2016巴菲特致股东的信

# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

# 致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东：

Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2016 was $27.5 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 10.7%. Over the last 52 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from $19 to $172,108, a rate of 19% compounded annually.*

2016年，伯克希尔的净资产增长了275亿美元，使得A类和B类股票每股账面价值均提升了10.7%。在过去52年中（也就是自现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值从19美元增长到了172,108美元，年复合增长率达19%。

During the first half of those years, Berkshire’s net worth was roughly equal to the number that really counts: the intrinsic value of the business. The similarity of the two figures existed then because most of our resources were deployed in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (less the tax that would be incurred if they were to be sold). In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very large part “marked to market.”

在那段时间的前半段，伯克希尔的净资产大致等于真正重要的数字：企业的内在价值。这两个数字之所以相近，是因为我们当时大部分资源都投资于可交易证券，这些证券会定期根据市场报价重新估值（扣除出售时可能产生的税款）。用华尔街的说法，我们当时的资产负债表在很大程度上是“按市价计价”的。

By the early 1990s, however, our focus was changing to the outright ownership of businesses, a shift that materially diminished the relevance of balance sheet figures. That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules (commonly referred to as “GAAP”) that apply to companies we control differ in important ways from those used to value marketable securities. Specifically, the accounting for businesses we own requires that the carrying value of “losers” be written down when their failures become apparent. “Winners,” conversely, are never revalued upwards.

然而，到了上世纪90年代初，我们的重点开始转向对企业的全面控股。这一转变大幅削弱了资产负债表数据的相关性。这种脱节出现的原因在于，适用于我们所控制公司的会计准则（通常称为“公认会计原则”或GAAP）与用于评估可交易证券的规则在关键方面有所不同。具体来说，对我们拥有的企业进行会计处理时，当表现不佳的企业出现问题变得明显时，其账面价值必须减记；而表现良好的企业却永远不会向上调整账面价值。

We’ve experienced both outcomes: As is the case in marriage, business acquisitions often deliver surprises after the “I do’s.” I’ve made some dumb purchases, paying far too much for the economic goodwill of companies we acquired. That later led to goodwill write-offs and to consequent reductions in Berkshire’s book value. We’ve also had some winners among the businesses we’ve purchased – a few of the winners very big – but have not written those up by a penny.

这两种情况我们都经历过：就像婚姻一样，在完成收购之后，商业并购往往会带来意想不到的结果。我曾做过一些愚蠢的购买决策，为收购的公司支付了过高的价格，导致后来不得不冲销商誉并进而减少伯克希尔的账面价值。我们也有一些非常成功的企业收购案例——其中少数极为成功——但我们从未因此调高它们的账面价值。

We have no quarrel with the asymmetrical accounting that applies here. But, over time, it necessarily widens the gap between Berkshire’s intrinsic value and its book value. Today, the large – and growing – unrecorded gains at our winners produce an intrinsic value for Berkshire’s shares that far exceeds their book value. The overage is truly huge in our property/casualty insurance business and significant also in many other operations.

我们并不反对这种不对称的会计处理方式。但随着时间推移，它必然会导致伯克希尔的内在价值与账面价值之间的差距扩大。如今，那些表现出色的企业所带来的大量且不断增长的未记录收益，使伯克希尔股票的内在价值远远超过了其账面价值。这种溢价在我们的财险/责任险业务中尤其巨大，在许多其他业务中也相当显著。

Over time, stock prices gravitate toward intrinsic value. That’s what has happened at Berkshire, a fact explaining why the company’s 52-year market-price gain – shown on the facing page – materially exceeds its book-value gain.

长期来看，股价会向内在价值靠拢。这正是伯克希尔的情况，这也解释了为何公司过去52年的市场价格涨幅（见下页图表）明显超过其账面价值涨幅。

(* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.)

（*本报告中所有每股数据均适用于伯克希尔A股。B股的数据为A股的1/1500。）

# What We Hope to Accomplish

# 我们希望实现的目标

Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect Berkshire’s normalized earning power per share to increase every year. Actual earnings, of course, will sometimes decline because of periodic weakness in the U.S. economy. In addition, insurance mega-catastrophes or other industry-specific events may occasionally reduce earnings at Berkshire, even when most American businesses are doing well.

查理·芒格（伯克希尔副主席兼我的合伙人）和我都期望伯克希尔每股的正常盈利能力每年都能增长。当然，实际收益有时会因美国经济周期性疲软而下降。此外，保险领域的重大灾难或其他特定行业事件也可能导致伯克希尔收益下滑，即使大多数美国企业表现良好。

It’s our job, though, to over time deliver significant growth, bumpy or not. After all, as stewards of your capital, Berkshire directors have opted to retain all earnings. Indeed, in both 2015 and 2016 Berkshire ranked first among American businesses in the dollar volume of earnings retained, in each year reinvesting many billions of dollars more than did the runner-up. Those reinvested dollars must earn their keep.

然而，我们的职责是在长期内带来显著增长，无论过程是否波折。毕竟，作为你们资本的受托人，伯克希尔的董事们选择保留全部收益。事实上，在2015年和2016年，伯克希尔在美国企业的留存收益金额上均排名第一，每年再投资的资金都远超排名第二的企业数百亿美元。这些再投资的资金必须物有所值。

Some years, the gains in underlying earning power we achieve will be minor; very occasionally, the cash register will ring loud. Charlie and I have no magic plan to add earnings except to dream big and to be prepared mentally and financially to act fast when opportunities present themselves. Every decade or so, dark clouds will fill the economic skies, and they will briefly rain gold. When downpours of that sort occur, it’s imperative that we rush outdoors carrying washtubs, not teaspoons. And that we will do.

有些年份，我们所实现的基础盈利能力的增长可能很小；但偶尔也会出现“收银机响个不停”的大好时机。查理和我并没有什么神奇的计划来增加盈利，除了大胆设想，并在机会来临时从心理和资金上做好快速行动的准备。每隔大约十年，乌云就会笼罩经济天空，并短暂地“下起黄金雨”。当这种倾盆大雨降临时，我们必须拿着洗衣盆而不是茶匙冲出去接水——而这正是我们会做的事。

I earlier described our gradual shift from a company obtaining most of its gains from investment activities to one that grows in value by owning businesses. Launching that transition, we took baby steps – making small acquisitions whose impact on Berkshire’s profits was dwarfed by our gains from marketable securities. Despite that cautious approach, I made one particularly egregious error, acquiring Dexter Shoe for $434 million in 1993. Dexter’s value promptly went to zero. The story gets worse: I used stock for the purchase, giving the sellers 25,203 shares of Berkshire that at yearend 2016 were worth more than $6 billion.

我之前曾描述过公司从主要依靠投资活动获利，向通过拥有企业实现价值增长的转变。启动这一转型时，我们采取了谨慎的小步策略——进行了一些小型收购，其对伯克希尔利润的影响远不及我们在可交易证券上的收益。尽管如此，我还是犯了一个特别严重的错误：1993年以4.34亿美元收购了Dexter鞋业。Dexter的价值很快归零。更糟的是，我用股票完成了这笔收购，给了卖方25,203股伯克希尔股票，到2016年底，这些股票价值超过60亿美元。

That wreck was followed by three key happenings – two positive, one negative – that set us firmly on our present course. At the beginning of 1996, we acquired the half of GEICO we didn’t already own, a cash transaction that changed our holding from a portfolio investment into a wholly-owned operating business. GEICO, with its almost unlimited potential, quickly became the centerpiece around which we built what I believe is now the world’s premier property/casualty business.

那次失败之后发生了三件关键事件——两个积极，一个消极——让我们坚定地走上了现在的道路。1996年初，我们收购了GEICO剩余的一半股权，这是一笔现金交易，使我们的持股从证券投资变成了全资运营企业。GEICO具有几乎无限的发展潜力，迅速成为我们构建全球领先财险/责任险业务的核心。

Unfortunately, I followed the GEICO purchase by foolishly using Berkshire stock – a boatload of stock – to buy General Reinsurance in late 1998. After some early problems, General Re has become a fine insurance operation that we prize. It was, nevertheless, a terrible mistake on my part to issue 272,200 shares of Berkshire in buying General Re, an act that increased our outstanding shares by a whopping 21.8%. My error caused Berkshire shareholders to give far more than they received (a practice that – despite the Biblical endorsement – is far from blessed when you are buying businesses).

不幸的是，在完成GEICO收购后不久，我又犯了一个愚蠢的错误：1998年底用大量伯克希尔股票收购了通用再保险公司（General Re）。虽然初期遇到了一些问题，但通用再保险如今已发展成我们非常珍视的优质保险业务。但我发行了272,200股伯克希尔股票用于收购，使流通股总数激增了21.8%，这是我犯下的严重错误。这使得伯克希尔股东付出的远大于他们得到的（尽管圣经中提到“多给的也必多取”，但在商业并购中这样做并不明智）。

Early in 2000, I atoned for that folly by buying 76% (since grown to 90%) of MidAmerican Energy, a brilliantly-managed utility business that has delivered us many large opportunities to make profitable and socially-useful investments. The MidAmerican cash purchase – I was learning – firmly launched us on our present course of (1) continuing to build our insurance operation; (2) energetically acquiring large and diversified non-insurance businesses and (3) largely making our deals from internally-generated cash. (Today, I would rather prep for a colonoscopy than issue Berkshire shares.)

2000年初，我通过收购中美能源公司（MidAmerican Energy）76%的股份（现已增至90%）弥补了之前的错误。这是一家管理卓越的公用事业公司，为我们带来了许多既盈利又有社会效益的投资机会。这次中美能源的现金收购标志着我们正式走上三条路线：（1）继续壮大保险业务；（2）积极收购大型且多元化的非保险企业；（3）主要依靠内部现金流完成交易。（现在，我宁愿去准备做肠镜检查也不愿发行伯克希尔股票。）

Our portfolio of bonds and stocks, de-emphasized though it is, has continued in the post-1998 period to grow and to deliver us hefty capital gains, interest, and dividends. Those portfolio earnings have provided us major help in financing the purchase of businesses. Though unconventional, Berkshire’s two-pronged approach to capital allocation gives us a real edge.

尽管投资组合的重要性已被弱化，但在1998年后仍持续增长，并为我们带来了可观的资本利得、利息和股息收入。这些投资收益在融资收购企业方面给予了我们巨大帮助。虽然这种方法不同寻常，但伯克希尔的双轨资本配置策略确实让我们拥有了真正的竞争优势。

Here’s our financial record since 1999, when the redirection of our business began in earnest. During the 18-year period covered, Berkshire’s outstanding shares grew by only 8.3%, with most of the increase occurring when we purchased BNSF. That, I’m happy to say, was one issuance of stock that made good sense.

以下是自1999年我们真正开始业务转型以来的财务记录。在这18年间，伯克希尔流通股仅增长了8.3%，其中大部分增长发生在我们收购BNSF铁路公司时。我很高兴地说，那次股票发行是极有意义的。

Year	Operations (1)	Capital Gains (2)
1999	0.67	0.89
2000	0.94	—
2001	(0.13)	—
2002	3.72	—
2003	5.42	—
2004	5.05	—
2005	5.00	—
2006	9.31	—
2007	9.63	—
2008	2.39	(4.65)
2009	0.92	0.49
2010	0.57	1.87
2011	2.73	(0.52)
2012	2.26	2.23
2013	3.53	4.34
2014	1.71	3.32
2015	3.58	6.73
2016	9.64	6.50

(1) Including interest and dividends from investments, but excluding capital
(2) In very large part, this tabulation includes only realized capital gains or losses. Unrealized gains and losses are also included, however, when GAAP requires that treatment.

年度	经营利润（1）	资本利得（2）
1999	0.67	0.89
2000	0.94	—
2001	(0.13)	—
2002	3.72	—
2003	5.42	—
2004	5.05	—
2005	5.00	—
2006	9.31	—
2007	9.63	—
2008	2.39	(4.65)
2009	0.92	0.49
2010	0.57	1.87
2011	2.73	(0.52)
2012	2.26	2.23
2013	3.53	4.34
2014	1.71	3.32
2015	3.58	6.73
2016	9.64	6.50

（1）包括来自投资的利息和股息，但不包括资本利得
（2）该表列示的内容主要是已实现的资本利得或损失。不过，当会计准则（GAAP）要求时，也会包含未实现的损益

Our expectation is that investment gains will continue to be substantial – though totally random as to timing – and that these will supply significant funds for business purchases. Concurrently, Berkshire’s superb corps of operating CEOs will focus on increasing earnings at the individual businesses they manage, sometimes helping them to grow by making bolt-on acquisitions. By our avoiding the issuance of Berkshire stock, any improvement in earnings will translate into equivalent per-share gains.

我们预计投资收益将继续保持可观水平——尽管它们的时间点完全随机——并将为收购企业提供重要资金来源。与此同时，伯克希尔出色的CEO团队将专注于提升各自管理企业的盈利能力，有时还会通过追加型收购帮助企业成长。由于我们避免发行新股，任何盈利的改善都将转化为每股收益的等量增长。

# What we do (我们做的事情)

Our efforts to materially increase the normalized earnings of Berkshire will be aided – as they have been throughout our managerial tenure – by America’s economic dynamism. One word sums up our country’s achievements: miraculous. From a standing start 240 years ago – a span of time less than triple my days on earth – Americans have combined human ingenuity, a market system, a tide of talented and ambitious immigrants, and the rule of law to deliver abundance beyond any dreams of our forefathers.

我们努力显著提升伯克希尔的正常盈利能力，将一如既往地受益于美国经济的活力。用一个词概括我们国家的成就：奇迹。从240年前白手起家——这段历史还不到我在世上度过的时间的三倍——美国人凭借人类的智慧、市场体系、一波又一波才华横溢且雄心勃勃的移民潮以及法治，创造出远超祖先想象的繁荣。

You need not be an economist to understand how well our system has worked. Just look around you. See the 75 million owner-occupied homes, the bountiful farmland, the 260 million vehicles, the hyper-productive factories, the great medical centers, the talent-filled universities, you name it – they all represent a net gain for Americans from the barren lands, primitive structures and meager output of 1776. Starting from scratch, America has amassed wealth totaling $90 trillion.

你不必成为经济学家也能理解我们的制度运作得多么成功。看看你身边的一切吧：7500万套自住房、富饶的农田、2.6亿辆汽车、高效运转的工厂、世界级医疗中心、人才济济的大学，等等。所有这些都代表了美国人从1776年那片贫瘠土地、简陋建筑和微薄产出中取得的净收益。从零开始，美国已积累了总计90万亿美元的财富。

It’s true, of course, that American owners of homes, autos and other assets have often borrowed heavily to finance their purchases. If an owner defaults, however, his or her asset does not disappear or lose its usefulness. Rather, ownership customarily passes to an American lending institution that then disposes of it to an American buyer. Our nation’s wealth remains intact. As Gertrude Stein put it, “Money is always there, but the pockets change.”

当然，美国的房屋、汽车和其他资产拥有者常常大量借贷来购买这些东西。但如果某位业主违约，他的资产并不会消失或失去其用途。通常情况下，所有权会转移给一家美国贷款机构，然后由该机构出售给另一位美国买家。我们国家的财富依然完整无损。正如格特鲁德·斯泰因所说：“钱一直都在，只是口袋换了。”

Above all, it’s our market system – an economic traffic cop ably directing capital, brains and labor – that has created America’s abundance. This system has also been the primary factor in allocating rewards. Governmental redirection, through federal, state and local taxation, has in addition determined the distribution of a significant portion of the bounty.

最重要的是，正是我们的市场体系——这个善于调配资本、智慧与劳动力的“经济交通警察”——创造了美国的丰裕。这一系统也是分配回报的主要机制。此外，通过联邦、州和地方税收，政府也决定了大量财富再分配的方式。

America has, for example, decided that those citizens in their productive years should help both the old and the young. Such forms of aid – sometimes enshrined as “entitlements” – are generally thought of as applying to the aged. But don’t forget that four million American babies are born each year with an entitlement to a public education. That societal commitment, largely financed at the local level, costs about $150,000 per baby. The annual cost totals more than $600 billion, which is about 31⁄2% of GDP.

