2005巴菲特致股东的信
# BERKSHILLE HATHAWAY INC. (伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司)
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our gain in net worth during 2005 was $5.6 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%. Over the last 41 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $59,377, a rate of 21.5% compounded annually.
在2005年，我们的净资产增长了56亿美元，使我们的A类和B类股票每股账面价值均增长了6.4%。在过去41年中（即现任管理层接管以来），账面价值从19美元增长到了59,377美元，年复合增长率达21.5%。
Berkshire had a decent year in 2005. We initiated five acquisitions (two of which have yet to close) and most of our operating subsidiaries prospered. Even our insurance business in its entirety did well, though Hurricane Katrina inflicted record losses on both Berkshire and the industry. We estimate our loss from Katrina at $2.5 billion – and her ugly sisters, Rita and Wilma, cost us an additional $.9 billion.
2005年对伯克希尔来说是不错的一年。我们启动了五项收购（其中两项尚未完成），大多数运营子公司都表现良好。即便是整个保险业务也取得了不错的成绩，尽管卡特里娜飓风给伯克希尔和整个行业带来了创纪录的损失。我们估计卡特里娜造成的损失为25亿美元——而另外两场恶劣的飓风丽塔和威尔玛又让我们额外损失了9亿美元。
Credit GEICO – and its brilliant CEO, Tony Nicely – for our stellar insurance results in a disaster-ridden year. One statistic stands out: In just two years, GEICO improved its productivity by 32%. Remarkably, employment fell by 4% even as policy count grew by 26% – and more gains are in store. When we drive unit costs down in such a dramatic manner, we can offer ever-greater value to our customers. The payoff: Last year, GEICO gained market-share, earned commendable profits and strengthened its brand. If you have a new son or grandson in 2006, name him Tony.
应将这一年灾难频发背景下出色的保险业绩归功于GEICO及其卓越的CEO Tony Nicely。一个数据格外突出：仅仅两年时间，GEICO的生产力提高了32%。令人惊讶的是，在保单数量增长26%的同时，员工人数却下降了4%——而且还有更多增长潜力尚未释放。当我们以如此显著的方式降低单位成本时，就能为客户提供越来越高的价值。其成果是：去年GEICO赢得了市场份额、实现了可观利润，并强化了品牌。如果你在2006年有了新的儿子或孙子，就给他取名叫Tony吧。
My goal in writing this report is to give you the information you need to estimate Berkshire’s intrinsic value. I say “estimate” because calculations of intrinsic value, though all-important, are necessarily imprecise and often seriously wrong. The more uncertain the future of a business, the more possibility there is that the calculation will be wildly off-base. (For an explanation of intrinsic value, see pages 77 – 78.) Here Berkshire has some advantages: a wide variety of relatively-stable earnings streams, combined with great liquidity and minimum debt. These factors mean that Berkshire’s intrinsic value can be more precisely calculated than can the intrinsic value of most companies.
我撰写这份报告的目标是向你们提供估算伯克希尔内在价值所需的信息。我之所以使用“估算”这个词，是因为虽然内在价值的计算至关重要，但本质上是不精确的，而且经常出现严重错误。一家企业未来越是不确定，其估值就越可能偏离实际。（关于内在价值的解释，请参见第77-78页。）在这方面伯克希尔具有一定优势：拥有多样化的相对稳定的盈利来源，同时具备充足的流动性和极低的债务。这些因素意味着伯克希尔的内在价值可以比大多数公司更精确地进行计算。
Yet if precision is aided by Berkshire’s financial characteristics, the job of calculating intrinsic value has been made more complex by the mere presence of so many earnings streams. Back in 1965, when we owned only a small textile operation, the task of calculating intrinsic value was a snap. Now we own 68 distinct businesses with widely disparate operating and financial characteristics. This array of unrelated enterprises, coupled with our massive investment holdings, makes it impossible for you to simply examine our consolidated financial statements and arrive at an informed estimate of intrinsic value.
然而，尽管伯克希尔的财务特征有助于提升估值的精确性，但众多的盈利来源也使得内在价值的计算变得更加复杂。1965年时，我们只拥有一家小型纺织企业，那时计算内在价值非常简单。如今我们拥有68家截然不同、运营和财务特征差异巨大的企业。这一系列互不相关的企业，加上我们庞大的投资组合，使得你无法仅凭查阅合并财务报表就得出一个有依据的内在价值估算结果。
We have attempted to ease this problem by clustering our businesses into four logical groups, each of which we discuss later in this report. In these discussions, we will provide the key figures for both the group and its important components. Of course, the value of Berkshire may be either greater or less than the sum of these four parts. The outcome depends on whether our many units function better or worse by being part of a larger enterprise and whether capital allocation improves or deteriorates when it is under the direction of a holding company. In other words, does Berkshire ownership bring anything to the party, or would our shareholders be better off if they directly owned shares in each of our 68 businesses? These are important questions but ones that you will have to answer for yourself.
我们试图通过将业务划分为四个逻辑组别来缓解这一问题，每组将在本报告后面部分分别讨论。在这些讨论中，我们会列出每个组别及其重要组成部分的关键数据。当然，伯克希尔的整体价值可能高于或低于这四个部分之和。结果取决于我们的各个业务单元作为更大企业的一部分是否运作得更好，以及当资本配置由控股公司主导时是否有所改善。换句话说，伯克希尔的所有权到底有没有带来增值？还是说股东们如果直接持有我们旗下68家企业的股份会更好？这些问题很重要，但需要你自己去判断。
Before we look at our individual businesses, however, let’s review two sets of figures that show where we’ve come from and where we are now. The first set is the amount of investments (including cash and cash-equivalents) we own on a per-share basis. In making this calculation, we exclude investments held in our finance operation because these are largely offset by borrowings:
不过，在具体分析各项业务之前，我们先来看两组数据，它们展示了我们过去的位置与当前所处的位置。第一组是我们按每股基础持有的投资总额（包括现金及等价物）。在计算这项指标时，我们排除了金融业务中的投资，因为这部分投资基本上被借款抵消了：
| Year | Per-Share Investments* |
|---|---|
| 1965 | $4 |
| 1975 | $159 |
| 1985 | $2,407 |
| 1995 | $21,817 |
| 2005 | $74,129 |
Compound Growth Rate 1965–2005: 28.0%
Compound Growth Rate 1995–2005: 13.0%
* 净少数权益
In addition to these marketable securities, which with minor exceptions are held in our insurance companies, we own a wide variety of non-insurance businesses. Below, we show the pre-tax earnings (excluding goodwill amortization) of these businesses, again on a per-share basis:
除了这些可交易证券（除极少数例外外，基本由我们的保险公司持有）之外，我们还拥有多样化的非保险业务。以下列出了这些业务的税前收益（不含商誉摊销），同样是以每股为基础显示的：
| Year | Per-Share Earnings* |
|---|---|
| 1965 | $4 |
| 1975 | $4 |
| 1985 | $52 |
| 1995 | $175 |
| 2005 | $2,441 |
Compound Growth Rate 1965–2005: 17.2%
Compound Growth Rate 1995–2005: 30.2%
* 税前并扣除少数权益
When growth rates are under discussion, it will pay you to be suspicious as to why the beginning and terminal years have been selected. If either year was aberrational, any calculation of growth will be distorted. In particular, a base year in which earnings were poor can produce a breathtaking, but meaningless, growth rate. In the table above, however, the base year of 1965 was abnormally good; Berkshire earned more money in that year than it did in all but one of the previous ten.
在讨论增长率时，你应该对为何选择特定起始年份和结束年份保持怀疑态度。如果其中任何一年是非典型的，那么增长率的计算就会失真。特别是，如果基准年收益特别差，可能会产生惊人但毫无意义的增长率。然而，在上表中，1965年这个基期却是异常良好的；那一年伯克希尔的盈利水平高于此前十年中除一年以外的所有年份。
As you can see from the two tables, the comparative growth rates of Berkshire’s two elements of value have changed in the last decade, a result reflecting our ever-increasing emphasis on business acquisitions. Nevertheless, Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I want to increase the figures in both tables. In this ambition, we hope – metaphorically – to avoid the fate of the elderly couple who had been romantically challenged for some time. As they finished dinner on their 50th anniversary, however, the wife – stimulated by soft music, wine and candlelight – felt a long-absent tickle and demurely suggested to her husband that they go upstairs and make love. He agonized for a moment and then replied, “I can do one or the other, but not both.”
从这两张表格可以看出，在过去十年中，伯克希尔两个价值构成要素的相对增长率发生了变化，这反映了我们日益重视企业并购的结果。尽管如此，查理·芒格（伯克希尔副主席兼我的合伙人）和我都希望继续提高这两个表格中的数值。在这个目标下，我们希望——用比喻的说法——避免一对老年夫妻的命运。这对夫妻多年来在感情上一直平淡无奇。但在他们金婚纪念日晚餐结束后，妻子受柔和的音乐、美酒和烛光感染，感到久违的心跳加速，便羞涩地建议丈夫一起上楼亲热一番。丈夫沉吟片刻后回答：“我可以做其中一件，但不能同时做两件事。”
Acquisitions
Over the years, our current businesses, in aggregate, should deliver modest growth in operating earnings. But they will not in themselves produce truly satisfactory gains. We will need major acquisitions to get that job done.
收购
总体而言，我们目前的业务应该能够在未来带来适度的营运利润增长。但仅靠这些业务本身不足以实现真正令人满意的增长。我们需要通过重大收购来实现这一目标。
In this quest, 2005 was encouraging. We agreed to five purchases: two that were completed last year, one that closed after yearend and two others that we expect to close soon. None of the deals involve the issuance of Berkshire shares. That’s a crucial, but often ignored, point: When a management proudly acquires another company for stock, the shareholders of the acquirer are concurrently selling part of their interest in everything they own. I’ve made this kind of deal a few times myself – and, on balance, my actions have cost you money.
在这方面，2005年是个积极的一年。我们达成了五项收购协议：其中两项已于去年完成，一项在年底后完成，另外两项预计很快完成。所有交易均未涉及伯克希尔股票的发行。这是一个关键但常被忽视的要点：当管理层自豪地以股票形式收购另一家公司时，收购方的股东实际上也在同时出售自己所持资产的一部分权益。我自己也曾做过几次这种交易——总的来说，这种做法给你们造成了经济损失。
Here are last year’s purchases:
• On June 30 we bought Medical Protective Company (“MedPro”), a 106-year-old medical malpractice insurer based in Fort Wayne. Malpractice insurance is tough to underwrite and has proved to be a graveyard for many insurers. MedPro nevertheless should do well. It will have the attitudinal advantage that all Berkshire insurers share, wherein underwriting discipline trumps all other goals. Additionally, as part of Berkshire, MedPro has financial strength far exceeding that of its competitors, a quality assuring doctors that long-to-settle claims will not end up back on their doorstep because their insurer failed. Finally, the company has a smart and energetic CEO, Tim Kenesey, who instinctively thinks like a Berkshire manager.
以下是我们去年的收购项目：
• 6月30日，我们收购了位于福特韦恩市的Medical Protective Company（简称“MedPro”），这是一家拥有106年历史的医疗事故保险公司。医疗事故保险承保难度大，已被证明是许多保险公司的坟墓。不过MedPro应该会表现良好。它将具备伯克希尔旗下所有保险公司都拥有的态度优势，即坚持承保纪律高于一切目标。此外，作为伯克希尔的一部分，MedPro的财务实力远超其竞争对手，这确保医生们不必担心那些需要多年才能解决的理赔最终会因保险公司倒闭而回到他们自己身上。最后，这家公司有一位聪明且精力充沛的CEO——Tim Kenesey，他本能地像伯克希尔管理者那样思考问题。
• Forest River, our second acquisition, closed on August 31. A couple of months earlier, on June 21, I received a two-page fax telling me – point by point – why Forest River met the acquisition criteria we set forth on page 25 of this report. I had not before heard of the company, a recreational vehicle manufacturer with $1.6 billion of sales, nor of Pete Liegl, its owner and manager. But the fax made sense, and I immediately asked for more figures. These came the next morning, and that afternoon I made Pete an offer. On June 28, we shook hands on a deal.
• 第二项收购是Forest River，于8月31日完成交割。几个月前的6月21日，我收到一封两页的传真，逐条说明为何Forest River符合我们在本报告第25页所列的收购标准。在此之前，我对这家年销售额达16亿美元、主营休闲车制造的公司及其所有者兼管理者Pete Liegl一无所知。但这份传真内容合理，于是我立刻要求提供更多数据。次日上午数据送达，当天下午我就向Pete提出了报价。6月28日，我们握手达成交易。
Pete is a remarkable entrepreneur. Some years back, he sold his business, then far smaller than today, to an LBO operator who promptly began telling him how to run the place. Before long, Pete left, and the business soon sunk into bankruptcy. Pete then repurchased it. You can be sure that I won’t be telling Pete how to manage his operation.
Pete是一位非凡的企业家。几年前，他曾将自己的企业以较低规模卖给一家杠杆收购公司，结果对方接手后立即开始告诉他该如何经营。不久之后，Pete离职，公司很快陷入破产。随后他又将其回购。你可以放心，我绝不会插手告诉Pete如何管理他的业务。
Forest River has 60 plants, 5,400 employees and has consistently gained share in the RV business, while also expanding into other areas such as boats. Pete is 61 – and definitely in an acceleration mode. Read the piece from RV Business that accompanies this report, and you’ll see why Pete and Berkshire are made for each other.
Forest River拥有60家工厂、5,400名员工，在休闲车市场持续扩大市场份额，同时也扩展到了船只等其他领域。Pete今年61岁，正处于加速发展阶段。阅读随本报告附带的《RV Business》文章，你就能明白为何Pete与伯克希尔是天作之合。
• On November 12, 2005, an article ran in The Wall Street Journal dealing with Berkshire’s unusual acquisition and managerial practices. In it Pete declared, “It was easier to sell my business than to renew my driver’s license.”
In New York, Cathy Baron Tamraz read the article, and it struck a chord. On November 21, she sent me a letter that began, “As president of Business Wire, I’d like to introduce you to my company, as I believe it fits the profile of Berkshire Hathaway subsidiary companies as detailed in a recent Wall Street Journal article.”
• 2005年11月12日，《华尔街日报》刊登了一篇关于伯克希尔非同寻常的收购和管理方式的文章。文中Pete表示：“卖掉我的公司比更新驾照还容易。”
在纽约，Cathy Baron Tamraz读到这篇文章并深受触动。11月21日，她给我写了一封信，开头写道：“作为Business Wire的总裁，我想向您介绍我的公司，因为我相信它符合《华尔街日报》最近一篇报道中所述伯克希尔·哈撒韦子公司形象。”
By the time I finished Cathy’s two-page letter, I felt Business Wire and Berkshire were a fit. I particularly liked her penultimate paragraph: “We run a tight ship and keep unnecessary spending under wraps. No secretaries or management layers here. Yet we’ll invest big dollars to gain a technological advantage and move the business forward.”
