自责,或者您这一辈子就活在自责当中,这是不好的。
Focus on the most important things first. For example, if I were the world’s greatest doctor or worked in another field I love—delegating management to trusted people is how I achieved my financial success.
尽量能够把最重要的事情先着手进行,比如说我是最棒的医生,或者我是从事不同的行业,我非常喜欢我的工作,我把我的钱就交给我相信的人进行管理,这就是我现在拥有那么好财务良机的方式。
I feel great knowing others trust me. Managing money for others, earning their trust—this is very valuable. If I could change anything, I wouldn’t—my life has been satisfying. Even if I die tomorrow, I’d still feel the same.
所以我觉得,大家相信我是非常好的感觉。所以我能够替别人管理钱,他们相信我,我觉得是非常好的。如果要改变的话,我觉得没什么要改变的,我这一辈子已经过得让我非常满意了,我觉得非常幸运,能够在过去六七十年之中,即便我明天就走的话,我也是同样的想法。
I never take the “regret pill,” nor do I criticize my past decisions. My belief is simple: Try to identify the thing you love doing most—that’s the most important thing.
所以我从来不去吃后悔药,或者特别指责我过去做过的一些事情。我的信念就是,试着去找到您做的而且您最喜欢做的一件事情,这是最重要的事。
You can become wiser and smile while doing things. You can use your money wisely and be kinder to the world. I don’t know if becoming richer makes the world better, but many of you are already on that path.
另外还有一点,您今天可以变得更聪明,而且你是随时都可以带着微笑做一件事情,也就你可以对所有人都智慧地使用您的这些金钱,而且对我们的所有全世界都更仁慈。我不知道我变得更富有的话,这个世界会不会变得更好,但是你们中很多人已经走在这样的路上。
# Q37: On March 4, Charlie’s will was released in Los Angeles. The first clause mentioned that my life became rich through family traditions and responsibilities. I hope old practices become more popular again—carrying forward this responsibility.
# If you had to ask Berkshire shareholders to take one responsibility, what would it be? And why?(问题37:3月4日查理的遗嘱在洛杉矶公布,第一条里面写了一条很特别的一点,就是说我的人生因为有家人的传统和大家对我的责任变得非常丰富。所以我也希望以前老的实践现在能够变得更加受欢迎,也就是我们能够把这样的责任继承下去。如果你要对伯克希尔的股东做出一些责任的要求,你会对他们做什么样的要求?为什么?)
Warren Buffett: I’d say, if they’re financially struggling or not doing well, they might be like many rich people—misallocating their wealth.
沃伦·巴菲特:我想说,如果他们在财务上还有困难,做得还不够好,那可能就像很多富人一样,他们的钱没有用到对的地方。
This applies regardless of wealth. If you feel fortunate, help others gain similar luck. That’s my advice to myself, always at the forefront—reminding myself to shut up.
这个问题,不管您穷还是富,都是一样的。如果您觉得自己足够幸运,那也要帮助周围的人也能够获得这样的运气。这也是我给自己的忠告,一直放在前面,提醒自己要闭嘴。
We’ve answered around 30 questions today. Thank you to everyone who traveled so far to join us. I hope you return next year—I certainly plan to attend.
今天我们只回答了大概三十多个问题,也谢谢大家不远万里来到现场参加。希望大家明年还能来参会,我也希望自己明年还能来。
Thank you all.
谢谢大家。
Once again, thank you for coming. Buy a copy of Charlie Munger’s book if you haven’t—it will benefit you greatly. Let’s meet again next year.
再次感谢大家来参会。可以去买一本查理·芒格的书,如果还没有买的话,大家可以从中获益匪浅。争取明年再次跟大家见面。