例如，美国决定让处于生产年龄阶段的公民帮助老年人和儿童。这类援助有时被称为“福利权利”，人们通常将其与老年人联系在一起。但别忘了，每年有四百万名美国婴儿出生，他们都有接受公立教育的权利。这项社会承诺主要由地方政府承担经费，每名婴儿的平均成本约为15万美元，全国每年总支出超过6000亿美元，约占GDP的3.5%。

However our wealth may be divided, the mind-boggling amounts you see around you belong almost exclusively to Americans. Foreigners, of course, own or have claims on a modest portion of our wealth. Those holdings, however, are of little importance to our national balance sheet: Our citizens own assets abroad that are roughly comparable in value.

无论我们的财富如何分配，你所看到的惊人财富几乎完全属于美国人。当然，外国人持有或对我们部分财富拥有索取权，但这些资产在我们的国家资产负债表上并不重要：因为我们的公民在国外拥有的资产价值大致相当。

Early Americans, we should emphasize, were neither smarter nor more hard working than those people who toiled century after century before them. But those venturesome pioneers crafted a system that unleashed human potential, and their successors built upon it.

我们必须强调，早期的美国人既不比前几个世纪辛勤劳作的人更聪明，也不更勤奋。但那些勇敢的开拓者建立了一个释放人类潜能的制度，而他们的后继者不断加以完善。

This economic creation will deliver increasing wealth to our progeny far into the future. Yes, the build-up of wealth will be interrupted for short periods from time to time. It will not, however, be stopped. I’ll repeat what I’ve both said in the past and expect to say in future years: Babies born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.

这种经济创造将在未来很长一段时间内持续为我们的子孙带来日益增长的财富。是的，财富积累过程偶尔会被短期中断，但它不会被终止。我愿重申过去曾说过、并在未来还会反复提到的一句话：今天在美国出生的婴儿，是历史上最幸运的一代人。

# America’s Economic Achievements and Stock Market Returns (美国经济成就与股市回报)

America’s economic achievements have led to staggering profits for stockholders. During the 20th century the Dow-Jones Industrials advanced from 66 to 11,497, a 17,320% capital gain that was materially boosted by steadily increasing dividends. The trend continues: By yearend 2016, the index had advanced a further 72%, to 19,763.

美国的经济成就为股东带来了惊人的利润。在20世纪，道琼斯工业平均指数从66点上涨至11,497点，实现了17,320%的资本增值，这一收益还因持续增长的股息大幅增强。这一趋势仍在延续：到2016年底，该指数进一步上涨72%，达到19,763点。

American business – and consequently a basket of stocks – is virtually certain to be worth far more in the years ahead. Innovation, productivity gains, entrepreneurial spirit and an abundance of capital will see to that. Ever-present naysayers may prosper by marketing their gloomy forecasts. But heaven help them if they act on the nonsense they peddle.

美国企业——以及一揽子股票——在未来几年几乎肯定会价值更高。创新、生产力提升、企业家精神和充足的资本将确保这一点。那些总是唱衰的预言家或许能靠兜售悲观预测获利，但如果他们真的按自己的荒谬言论行动，天知道会怎样。

Many companies, of course, will fall behind, and some will fail. Winnowing of that sort is a product of market dynamism. Moreover, the years ahead will occasionally deliver major market declines – even panics – that will affect virtually all stocks. No one can tell you when these traumas will occur – not me, not Charlie, not economists, not the media. Meg McConnell of the New York Fed aptly described the reality of panics: “We spend a lot of time looking for systemic risk; in truth, however, it tends to find us.”

当然，许多公司会落后，甚至倒闭。这类淘汰正是市场活力的体现。此外，未来偶尔会出现大幅市场下跌——甚至是恐慌——几乎影响所有股票。没人能准确预测这些冲击何时发生：无论是我、查理、经济学家还是媒体都无法做到。纽约联储的梅格·麦康奈尔（Meg McConnell）精辟地描述了恐慌的现实：“我们花大量时间寻找系统性风险，但事实上，它往往自己找上门来。”

During such scary periods, you should never forget two things: First, widespread fear is your friend as an investor, because it serves up bargain purchases. Second, personal fear is your enemy. It will also be unwarranted. Investors who avoid high and unnecessary costs and simply sit for an extended period with a collection of large, conservatively-financed American businesses will almost certainly do well.

在这样令人恐惧的时期，你应永远记住两件事：第一，广泛的恐惧对投资者而言是朋友，因为它带来了低价买入的机会；第二，个人恐惧才是敌人，而且毫无必要。那些避开高昂且不必要的成本，长期持有由大型、稳健融资的美国企业组成的投资组合的投资者，几乎肯定会获得良好回报。

As for Berkshire, our size precludes a brilliant result: Prospective returns fall as assets increase. Nonetheless, Berkshire’s collection of good businesses, along with the company’s impregnable financial strength and owner-oriented culture, should deliver decent results. We won’t be satisfied with less.

至于伯克希尔，我们的规模限制了取得辉煌业绩的可能性：随着资产增长，预期回报率必然下降。然而，凭借优质企业的组合、坚不可摧的财务实力以及以股东为导向的文化，我们仍应能实现稳健回报。我们不会接受低于这一标准的结果。

In the investment world, discussions about share repurchases often become heated. But I’d suggest that participants in this debate take a deep breath: Assessing the desirability of repurchases isn’t that complicated.

在投资领域，关于股票回购的讨论常常引发激烈争论。但我想建议参与者们深吸一口气：判断回购是否合理其实并不复杂。

From the standpoint of exiting shareholders, repurchases are always a plus. Though the day-to-day impact of these purchases is usually minuscule, it’s always better for a seller to have an additional buyer in the market.

从退出股东的角度看，回购始终是利好。尽管日常影响通常微乎其微，但市场中多一个买家对卖家总是更有利。

For continuing shareholders, however, repurchases only make sense if the shares are bought at a price below intrinsic value. When that rule is followed, the remaining shares experience an immediate gain in intrinsic value. Consider a simple analogy: If there are three equal partners in a business worth $3,000 and one is bought out by the partnership for $900, each of the remaining partners realizes an immediate gain of $50. If the exiting partner is paid $1,100, however, the continuing partners each suffer a loss of $50. The same math applies with corporations and their shareholders. Ergo, the question of whether a repurchase action is value-enhancing or value-destroying for continuing shareholders is entirely purchase-price dependent.

但对于继续持股的股东来说，只有当回购价格低于内在价值时，回购才有意义。遵循这一原则时，剩余股份的内在价值会立即提升。设想一个简单类比：若一家价值3,000美元的企业有三位平等合伙人，其中一人以900美元被回购，其余两人各自立即获得50美元的收益；但若退出者获得1,100美元，则剩余合伙人各损失50美元。同样的数学逻辑适用于公司与股东。因此，回购对继续持股的股东是增值还是毁值，完全取决于购买价格。

It is puzzling, therefore, that corporate repurchase announcements almost never refer to a price above which repurchases will be eschewed. That certainly wouldn’t be the case if a management was buying an outside business. There, price would always factor into a buy-or-pass decision.

因此令人费解的是，公司回购公告几乎从未提及高于某一价格即停止回购。如果管理层是在收购外部企业，情况绝非如此：价格必然是买或不买决策的核心因素。

When CEOs or boards are buying a small part of their own company, though, they all too often seem oblivious to price. Would they behave similarly if they were managing a private company with just a few owners and were evaluating the wisdom of buying out one of them? Of course not.

然而，当CEO或董事会回购自家公司少量股份时，他们却常常忽视价格。如果他们管理的是一家仅少数人持股的私有公司，并需评估回购某位股东股份的合理性，他们会采取类似做法吗？当然不会。

It is important to remember that there are two occasions in which repurchases should not take place, even if the company’s shares are underpriced. One is when a business both needs all its available money to protect or expand its own operations and is also uncomfortable adding further debt. Here, the internal need for funds should take priority. This exception assumes, of course, that the business has a decent future awaiting it after the needed expenditures are made.

必须记住，即使股价被低估，也有两种情形下不应进行回购。其一是企业需要全部可用资金用于保护或扩展运营，且不愿增加更多债务。此时，内部资金需求应优先满足。当然，这一例外假设支出完成后企业仍有光明前景。

The second exception, less common, materializes when a business acquisition (or some other investment opportunity) offers far greater value than do the undervalued shares of the potential repurchaser. Long ago, Berkshire itself often had to choose between these alternatives. At our present size, the issue is far less likely to arise.

第二个例外情形较少见：当一项企业收购（或其他投资机会）的价值远超潜在回购方的低估股份时。很久以前，伯克希尔自身也常面临这类选择。但以我们目前的规模，此类问题几乎不再出现。

My suggestion: Before even discussing repurchases, a CEO and his or her Board should stand, join hands and in unison declare, “What is smart at one price is stupid at another.”

我的建议是：在讨论回购之前，CEO和董事会应站起身，手牵手齐声宣布：“某一价格下的明智之举，在另一价格下可能是愚蠢行为。”

# Berkshire’s Repurchase Policy and Insurance Operations (伯克希尔的回购政策与保险业务)

To recap Berkshire’s own repurchase policy: I am authorized to buy large amounts of Berkshire shares at 120% or less of book value because our Board has concluded that purchases at that level clearly bring an instant and material benefit to continuing shareholders. By our estimate, a 120%-of-book price is a significant discount to Berkshire’s intrinsic value, a spread that is appropriate because calculations of intrinsic value can’t be precise.

简要回顾伯克希尔的回购政策：我被授权以不超过账面价值120%的价格大量回购伯克希尔股票，因为董事会认为这一价格水平下的回购将立即为继续持股股东带来显著收益。据我们估算，120%账面价值的价格对伯克希尔的内在价值仍有显著折扣，这种价差是合理的，因为内在价值的计算无法精确。

The authorization given me does not mean that we will “prop” our stock’s price at the 120% ratio. If that level is reached, we will instead attempt to blend a desire to make meaningful purchases at a value-creating price with a related goal of not over-influencing the market.

这一授权并不意味着我们会人为维持股价在120%的水平。若股价达到该水平，我们将努力平衡“以增值价格进行有意义的回购”与“不过度干预市场”两个目标。

To date, repurchasing our shares has proved hard to do. That may well be because we have been clear in describing our repurchase policy and thereby have signaled our view that Berkshire’s intrinsic value is significantly higher than 120% of book value. If so, that’s fine. Charlie and I prefer to see Berkshire shares sell in a fairly narrow range around intrinsic value, neither wishing them to sell at an unwarranted high price – it’s no fun having owners who are disappointed with their purchases – nor one too low. Furthermore, our buying out “partners” at a discount is not a particularly gratifying way of making money. Still, market circumstances could create a situation in which repurchases would benefit both continuing and exiting shareholders. If so, we will be ready to act.

迄今为止，回购我们的股票一直困难。这或许是因为我们明确阐述了回购政策，从而向市场传递了“伯克希尔内在价值远高于账面价值120%”的信号。如果是这样，那就再好不过。查理和我都希望伯克希尔股价围绕内在价值在一个较窄区间波动，既不希望它因过高定价而让股东失望，也不愿看到它被低估。此外，以折扣价“买断”股东股份并非我们特别愿意依赖的获利方式。然而，市场环境可能会出现回购同时有利于继续持股和退出股东的情况，届时我们将做好准备。

# Insurance (保险业务)

Let’s now look at Berkshire’s various businesses, starting with our most important sector, insurance. The property/casualty (“P/C”) branch of that industry has been the engine that has propelled our growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property/casualty company in the world as measured by net worth.

让我们来看看伯克希尔的各项业务，从最重要的保险业开始。自1967年我们以860万美元收购National Indemnity及其姊妹公司National Fire & Marine以来，财产/意外险（P/C）板块一直是推动我们增长的引擎。如今，National Indemnity以净资产衡量，已成为全球最大的财产/意外险公司。

One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:

我们被P/C业务吸引的原因之一是其财务特性：保险公司先收取保费，之后才支付理赔。极端情况下（如石棉暴露引发的索赔），赔付可能持续数十年。这种“先收后付”模式使P/C公司持有大量最终需支付给他人资金——我们称之为“浮存金”。与此同时，保险公司可利用这部分浮存金进行投资。尽管单个保单和理赔不断变化，浮存金规模通常与保费规模保持稳定比例。因此，随着业务扩张，我们的浮存金也同步增长。以下表格展示了其增长情况：

Year	Float (in millions)
1970	$39
1980	$237
1990	$1,632
2000	$27,871
2010	$65,832
2016	$91,577

年度	浮存金（百万美元）
1970	39
1980	237
1990	1,632
2000	27,871
2010	65,832
2016	91,577

We recently wrote a boost, float at GEICO and several of our specialized operations is almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of large run-off contracts whose float is certain to drift downward.

我们近期撰文指出，GEICO及部分专业业务的浮存金几乎肯定会快速增长。然而，National Indemnity的再保险部门参与了多项大型到期合约，这些合约的浮存金将逐步减少。

We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. This structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. It will never be compromised.

未来我们可能会经历浮存金的下降。若发生这种情况，降幅也将非常缓慢——每年最多不超过3%。我们保险合约的性质决定了我们永远不会面临对现金流构成重大压力的短期偿付要求。这种结构是刻意设计的，是我们保险公司无与伦比财务实力的关键组成部分。这一原则绝不会妥协。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

若我们的保费收入超过费用和最终赔付总额，保险业务将实现承保利润，这一利润叠加浮存金的投资收益。当实现承保利润时，我们相当于免费使用资金——更妙的是，我们还能因持有这些资金而获得报酬。

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses.

遗憾的是，所有保险公司都渴望实现这一理想结果，导致竞争异常激烈，甚至使整个P/C行业整体出现承保亏损。这种亏损实质上是行业为持有浮存金所支付的成本。竞争格局几乎可以确定，尽管保险公司享有浮存金收益，但保险业在有形净资产回报率方面仍将长期落后于其他美国企业。

# Berkshire’s Repurchase Policy and Insurance Operations (伯克希尔的回购政策与保险业务)

# Insurance (保险业务)

Year	Float (in millions)
1970	$39
1980	$237
1990	$1,632
2000	$27,871
2010	$65,832
2016	$91,577

年度	浮存金（百万美元）
1970	39
1980	237
1990	1,632
2000	27,871
2010	65,832
2016	91,577

# This Outcome and Berkshire’s Insurance Prospects (这一结果与伯克希尔的保险前景)

This outcome is made more certain by the dramatically lower interest rates that now exist throughout the world. The investment portfolios of almost all P/C companies – though not those of Berkshire – are heavily concentrated in bonds. As these high-yielding legacy investments mature and are replaced by bonds yielding a pittance, earnings from float will steadily fall. For that reason, and others as well, it’s a good bet that industry results over the next ten years will fall short of those recorded in the past decade, particularly in the case of companies that specialize in reinsurance.

这一趋势因全球利率大幅下降而愈发确定。几乎所有P/C公司的投资组合（伯克希尔除外）都高度集中在债券领域。随着高收益的旧有投资到期并被低收益债券取代，浮存金带来的收益将稳步下滑。因此，未来十年行业整体表现很可能不及过去十年，尤其是专注于再保险的公司。

Nevertheless, I very much like our own prospects. Berkshire’s unrivaled financial strength allows us far more flexibility in investing than that generally available to P/C companies. The many alternatives available to us are always an advantage; occasionally, they offer us major opportunities. When others are constrained, our choices expand.

然而，我对伯克希尔自身的前景充满信心。我们无与伦比的财务实力赋予了我们在投资上的更大灵活性——远超P/C行业的普遍水平。我们拥有的多元选择始终是优势所在，有时甚至能带来重大机遇。当其他公司受限时，我们的选择空间反而扩大。

Our P/C companies have an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 14 consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $28 billion. That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.

我们的P/C公司拥有卓越的承保记录。伯克希尔已连续14年实现承保利润，期间税前收益累计达280亿美元。这一成就并非偶然：所有保险经理人每日的核心任务都是严谨的风险评估。他们深知，尽管浮存金价值显著，但糟糕的承保决策足以吞噬其收益。其他保险公司对此仅停留在口头承诺，而在伯克希尔，这是一套如《旧约》般严苛的信仰体系。

# Float and Intrinsic Value (浮存金与内在价值)

So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as a typical liability is a major mistake. It should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses – a huge $27 billion to more than six million claimants in 2016 – and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business that will soon generate its own claims, adding to float.

我们的浮存金如何影响内在价值？计算伯克希尔账面价值时，浮存金被全额列为负债，仿佛我们必须次日偿付且无法补充。但将浮存金视为普通负债是重大误解。它应被视作循环基金：我们每日支付旧索赔及费用（2016年向超600万索赔者支付270亿美元），从而减少浮存金；同时每日新增保单产生未来索赔，又会增加浮存金。

If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing $1 that in effect will never leave the premises – because new business is almost certain to deliver a substitute – is worlds different from owing $1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities, however, are treated as equals under GAAP.