当我读完Cathy那两页信件时，我已经觉得Business Wire与伯克希尔非常契合。我尤其喜欢她的倒数第二段：“我们运作高效，严格控制不必要的开支。这里没有秘书也没有繁复的管理层级。尽管如此，我们会投入重金来获得技术优势并推动业务发展。”
I promptly gave Cathy a call, and before long Berkshire had reached agreement with Business Wire’s controlling shareholder, Lorry Lokey, who founded the company in 1961 (and who had just made Cathy CEO). I love success stories like Lorry’s. Today 78, he has built a company that disseminates information in 150 countries for 25,000 clients. His story, like those of many entrepreneurs who have selected Berkshire as a home for their life’s work, is an example of what can happen when a good idea, a talented individual and hard work converge.
我立刻给Cathy打了电话，不久之后伯克希尔便与Business Wire的实际控制人Lorry Lokey达成协议。Lorry于1961年创立了该公司（并在不久前任命Cathy为CEO）。我喜欢像Lorry这样的成功故事。现年78岁的他打造了一家为全球150个国家、25,000家客户提供信息服务的公司。他的经历，就像许多选择伯克希尔作为其毕生事业归宿的企业家一样，展示了当一个好点子、一位有才华的人以及辛勤努力结合在一起时所能产生的奇迹。
• In December we agreed to buy 81% of Applied Underwriters, a company that offers a combination of payroll services and workers’ compensation insurance to small businesses. A majority of Applied’s customers are located in California.
• 12月，我们同意收购Applied Underwriters 81%的股份。这家公司为中小企业提供薪资服务与工伤赔偿保险的组合产品。Applied的大多数客户位于加利福尼亚州。
In 1998, though, when the company had 12 employees, it acquired an Omaha-based operation with 24 employees that offered a somewhat-similar service. Sid Ferenc and Steve Menzies, who have built Applied’s remarkable business, concluded that Omaha had many advantages as an operational base – a brilliant insight, I might add – and today 400 of the company’s 479 employees are located here.
然而早在1998年，当时公司仅有12名员工，Applied就收购了一家总部设在奥马哈、拥有24名员工、提供类似服务的公司。Sid Ferenc和Steve Menzies创建了Applied令人瞩目的业务。他们认为奥马哈作为运营基地具有诸多优势——我必须说这是一个极具洞察力的判断。如今，公司479名员工中有400人都在这里工作。
Less than a year ago, Applied entered into a large reinsurance contract with Ajit Jain, the extraordinary manager of National Indemnity’s reinsurance division. Ajit was impressed by Sid and Steve, and they liked Berkshire’s method of operation. So we decided to join forces. We are pleased that Sid and Steve retain 19% of Applied. They started on a shoestring only 12 years ago, and it will be fun to see what they can accomplish with Berkshire’s backing.
不到一年前，Applied与National Indemnity再保险部门的杰出管理者Ajit Jain签订了一份大型再保险合同。Ajit对Sid和Steve印象深刻，而他们也欣赏伯克希尔的运营方式。于是我们决定携手合作。我们很高兴Sid和Steve仍保留了Applied 19%的股份。他们仅靠微薄资金起家，12年前才起步，现在可以期待他们在伯克希尔支持下能取得怎样的成就。
• Last spring, MidAmerican Energy, our 80.5% owned subsidiary, agreed to buy PacifiCorp, a major electric utility serving six Western states. An acquisition of this sort requires many regulatory approvals, but we’ve now obtained these and expect to close this transaction soon. Berkshire will then buy $3.4 billion of MidAmerican’s common stock, which MidAmerican will supplement with $1.7 billion of borrowing to complete the purchase. You can’t expect to earn outsized profits in regulated utilities, but the industry offers owners the opportunity to deploy large sums at fair returns – and therefore, it makes good sense for Berkshire. A few years back, I said that we hoped to make some very large purchases in the utility field. Note the plural – we’ll be looking for more.
• 去年春天，我们持股80.5%的MidAmerican Energy同意收购PacifiCorp，这是一家服务于西部六个州的重要电力公用事业公司。此类收购需要多项监管批准，但我们现在已经获得了这些批准，并预计很快完成交易。届时伯克希尔将购买MidAmerican价值34亿美元的普通股，MidAmerican还将通过17亿美元的借款来完成此次收购。你不能指望在受监管的公共事业中获得超额利润，但这个行业确实为投资者提供了部署大量资金并获得合理回报的机会——因此对伯克希尔来说这是个明智之举。几年前我说过我们希望在公用事业领域进行一些大规模收购。请注意用词是复数形式——我们还会继续寻找更多机会。
In addition to buying these new operations, we continue to make “bolt-on” acquisitions. Some aren’t so small: Shaw, our carpet operation, spent about $550 million last year on two purchases that furthered its vertical integration and should improve its profit margin in the future. XTRA and Clayton Homes also made value-enhancing acquisitions.
除了收购这些新业务外，我们还继续进行“附加式”收购。有些金额并不小：我们的地毯业务Shaw去年斥资约5.5亿美元收购了两家公司，进一步推进了垂直整合战略，并有望在未来提升利润率。XTRA和Clayton Homes也进行了增值型收购。
Unlike many business buyers, Berkshire has no “exit strategy.” We buy to keep. We do, though, have an entrance strategy, looking for businesses in this country or abroad that meet our six criteria and are available at a price that will produce a reasonable return. If you have a business that fits, give me a call. Like a hopeful teenage girl, I’ll be waiting by the phone.
与许多商业买家不同，伯克希尔没有所谓的“退出策略”。我们购买是为了长期持有。但我们确实有一个“进入策略”，即寻找国内或国外符合我们六项标准、且价格能够带来合理回报的企业。如果你有一家符合条件的公司，请打电话给我。我会像一个满怀期待的少女一样，守着电话等待来电。
# Insurance （保险业务）
Let’s now talk about our four sectors and start with insurance, our core business. What counts here is the amount of “float” and its cost over time.
现在让我们谈谈我们的四大业务板块，首先从核心业务——保险开始。在这里，关键在于“浮存金”（float）的数量及其成本。
For new readers, let me explain. “Float” is money that doesn’t belong to us but that we temporarily hold. Most of our float arises because (1) premiums are paid upfront though the service we provide – insurance protection – is delivered over a period that usually covers a year and; (2) loss events that occur today do not always result in our immediately paying claims, because it sometimes takes many years for losses to be reported (asbestos losses would be an example), negotiated and settled. The $20 million of float that came with our 1967 entry into insurance has now increased – both by way of internal growth and acquisitions – to $49 billion.
对于新读者，让我先解释一下。“浮存金”是指不属于我们、但我们暂时持有的资金。我们的大部分浮存金来源于两个原因：(1) 保费是预先支付的，但我们提供的服务——保险保障——通常覆盖一年时间；(2) 今天发生的损失事件并不总是意味着我们必须立即支付赔款，因为有些损失可能要很多年后才会被报告（例如石棉相关损失）、协商和结案。1967年我们进入保险业时仅有2,000万美元的浮存金，如今这一数字已通过内生增长和收购增加至490亿美元。
Float is wonderful – if it doesn’t come at a high price. Its cost is determined by underwriting results, meaning how the expenses and losses we will ultimately pay compare with the premiums we have received. When an insurer earns an underwriting profit – as has been the case at Berkshire in about half of the 39 years we have been in the insurance business – float is better than free. In such years, we are actually paid for holding other people’s money. For most insurers, however, life has been far more difficult: In aggregate, the property-casualty industry almost invariably operates at an underwriting loss. When that loss is large, float becomes expensive, sometimes devastatingly so.
浮存金是美妙的——只要它的代价不高。其成本取决于承保业绩，也就是我们最终支付的费用和损失与我们所收取保费之间的对比。当一家保险公司实现承保利润时——这正是伯克希尔在过去39年中大约一半时间所做到的——浮存金甚至比免费还要好。在那些年份里，我们实际上是被付钱来持有别人的钱。然而，对于大多数保险公司而言，情况要艰难得多：总体来看，财产险行业几乎总是处于承保亏损状态。一旦这种亏损巨大，浮存金的成本就会变得昂贵，有时甚至是灾难性的。
In 2004 our float cost us less than nothing, and I told you that we had a chance – absent a mega-catastrophe – of no-cost float in 2005. But we had the mega-cat, and as a specialist in that coverage, Berkshire suffered hurricane losses of $3.4 billion. Nevertheless, our float was costless in 2005 because of the superb results we had in our other insurance activities, particularly at GEICO.
2004年我们的浮存金成本甚至低于零，我当时告诉你们，除非发生特大灾难，否则2005年的浮存金成本可能接近于零。但我们确实遭遇了这场特大灾难，作为这一领域的专业承保商，伯克希尔因飓风损失达34亿美元。不过，由于我们在其他保险业务——尤其是GEICO——取得了卓越成绩，2005年的浮存金对我们来说仍然是无成本的。
Auto policies in force grew by 12.1% at GEICO, a gain increasing its market share of U.S. private passenger auto business from about 5.6% to about 6.1%. Auto insurance is a big business: Each share-point equates to $1.6 billion in sales.
GEICO在手汽车保单增长了12.1%，使其在美国私人乘用车市场的份额从约5.6%上升至约6.1%。汽车保险是一个巨大的行业：每增加一个市场份额点就意味着16亿美元的销售额。
While our brand strength is not quantifiable, I believe it also grew significantly. When Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its annual advertising expenditures were $31 million. Last year we were up to $502 million. And I can’t wait to spend more.
尽管品牌实力难以量化，但我相信它也显著增强了。1996年伯克希尔取得GEICO控制权时，其年度广告支出为3,100万美元。去年我们已增至5.02亿美元。而且我迫不及待想花更多钱。
Our advertising works because we have a great story to tell: More people can save money by insuring with us than is the case with any other national carrier offering policies to all comers. (Some specialized auto insurers do particularly well for applicants fitting into their niches; also, because our national competitors use rating systems that differ from ours, they will sometimes beat our price.) Last year, we achieved by far the highest conversion rate – the percentage of internet and phone quotes turned into sales – in our history. This is powerful evidence that our prices are more attractive relative to the competition than ever before. Test us by going to GEICO.com or by calling 800-847-7536. Be sure to indicate you are a shareholder because that fact will often qualify you for a discount.
我们的广告有效，是因为我们有精彩的故事可讲：相比任何一家向所有客户提供保单的全国性保险公司，更多人选择我们能省下更多钱。（一些专业汽车保险公司对符合特定条件的客户的确提供更优惠的价格；此外，由于我们的全国竞争对手使用与我们不同的评级系统，有时他们的价格会比我们更具优势。）去年，我们实现了公司历史上最高的转化率——即互联网和电话报价转化为销售的比例。这有力地证明，我们的价格相对于竞争对手而言比以往任何时候都更有吸引力。请访问GEICO.com或拨打800-847-7536进行测试。务必说明你是股东，因为这一身份通常可让你享受折扣。
I told you last year about GEICO’s entry into New Jersey in August, 2004. Drivers in that state love us. Our retention rate there for new policyholders is running higher than in any other state, and by sometime in 2007, GEICO is likely to become the third largest auto insurer in New Jersey. There, as elsewhere, our low costs allow low prices that lead to steady gains in profitable business.
我去年曾告诉你，GEICO于2004年8月进入新泽西州市场。该州的驾驶者们非常喜爱我们。那里新保户的续保率高于我们在其他任何州的水平，预计到2007年某个时候，GEICO有望成为新泽西州第三大汽车保险公司。在那里，就像在其他地方一样，我们的低成本使我们能够提供低价，从而实现盈利业务的稳步增长。
That simple formula immediately impressed me 55 years ago when I first discovered GEICO. Indeed, at age 21, I wrote an article about the company – it’s reproduced on page 24 – when its market value was $7 million. As you can see, I called GEICO “The Security I Like Best.” And that’s what I still call it.
这个简单的公式在我55年前第一次发现GEICO时就给我留下了深刻印象。事实上，在我21岁时，我曾写过一篇关于这家公司的文章（见第24页），当时它的市值仅为700万美元。正如你所见，我把GEICO称为“我最喜欢的证券”。直到今天，我仍然这么称呼它。
# We have major reinsurance operations at General Re and National Indemnity. The former is run by Joe Brandon and Tad Montross, the latter by Ajit Jain. Both units performed well in 2005 considering the extraordinary hurricane losses that battered the industry.
我们在General Re和National Indemnity拥有重要的再保险业务。前者由Joe Brandon和Tad Montross管理，后者由Ajit Jain负责。考虑到重创行业的异常飓风损失，这两个单位在2005年的表现依然出色。
It’s an open question whether atmospheric, oceanic or other causal factors have dramatically changed the frequency or intensity of hurricanes. Recent experience is worrisome. We know, for instance, that in the 100 years before 2004, about 59 hurricanes of Category 3 strength, or greater, hit the Southeastern and Gulf Coast states, and that only three of these were Category 5s. We further know that in 2004 there were three Category 3 storms that hammered those areas and that these were followed by four more in 2005, one of them, Katrina, the most destructive hurricane in industry history. Moreover, there were three Category 5s near the coast last year that fortunately weakened before landfall.
大气、海洋或其他因素是否已显著改变飓风的频率或强度，这是一个尚未明确的问题。近期的经验令人担忧。例如我们知道，在2004年之前的一百年里，大约有59场三级及以上强度的飓风袭击了美国东南部和墨西哥湾沿岸各州，其中只有3场是五级飓风。我们还知道，2004年有三场三级飓风重创这些地区，并在2005年又接连出现四场，其中之一就是卡特里娜飓风，这是业内最具破坏力的飓风。此外，去年沿海地区出现了三场五级飓风，幸运的是它们登陆前减弱了。
Was this onslaught of more frequent and more intense storms merely an anomaly? Or was it caused by changes in climate, water temperature or other variables we don’t fully understand? And could these factors be developing in a manner that will soon produce disasters dwarfing Katrina?
这种频繁而强烈的风暴袭击仅仅是异常现象吗？还是由气候变化、海水温度变化或其他我们尚不完全理解的因素引起的？这些因素是否正在以一种可能导致未来灾害远超卡特里娜的方式发展？
Joe, Ajit and I don’t know the answer to these all-important questions. What we do know is that our ignorance means we must follow the course prescribed by Pascal in his famous wager about the existence of God. As you may recall, he concluded that since he didn’t know the answer, his personal gain/loss ratio dictated an affirmative conclusion.
Joe、Ajit和我都无法回答这些至关重要的问题。但我们知道的是，我们的无知意味着我们必须遵循帕斯卡在其著名“上帝存在与否”赌注中提出的应对方式。也许你还记得，他的结论是：既然不知道答案，那么从个人得失比例来看，他应该倾向于相信上帝存在。
So guided, we’ve concluded that we should now write mega-cat policies only at prices far higher than prevailed last year – and then only with an aggregate exposure that would not cause us distress if shifts in some important variable produce far more costly storms in the near future. To a lesser degree, we felt this way after 2004 – and cut back our writings when prices didn’t move. Now our caution has intensified. If prices seem appropriate, however, we continue to have both the ability and the appetite to be the largest writer of mega-cat coverage in the world.