若我们的循环浮存金既是无成本又能长期持续（我相信正是如此），其真实负债价值将远低于会计负债。欠下1美元但因新业务几乎必然产生替代资金而无需实际流出，与次日必须偿付且无法补充的1美元，本质截然不同。但根据会计准则（GAAP），这两类负债被等同视之。

A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that is included in our book-value figure. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

这一高估负债的部分被一项155亿美元的“商誉”资产抵消——这是我们收购保险公司时产生的，已计入账面价值。其中大部分商誉实质上是我们为保险业务浮存金生成能力支付的价格。但商誉成本与其真实价值无关：若某保险公司长期承受重大承保亏损，无论其原始成本多少，账面商誉应视为零。

Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Indeed, almost the entire $15.5 billion we carry for goodwill in our insurance business was already on our books in 2000 when float was $28 billion. Yet we have subsequently increased our float by $64 billion, a gain that in no way is reflected in our book value. This unrecorded asset is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value far exceeds its book value.

幸运的是，伯克希尔并非如此。查理和我认为，我们的保险商誉真实经济价值——即我们愿为拥有类似浮存金质量的保险公司支付的价格——远超其历史账面价值。事实上，截至2000年浮存金为280亿美元时，我们保险业务的155亿美元商誉已全部入账。此后我们浮存金又增长了640亿美元，但这一增值完全未反映在账面价值中。这种未记录资产正是我们坚信伯克希尔内在价值远超账面价值的关键原因之一。

# Berkshire’s Insurance Managers (伯克希尔的保险管理团队)

Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that in most cases possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.

伯克希尔卓越的保险经济效应仅因我们拥有一批卓越的管理团队，他们在多数情况下运营着难以复制的商业模式。让我为您介绍主要单位。

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.

按浮存金规模排名首位的是由阿吉特·杰恩（Ajit Jain）管理的伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险集团。阿吉特承保的是其他公司既无意愿也无资本承担的风险。他的业务模式融合了承保能力、速度、决断力，最重要的是智慧，在保险业独树一帜。但他从不让伯克希尔承担与其资源不匹配的风险。

Indeed, Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a large profit for the year. Our many streams of non-insurance earnings would see to that. Additionally, we would remain awash in cash and be eager to write business in an insurance market that might well be in disarray. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be swimming in red ink, if not facing insolvency.

事实上，伯克希尔在风险规避上的保守程度远超多数大型保险公司。例如，若保险业因超级灾难遭受2500亿美元损失（约为历史最高损失的三倍），伯克希尔整体仍可能录得巨额年度利润。这得益于我们多元化的非保险收入。此外，我们将保持充裕现金流，随时准备在混乱的保险市场中开展业务。而其他主要保险公司和再保公司则可能深陷赤字泥潭，甚至面临破产。

When Ajit entered Berkshire’s office on a Saturday in 1986, he did not have a day’s experience in the insurance business. Nevertheless, Mike Goldberg, then our manager of insurance, handed him the keys to our small and struggling reinsurance business. With that move, Mike achieved sainthood: Since then, Ajit has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire shareholders. If there were ever to be another Ajit and you could swap me for him, don’t hesitate. Make the trade!

1986年周六踏入伯克希尔办公室时，阿吉特对保险业毫无经验。然而，当时的保险业务主管迈克·戈德堡将我们当时规模小且陷入困境的再保险业务交给他全权负责。这一决定让迈克堪比圣人：此后阿吉特为伯克希尔股东创造了数千亿美元价值。如果有另一个阿吉特可用，并能以我换取他，千万别犹豫——这笔交易绝对划算！

# General Re and Its Leadership Transition (通用再保险及其领导层更替)

We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed until recently by Tad Montross. After 39 years at General Re, Tad retired in 2016. Tad was a class act in every way and we owe him a ton of thanks. Kara Raiguel, who has worked with Ajit for 16 years, is now CEO of General Re.

我们在通用再保险（General Re）拥有另一家再保险巨头，此前由泰德·蒙特罗斯（Tad Montross）管理。在通用再保险工作39年后，泰德于2016年退休。泰德在各方面都堪称典范，我们对他深表感激。与阿吉特共事16年的卡拉·雷吉尔（Kara Raiguel）现已成为通用再保险的首席执行官。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance. Tad never listened to that nonsensical excuse for sloppy underwriting, and neither will Kara.

许多保险公司通过了前三项原则，却在第四项上失败：他们无法拒绝竞争对手热衷承保的业务。“别人这么做，我们也要跟上”的老调重弹，在任何行业都意味着麻烦，而在保险业尤为致命。泰德从未将这种草率承保的借口当回事，卡拉也不会。

# GEICO: A Legacy of Growth and Innovation (GEICO：增长与创新的传奇)

Finally, there is GEICO, the company that set my heart afire 66 years ago (and for which the flame still burns). GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 55 years of service in 2016.

最后要提的是GEICO，这家公司在我66年前首次接触时便令我热血沸腾（至今热情未减）。GEICO由托尼·尼利（Tony Nicely）管理，他18岁加入公司，在2016年完成了55年的工作生涯。

Tony became CEO of GEICO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony, who brings his combination of brilliance, dedication and soundness to the job. (The latter quality is essential to sustained success. As Charlie says, it’s great to have a manager with a 160 IQ – unless he thinks it’s 180.) Like Ajit, Tony has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire.

托尼自1993年担任GEICO首席执行官以来，公司便一路腾飞。托尼的卓越管理能力、奉献精神与稳健作风无人能及（后者对持续成功至关重要。正如查理所说，拥有160智商的经理人很棒，除非他自己以为是180）。与阿吉特一样，托尼也为伯克希尔创造了数千亿美元的价值。

On my initial visit to GEICO in 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed over the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed. The company’s annual sales were then $8 million; In 2016, GEICO did that much business every three hours of the year.

1951年我初次造访GEICO时，便被其远超行业巨头的成本优势震撼。我清楚地意识到，GEICO的成功是必然的——因为它理应成功。当时公司年销售额为800万美元；到2016年，GEICO每三小时便能完成同等规模的业务量。

Auto insurance is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them – and only a low-cost operation can deliver those. In fact, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading – right now! – and go to geico.com or call 800-847-7536.

汽车保险是大多数家庭的重要支出。节省费用对他们至关重要——只有低成本运营才能实现这一点。事实上，至少40%的本信读者可通过选择GEICO节省保费。所以，别再读了——立刻行动！访问geico.com或致电800-847-7536。

# GEICO’s Enduring Competitive Advantage (GEICO持久的竞争优势)

GEICO’s low costs create a moat – an enduring one – that competitors are unable to cross. As a result, the company gobbles up market share year after year, ending 2016 with about 12% of industry volume. That’s up from 2.5% in 1995, the year Berkshire acquired control of GEICO. Employment, meanwhile, grew from 8,575 to 36,085.

GEICO的低成本构筑了一道持久的护城河，竞争对手难以跨越。结果便是公司年复一年地抢占市场份额，2016年市场占有率已达约12%（1995年伯克希尔收购GEICO时仅为2.5%）。员工人数也从8,575人增长至36,085人。

GEICO’s growth accelerated dramatically during the second half of 2016. Loss costs throughout the auto-insurance industry had been increasing at an unexpected pace and some competitors lost their enthusiasm for taking on new customers. GEICO’s reaction to the profit squeeze, however, was to accelerate its new-business efforts. We like to make hay while the sun sets, knowing that it will surely rise again.

GEICO在2016年下半年的增长显著加速。整个汽车保险行业的赔付成本以出乎意料的速度上升，部分竞争对手对新增客户失去热情。然而，GEICO面对盈利压力的应对策略是加快新业务拓展。我们习惯在日落时收割利润，因为我们知道太阳终将升起。

GEICO continues on a roll as I send you this letter. When insurance prices increase, people shop more. And when they shop, GEICO wins.
Have you called yet? (800-847-7536 or go to geico.com)

当我撰写此信时，GEICO仍在持续高歌猛进。当保险价格上涨时，人们会更积极比价。而当他们比价时，GEICO总能胜出。
您打电话了吗？（800-847-7536 或访问 geico.com）

# Other Insurance Operations and Regulated Businesses (其他保险业务与受监管企业)

In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a collection of smaller companies that primarily write commercial coverages. In aggregate, these companies are a large, growing and valuable operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit, usually one much superior to that reported by their competitors. Over the past 14 years, this group has earned $4.7 billion from underwriting – about 13% of its premium volume – while increasing its float from $943 million to $11.6 billion.

除三大保险业务外，我们还拥有一系列规模较小、主要承保商业保险的公司。整体来看，这些公司构成了一项规模庞大、持续增长且价值显著的业务，常年实现承保利润，且通常远超同行水平。过去14年，该业务群累计承保利润达47亿美元（约占保费收入的13%），浮存金规模则从9.43亿美元增至116亿美元。

Less than three years ago, we formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”), which is included in this grouping. Our first decision was to put Peter Eastwood in charge, a move that proved to be a home run: We expected significant losses in the early years while Peter built the personnel and infrastructure needed for a world-wide operation. Instead, he and his crew delivered significant underwriting profits throughout the start-up period. BHSI’s volume increased 40% in 2016, reaching $1.3 billion. It’s clear to me that the company is destined to become one of the world’s leading P/C insurers.

不到三年前，我们成立了伯克希尔哈撒韦专业保险公司（BHSI），并将其纳入此业务群。我们最初决定由彼得·伊斯伍德（Peter Eastwood）领导——这一决策堪称制胜之举：我们原预计他在构建全球运营所需的人才和基础设施期间会出现初期亏损，但事实是他和他的团队在整个初创期均实现了显著承保利润。2016年，BHSI业务量增长40%，达到13亿美元。我确信这家公司将成为全球领先的P/C保险公司之一。

Here’s a recap of pre-tax underwriting earnings and float by division:
Underwriting Profit Yearend Float 2016
Insurance Operations
BH Reinsurance .................................... General Re ........................................... GEICO ................................................ Other Primary .......................................
2016 | 2015
$ 822 | $ 421
190 | 132
462 | 460
657 | 824
$2,131 | $1,837
$
$
45,081 | 44,108
17,699 | 18,560
17,148 | 15,148
11,649 | 9,906
$ 91,577 | $ 87,722
(in millions)

以下是各保险部门税前承保利润与年末浮存金汇总：

承保利润	年末浮存金（百万美元）
2016	2015
BH再保险	822
通用再保险	190
GEICO	462
其他主营	657
总计	2,131

Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a range of business models protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that time will only make more valuable.

伯克希尔卓越的管理团队、顶级财务实力以及由宽护城河保护的多元商业模式，在保险业中独一无二。这一实力组合是伯克希尔股东的重要资产，且随着时间推移将愈发珍贵。

# Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses (受监管的资本密集型企业)

Our BNSF railroad and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”), our 90%-owned utility business, share important characteristics that distinguish them from Berkshire’s other activities. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement. These two very major companies accounted for 33% of Berkshire’s after-tax operating earnings last year.

我们的BNSF铁路公司和控股90%的公用事业企业伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）具备区别于伯克希尔其他业务的重要特征。因此，我们在年报中为它们单独设立章节，并在GAAP资产负债表和利润表中单独列示其合并财务数据。这两家大型企业贡献了伯克希尔去年33%的税后运营利润。

A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 6:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as seriously flawed.)

这两家公司的核心特征是对长期受监管资产进行巨额投资，部分资金来自无需伯克希尔担保的长期债务。事实上，我们的信用背书并不必要，因为两家公司盈利能力强劲，在极端经济环境下仍远超利息支出。例如，2016年铁路行业表现低迷，但BNSF的利息保障倍数仍超过6:1（我们的定义是息税前利润与利息之比，而非普遍使用的EBITDA/利息，我们认为后者存在严重缺陷）。

At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service for which demand is remarkably steady. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: an ever-widening diversity of earnings streams, which shield BHE from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. These many sources of profit, supplemented by the inherent advantage of the company being owned by a strong parent, have allowed BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. That economic fact benefits both us and our customers.

BHE方面，两个因素确保其在任何情况下都能偿付债务。第一点是公用事业共性：提供需求稳定的必需服务带来的抗衰退盈利能力。第二点则鲜少同业具备：收入来源日益多元化，使BHE免受单一监管机构重大影响。这些多元利润来源，叠加母公司雄厚背景的天然优势，使BHE及其公用事业子公司大幅降低债务成本。这一经济现实同时惠及我们自身与客户。

All told, BHE and BNSF invested $8.9 billion in plant and equipment last year, a massive commitment to their segments of America’s infrastructure. We relish making such investments as long as they promise reasonable returns – and, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.

总计，BHE与BNSF去年在厂房设备上投入89亿美元，为美国基础设施建设作出重大承诺。我们乐于进行此类投资，只要它们能带来合理回报——而在此前提下，我们对未来的监管环境抱有充分信心。

# Confidence in Regulated Investments and Environmental Stewardship (对受监管投资的信心与环保责任)

Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need huge investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is concomitantly in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.

我们的信心既源于过往经验，也基于对社会永远需要交通与能源巨额投资的认知。政府有责任以保障资本持续流向关键项目的模式对待投资者；相应地，我们也有责任以赢得监管机构及公众支持的方式运营。

Low prices are a powerful way to keep these constituencies happy. In Iowa, BHE’s average retail rate is 7.1¢ per KWH. Alliant, the other major electric utility in the state, averages 9.9¢. Here are the comparable industry figures for adjacent states: Nebraska 9.0¢, Missouri 9.5¢, Illinois 9.2¢, Minnesota 10.0¢. The national average is 10.3¢. We have promised Iowans that our base rates will not increase until 2029 at the earliest. Our rock-bottom prices add up to real money for paycheck-strapped customers.

低价是维系这些利益相关者满意的关键。在爱荷华州，BHE的平均零售电价为每千瓦时7.1美分，而该州另一大电力公司Alliant的均价为9.9美分。邻近州的行业数据分别为：内布拉斯加9.0美分、密苏里9.5美分、伊利诺伊9.2美分、明尼苏达10.0美分，全国均价为10.3美分。我们已承诺爱荷华人至少到2029年基本电价不会上涨。对于收入拮据的家庭，我们的超低电价意味着实实在在的节省。

At BNSF, price comparisons between major railroads are far more difficult to make because of significant differences in both their mix of cargo and the average distance the load is carried. To supply a very crude measure, however, our revenue per ton-mile was 3¢ last year, while shipping costs for customers of the other four major U.S.-based railroads ranged from 4¢ to 5¢.

由于各铁路公司货物类型和平均运输距离差异显著，BNSF与其他主要铁路的价格对比极为复杂。若粗略衡量，我们去年每吨英里的收入为3美分，而其他四家美国主要铁路客户支付的运费介于4至5美分之间。

Both BHE and BNSF have been leaders in pursuing planet-friendly technology. In wind generation, no state comes close to rivaling Iowa, where last year the megawatt-hours we generated from wind equaled 55% of all megawatt-hours sold to our Iowa retail customers. New wind projects that are underway will take that figure to 89% by 2020.

BHE与BNSF均在环保技术研发上领先。在风电领域，无一州能匹敌爱荷华：去年我们风力发电量占向该州零售客户售电总量的55%。正在推进的新风电项目将使这一比例于2020年提升至89%。

# Economic and Environmental Impact (经济与环境效益)

Bargain-basement electric rates carry second-order benefits with them. Iowa has attracted large high-tech installations, both because of its low prices for electricity (which data centers use in huge quantities) and because most tech CEOs are enthusiastic about using renewable energy. When it comes to wind energy, Iowa is the Saudi Arabia of America.

超低电价带来了深远的附加效益。爱荷华吸引了大量高科技企业落户，既因其低廉电价（数据中心用电量巨大），也因多数科技公司CEO热衷使用可再生能源。在风电领域，爱荷华堪称美国的“沙特阿拉伯”。

BNSF, like other Class I railroads, uses only a single gallon of diesel fuel to move a ton of freight almost 500 miles. Those economics make railroads four times as fuel-efficient as trucks! Furthermore, railroads alleviate highway congestion – and the taxpayer-funded maintenance expenditures that come with heavier traffic – in a major way.