受此启发，我们得出结论：现在我们只应在价格远高于去年的前提下承保巨灾险——并且只能在总风险敞口不至于让我们痛苦的情况下这么做，以防某些关键变量变化导致未来几年内风暴造成的损失大幅上升。早在2004年之后我们就已有类似想法，并在价格未上涨时减少了承保量。如今我们的谨慎程度进一步提高。然而，如果价格合适，我们仍有能力和意愿继续做全球最大规模的巨灾保险承保商。
Our smaller insurers, with MedPro added to the fold, delivered truly outstanding results last year. However, what you see in the table below does not do full justice to their performance. That’s because we increased the loss reserves of MedPro by about $125 million immediately after our purchase.
随着MedPro的加入，我们的中小型保险公司去年交出了真正杰出的成绩。但你在下表中看到的数据并未充分反映它们的表现。这是因为我们在收购后立即提高了MedPro的损失准备金约1.25亿美元。
No one knows with any precision what amount will be required to pay the claims we inherited. Medical malpractice insurance is a “long-tail” line, meaning that claims often take many years to settle. In addition, there are other losses that have occurred, but that we won’t even hear about for some time.
没有人能准确判断我们需要支付多少金额来处理我们继承的理赔请求。医疗事故保险属于“长尾业务”，意味着许多理赔往往需要多年才能解决。此外，还有其他已经发生的损失，我们甚至要过一段时间才会得知。
One thing, though, we have learned – the hard way – after many years in the business: Surprises in insurance are far from symmetrical. You are lucky if you get one that is pleasant for every ten that go the other way. Too often, however, insurers react to looming loss problems with optimism. They behave like the fellow in a switchblade fight who, after his opponent has taken a mighty swipe at his throat, exclaimed, “You never touched me.” His adversary’s reply: “Just wait until you try to shake your head.”
然而，经过多年的从业经验，我们学到一件苦涩的事情：保险业中的意外远非对称性的。如果你在十次负面事件中能有一次正面惊喜，那你就算是幸运的了。然而，太多保险公司面对即将显现的损失问题时仍抱持乐观态度。他们就像一个在弹簧刀搏斗中的人，当对手猛砍他的喉咙后，他还喊道：“你连我都没碰到！” 对方回应道：“等你试着摇头的时候就知道了。”
Excluding the reserves we added for prior periods, MedPro wrote at an underwriting profit. And our other primary companies, in aggregate, had an underwriting profit of $324 million on $1,270 million of volume. This is an extraordinary result, and our thanks go to Rod Eldred of Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Companies, John Kizer of Central States Indemnity, Tom Nerney of U. S. Liability, Don Towle of Kansas Bankers Surety and Don Wurster of National Indemnity.
剔除我们为前期计提的准备金后，MedPro实现了承保利润。而我们的其他主要保险公司整体上在12.7亿美元保费收入中实现了3.24亿美元的承保利润。这是一个非凡的成绩。我们感谢Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Companies的Rod Eldred、Central States Indemnity的John Kizer、U.S. Liability的Tom Nerney、Kansas Bankers Surety的Don Towle以及National Indemnity的Don Wurster。
Here’s the overall tally on our underwriting and float for each major sector of insurance:
(in $ millions)
| Insurance Operations | 2005 Underwriting Profit (Loss) | 2004 Underwriting Profit (Loss) | Yearend Float 2005 |
|---|---|---|---|
| General Re | $(334) | $235* | $22,920 |
| B-H Reinsurance | $1,221 | $1,069 | $16,233 |
| GEICO | $235 | $53 | $6,692 |
| Other Primary | $417 | $970 | $3,442 |
| Total | $1,551 | $1,617 | $49,287 |
以下是我们在各主要保险板块的承保和浮存金汇总数据：
（单位：百万美元）
| 保险运营部门 | 2005年承保利润（亏损） | 2004年承保利润（亏损） | 2005年末浮存金 |
|---|---|---|---|
| General Re | $(3.34亿) | $2.35亿* | $229.2亿 |
| B-H 再保险 | $12.21亿 | $10.69亿 | $162.33亿 |
| GEICO | $2.35亿 | $5,300万 | $66.92亿 |
| 其他主要公司 | $4.17亿 | $9.7亿 | $34.42亿 |
| 总计 | $15.51亿 | $16.17亿 | $492.87亿 |
*包含自2005年6月30日起纳入的MedPro数据
# Regulated Utility Business （受监管的公用事业）
We have an 80.5% (fully diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.7 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 706,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; and (3) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry 7.8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S. When our PacifiCorp acquisition closes, we will add 1.6 million electric customers in six Western states, with Oregon and Utah providing us the most business. This transaction will increase MidAmerican’s revenues by $3.3 billion and its assets by $14.1 billion.
我们持有MidAmerican Energy Holdings 80.5%（完全摊薄）的权益，该公司拥有多样化的公用事业运营资产。其中最大的三项包括：(1) Yorkshire Electricity和Northern Electric，这两家公司在英国拥有370万电力用户，是英国第三大电力分销商；(2) MidAmerican Energy，服务70.6万名电力用户，主要位于爱荷华州；(3) Kern River和Northern Natural天然气管道，输送着美国消耗天然气总量的7.8%。一旦我们完成对PacifiCorp的收购，我们将新增六位西部州共160万电力用户，其中俄勒冈州和犹他州将为我们带来最多业务。这项交易将使MidAmerican的营收增加33亿美元，资产总额增加141亿美元。
The Public Utility Holding Company Act (“PUHCA”) was repealed on August 8, 2005, a milestone that allowed Berkshire to convert its MidAmerican preferred stock into voting common shares on February 9, 2006. This conversion ended a convoluted corporate arrangement that PUHCA had forced upon us. Now we have 83.4% of both the common stock and the votes at MidAmerican, which allows us to consolidate the company’s income for financial accounting and tax purposes. Our true economic interest, however, is the aforementioned 80.5%, since there are options outstanding that are sure to be exercised within a few years and that upon exercise will dilute our ownership.
《公用事业控股公司法案》（PUHCA）于2005年8月8日被废除，这一里程碑事件使伯克希尔得以于2006年2月9日将其所持MidAmerican优先股转换为具有投票权的普通股。此次转换结束了PUHCA强加给我们的复杂公司结构安排。现在我们持有MidAmerican 83.4%的普通股和投票权，这使我们能够在财务会计和税务目的上合并该公司的收入。然而，我们真正的经济权益仍是前述的80.5%，因为目前还有一些期权将在未来几年内行权，届时将稀释我们的持股比例。
Though our voting power has increased dramatically, the dynamics of our four-party ownership have not changed at all. We view MidAmerican as a partnership among Berkshire, Walter Scott, and two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. It’s unimportant how many votes each party has; we will make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise. Five years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have underscored my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.
尽管我们的投票权大幅增加，但我们四方股东之间的合作关系并未改变。我们将MidAmerican视为伯克希尔、Walter Scott以及两位杰出管理者Dave Sokol和Greg Abel之间的合伙企业。各方拥有多少投票权并不重要；只有当我们一致认为某项重大决策明智时才会推进。与Dave、Greg和Walter合作五年后，我更加坚信当初的看法：伯克希尔不可能找到比他们更好的合作伙伴。
You will notice that this year we have provided you with two balance sheets, one representing our actual figures per GAAP on December 31, 2005 (which does not consolidate MidAmerican) and one that reflects the subsequent conversion of our preferred. All future financial reports of Berkshire will include MidAmerican’s figures.
你会注意到，今年我们提供了两张资产负债表：一张反映的是截至2005年12月31日按GAAP准则编制的实际数据（未合并MidAmerican），另一张则反映了随后优先股转换后的数据。今后伯克希尔的所有财务报告都将包含MidAmerican的数据。
Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S. And it’s a gem. The parent company’s name is HomeServices of America, but our 19,200 agents operate through 18 locally-branded firms. Aided by three small acquisitions, we participated in $64 billion of transactions last year, up 6.5% from 2004.
有些出人意料的是，MidAmerican还拥有美国第二大房地产经纪公司，而且这家公司非常出色。母公司名为HomeServices of America，但我们的19,200名经纪人通过18家本地品牌公司开展业务。借助三起小型收购，我们去年参与了总值640亿美元的交易，较2004年增长了6.5%。
Currently, the white-hot market in residential real estate of recent years is cooling down, and that should lead to additional acquisition possibilities for us. Both we and Ron Peltier, the company’s CEO, expect HomeServices to be far larger a decade from now.
目前，近年来炽热的住宅房地产市场正在降温，这应该会为我们带来更多的收购机会。我们和公司CEO Ron Peltier都预计，十年后HomeServices的规模将会大得多。
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:
以下是MidAmerican运营的一些关键数据：
| 项目（英文 + 中文） | 2005年（百万美元） | 2004年（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities （英国公用事业） | $308 | $326 |
| Iowa utility （爱荷华州公用事业） | $288 | $268 |
| Pipelines （天然气管道） | $309 | $288 |
| HomeServices | $148 | $130 |
| Other (net) （其他净收益） | $107 | $172 |
| Income (loss) from discontinued zinc project （锌项目停产业务的收益/亏损） | $(8) | $(579) |
| Earnings before corporate interest and taxes （税前及利息前利润） | $1,168 | $605 |
| Interest, other than to Berkshire （非伯克希尔相关利息支出） | $(200) | $(212) |
| Interest on Berkshire junior debt （伯克希尔次级债务利息支出） | $(157) | $(170) |
| Income tax （所得税） | $(248) | $(53) |
| Net earnings （净利润） | $563 | $170 |
| Earnings applicable to Berkshire* （归属于伯克希尔的利润） | $170 | $9 |
| Debt owed to others （应付他人债务） | $10,296 | $10,528 |
| Debt owed to Berkshire （应付伯克希尔债务） | $1,289 | $1,478 |
* 包括伯克希尔获得的利息收入（扣除相关所得税后）：2005年为1.02亿美元，2004年为1.1亿美元。
# Finance and Financial Products （金融与金融产品）
The star of our finance sector is Clayton Homes, masterfully run by Kevin Clayton. He does not owe his brilliant record to a rising tide: The manufactured-housing business has been disappointing since Berkshire purchased Clayton in 2003. Industry sales have stagnated at 40-year lows, and the recent uptick from Katrina-related demand will almost certainly be short-lived. In recent years, many industry participants have suffered losses, and only Clayton has earned significant money.
我们金融板块的明星是Clayton Homes，由Kevin Clayton卓越管理。他取得的优异成绩并非得益于行业整体上涨：自伯克希尔于2003年收购Clayton以来，预制房业务一直令人失望。整个行业的销售持续低迷至40年来的最低水平，而因卡特里娜飓风引发的需求回升几乎肯定是短暂的。近年来，行业内许多参与者都遭遇亏损，唯有Clayton实现了显著盈利。
In this brutal environment Clayton has bought a large amount of manufactured-housing loans from major banks that found them unprofitable and difficult to service. Clayton’s operating expertise and Berkshire’s financial resources have made this an excellent business for us and one in which we are preeminent. We presently service $17 billion of loans, compared to $5.4 billion at the time of our purchase. Moreover, Clayton now owns $9.6 billion of its servicing portfolio, a position built up almost entirely since Berkshire entered the picture.
在如此严酷的环境下，Clayton从各大银行手中购买了大量预制房贷款——这些银行发现这类贷款无利可图且难以服务。Clayton的运营专长与伯克希尔的财务资源结合在一起，使这项业务成为我们的优势领域之一，也使我们在行业中占据领先地位。目前我们管理的贷款总额达170亿美元，相比之下，收购时仅为54亿美元。此外，Clayton如今拥有其服务贷款组合中的96亿美元资产，几乎所有这些头寸都是自伯克希尔进入后建立起来的。
To finance this portfolio, Clayton borrows money from Berkshire, which in turn borrows the same amount publicly. For the use of its credit, Berkshire charges Clayton a one percentage-point markup on its borrowing cost. In 2005, the cost to Clayton for this arrangement was $83 million. That amount is included in “Other” income in the table on the facing page, and Clayton’s earnings of $416 million are after deducting this payment.
为了融资支持这个贷款组合，Clayton向伯克希尔借款，而伯克希尔则在市场上以公开发行方式筹集相应资金。出于使用信用额度的原因，伯克希尔对Clayton收取其融资成本基础上1个百分点的溢价。2005年，这种安排给Clayton带来的成本为8,300万美元。这笔金额已计入下页表格“其他收入”项下，Clayton当年4.16亿美元的盈利是在扣除该项费用之后的结果。
On the manufacturing side, Clayton has also been active. To its original base of twenty plants, it first added twelve more in 2004 by way of the bankruptcy purchase of Oakwood, which just a few years earlier was one of the largest companies in the business. Then in 2005 Clayton purchased Karsten, a four-plant operation that greatly strengthens Clayton’s position on the West Coast.
在制造端，Clayton也非常活跃。在原有20家工厂的基础上，它于2004年通过破产收购Oakwood又增加了12家工厂。就在几年前，Oakwood还是业内最大的公司之一。接着在2005年，Clayton又收购了Karsten，后者拥有四家工厂，大大增强了Clayton在西海岸的竞争力。
Long ago, Mark Twain said: “A man who tries to carry a cat home by its tail will learn a lesson that can be learned in no other way.” If Twain were around now, he might try winding up a derivatives business. After a few days, he would opt for cats.
很久以前，马克·吐温曾说：“一个人如果试图抓住猫尾巴把它带回家，他会学到一种别的方式学不到的教训。” 如果马克·吐温活到现在，他可能会尝试结束一个衍生品业务。几天之后，他宁愿选择去抓猫。
We lost $104 million pre-tax last year in our continuing attempt to exit Gen Re’s derivative operation. Our aggregate losses since we began this endeavor total $404 million.
去年，在我们持续努力退出Gen Re的衍生品业务过程中，我们税前损失了1.04亿美元。自我们开始这一进程以来，累计损失已达4.04亿美元。
Originally we had 23,218 contracts outstanding. By the start of 2005 we were down to 2,890. You might expect that our losses would have been stemmed by this point, but the blood has kept flowing. Reducing our inventory to 741 contracts last year cost us the $104 million mentioned above.
最初我们共有23,218份未到期合约。到2005年初，数量减少至2,890份。你或许会以为此时损失应已得到控制，但事实是出血仍未停止。去年我们将合约数量进一步削减至741份，为此又付出了上述1.04亿美元的代价。
Remember that the rationale for establishing this unit in 1990 was Gen Re’s wish to meet the needs of insurance clients. Yet one of the contracts we liquidated in 2005 had a term of 100 years! It’s difficult to imagine what “need” such a contract could fulfill except, perhaps, the need of a compensation-conscious trader to have a long-dated contract on his books. Long contracts, or alternatively those with multiple variables, are the most difficult to mark to market (the standard procedure used in accounting for derivatives) and provide the most opportunity for “imagination” when traders are estimating their value. Small wonder that traders promote them.
请记住，1990年设立该部门的初衷是Gen Re希望满足保险客户的需求。然而，我们在2005年清算的一份合约期限竟长达100年！很难想象这份合约除了满足某些注重薪酬的交易员希望账面上保留一份长期合约外，还能满足什么实际需求。期限很长的合约，或涉及多个变量的合约，是最难进行市值计价（衍生品会计的标准程序）的，也是交易员在估值时最容易发挥“想象力”的。难怪交易员们热衷推广这类合约。
A business in which huge amounts of compensation flow from assumed numbers is obviously fraught with danger. When two traders execute a transaction that has several, sometimes esoteric, variables and a far-off settlement date, their respective firms must subsequently value these contracts whenever they calculate their earnings. A given contract may be valued at one price by Firm A and at another by Firm B. You can bet that the valuation differences – and I’m personally familiar with several that were huge – tend to be tilted in a direction favoring higher earnings at each firm. It’s a strange world in which two parties can carry out a paper transaction that each can promptly report as profitable.
一个基于假设数字就能产生巨额报酬的业务显然充满风险。当两名交易员执行一项交易，其中包含多个有时甚至晦涩难懂的变量，并且结算日期遥不可及时，他们的公司就必须在每次计算收益时对该合约进行估值。同一份合约可能在A公司估值为某一价格，在B公司却为另一个价格。你可以打赌，这些估值差异——我自己就亲历过几次巨大的差异——往往偏向有利于各自公司报告更高盈利的方向。这是一个奇怪的世界：两方可以完成一笔纸上交易，并迅速各自宣称从中获利。
I dwell on our experience in derivatives each year for two reasons. One is personal and unpleasant. The hard fact is that I have cost you a lot of money by not moving immediately to close down
我每年都会反复强调我们在衍生品业务上的经验，原因有两个。一个是个人层面的，也是令人不愉快的。残酷的事实是，因为我没有立即采取行动关闭这项业务，我给你们造成了巨大损失。
Gen Re’s trading operation. Both Charlie and I knew at the time of the Gen Re purchase that it was a problem and told its management that we wanted to exit the business. It was my responsibility to make sure that happened. Rather than address the situation head on, however, I wasted several years while we attempted to sell the operation. That was a doomed endeavor because no realistic solution could have extricated us from the maze of liabilities that was going to exist for decades. Our obligations were particularly worrisome because their potential to explode could not be measured. Moreover, if severe trouble occurred, we knew it was likely to correlate with problems elsewhere in financial markets.
Gen Re的交易业务。在收购Gen Re时，Charlie和我都清楚这是一个问题，并明确告知其管理层我们希望退出该业务。我本应确保这一目标尽快实现。然而我没有果断采取行动，而是浪费了数年时间尝试将这项业务出售。这注定失败，因为没有任何现实可行的办法能让我们摆脱未来几十年都难以解决的复杂负债。我们的义务尤其令人担忧，因为这些潜在风险无法准确衡量。而且一旦发生严重问题，我们知道它很可能与金融市场其他领域的危机相互关联。
So I failed in my attempt to exit painlessly, and in the meantime more trades were put on the books. Fault me for dithering. (Charlie calls it thumb-sucking.) When a problem exists, whether in personnel or in business operations, the time to act is now.
因此，我在试图平稳退出的过程中失败了，而在此期间又有更多交易被记录在案。请把责任归咎于我的犹豫不决。（Charlie称之为“吮指”——即拖延症。）当一个问题存在时，无论是人事还是运营方面，现在就是采取行动的最佳时机。
The second reason I regularly describe our problems in this area lies in the hope that our experiences may prove instructive for managers, auditors and regulators. In a sense, we are a canary in this business coal mine and should sing a song of warning as we expire. The number and value of derivative contracts outstanding in the world continues to mushroom and is now a multiple of what existed in 1998, the last time that financial chaos erupted.
我每年都会反复描述我们在这一领域的问题的第二个原因，是希望我们的经历能为管理者、审计师和监管者提供一些借鉴意义。从某种意义上说，我们就像矿井里的金丝雀，在逐渐死亡前发出警告之歌。全球未到期衍生品合约的数量和价值仍在持续激增，如今已远超1998年金融危机爆发时的水平。
Our experience should be particularly sobering because we were a better-than-average candidate to exit gracefully. Gen Re was a relatively minor operator in the derivatives field. It has had the good fortune to unwind its supposedly liquid positions in a benign market, all the while free of financial or other pressures that might have forced it to conduct the liquidation in a less-than-efficient manner. Our accounting in the past was conventional and actually thought to be conservative. Additionally, we know of no bad behavior by anyone involved.
我们的经验应该特别具有警示作用，因为我们原本属于较容易顺利退出的公司。Gen Re在衍生品领域只是一个相对较小的参与者。我们有幸在一个温和的市场环境中清算那些被认为流动性较强的头寸，且从未面临可能迫使我们低效清算的财务或其他压力。我们过去使用的会计方法是常规的，甚至一度被认为是保守的。此外，我们并未发现任何相关人员存在不当行为。
It could be a different story for others in the future. Imagine, if you will, one or more firms (troubles often spread) with positions that are many multiples of ours attempting to liquidate in chaotic markets and under extreme, and well-publicized, pressures. This is a scenario to which much attention should be given now rather than after the fact. The time to have considered – and improved – the reliability of New Orleans’ levees was before Katrina.
未来其他机构的情况可能会完全不同。试想一下，一家或多家机构（麻烦往往会蔓延）持有的头寸规模是我们的许多倍，却不得不在混乱的市场中、在极端且广受关注的压力下进行清算。这是当前就应引起高度重视的情景，而不是事后才来应对。考虑并提升新奥尔良防洪堤可靠性的最佳时机是在卡特里娜飓风来临之前。
When we finally wind up Gen Re Securities, my feelings about its departure will be akin to those expressed in a country song, “My wife ran away with my best friend, and I sure miss him a lot.”
当我们最终彻底结束Gen Re Securities的业务时，我对它的离去心情就如同一首乡村歌曲所唱：“我妻子跟着我最好的朋友跑了，我真的非常想念他。”
# Below are the results of our various finance and financial products activities:
以下是我们在各类金融与金融产品业务中的业绩表现：
| 项目（英文 + 中文） | 2005年（百万美元） | 2004年（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|
| Trading – ordinary income （交易——普通收入） | $200 | $264 |
| Gen Re Securities (loss) （Gen Re证券亏损） | $(104) | $(44) |
| Life and annuity operation （寿险与年金业务） | $30 | $(57) |
| Value Capital (loss) （Value Capital亏损） | $173 | $33 |
| Leasing operations （租赁业务） | $92 | $11 |
| Manufactured-housing finance (Clayton) （预制房金融业务——Clayton） | $416 | $9,299* |
| Other （其他） | $192 | $3,636* |
| Income before capital gains （资本利得前收益） | $822 | $588 |
| Trading – capital gains (losses) （交易——资本利得/损失） | $159 | $2,334 |
| Total （总计） | $977 | $1,646 |
* 包括所有负债
# Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations （制造、服务与零售业务）
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
伯克希尔这部分业务覆盖范围极广。下面我们来看整个集团的简要资产负债表和利润表。
# Balance Sheet 截至 2005 年 12 月 31 日（单位：百万美元）
| 资产（英文 + 中文） | 金额（百万美元） |
|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents （现金及等价物） | $1,469 |
| Accounts and notes receivable （应收账款与票据） | $5,371 |
| Inventory （存货） | $6,840 |
| Other current assets （其他流动资产） | $338 |
| Total current assets （流动资产合计） | $13,018 |
| Goodwill and other intangibles （商誉及其他无形资产） | $16,839 |
| Fixed assets （固定资产） | $29,885 |
| Other assets （其他资产） | $2,157 |
| 总资产（Total Assets） | $61,900 |
| 负债与权益（英文 + 中文） | 金额（百万美元） |
|---|---|
| Notes payable （应付票据） | $1,004 |
| Other current liabilities （其他流动负债） | $3,287 |
| Total current liabilities （流动负债合计） | $4,143 |
| Deferred taxes （递延税项） | $8,776 |
| Term debt and other liabilities （长期债务及其他负债） | $9,260 |
| Equity （股东权益） | $7,148 |
| 总负债与权益（Total Liabilities & Equity） | $61,900 |
# Earnings Statement （利润表，单位：百万美元）
| 项目（英文 + 中文） | 2005年 | 2004年 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenues （营业收入） | $44,142 | $46,896 |
| Operating expenses （营业支出，含折旧） | $41,604（2005年折旧699百万美元） $44,190（2004年折旧676百万美元） | —— |
| Interest expense (net) （净利息支出） | $57 | $83 |
| Pre-tax earnings （税前利润） | $2,481 | $2,623 |
| Income taxes （所得税） | $941 | $977 |
| Net income （净利润） | $1,540 | $1,646 |
This eclectic collection, which sells products ranging from Dilly Bars to fractional interests in Boeing 737s, earned a very respectable 22.2% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s noteworthy also that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly, we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at substantial premiums to net worth – a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet – and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 10.1%.
这个多元化组合销售的产品种类繁多，从Dilly Bars冰淇淋到波音737的部分产权都有。去年，它在平均有形净资产基础上实现了相当可观的22.2%回报率。更值得注意的是，这些业务仅使用了极少的财务杠杆就达到了这一回报水平。显然，我们拥有一些非常优秀的企业。然而，我们以显著高于账面价值的价格收购了其中许多企业——这一点体现在资产负债表上的商誉科目中——因此，按平均账面价值计算的回报率下降到了10.1%。
Here are the pre-tax earnings for the larger categories or units:
以下是较大业务板块或单元的税前利润情况：
| 项目（英文 + 中文） | 2005年（百万美元） | 2004年（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|
| Building Products （建筑材料） | $751 | $643 |
| Shaw Industries （Shaw工业集团） | $485 | $466 |
| Apparel & Footwear （服装与鞋类） | $348 | $325 |
| Retailing of Jewelry, Home Furnishings and Candy （珠宝、家居用品与糖果零售） | $257 | $215 |
| Flight Services （飞行服务） | $120 | $191 |
| McLane （McLane公司） | $217 | $228 |
| Other businesses （其他业务） | $445 | $413 |
| 总计（Total） | $2,623 | $2,481 |
In both our building-products companies and at Shaw, we continue to be hit by rising costs for raw materials and energy. Most of these operations are significant users of oil (or more specifically, petrochemicals) and natural gas. And prices for these commodities have soared.
We, likewise, have raised prices on many products, but there are often lags before increases become effective. Nevertheless, both our building-products operations and Shaw delivered respectable results in 2005, a fact attributable to their strong business franchises and able managements.
我们的建筑材料公司和Shaw集团都继续受到原材料和能源成本上涨的冲击。这些业务中大多数都是石油（更准确地说是石化产品）和天然气的重要使用者，而这些商品的价格已经飙升。
我们也对许多产品提高了价格，但价格调整往往存在滞后效应。尽管如此，我们的建筑材料业务和Shaw在2005年仍然取得了令人满意的成绩，这归功于它们强大的品牌优势和出色的管理团队。
• In apparel, our largest unit, Fruit of the Loom, again increased earnings and market-share. You know, of course, of our leadership position in men’s and boys’ underwear, in which we account for about 48.7% of the sales recorded by mass-marketers (Wal-Mart, Target, etc.). That’s up from 44.2% in 2002, when we acquired the company. Operating from a smaller base, we have made still greater gains in intimate apparel for women and girls that is sold by the mass-marketers, climbing from 13.7% of their sales in 2002 to 24.7% in 2005. A gain like that in a major category doesn’t come easy. Thank John Holland, Fruit’s extraordinary CEO, for making this happen.
• 在服装业务中，我们最大的子公司Fruit of the Loom再次实现了盈利和市场份额的增长。你当然知道我们在男童和男士内衣市场处于领先地位，在大众零售商（如沃尔玛、塔吉特等）记录的销售中，我们占据了约48.7%的份额。这一数字比2002年我们收购该公司时的44.2%有所上升。而在女性和女童贴身衣物领域，虽然起步规模较小，但我们取得了更大的增长——从2002年占大众零售商销售的13.7%，提升到2005年的24.7%。在一个主要品类中实现这样的增长并不容易。这一切要归功于Fruit卓越的CEO John Holland。
• I told you last year that Ben Bridge (jewelry) and R. C. Willey (home furnishings) had same-store sales gains far above the average of their industries. You might think that blow-out figures in one year would make comparisons difficult in the following year. But Ed and Jon Bridge at their operation and Scott Hymas at R. C. Willey were more than up to this challenge. Ben Bridge had a 6.6% same-store gain in 2005, and R. C. Willey came in at 9.9%.
• 去年我曾提到Ben Bridge（珠宝）和R.C. Willey（家居用品）的同店销售增长远高于各自行业的平均水平。你可能会认为，一年的高增长会让下一年度的比较变得困难。但Ed和Jon Bridge以及R.C. Willey的Scott Hymas成功应对了这一挑战。Ben Bridge在2005年实现了6.6%的同店销售增长，而R.C. Willey则达到了9.9%。
Our never-on-Sunday approach at R. C. Willey continues to overwhelm seven-day competitors as we roll out stores in new markets. The Boise store, about which I was such a skeptic a few years back, had a 21% gain in 2005, coming off a 10% gain in 2004. Our new Reno store, opened in November, broke out of the gate fast with sales that exceeded Boise’s early pace, and we will begin business in Sacramento in June. If this store succeeds as I expect it to, Californians will see many more R. C. Willey stores in the years to come.
我们在R.C. Willey实行“周日不营业”的策略，这一做法在新市场拓展过程中继续碾压那些全年无休的竞争者。几年前我对博伊西（Boise）门店持怀疑态度，但它在2005年实现了21%的增长，而2004年也实现了10%的增长。我们于11月新开的雷诺（Reno）门店迅速打开局面，其销售速度甚至超过了博伊西早期的表现。我们将于6月在萨克拉门托（Sacramento）开业。如果这家门店能如我预期般成功，加州居民将在未来几年看到越来越多的R.C. Willey门店。
• In flight services, earnings improved at FlightSafety as corporate aviation continued its rebound. To support growth, we invest heavily in new simulators. Our most recent expansion, bringing us to 42 training centers, is a major facility at Farnborough, England that opened in September. When it is fully built out in 2007, we will have invested more than $100 million in the building and its 15 simulators. Bruce Whitman, FlightSafety’s able CEO, makes sure that no competitor comes close to offering the breadth and depth of services that we do.
• 在飞行服务方面，随着企业航空业持续复苏，FlightSafety的盈利有所改善。为了支持增长，我们大量投资于新型模拟器。我们最新的扩展使全球培训中心总数达到42个，其中位于英国法恩伯勒（Farnborough）的新设施于9月正式开放。预计到2007年全面建成后，我们将在这座建筑及其15台模拟器上投资超过1亿美元。FlightSafety出色的CEO Bruce Whitman确保了没有任何竞争对手能在服务广度和深度上与我们匹敌。
Operating results at NetJets were a different story. I said last year that this business would earn money in 2005 – and I was dead wrong.
NetJets的运营结果却完全不同。去年我说这项业务会在2005年实现盈利——但我完全错了。
Our European operation, it should be noted, showed both excellent growth and a reduced loss. Customer contracts there increased by 37%. We are the only fractional-ownership operation of any size in Europe, and our now-pervasive presence there is a key factor in making NetJets the worldwide leader in this industry.