BNSF与一级铁路公司一样，仅用1加仑柴油即可运送1吨货物近500英里。这一效率使铁路燃油经济性达卡车的四倍！此外，铁路大幅缓解了公路拥堵及由此带来的高额纳税人维护支出。

# Financial Overview of BHE and BNSF (BHE与BNSF财务概览)

All told, BHE and BNSF own assets that are of major importance to our country as well as to shareholders of Berkshire. Here are the key financial figures for both:

总体而言，BHE与BNSF的资产对国家及伯克希尔股东均具有重大意义。以下是两家公司关键财务数据：

# BNSF Railway

Earnings (in millions)	2016	2015	2014
Revenues	$19,829	$21,967	$23,239
Operating expenses	13,144	14,264	16,237
Operating earnings before interest and taxes	6,685	7,703	7,002
Interest (net)	992	928	833
Income taxes	2,124	2,527	2,300
Net earnings	$3,569	$4,248	$3,869

# 伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（90%控股）

部门	2016（百万美元）	2015	2014
英国公用事业	367	460	527
爱荷华公用事业	392	292	270
内华达公用事业	559	586	549
PacifiCorp（主要覆盖俄勒冈与犹他）	1,105	1,026	1,010
天然气管道（北方天然气与凯恩河）	413	401	379
加拿大输电公司	147	170	16
可再生能源项目	157	175	194
HomeServices	225	191	139
其他（净额）	73	49	54
公司整体税息前利润	$3,438	$3,350	$3,138
利息支出	465	499	427
所得税	431	481	616
净利润	$2,542	$2,370	$2,095
归属于伯克希尔收益	$2,287	$2,132	$1,882

HomeServices may appear out of place in the above table. But it came with our purchase of MidAmerican (now BHE) in 1999 – and we are lucky that it did.
HomeServices owns 38 realty companies with more than 29,000 agents who operate in 28 states. Last year it purchased four realtors, including Houlihan Lawrence, the leader in New York’s Westchester County (in a transaction that closed shortly after yearend).
In real estate parlance, representing either a buyer or a seller is called a “side,” with the representation of both counting as two sides. Last year, our owned realtors participated in 244,000 sides, totaling $86 billion in volume.
HomeServices also franchises many operations throughout the country that use our name. We like both aspects of the real estate business and expect to acquire many realtors and franchisees during the next decade.

上述表格中HomeServices看似突兀，但它是1999年收购中美能源（现BHE）时附带的业务——我们为此感到幸运。
HomeServices旗下拥有38家房地产公司，28个州内超过29,000名代理。去年收购了四家地产商，包括纽约威彻斯特县领先的Houlihan Lawrence公司（交易于年末后完成）。
在房地产术语中，代表买方或卖方各称为“一边”，同时代表双方则计为两边。去年，我们的地产公司参与了244,000边交易，总成交额达860亿美元。
HomeServices还在全国特许经营多家使用伯克希尔品牌的地产公司。我们看好房地产业务的双重模式，预计未来十年将收购更多地产商与特许加盟商。

# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations (制造、服务与零售业务)

Our manufacturing, service and retailing operations sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

我们的制造、服务与零售业务销售从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机的各种产品。以下为该业务群的合并资产负债表和利润表概览：

# Balance Sheet 截至2016年12月31日（单位：百万美元）

资产（Assets）
Cash and equivalents （现金及等价物）........................... $ 2,054
Accounts and notes receivable （应收账款及票据）.............. 12,464
Inventory （存货）.......................................... 14,518
Other current assets （其他流动资产）......................... 12,044
Total current assets （流动资产总额） ..................... 36,022
Goodwill and other intangibles （商誉及其他无形资产）.............. 71,473
Fixed assets （固定资产）....................................... 18,915
Other assets （其他资产） ....................................... 3,183
总资产（Total assets） ...................................... $129,593

负债及权益（Liabilities and Equity）
Notes payable （应付票据）................................ $ —
Other current liabilities （其他流动负债）.................... 4,468
Total current liabilities （流动负债总额）.................. 4,468
Deferred taxes （递延税项）................................ 5,631
Term debt and other liabilities （长期债务及其他负债）........... 8,073
Non-controlling interests （非控股股东权益）.................. 214
伯克希尔股权（Berkshire equity） .......................... 103,397
总负债及权益（Total liabilities and equity） ............... $129,593

# Earnings Statement 2016年利润表（单位：百万美元）

Revenues （收入） ................................................................ $120,059
Operating expenses （运营费用）................................................... 111,383
Interest expense （利息支出）........................................................ 214
息税前收益（Pre-tax earnings） ....................................................... 8,462
Income taxes and non-controlling interests （所得税及非控股股东权益）.................... 2,831
净利润（Net earnings） ............................................................ $ 5,631

Included in this financial summary are 44 businesses that report directly to headquarters. But some of these companies, in turn, have many individual operations under their umbrella. For example, Marmon has 175 separate business units, serving widely disparate markets, and Berkshire Hathaway Automotive owns 83 dealerships, operating in nine states.

本财务摘要涵盖44家直接向总部汇报的公司。其中部分企业旗下又包含多个独立运营单元。例如，Marmon拥有175个业务单元，服务于高度差异化的市场；伯克希尔汽车集团拥有83家经销商，在九个州开展业务。

This collection of businesses is truly a motley crew. Some operations, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific returns that, in a couple of instances, exceed 100%. Most are solid businesses generating good returns in the area of 12% to 20%.

这一业务组合堪称多元化。部分企业以无杠杆净资产收益率衡量，回报率极高，个别甚至超过100%。多数为稳健企业，年回报率在12%-20%区间。

A few, however – these are serious blunders I made in my job of capital allocation – produce very poor returns. In most cases, I was wrong when I originally sized up the economic characteristics of these companies or the industries in which they operate, and we are now paying the price for my misjudgments. In a couple of instances, I stumbled in assessing either the fidelity or ability of incumbent managers or ones I later put in place. I will commit more errors; you can count on that. Fortunately, Charlie – never bashful – is around to say “no” to my worst ideas.

然而，少数企业（这些是我资本配置决策中的重大失误）回报率极低。大多数情况下，我当初误判了这些公司的经济特性或所处行业，如今我们正为此付出代价。个别案例中，我对现任或继任管理者的忠诚度或能力判断失误。未来我仍会犯错——这是肯定的。幸运的是，查理从不怯于否决我最糟糕的想法。

Viewed as a single entity, the companies in the manufacturing, service and retailing group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $24 billion of net tangible assets during 2016 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and carrying very little debt, earned 24% after-tax on that capital.

若将该业务群视为单一企业，它是一家卓越的生意。2016年，其平均运用240亿美元净有形资产，尽管持有大量现金且负债极少，仍实现24%的税后资本回报率。

Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought at too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show on our balance sheet for goodwill and other intangibles. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Absent a recession, earnings from the group will likely grow in 2017, in part because Duracell and Precision Castparts (both bought in 2016) will for the first time contribute a full year’s earnings to this group. Additionally, Duracell incurred significant transitional costs in 2016 that will not recur.

当然，若买入价格过高，再好的企业也可能成为差投资。我们为多数企业支付了显著溢价，这部分成本反映在资产负债表中庞大的商誉及其他无形资产科目。然而总体而言，我们在该领域的资本部署获得了合理回报。若无经济衰退，2017年该业务群利润有望增长，部分得益于Duracell和Precision Castparts（均于2016年收购）首次贡献全年收益，且Duracell在2016年产生的重大过渡成本不会重复发生。

We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their competitors – both current and potential – read this report. In a few of our businesses, we might be disadvantaged if outsiders knew our numbers. Therefore, in certain of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, we only disclose what is required. You can nevertheless find a good bit of detail about many of our operations on pages 90 - 94. Be aware, though, that it’s the growth of the Berkshire forest that counts. It would be foolish to focus over-intently on any single tree.

该业务群企业数量众多，无法逐一评论。此外，现有及潜在竞争对手会阅读本报告。部分业务若披露详细数据可能对我们不利。因此，对不影响伯克希尔整体评估的业务，我们仅披露必要信息。您仍可在第90-94页找到更多细节。但请注意，真正重要的是伯克希尔森林的整体成长——过度关注某一棵树是不明智的。

# Accounting Adjustments and Economic Reality (会计调整与经济现实)

For several years I have told you that the income and expense data shown in this section does not conform to GAAP. I have explained that this divergence occurs primarily because of GAAP-ordered rules regarding purchase-accounting adjustments that require the full amortization of certain intangibles over periods averaging about 19 years. In our opinion, most of those amortization “expenses” are not truly an economic cost. Our goal in diverging from GAAP in this section is to present the figures to you in a manner reflecting the way in which Charlie and I view and analyze them.

多年来我已多次说明，本节展示的收入与支出数据并不符合通用会计准则（GAAP）。这一差异主要源于GAAP对并购会计调整的规定——要求某些无形资产在平均约19年内全额摊销。我们认为，其中大部分“摊销费用”并非真实的经济成本。我们偏离GAAP的目的是以更贴近查理和我的视角呈现数据，便于分析与判断。

On page 54 we itemize $15.4 billion of intangibles that are yet to be amortized by annual charges to earnings. (More intangibles to be amortized will be created as we make new acquisitions.) On that page, we show that the 2016 amortization charge to GAAP earnings was $1.5 billion, up $384 million from 2015. My judgment is that about 20% of the 2016 charge is a “real” cost.

第54页详细列出了尚未通过年度损益计提摊销的154亿美元无形资产（未来新收购将产生更多待摊销无形资产）。该页显示，2016年对GAAP利润的摊销费用为15亿美元，较2015年增加3.84亿美元。我认为其中约20%的费用属于“真实”成本。

Eventually amortization charges fully write off the related asset. When that happens – most often at the 15-year mark – the GAAP earnings we report will increase without any true improvement in the underlying economics of Berkshire’s business. (My gift to my successor.)

最终，摊销费用将彻底核销相关资产。当这种情况发生（通常在15年期限）时，我们报告的GAAP利润将上升，但伯克希尔业务的经济基本面并未真正改善。（这是我留给继任者的礼物。）

Now that I’ve described a GAAP expense that I believe to be overstated, let me move on to a less pleasant distortion produced by accounting rules. The subject this time is GAAP-prescribed depreciation charges, which are necessarily based on historical cost. Yet in certain cases, those charges materially understate true economic costs. Countless words were written about this phenomenon in the 1970s and early 1980s, when inflation was rampant. As inflation subsided – thanks to heroic actions by Paul Volcker – the inadequacy of depreciation charges became less of an issue. But the problem still prevails, big time, in the railroad industry, where current costs for many depreciable items far outstrip historical costs. The inevitable result is that reported earnings throughout the railroad industry are considerably higher than true economic earnings.

既然已说明一项我认为被高估的GAAP费用，接下来讨论另一项由会计规则造成的扭曲问题：GAAP规定的折旧费用——必须基于历史成本。然而在某些情况下，这些费用严重低估了真实经济成本。上世纪70至80年代通胀高企时期，这一现象曾引发广泛讨论。随着通胀回落（得益于保罗·沃尔克的果断行动），折旧费用不足的问题逐渐淡化。但在铁路行业，这一问题依然突出：许多可折旧资产的现值远超历史成本。其必然结果是，整个铁路行业的报告利润显著高于真实经济利润。

At BNSF, to get down to particulars, our GAAP depreciation charge last year was $2.1 billion. But were we to spend that sum and no more annually, our railroad would soon deteriorate and become less competitive. The reality is that – simply to hold our own – we need to spend far more than the cost we show for depreciation. Moreover, a wide disparity will prevail for decades.

以BNSF为例，去年按GAAP计提的折旧费用为21亿美元。但如果每年仅投入这一金额，我们的铁路系统将很快老化并失去竞争力。现实情况是，为维持现有地位，我们必须投入远超账面折旧费用的资金。而且这一差距将持续数十年。

All that said, Charlie and I love our railroad, which was one of our better purchases.

尽管如此，查理和我依然热爱我们的铁路业务，这是我们的最佳收购之一。

# The Pitfalls of “Adjusted Earnings” (“调整后收益”的陷阱)

Too many managements – and the number seems to grow every year – are looking for any means to report, and indeed feature, “adjusted earnings” that are higher than their company’s GAAP earnings. There are many ways for practitioners to perform this legerdemain. Two of their favorites are the omission of “restructuring costs” and “stock-based compensation” as expenses.

越来越多的管理层（数量似乎每年增长）试图通过各种手段报告甚至突出“调整后收益”，使其高于公司GAAP利润。实现这一目标的方式多种多样，其中两个最常用手法是剔除“重组成本”与“股权激励薪酬”作为费用。

Charlie and I want managements, in their commentary, to describe unusual items – good or bad – that affect the GAAP numbers. After all, the reason we look at these numbers of the past is to make estimates of the future. But a management that regularly attempts to wave away very real costs by highlighting “adjusted per-share earnings” makes us nervous. That’s because bad behavior is contagious: CEOs who overtly look for ways to report high numbers tend to foster a culture in which subordinates strive to be “helpful” as well. Goals like that can lead, for example, to insurers underestimating their loss reserves, a practice that has destroyed many industry participants.

查理和我希望管理层在讨论中能说明影响GAAP数据的异常项目（无论好坏）。毕竟，我们回顾历史数据是为了预测未来。但若管理层频繁通过强调“调整后每股收益”来掩盖真实的高额成本，我们会感到不安。因为这种行为具有传染性：刻意追求高数字的CEO会助长下属争相“帮忙”的文化。例如，保险公司低估理赔准备金的行为就曾导致大量同行破产。

Charlie and I cringe when we hear analysts talk admiringly about managements who always “make the numbers.” In truth, business is too unpredictable for the numbers always to be met. Inevitably, surprises occur. When they do, a CEO whose focus is centered on Wall Street will be tempted to make up the numbers.

每当听到分析师称赞管理层“总是达成预期数字”，查理和我都感到不适。事实上，商业世界充满不确定性，目标永远无法百分百实现。意外总会发生。此时，若CEO只关注华尔街预期，就可能试图“人为补足”数据。

Let’s get back to the two favorites of “don’t-count-this” managers, starting with “restructuring.” Berkshire, I would say, has been restructuring from the first day we took over in 1965. Owning only a northern textile business then gave us no other choice. And today a fair amount of restructuring occurs every year at Berkshire. That’s because there are always things that need to change in our hundreds of businesses. Last year, as I mentioned earlier, we spent significant sums getting Duracell in shape for the decades ahead.

让我们回到“别算这个”型管理层最爱的两个项目，从“重组”开始。可以说，自1965年接管以来，伯克希尔每天都在重组。当时我们仅拥有一家北方纺织企业，别无选择。如今，伯克希尔每年都会进行大量重组，因为我们旗下数百家企业总有需要改变之处。正如我之前提到的，去年我们投入巨资为Duracell未来几十年的发展做好准备。

We have never, however, singled out restructuring charges and told you to ignore them in estimating our normal earning power. If there were to be some truly major expenses in a single year, I would, of course, mention it in my commentary. Indeed, when there is a total rebasing of a business, such as occurred when Kraft and Heinz merged, it is imperative that for several years the huge one-time costs of rationalizing the combined operations be explained clearly to owners. That’s precisely what the CEO of Kraft Heinz has done, in a manner approved by the company’s directors (who include me). But, to tell owners year after year, “Don’t count this,” when management is simply making business adjustments that are necessary, is misleading. And too many analysts and journalists fall for this baloney.

但我们从未单独列出重组费用并要求您忽略它在评估正常盈利能力时的影响。若某年确实发生巨额支出，我自然会在报告中提及。例如，当卡夫与亨氏合并进行彻底重组时，必须向股东清晰解释整合运营产生的巨额一次性成本。卡夫亨氏CEO正是这样做的，这一做法也得到董事会（包括我在内）的认可。然而，管理层若年复一年地声称“别算这个”——仅因进行必要业务调整——则是误导性的。太多分析师和记者却轻信了这套说辞。

To say “stock-based compensation” is not an expense is even more cavalier. CEOs who go down that road are, in effect, saying to shareholders, “If you pay me a bundle in options or restricted stock, don’t worry about its effect on earnings. I’ll ‘adjust’ it away.”

宣称“股权激励薪酬”不是费用的做法更为轻率。选择这条路的CEO实质上是在告诉股东：“如果您以股票期权或限制性股票支付我高额报酬，无需担心对利润的影响。我会通过‘调整’把它抹掉。”

To explore this maneuver further, join me for a moment in a visit to a make-believe accounting laboratory whose sole mission is to juice Berkshire’s reported earnings. Imaginative technicians await us, eager to show their stuff.

若要进一步探讨这一操作，请随我进入一家虚构的会计实验室，其唯一使命是人为提升伯克希尔报告利润。富有创意的技术人员已准备好向我们展示他们的“成果”。

# Stock-Based Compensation and Financial Realities (股权激励与财务现实)

Listen carefully while I tell these enablers that stock-based compensation usually comprises at least 20% of total compensation for the top three or four executives at most large companies. Pay attention, too, as I explain that Berkshire has several hundred such executives at its subsidiaries and pays them similar amounts, but uses only cash to do so. I further confess that, lacking imagination, I have counted all of these payments to Berkshire’s executives as an expense.

请仔细听我说：对大多数大公司而言，前三到四位高管的股权激励通常占总薪酬至少20%。请注意，伯克希尔旗下有数百位此类高管，我们支付的薪酬水平相近，但全部以现金支付。我进一步坦白，由于缺乏“想象力”，我将这些高管薪酬均计入了费用。

My accounting minions suppress a giggle and immediately point out that 20% of what is paid these Berkshire managers is tantamount to “cash paid in lieu of stock-based compensation” and is therefore not a “true” expense. So – presto! – Berkshire, too, can have “adjusted” earnings.

我的会计团队忍不住偷笑，立刻指出：支付给这些伯克希尔高管薪酬的20%相当于“以现金替代股权激励”，因此不属于“真实”成本。于是——变魔术般！——伯克希尔也能拥有“调整后收益”。

Back to reality: If CEOs want to leave out stock-based compensation in reporting earnings, they should be required to affirm to their owners one of two propositions: why items of value used to pay employees are not a cost or why a payroll cost should be excluded when calculating earnings.

回到现实：若CEO想在报告利润中剔除股权激励成本，应向股东明确两点之一：为何用于支付员工的资源不构成成本，或为何计算利润时应排除薪酬成本。

During the accounting nonsense that flourished during the 1960s, the story was told of a CEO who, as his company revved up to go public, asked prospective auditors, “What is two plus two?” The answer that won the assignment, of course, was, “What number do you have in mind?”

上世纪60年代盛行的会计乱象中流传着一个故事：某公司准备上市时，CEO问潜在审计师：“2+2等于几？”中标答案是：“您想要什么数字？”

# Finance and Financial Products (金融与金融产品业务)

Our three leasing and rental operations are conducted by CORT (furniture), XTRA (semi-trailers), and Marmon (primarily tank cars but also freight cars, intermodal tank containers and cranes). Each is the leader in its field.

我们的三大租赁业务由以下公司运营：

CORT（家具租赁）
XTRA（半挂车租赁）
Marmon（以罐车为主，也涉及货运车厢、多式联运罐箱和起重机）
每家公司均在其领域处于领先地位。

We also include Clayton Homes in this section. This company receives most of its revenue from the sale of manufactured homes, but derives the bulk of its earnings from its large mortgage portfolio. Last year, Clayton became America’s largest home builder, delivering 42,075 units that accounted for 5% of all new American homes. (In fairness, other large builders do far more dollar volume than Clayton because they sell site-built homes that command much higher prices.)

本节还包括 Clayton Homes。该公司主要收入来自预制房屋销售，但大部分利润来自庞大的抵押贷款组合。去年，Clayton成为美国最大住宅建筑商，交付42,075套房屋，占全美新房销量的5%。（公平起见，其他大型建筑商因销售价格更高的现场建造房屋，在美元交易量上远超Clayton。）

In 2015, Clayton branched out, purchasing its first site-builder. Two similar acquisitions followed in 2016, and more will come. Site-built houses are expected to amount to 3% or so of Clayton’s unit sales in 2017 and will likely deliver about 14% of its dollar volume.

2015年，Clayton首次进军现场建造房屋领域，收购首家开发商。2016年又完成两起类似收购，未来还将继续。预计2017年现场建造房屋将占Clayton销量约3%，贡献约14%的美元交易额。

Even so, Clayton’s focus will always be manufactured homes, which account for about 70% of new American homes costing less than $150,000. Clayton manufactures close to one-half of the total. That is a far cry from Clayton’s position in 2003 when Berkshire purchased the company. It then ranked third in the industry in units sold and employed 6,731 people. Now, when its new acquisitions are included, the employee count is 14,677. And that number will increase in the future.

尽管如此，Clayton的核心仍是预制房屋——占美国15万美元以下新房销量的70%。Clayton生产了其中近半数。这一地位与2003年伯克希尔收购时大相径庭：当时该公司销量排名行业第三，员工仅6,731人。如今并购后员工达14,677人，未来人数将继续增长。

# Clayton’s Performance and Risk Profile (Clayton的业绩与风险特征)

Clayton’s earnings in recent years have materially benefited from extraordinarily low interest rates. The company’s mortgage loans to home-buyers are at fixed-rates and for long terms (averaging 25 years at inception). But Clayton’s own borrowings are short-term credits that re-price frequently. When rates plunge, Clayton’s earnings from its portfolio greatly increase. We normally would shun that kind of lend-long, borrow-short approach, which can cause major problems for financial institutions. As a whole, however, Berkshire is always asset-sensitive, meaning that higher short-term rates will benefit our consolidated earnings, even as they hurt at Clayton.

近年Clayton的盈利大幅受益于极低利率。公司向购房者发放的抵押贷款为长期固定利率（初始平均期限25年），但自身融资为短期信贷且频繁重新定价。利率骤降时，Clayton的资产组合收益显著增加。我们通常避免这种“长期放贷、短期融资”的做法，因其可能给金融机构带来重大风险。但整体而言，伯克希尔是“资产敏感型”的，即短期利率上升将提升集团整体利润，尽管会对Clayton造成负面影响。

Last year Clayton had to foreclose on 8,304 manufactured-housing mortgages, about 2.5% of its total portfolio. Customer demographics help explain that percentage. Clayton’s customers are usually lower-income families with mediocre credit scores; many are supported by jobs that will be at risk in any recession; many, similarly, have financial profiles that will be damaged by divorce or death to an extent that would not be typical for a high-income family. Those risks that our customers face are partly mitigated because almost all have a strong desire to own a home and because they enjoy reasonable monthly payments that average only $587, including the cost of insurance and property taxes.

去年，Clayton对8,304笔预制房屋抵押贷款进行了止赎，约占其总贷款组合的2.5%。客户人口特征可部分解释这一比例：Clayton的客户通常是低收入家庭，信用评分一般；许多家庭依赖的岗位在经济衰退时易受冲击；离婚或死亡对这类家庭财务的影响也远超高收入家庭。但这些风险被两大因素缓解：几乎所有客户都强烈渴望拥有住房，且月供平均仅587美元（含保险和房产税），负担合理。

Clayton also has long had programs that help borrowers through difficulties. The two most popular are loan extensions and payment forgiveness. Last year about 11,000 borrowers received extensions, and 3,800 had $3.4 million of scheduled payments permanently canceled by Clayton. The company does not earn interest or fees when these loss-mitigation moves are made. Our experience is that 93% of borrowers helped through these programs in the last two years now remain in their homes. Since we lose significant sums on foreclosures – losses last year totaled $150 million – our assistance programs end up helping Clayton as well as its borrowers.

Clayton长期设有帮助借款人的计划，最常用的是贷款延期和还款豁免。去年约11,000名借款人获得延期，3,800名借款人被永久豁免总计340万美元的应付账款。这类减损操作不会产生利息或费用。过去两年通过这些计划获得帮助的借款人中，93%仍保有住房。由于止赎损失去年达1.5亿美元，我们的援助计划最终既帮助了借款人，也保护了Clayton自身利益。

# Railcar and Leasing Operations (铁路车厢与租赁业务)

Marmon’s railcar business experienced a major slowdown in demand last year, which will cause earnings to decline in 2017. Fleet utilization was 91% in December, down from 97% a year earlier, with the drop particularly severe at the large fleet we purchased from General Electric in 2015. Marmon’s crane and container rentals have weakened as well.

Marmon的铁路车厢业务去年遭遇需求大幅放缓，预计2017年利润将下滑。12月机车使用率为91%，较一年前的97%下降明显，尤其在2015年从通用电气收购的庞大车队中表现更糟。Marmon的起重机和集装箱租赁业务也出现疲软。

Big swings in railcar demand have occurred in the past and they will continue. Nevertheless, we very much like this business and expect decent returns on equity capital over the years. Tank cars are Marmon’s specialty. People often associate tank cars with the transportation of crude oil; in fact, they are essential to a great variety of shippers.

铁路车厢需求历来波动剧烈，未来亦将延续。尽管如此，我们非常看好这一业务，长期来看预期能实现稳健的股本回报率。Marmon的专长是罐车。人们常将罐车与原油运输挂钩，实际上它们是众多货物运输的关键工具。

Over time, we expect to expand our railcar operation. Meanwhile, Marmon is making a number of bolt-on acquisitions whose results are included in the Manufacturing, Service and Retailing section.

长期来看，我们将扩大铁路车厢业务。同时，Marmon正在推进多项追加型收购，其财务数据已包含在制造、服务与零售业务章节中。

# Pre-Tax Earnings Recap (税前收益概览)

Here’s the pre-tax earnings recap for our finance-related companies:
以下是金融相关企业的税前收益概览：

# 税前收益（百万美元）

公司（Company）	2016	2015	2014
Berkadia (our 50% share) 伯克地亚（我们50%权益）	$91	$74	$122
Clayton 克莱顿	744	706	558
CORT 科特	60	55	49
Marmon – Containers and Cranes 马蒙——集装箱与起重机	126	192	238
Marmon – Railcars 马蒙——铁路车厢	654	546	442
XTRA	179	172	147
Net financial income* 净金融收入*	276	341	283
总计	$2,130	$2,086	$1,839

Excludes capital gains or losses *不包括资本利得或损失

Clayton and Berkshire have been a wonderful partnership. Kevin Clayton came to us with a best-in-class management group and culture. Berkshire, in turn, provided unmatched staying power when the manufactured-home industry fell apart during the Great Recession. (As other lenders to the industry vanished, Clayton supplied credit not only to its own dealers but also to dealers who sold the products of its competitors.) At Berkshire, we never count on synergies when we acquire companies. Truly important ones, however, surfaced after our purchase of Clayton.

Clayton与伯克希尔的合作堪称典范。Kevin Clayton带来了顶尖的管理团队与文化。而在大衰退期间，当行业贷款机构纷纷消失时，伯克希尔为Clayton提供了无与伦比的抗风险能力。（Clayton不仅继续为自有经销商提供信贷，也为竞争对手产品的经销商提供资金。）我们从不指望收购后产生协同效应，但Clayton的案例却意外实现了这一目标。

# Investments (投资组合)

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. The 325,442,152 shares Berkshire owns of Kraft Heinz are carried on our balance sheet at a GAAP figure of $15.3 billion and had a yearend market value of $28.4 billion. Our cost basis for the shares is $9.8 billion.

以下是我们年末按市值排名前十五的普通股投资列表。未包含卡夫亨氏（Kraft Heinz）持仓，因伯克希尔为控股方，需按“权益法”核算该投资。我们持有的325,442,152股卡夫亨氏股票按GAAP会计准则入账价值为153亿美元，年末市值为284亿美元。我们的持股成本基础为98亿美元。

# Fifteen Largest Common Stock Holdings (前十五大普通股持仓)

Shares* （持股数量）	Company （公司）	Percentage of Company Owned （持股比例）	12/31/16 Cost** （成本，百万美元）	Market （市值，百万美元）
151,610,700	American Express Company （美国运通公司）	16.8%	$1,287	$11,231
61,242,652	Apple Inc. （苹果公司）	1.1%	6,747	7,093
6,789,054	Charter Communications, Inc. （特许通信公司）	2.5%	1,210	1,955
400,000,000	The Coca-Cola Company （可口可乐公司）	9.3%	1,299	16,584
54,934,718	Delta Airlines Inc. （达美航空）	7.5%	2,299	2,702
11,390,582	The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. （高盛集团）	2.9%	654	2,727
81,232,303	International Business Machines Corp. （IBM）	8.5%	13,815	13,484
24,669,778	Moody’s Corporation （穆迪公司）	12.9%	248	2,326
74,587,892	Phillips 66 （菲利普斯66）	14.4%	5,841	6,445
22,169,930	Sanofi （赛诺菲）	1.7%	1,692	1,791
43,203,775	Southwest Airlines Co. （西南航空）	7.0%	1,757	2,153
101,859,335	U.S. Bancorp （美国合众银行）	6.0%	3,239	5,233
26,620,184	United Continental Holdings Inc. （联合大陆控股）	8.4%	1,477	1,940
43,387,980	USG Corp. （USG公司）	29.7%	836	1,253
500,000,000	Wells Fargo & Company （富国银行）	10.0%	12,730	27,555
Others （其他）	—	—	10,697	17,560
总计（Total Common Stocks Carried at Market）	—	—	$65,828	$122,032

Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.
排除伯克希尔子公司养老金基金所持股份
** 成本为实际购入价格及税务基础；少数情况下GAAP会计准则下的“成本”因减值调整而不同

Some of the stocks in the table are the responsibility of either Todd Combs or Ted Weschler, who work with me in managing Berkshire’s investments. Each, independently, manages more than $10 billion; I usually learn about decisions they have made by looking at monthly trade sheets. Included in the $21 billion that the two manage is about $7.6 billion of pension trust assets of certain Berkshire subsidiaries. As noted, pension investments are not included in the preceding tabulation of Berkshire holdings.

表中部分股票由托德·康布斯（Todd Combs）或泰德·韦施勒（Ted Weschler）管理，他们与我共同负责伯克希尔投资。两人各自独立管理超百亿美元资金；我通常通过月度交易清单了解他们的决策。两人管理的210亿美元中，约76亿美元为伯克希尔子公司的养老金信托资产。如前所述，养老金投资未包含在上述持仓列表中。

# Bank of America Preferred and Warrants (美国银行优先股及权证)

Excluded from the table – but important – is our ownership of $5 billion of preferred stock issued by Bank of America. This stock, which pays us $300 million per year, also carries with it a valuable warrant allowing Berkshire to purchase 700 million common shares of Bank of America for $5 billion at any time before September 2, 2021. At yearend, that privilege would have delivered us a profit of $10.5 billion. If it wishes, Berkshire can use its preferred shares to satisfy the $5 billion cost of exercising the warrant.

表中未列出但重要的是我们持有的50亿美元美国银行优先股。该优先股每年派息3亿美元，并附带一项宝贵权证：伯克希尔可在2021年9月2日前以50亿美元购买7亿股美国银行普通股。截至年末，行使该权证将带来105亿美元利润。伯克希尔可选择使用优先股抵扣行权时的50亿美元成本。

# Cash, Repatriation Taxes and Investment Flexibility (现金、汇回税与投资灵活性)

It’s important for you to understand that 95% of the $86 billion of “cash and equivalents” (which in my mind includes U.S. Treasury Bills) shown on our balance sheet are held by entities in the United States and, consequently, is not subject to any repatriation tax. Moreover, repatriation of the remaining funds would trigger only minor taxes because much of that money has been earned in countries that themselves impose meaningful corporate taxes. Those payments become an offset to U.S. tax when money is brought home.

需明确的是，资产负债表中860亿美元“现金及等价物”（含国债）的95%由美国境内实体持有，因此无需缴纳汇回税。剩余资金若汇回仅需支付小额税费，因其多数来自征收较高企业税的国家，这部分税款可抵扣美国应缴税额。

These explanations are important because many cash-rich American companies hold a large portion of their funds in jurisdictions imposing very low taxes. Such companies hope – and may well be proved right – that the tax levied for bringing these funds to America will soon be materially reduced. In the meantime, these companies are limited as to how they can use that cash. In other words, off-shore cash is simply not worth as much as cash held at home.

这一解释至关重要，因许多现金充裕的美国公司将大量资金存放于低税率地区。这些公司希望——也可能确实正确——未来将资金汇回美国时税率将大幅降低。但在此之前，其境外资金的用途受限。换言之，离岸现金价值远不及本土现金。

# Permanence of Holdings and Tax Considerations (持仓的长期性与税务考量)

Sometimes the comments of shareholders or media imply that we will own certain stocks “forever.” It is true that we own some stocks that I have no intention of selling for as far as the eye can see (and we’re talking 20/20 vision). But we have made no commitment that Berkshire will hold any of its marketable securities forever.