值得一提的是，我们的欧洲业务表现出了强劲增长并亏损收窄。客户合同数量增长了37%。我们是欧洲唯一具有一定规模的共享飞机所有权运营商，如今我们在当地广泛的存在感是NetJets成为该行业全球领导者的关键因素。
Despite a large increase in customers, however, our U.S. operation dipped far into the red. Its efficiency fell, and costs soared. We believe that our three largest competitors suffered similar problems, but each is owned by aircraft manufacturers that may think differently than we do about the necessity of making adequate profits. The combined value of the fleets managed by these three competitors, in any case, continues to be less valuable than the fleet that we operate.
然而，尽管客户数量大幅增加，我们的美国业务却陷入严重亏损。效率下降，成本激增。我们认为我们的三大竞争对手也面临类似问题，但它们分别隶属于飞机制造商，可能在如何看待必须获得合理利润这一点上与我们看法不同。无论如何，由这三家竞争对手管理的机队总价值仍低于我们所运营的机队价值。
Rich Santulli, one of the most dynamic managers I’ve ever met, will solve our revenue/expense problem. He won’t do it, however, in a manner that impairs the quality of the NetJets experience. Both he and I are committed to a level of service, security and safety that can’t be matched by others.
Rich Santulli是我见过最有活力的管理者之一，他将解决我们的收入与支出问题。但他不会以牺牲NetJets客户体验质量为代价来达成目标。他和我都致力于提供他人无法企及的服务水平、安全保障和飞行安全标准。
• Our retailing category includes See’s Candies, a company we bought early in 1972 (a date making it our oldest non-insurance business). At that time, Charlie and I immediately decided to put Chuck Huggins, then 46, in charge. Though we were new at the game of selecting managers, Charlie and I hit a home run with this appointment. Chuck’s love for the customer and the brand permeated the organization, which in his 34-year tenure produced a more-than-tenfold increase in profits. This gain was achieved in an industry growing at best slowly and perhaps not at all. (Volume figures in this industry are hard to pin down.)
• 我们的零售板块包括See’s Candies，这家公司是我们于1972年初收购的（也是我们历史最久的非保险业务）。当时，Charlie和我立刻决定任命年仅46岁的Chuck Huggins负责管理。尽管那时我们还刚接触挑选经理人的工作，但这次任命堪称一记全垒打。Chuck对顾客和品牌的热爱渗透到了整个组织，在他任职的34年间，利润增长了十倍以上。这一成绩是在一个增长缓慢甚至几乎停滞的行业中取得的。（这个行业销量数据难以准确衡量。）
At yearend, Chuck turned the reins at See’s over to Brad Kinstler, who previously had served Berkshire well while running Cypress Insurance and Fechheimer’s. It’s unusual for us to move managers around, but Brad’s record made him an obvious choice for the See’s job. I hope Chuck and his wife, Donna, are at the annual meeting. If they are, shareholders can join Charlie and me in giving America’s number one candy maker a richly-deserved round of applause.
年底时，Chuck将See’s的管理权交给了Brad Kinstler，后者此前在执掌Cypress Insurance和Fechheimer期间表现出色。我们很少调动经理人，但Brad的业绩让他成为See’s掌门人的显而易见之选。我希望Chuck和他的妻子Donna能出席股东大会。如果他们到场，请股东们和Charlie、我一起，向这位美国首屈一指的糖果制造商献上热烈掌声。
Every day, in countless ways, the competitive position of each of our businesses grows either weaker or stronger. If we are delighting customers, eliminating unnecessary costs and improving our products and services, we gain strength. But if we treat customers with indifference or tolerate bloat, our businesses will wither. On a daily basis, the effects of our actions are imperceptible; cumulatively, though, their consequences are enormous.
每一天，我们的每项业务竞争力都在或增强或削弱。如果我们能让客户满意、削减不必要的成本并改进产品和服务，我们就变得更强大；如果我们对客户漠不关心或容忍机构臃肿，我们的业务就会衰退。从单日来看，行动的效果微乎其微；但从长远来看，这些影响却是巨大的。
When our long-term competitive position improves as a result of these almost unnoticeable actions, we describe the phenomenon as “widening the moat.” And doing that is essential if we are to have the kind of business we want a decade or two from now. We always, of course, hope to earn more money in the short-term. But when short-term and long-term conflict, widening the moat must take precedence. If a management makes bad decisions in order to hit short-term earnings targets, and consequently gets behind the eight-ball in terms of costs, customer satisfaction or brand strength, no amount of subsequent brilliance will overcome the damage that has been inflicted. Take a look at the dilemmas of managers in the auto and airline industries today as they struggle with the huge problems handed them by their predecessors. Charlie is fond of quoting Ben Franklin’s “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” But sometimes no amount of cure will overcome the mistakes of the past.
当我们的长期竞争优势因这些看似微小的行动而得到提升时，我们称这种现象为“拓宽护城河”。如果我们希望十年或二十年后拥有理想的企业形态，这是必不可少的。当然，我们始终希望短期内能赚更多钱。但如果短期与长期目标发生冲突，我们必须优先考虑拓宽护城河。如果管理层为了达成短期盈利目标做出错误决策，从而在成本控制、客户满意度或品牌力量等方面陷入被动，那么无论后续如何努力都无法弥补造成的损失。看看今天汽车和航空业管理者面临的困境吧，他们正苦苦应对前辈留下的巨大难题。Charlie喜欢引用本杰明·富兰克林的话：“一分预防胜过十分治疗。” 但在某些情况下，再多的治疗也无法弥补过去的错误。
Our managers focus on moat-widening – and are brilliant at it. Quite simply, they are passionate about their businesses. Usually, they were running those long before we came along; our only function since has been to stay out of the way. If you see these heroes – and our four heroines as well – at the annual meeting, thank them for the job they do for you.
我们的管理者专注于拓宽护城河，并且在这方面非常出色。简单来说，他们对自己的业务充满热情。通常，他们在我们介入之前就已经经营多年；我们唯一的职责就是不去打扰他们。如果你在股东大会上见到这些英雄人物——还有我们四位巾帼不让须眉的女管理者——请向他们致谢，感谢他们为你所做的贡献。
The attitude of our managers vividly contrasts with that of the young man who married a tycoon’s only child, a decidedly homely and dull lass. Relieved, the father called in his new son-in-law after the wedding and began to discuss the future:
“Son, you’re the boy I always wanted and never had. Here’s a stock certificate for 50% of the company. You’re my equal partner from now on.”
“Thanks, dad.”
“Now, what would you like to run? How about sales?”
“I’m afraid I couldn’t sell water to a man crawling in the Sahara.”
“Well then, how about heading human relations?”
“I really don’t care for people.”
“No problem, we have lots of other spots in the business. What would you like to do?”
“Actually, nothing appeals to me. Why don’t you just buy me out?”
我们的管理者的态度，与下面这个年轻人形成了鲜明对比：他娶了一位富豪的独生女，一位明显相貌平平、性格沉闷的女孩。婚礼结束后，老父亲松了一口气，把新女婿叫过来，开始讨论未来：
“儿子啊，你就是我一直想要却没有的孩子。这是公司50%的股票凭证，从现在起你就是我的平等合伙人了。”
“谢谢爸爸。”
“那你想负责哪一块？销售怎么样？”
“恐怕我连爬在撒哈拉沙漠里的人卖瓶水都做不到。”
“那人力资源呢？”
“说实话，我不太喜欢跟人打交道。”
“没关系，我们公司还有很多其他岗位，你想做什么？”
“其实哪个都不感兴趣。要不你直接把我买断算了？”
# Investments （投资）
We show below our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $700 million at the end of 2005 are itemized.
我们列示了我们的普通股投资。截至2005年底，市场价值超过7亿美元的投资如下：
| Shares（持股数量） | Company（公司名称） | Cost*（成本，百万美元） | Market (12/31/05)（市值，百万美元） | Percentage of Total Common Stocks（占普通股总市值比例） |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | $1,287 | $7,802 | 12.2% |
| 30,322,137 | Ameriprise Financial, Inc. | $183 | $1,243 | 12.1% |
| 43,854,200 | Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc. | $2,133 | $8,062 | 5.6% |
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | $1,299 | $732 | 6.0% |
| 6,708,760 | M&T Bank Corporation | $103 | $499 | 16.2% |
| 48,000,000 | Moody’s Corporation | $488 | $2,948 | 1.3% |
| 2,338,961,000 | PetroChina “H” shares (or equivalents) | $940 | $1,915 | 3.0% |
| 100,000,000 | The Procter & Gamble Company | $944 | $5,788 | 0.5% |
| 19,944,300 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | $11 | $933 | 18.0% |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company | $5,754 | $5,975 | 5.7% |
| 95,092,200 | Wells Fargo & Company | $369 | $16,000 | 16.0% |
| 1,724,200 | White Mountains Insurance | $7,154 | $46,721 | — |
| Others | 其他公司 | $15,947 | — | — |
| Total | 总计 | $46,721 | — | 100% |
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required, GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases.
* 这是我们实际购买价格及税务基础；由于某些资产需进行账面价值调整，GAAP中的“成本”在个别情况下有所不同。
A couple of last year’s changes in our portfolio occurred because of corporate events: Gillette was merged into Procter & Gamble, and American Express spun off Ameriprise. In addition, we substantially increased our holdings in Wells Fargo, a company that Dick Kovacevich runs brilliantly, and established positions in Anheuser-Busch and Wal-Mart.
去年我们投资组合的一些变化源于企业事件：吉列被并入宝洁公司，美国运通分拆出Ameriprise。此外，我们大幅增加了对Wells Fargo的投资——这是一家由Dick Kovacevich卓越管理的公司，并新建仓了Anheuser-Busch和沃尔玛。
Expect no miracles from our equity portfolio. Though we own major interests in a number of strong, highly-profitable businesses, they are not selling at anything like bargain prices. As a group, they may double in value in ten years. The likelihood is that their per-share earnings, in aggregate, will grow 6–8% per year over the decade and that their stock prices will more or less match that growth. (Their managers, of course, think my expectations are too modest – and I hope they’re right.)
不要指望我们的股票投资组合能带来奇迹。尽管我们持有多家强大且盈利丰厚公司的重大权益，但它们的股价并不便宜。整体来看，它们的价值可能在十年内翻倍。最有可能的是，这些公司的每股收益在未来十年将以年均6%-8%的速度增长，其股价也将大致匹配这一增长幅度。（当然，他们的管理层认为我的预期过于保守——我希望他们是正确的。）
#
The P&G-Gillette merger, closing in the fourth quarter of 2005, required Berkshire to record a $5.0 billion pre-tax capital gain. This bookkeeping entry, dictated by GAAP, is meaningless from an economic standpoint, and you should ignore it when you are evaluating Berkshire’s 2005 earnings. We didn’t intend to sell our Gillette shares before the merger; we don’t intend to sell our P&G shares now; and we incurred no tax when the merger took place.
宝洁与吉列的合并于2005年第四季度完成，伯克希尔因此记录了一笔50亿美元的税前资本利得。这笔会计记账依据的是GAAP准则，但从经济实质来看毫无意义。当你评估伯克希尔2005年的盈利时，请忽略它。我们原本无意在合并前出售持有的吉列股份，现在也不打算出售所持的宝洁股份；并且在合并发生时，我们并未产生任何税负。
It’s hard to overemphasize the importance of who is CEO of a company. Before Jim Kilts arrived at Gillette in 2001, the company was struggling, having particularly suffered from capital-allocation blunders. In the major example, Gillette’s acquisition of Duracell cost Gillette shareholders billions of dollars, a loss never made visible by conventional accounting. Quite simply, what Gillette received in business value in this acquisition was not equivalent to what it gave up. (Amazingly, this most fundamental of yardsticks is almost always ignored by both managements and their investment bankers when acquisitions are under discussion.)
CEO人选对公司的重要性再怎么强调都不为过。Jim Kilts于2001年加入吉列之前，公司正陷入困境，尤其是因为资本配置方面的严重失误。一个典型案例是吉列收购Duracell电池业务，给股东造成了数十亿美元损失，而传统会计方法从未反映出这笔损失。简单来说，吉列在这项并购中获得的商业价值远不及其所付出的代价。（令人惊讶的是，当讨论并购交易时，管理层及其投行顾问几乎总是忽视这项最基本的衡量标准。）
Upon taking office at Gillette, Jim quickly instilled fiscal discipline, tightened operations and energized marketing, moves that dramatically increased the intrinsic value of the company. Gillette’s merger with P&G then expanded the potential of both companies. For his accomplishments, Jim was paid very well – but he earned every penny. (This is no academic evaluation: As a 9.7% owner of Gillette, Berkshire in effect paid that proportion of his compensation.) Indeed, it’s difficult to overpay the truly extraordinary CEO of a giant enterprise. But this species is rare.
Jim上任后迅速引入财务纪律、优化运营并重振营销，这些举措显著提升了公司的内在价值。吉列与宝洁的合并进一步释放了两家公司的潜力。Jim为此获得了丰厚报酬——但他每一分钱都值得。这不是纸上谈兵的评价：作为持有吉列9.7%股份的股东，伯克希尔实际上支付了相应比例的薪酬。事实上，对于真正非凡的大型企业CEO，你很难说他们拿多了钱。但这种人才极为稀有。
Too often, executive compensation in the U.S. is ridiculously out of line with performance. That won’t change, moreover, because the deck is stacked against investors when it comes to the CEO’s pay. The upshot is that a mediocre-or-worse CEO – aided by his handpicked VP of human relations and a consultant from the ever-accommodating firm of Ratchet, Ratchet and Bingo – all too often receives gobs of money from an ill-designed compensation arrangement.
然而，美国的企业高管薪酬常常与业绩严重脱节。而且这种情况不会改变，因为在决定CEO薪酬时，投资者始终处于不利地位。结果往往是：一位平庸甚至糟糕的CEO，在自己挑选的人力资源副总裁和来自Ratchet, Ratchet and Bingo这家一贯配合的咨询公司支持下，却能从设计不良的薪酬机制中大赚一笔。
Take, for instance, ten-year, fixed-price options (and who wouldn’t?). If Fred Futile, CEO of Stagnant, Inc., receives a bundle of these – let’s say enough to give him an option on 1% of the company – his self-interest is clear: He should skip dividends entirely and instead use all of the company’s earnings to repurchase stock.
举个例子，比如十年期固定行权价期权（谁会不喜欢呢？）。假设Stagnant公司CEO Fred Futile获得了一批这样的期权——比如说足够让他拥有公司1%股权的期权——他的利益就很明显了：他应该完全取消分红，将公司全部利润用于回购股票。
Let’s assume that under Fred’s leadership Stagnant lives up to its name. In each of the ten years after the option grant, it earns $1 billion on $10 billion of net worth, which initially comes to $10 per share on the 100 million shares then outstanding. Fred eschews dividends and regularly uses all earnings to repurchase shares. If the stock constantly sells at ten times earnings per share, it will have appreciated 158% by the end of the option period. That’s because repurchases would reduce the number of shares to 38.7 million by that time, and earnings per share would thereby increase to $25.80. Simply by withholding earnings from owners, Fred gets very rich, making a cool $158 million, despite the business itself improving not at all. Astonishingly, Fred could have made more than $100 million if Stagnant’s earnings had declined by 20% during the ten-year period.