有时股东或媒体会误以为我们会长期持有某些股票“永久”。尽管我们持有部分我认为远期不会出售的股票（此处指长期持有），但伯克希尔从未承诺永久持有任何可交易证券。

Confusion about this point may have resulted from a too-casual reading of Economic Principle 11 on pages 110-111, which has been included in our annual reports since 1983. That principle covers controlled businesses, not marketable securities. This year I’ve added a final sentence to #11 to ensure that our owners understand that we regard any marketable security as available for sale, however unlikely such a sale now seems.

这一误解可能源于对年报第110-111页“经济原则第11条”的粗略理解（自1983年起纳入年报）。该原则适用于控股企业，而非可交易证券。今年我在第11条新增一句，明确告知股东：任何可交易证券均可能出售，即使当前出售可能性极低。

# Dividends, Capital Gains and Tax Efficiency (股息、资本利得与税务效率)

Before we leave this investment section, a few educational words about dividends and taxes: Berkshire, like most corporations, nets considerably more from a dollar of dividends than it reaps from a dollar of capital gains. That will probably surprise those of our shareholders who are accustomed to thinking of capital gains as the route to tax-favored returns.

在结束本节前，有必要科普股息与税务问题：伯克希尔作为企业法人，每1美元股息的实际净收益远超1美元资本利得。这可能令习惯认为资本利得更优的股东感到意外。

But here’s the corporate math. Every $1 of capital gains that a corporation realizes carries with it 35 cents of federal income tax (and often state income tax as well). The tax on dividends received from domestic corporations, however, is consistently lower, though rates vary depending on the status of the recipient.

企业税务计算如下：每1美元资本利得需缴纳35美分联邦所得税（通常还需州所得税）。而来自美国本土企业的股息税率更低，具体税率因持有者身份而异。

# Tax Efficiency of Dividends vs. Capital Gains (股息与资本利得的税务效率)

For a non-insurance company – which describes Berkshire Hathaway, the parent – the federal tax rate is effectively 10.5 cents per $1 of dividends received. Furthermore, a non-insurance company that owns more than 20% of an investee owes taxes of only 7 cents per $1 of dividends. That rate applies, for example, to the substantial dividends we receive from our 27% ownership of Kraft Heinz, all of it held by the parent company. (The rationale for the low corporate taxes on dividends is that the dividend-paying investee has already paid its own corporate tax on the earnings being distributed.)

对于非保险公司（如伯克希尔母公司），每1美元股息的实际联邦税率仅为10.5美分。若持股比例超过20%，税率进一步降至每1美元股息仅7美分。例如，我们通过母公司持有卡夫亨氏27%股份获得的巨额股息适用这一税率。（股息税率较低的逻辑在于，派息公司已对其分配利润缴纳过企业所得税。）

Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries pay a tax rate on dividends that is somewhat higher than that applying to non-insurance companies, though the rate is still well below the 35% hitting capital gains. Property/casualty companies owe about 14% in taxes on most dividends they receive. Their tax rate falls, though, to about 11% if they own more than 20% of a U.S.-based investee.

伯克希尔的保险子公司股息税率略高于非保险公司，但仍远低于资本利得35%的税率。财险/意外险公司通常需为大部分股息缴纳14%的税；若持股比例超20%，税率则降至约11%。

And that’s our tax lesson for today.

以上是今天的税务课程。

# “The Bet” – A Decade-Long Lesson in Investing (“赌约”——十年投资启示录)

In this section, you will encounter, early on, the story of an investment bet I made nine years ago and, next, some strong opinions I have about investing. As a starter, though, I want to briefly describe Long Bets, a unique establishment that played a role in the bet.

本节将首先讲述九年前我发起的一项投资赌约，并随后分享我对投资的坚定观点。但在此之前，先简要介绍这场赌局的平台——独特的非营利机构 Long Bets。

Long Bets was seeded by Amazon’s Jeff Bezos and operates as a non-profit organization that administers just what you’d guess: long-term bets. To participate, “proposers” post a proposition at Longbets.org that will be proved right or wrong at a distant date. They then wait for a contrary-minded party to take the other side of the bet. When a “doubter” steps forward, each side names a charity that will be the beneficiary if its side wins; parks its wager with Long Bets; and posts a short essay defending its position on the Long Bets website. When the bet is concluded, Long Bets pays off the winning charity.

Long Bets由亚马逊创始人杰夫·贝索斯（Jeff Bezos）资助，专门管理长期预测赌局。参与者（“提议者”）在Longbets.org发布未来某日才能验证对错的命题，等待持相反观点的“质疑者”应战。双方指定慈善机构为获胜方的受益人，将赌注交由Long Bets托管，并在网站发布论战短文。赌局终结时，Long Bets向胜方慈善机构支付奖金。

Here are examples of what you will find on Long Bets’ very interesting site:
在Long Bets网站上，你能看到以下有趣的赌约示例：

In 2002, entrepreneur Mitch Kapor asserted that “By 2029 no computer – or ‘machine intelligence’ – will have passed the Turing Test,” which deals with whether a computer can successfully impersonate a human being. Inventor Ray Kurzweil took the opposing view. Each backed up his opinion with $10,000. I don’t know who will win this bet, but I will confidently wager that no computer will ever replicate Charlie.

2002年，企业家米奇·卡普尔（Mitch Kapor）断言：“到2029年，任何计算机或‘机器智能’都无法通过图灵测试（即机器成功伪装成人类）。”发明家雷·库兹韦尔（Ray Kurzweil）持反对意见。双方各押注1万美元。我不知胜负如何，但我敢赌没有任何计算机能复刻查理的智慧。

That same year, Craig Mundie of Microsoft asserted that pilotless planes would routinely fly passengers by 2030, while Eric Schmidt of Google argued otherwise. The stakes were $1,000 each. To ease any heartburn Eric might be experiencing from his outsized exposure, I recently offered to take a piece of his action. He promptly laid off $500 with me. (I like his assumption that I’ll be around in 2030 to contribute my payment, should we lose.)

同年，微软的克雷格·蒙迪（Craig Mundie）与谷歌的埃里克·施密特（Eric Schmidt）就“2030年前无人驾驶飞机能否常态化载客”展开赌约，各下注1,000美元。为减轻埃里克的“风险焦虑”，我主动分担了500美元赌注。（感谢他假设我和他都能活到2030年再来结算这笔赌资。）

Now, to my bet and its history. In Berkshire’s 2005 annual report, I argued that active investment management by professionals – in aggregate – would over a period of years underperform the returns achieved by rank amateurs who simply sat still. I explained that the massive fees levied by a variety of “helpers” would leave their clients – again in aggregate – worse off than if the amateurs simply invested in an unmanaged low-cost index fund. (See pages 114 - 115 for a reprint of the argument as I originally stated it in the 2005 report.)

接下来是关于我的赌约及其背景。2005年伯克希尔年报中，我提出：专业投资者整体而言，其主动管理的长期回报将跑输“完全静止不动”的业余投资者。我解释称，各类“帮手”收取的高额费用会让客户整体回报逊于直接投资低成本指数基金的投资者。（详见第114-115页对2005年原文的重印。）

# The Wager: Hedge Funds vs. Index Funds (赌约：对冲基金 vs. 指数基金)

Subsequently, I publicly offered to wager $500,000 that no investment pro could select a set of at least five hedge funds – wildly-popular and high-fee investing vehicles – that would over an extended period match the performance of an unmanaged S&P-500 index fund charging only token fees. I suggested a ten-year bet and named a low-cost Vanguard S&P fund as my contender. I then sat back and waited expectantly for a parade of fund managers – who could include their own fund as one of the five – to come forth and defend their occupation. After all, these managers urged others to bet billions on their abilities. Why should they fear putting a little of their own money on the line?

随后，我公开下注50万美元：没有任何投资专家能挑选出至少五只对冲基金（广受欢迎的高费用投资工具），其长期表现能匹敌费用极低的标普500指数基金。我提议十年赌期，指定先锋低成本标普基金为标的。我原以为会有一长串基金经理应战（他们甚至可将自己管理的基金纳入五选一），毕竟他们劝说他人以数十亿美元押注其能力。为何不敢自己投入一点真金白银？

What followed was the sound of silence. Though there are thousands of professional investment managers who have amassed staggering fortunes by touting their stock-selecting prowess, only one man – Ted Seides – stepped up to my challenge. Ted was a co-manager of Protégé Partners, an asset manager that had raised money from limited partners to form a fund-of-funds – in other words, a fund that invests in multiple hedge funds.

但回应我的只有沉默。尽管数千名专业基金经理靠吹嘘选股能力积累了巨额财富，只有泰德·塞德斯（Ted Seides）一人应战。泰德是Protégé Partners的联合经理人，该公司通过有限合伙人资金组建了“基金中的基金”——即投资多只对冲基金的母基金。

I hadn’t known Ted before our wager, but I like him and admire his willingness to put his money where his mouth was. He has been both straight-forward with me and meticulous in supplying all the data that both he and I have needed to monitor the bet.

与泰德对赌前我并不相识，但我欣赏他敢于“用钱投票”的勇气。他始终坦诚且细致提供双方所需的所有数据，便于跟踪赌约进展。

For Protégé Partners’ side of our ten-year bet, Ted picked five funds-of-funds whose results were to be averaged and compared against my Vanguard S&P index fund. The five he selected had invested their money in more than 100 hedge funds, which meant that the overall performance of the funds-of-funds would not be distorted by the good or poor results of a single manager.

泰德代表Protégé Partners选择了五只基金中的基金，其平均表现将与我的先锋标普指数基金对比。这五只母基金共投资超100只对冲基金，避免单一经理的极端表现扭曲整体结果。

Each fund-of-funds, of course, operated with a layer of fees that sat above the fees charged by the hedge funds in which it had invested. In this doubling-up arrangement, the larger fees were levied by the underlying hedge funds; each of the fund-of-funds imposed an additional fee for its presumed skills in selecting hedge-fund managers.

当然，每只母基金都叠加了自身管理费和所投对冲基金的费用。这种双重收费结构中，底层对冲基金收费更高，而母基金再额外收取“筛选对冲基金经理能力”的费用。

# Results After Nine Years (九年赌约结果)

Here are the results for the first nine years of the bet – figures leaving no doubt that Girls Inc. of Omaha, the charitable beneficiary I designated, will be the organization eagerly opening the mail next January.

以下是赌约前九年的结果——数据清晰显示，我指定的慈善机构奥马哈Girls Inc.将在明年1月收到胜局奖金。

# 赌约结果（截至2016年）

年度	标普指数基金	基金中的基金A	基金中的基金B	基金中的基金C	基金中的基金D	基金中的基金E
2008	-37.0%	-16.5%	-22.3%	-21.3%	-29.3%	-30.1%
2009	26.6%	11.3%	14.5%	21.4%	16.5%	16.8%
2010	15.1%	5.9%	6.8%	13.3%	4.9%	11.9%
2011	2.1%	-6.3%	-1.3%	5.9%	-6.3%	-2.8%
2012	16.0%	3.4%	9.6%	5.7%	6.2%	9.1%
2013	32.3%	10.5%	15.2%	8.8%	14.2%	14.4%
2014	13.6%	4.7%	4.0%	18.9%	0.7%	-2.1%
2015	1.4%	1.6%	2.5%	5.4%	1.4%	-5.0%
2016	11.9%	-2.9%	1.7%	-1.4%	2.9%	4.4%
累计复合年化收益	7.1%	2.2%	8.7%	28.3%	62.8%	2.9%

注：根据协议，五只母基金名称未公开，但我可查看其年度审计报告。

The compounded annual increase to date for the index fund is 7.1%, which is a return that could easily prove typical for the stock market over time. That’s an important fact: A particularly weak nine years for the market over the lifetime of this bet would have probably helped the relative performance of the hedge funds, because many hold large “short” positions. Conversely, nine years of exceptionally high returns from stocks would have provided a tailwind for index funds.

先锋标普指数基金的九年复合年化收益为7.1%，这一回报率与股市长期表现一致。需注意：若市场在赌约期内表现疲软（因许多对冲基金持有大量“做空”头寸），对冲基金相对表现可能更好；反之，若股市暴涨，则指数基金将受益。

Instead we operated in what I would call a “neutral” environment. In it, the five funds-of-funds delivered, through 2016, an average of only 2.2%, compounded annually. That means $1 million invested in those funds would have gained $220,000. The index fund would meanwhile have gained $854,000.

但实际环境可谓“中性”。截至2016年，五只母基金年化收益仅为2.2%，即100万美元投资增值22万美元。而指数基金同期增值达85.4万美元。

# Lessons from the Bet (赌约启示录)

This bet was designed to showcase how hard it is for professional investors to beat a simple index fund when fees are high and costs compound. Over the years, our side of the bet – the index fund – has demonstrated the power of low-cost, passive investing. Meanwhile, the hedge-fund industry’s structure – layered fees and excessive complexity – has proven to be a drag.

这项赌约旨在揭示：当费用高昂且成本复利增长时，专业投资者战胜简单指数基金的难度。多年来，我们的标的——指数基金——已证明低成本被动投资的威力。而对冲基金行业层层叠加的费用与过度复杂性，已被证实是沉重负担。

Let’s remember that the $500,000 wager was minuscule compared to the sums that huge institutional investors commit to hedge funds. If the pros can’t beat the market with their own money, how can they justify charging investors high fees for the privilege of losing to an index fund? Charlie and I believe that the vast majority of funds for which investors pay high fees will, over time, underperform a low-cost index fund. This is a lesson I urge all investors to heed.

需铭记：50万美元的赌注相较机构投资者对对冲基金的巨额投入微不足道。若专业投资者连自己的钱都难以跑赢市场，他们凭什么收取高额费用？查理和我坚信，支付高费的投资者长期将输给低成本指数基金。这是每位投资者都应牢记的教训。

# The Costly Illusion of Active Management (主动管理的昂贵幻觉)

Bear in mind that every one of the 100-plus managers of the underlying hedge funds had a huge financial incentive to do his or her best. Moreover, the five funds-of-funds managers that Ted selected were similarly incentivized to select the best hedge-fund managers possible because the five were entitled to performance fees based on the results of the underlying funds.

请注意，这100多位对冲基金经理人几乎都面临巨大的金钱激励去全力以赴。此外，泰德选择的五家母基金管理人也有同样动力去挑选最优秀的对冲基金经理，因为他们的收益直接与底层基金的表现挂钩。

I’m certain that in almost all cases the managers at both levels were honest and intelligent people. But the results for their investors were dismal – really dismal. And, alas, the huge fixed fees charged by all of the funds and funds-of-funds involved – fees that were totally unwarranted by performance – were such that their managers were showered with compensation over the nine years that have passed. As Gordon Gekko might have put it: “Fees never sleep.”

我确信，几乎所有层面的经理人都是诚实且聪明的。但投资者的回报却极其惨淡——真正惨淡。更令人遗憾的是，所有基金和母基金收取的巨额固定费用（远超其表现应得），让经理人在过去九年中获得了丰厚报酬。正如戈登·盖柯（Gordon Gekko）可能会说的：“收费从不眠休。”

The underlying hedge-fund managers in our bet received payments from their limited partners that likely averaged a bit under the prevailing hedge-fund standard of “2 and 20,” meaning a 2% annual fixed fee, payable even when losses are huge, and 20% of profits with no clawback (if good years were followed by bad ones). Under this lopsided arrangement, a hedge fund operator’s ability to simply pile up assets under management has made many of these managers extraordinarily rich, even as their investments have performed poorly.

我们赌约中的对冲基金经理从有限合伙人那里获得的报酬可能略低于行业通行的“2和20”标准（即2%的固定管理费，无论亏损多大；20%的利润提成且无回拨条款）。在这种失衡的安排下，仅靠管理资产规模就能让许多经理人变得极其富有，尽管其投资表现糟糕透顶。

Still, we’re not through with fees. Remember, there were the fund-of-funds managers to be fed as well. These managers received an additional fixed amount that was usually set at 1% of assets. Then, despite the terrible overall record of the five funds-of-funds, some experienced a few good years and collected “performance” fees. Consequently, I estimate that over the nine-year period roughly 60% – gulp! – of all gains achieved by the five funds-of-funds were diverted to the two levels of managers. That was their misbegotten reward for accomplishing something far short of what their many hundreds of limited partners could have effortlessly – and with virtually no cost – achieved on their own.

但这还没完。别忘了母基金管理人也需要“喂饱”。他们通常额外收取1%的固定费用。更讽刺的是，尽管五只母基金整体表现糟糕，但某些基金偶有佳绩便收取“绩效费用”。因此，我估计过去九年，五只母基金收益的约60%（倒吸一口冷气！）被两层经理人瓜分。这是他们对有限合伙人本可零成本轻松实现的收益所施加的掠夺性回报。

# The Mathematics of Investing (投资的数学逻辑)

So that was my argument – and now let me put it into a simple equation. If Group A (active investors) and Group B (do-nothing investors) comprise the total investing universe, and B is destined to achieve average results before costs, so, too, must A. Whichever group has the lower costs will win. (The academic in me requires me to mention that there is a very minor point – not worth detailing – that slightly modifies this formulation.) And if Group A has exorbitant costs, its shortfall will be substantial.

这就是我的论点——现在将其简化为一个公式：若主动投资者（A组）与被动投资者（B组）构成整个投资世界，而B组在无费用时注定获得平均收益，则A组也必须如此。费用更低的一方将胜出。（严谨的学术思维让我必须补充一个微小但不影响结论的修正。）若A组费用高昂，其收益差距将巨大。

There are, of course, some skilled individuals who are highly likely to out-perform the S&P over long stretches. In my lifetime, though, I’ve identified – early on – only ten or so professionals that I expected would accomplish this feat.

当然，确实存在少数高手可能长期跑赢标普500指数。但在我一生中，早期只识别出约十位我认为能实现这一目标的专业人士。

There are no doubt many hundreds of people – perhaps thousands – whom I have never met and whose abilities would equal those of the people I’ve identified. The job, after all, is not impossible. The problem simply is that the great majority of managers who attempt to over-perform will fail. The probability is also very high that the person soliciting your funds will not be the exception who does well.

毫无疑问，我未谋面但能力相当的人才或许成百上千。毕竟，这份工作并非不可能。问题在于，绝大多数试图跑赢市场的经理人终将失败。更大概率，向你募集资金的人并非那极少数成功者。

Bill Ruane – a truly wonderful human being and a man whom I identified 60 years ago as almost certain to deliver superior investment returns over the long haul – said it well: “In investment management, the progression is from the innovators to the imitators to the swarming incompetents.”

比尔·鲁安（Bill Ruane）——一位真正的杰出人物，我在60年前就认定他会长期创造卓越回报——曾精辟总结：“在投资管理领域，发展路径总是从创新者到模仿者，最终沦为乌合之众。”

Further complicating the search for the rare high-fee manager who is worth his or her pay is the fact that some investment professionals, just as some amateurs, will be lucky over short periods. If 1,000 managers make a market prediction at the beginning of a year, it’s very likely that the calls of at least one will be correct for nine consecutive years. Of course, 1,000 monkeys would be just as likely to produce a seemingly all-wise prophet. But there would remain a difference: The lucky monkey would not find people standing in line to invest with him.

寻找少数物有所值的高费率经理人更加困难，因为部分专业人士（如同业余选手）可能短期走运。若有1,000名经理人年初预测市场，至少有一人连续九年正确预测的概率极高。当然，1,000只猴子同样可能产生“神算”预言。但区别在于：幸运的猴子不会吸引人们排队投资。

# When Success Breeds Failure (成功孕育失败的三大定律)

Finally, there are three connected realities that cause investing success to breed failure. First, a good record quickly attracts a torrent of money. Second, huge sums invariably act as an anchor on investment performance: What is easy with millions, struggles with billions (sob!). Third, most managers will nevertheless seek new money because of their personal equation – namely, the more funds they have under management, the more their fees.

最终，有三大相互关联的现实导致投资成功反噬自身：第一，优秀业绩迅速吸引资金洪流；第二，巨资必然拖累表现：百万级资金轻松实现的收益，十亿级资金却举步维艰；第三，大多数经理人仍会追逐新资金，因为个人利益公式简单明了：管理规模越大，收费越多。

These three points are hardly new ground for me: In January 1966, when I was managing $44 million, I wrote my limited partners: “I feel substantially greater size is more likely to harm future results than to help them. This might not be true for my own personal results, but it is likely to be true for your results. Therefore, . . . I intend to admit no additional partners to BPL. I have notified Susie that if we have any more children, it is up to her to find some other partnership for them.”

这三点对我而言早已耳熟能详：1966年1月，当我管理4,400万美元时，我曾致信有限合伙人：“我认为更大规模更可能损害而非帮助未来回报。这对我的个人收益或许不成立，但对您的回报必然成立。因此……我将不再接纳新合伙人。”我还通知苏西，若再生孩子，得由她另找其他合伙关系。

The bottom line: When trillions of dollars are managed by Wall Streeters charging high fees, it will usually be the managers who reap outsized profits, not the clients. Both large and small investors should stick with low-cost index funds.

核心结论：当华尔街以高昂费用管理数万亿美元时，收获超额利润的往往是经理人而非客户。无论大额或小额投资者，都应坚持低成本指数基金。

# Jack Bogle: America’s Investing Hero (杰克·伯格：美国投资者英雄)

If a statue is ever erected to honor the person who has done the most for American investors, the hands-down choice should be Jack Bogle. For decades, Jack has urged investors to invest in ultra-low-cost index funds. In his crusade, he amassed only a tiny percentage of the wealth that has typically flowed to managers who have promised their investors large rewards while delivering them nothing – or, as in our bet, less than nothing – of added value.

若要为对美国投资者贡献最大的人立雕像，非杰克·伯格（Jack Bogle）莫属。数十年来，他始终呼吁投资者选择超低成本指数基金。在推动这一理念的过程中，他本人积累的财富仅占那些向客户承诺高回报却实际提供零价值（甚至负价值）经理人的零头。

In his early years, Jack was frequently mocked by the investment-management industry. Today, however, he has the satisfaction of knowing that he helped millions of investors realize far better returns on their savings than they otherwise would have earned. He is a hero to them and to me.

早年间，杰克常被投资管理行业嘲讽。但今天，他欣慰地知道，自己帮助数百万投资者实现了远超预期的储蓄回报。他是他们的英雄，也是我的英雄。

# Investment Advice and Human Behavior (投资建议与人性)

Over the years, I’ve often been asked for investment advice, and in the process of answering I’ve learned a good deal about human behavior. My regular recommendation has been a low-cost S&P 500 index fund. To their credit, my friends who possess only modest means have usually followed my suggestion.

多年来，我常被问及投资建议，而在这个过程中，我对人性有了深刻理解。我的常规建议是低成本的标普500指数基金。值得称赞的是，那些资产有限的朋友大多采纳了我的建议。

# The Paradox of Wealth and Advice (财富与建议的悖论)

I believe, however, that none of the mega-rich individuals, institutions or pension funds has followed that same advice when I’ve given it to them. Instead, these investors politely thank me for my thoughts and depart to listen to the siren song of a high-fee manager or, in the case of many institutions, to seek out another breed of hyper-helper called a consultant.

但我相信，当面对富豪、机构或养老基金时，我的这一建议从未被采纳。他们礼貌地感谢我的观点，转身却去追逐高费率的基金经理或咨询顾问——后者是一群更复杂的“帮手”。

That professional, however, faces a problem. Can you imagine an investment consultant telling clients, year after year, to keep adding to an index fund replicating the S&P 500? That would be career suicide. Large fees flow to these hyper-helpers, however, if they recommend small managerial shifts every year or so. That advice is often delivered in esoteric gibberish that explains why fashionable investment “styles” or current economic trends make the shift appropriate.

然而，这类专业人士面临一个难题：你能否想象一位投资顾问年复一年地建议客户持续买入标普500指数基金？这无异于职业自杀。只有当顾问推荐每年微调投资策略时，他们才能获取高额费用。这类建议常裹挟着晦涩难懂的术语，解释为何当下流行的“投资风格”或经济趋势要求调整方向。

The wealthy are accustomed to feeling that it is their lot in life to get the best food, schooling, entertainment, housing, plastic surgery, sports tickets, you name it. Their money, they feel, should buy them something superior compared to what the masses receive.

富人习惯于认为自己理应享受最好的食物、教育、娱乐、住房、整容手术和体育门票。他们相信，金钱应带来超越普通人的优越体验。

In many aspects of life, indeed, wealth does command top-grade products or services. For that reason, the financial “elites” – wealthy individuals, pension funds, college endowments and the like – have great trouble meekly signing up for a financial product or service that is available as well to people investing only a few thousand dollars. This reluctance of the rich normally prevails even though the product at issue is – on an expectancy basis – clearly the best choice.

在许多领域，财富确实能换来顶级产品与服务。因此，金融“精英”（富豪、养老基金、大学捐赠基金等）很难接受一种连几千美元投资者都能获得的金融产品或服务。即使该产品从概率上看明显最优，富人仍会本能抗拒。

My calculation, admittedly very rough, is that the search by the elite for superior investment advice has caused it, in aggregate, to waste more than $100 billion over the past decade. Figure it out: Even a 1% fee on a few trillion dollars adds up. Of course, not every investor who put money in hedge funds ten years ago lagged S&P returns. But I believe my calculation of the aggregate shortfall is conservative.

我的粗略估算显示，过去十年，精英群体对“更优投资建议”的追求，已累计造成超千亿美元损失。算笔账：哪怕对几万亿美元资产收取1%费用，总额也十分惊人。当然，十年前投资对冲基金的投资者并非全部跑输标普500指数。但我相信，整体亏损的估算仍属保守。

# The Cost of Arrogance (傲慢的代价)

Much of the financial damage befell pension funds for public employees. Many of these funds are woefully underfunded, in part because they have suffered a double whammy: poor investment performance accompanied by huge fees. The resulting shortfalls in their assets will, for decades, have to be made up by local taxpayers.

公共雇员养老基金承受了大部分损失。许多基金深陷资金不足困境，部分原因正是糟糕的投资表现叠加巨额费用。这种双重打击导致的资产缺口，将由地方纳税人用数十年时间填补。

Human behavior won’t change. Wealthy individuals, pension funds, endowments and the like will continue to feel they deserve something “extra” in investment advice. Those advisors who cleverly play to this expectation will get very rich. This year the magic potion may be hedge funds, next year something else. The likely result from this parade of promises is predicted in an adage: “When a person with money meets a person with experience, the one with experience ends up with the money and the one with money leaves with experience.”

人性不会改变。富豪、养老基金和捐赠基金将继续认为自己理应获得“特殊”建议。那些精准迎合这种心理的顾问将变得极其富有。今年的灵丹妙药是对冲基金，明年或许是别的什么。这场承诺游行的结果早已被一句谚语预言：“当有钱人遇见有经验的人，有经验的人得到钱，有钱人得到教训。”

# Lessons from the Stockyards (牲畜市场的启示)

Long ago, a brother-in-law of mine, Homer Rogers, was a commission agent working in the Omaha stockyards. I asked him how he induced a farmer or rancher to hire him to handle the sale of their hogs or cattle to the buyers from the big four packers (Swift, Cudahy, Wilson and Armour). After all, hogs were hogs and the buyers were experts who knew to the penny how much any animal was worth. How then, I asked Homer, could any sales agent get a better result than any other?

多年前，我的姻亲霍默·罗杰斯（Homer Rogers）是奥马哈牲畜市场的佣金代理。我问他如何说服农民或牧场主雇佣他，将猪牛出售给四大加工商（Swift、Cudahy、Wilson和Armour）。毕竟，买家都是精通行情的专家，精确到美分计算每头牲畜价值。既然如此，我问霍默，任何销售代理如何能卖出更高价格？

Homer gave me a pitying look and said: “Warren, it’s not how you sell ‘em, it’s how you tell ‘em.” What worked in the stockyards continues to work in Wall Street.

霍默怜悯地看着我：“沃伦，关键不在于怎么卖，而在于怎么讲。”在牲畜市场奏效的技巧，如今仍在华尔街盛行。

# An Olive Branch to Wall Street (向华尔街伸出橄榄枝)

And, finally, let me offer an olive branch to Wall Streeters, many of them good friends of mine. Berkshire loves to pay fees – even outrageous fees – to investment bankers who bring us acquisitions. Moreover, we have paid substantial sums for over-performance to our two in-house investment managers – and we hope to make even larger payments to them in the future.

最后，请允许我向华尔街朋友们伸出橄榄枝——其中许多是我挚友。伯克希尔乐于支付费用——甚至高昂费用——给为我们带来并购机会的投行家。此外，我们曾为两位内部投资经理的超额收益支付重金，未来也希望给予他们更多奖励。

To get biblical (Ephesians 3:18), I know the height and the depth and the length and the breadth of the energy flowing from that simple four-letter word – fees – when it is spoken to Wall Street. And when that energy delivers value to Berkshire, I will cheerfully write a big check.

借用《圣经》（以弗所书3:18）的话，我深知“费用”这个词在华尔街激起的能量有多深远。当这种能量为伯克希尔创造价值时，我愿毫不犹豫开出大额支票。

# The Annual Meeting (年度股东大会)

Last year we partnered with Yahoo to air the first-ever webcast of our annual meeting. Thanks to Andy Serwer and his Yahoo crew, the production was a success in all respects, registering 1.1 million unique visits in real-time viewing and 11.5 million more in replays (many of those, to be sure, called up by viewers interested in only certain segments of the webcast).

去年，我们首次与雅虎合作，通过网络直播股东大会。感谢安迪·瑟沃及其团队的出色工作，此次直播全面成功：实时观看独立访问量达110万次，重播观看量达1,150万次（其中许多观众仅观看特定片段）。

Berkshire’s thank-you mail for initiating the webcast included many notes from three constituencies: the elderly who find travel difficult; the thrifty who find it expensive to travel to Omaha; and those who cannot attend a Saturday meeting for religious reasons.

直播推出后收到的感谢信中，许多来自三类人群：年长者（出行困难）、节俭者（赴奥马哈成本过高）以及因宗教原因无法出席周六会议的人士。

The webcast cut attendance at last year’s meeting to about 37,000 people (we can’t get a precise count), which was down about 10%. Nevertheless, both Berkshire’s subsidiaries and Omaha hotels and restaurants racked up huge sales. Nebraska Furniture Mart’s sales broke their 2015 record volume by 3%, with the Omaha store recording one-week volume of $45.5 million.

网络直播使去年股东大会参与人数降至约37,000人（无法精确统计），同比下降10%。但伯克希尔旗下公司及奥马哈酒店餐饮业销售额仍创新高。内布拉斯加家具商城（NFM）销售额同比增长3%，奥马哈门店单周销售额达4,550万美元。

Our Berkshire exhibitors at CenturyLink were open from noon until 5 p.m. on Friday and drew a crowd of 12,000 bargain-hunting shareholders. We will repeat those Friday shopping hours this year on May 5th. Bring money.

世纪链接中心（CenturyLink）的伯克希尔展商于周五中午至下午5点开放，吸引12,000名寻宝股东。今年5月5日将延续这一安排，请携带现金前来。

# Event Schedule and Webcast Details (活动日程与直播详情)

The annual meeting falls on May 6th and will again be webcast by Yahoo, whose web address is https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream. The webcast will go live at 9 a.m. Central Daylight Time. Yahoo will interview directors, managers, stockholders and celebrities before the meeting and during the lunch break. Both those interviews and meeting will be translated simultaneously into Mandarin.

股东大会定于5月6日举行，雅虎将继续提供直播（网址：https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream）。直播将于美国中部夏令时上午9点开始，雅虎将在会议前及午休期间采访董事、管理层、股东及名人，访谈与会议内容将同步提供中文翻译。

For those attending the meeting in person, the doors at the CenturyLink will open at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday to facilitate shopping prior to our shareholder movie, which begins at 8:30. The question-and-answer period will start at 9:30 and run until 3:30, with a one-hour lunch break at noon. Finally, at 3:45 we will begin the formal shareholder meeting. It will run an hour or so. That is somewhat longer than usual because three proxy items are to be presented by their proponents, who will be given a reasonable amount of time to state their case.

亲临现场的股东可于周六上午7点进入世纪链接中心，优先参与购物活动。股东电影放映于8:30开始，问答环节从9:30持续至15:30（中午12点午餐休息一小时）。正式股东大会将于15:45召开，预计持续约一小时（较常规延长），因需审议三项代理提案，提案方将获得合理陈述时间。

# Special Events and Discounts (特别活动与优惠)

On Saturday morning, we will have our sixth International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will again be the porch of a Clayton Home, located precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. When I was a teenager – in my one brief flirtation with honest labor – I delivered about 500,000 papers. So I think I’m pretty good at this game. Challenge me! Humiliate me! Knock me down a peg! The papers will run 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed). The competition will begin about 7:45, and I’ll take on ten or so competitors selected a few minutes earlier by my assistant, Deb Bosanek.