假设在Fred领导下，Stagnant公司名副其实。在授予期权后的十年里，每年净资产100亿美元带来10亿美元利润，初始每股收益为10美元（当时流通股为1亿股）。Fred拒绝分红，定期将所有利润用于回购股票。如果股价始终保持在市盈率10倍水平，到期时股价将上涨158%。这是因为回购使流通股减少至3,870万股，每股收益上升至25.80美元。仅仅通过不向股东分配利润，Fred就能轻松赚取1.58亿美元，尽管公司本身没有任何改善。更令人震惊的是，即使Stagnant公司在十年间盈利下降20%，Fred仍可能获利超过1亿美元。
Fred can also get a splendid result for himself by paying no dividends and deploying the earnings he withholds from shareholders into a variety of disappointing projects and acquisitions. Even if these initiatives deliver a paltry 5% return, Fred will still make a bundle. Specifically – with Stagnant’s p/e ratio remaining unchanged at ten – Fred’s option will deliver him $63 million. Meanwhile, his shareholders will wonder what happened to the “alignment of interests” that was supposed to occur when Fred was issued options.
Fred还可以选择不分红，并将从股东手中截留的资金投入各种表现不佳的项目和并购中。即使这些项目的回报率低至5%，Fred仍然能从中大赚一笔。具体而言——若Stagnant的市盈率保持不变为10倍——Fred的期权将为他带来6,300万美元收入。与此同时，股东们只能疑惑：当初授予Fred期权时所宣称的“利益一致化”到底去了哪里？
A “normal” dividend policy, of course – one-third of earnings paid out, for example – produces less extreme results but still can provide lush rewards for managers who achieve nothing.
当然，采取一种“正常”的分红政策——例如每年派发三分之一利润——产生的结果不会那么极端，但依然能让那些毫无建树的管理者获得丰厚回报。
CEOs understand this math and know that every dime paid out in dividends reduces the value of all outstanding options. I’ve never, however, seen this manager-owner conflict referenced in proxy materials that request approval of a fixed-priced option plan. Though CEOs invariably preach internally that capital comes at a cost, they somehow forget to tell shareholders that fixed-price options give them capital that is free.
CEO们都明白这个数学逻辑：每一美分的分红都会降低现有期权的价值。但我从未见过任何请求批准固定行权价期权计划的委托材料中提及这种管理层与股东之间的利益冲突。虽然CEO们通常会在内部反复强调资本是有成本的，但他们似乎忘记了告诉股东，固定行权价期权实际上让他们可以免费使用资本。
It doesn’t have to be this way: It’s child’s play for a board to design options that give effect to the automatic build-up in value that occurs when earnings are retained. But – surprise, surprise – options of that kind are almost never issued. Indeed, the very thought of options with strike prices that are adjusted for retained earnings seems foreign to compensation “experts,” who are nevertheless encyclopedic about every management-friendly plan that exists. (“Whose bread I eat, his song I sing.”)
情况本不必如此：董事会只需设计一种期权方案，让留存收益自动反映在期权价值上即可，这不过是小孩子都能做到的事。但令人“惊喜”的是，这类期权几乎从未被发行。事实上，“薪酬专家”们对调整行权价以反映留存收益的想法似乎完全陌生，尽管他们对每一种有利于管理层的激励计划都如数家珍。（“吃谁的面包，唱谁的歌。”）
Getting fired can produce a particularly bountiful payday for a CEO. Indeed, he can “earn” more in that single day, while cleaning out his desk, than an American worker earns in a lifetime of cleaning toilets. Forget the old maxim about nothing succeeding like success: Today, in the executive suite, the all-too-prevalent rule is that nothing succeeds like failure.
被解雇反而可能成为CEO的一次“丰收日”。事实上，他在离职当天“赚到”的钱，可能比一名美国人一辈子靠打扫厕所赚的钱还要多。忘记那句老话“成功才是最大的成功”吧：如今在高管层流行的新规则是——没有什么比失败更能带来成功。
Huge severance payments, lavish perks and outsized payments for ho-hum performance often occur because comp committees have become slaves to comparative data. The drill is simple: Three or so directors – not chosen by chance – are bombarded for a few hours before a board meeting with pay statistics that perpetually ratchet upwards. Additionally, the committee is told about new perks that other managers are receiving. In this manner, outlandish “goodies” are showered upon CEOs simply because of a corporate version of the argument we all used when children: “But, Mom, all the other kids have one.” When comp committees follow this “logic,” yesterday’s most egregious excess becomes today’s baseline.
巨额离职补偿、奢华福利以及对平庸表现的过度奖励之所以频繁出现，往往是因为薪酬委员会已沦为“同业数据”的奴隶。操作方式很简单：三名左右董事（并非随机选出）在董事会召开前几个小时被灌输一堆不断上升的薪酬统计数据。此外，委员会还会被告知其他高管获得了哪些新福利。就这样，荒唐的“好处”被一股脑地砸向CEO们，仅仅因为公司版的童年辩词仍在生效：“妈妈，别人都有。” 当薪酬委员会遵循这种“逻辑”时，昨天最过分的奢侈就变成了今天的基准。
Comp committees should adopt the attitude of Hank Greenberg, the Detroit slugger and a boyhood hero of mine. Hank’s son, Steve, at one time was a player’s agent. Representing an outfielder in negotiations with a major league club, Steve sounded out his dad about the size of the signing bonus he should ask for. Hank, a true pay-for-performance guy, got straight to the point, “What did he hit last year?” When Steve answered “.246,” Hank’s comeback was immediate: “Ask for a uniform.”
薪酬委员会应当效仿底特律棒球明星、我儿时偶像Hank Greenberg的态度。Hank的儿子Steve曾是一名球员经纪人。有一次他代表一名外野手与大联盟俱乐部谈判，试探父亲应要求多少签约奖金合适。作为真正“绩效导向”的Hank直奔主题：“他去年打击率多少？”当Steve回答“.246”时，Hank立刻回应：“让他要件球衣吧。”
(Let me pause for a brief confession: In criticizing comp committee behavior, I don’t speak as a true insider. Though I have served as a director of twenty public companies, only one CEO has put me on his comp committee. Hmmmm . . .)
（让我坦白一下：在批评薪酬委员会行为时，我不是真正的圈内人。尽管我曾担任过二十家上市公司的董事，但只有一位CEO邀请我加入他的薪酬委员会。嗯……）
# My views on America’s long-term problem in respect to trade imbalances, which I have laid out in previous reports, remain unchanged. My conviction, however, cost Berkshire $955 million pre-tax in 2005. That amount is included in our earnings statement, a fact that illustrates the differing ways in which GAAP treats gains and losses. When we have a long-term position in stocks or bonds, year-to-year changes in value are reflected in our balance sheet but, as long as the asset is not sold, are rarely reflected in earnings. For example, our Coca-Cola holdings went from $1 billion in value early on to $13.4 billion at yearend 1998 and have since declined to $8.1 billion – with none of these moves affecting our earnings statement. Long-term currency positions, however, are daily marked to market and therefore have an effect on earnings in every reporting period. From the date we first entered into currency contracts, we are $2.0 billion in the black.
我对美国长期贸易失衡问题的看法——此前报告中已多次阐述——至今未变。然而，我的判断也让我们伯克希尔在2005年税前损失了9.55亿美元。这笔金额体现在我们的利润表上，它说明了GAAP准则对损益处理的不同方式。当我们持有股票或债券这类长期资产时，其年度价值变动会反映在资产负债表中，但只要没有出售，通常不会影响利润表。例如，我们持有的可口可乐股份最初价值10亿美元，到1998年底增至134亿美元，之后又回落至81亿美元——这些变化从未影响我们的利润表。而长期货币头寸则每日按市价计价，因此每个报告期都会影响盈利。自我们首次进入外汇合约以来，我们在这一块已经获利20亿美元。
We reduced our direct position in currencies somewhat during 2005. We partially offset this change, however, by purchasing equities whose prices are denominated in a variety of foreign currencies and that earn a large part of their profits internationally. Charlie and I prefer this method of acquiring non-dollar exposure. That’s largely because of changes in interest rates: As U.S. rates have risen relative to those of the rest of the world, holding most foreign currencies now involves a significant negative “carry.” The carry aspect of our direct currency position indeed cost us money in 2005 and is likely to do so again in 2006. In contrast, the ownership of foreign equities is likely, over time, to create a positive carry – perhaps a substantial one.
我们在2005年减少了部分直接的货币头寸。不过，我们通过购买以多种外币计价、且国际收入占比较高的股票，在一定程度上抵消了这一调整。Charlie和我都更偏好这种获得非美元敞口的方式。这主要是由于利率变化：随着美国利率相对于世界其他国家上升，持有大多数外币现在会产生显著的负“利差”。我们的直接货币头寸在2005年确实带来了成本，2006年可能还会如此。相比之下，持有外国股票从长远来看可能会带来正的利差——也许是非常可观的正利差。
The underlying factors affecting the U.S. current account deficit continue to worsen, and no letup is in sight. Not only did our trade deficit – the largest and most familiar item in the current account – hit an all-time high in 2005, but we also can expect a second item – the balance of investment income – to soon turn negative. As foreigners increase their ownership of U.S. assets (or of claims against us) relative to U.S. investments abroad, these investors will begin earning more on their holdings than we do on ours. Finally, the third component of the current account, unilateral transfers, is always negative.
影响美国经常账户赤字的基本因素持续恶化，而且看不到缓解迹象。不仅经常账户中最大、最熟悉的项目——贸易逆差——在2005年创下历史新高；第二项——投资收益余额——也将很快转为负值。随着外国人持有的美国资产（或对我们债权）相对于美国对外投资的增长，他们将开始从这些资产中赚取比我们更多回报。最后，经常账户中的第三部分——单方面转移支付——始终是负数。
The U.S., it should be emphasized, is extraordinarily rich and will get richer. As a result, the huge imbalances in its current account may continue for a long time without their having noticeable deleterious effects on the U.S. economy or on markets. I doubt, however, that the situation will forever remain benign. Either Americans address the problem soon in a way we select, or at some point the problem will likely address us in an unpleasant way of its own.
需要强调的是，美国极其富有，并将继续变得更富。因此，其经常账户的巨大不平衡或许还能维持相当长时间，而不会对美国经济或市场造成明显负面影响。但我怀疑这种良性局面不会永远持续下去。要么美国人尽快以我们自己选择的方式解决这个问题；否则，迟早问题将以一种令人不快的方式反过来找上门来。
# How to Minimize Investment Returns （如何最小化投资回报）
It’s been an easy matter for Berkshire and other owners of American equities to prosper over the years. Between December 31, 1899 and December 31, 1999, to give a really long-term example, the Dow rose from 66 to 11,497. (Guess what annual growth rate is required to produce this result; the surprising answer is at the end of this section.) This huge rise came about for a simple reason: Over the century American businesses did extraordinarily well and investors rode the wave of their prosperity. Businesses continue to do well. But now shareholders, through a series of self-inflicted wounds, are in a major way cutting the returns they will realize from their investments.
多年来，伯克希尔和其他美国股市投资者实现繁荣是一件轻而易举的事。举个真正的长期例子：从1899年12月31日到1999年12月31日，道琼斯指数从66点上涨到了11,497点。（猜猜实现这一结果所需的年均增长率是多少？答案就在本节末尾，会让你惊讶。）这次巨大增长的原因其实很简单：整个世纪里美国企业表现出色，投资者乘上了它们繁荣的浪潮。企业今天仍然表现良好。但现在股东们却因一系列自我造成的“伤口”，大幅削减了自己的投资回报。
The explanation of how this is happening begins with a fundamental truth: With unimportant exceptions, such as bankruptcies in which some of a company’s losses are borne by creditors, the most that owners in aggregate can earn between now and Judgment Day is what their businesses in aggregate earn. True, by buying and selling that is clever or lucky, investor A may take more than his share of the pie at the expense of investor B. And, yes, all investors feel richer when stocks soar. But an owner can exit only by having someone take his place. If one investor sells high, another must buy high. For owners as a whole, there is simply no magic – no shower of money from outer space – that will enable them to extract wealth from their companies beyond that created by the companies themselves.
解释这一点首先要从一个基本事实说起：除去一些无关紧要的情况（比如破产中由债权人承担的部分损失），从现在到审判日为止，所有股东合计能获得的最大收益就是这些企业合计所赚的钱。当然，聪明或幸运的A投资者可以通过买卖从B投资者那里分得更大一块蛋糕；没错，股价上涨时所有投资者都觉得自己更有钱了。但一位股东若想退出，必须有人接盘。如果某位投资者高价卖出，另一位就得高价买入。对于全体股东而言，没有任何魔法能让他们的财富增长超过企业自身创造的价值。
Indeed, owners must earn less than their businesses earn because of “frictional” costs. And that’s my point: These costs are now being incurred in amounts that will cause shareholders to earn far less than they historically have.
事实上，由于存在“摩擦性”成本，股东实际获得的收益一定低于企业本身所赚的钱。而这正是我想说的重点：目前这些成本之高，使得股东们未来将获得远低于历史水平的回报。
To understand how this toll has ballooned, imagine for a moment that all American corporations are, and always will be, owned by a single family. We’ll call them the Gotrocks. After paying taxes on dividends, this family – generation after generation – becomes richer by the aggregate amount earned by its companies. Today that amount is about $700 billion annually. Naturally, the family spends some of these dollars. But the portion it saves steadily compounds for its benefit. In the Gotrocks household everyone grows wealthier at the same pace, and all is harmonious.
要理解这项成本是如何膨胀的，不妨设想这样一个场景：全美所有公司过去、现在和将来都属于一个家族。我们称他们为Gotrocks家族。这个家族每年缴纳完股息所得税后，靠旗下企业整体盈利一代代致富。如今，这个总额约为每年7000亿美元。很自然，家族成员花掉其中一部分，但剩下的储蓄持续复利增长，使他们更加富裕。在Gotrocks家族内部，所有人以同样的速度变得富有，一切井然有序。
But let’s now assume that a few fast-talking Helpers approach the family and persuade each of its members to try to outsmart his relatives by buying certain of their holdings and selling them certain others. The Helpers – for a fee, of course – obligingly agree to handle these transactions. The Gotrocks still own all of corporate America; the trades just rearrange who owns what. So the family’s annual gain in wealth diminishes, equaling the earnings of American business minus commissions paid. The more that family members trade, the smaller their share of the pie and the larger the slice received by the Helpers. This fact is not lost upon these broker-Helpers: Activity is their friend and, in a wide variety of ways, they urge it on.
但假设这时来了几位巧舌如簧的“帮手”，劝说家族每位成员尝试通过相互买卖股权来胜过亲戚。这些“帮手”——当然是收费的——欣然接受委托，负责执行交易。Gotrocks家族依然拥有全部美国企业；只是交易让持股结构发生了变化。于是，家族整体的年度财富增长减少，变为企业总盈利减去支付给帮手们的佣金。家族成员交易越频繁，他们分得的蛋糕就越小，而“帮手”们分走的份额越大。这点精明的经纪型帮手心知肚明：交易活跃度是他们的朋友，他们会用各种方式鼓励交易。
After a while, most of the family members realize that they are not doing so well at this new “beat-my-brother” game. Enter another set of Helpers. These newcomers explain to each member of the Gotrocks clan that by himself he’ll never outsmart the rest of the family. The suggested cure: “Hire a manager – yes, us – and get the job done professionally.” These manager-Helpers continue to use the broker-Helpers to execute trades; the managers may even increase their activity so as to permit the brokers to prosper still more. Overall, a bigger slice of the pie now goes to the two classes of Helpers.