周六早晨将举办第六届国际报纸投掷挑战赛。目标仍是距离投掷线35英尺的克莱顿房屋门廊。我青少年时期短暂从事过送报工作（累计投递50万份），自认擅长此道。来挑战我吧！让我难堪吧！击败我吧！报纸需自折（禁用橡皮筋），共36-42页。比赛约7:45开始，我的助理黛布·博萨内克将提前几分钟选出约十位选手与我同台竞技。

Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of our subsidiaries will be for sale. Say hello to the many Berkshire managers who will be captaining their exhibits. And be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad layout that salutes all of our companies. Your children (and you!) will be enchanted with it.

购物区设于会议场地毗邻的194,300平方英尺展馆，展售伯克希尔旗下数十家子公司产品。请向现场各展台的伯克希尔高管问好，并务必参观致敬伯克希尔所有企业的BNSF铁路模型展区——您和孩子都会为之着迷。

Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them on Sunday at our fourth annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your meeting credentials. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in; the fudge and peanut brittle we eat throughout the Saturday meeting takes its toll.) Participation in the 5K grows every year. Help us set another record.

我们的运动鞋子公司Brooks将推出纪念款跑鞋。购买后可于周日参加第四届“伯克希尔5公里跑”（8点世纪链接中心起跑）。完整参赛指南将随会议证件寄送。参赛者将与伯克希尔高管、董事及合作伙伴同跑。（查理和我将缺席——周六会议期间狂吃的软糖和花生脆让我们力不从心。）5公里跑参与人数逐年增长，请助我们再创新高。

A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. At last year’s meeting, we set a record for policy sales, up 21% from 2015. I predict we will be up again this year.
So stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money. Spend the savings on other Berkshire products.

购物区设有GEICO展位，由全国顶尖顾问驻场。去年会议期间保单销量同比增长21%，预计今年将再创新高。
请前来获取报价，符合条件者可享股东专属折扣（通常8%），覆盖我们在51个司法管辖区中的44个。（注：若您已享受其他折扣，如团体折扣，则无法叠加。）携带现有保险明细对比我们的价格，省下的钱可用于购买其他伯克希尔产品。

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. This Omaha-based retailer will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. The best book I read last year was Shoe Dog, by Nike’s Phil Knight. Phil is a very wise, intelligent and competitive fellow who is also a gifted storyteller. The Bookworm will have piles of Shoe Dog as well as several investment classics by Jack Bogle.

务必造访奥马哈书店“Bookworm”，将展售约35本图书及DVD，含新书。去年我读到的最佳书籍是耐克创始人菲尔·奈特的《鞋狗》（Shoe Dog）。菲尔兼具智慧、竞争意识与叙事才华。Bookworm将备足《鞋狗》及多本杰克·伯格的投资经典著作。

The Bookworm will once again offer our history of the highlights (and lowlights) of Berkshire’s first 50 years. Non-attendees of the meeting can find the book on eBay. Just type in: Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Celebrating 50 years of a Profitable Partnership (2nd Edition).

Bookworm还将发售《伯克希尔哈撒韦前50年：辉煌与低谷》一书。未亲临会议者可在eBay搜索：Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Celebrating 50 years of a Profitable Partnership (2nd Edition)。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Keep in mind that airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend – though I must admit I have developed some tolerance, bordering on enthusiasm, for that practice now that Berkshire has made large investments in America’s four major carriers. Nevertheless, if you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 21/2 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.

随代理材料附上的附件详细说明如何获取参会凭证。请注意，伯克希尔已投资美国四大航空公司，因此我对“伯克希尔周末”期间航空票价上涨已变得宽容——甚至略感欣慰。若您远道而来，建议对比飞往堪萨斯城与奥马哈的成本。两城车程约2.5小时，飞往堪萨斯城可能节省上千美元，省下的钱请继续消费于伯克希尔。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, May 2nd and Monday, May 8th inclusive, and must also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. During “Berkshire Weekend,” NFM will be open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Saturday and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is hosting a picnic to which you are all invited.

内布拉斯加家具商城（NFM）将于5月2日（周二）至5月8日（周一）推出“伯克希尔周末”特别折扣，需出示会议凭证。即使部分品牌通常严禁打折，也破例参与本次活动。我们感谢他们的支持。
营业时间：
周一至周五 10:00-21:00
周六 10:00-21:30
周日 10:00-20:00
周六17:30-20:00将举办露天野餐，诚邀您的参与。

This year we have good news for shareholders in the Kansas City and Dallas metro markets who can’t attend the meeting or perhaps prefer the webcast. From May 2nd through May 8th, shareholders who present meeting credentials or other evidence of their Berkshire ownership (such as brokerage statements) to their local NFM store will receive the same discounts enjoyed by those visiting the Omaha store.

今年堪萨斯城与达拉斯地区股东迎来利好：5月2日至8日，凭会议凭证或持股证明（如经纪报表）即可在本地NFM门店享受与奥马哈门店相同的折扣优惠。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 5th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 7th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. Remember, the more you buy, the more you save (or so my daughter tells me when we visit the store).

波仙珠宝店（Borsheims）将举办两场仅限股东参加的活动：

周五晚宴：5月5日18:00-21:00鸡尾酒会
周日庆典：5月7日9:00-16:00主宴会
周六营业至18:00。请记住，购物越多，节省越多（这是我女儿常提醒我的）。

# Borsheims and Special Guests (波仙珠宝店与特别嘉宾)

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, May 1st through Saturday, May 13th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing you own our stock.

周末期间波仙珠宝店将人流如织。为方便购物，股东专属优惠将从5月1日（周一）延续至5月13日（周六）。请出示会议凭证或持股证明（如经纪报表）以验证股东身份。

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician and motivational speaker from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. On the upper level, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. If they suggest wagering on the game, change the subject. I will join them at some point and hope Ajit, Charlie and Bill Gates will do so also.

周日中午起，达拉斯魔术大师诺曼·贝克（Norman Beck）将在波仙珠宝店外商场表演惊艳魔术。二楼将有桥牌世界冠军鲍勃·哈曼（Bob Hamman）与莎伦·奥斯伯格（Sharon Osberg）与股东对战。若他们提议下注，请立刻转移话题。我将参与其中，希望阿吉特、查理和比尔·盖茨也能加入。

My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine, and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Ariel represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. Now, she’s a senior at Princeton (after interning last summer at JPMorgan Chase). If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates did pretty well playing Ariel last year, so he may be ready to again challenge her. (My advice: Bet on Ariel.)

周日下午1点起，好友艾瑞尔·邢（Ariel Hsing）将在商场举办乒乓球挑战赛。我九岁时认识她，当时便无法从她手上赢一分。艾瑞尔曾代表美国参加2012年奥运会，现为普林斯顿大学高年级生（去年夏天刚在摩根大通实习）。若您不介意“出丑”，可前来挑战。比尔·盖茨去年表现不错，或许会再次迎战。（我的建议：押艾瑞尔。）

Gorat’s will be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 7th, serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 3rd (but not before). Show you are a sophisticated diner by ordering the T-bone with hash browns.

周日5月7日，戈拉特牛排馆（Gorat’s）将仅对伯克希尔股东开放，营业时间13:00-22:00。4月3日拨打402-551-3733预约座位（不得早于该日）。点餐时选择T骨牛排配土豆饼，展现您的老饕气质。

# Question-and-Answer Session and Analysts (问答环节与分析师)

We will have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, the preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be e-mailed at loomisbrk@gmail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of the New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.

本次问答环节将继续由三位资深财经记者主持，提问来自股东通过电子邮件提交的问题。记者及其邮箱如下：

卡罗尔·卢米斯（Carol Loomis），时代顶尖商业记者：loomisbrk@gmail.com
贝基·奎克（Becky Quick），CNBC主持人：BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金（Andrew Ross Sorkin），《纽约时报》记者：arsorkin@nytimes.com

From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important to shareholders. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)

每位记者将从提交问题中筛选六个最有趣、最重要的。记者透露：简明扼要、提前提交、紧扣伯克希尔主题、每封邮件不超过两个问题，入选概率最高。（邮件中请说明是否希望提问时提及您的姓名。）

An accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Jay Gelb of Barclays. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Since what we will be conducting is a shareholders’ meeting, our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.

此外，三位分析师将提出专业问题：巴克莱保险分析师杰·格尔布（Jay Gelb）；鲁安·坎尼夫基金乔纳森·布兰特（Jonathan Brandt）与晨星公司格雷格·沃伦（Gregg Warren）负责非保险业务提问。我们期待他们提出能加深股东对其投资理解的问题。

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. Multi-part questions aren’t allowed; we want to give as many questioners as possible a shot at us. Our goal is for you to leave the meeting knowing more about Berkshire than when you came and for you to have a good time while in Omaha.

查理和我不会提前得知任何问题。欢迎尖锐提问——这正是我们所期待的。请勿提出复合型问题，我们希望尽可能多的股东获得提问机会。我们的目标是：您离开时对伯克希尔的理解胜于入场时，且在奥马哈度过愉快时光。

All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.

总计将安排至少54个提问环节：每位分析师/记者提问6个，现场观众18个。观众提问者将通过11组抽奖决定，抽奖将于股东大会当天早上8:15进行。会议大厅及溢出会场的11个麦克风，每个都将对应一组抽奖。

# Transparency and Equal Access (透明度与平等信息权)

While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and, if possible, should also have adequate time to digest and analyze it before any trading takes place. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday (a day that also eases traffic and parking problems).

借此机会提醒：查理和我始终坚信所有股东应同步获取伯克希尔发布的信息，且在交易前应有充足时间消化。因此，我们常于周五晚间或周六早间发布财报，并将股东大会定于周六（也缓解交通与停车压力）。

We do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders. There is no one more important to us than the shareholder of limited means who trusts us with a substantial portion of his or her savings. As I run the company day-to-day – and as I write this letter – that is the shareholder whose image is in my mind.

我们从不与大型机构投资者或分析师进行一对一沟通，而是将所有股东一视同仁。对我们而言，最重要的股东是那些将毕生积蓄托付给我们的小额投资者。在我日常管理公司和撰写此信时，脑海中浮现的正是这类股东的形象。

# Our Team and Annual Meeting Philosophy (我们的团队与股东大会理念)

For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I also believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.

我经常盛赞旗下经理人的成就绝非偶然。他们如同全明星，以家族唯一资产的态度经营企业。我认为他们的股东导向思维，在上市公司中无出其右。多数经理人早已财务自由，推动他们的是击出“全垒打”的喜悦，而非薪酬。

Equally important, however, are the men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This team efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 30,450-page Federal income tax return, oversees the filing of 3,580 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities, fact-checks this letter – and the list goes on and on.

但总部团队同样重要：他们高效处理SEC监管要求、完成30,450页联邦税申报、监督3,580份州税申报、回应股东与媒体提问、发布年报、筹备全国最大股东大会、协调董事会工作、核实本信内容……贡献远超清单所列。

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year, for example, they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and French fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. In addition, they cheerfully pitch in to help Carrie Sova – our talented ringmaster at the annual meeting – deliver an interesting and entertaining weekend for our shareholders. They are proud to work for Berkshire, and I am proud of them.

他们以乐观态度和惊人效率完成所有工作，让我的生活轻松愉悦。他们的付出甚至超越伯克希尔本职：去年协助40所高校（从200所申请中选出）学生赴奥马哈参加问答日；安排我的行程、甚至为我准备淋满亨氏番茄酱的汉堡与薯条午餐。此外，他们全力支持年度大会策划人卡莉·索娃（Carrie Sova）打造趣味十足的股东周末。他们为伯克希尔自豪，我也为他们自豪。

I’m a lucky guy, very fortunate in being surrounded by this excellent staff, a team of highly-talented operating managers and a boardroom of very wise and experienced directors. Come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – on May 6th and meet the Berkshire Bunch. All of us look forward to seeing you.
February 25, 2017
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

我是幸运的，拥有卓越的总部团队、才华横溢的经理人和睿智的董事。5月6日，请到奥马哈——资本主义的摇篮——亲见伯克希尔大家庭。我们期待与您相见。
2017年2月25日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席

编辑

上次更新: 2025/07/14, 21:42:27

← 2017巴菲特致股东的信 2015巴菲特致股东的信→

2016巴菲特致股东的信

# BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

# 致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东：

# What We Hope to Accomplish

# 我们希望实现的目标

# What we do (我们做的事情)

# America’s Economic Achievements and Stock Market Returns (美国经济成就与股市回报)

# Share Repurchases (股票回购)

# Berkshire’s Repurchase Policy and Insurance Operations (伯克希尔的回购政策与保险业务)

# Insurance (保险业务)

# Berkshire’s Repurchase Policy and Insurance Operations (伯克希尔的回购政策与保险业务)

# Insurance (保险业务)

# This Outcome and Berkshire’s Insurance Prospects (这一结果与伯克希尔的保险前景)

# Float and Intrinsic Value (浮存金与内在价值)

# Berkshire’s Insurance Managers (伯克希尔的保险管理团队)

# General Re and Its Leadership Transition (通用再保险及其领导层更替)

# GEICO: A Legacy of Growth and Innovation (GEICO：增长与创新的传奇)

# GEICO’s Enduring Competitive Advantage (GEICO持久的竞争优势)

# Other Insurance Operations and Regulated Businesses (其他保险业务与受监管企业)

# Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses (受监管的资本密集型企业)

# Confidence in Regulated Investments and Environmental Stewardship (对受监管投资的信心与环保责任)

# Economic and Environmental Impact (经济与环境效益)

# Financial Overview of BHE and BNSF (BHE与BNSF财务概览)

# BNSF Railway

# 伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（90%控股）

# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations (制造、服务与零售业务)

# Balance Sheet 截至2016年12月31日（单位：百万美元）

# Earnings Statement 2016年利润表（单位：百万美元）

# Accounting Adjustments and Economic Reality (会计调整与经济现实)

# The Pitfalls of “Adjusted Earnings” (“调整后收益”的陷阱)

# Stock-Based Compensation and Financial Realities (股权激励与财务现实)

# Finance and Financial Products (金融与金融产品业务)

# Clayton’s Performance and Risk Profile (Clayton的业绩与风险特征)

# Railcar and Leasing Operations (铁路车厢与租赁业务)

# Pre-Tax Earnings Recap (税前收益概览)

# 税前收益（百万美元）

# Investments (投资组合)

# Fifteen Largest Common Stock Holdings (前十五大普通股持仓)

# Bank of America Preferred and Warrants (美国银行优先股及权证)

# Cash, Repatriation Taxes and Investment Flexibility (现金、汇回税与投资灵活性)

# Permanence of Holdings and Tax Considerations (持仓的长期性与税务考量)

# Dividends, Capital Gains and Tax Efficiency (股息、资本利得与税务效率)

# Tax Efficiency of Dividends vs. Capital Gains (股息与资本利得的税务效率)

# “The Bet” – A Decade-Long Lesson in Investing (“赌约”——十年投资启示录)

# The Wager: Hedge Funds vs. Index Funds (赌约：对冲基金 vs. 指数基金)

# Results After Nine Years (九年赌约结果)

# 赌约结果（截至2016年）

# Lessons from the Bet (赌约启示录)

# The Costly Illusion of Active Management (主动管理的昂贵幻觉)

# The Mathematics of Investing (投资的数学逻辑)

# When Success Breeds Failure (成功孕育失败的三大定律)

# Jack Bogle: America’s Investing Hero (杰克·伯格：美国投资者英雄)

# Investment Advice and Human Behavior (投资建议与人性)

# The Paradox of Wealth and Advice (财富与建议的悖论)

# The Cost of Arrogance (傲慢的代价)

# Lessons from the Stockyards (牲畜市场的启示)

# An Olive Branch to Wall Street (向华尔街伸出橄榄枝)

# The Annual Meeting (年度股东大会)

# Event Schedule and Webcast Details (活动日程与直播详情)

# Special Events and Discounts (特别活动与优惠)

# Borsheims and Special Guests (波仙珠宝店与特别嘉宾)

# Question-and-Answer Session and Analysts (问答环节与分析师)

# Transparency and Equal Access (透明度与平等信息权)

# Our Team and Annual Meeting Philosophy (我们的团队与股东大会理念)