过了一段时间，大部分家族成员意识到在这场“打败兄弟姐妹”的新游戏中，他们并未获益。于是第二批“帮手”登场了。这些新人告诉Gotrocks家族每一位成员：仅凭自己你永远赢不了其他人。“建议你雇个专业经理人——也就是我们——来做这件事。” 这些管理型帮手继续使用经纪型帮手进行交易，甚至可能进一步加大交易量，从而让经纪型帮手赚得更多。总体来看，两个层级的“帮手”现在瓜分了更大的蛋糕。
The family’s disappointment grows. Each of its members is now employing professionals. Yet overall, the group’s finances have taken a turn for the worse. The solution? More help, of course.
家族失望情绪日益加深。现在每人都请了专业人士帮忙，但整体财务状况反而更糟。那怎么办？当然，还要再请更多的帮手。
It arrives in the form of financial planners and institutional consultants, who weigh in to advise the Gotrocks on selecting manager-Helpers. The befuddled family welcomes this assistance. By now its members know they can pick neither the right stocks nor the right stock-pickers. Why, one might ask, should they expect success in picking the right consultant? But this question does not occur to the Gotrocks, and the consultant-Helpers certainly don’t suggest it to them.
于是，新的“帮手”——财务规划师和机构顾问——出现了，他们介入并指导Gotrocks家族挑选合适的经理人帮手。困惑的家族热烈欢迎这些新帮手。此时他们早已明白，无论是选股还是选基金经理，自己都不擅长。那么，为何还指望能在挑选咨询顾问时成功呢？但这个问题压根没出现在Gotrocks家族的脑海中，而顾问型帮手当然也不会提醒他们这一点。
Answer to earlier question: The annual growth rate required to raise the Dow from 66 to 11,497 over 100 years is just 5.3%.
解答前面的问题：道琼斯指数从66涨到11,497，整整100年间所需年均增长率仅为5.3%。
The Gotrocks, now supporting three classes of expensive Helpers, find that their results get worse, and they sink into despair. But just as hope seems lost, a fourth group – we’ll call them the hyper-Helpers – appears. These friendly folk explain to the Gotrocks that their unsatisfactory results are occurring because the existing Helpers – brokers, managers, consultants – are not sufficiently motivated and are simply going through the motions. “What,” the new Helpers ask, “can you expect from such a bunch of zombies?”
Gotrocks家族在供养了三类昂贵的“帮手”后发现，他们的投资结果越来越差，陷入了绝望。但就在希望即将破灭之际，第四类“帮手”出现了——我们称他们为“超级帮手”。这些“友好人士”告诉Gotrocks：之所以回报不佳，是因为现有的帮手——经纪人、经理人、顾问——缺乏足够的动力，只是走走过场。“你又能指望这群行尸走肉干出什么成绩呢？”新的帮手反问。
The new arrivals offer a breathtakingly simple solution: Pay more money. Brimming with self-confidence, the hyper-Helpers assert that huge contingent payments – in addition to stiff fixed fees – are what each family member must fork over in order to really outmaneuver his relatives.
这些新来者提出一个令人震惊又简单的解决方案：多花钱。自信满满的超级帮手们宣称，只有支付巨额绩效提成——再加上高昂的固定费用——每位家族成员才有可能真正胜过亲戚们。
The more observant members of the family see that some of the hyper-Helpers are really just manager-Helpers wearing new uniforms, bearing sewn-on sexy names like HEDGE FUND or PRIVATE EQUITY. The new Helpers, however, assure the Gotrocks that this change of clothing is all-important, bestowing on its wearers magical powers similar to those acquired by mild-mannered Clark Kent when he changed into his Superman costume. Calmed by this explanation, the family decides to pay up.
家族中一些观察力更强的成员发现，这些超级帮手其实就是换上了新制服的管理型帮手，上面绣着“对冲基金”或“私募股权”等炫目的名字。不过新帮手们向Gotrocks保证，这件“外衣”的改变至关重要，它赋予穿着者类似克拉克·肯特变身超人时所获得的那种神奇力量。听完这番解释，家族成员安心地继续掏钱。
And that’s where we are today: A record portion of the earnings that would go in their entirety to owners – if they all just stayed in their rocking chairs – is now going to a swelling army of Helpers. Particularly expensive is the recent pandemic of profit arrangements under which Helpers receive large portions of the winnings when they are smart or lucky, and leave family members with all of the losses – and large fixed fees to boot – when the Helpers are dumb or unlucky (or occasionally crooked).
这就是我们今天所处的局面：原本可以全部归股东所有的利润——如果他们都安安稳稳坐在摇椅上不动的话——现在有史以来最大比例被不断膨胀的“帮手大军”拿走。最近流行的一种安排尤其昂贵：当帮手聪明或幸运时，他们拿走大部分收益；而当他们愚蠢、倒霉（甚至偶尔不道德）时，损失和高额固定费用却都由家族成员承担。
A sufficient number of arrangements like this – heads, the Helper takes much of the winnings; tails, the Gotrocks lose and pay dearly for the privilege of doing so – may make it more accurate to call the family the Hadrocks. Today, in fact, the family’s frictional costs of all sorts may well amount to 20% of the earnings of American business. In other words, the burden of paying Helpers may cause American equity investors, overall, to earn only 80% or so of what they would earn if they just sat still and listened to no one.
这种“赢了我拿大头、输了你全赔”的安排只要足够多，或许就该把这个家族改名为Hadrocks了。事实上，如今美国股市投资者因各类摩擦成本而损失的利润可能高达企业总盈利的20%。换句话说，所有美国股票投资者的整体回报，可能只相当于他们若什么都不做、谁都不听时所能赚到的80%左右。
Long ago, Sir Isaac Newton gave us three laws of motion, which were the work of genius. But Sir Isaac’s talents didn’t extend to investing: He lost a bundle in the South Sea Bubble, explaining later, “I can calculate the movement of the stars, but not the madness of men.” If he had not been traumatized by this loss, Sir Isaac might well have gone on to discover the Fourth Law of Motion: For investors as a whole, returns decrease as motion increases.
很久以前，艾萨克·牛顿爵士为我们提出了三大运动定律，那是天才之作。但他的天赋并未延伸至投资领域：他在南海泡沫中损失惨重，后来他无奈地说：“我能计算星辰运行轨迹，却算不出人类的疯狂。” 如果他没有因此遭受打击，或许会进一步发现“第四运动定律”：对于整体投资者而言，交易越频繁，回报越低。
Here’s the answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section: To get very specific, the Dow increased from 65.73 to 11,497.12 in the 20th century, and that amounts to a gain of 5.3% compounded annually. (Investors would also have received dividends, of course.) To achieve an equal rate of gain in the 21st century, the Dow will have to rise by December 31, 2099 to – brace yourself – precisely 2,011,011.23. But I’m willing to settle for 2,000,000; six years into this century, the Dow has gained not at all.
本节开头问题的答案如下：具体来说，在整个20世纪，道琼斯指数从65.73上涨至11,497.12点，年复合增长率仅为5.3%。（当然，投资者还会收到股息。）若想在21世纪实现同样增速，到2099年12月31日，道指必须涨至——请做好心理准备——2,011,011.23点。但我愿意接受200万点就够了；进入新世纪六年多了，道指至今毫无增长。
# Debt and Risk （债务与风险）
As we consolidate MidAmerican, our new balance sheet may suggest that Berkshire has expanded its tolerance for borrowing. But that’s not so. Except for token amounts, we shun debt, turning to it for only three purposes:
随着MidAmerican并表，我们的新资产负债表可能让人误以为伯克希尔提高了对借贷的容忍度。但事实并非如此。除了极少量例外，我们避债如瘟疫，仅在以下三种情况下使用债务：
- We occasionally use repos as a part of certain short-term investing strategies that incorporate ownership of U.S. government (or agency) securities. Purchases of this kind are highly opportunistic and involve only the most liquid of securities. A few years ago, we entered into several interesting transactions that have since been unwound or are running off. The offsetting debt has likewise been cut substantially and before long may be gone.
1）我们偶尔会在某些短期投资策略中使用回购协议，这些策略涉及持有美国政府（或其机构）证券。这类操作高度机会主义，且仅限于流动性最强的证券。几年前，我们参与了几项有趣的交易，目前已逐步平仓或到期。相应的债务也已大幅削减，不久后可能彻底消失。
- We borrow money against portfolios of interest-bearing receivables whose risk characteristics we understand. We did this in 2001 when we guaranteed $5.6 billion of bank debt to take over, in partnership with Leucadia, a bankrupt Finova (which held a broad range of receivables). All of that debt has been repaid. More recently, we have borrowed to finance a widely-diversified, predictably-performing portfolio of manufactured-home receivables managed by Clayton. Alternatively, we could “securitize” – that is, sell – these receivables, but retain the servicing of them. If we followed this procedure, which is common in the industry, we would not show the debt that we do on our balance sheet, and we would also accelerate the earnings we report. In the end, however, we would earn less money. Were market variables to change so as to favor securitization (an unlikely event), we could sell part of our portfolio and eliminate the related debt. Until then, we prefer better profits to better cosmetics.
2）我们会基于对利息收益资产组合的风险充分理解后进行借款融资。2001年，我们曾与Leucadia合作接管破产的Finova公司（拥有广泛的应收债权），为此担保了56亿美元银行贷款。这项债务现已全部偿还。近期，我们通过借款支持Clayton管理的一个广泛分散、表现可预测的预制房应收账款组合。我们也可以选择“证券化”——即出售这些应收账款，同时保留服务权。若采用这一业内常见做法，我们在资产负债表上就不会显示这些负债，同时还能提前确认收入。但最终，我们将赚得更少。只有市场条件发生重大变化、使证券化变得有利（可能性很低）时，我们才会考虑出售部分资产以消除相关债务。在此之前，我们宁要真实利润，不要漂亮报表。
- At MidAmerican, we have substantial debt, but it is that company’s obligation only. Though it will appear on our consolidated balance sheet, Berkshire does not guarantee it.
Even so, this debt is unquestionably secure because it is serviced by MidAmerican’s diversified stream of highly-stable utility earnings. If there were to be some bolt from the blue that hurt one of MidAmerican’s utility properties, earnings from the others would still be more than ample to cover all debt requirements. Moreover, MidAmerican retains all of its earnings, an equity-building practice that is rare in the utility field.
3）MidAmerican确实存在大量债务，但这完全属于该公司自身义务。虽然这笔债务将出现在合并报表中，但伯克希尔并不提供担保。
即便如此，这笔债务无疑仍是安全的，因为它的偿付依赖MidAmerican多元化的、高度稳定的公用事业收益流。即使某个突发灾难影响了其中一项公用事业资产，其他资产的收益仍足以覆盖全部债务。此外，MidAmerican保留全部利润用于再投资，这种增强资本的做法在公用事业界极为罕见。
From a risk standpoint, it is far safer to have earnings from ten diverse and uncorrelated utility operations that cover interest charges by, say, a 2:1 ratio than it is to have far greater coverage provided by a single utility. A catastrophic event can render a single utility insolvent – witness what Katrina did to the local electric utility in New Orleans – no matter how conservative its debt policy. A geographical disaster – say, an earthquake in a Western state – can’t have the same effect on MidAmerican. And even a worrier like Charlie can’t think of an event that would systemically decrease utility earnings in any major way. Because of MidAmerican’s ever-widening diversity of regulated earnings, it will always utilize major amounts of debt.
从风险角度看，十家互不相关的公用事业运营所带来的收益，即便它们仅以2:1的比例覆盖利息支出，也远比一家公用事业提供更高保障。一场灾难可以让单一公用事业资不抵债——卡特里娜飓风摧毁新奥尔良当地电力公司就是明证——无论其债务政策多么保守。一次区域性灾害——比如西部某州地震——对MidAmerican的影响远远小于单个公司。就连一向谨慎的Charlie也无法想象有什么事件能系统性地严重压低公用事业收益。正因MidAmerican监管业务收益来源日益多元化，它将继续维持高杠杆水平。
And that’s about it. We are not interested in incurring any significant debt at Berkshire for acquisitions or operating purposes. Conventional business wisdom, of course, would argue that we are being too conservative and that there are added profits that could be safely earned if we injected moderate leverage into our balance sheet.
大致如此。伯克希尔不会为了收购或经营而承担任何重大债务。传统商业智慧可能会认为我们过于保守，认为如果我们适度增加财务杠杆，就能获取更多安全收益。
Maybe so. But many of Berkshire’s hundreds of thousands of investors have a large portion of their net worth in our stock (among them, it should be emphasized, a large number of our board and key managers) and a disaster for the company would be a disaster for them. Moreover, there are people who have been permanently injured to whom we owe insurance payments that stretch out for fifty years or more. To these and other constituencies we have promised total security, whatever comes: financial panics, stock-exchange closures (an extended one occurred in 1914) or even domestic nuclear, chemical or biological attacks.
也许吧。但伯克希尔数十万投资者中的许多人（包括董事会和关键管理层）都将自己的净资产大量投入本公司股票，公司一旦遭遇灾难，他们也会随之遭殃。此外，我们还欠那些终身伤残者的保险赔付，期限长达五十年以上。我们对这些群体及其他利益相关方做出了承诺：无论发生什么——金融恐慌、交易所长期关闭（如1914年那次）、甚至是国内核生化袭击——我们都将确保绝对安全。
We are quite willing to accept huge risks. Indeed, more than any other insurer, we write high-limit policies that are tied to single catastrophic events. We also own a large investment portfolio whose market value could fall dramatically and quickly under certain conditions (as happened on October 19, 1987). Whatever occurs, though, Berkshire will have the net worth, the earnings streams and the liquidity to handle the problem with ease.
我们非常愿意承担巨大风险。事实上，我们承保的巨灾险种限额远高于其他保险公司。我们也持有一个庞大的投资组合，其市值在特定条件下可能迅速暴跌（正如1987年10月19日那样）。但无论发生什么情况，伯克希尔都将凭借充足的净资产、稳定现金流和充足流动性轻松应对。
Any other approach is dangerous. Over the years, a number of very smart people have learned the hard way that a long string of impressive numbers multiplied by a single zero always equals zero. That is not an equation whose effects I would like to experience personally, and I would like even less to be responsible for imposing its penalties upon others.
任何其他方式都是危险的。多年来，许多极其聪明的人用惨痛代价明白了一个道理：一长串辉煌数字乘以一个零，结果只能是零。我不愿亲身经历这样的公式后果，更不愿成为让别人承受这种代价的罪魁祸首。
# Management Succession （管理层继任计划）
As owners, you are naturally concerned about whether I will insist on continuing as CEO after I begin to fade and, if so, how the board will handle that problem. You also want to know what happens if I should die tonight.
作为股东，你们自然会关心：如果我的能力开始衰退，我是否会坚持继续担任CEO？如果是这样，董事会又将如何处理这个问题。你们还想了解，如果我今晚突然去世会发生什么。
That second question is easy to answer. Most of our many businesses have strong market positions, significant momentum, and terrific managers. The special Berkshire culture is deeply ingrained throughout our subsidiaries, and these operations won’t miss a beat when I die.
第二个问题很容易回答。我们旗下大多数企业都拥有强劲的市场地位、显著的增长势头和出色的管理者。伯克希尔特有的企业文化已深深植根于各子公司之中，即使我不在了，这些业务也不会受到任何实质性影响。
Moreover, we have three managers at Berkshire who are reasonably young and fully capable of being CEO. Any of the three would be much better at certain management aspects of my job than I. On the minus side, none has my crossover experience that allows me to be comfortable making decisions in either the business arena or in investments. That problem will be solved by having another person in the organization handle marketable securities. That’s an interesting job at Berkshire, and the new CEO will have no problem in hiring a talented individual to do it. Indeed, that’s what we have done at GEICO for 26 years, and our results have been terrific.
此外，伯克希尔还有三位相对年轻的高管，他们完全有能力胜任CEO一职。这三人中的每一位在某些管理职能上都比我更强。但另一方面，他们都不具备我在实业经营与投资之间自由切换的经验。这一问题可以通过让组织内另一人专门负责证券投资来解决。这个职位在伯克希尔很有意思，新任CEO要找一位有才华的人来做这件事并不困难。事实上，GEICO在过去26年就是这么做的，结果非常成功。
Berkshire’s board has fully discussed each of the three CEO candidates and has unanimously agreed on the person who should succeed me if a replacement were needed today. The directors stay updated on this subject and could alter their view as circumstances change – new managerial stars may emerge and present ones will age. The important point is that the directors know now – and will always know in the future – exactly what they will do when the need arises.
伯克希尔董事会已经对这三位候选人进行了全面讨论，并一致同意：如果今天就需要更换CEO，谁将是接班人选。董事们对此保持持续关注，并可能根据情况变化调整他们的判断——新的管理明星可能会出现，而现任者也会变老。重要的是，现在董事会知道、并且将来也始终会清楚地知道，在需要时他们会怎么做。
The other question that must be addressed is whether the Board will be prepared to make a change if that need should arise not from my death but rather from my decay, particularly if this decay is accompanied by my delusionally thinking that I am reaching new peaks of managerial brilliance. That problem would not be unique to me. Charlie and I have faced this situation from time to time at Berkshire’s subsidiaries. Humans age at greatly varying rates – but sooner or later their talents and vigor decline. Some managers remain effective well into their 80s – Charlie is a wonder at 82 – and others noticeably fade in their 60s. When their abilities ebb, so usually do their powers of self-assessment. Someone else often needs to blow the whistle.
另一个必须面对的问题是：如果接班不是因为我的去世，而是因为我逐渐衰老（特别是当这种衰老伴随着我认为自己仍在不断达到管理巅峰的幻觉时），董事会是否有勇气做出改变？这个问题并非我所独有。Charlie和我在伯克希尔的子公司中曾多次遇到类似情况。人类的衰老速度差异很大——但迟早都会出现才能和精力的衰退。有些管理者即便到了80多岁仍很有效力——Charlie今年82岁依然神采奕奕；而有些人则在60岁时就明显退步。随着能力衰退，自我评估的能力通常也会下降。这时往往需要其他人站出来吹响警哨。
When that time comes for me, our board will have to step up to the job. From a financial standpoint, its members are unusually motivated to do so. I know of no other board in the country in which the financial interests of directors are so completely aligned with those of shareholders. Few boards even come close. On a personal level, however, it is extraordinarily difficult for most people to tell someone, particularly a friend, that he or she is no longer capable.
当我走到那一步时，我们的董事会必须勇敢承担责任。从财务角度而言，董事会成员有强烈的动机去做正确的事。我想不到美国还有哪家公司的董事会成员利益能如此紧密地与股东利益一致。绝大多数公司根本做不到这一点。但从个人层面来说，大多数人很难开口告诉某人——尤其是朋友——他已经不再胜任这项工作。
If I become a candidate for that message, however, our board will be doing me a favor by delivering it. Every share of Berkshire that I own is destined to go to philanthropies, and I want society to reap the maximum good from these gifts and bequests. It would be a tragedy if the philanthropic potential of my holdings was diminished because my associates shirked their responsibility to (tenderly, I hope) show me the door. But don’t worry about this. We have an outstanding group of directors, and they will always do what’s right for shareholders.
但如果我真的成了那个应该被通知的人，董事会告诉我这个决定其实是在帮我的忙。我持有的每一份伯克希尔股票最终都将捐给慈善机构，我希望社会能从这些捐赠中获得最大的益处。如果因身边人未能履行职责、不敢温柔地请我离开，导致这笔慈善资产的价值受损，那将是一场悲剧。不过你不必担心这点。我们有一群杰出的董事，他们会始终为股东的利益做正确的事情。
And while we are on the subject, I feel terrific.
顺便提一句，目前我的状态非常好。
# The Annual Meeting （股东大会）
Our meeting this year will be on Saturday, May 6. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and the latest Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. This schedule worked well last year, because it let those who wanted to attend the formal session to do so, while freeing others to shop.
今年的股东大会将在5月6日星期六举行。一如往常，Qwest中心的大门将于早上7点开放，8:30放映最新的伯克希尔影片。9:30我们将直接进入问答环节（中午可在现场摊位用餐），持续到下午3点。短暂休息后，我和Charlie将在3:15分召开正式年度会议。去年这个安排非常成功，既让想参加正式会议的人可以参加，也让其他人有时间去购物。
You certainly did your share in this respect last year. The 194,300 square foot hall adjoining the meeting area was filled with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries, and the 21,000 people who came to the meeting allowed every location to rack up sales records. Kelly Broz (neé Muchemore), the Flo Ziegfeld of Berkshire, orchestrates both this magnificent shopping extravaganza and the meeting itself. The exhibitors love her, and so do I. Kelly got married in October, and I gave her away. She asked me how I wanted to be listed in the wedding program. I replied “envious of the groom,” and that’s the way it went to press.
你们去年在这方面也确实“买账”了。毗邻会场的194,300平方英尺展览厅摆满了伯克希尔子公司的产品，来自世界各地的21,000名参会者使每个展位都创下了销售纪录。被称作伯克希尔版“弗洛·齐格菲”的Kelly Broz（原名Muchemore）一手策划了这场盛大的购物嘉年华和整个股东大会。参展商们都爱她，我也一样。Kelly去年十月结婚时，是我把她送上红毯的。她问我希望婚礼节目单上怎么写我的名字。我回答：“嫉妒新郎的人”。于是就这么印出来了。
This year we will showcase two Clayton homes (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings and NFM furniture). You will find that these homes, priced at $79,000 and $89,000, deliver excellent value. In fact, three shareholders came so firmly to that conclusion last year that they bought the $119,000 model we then showcased. Flanking the Clayton homes on the exhibition floor will be RVs from Forest River.
今年我们将在展会展示两套Clayton预制房（配有Acme砖块、Shaw地毯、Johns Manville保温材料、MiTek紧固件、Carefree遮阳篷和NFM家具）。你会看到，这两套分别售价79,000美元和89,000美元的房子性价比极高。事实上，去年就有三位股东坚定地认同这一点，当场购买了当时展出的119,000美元款型。展会上Clayton住宅的两侧，还将陈列来自Forest River的休闲房车。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 45 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can. And while you’re at it, sign up for the new GEICO credit card. It’s the one I now use.
GEICO将在展会设立展位，并由全国多位顶级保险顾问驻守，随时为您提供汽车保险报价。大多数情况下，GEICO可为您提供特别股东折扣（通常是8%）。我们在运营的50个司法管辖区中有45个允许该折扣。（补充说明：如果您符合其他折扣条件，例如特定团体折扣，该股东折扣不能叠加使用。）带上您现有的保单信息，看看我们是否能为您省钱。我相信至少50%的股东都能从中受益。顺便说一句，别忘了申请全新的GEICO信用卡——我现在用的就是它。
On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets® available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane.
星期六当天，在奥马哈机场照例会有NetJets®旗下的飞机供参观。欢迎前往Qwest展馆内的NetJets展位了解更多详情。您可以乘大巴来到奥马哈，然后开着自己的新飞机离开。
The Bookworm boutique at the Qwest broke all records last year selling Berkshire-related books. An amazing 3,500 of these were Poor Charlie’s Almanack, the collected wisdom of my partner. This means that a copy was sold every 9 seconds. And for good reason: You will never find a book with more useful ideas. Word-of-mouth recommendations have caused Charlie’s first printing of 20,500 copies to sell out, and we will therefore have a revised and expanded edition on sale at our meeting. Among the other 22 titles and DVDs available last year at the Bookworm, 4,597 copies were sold for $84,746. Our shareholders are a bookseller’s dream.
Qwest展馆内的Bookworm书店去年创下销售伯克希尔相关书籍的新纪录。其中卖出最多的书是《Poor Charlie’s Almanack》（查理·芒格智慧全书）共3,500本，意味着每9秒就售出一本。这毫不奇怪：你找不到哪本书比它包含更多实用洞见。口耳相传之下，首印20,500册很快售罄，因此我们将在本次股东大会推出更新扩展版。此外，去年该店还售出其他22种图书和DVD共计4,597本，总收入达84,746美元。我们的股东简直就是书店梦寐以求的顾客。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it.
随本报告附上的委托书材料中有一份附件，详细说明了您如何获取参加股东大会及其他活动所需的入场凭证。至于航班、酒店和租车预订，我们再次委托American Express（美国运通，电话：800-799-6634）为您提供专属协助。负责这些事务的Carol Pedersen每年为我们做得都非常出色，我在此向她表示感谢。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM nine years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $27.4 million in 2005 (up 9% from a year earlier). I get goose bumps just thinking about this volume.
位于Dodge大道与Pacific大道之间的72街占地77英亩的Nebraska Furniture Mart（内布拉斯加家具商城）将继续推出“伯克希尔周末”优惠价格。这一活动我们九年前首次在NFM举办，销售额从1997年的530万美元增长至2005年的2,740万美元（同比增长9%）。光是想到这个数字我就激动不已。
To obtain the discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, May 4 and Monday, May 8 inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but that, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., we are having a special affair for shareholders only. I’ll be there, eating barbeque, drinking Coke, and counting sales.
如欲享受折扣，请在5月4日至5月8日期间凭股东大会入场证进行购物。此次优惠甚至适用于一些平时坚决不打折的著名制造商的产品，他们在股东周末期间破例给予了我们支持。我们深表感谢。NFM营业时间为周一至周六上午10点至晚上9点，周日为上午10点至下午6点。今年5月6日星期六晚5:30至8:00，我们将为股东单独举办一场特别活动。我会到场吃烧烤、喝可乐，并数着销售数据。
Borsheim’s again will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 5. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Sunday, May 7. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.
Borsheim珠宝店也将为股东举办两场专属活动。第一场是5月5日星期五下午6点至晚上10点的鸡尾酒会；第二场则是5月7日星期日上午9点至下午4点的主宴会。星期六当天，店铺营业至下午6点。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheim’s throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, May 1 through Saturday, May 13. During that period, just identify yourself as a shareholder through your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement.
本周末Borsheim珠宝店将迎来大量人群。为方便各位股东，股东专属优惠将持续至5月1日（星期一）至5月13日（星期六）期间。在此期间，您只需出示股东大会入场证或经纪账户对账单，即可享受股东折扣。
Borsheim’s operates on a gross margin that, even before the shareholders’ discount, is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals. Last year, our shareholder-period business increased 9% from 2004, which came on top of a 73% gain the year before. The store sold 5,000 Berkshire Monopoly games – and then ran out. We’ve learned: Plenty will be in stock this year.
Borsheim的毛利率即使在提供股东折扣之前，也比其主要竞争对手低整整二十个百分点。去年我们的股东活动期间业务增长了9%（相比2004年），而前一年已增长了73%。该店售出了5,000套伯克希尔版大富翁游戏——然后就脱销了。我们吸取了教训：今年我们将准备充足库存。
In a tent outside of Borsheim’s, Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers in groups of six – blindfolded. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. They plan to keep their eyes open – but Bob never sorts his cards, even when playing for a national championship.
在Borsheim店外将搭建帐篷举办特别活动。曾两次获得美国国际象棋冠军的Patrick Wolff将在蒙眼状态下接受每组六人的挑战。此外，我们还邀请到世界顶级桥牌高手Bob Hamman和Sharon Osberg于星期日下午与股东们切磋牌技。他们承诺不会蒙眼——不过Bob打桥牌时从不整理手牌，即便参加全国锦标赛也是如此。
Gorat’s – my favorite steakhouse – will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 7, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on that day, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1 (but not before).
我最喜欢的牛排馆Gorat’s将于5月7日星期日下午4点至晚上10点专为伯克希尔股东开放。请务必记住，当天前往Gorat’s必须提前预订。您可在4月1日当天拨打电话402-551-3733进行预约（不可早于4月1日）。
In this school year, about 35 university classes will come to Omaha for sessions with me. I take almost all – in aggregate, perhaps 2,000 students – to lunch at Gorat’s. And they love it. To learn why, come join us on Sunday.
在本学年中，约有35个大学班级将来到奥马哈与我会面交流。我几乎每次都带这些学生——总计约2,000人——去Gorat’s共进午餐，他们都非常喜欢这个地方。想了解为什么？那就星期天来加入我们吧。
We will again have a special reception from 4:00 to 5:30 on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside of North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far. Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 400 of you from many dozens of countries. Any shareholder who comes from other than the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.
我们还将再次为来自北美以外地区的股东举办一场特别招待会，时间为星期六下午4:00至5:30。每年都有来自世界各地的许多股东参加我们的股东大会，Charlie和我都希望亲自欢迎远道而来的朋友们。去年我们有幸见到了来自几十个国家、超过400位海外股东。凡来自美国或加拿大以外国家的股东都将获得一张特别入场凭证及参加该活动的指引说明。
# Charlie and I are extraordinarily lucky. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a “business” gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to other people who contribute as much or more to our society’s well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped every day in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. No wonder we tap-dance to work. But nothing is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting. So join us on May 6th at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We’ll see you there.
Charlie和我非常幸运。我们出生在美国；拥有卓越的父母，他们确保我们接受了良好的教育；我们拥有幸福的家庭和健康的身体；而且我们似乎天生具备“商业基因”，使我们能以远超其他同样甚至更努力贡献社会的人的速度积累财富。此外，我们长期从事着热爱的工作，在每一天都得到无数才华横溢、乐观积极的同事帮助。难怪我们每天都跳着踢踏舞去上班。但对我们来说最令人兴奋的事，还是能在伯克希尔年度股东大会上与我们的股东伙伴们欢聚一堂。因此，请于5月6日在Qwest中心加入我们这场一年一度的“资本主义伍德斯托克音乐节”。我们到时候见！
February 28, 2006
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
2006年2月28日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席